G.R. No.

123979 December 3, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALIPIO SANTIANO, JOSE SANDIGAN, ARMENIA PILLUETA and JOSE VICENTE (JOVY) CHANCO, accused-appellants.

VITUG, J.:

Accuse-appellants Alipio Santiano, Jose Sandigan, Armenia Pillueta and Jose Vicente (Jovy) Chance were indicted for the kidnapping with
murder of Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., a detention prisoner at the Naga City Jail, in an amended Information, docketed Criminal Case No. P-2319,
filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Pili, Branch 32, Camarines Sur.

When arraigned, the four accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial thereupon ensued.

The evidence submitted by the prosecution, disclosing its version of the case, is narrated by the Solicitor General in the People's brief.

On May 13, 1993, the kidnap victim, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and his live-in partner, Loida Navidad were arrested by
appellants Jose Sandigan and Armenia Pillueta and several other NARCOM agents for alleged illegal possession of
marijuana (p. 32, TSN, April 20, 1994).

After the arrest, they were brought to the NARCOM Office situated at the compound of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Headquarters, Naga City (p. 32, ibid.). Thereat, they were at first warned by appellant Pillueta not to contact a
lawyer (p. 35, ibid.). Appellant Pillueta likewise reminded them that "it is only a matter of P10,000.00" (p. 35, ibid.).

When Navidad's brother nonetheless arrived accompanied by a lawyer, appellant Pillueta got angry (p. 38, ibid.). At once,
the victim and Navidad were dragged to the Naga City Jail situated at a distance of six (6) to seven (7) meters from the
NARCOM Office (pp. 10, 38-39, ibid.). Since their arrest, they were detained at the Naga City Jail (ibid.).

Sometime in July 1993, appellant Alipio Santiano was detained at the Naga City Jail (pp. 4-5, ibid.). He was detained in the
same cell occupied by the victim (p. 6, ibid.). When appellant Santiano was mauled by the inmates of Cell 3, the victim
was one of those who participated in mauling him (p. 16, ibid.).

After the release of Santiano, he returned to the City Jail in November 1993 accompanied by one Lt. Dimaano (pp. 7-
8, ibid.). Thereat, the victim was pointed to by appellant Santiano as the one who mastermind his mauling (ibid.).

On December 27, 1993, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, the victim asked permission from a jail trustee to allow him to
buy viand outside the jail (pp. 7-9, ibid.). When he left, the victim was wearing a fatigue jacket and short pants (p. 9, ibid.).

As the victim emerged from the PNP store, he was accosted by appellants Sandigan and Santiano (p. 7, TSN, April 25,
1994). The two (2) appellants held the victim between them and thereafter hurriedly, proceeded towards the NARCOM
Office situated at a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters away (pp. 7, 38-41, ibid.). Upon reaching the door of the
NARCOM office, the victim was pushed inside (pp. 7-8, ibid.). Once the victim was already inside the NARCOM Office,
appellant Sandigan proceeded to and took his place at Plaza Barlin facing the PNP Police Station (pp. 8-12, ibid.). The
victim was made to sit and thereafter mauled by appellant Santiano (pp. 8-11, ibid.). Santiano got hold of a handkerchief,
rolled it around his fists and continued to punch the victim for almost fifteen (15) minutes (p. 16, ibid.). As the victim was
being mauled, appellant Pillueta stood by the door of the NARCOM office, her both hands inside her pockets while
looking to her right and left, acting as a lookout (ibid.).

At this time, appellant Chanco who owned and drove his trimobile, parked it in front of the door of the NARCOM Office
(pp. 15, 17, TSN, April 25, 1994). Thereafter, he proceeded inside the NARCOM Office (pp. 15, 17, ibid.).

After a few minutes, appellant Chanco went out of the NARCOM Office and started the trimobile (p. 21,ibid.). His co-
appellant Santiano and Pillueta followed him. Inside the trimobile, appellant Pillueta occupied the back seat (p. 21, ibid.).
Santiano occupied the reserved seat in front of the passenger seat which was occupied by the victim (ibid.).

As appellant Chanco was about to start his trimobile, appellant Sandigan, who was at Plaza Barlin, transferred to and
stationed himself at the Century Fox in front of the GSIS building situated at the corner of General Luna and Arana Streets
(p. 23, ibid.).

The trimobile proceeded towards the direction of San Francisco Church (p. 40, TSN, April 23, 1994). When it passed the
Panganiban Drive, Naga City, on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, the victim was still aboard
the trimobile seated at the passenger seat nearest the driver (p. 4, TSN, May 24, 1994).
 When prosecution witness Rañola heard over the radio that a person was found dead at the canal in Palestina, Pili,
Camarines Sur, he lost no time in informing a policeman Prila of the Pili Police Department that the descriptions of the
dead person he heard over the radio fit not only the person he saw being hauled to and thereafter mauled at the NARCOM
Office but likewise the same person who was on board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco (p. 13, TSN, May 6,
1994).

Robert Dy Kow identified the man found dead in Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, as his brother Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. 1

The defense presented its own account of the facts hereunder expounded by it; viz:

Accused-appellant Armenia Pillueta is an organic member of the NARCOM, Naga City, Command. Accused-Appellant
Jose Sandigan is a regular member of the PNP but, he was a former organic member of the NARCOM. On the other hand,
Accused Alipio Santiano and Jose Vicente "Jovi" Chanco are amongst the active Civilian Volunteer/Assists of the
NARCOM.

That at or about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of December 27, 1993, accused-appellant Sandigan was in front of the Advent theater;
that while thereat, he saw accused-appellant Santiano and he invited the latter for a snack at the Mang Donald's, a burger
house, situated just beside the Advent theater; that after taking their snacks, they decided to go to the NARCOM office;
that while on their way to the NARCOM office, they saw accused-appellant Chanco emerging from the Nehrus Department
Store where the latter bought something; that this Nehrus Department Store is located in front of the Naga City Police Head
Quarters which is also near the NARCOM office, that the three of them (Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco) proceeded to the
NARCOM office; that when they arrived, accused-appellant Pillueta, SPO3 Lorna "Onang" Fernandez, Tet Deniega and
the NARCOM, District Commander P/Insp. Del Socorro were at the NARCOM office while accused-appellant. Chanco's
trimobile was parked in front of the NARCOM office; that while in the NARCOM office, accused-appellant Santiano and
Chanco were joking with each other, like kids, such that accused-appellants Santiano would sling accused-appellant
Chanco with his handkerchief; that, as it was intermittently raining, accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and Chanco left
the NARCOM office past 6:00 P.M. aboard the trimobile of accused-appellant Chanco, while accused-appellant Pillueta
together with SPO3 Lorna Fernandez and Tet Deniega left the NARCOM office at or about 8:00 P.M. and proceeded to the
Sampaguita Music Lounge to watch a lady band performing at the Sampaguita Music Lounge, leaving behind P/Insp.
Nelson Del Socorro at the NARCOM office.

That upon leaving the NARCOM office and while on board the trimobile accused-appellants Sandigan, Santiano and
Chanco were deciding whether to see a movie or have a round of drink and, after failing to decide whether to see a movie
or a round of drink, accused-appellants Sandigan and Chanco conducted accused-appellant Santiano to the jeepney
terminal for Milaor, Camarines Sur and thereupon, accused-appellant Chanco also conducted accused-appellant Sandigan
to the Philtranco terminal where the latter boarded a bus to Bato, Camarines Sur where he resides.

That between 6:30 and 7:00 o'clock P.M. of the same date, accused-appellant Santiano was in Milaor, Camarines Sur, a
Municipality less than four kilometers away from Naga City, and fetched Ms. Arcadia Paz, a traditional mid-wife
(komadrana), from the latter's residence to conduct/perform a pre-natal therapy (hilot) upon his (Santiano) pregnant wife;
that Ms. Paz and accused-appellant Santiano proceeded to and arrived at the latter's house in Naga City about past 7:00
o'clock in the evening where Ms. Paz conducted a pre-natal therapy upon appellant Santiano's wife; that Ms. Paz finished
the pre-natal therapy at or about 9:00 o'clock P.M.; that she (Paz) left the house of accused-appellant Santiano and was
accompanied for home by latter at or about 10:00 o'clock of the same evening; that from past 7:00 o'clock when Paz and
Santiano arrived at the latter's house until past 10:00 o'clock when they left Santiano's house, accused-appellant Santiano
was all the time present at and never left his house;

That on the other hand, SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, upon leaving the NARCOM office, went
directly to the Sampaguita Music Lounge and watched the lady band perform thereat; that Roy Cabral, a common
acquaintance of SPO3 Fernandez, Deniega and accused-appellant Pillueta, even saw and approached them (SPO3
Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) at their table inside the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that the three of them (SPO3
Fernandez, Deniega and Pillueta) left the Sampaguita Music Lounge at or about 2:00 A.M. of December 28, 1993, and
thereupon, they went to their respective homes.

That on December 27, 1993, at any time of the day, the late Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. was neither seen by the accused-
appellants nor was he in the NARCOM office more specifically and particularly between 6:00 to 7:00 P.M. of the same
date; that the late Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. was known to SPO3 Fernandez and his (Dy Kow, Jr.) height and body built is
almost the same or similarly the same as that of accused-appellant Chanco; that she (SPO3 Fernandez) also known William
Rañola whom she usually see drunk/under the influence of liquor;

That in the first week of January, 1994, during the investigation of the case conducted by the PNP Pili, Camarines Sur,
SPO3 Fernandez was asked by major Ernesto Idian, chief of PNP Pili, Camarines Sur, of accused-appellant Pillueta's
whereabouts in the night of December 27, 1993, where she (SPO3 Fernandez) told Major Idian that accused-appellant
Pillueta was with her (SPO3 Fernandez) at the Sampaguita Music Lounge; that Major Idian did not ask her (SPO3
 Fernandez) to execute an affidavit of what she told him instead, Major Idian requested her not to tell accused-appellant
Pillueta about what he asked her.

That on January 20, 1994, accuse-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco, reported and submitted themselves to their
superior officer, Col. Norberto Manaog, Deputy Director of the NARCOM at Camp Crame, Quezon City, wherein they
reported that they were suspected of having killed Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. and requested that they be placed under his
custody; that Col. Manaog referred them to the legal officer of the NARCOM, Major Acpal; that after being informed by
accused-appellants Pillueta, Santiano and Chanco that they did not have any idea of whether a warrant of arrest was already
issued against them, Col. Manaog, in consultation with Major Acpal, told them that there is no yet basis for them to be
placed under custody, so that, Col. Manaog instructed them just get in touch with him so that if a warrant of arrest comes
out, the same could be served upon them; that Col. Manaog directed Major Acpal to proceed to Pili, Camarines Sur to
determine the status of the investigation and to know whether a warrant of arrest was already issued; that on January 24,
1994, Major Acpal went to Pili, Camarines Sur and found out that a warrant of arrest against accused-appellants, Sandigan,
who was already arrested, Pillueta and Santiano has been issued on January 21, 1994; that on January 25, 1994, Major
Acpal, being a lawyer and the Legal officer of the NARCOM filed before the Municipal Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, a
motion to quash the warrant of arrest; that on January 23, 1994 accused-appellant Pillueta informed Col. Manaog that she
was hospitalized due to a car accident and that she may be placed under his custody should a warrant for her arrest be
issued; on January 26, 1994, she was placed under the custody of her superior, Col. Manaog of the NARCOM. On the
other hand, accused-appellants, Santiano and Chanco were, from time to time, contacting Col. Manaog to determine
whether a warrant of arrest was already issued but, since Col. Manaog was always out of his office, they were able to
contact, via telephone facility, Col. Manaog only on April 16, 1994; and accused-appellants Chanco and Santiano went to
the office of NARCOM, Camp Crame, Quezon City, voluntarily surrendered, and Maj. Acpal placed them under the
custody of the NARCOM and were detained at PNP NARCOM Cell, Camp Crame, Quezon City. The records of this case
show that no warrant of arrest was issued against accused-appellant Chanco (Order dated Sept. 5, 1994), however, he
voluntarily surrendered and submitted to the custody of the NARCOM and to the trial court. 2

Appellant Jovy Chanco had this further statement in his supplemental appeal brief; thus:

On December 28, 1993, a cadaver of an unknown person was discovered somewhere in the vicinity of Barangay Palestina,
Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines, by Danilo Camba, the Barangay Captain of said locality. The corpse was later
on identified by Robert Dy Kow as that one of his brother, Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. 3

Dr. Thomas S. Gonzales performed an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. His findings revealed that Dy Kow, Jr., had fatally sustained the
following injuries:

Eye: Contusion, upper lid extending to the outer canthus, right;

Ear: lacerated wound ripping off the lowest pole of the lobule, right; serrated
border

Sub-occipital region: lacerated wound, 0.9 cms. in length, centrally located;

Neck: punctured wound, 3-4 mm deep, semi-circular with serrated border,

base of neck at the sternomastoid border, right;

Chest: Gunshot wound

point of entrance: 2nd ICS, sternal border, right, 12 mm in diameter

Bullet route: from the point of entrance extending backwards to the left,
piercing the heart and left lung and lodging on the anterior aspect or surface of
the sub scapular area, left

Point of exist: None

Bullet slug: Recovered

CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE

SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND.4

Evaluating the evidence before it, the trial court found all four accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping, defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code; the court adjudged:

UPON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, this Court FINDS FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
finds all of the accused, Jose Sandigan, Armenia, aka Armie Pillueta, Alipio Santiano, and Jose Vicente Chanco, aka Jovy,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING as defined and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby sentences each and all of them to suffer
imprisonment, RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessories of the penalty, and to indemnify the heirs of Ramon John
Dy Kow, Jr. the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos, and to pay the costs; they are credited in full for the preventive
imprisonment.5

Accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

Assailing the decision of the court a quo, appellants would insist that the amended information under which they were arraigned, tried and
convicted, although so captioned as an indictment for the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, was, in reality a mere indictment for murder.
According to appellants, the use of the words "abducted" and "kidnapping" in the amended information was not in itself indicative of the crime of
kidnapping being charged but that, from the averments of the information, it could be apparent that Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr., was "abducted or
kidnapped" not for the purpose of detaining but of liquidating him. Hence, the defense theorized, the conviction for kidnapping had no legal
ground to stand on.

Let it not be said that the contention lacks remarkableness nevertheless, it is a legal proposition that can here hardly be accepted. The amended
information reads:

The undersigned 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur accuses JOSE SANDIGAN, ALIPIO SANTIANO,
ARMIE PILLUETA and JOVY CHANCO of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH MURDER, defined and penalized under
Article 267 and Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening
at Barangay Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another with intent to kill, with treachery, superior strength and evident
premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abduct, kidnap, and bring
into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, one RAMON JOHN DY KOW, JR. and
while thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times
hitting him on the different parts of his body causing his instantaneous death.

That as a consequence of the death of the victim Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. his heirs suffered
damages. 6

The information is not so wanting as to render it legally inadequate for the purpose it has been intended by the prosecution. It should be sufficient
for an information to distinctly state the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions complained of as being constitutive of that
offense.7 A reading of the amended information readily reveals that the charge is for "kidnapping with murder, defined and penalized
under Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention) and Article 248 (Murder) of the Revised Penal Code" Evidently, appellants
have been properly apprised of the charges, the information did go on to state thus —

That on or about the 27th day of December 1993 between 6:00 o'clock to 7:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay
Palestina, Municipality of Pili, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with intent to kill,
with treachery, superior strength and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously abduct kidnap and bring into a secluded place at Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur one RAMON JOHN DY
KOW, JR. and while thereat attack and shoot with firearm the said Ramon John Dy Kow, Jr. for several times
hitting him on the different parts of his body causing his instantaneous death. 8

The accused have gone through trial without any objection thereover. Exceptions relative to the statement or recital of fact
constituting the offense charged ought be presented before the trial court; if none is taken and the defective or even omitted
averments are supplied by competent proof, it would not be error for an appellate court to reject those exceptions on appeal.9

The issue is next posed: When a complex crime has been charged in an information and the evidence fails to support the charge on one of
the component offenses, can the defendant still be separately convicted of the other offense? The question has long been answered in the
affirmative. In United States vs. Lahoylahoy and Madanlog, 10 the Court has ruled to be legally feasible the conviction of an accused on
one of the offenses included in a complex crime charged, when properly established, despite the failure of evidence to hold the accused
guilty of the other charge.

11
Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Section 8 of Republic Act 7659, reads:
 Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another; or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death;

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.

The elements of the offense, here adequately shown, are (a) that the offender is a private individual; (b) that he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (d) that, in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present, i.e., (i) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5
days, or (ii) that it is committed simulating public authority, or (iii) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made, or (iv) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public
officer. 12

Prosecution witness William Rañola testified that he had seen the victim being accosted, held and thereafter dragged to the NARCOM
office by appellants Santiago and Sandigan. Inside the NARCOM office the victim was mauled by Santiano. For several minutes,
Santiano continued to batter him with punches while Pillueta stood by the door and so acted as the "lockout." The appellants then took
the victim away on a trimobile owned and driven by Chanco. Rañola positively identified the fatigue jacket worn by the victim on the
evening of his abduction on 27 December 1993 and when his lifeless body was found in the morning of 28 December 1993. Don Gumba
corroborated Rañola's testimony. Gumba was positive that he had seen the victim at around eight o'clock in the evening of 27 December
1993 with appellants Santiano and Pillueta on board the trimobile driven by appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of
Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur, where, the following morning the victim was found dead evidently after succumbing to several gunshot
wounds.

Appellants have not shown any nefarious motive on the part of the witnesses that might have influenced them to declare falsely against
appellants; the Court sees no justification to thereby deny faith and credit to their testimony. 13 The Court likewise shares the view of the
Solicitor General in pointing out that —

1. There is no question that the victim, who was on the date in question detained at the Naga City Jail, asked permission from the jail
trustee in order to buy viand outside. It was while he was emerging from the PNP store that he was accosted by appellants Santiano and
Sandigan.

2. From the moment that the victim was accosted in Naga City, he was at first dragged to the NARCOM Office where he was mauled.
This circumstance indicated the intention to deprive him of his liberty for sometime, an essential element of the crime of kidnapping.

3. The victim did not only sustain serious physical injuries but likewise died as indicated in the autopsy report, thus, belying appellants'
claim that none of the circumstances in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was present.

4. Witness Don Gumba was positive when he declared that he saw the victim at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of December 27, 1993
with appellant Chanco on its way towards the direction of Palestina, Pili, Camarines Sur where the victim was found dead. 14

The fact alone that appellant Pillueta is "an organic member of the NARCOM" and appellant Sandigan a regular member of the PNP
would not exempt them from the criminal liability for kidnapping. 15 It is quite clear that in abducting and taking away the victim,
appellants did so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to
their office, but in purely private capacity that they have acted in concert with their co-appellants Santiano and Chanco.

The crime of kidnapping cannot be here absorbed by the charge of murder since the detention of the victim is not shown to have been for
the purpose of liquidating him. Appellants themselves, in fact, all deny having killed the victim. And while the evidence may have thus
been found to be wanting by the trial court so as to equally hold appellants responsible for the death of the victim, the Court is conviced
that the court a quo did not err in making them account for kidnapping. The circumstances heretofore recited indicate the attendance of
conspiracy among the appellants thereby making them each liable for the offense.
The claim of appellants that they cannot be held liable for indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 because the prosecution did not present
evidence to prove damages is without merit. The indemnity awarded by the trial court clearly refers to the civil indemnity for the
offense 16 and not for actual damages sustained.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-33466-67 April 20, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAMERTO NARVAEZ, defendant-appellant.

MAKASIAR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch I, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1815 and 1816 for murder
which, after a joint trial, resulted in the conviction of the accused in a decision rendered on September 8, 1970, with the following
pronouncement:

Thus, we have a crime of MURDER qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The proper penalty imposable, therefore, is RECLUSION
PERPETUA (Arts. 248 and 64, Revised Penal Code).

Accordingly, finding Mamerto Narvaez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,

(a) In Criminal Case No. 1815, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Davis Q. Fleischer in the sum of P 12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P 10,000.00 as moral damages, P
2,000.00 as attorney's fees, the offended party having been represented by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs;

(b) In Criminal Case No. 1816, he is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Flaviano Rubia in the sum of P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P2,000.00 as
attorney's fees, the offended party having been represent by a private prosecutor, and to pay the costs (p. 48, rec.).

The facts are summarized in the People's brief, as follows:

At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez together with the two
deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis
Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. This is located in
the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto
Narvaez (pp. 179-182, t.s.n., Pieza II). At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls of his
house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on, appellant would be
prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible
you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is
appellant's compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently
lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep,
and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him (pp. 127-133, t.s.n., Defense
transcript). Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting' (pp. 9-14, t.s.n., Pieza I, pp. 8-9, Appellant's Brief,
p.161, rec.).

It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and Co., Inc. of which deceased
Fleischer was the secretary-treasurer and deceased Rubia the assistant manager, on the one hand, and the land settlers of Cotabato, among whom
was appellant.

From the available records of the related cases which had been brought to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 28858-R and 50583-R) and to this
Court on certiorari (G.R. No. L-26757 and L-45504), WE take judicial notice of the following antecedent facts:

Appellant was among those persons from northern and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of
Kiamba and now a separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area, and was
among those who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong
Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros Oriental, filed sales application
No. 21983 on June 3, 1937 over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation Company, covering 1,017.2234
hectares.

Meanwhile, the subdivision was ordered and a public land surveyor did the actual survey in 1941 but the survey report was not submitted until
1946 because of the outbreak of the second world war. According to the survey, only 300 hectares Identified as Lots Nos. 22, 26 and 38, Ps. 176
Kiamba, were set aside for Sales Application No. 21983, while the rest were subdivided into sublots of 5 to 6 hectares each to be distributed
among the settlers (pp. 32-33, G.R. No. L-45504).

The 300 hectares set aside for the sales application of Fleischer and Company was declared open for disposition, appraised and advertised for
public auction. At the public auction held in Manila on August 14, 1948, Fleischer and Company was the only bidder for P6,000.00. But because
of protests from the settlers the corresponding award in its favor was held in abeyance, while an investigator was sent by the Director of Lands to
Kiamba in the person of Atty. Jose T. Gozon Atty. Gozon came back after ten days with an amicable settlement signed by the representative of
the settlers. This amicable settlement was later repudiated by the settlers, but the Director of Lands, acting upon the report of Atty. Gozon,
approved the same and ordered the formal award of the land in question to Fleischer and Company. The settlers appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, who, however, affirmed the decision in favor of the company.

On May 29, 1950, the settlers filed Civil Case No. 240 in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato which then consisted only of one sala, for the
purpose of annulling the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which affirmed the order of the Director of Lands awarding
the contested land to the company. The settlers as plaintiffs, lost that case in view of the amicable settlement which they had repudiated as
resulting from threats and intimidation, deceit, misrepresentation and fraudulent machination on the part of the company. They appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 28858-R) which likewise affirmed on August 16, 1965 the decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of the
company.

This resulted in the ouster of the settlers by an order of the Court of First Instance dated September 24, 1966, from the land which they had been
occupying for about 30 years. Among those ejected was the appellant who, to avoid trouble, voluntarily dismantled his house, built in 1947 at a
cost of around P20,000.00, and transferred to his other house which he built in 1962 or 1963 near the highway. The second house is not far from
the site of the dismantled house. Its ground floor has a store operated by Mrs. June Talens who was renting a portion thereof. He also transferred
his store from his former residence to the house near the highway. Aside from the store, he also had a rice mill located about 15 meters east of the
house and a concrete pavement between the rice mill and the house, which is used for drying grains and copra.

On November 14, 1966, appellant was among the settlers on whose behalf Jose V. Gamboa and other leaders filed Civil Case No. 755 in the
Court of First Instance of Cotabato, Branch I. to obtain an injunction or annulment of the order of award with prayer for preliminary injunction.
During the pendency of this case, appellant on February 21, 1967 entered into a contract of lease with the company whereby he agreed to lease an
area of approximately 100 to 140 square meters of Lot No. 38 from the company (Exh. 9, p. 1, Folder of Exhibits for Defense) for a consideration
of P16.00 monthly. According to him, he signed the contract although the ownership of the land was still uncertain, in order to avoid trouble,
until the question of ownership could be decided. He never paid the agreed rental, although he alleges that the milling job they did for Rubia was
considered payment. On June 25, 1968, deceased Fleischer wrote him a letter with the following tenor:

You have not paid six months rental to Fleischers & Co., Inc. for that portion of land in which your house and ricemill are
located as per agreement executed on February 21, 1967. You have not paid as as even after repeated attempts of collection
made by Mr. Flaviano Rubia and myself.

In view of the obvious fact that you do not comply with the agreement, I have no alternative but to terminate our agreement
on this date.

I am giving you six months to remove your house, ricemill, bodega, and water pitcher pumps from the land of Fleischers &
Co., Inc. This six- month period shall expire on December 31, 1966.

In the event the above constructions have not been removed within the six- month period, the company shall cause their
immediate demolition (Exhibit 10, p. 2, supra).

On August 21, 1968, both deceased, together with their laborers, commenced fencing Lot 38 by putting bamboo posts along the property line
parallel to the highway. Some posts were planted right on the concrete drier of appellant, thereby cutting diagonally across its center (pp. 227-
228, t.s.n., Vol. 2), with the last post just adjacent to appellant's house (p. 231, t.s.n., supra). The fence, when finished, would have the effect of
shutting off the accessibility to appellant's house and rice mill from the highway, since the door of the same opens to the Fleischers' side. The
fencing continued on that fateful day of August 22, 1968, with the installation of four strands of barbed wire to the posts.

At about 2:30 p.m. on the said day, appellant who was taking a nap after working on his farm all morning, was awakened by some noise as if the
wall of his house was being chiselled. Getting up and looking out of the window, he found that one of the laborers of Fleischer was indeed
chiselling the wall of his house with a crowbar (p. 129, t.s.n., Vol. 6), while deceased Rubia was nailing the barbed wire and deceased Fleischer
was commanding his laborers. The jeep used by the deceased was parked on the highway. The rest of the incident is narrated in the People's Brief
as above-quoted. Appellant surrendered to the police thereafter, bringing with him shotgun No. 1119576 and claiming he shot two persons (Exh.
Pp. 31, Defense Exhibits).
Appellant now questions the propriety of his conviction, assigning the following errors:

First Assignment of Error: That the lower court erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact that he acted in
defense of his person; and

Second Assignment of Error: That the court a quo also erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted in defense
of his rights (p. 20 of Appellant's Brief, p. 145, rec.).

The act of killing of the two deceased by appellant is not disputed. Appellant admitted having shot them from the window of his house with the
shotgun which he surrendered to the police authorities. He claims, however, that he did so in defense of his person and of his rights, and therefore
he should be exempt from criminal liability.

Defense of one's person or rights is treated as a justifying circumstance under Art. 11, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, but in order for it to be
appreciated, the following requisites must occur:

First. Unlawful aggression;

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself (Art. 11, par. 1, Revised Penal Code, as
amended).

The aggression referred to by appellant is the angry utterance by deceased Fleischer of the following words: "Hindi, sigue, gademit, avante", in
answer to his request addressed to his compadre, the deceased Rubia, when he said, "Pare, hinto mona ninyo at pag-usapan natin kung ano ang
mabuti" (pp. 227-229, t.s.n., Vol. 6). This was in reaction to his having been awakened to see the wall of his house being chiselled. The verbal
exchange took place while the two deceased were on the ground doing the fencing and the appellant was up in his house looking out of his
window (pp. 225-227, supra). According to appellant, Fleischer's remarks caused this reaction in him: "As if, I lost my senses and unknowingly I
took the gun on the bed and unknowingly also I shot Mr. Fleischer, without realizing it, I shot Mr. Fleischer" (p. 132, supra). As for the shooting
of Rubia, appellant testified:

When I shot Davis Fleischer, Flaviano Rubia was nailing and upon hearing the shot, Mr. Rubia looked at Mr. Fleischer and
when Mr. Fleischer fell down, Mr. Rubia ran towards the jeep and knowing that there was a firearm in the jeep and
thinking that if he will take that firearm he will kill me, I shot at him (p. 132, supra, Emphasis supplied).

The foregoing statements of appellant were never controverted by the prosecution. They claim, however, that the deceased were in lawful
exercise of their rights of ownership over the land in question, when they did the fencing that sealed off appellant's access to the highway.

A review of the circumstances prior to the shooting as borne by the evidence reveals that five persons, consisting of the deceased and their three
laborers, were doing the fencing and chiselling of the walls of appellant's house. The fence they were putting up was made of bamboo posts to
which were being nailed strands of barbed wire in several layers. Obviously, they were using tools which could be lethal weapons, such as nail
and hammer, bolo or bamboo cutter, pliers, crowbar, and other necessary gadgets. Besides, it was not disputed that the jeep which they used in
going to the place was parked just a few steps away, and in it there was a gun leaning near the steering wheel. When the appellant woke up to the
sound of the chiselling on his walls, his first reaction was to look out of the window. Then he saw the damage being done to his house,
compounded by the fact that his house and rice mill will be shut off from the highway by the fence once it is finished. He therefore appealed to
his compadre, the deceased Rubia, to stop what they were doing and to talk things over with him. But deceased Fleischer answered angrily with
'gademit' and directed his men to proceed with what they were doing.

The actuation of deceased Fleischer in angrily ordering the continuance of the fencing would have resulted in the further chiselling of the walls of
appellant's house as well as the closure of the access to and from his house and rice mill-which were not only imminent but were actually in
progress. There is no question, therefore, that there was aggression on the part of the victims: Fleischer was ordering, and Rubia was actually
participating in the fencing. This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights.

The question is, was the aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant's
house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway?

Article 30 of the Civil Code recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.

However, at the time of the incident on August 22, 1968, Civil Case no. 755 for annulment of the order of award to Fleischer and Company was
still pending in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The parties could not have known that the case would be dismissed over a year after the
incident on August 22, 1968, as it was dismissed on January 23, 1970 on ground of res judicata, in view of the dismissal in 1965 (by the Court of
Appeals) of Civil Case No. 240 filed in 1950 for the annulment of the award to the company, between the same parties, which the company won
by virtue of the compromise agreement in spite of the subsequent repudiation by the settlers of said compromise agreement; and that such 1970
dismissal also carried the dismissal of the supplemental petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on November 28, 1968 to annul the sales
patent and to cancel the corresponding certificate of title issued to the company, on the ground that the Director of Lands had no authority to
conduct the sale due to his failure to comply with the mandatory requirements for publication. The dismissal of the government's supplemental
petition was premised on the ground that after its filing on November 28, 1968, nothing more was done by the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines except to adopt all the evidence and arguments of plaintiffs with whom it joined as parties-plaintiffs.

Hence, it is reasonable to believe that appellant was indeed hoping for a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 755 filed on November 14, 1966
and his execution of the contract of lease on February 21, 1967 was just to avoid trouble. This was explained by him during cross-examination on
January 21, 1970, thus:

It happened this way: we talked it over with my Mrs. that we better rent the place because even though we do not know
who really owns this portion to avoid trouble. To avoid trouble we better pay while waiting for the case because at that
time, it was not known who is the right owner of the place. So we decided until things will clear up and determine who is
really the owner, we decided to pay rentals (p. 169, t.s.n., Vol.6).

In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 (Exh.10, p. 2, Defense Exhibits) within which to vacate the land. He should have
allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his house and closing appellant's
entrance and exit to the highway.

The following provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines are in point:

Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects
thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of
the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.

Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be
protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court (Articles 536 and
539, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility
to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. The assault on appellant's property, therefore, amounts to
unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.

Illegal aggression is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of immediate and imminent kind (People vs.
Encomiendas, 46 SCRA 522).

In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant's property which he had the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal
thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property (Emphasis supplied).

The reasonableness of the resistance is also a requirement of the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of one's rights under paragraph
1 of Article 11, Revised Penal Code. When the appellant fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was
disproportionate to the attack.

WE find, however, that the third element of defense of property is present, i.e., lack of sufficient provocation on the part of appellant who was
defending his property. As a matter of fact, there was no provocation at all on his part, since he was asleep at first and was only awakened by the
noise produced by the victims and their laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men to stop and talk things over with him was no
provocation at all.

Be that as it may, appellant's act in killing the deceased was not justifiable, since not all the elements for justification are present. He should
therefore be held responsible for the death of his victims, but he could be credited with the special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense,
pursuant to paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

The crime committed is homicide on two counts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because of the
presence of provocation on the part of the deceased. As WE held earlier in People vs. Manlapaz (55 SCRA 598), the element of a sudden
unprovoked attack is therefore lacking.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, "it must clearly appear that the method of assault adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen
with a special view to the accomplishment of the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made. This
cannot be said of a situation where the slayer acted instantaneously ..." (People vs. Cañete, 44 Phil. 481).

WE likewise find the aggravating (qualifying) circumstance of evident premeditation not sufficiently established. The only evidence presented to
prove this circumstance was the testimony of Crisanto Ibañez, 37 years old, married, resident of Maitum, South Cotabato, and a laborer of
Fleischer and Company, which may be summarized as follows:

On August 20, 1968 (two days before the incident) at about 7:00 A.M., he was drying corn near the house of Mr. and Mrs.
Mamerto Narvaez at the crossing, Maitum, South Cotabato, when the accused and his wife talked to him. Mrs. Narvaez
asked him to help them, as he was working in the hacienda. She further told him that if they fenced their house, there is a
head that will be broken. Mamerto Narvaez added 'Noy, it is better that you will tell Mr. Fleischer because there will be
nobody who will break his head but I will be the one.' He relayed this to Mr. Flaviano Rubia, but the latter told him not to
believe as they were only Idle threats designed to get him out of the hacienda (pp. 297-303, t.s.n., Vol. 2).

This single evidence is not sufficient to warrant appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. As WE have consistently
held, there must be "direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victim, .... it is not enough that premeditation be suspected or
surmised, but the criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit the crime" (People vs.
Ordioles, 42 SCRA 238). Besides, there must be a "showing" that the accused premeditated the killing; that the culprit clung to their (his)
premeditated act; and that there was sufficient interval between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow them (him) to reflect
upon the consequences of the act" (People vs. Gida, 102 SCRA 70).

Moreover, the obvious bias of witness Crisanto Ibañez, as a laborer of the deceased Davis Fleischer, neutralizes his credibility.

Since in the case at bar, there was no direct evidence of the planning or preparation to kill the victims nor that the accused premeditated the
killing, and clung to his premeditated act, the trial court's conclusion as to the presence of such circumstance may not be endorsed.

Evident premeditation is further negated by appellant pleading with the victims to stop the fencing and destroying his house and to talk things
over just before the shooting.

But the trial court has properly appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant
surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting.

Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and
its accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being unlawfully violated; his business was
also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway. These circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was
dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer to his only remaining house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason
causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the antecedent facts of this case, where appellant
had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his
castle crumbling at the hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he should be
credited with this mitigating circumstance.

Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of homicide only, the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance,
but extenuated by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and
passion and obfuscation.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article 69, supra, the penalty lower
by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same. Considering that the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two degrees, i.e.,
to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the
presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance.

The civil liability of the appellant should be modified. In the case of Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways (43 SCRA 397), the award for
moral damages was reduced because the plaintiff contributed to the gravity of defendant's reaction. In the case at bar, the victims not only
contributed but they actually provoked the attack by damaging appellant's properties and business. Considering appellant's standing in the
community, being married to a municipal councilor, the victims' actuations were apparently designed to humiliate him and destroy his reputation.
The records disclose that his wife, councilor Feliza Narvaez, was also charged in these two cases and detained without bail despite the absence of
evidence linking her to the killings. She was dropped as a defendant only upon motion of the prosecution dated October 31, 1968. (p. 14, CFI rec.
of Crim. Case No. 1816), but acted upon on November 4, 1968 (p. 58, CFI rec. of Criminal Case No. 1815).

Moreover, these cases arose out of an inordinate desire on the part of Fleischer and Company, despite its extensive landholdings in a Central
Visayan province, to extend its accumulation of public lands to the resettlement areas of Cotabato. Since it had the capability-financial and
otherwise-to carry out its land accumulation scheme, the lowly settlers, who uprooted their families from their native soil in Luzon to take
advantage of the government's resettlement program, but had no sufficient means to fight the big landowners, were the ones prejudiced. Thus, the
moral and material suffering of appellant and his family deserves leniency as to his civil liability.

Furthermore, Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code requires a person convicted of prision correccional or arrests mayor and fine who has no
property with which to meet his civil liabilities to serve a subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one (1) day for each P 2.50. However, the
amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465 on April 21, 1969 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and not to reparation
of the damage caused, indemnification of consequential damages and costs of proceedings. Considering that Republic Act 5465 is favorable to
the accused who is not a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF ONLY TWO (2) HOMICIDES, MITIGATED BY
THE PRIVILEGED EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE AS WELL AS BY TWO (2) GENERIC
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER AND OBFUSCATION, WITHOUT ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, APPELLANT IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF FOUR (4) MONTHS OF ARRESTO
MAYOR, TO INDEMNIFY EACH GROUP OF HEIRS OF DAVIS FLEISCHER AND OF FLAVIANO RUBIA IN THE SUM OF FOUR
THOUSAND (P 4,000.00) PESOS, WITHOUT SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT AND WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR MORAL DAMAGES
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.

CONSIDERING THAT APPELLANT HAS BEEN UNDER DETENTION FOR ALMOST FOURTEEN (14) YEARS NOW SINCE HIS
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON AUGUST 22,1968, HIS IMMEDIATE RELEASE IS HEREBY ORDERED. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181354 February 27, 2013

SIMON A. FLORES, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the August 2 7, 2004 Decision 1 of
the Sandiganbayan, First Division (Sandiganbayan), in Criminal Case No. 16946, finding petitioner Simon A. Flores (Flores) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, and its November 29, 2007 Resolution 2 denying his motion for reconsideration.

Flores was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information, dated July 9, 1991, filed before the Sandiganbayan which reads:

That on or about the 15th day of August, 1989, at nighttime, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay Chairman of San Roque, Alaminos,
Laguna, while in the performance of his official functions and committing the offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and with intent to kill, shoot one JESUS AVENIDO with an M-16 Armalite Rifle, thereby inflicting upon him several
gunshot wounds in different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JESUS
AVENIDO.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

During his arraignment, on August 26, 1991, Flores pleaded "Not Guilty" and waived the pre-trial. Thereafter, the prosecution presented four (4)
witnesses, namely: Paulito Duran, one of the visitors (Duran); Gerry Avenido (Gerry), son of the victim; Elisa Avenido (Elisa), wife of the
victim; and Dr. Ruben Escueta, the physician who performed the autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, Jesus Avenido (Jesus).
For its part, the defense presented as witnesses, the accused Flores himself; his companion-members of the Civilian Action Force Group Unit
(CAFGU), Romulo Alquizar and Maximo H. Manalo; and Dr. Rene Bagamasbad, resident physician of San Pablo City District Hospital.

The Version of the Prosecution

On August 15, 1989, on the eve of the barangay fiesta in San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors, Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin
Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the terrace of the house of Jesus. They started drinking at 8:30 o’clock in the evening. Jesus, however,
joined his visitors only at around 11:00 o’clock after he and his wife arrived from Sta. Rosa, Laguna, where they tried to settle a problem
regarding a vehicular accident involving one of their children. The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when Flores arrived with an M-16 armalite
rifle.4

Duran testified that Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores who was heading towards the terrace. After glancing at the two, who began
talking to each other near the terrace, Duran focused his attention back to the table. Suddenly, he heard several gunshots prompting him to duck
under the table. Right after the shooting, he looked around and saw the bloodied body of Jesus lying on the ground. By then, Flores was no longer
in sight.5

Duran immediately helped board Jesus in an owner-type jeep to be brought to a hospital. Thereafter, Duran, Ronnie de Mesa and Noli de Mesa
went home. Jesus was brought to the hospital by his wife and children. Duran did not, at any time during the occasion, notice the victim carrying
a gun with him.6

Gerry narrated that he was going in and out of their house before the shooting incident took place, anxiously waiting for the arrival of his parents
from Sta. Rosa, Laguna. His parents were then attending to his problem regarding a vehicular accident. When they arrived, Gerry had a short
conversation with his father, who later joined their visitors at the terrace. 7

Gerry was outside their house when he saw Flores across the street in the company of some members of the CAFGU. He was on his way back to
the house when he saw Flores and his father talking to each other from a distance of about six (6) meters. Suddenly, Flores shot his father, hitting
him on the right shoulder. Flores continued shooting even as Jesus was already lying flat on the ground. Gerry testified that he felt hurt to have
lost his father.8

Elisa related that she was on her way from the kitchen to serve "pulutan" to their visitors when she saw Flores, from their window, approaching
the terrace. By the time she reached the terrace, her husband was already lying on the ground and still being shot by Flores. After the latter had
left, she and her children rushed him to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 9

As a consequence of her husband’s untimely demise, she suffered emotionally. She testified that Jesus had an average monthly income of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) before he died at the age of forty-one (41). He left four (4) children. Although she had no receipt, Elisa asked for
actual damages consisting of lawyer’s fees in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00) plus Five Hundred Pesos (₱500.00) for every
hearing, and Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱6,500.00) for the funeral expenses. 10

Dr. Ruben Escueta (Dr. Escueta) testified that on August 17, 1989, he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Jesus, whom he assessed to have
died at least six (6) hours before his body was brought to him.11

Based on the Autopsy Report,12 it appeared that the victim suffered four gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, specifically: on the
medial portion of the left shoulder, between the clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the
abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. The victim died of
massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.

The Version of the Defense

To avoid criminal liability, Flores interposed self-defense.

Flores claimed that in the evening of August 15, 1989, he, together with four members of the CAFGU and Civil Service Unit (CSU), Maximo
Manalo, Maximo Latayan (Latayan), Ronilo Haballa, and Romulo Alquizar, upon the instructions of Mayor Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna,
conducted a ronda in Barangay San Roque which was celebrating the eve of its fiesta. 13

At around midnight, the group was about 15 meters from the house of Jesus, who had earlier invited them for some "bisperas" snacks, when they
heard gunshots seemingly emanating from his house. Flores asked the group to stay behind as he would try to talk to Jesus, his cousin, to spare
the shooting practice for the fiesta celebration the following day. As he started walking towards the house, he was stopped by Latayan and handed
him a baby armalite. He initially refused but was prevailed upon by Latayan who placed the weapon over his right shoulder, with its barrel or
nozzle pointed to the ground. Latayan convinced Flores that such posture would gain respect from the people in the house of Jesus.14

Flores then proceeded to the terrace of the house of Jesus, who was having a drinking spree with four others. In a calm and courteous manner,
Flores asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their guns as it was already late at night and to save their shots for the following day’s fiesta
procession. Flores claimed that despite his polite, unprovocative request and the fact that he was a relative of Jesus and the barangay chairman, a
person in authority performing a regular routine duty, he was met with hostility by Jesus and his guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, immediately
stood up and approached

him as he was standing near the entrance of the terrace. Jesus abruptly drew his magnum pistol and poked it directly at his chest and then fired it.
By a twist of fate, he was able to partially parry Jesus’ right hand, which was holding the pistol, and was hit on his upper right shoulder. 15

With fierce determination, however, Jesus again aimed his gun at Flores, but the latter was able to instinctively take hold of Jesus’ right hand,
which was holding the gun. As they wrestled, Jesus again fired his gun, hitting Flores’ left hand. 16

Twice hit by bullets from Jesus’ magnum pistol and profusely bleeding from his two wounds, Flores, with his life and limb at great peril,
instinctively swung with his right hand the baby armalite dangling on his right shoulder towards Jesus and squeezed its trigger. When he noticed
Jesus already lying prostrate on the floor, he immediately withdrew from the house. As he ran towards the coconut groves, bleeding and utterly
bewildered over the unfortunate incident that just transpired between him and his cousin Jesus, he heard more gunshots. Thus, he continued
running for fear of more untoward incidents that could follow. He proceeded to the Mayor’s house in Barangay San Gregorio, Alaminos, Laguna,
to report what had happened. There, he found his ronda groupmates.17

The incident was also reported the following day to the CAFGU Superior, Sgt. Alfredo Sta. Ana.

Decision of the Sandiganbayan

On August 27, 2004, after due proceedings, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed decision 18 finding Flores guilty of the offense charged. The
Sandiganbayan rejected Flores’ claim that the shooting was justified for failure to prove self-defense. It gave credence to the consistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Flores shot Jesus with an armalite rifle (M16) which resulted in his death. According to the
Sandiganbayan, there was no reason to doubt the testimonies of the said witnesses who appeared to have no ill motive to falsely testify against
Flores. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 16946 finding the accused Simon A. Flores GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide and to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to 17 years, and 4
months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. The accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity for the death of Jesus Avenido, another Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages, and Six Thousand
Five Hundred Pesos (₱6,500.00) as actual or compensatory damages.

SO ORDERED.19

Flores filed a motion for the reconsideration. As the motion did not contain any notice of hearing, the Prosecution filed its Motion to Expunge
from the Records Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration."20

In its Resolution, dated November 29, 2007, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for being a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain a notice of
hearing and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Flores is considered pro forma which did not toll the
running of the period to appeal, and thus, the assailed judgment of this Court has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.21

Hence, Flores filed the present petition before this Court on the ground that the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors involving questions of
substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence. Specifically, Flores raises the following

ISSUES

(I)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING DUE CREDIT TO PETITIONER’S
CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE

(II)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED SERIOUS BUT REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ARRIVING
AT ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
 (III)

WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER
OF THE CRIME CHARGED22

The Court will first resolve the procedural issue raised by Flores in this petition.

Flores claims that the outright denial of his motion for reconsideration by the Sandiganbayan on a mere technicality amounts to a violation of his
right to due process. The dismissal rendered final and executory the assailed decision which was replete with baseless conjectures and
conclusions that were contrary to the evidence on record. He points out that a relaxation of procedural rules is justified by the merits of this case
as the facts, viewed from the proper and objective perspective, indubitably demonstrate selfdefense on his part.

Flores argues that he fully complied with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 37 and Section 4 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court when the
motion itself was served upon the prosecution and the latter, in fact, admitted receiving a copy. For Flores, such judicial admission amounts to
giving due notice of the motion which is the intent behind the said rules. He further argues that a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is not
necessary as no further proceeding, such as a hearing, is required under Section 3 of Rule 121.

Flores’ argument fails to persuade this Court.

Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court reads:

SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. – The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the
hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.

Section 2, Rule 37 provides:

SEC. 2. Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof. – The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or
grounds therefore, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party.

xxxx

A pro forma motion for new trial or reconsideration shall not toll the reglementary period of appeal.

Section 4, Rule 121 states:

SEC. 4. Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor. – The motion for a new trial or reconsideration shall be in writing and shall state the
grounds on which it is based. X x x. Notice of the motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be given to the prosecutor.

As correctly stated by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Sec. 2 of Rule 37 and Sec. 4 of Rule 121 should be read in conjunction with
Sec. 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Basic is the rule that every motion must be set for hearing by the movant except for those motions which
the court may act upon without prejudice to the rights of the adverse party. 23 The notice of hearing must be addressed to all parties and must
specify the time and date of the hearing, with proof of service.

This Court has indeed held, time and again, that under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, the requirement is mandatory. Failure to
comply with the requirement renders the motion defective. "As a rule, a motion without a notice of hearing is considered pro forma and does not
affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading."24

In this case, as Flores committed a procedural lapse in failing to include a notice of hearing, his motion was a worthless piece of paper with no
legal effect whatsoever. Thus, his motion was properly dismissed by the Sandiganbayan.

Flores invokes the exercise by the Court of its discretionary power to review the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan. He avers that
the ponente as well as the other members of the First Division who rendered the assailed decision, were not able to observe the witnesses or their
manner of testifying as they were not present during the trial. 25 He, thus, argues that there was palpable misapprehension of the facts that led to
wrong conclusions of law resulting in his unfounded conviction.

His contention is likewise devoid of merit.

"It is often held that the validity of a decision is not necessarily impaired by the fact that the ponente only took over from a colleague who had
earlier presided at the trial, unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion in the factual findings reached by him."26
"Moreover, it should be stressed that the Sandiganbayan, which functions in divisions of three Justices each, is a collegial body which arrives at
its decisions only after deliberation, the exchange of view and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority vote." 27

In the present case, Flores has not convinced the Court that there was misapprehension or misinterpretation of the material facts nor was the
defense able to adduce evidence to establish that the factual findings were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that Flores shot Jesus and continued riddling his body with bullets even after he was already lying helpless on the
ground.

Flores insists that the evidence of this case clearly established all the elements of self-defense. According to him, there was an unlawful
aggression on the part of Jesus. He was just at the entrance of Jesus’ terrace merely advising him and his guests to reserve their shooting for the
fiesta when Jesus approached him, drew a magnum pistol and fired at him. The attack by Jesus was sudden, unexpected and instantaneous. The
intent to kill was present because Jesus kept pointing the gun directly at him. As he tried to parry Jesus’ hand, which was holding the gun, the
latter kept firing. Left with no choice, he was compelled to use the baby armalite he was carrying to repel the attack. He asserts that there was
lack of sufficient provocation on his part as he merely requested Jesus and his drinking buddies to reserve their shooting for the following day as
it was already late at night and the neighbors were already asleep.

In effect, Flores faults the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight to the justifying circumstance of self-defense interposed by him and in relying on
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses instead.

His argument deserves scant consideration.

The issue of whether Flores indeed acted in self-defense is basically a question of fact. In appeals to this Court, only questions of law may be
raised and not issues of fact. The factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are, thus, binding upon this Court.28 This Court, nevertheless, finds no
reason to disturb the finding of the Sandiganbayan that Flores utterly failed to prove the existence of self-defense.

Generally, "the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he
was in fact innocent." If the accused, however, admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove
such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his part. To escape liability, it
now becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of that justifying circumstance. 29

In this case, Flores does not dispute that he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his shooting of
Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect, admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was incumbent upon him
to prove that the killing was legally justified under the circumstances.

To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must satisfactorily prove the concurrence of the elements of self-defense. Under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code, any person who acts in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided that the following
circumstances concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The most important among all the elements is unlawful aggression. "There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense."30 "Unlawful aggression is defined as an actual
physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively
showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger––not merely threatening and
intimidating action. It is present only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one’s life."31"Aggression, if not continuous, does
not constitute aggression warranting self-defense."32

In this case, Flores failed to discharge his burden.

The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative value of evidence on record. As correctly
noted by the Sandiganbayan, the defense evidence, both testimonial and documentary, were crowded with flaws which raised serious doubt as to
its credibility, to wit:

First, the accused claims that Jesus Avenido shot him on his right shoulder with a magnum handgun from a distance of about one (1) meter. With
such a powerful weapon, at such close range, and without hitting any hard portion of his body, it is quite incredible that the bullet did not exit
through the accused’s shoulder. On the contrary, if he were hit on the part where the ball and socket were located, as he tried to make it appear
later in the trial, it would be very impossible for the bullet not to have hit any of the bones located in that area of his shoulder.

Second, Simon Flores executed an affidavit on September 2, 1989. Significantly, he did not mention anything about a bullet remaining on his
shoulder. If indeed a bullet remained lodged in his shoulder at the time he executed his affidavit, it defies logic why he kept mum during the
preliminary investigation when it was crucial to divulge such fact if only to avoid the trouble of going through litigation. To wait for trial before
finally divulging such a very material information, as he claimed, simply stretches credulity.
Third, in his feverish effort of gathering evidence to establish medical treatment on his right shoulder, the accused surprisingly did not bother to
secure the x-ray plate or any medical records from the hospital. Such valuable pieces of evidence would have most likely supported his case of
self-defense, even during the preliminary investigation, if they actually existed and had he properly presented them. The utter lack of interest of
the accused in retrieving the alleged x-ray plate or any medical record from the hospital militate against the veracity of his version of the incident.

Fourth, the T-shirt presented by the accused in court had a hole, apparently from a hard object, such as a bullet, that pierced through the same.
However, the blood stain is visibly concentrated only on the area around the hole forming a circular shape. Within five (5) hours and a half from
12:00 o’clock midnight when he was allegedly shot, to 5:35 a.m. in the early morning of August 16, 1989, when his wounds were treated, the
blood would naturally have dripped down to the hem. The blood on the shirt was not even definitively shown to be human blood.

Fifth, Jesus Avenido arrived at his house and joined his visitors who were drinking only at 11:00 o’clock in the evening. Both parties claim that
the shooting incident happened more or less 12:00 midnight. Hence, it is very possible that Jesus Avenido was not yet drunk when the incident in
question occurred. Defense witnesses themselves noted that the victim Jesus Avenido was bigger in built and taller than the accused. Moreover,
the victim was familiar and very much experienced with guns, having previously worked as a policeman.1âwphi1 In addition, the latter was
relatively young, at the age of 41, when the incident happened. The Court therefore finds it difficult to accept how the victim could miss when he
allegedly shot the accused at such close range if, indeed, he really had a gun and intended to harm the accused. We find it much less acceptable to
believe how the accused allegedly overpowered the victim so easily and wrestled the gun from the latter, despite allegedly having been hit earlier
on his right shoulder.

Finally, it hardly inspires belief for the accused to have allegedly unlocked, with such ease, the armalite rifle (M16) he held with one hand, over
which he claims to have no experience handling, while his right shoulder was wounded and he was grappling with the victim. 33 (Underscoring
supplied citations omitted)

The foregoing circumstances indeed tainted Flores’ credibility and reliability, his story being contrary to ordinary human experience. "Settled is
the rule that testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in
itself. Hence, the test to determine the value or credibility of the testimony of a witness is whether the same is in conformity with common
knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind."34

The Court also sustains the finding that the testimony of Dr. Bagamasbad, adduced to prove that Flores was shot by Jesus, has no probative
weight for being hearsay. As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan:

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Bagamasbad, cannot be of any help either since the same is in the nature of hearsay evidence. Dr.
Bagamasbad’s testimony was a mere re-statement of what appeared as entries in the hospital logbook (EXH. "8-a"), over which he admitted to
possess no personal knowledge. The photocopy of the logbook itself does not possess any evidentiary value since it was not established by the
defense that such evidence falls under any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3, Rule 130, which pertain to the rules on the admissibility of
evidence.35 x x x

Granting for the sake of argument that unlawful aggression was initially staged by Jesus, the same ceased to exist when Jesus was first shot on the
shoulder and fell to the ground. At that point, the perceived threat to Flores’ life was no longer attendant. The latter had no reason to pump more
bullets on Jesus’ abdomen and buttocks.

Indeed, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds inflicted upon Jesus further negate the claim of self-defense by the accused. Records show
that Jesus suffered four (4) gunshot wounds in the different parts of his body, specifically: on the medial portion of the left shoulder, between the
clavicle and the first rib; on the left hypogastric region through the upper right quadrant of the abdomen; on the tip of the left buttocks to the tip of
the sacral bone or hip bone; and on the right flank towards the umbilicus. According to Dr. Ruben Escueta, who performed the autopsy on the
victim, the latter died of massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage due to laceration of the liver.36 If there was any truth to Flores’ claim that he
merely acted in self-defense, his first shot on Jesus’ shoulder, which already caused the latter to fall on the ground, would have been sufficient to
repel the attack allegedly initiated by the latter. But Flores continued shooting Jesus. Considering the number of gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim, the Court finds it difficult to believe that Flores acted to defend himself to preserve his own life. "It has been held in this regard that the
location and presence of several wounds on the body of the victim provide physical evidence that eloquently refutes allegations of self-defense."37

"When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no longer
acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original aggressor."38Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression
that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the
aggressor was injured by the accused.39

The Court quotes with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x. The difference in the location of the entry and exit points of this bullet wound was about two to three inches. From the entry point of the
bullet, the shooting could not have taken place when accused and his victim were standing and facing each other. Another bullet entered through
the medial portion of the victim's buttocks and exited through his abdominal cavity. A third bullet entered through the left hypogastric region and
exited at the upper right quadrant of the victim's abdomen. The respective trajectory of these wounds are consistent with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses Elisa B. Avenido and Arvin B. Aveniclo that the accused shot Jesus Avenido while the latter was already lying on the
ground. Moreover, according to Arvin Avenido, the first shot hit his father on the right shoulder making him fall to the ground. Hence, even on
the assumption that unlawful aggression initially existed, the same had effectively ceased after the victim was first shot and fell to the ground.
There was no more reason for the accused to pull the trigger, at least three times more, and continue shooting at the victim. 40 (Emphasis in the
original)

The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and
must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. 41 In this case, the continuous shooting by Flores which caused the fatal
gunshot wounds were not necessary and reasonable to prevent the claimed unlawful aggression from Jesus as the latter was already lying flat on
the ground after he was first shot on the shoulder.

In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in finding accused Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 109614-15 March 29, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ADRONICO GREGORIO and RICARDO GREGORIO, defendants-appellants.

KAPUNAN, J.:p

The instant appeal seeks the reversal of the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 43, rendered on April 20, 1992, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 428 and 6307 finding both appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

The facts of the case as established by the evidence for the prosecution are faithfully summarized in the People's brief, to wit:

Around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse together with his fifteen year old son Romeo Catorse arrived at the house (the
house is composed of two storeys) of appellant Adronico Gregorio at Sitio Bug-as, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Murcia, Negros Occidental, to attend the
wake of the latter's grandson (TSN, March 24, 1987, pp. 3-4).

When Carlos and his son arrived, there were already people attending the wake. Jovito Nicavera, Marcelo Lo and Adronico were conversing
downstairs while upstairs, some were playing "pusoy" (russian poker), among them were Jerry Nicavera, Renato Calalas, "Tunggak", (son of
Adronico) and Ricardo Gregorio (brother and co-appellant of Adronico). Kibitzing and at times betting in the game were John Villarosa,
Remolito Calalas, Carmelo Alubaga and Crispin Calalas (I.D., pp. 5; TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 12-13).

Persons attending the wake were requested by appellant Adronico to deposit with him any weapon in their possession for safekeeping so as to
avoid trouble. Complying therewith, Carlos Catorse handed over his "samurai", John Villarosa and Remolito Calalas, their respective knives, to
Adronico (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 16-19; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 22-23).

Around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of May 8, 1986, while the game of "pusoy" was still in progress, appellant Ricardo, in a very loud voice,
reprimanded "Tunggak" from (sic) peeping at the cards of other players. In response, "Tunggak" stood up and also in a very loud voice ordered
the game stopped (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 25-27; TSN, November 14, 1987, pp. 45-50).

Overhearing the incident, Adronico ordered Tunggak downstairs and right there and then, Adronico scolded and boxed him (Tunggak) several
times (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 27-30; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 51-55).

While Adronico was severely beating Tunggak, Carlos Catorse approached and begged Adronico from further hurting his son so as not to put him
to shame before the crowd. Carlos was in this act of pacifying the matter between the father and son when suddenly appellant Ricardo stealthily
stabbed Carlos from behind with a "samurai" (the same samurai deposited by Carlos to Adronico) and thereafter hacked and stabbed him several
times more in different parts of his body. Right after Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico, for his part, repeatedly hacked the victim with a bolo.
(TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 30-31; November 14, 1989, pp. 57-65).

Terrified, Romeo Catorse, son of Carlos Catorse, ran out of the house. Jovito Nicavera also tried to get out of the house but Adronico hacked him
instead with a bolo hitting his left shoulder. Marcelo Lo tried to help his uncle Jovito but Ricardo, with the same "samurai" used against Carlos
hacked him on his forearm. Adronico immediately followed and using a bolo hacked Marcelo on the nape. Although wounded, Marcelo was able
to run out of the house but Adronico ran after and overtook him. Adronico then hacked him again. When Ricardo followed the two, the visitors
attending the wake scampered out of the house (TSN, May 30, 1989, pp. 44-56; TSN, November 14, 1989, pp. 66-77).

Later, Romeo Catorse together with his sister and younger brother returned to the house of Adronico where they found their father lying prostrate
and dead. Nobody was around. Later on, the family of Jovito Nicavera arrived and brought the latter to a hospital in Bacolod (TSN, March 24,
1987, pp. 8-10).

Around 9:00 o'clock of the same morning of May 8, 1987, police authorities arrived at Adronico's place to investigate the killing incident. The
bodies of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo were found inside the house and at the yard of Adronico, respectively (TSN, November 14, 1989, pp.
76-78). The investigation revealed that appellants Adronico and Ricardo fled to Sitio Anangge, Barangay Buenavista, Murcia, Negros Occidental,
about 4 kilometers away from the situs of the crime. The authorities pursued and succeeded in apprehending the appellants. Appellants were
thereafter brought and investigated at Murcia Police Headquarters (TSN, April 5, 1991, pp. 9-10).

The post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victims reveals that Carlos Catorse sustained twelve hack and four stab wounds while
Marcelo Lo sustained six hack wounds. Both victims died of cardio respiratory arrest due to multiple wounds (Exhibits "A", "B", "C" & "D"). 1

Accordingly, an information for the murder of Carlos Catorse was filed against Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio before the Regional
Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Branch LXII, Bago City. The indictment, docketed as Criminal Case No. 428, reads:

That on or about the 8th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a "samurai" and a bolo, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each
other, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab and hack one, CARLOS CATORSE y APELYEDO thereby inflicting multiple stab and hack wounds upon the body of the latter, which
caused the death of said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Upon arraignment, both accused entered separate pleas of "not guilty."3

Another information for the murder of Marcelo Lo was instituted against Adronico Gregorio, this time, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Occidental, Branch 43, Bacolod City. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 6307, the accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about the 8th day of May, 1986, in the Municipality of Murcia, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack
one MARCELO LO y NICAVERA, thereby inflicting multiple injuries upon the body of the latter which caused the death
of the said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On arraignment, Adronico Gregorio entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged. 5

Later, the two cases were consolidated and tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 43.

On April 20, 1992 as aforestated, the trial court rendered a joint decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds and so holds the two (2) accused Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio "GUILTY"
beyond reasonable doubt as principals of having committed the crime of Murder in Crim. Case No. 428 and hereby sentences each to life
imprisonment and to solidarily indemnify the heirs of Carlos Catorse the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS with no subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In Crim. Case No. 6307 (2292) (sic) the Court finds the same Adronico Gregorio "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of having committed
Murder and hereby sentences him to another life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of Marcelo Lo the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS with no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Further, the two (2) accused shall be credited with the full term of their preventive confinement.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.6

Hence, this appeal.

In their brief, appellants raised the following errors, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE THEORY OF THE
PROSECUTION AND IN DISREGARDING THAT OF THE DEFENSE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING APPELLANTS' DEFENSE OF SELF-DEFENSE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXIST CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN
THE CASE AT BAR.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING BOTH THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.7

However, before the Office of the Solicitor General could file its Appellee's Brief, appellant Ricardo Gregorio died on December 12, 1993.
Consequently, his criminal liability as well as his civil liability based solely thereon is extinguished. 8 Evidently, this appeal will proceed only
with respect to appellant Adronico Gregorio.

After a careful perusal and evaluation of the case, this Court is not inclined to disturb the findings and conclusion of the court below, there being
no cogent reason therefor. For, aside from the well-settled rule that the factual findings of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and assess their credibility is entitled to the highest degree of respect,9 there appears to be no strong reason to depart
from the said doctrine since the decision is fully supported by the evidence on record.

Appellant Adronico Gregorio interposed self-defense to exculpate himself from criminal liability. However, the trial court, skeptic of the said
plea, rejected the same, reasoning that appellant failed to establish self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. We agree. In numerous cases
decided by this Court, the guiding jurisprudential principle has always been that when an accused invokes the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, the burden of proof is shifted to him to prove the elements of that claim; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is
inescapable.10Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.11Having admitted the
killing, appellant has to justify his taking of a life by the exacting standards of the law.
It is axiomatic that for self-defense to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that
the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.12

In the case at bench, appellant's claim of self-defense must fail. For one, the physical evidence tells us a different story. Dr. Emmanuel Boado, the
medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo, submitted the following post-mortem reports
and attested to the veracity and authenticity of the same, thus:

Cadaver of Carlos Catorse:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Hack wound 5 inches long, left temporal going backward with chip fractured (sic) of the skull.

2. Hack wound 8 inches long, from the base of the left Nose going backward below the left ear.

3. Hack wound 7 inches long, neck left side going backward with complete chip fractured (sic) of the fourth vertebrae
cutting blood vessels.

4. Stab wound 2 inches wide, 4 inches deep anterior abdomen, below the 10th rib, left side.

5. Stab wound 1 1/2 inches wide, 4 inches deep at the side of the navel left.

6. Hack wound, base of the palm, 3 inches long posterior side, cutting bones.

7. Hack wound, cutting left small finger.

8. Hack wound, 3 inches long upper 3rd right forearm running anteroposteriorly, chip fracture of bones.

9. Hack wound left shoulder back 4 inches long going downward with chip fracture of the shoulder joint.

10. Hack wound 5 inches long posteriorly left joint with chip fracture of the bones.

11. Hack wound 3 inches long posteriorly forearm below the elbow joint chip fracture of the bones.

12. Hack wound 3 inches long middle 3rd forearm, posterior surface, with chip fracture of the bones.

13. Stab wound 4 inches wide left back level of the 11th embracio rib, back side through and through of the level of 12th
rib right.

14. Hack wound 2 1/2 inches long with chip fracture of the 11th lobar vertebrae.

15. Hack wound middle right arm posterior side 4 inches long with chip fracture of bone.

16. Stab wound 1 inch wide hitting the vertebral bones, 5th thoracic vertebrae.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound, liver, large intestine, small intestine.

2. Massive abdominal bleeding.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to Multiple hack and Stab wounds. 13

Cadaver of Marcelo Lo:

 EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Hack wound 6 inches long left temporal area going occiput, chip fracture skull.

2. Hack wound, left face going backward base of the skull, brain tissue coming out, with chip fracture of the skull.

3. Hack wound, right 4 inches long right back cutting the scapular bones.

4. Hack wound 6 inches long, with chip fracture of the Vertebrae bones.

5. Hack wound 4 inches long cutting the 1st thoracic rib; scapular bones.

6. Hack wound 4 inches long, below the left scapular bones, cutting ribs.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Cerebral Hemorrhage, Massive

2. Thoracic Hemorrhage, Massive

CAUSE OF DEATH:

Cardio Respiratory Arrest due to multiple hack wounds. 14

If Adronico Gregorio and Ricardo Gregorio stabbed Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo merely to defend themselves, it certainly defies reason why
they had to inflict sixteen stab wounds on Carlos and six on Marcelo. The location, number and gravity of the wounds inflicted on the victims
belie the appellant's contention that they acted in self-defense.15 The rule is settled that the nature and extent of the wounds inflicted on a victim
negate an accused's claim of self-defense.16

The futility of invoking self-defense is likewise revealed in the testimonies of accused Ricardo Gregorio and appellant Adronico Gregorio.
Ricardo Gregorio testified that at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of May 7, 1986, Carlos Catorse suddenly kicked, from the outside, the front
door of the house of Adronico, then ran towards Eduardo (nephew of Ricardo) and boxed the latter; that he intervened to pacify Carlos but the
latter drew his "samurai" and attempted to attack him and Eduardo; that he grappled for possession of the "samurai" and was able to turn its point
back to Carlos who was hit in the stomach and then fell on the ground; and thereafter he left the victim, then went home. 17

On his part, appellant Adronico Gregorio declared that at the same time his son, Eduardo, and brother, Ricardo, were being attacked by Carlos, he
was in the kitchen preparing food for the people attending the wake of his grandson; that suddenly Marcelo Lo and Jovito Nicavera destroyed the
bamboo walls of his kitchen, entered threat and assaulted him; that Marcelo attacked him with a bolo but he was able to parry the latter's hand and
the bolo instead landed and struck the wooden rail of the kitchen sink; that Jovito in turn pointed a gun at him but without wasting time, he
dislodged the bolo from the wooden rail of the sink and slashed Jovito's hand; that because of the injury sustained, Jovito dropped the gun and ran
out of the house; that he turned to Marcelo and struck him with a bolo until the latter fell outside of the kitchen; and that he never knew what
happened next to Marcelo until the following morning when he learned that the latter died. 18

Not only are the foregoing declarations incredible and incredulous but are innately false and fatuous.

By making said allegations, appellant and deceased accused would want to impress upon this Court that both were able to inflict only a single
stab wound on deceased Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo. Curiously, however, none of their empty claims could explain the physical evidence and
findings of the autopsy reports that Carlos Catorse sustained a total of 16 hack and stab wounds while Marcelo Lo, 6 mortal hack
wounds. 19 Moreover, the prosecution witnesses were unanimous in their declaration that it was the appellant and his brother Ricardo who started
the skirmish. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of Carlos Catorse who only wanted to help pacify Adronico nor on Marcelo Lo's part,
who was only trying to flee from the melee when he was attacked and hacked to death. Likewise extant from the records is the absence of any act
on the part of the victims giving sufficient provocation for the attack.

Likewise telling is the fact that appellant and his brother fled from their homes soon after the incident instead of reporting the matter to the police.
Their flight negates self-defense and indicates guilt.20 As we have repeatedly held, flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience, the same
strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience.21

Appellant also challenges the court a quo's finding that there was conspiracy between his and his brother Ricardo. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 22 However, direct proof is not essential to
prove conspiracy,23 as it maybe deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused.24 Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and regardless of the fact, the perpetrators will be liable as principals. 25

In the case at bench, although there is no proof as to a previous agreement by the assailants to commit the crime charged, conspiracy is evident
from the manner of its perpetration.26 After Ricardo lunged at Carlos with a samurai from behind several times, Adronico attacked him in turn
with a bolo. Likewise, appellants successively hacked Marcelo using the weapons they used against Carlos. The incident happened in split
seconds, so to speak. Under the circumstances, it is evident that Adronico and Ricardo acted in unison and cooperated with each other towards the
accomplishment of a common felonious objective. In People v. Regalario 27 cited in People v. Lopez,28 we held:

An indicium of conspiracy is when the acts of the accused are aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another
part so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. The evidence need not establish the
actual agreement which shows the pre-conceived plan, motive, interest, or purpose in the commission of the crime; conspiracy is shown by the
coordinated acts of the assailants.29

Certainly, there was conspiracy between the brothers Adronico and Ricardo, and it was not necessary to prove a previous agreement to commit
the crime since from their overt acts, it was clear that they acted in concert in the pursuit of their unlawful design or common goal which was to
kill the victims.30

We agree with the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of treachery (alevosia) may be appreciated against the appellants. Treachery exists
when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly
and specially insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 31 In this case, it was
clearly established that Ricardo stealthily stabbed Carlos from behind, and repeatedly hacked him in different parts of his body, with a "samurai."
As Carlos fell to the ground, Adronico followed suit, repeatedly hacking the victim with a bolo. Though the assault upon Marcelo was preceded
by appellants' assault upon Carlos and Jovito, the incident happened in a span of seconds only. Terrified by what he witnessed, Jovito Nicavera
tried to run out of the house but Adronico hacked him instead. Instinctively, Marcelo Lo came to help his uncle Jovito but Ricardo followed by
Adronico hacked him using the same samurai and bolo they used against Carlos. Defenseless and severely wounded Marcelo tried to run but
Adronico finished him off by more mortal hacks. From all indications; the mode of attack adopted by the appellant and his brother qualifies the
killing to murder as the same rendered the victims who were unarmed at that time defenseless and helpless, without any opportunity to defend
themselves from their assailants' unreasonable and unexpected assault. The attack was sudden and was specially employed by the assailants to
insure the execution of the said crime without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victims might make.

Indeed, the use against Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo of the "samurai" and "bolo", both deadly weapons, the traitorous manner in which they
were assaulted, and the number of wounds inflicted on them, all demonstrate a deliberate, determined assault with intent to kill. Appellant is
guilty of murder.

Some last notes. The fallo of the assailed decision sentences the appellant to suffer the penalty of "life imprisonment" and to indemnify the heirs
of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P30,000.00 each. The correct penalty, however, should be reclusion perpetua in accordance with
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. As we have held time and again, life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are different and distinct from
each other. In People v. Ruelan,32 we outlined the distinction thusly:

As noted from the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment for the crime of murder.
Evidently, the said court failed to appreciate the substantial difference between Reclusion Perpetua under the Revised Penal Code and Life
Imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by special law. These two penalties are different and distinct from each other. Hence, we would like to
reiterate our admonition in the case of People v. Penillos, likewise quoted under Administrative Circular No. 6-A-92 amending Administrative
Circular No. 6-92 dated October 12, 1992 re: the correct application of the penalties of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment, thus:

As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the trial court imposed the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment."
Evidently, it considered the latter as the English translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and distinct penalties. In the
recent case of People v. Baguio, this Court held:

The Code does not prescribe the penalty of "life imprisonment" for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30)
years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special disqualification,
etc. It is not the same as "life imprisonment" which, for one thing, does not "carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear
to have any definite extent or duration."

As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in People vs. Pilones, and in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People
vs. Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua, is not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every judge
should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that, henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other. 33

Finally, conformably with the stated policy of this Court and pursuant to People v. Sison,34 the civil indemnity for the death of a victim is
increased to P50,000.00. Consequently, the heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo are entitled to P50,000.00 each.
WHEREFORE, except for the modification that appellant Adronico Gregorio is to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of Carlos Catorse and Marcelo Lo the sum of P50,000.00 each, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. As
aforestated, the death of Ricardo Gregorio extinguished both his criminal and civil liability arising from said crime.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUIS B. TORING DIOSDADO BERDON and CARMELO B. BERDIN, accused-appellants.

FERNAN, C.J.:

The appellants herein seek the reversal of the October 28, 1980 decision of the Circuit Criminal Court in Cebu City in Criminal Case No. CCC-
XIV-2170, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Luis B. Toring guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER by
direct participation as principal; Diosdado Berdon as accomplice thereto; and Carmelo Berdin as accessory after the fact.

Appreciating in favor of the accused Luis B. Toring the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the said
circumstance having been offset by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the accused Luis Toring should be, as he is,
hereby sentenced to the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of law.

There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances on the part of the accused Diosdado Berdon, the said accused
should as he is hereby sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of from SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to TWELVE (12) and ONE (1) DAY of ReclusionTemporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the
law.

Appreciating in favor of the accused Carmelo Berdin, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the said accused
being only 17 years of age, the accused Carmelo Berdin should be, as he is, sentenced to the penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law.

The defendants shall jointly and solidarily indemnify the heirs of the deceased Samuel Augusto for actual and
compensatory damages in the sum of P15,000.00 and for moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The instrument of the crime, the knife, Exhibit "B", is confiscated in favor of the government.

Proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED. 1

According to the prosecution, the antecedent facts are as follows:

In the evening of May 25, 1980, a benefit dance was held at sitio Naga, Babag II, Lapu-lapu City for the last canvassing of votes for the
candidates for princesses who would reign at the sitio fiesta. As one of the candidates was the daughter of Samuel Augusto, he and the members
of his family attended the affair.

Also present were members of the kwaknit gang, a group which was noted for their bird-like way of dancing and their propensity for drunkenness
and provoking trouble. Its president, called the "alas" king, was Luis Toring. The group was then outside the dancing area which was ringed by
benches.

At around 10:45 p.m., Samuel's daughter was proclaimed the winner in the contest. Beer and softdrinks having been served the parents of the
candidates by the officers of the Naga Chapel Association which took charge of the affair, Samuel was tipsy when, after his daughter's
proclamation, he stepped out of the dancing area to answer the call of nature.
At that moment, barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring, Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon proceed to a dark area while whispering to
each other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knife to Luis Toring, 2 who then approached Samuel from behind, held Samuel's left hand with his left
hand, and with his right hand, stabbed with the knife the right side of Samuel's abdomen. 3 Upon seeing Felix running towards them, Luis Toring
pulled out the knife and, together with Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdon, ran towards the dark. Felix tried to chase the three but he was not
able to catch them. He returned to where Samuel had slumped and helped others in taking Samuel to the hospital.

According to Maria Catalina Sorono, who was six (6) meters away from Samuel and Luis when the assault occurred, Diosdado Berdon and
Carmelo Berdin were poised to deliver fist blows on Samuel just before Luis Toring stabbed him. Diosdado gave the knife to Luis Toring. 4

As soon as she saw the stabbing of Samuel, Maria Catalina shouted for help. The three assailants ran towards the direction of the fields. Jacinto
Lobas and Mario Andog responded to her shouts and brought Samuel to the Opon Emergency Hospital where he died on arrival. According to the
necropsy report, 5 Samuel, who was thirty years old, died due to massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the abdomen. Said wound
is described in the report as follows:

Stab wound, with herniation of omental issues; elliptical, 3.5 cms. long, running vertically downward, edges clean-cut,
superior extremity rounded, inferior extremity sharp, located at the abdominal region, right anterior aspect, 7.5 cms. to the
right of anterior median line and 107.0 cms. above right heel, directed backward, upward and medially, involving skin and
the underlying soft tissues, penetrating right peritoneal cavity, incising inferior vena cava, attaining an approximate depth
of 15.0 cms.

The death weapon, a kitchen knife made of stainless steel and with a red-colored handle, was recovered from the house of Luis Toring. According
to Patrolman Pantaleon P. Amodia, the police found out during the investigation that Luis Toring had left the weapon with "Camilo" Berdin.
When the police confronted Berdin, the latter led them to the house of Toring which Berdin entered. When he emerged from the house, Berdin
handed the weapon to the police. 6

An information for murder was filed against Toring. Subsequently, however, the information was amended to include Diosdado Berdon and
Carmelo Berdin as defendants. The three were charged therein with conspiracy in killing Samuel Augusto in a treacherous manner. Berdon, it
was alleged, "conveniently supplied the death weapon" which Toring used in stabbing Samuel while Berdin allegedly concealed the weapon to
prevent its discovery by the police. 7 The crime was purportedly committed with the attendance of the generic aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and nighttime.

All three accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. At the trial, Luis Toring, alias "Lowe," testified that he was not the president of the
kwaknit gang. He went to the benefit dance in the company of Venir Ybañez, Joel Escobia, Ely Amion, Abel Pongase, Abe Berdon, Genio Berdin
and Alex Augusta. Toring and his group were standing outside the dancing area when, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Samuel, a known
tough guy ("maldito"), approached them and held Venir Ybanez by his collar. Then Samuel thrust the butt of his shotgun on the chin of Joel
Escobia, 8 proceeded to another group who were also gangmates of Toring, and again, with the barrel of his shotgun, hit Eli Amion's chest several
times. 9

Reacting to what he saw, Toring got his kitchen knife which was tucked in his waist, approached Samuel from the latter's right side and stabbed
him once as he did not intend to kill Samuel. Toring then ran towards the dark portion of the area and went home. There, he left the knife and
proceeded to the hut by the fishpond of one Roman. 10

Toring was sleeping in the hut with his older brother, Arsenio, when, at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning of May 26, 1980, Edgar Augusto, the
younger brother of Samuel, shot them. Arsenio was hit on the left leg and he stayed two months in the hospital for the treatment of his wound. 11

At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 26, 1980, Toring surrendered to two Philippine Constabulary soldiers.12 They brought him to the police
of Lapu-lapu City on May 28, 1980.13 When the police asked him about the knife he used in stabbing Samuel, Toring told them to go to Carmelo
Berdin because he was the only person who knew where Toring hid it. 14 Asserting that he was the one who returned the knife to his own house,
Toring testified that Carmelo Berdin used to see him hide his weapons upstairs because Berdin was a frequent visitor of his. 15

For his part, Carmelo, a 5 feet tall, asthmatic 17-year-old whom the court described as "lilliputian," admitted that he witnessed the stabbing
incident but he ran away with his group immediately after because he was afraid he might be shot by Samuel. He was with Toring when the latter
hid the still bloodied knife under a trunk in Toring's house. He was familiar with the hiding place of the knife because Toring showed it to him
and there were times when he would get the knife there upon Toring's request. Carmelo corroborated Toring's testimony that on that fateful night,
Toring carried the knife tucked at the back of his waistline. 16

In court, Toring testified that he never saw Diosdado at the dance. 17 However, in his sworn statement dated May 28, 1980 and marked as Exhibit
D, Toring stated that he took the knife from Diosdado to stab Samuel. Confronted with said statement, Diosdado said that when he asked Toring
why he implicated him, Toring allegedly replied that he "included" Diosdado because of the case the barangay brigade had filed against Toring. 18

According to Diosdado, he did not attend the May 25 dance because of the trouble which erupted during the dance the night before. He did not
have anything to do with the stabbing of Samuel. He admitted, however, that a week after the incident, his family went to barrio Andaliw Ronda,
Cebu, for their yearly visit to his father-in-law. He stayed there for fifteen days and would have stayed longer had not his mother informed him of
the subpoena addressed to him. 19
On October 28, 1980, a day after the last day of hearing, the lower court 20 rendered a decision discrediting Toring's claim that the killing of
Samuel was justified because it was done in defense of a stranger pursuant to Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court found
that Toring was the "aggressor acting in retaliation or revenge by reason of a running feud or long-standing grudge" between the kwaknit gang
and the group of Samuel, who, being the son of the barangay captain, was a "power to be reckoned with." It mentioned the fact that a year before
the incident in question, Toring was shot by Edgar Augusto (Samuel's brother) and hence, in his desire to avenge himself, Toring, "needed but a
little excuse to do away with the object of his hatred. 21

The lower court could not believe that Samuel brought along his shotgun to the dance because he was "not reputed to be a public official or
functionary entitled to possess a firearm." Otherwise, the police and the barangay tanod would have arrested him. The court surmised that if
Samuel really carried a shotgun, he certainly must have had a permit or license to possess the same.

It noted that while Toring testified that Samuel was aiming his shotgun at the chest of Ely Amyon (Amion), prosecution witness Joel Escobia
claimed that he was at the receiving end of Samuel's thrusts with the butt of his shotgun. To the court, such discrepancy is fatal to the defense
because in appreciating the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger, the court must know "with definiteness the identity of the stranger
defended by the accused." 22

The lower court, however, ruled out the existence of conspiracy among the three accused on the ground that there was no proof on what they
were whispering about when Felix saw them. Accordingly, it held that the accused have individual or separate liabilities for the killing of Samuel:
Toring, as a principal, Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice by his act of giving Toring the knife, and Carmelo Berdin as an accessory for
concealing the weapon. It considered treachery as the qualifying circumstance to the killing, found no proof as to allegation of evident
premeditation but appreciated nighttime as an aggravating circumstance. It meted the accused the penalties mentioned above.

All three accused appealed.

Toring seeks his exoneration by contending that his assault on Samuel was justified because he acted in defense of his first cousin, Joel Escobia.
Article 11 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides that no criminal liability is incurred by anyone "who acts in defense of ... his relatives ... by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are
present, and the further requisite, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein." The
first and second requisites referred to are enumerated in paragraph (b) in the same article on selfdefense as: (a) unlawful aggression, and (b) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Joel Escobia, whose chin was hit with the butt of Samuel's shotgun, is the first cousin of Toring their fathers being brothers, 23 although no
explanation appears on record why they have different surnames. At any rate, this allegation on relationship was not rebutted by the prosecution.

The appreciation of the justifying circumstance of defense of a relative, however, hinges in this case on the presence of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim. Corollarily, the claim of Toring that Samuel was, at the time of the assault, carrying a shotgun to intimidate Toring's group
must be proven.

Understandably, no prosecution witness attested that they saw Samuel with a firearm. The prosecution even recalled to the witness stand Samuel's
widow who asserted that her husband did not own any firearm. 24 Going along with the prosecution's evidence, the lower court arrived at the
rather gratuitous conjecture that Samuel could not have had a shotgun with him because no one without a permit would carry a firearm without
risking arrest by the police or the barangay tanod. At the same time, however, the lower court described Samuel as the son of the barangay
captain who "had the run of the place and had his compelling presence felt by all and " sundry." 25

While matters dealing with the credibility of witnesses and appreciation of evidence are primarily the lower court's province, this Court has the
power to determine whether in the performance of its functions, the lower court overlooked certain matters which may have a substantial effect in
the resolution of a case. 26 Defense witness Joel Escobia was, besides Toring, the only witness whose sworn statement was taken by the police on
May 26, 1980, the day after the fatal assault on Samuel.

In his sworn statement, 27 Escobia attested that as he was about to dance with a girl, Samuel stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet
from his jacket pocket, showed it to Escobia and asked him, "Do you like this, Dong?" to which Escobia replied, "No, Noy I do not like that."
Samuel then placed the bullet in the shotgun and was thus pointing it at Escobia when Toring came from behind Samuel and stabbed the latter.
Even on cross-examination at the trial, Escobia did not depart from his statement. In fact he added that Samuel pointed the shotgun at his chin and
told him to eat the bullet. 28

There is no reason to doubt Joel Escobia's assertion of Samuel's unlawful aggression inasmuch as his sworn statement 29 and testimony in court
had not been successfully discredited by the prosecution which also failed to prove that Joel had reason to prevaricate to favor Toring.

The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring notwithstanding, full
credence cannot be given, to Toring's claim of defense of a relative. Toring himself admitted in court 30 as well as in his sworn statement 31 that in
1979, he was shot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel's brother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking Samuel, Toring
was impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was
motivated by revenge, resentment or evil motive 32 because of a "running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers. As the defense
itself claims, after the incident subject of the instant case occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot on the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed,
vendetta appears to have driven both camps to commit unlawful acts against each other. Hence, under the circumstances, to justify Toring's act of
assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein to lawlessness.

The lower court correctly considered the killing as murder in view of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The suddenness of
the assault rendered Samuel helpless even to use his shotgun. We also agree with the lower court that conspiracy and evident premeditation were
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, nighttime cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. There is no proof that it was
purposely sought to insure the commission of the crime or prevent its discovery. 33 However, Toring should be credited with the privileged
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of relative and the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code being reclusion temporal maximum to death, the imposable penalty
is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of
relative and voluntary surrender (Art. 64 [5]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty to be meted on Toring
is prision correctional maximum as minimum to prision mayor maximum as maximum penalty.

On the culpability of Diosdado Berdon, the Court holds that his defense of alibi cannot be sustained in the absence of proof that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. 34 His house was only a kilometer away from the place where he
supplied the knife to Toring. 35 That distance does not preclude the possibility that Diosdado aided Toring in the perpetration of the crime as it
could be negotiated in just a few minutes by merely walking. 36 Moreover, his alibi was uncorroborated as it was founded only on his own
testimony and what appears as a self-exonerating affidavit. 37

But what pins culpability on Diosdado were the testimonies of at least two prosecution witnesses who positively identified him as the one who
gave Toring the knife. Motive, therefore, has become immaterial in the face of such positive identification 38 and hence, even if it were true that
he was not a member of the kwaknit gang, his participation in the killing has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Added to this is the fact that
Toring himself in his sworn statement before the police pointed to him as the source of the knife. 39 Verily, Toting could not have implicated him
because of the incomprehensible reason that a case had been filed against Toring before the barangay brigade.

Pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as an accomplice by his previous act of supplying Toring the death weapon, Diosdado Berdon
should be meted the penalty of prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporalmedium which is the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion
temporal maximum to death, the penalty prescribed for murder by Article 248 (Article 6 [3]). There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be in its medium period or reclusion temporal minimum (Article 64 [1]). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from prision mayor minimum while the maximum penalty should be within the period of reclusion
temporal minimum.

With regards to Carmelo Berdin, his culpability as an accessory to the murder has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that he
knew where Toring hid the knife does not imply that he concealed it to prevent its discovery (Article 19 [2]). There simply is no proof to that
effect. On the contrary, Luis Toring in his sworn statement and testimony during the trial testified that after stabbing the victim, he ran away and
went to his house to hide the murder weapon. Being a close friend of Toring and a frequent visitor to the latter's house, it is not impossible for
Carmelo Berdin to know where Toring hid his knives. Significantly, Carmelo readily acceded to the request of police officers to lead them to the
place where Toring kept the knife. He willingly retrieved it and surrendered it to the police, a behavior we find inconsistent with guilt.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as it convicts Luis Toring as principal in the murder of Samuel Augusto
and Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice thereto.

The lower court's decision is modified as follows:

(a) Luis Toring shall be imposed the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor maximum as maximum;

(b) Diosdado Berdon shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayorminimum as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum;

(c) Carmelo Berdin is acquitted as an accessory to the murder of Samuel Augusto, and

(d) Luis Toring and Diosdado Berdon shall jointly and severally pay the heirs of Samuel Augusto an indemnity of thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00). Costs against appellants Toring and Berdon.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60159 November 6, 1989

P/CPL. FAUSTO ANDAL, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The petitioner, Fausto Andal, a member of the Batangas Integrated National Police, has appealed to this Court the decision * of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2521 which found him guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one (1)
year of prision correccional; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P20,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the
costs.

In his petition for review, the petitioner alleges that the Sandiganbayan erred in rejecting his plea of self-defense, on the ground that the initial
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased after the petitioner had disarmed him.

We find no merit in the petition for it raises only factual issues. The record of this case shows that the herein petitioner, Fausto Andal, then a
corporal in the Batangas Integrated National Police, whose duty shift was from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 12:00 o'clock midnight, was on
patrol aboard a tricycle driven by Police Pfc. Casiano Quinio in the evening of 25 September 1980. At about 7:00 o'clock that night, he went to
the pier located at Sta. Clara, Batangas City, to check on one of his men, Pfc. Maximo Macaraig, who was stationed there, because the said
Macaraig had failed to report to police headquarters for briefing.

Upon reaching the police checkpoint at the pier, and upon seeing Macaraig, petitioner asked Macaraig why he did not pass by police headquarters
for briefing before proceeding to his post. Macaraig replied that he did not have to report to police headquarters since he already had his orders.
Sensing trouble, Quinio drove away his tricycle. Macaraig, however, followed them and told the petitioner: "You report, supsup, ka." Petitioner
kept his cool and did not say anything. But, Quinio went to Macaraig to pacify him. Thereafter, petitioner and Quinio went back to the poblacion
of Batangas City.

At about 11:00 o'clock that night, petitioner and Quinio parked their vehicle in front of the Philbanking Building at P. Burgos Street, Batangas
City. Quinio alighted from the tricycle and joined Pat. Andres Perez and Pat. Pedro Banaag who were seated on a bench. The petitioner also
alighted from the tricycle and stood at the sidewalk near the bench. After a few minutes, Macaraig arrived and went straight to the petitioner. He
was furious this time and demanded why the petitioner had embarrassed him in front of so many people. The petitioner denied the charge and
called Quinio to clear up matters with Macaraig. Quinio told Macaraig that the petitioner did not utter defamatory words against him and asked
him to forget the incident. ("Pasensiyahan na kayo, hindi kayo magkakaiba.") Macaraig did not say anything. But, he returned to the petitioner
and challenged him. Quinio again tried to pacify Macaraig and brought him across the street. Still, Macaraig refused to be pacified and went to
the petitioner with a drawn gun in his hand.

Pointing the gun menacingly at the petitioner, Macaraig said: "Bumunot ka bumunot ka." Petitioner, however, refused to fight, saying: "I cannot
fight you because we are both policemen" Macaraig, nevertheless, fired his gun pointblank at the petitioner, hitting the latter in the middle aspect,
lower right knee. Petitioner then lunged at Macaraig and they grappled for possession of the gun. Petitioner was able to wrest the gun from
Macaraig. Thereafter, two (2) successive shots were fired and Macaraig fell to the ground. He was brought to the hospital but he was dead on
arrival.

The factual issue hinges on what transpired after the petitioner had wrested the gun from the deceased until the two (2) shots were fired, which
caused the death of Macaraig. The findings of respondent court on this factual issue are to this effect:
 The pivotal question is: Was there an appreciable time lapse between the first aggression, i.e. when deceased shot accused
on his knee and the time accused resorted to force by way of firing the two shots at the deceased? The facts unfolded
indicate that there was. This is what happened after accused had grabbed the gun: (1) He asked deceased, "Why did you
fire at me?" (2) He even turned bis head towards his son and instructed him just to stay in the jeep. (3) His son, Domingo
Andal, challenged deceased to a fight "Sportsman like." (4) Deceased moved backward — 2 meters away from accused. (5)
Pfc. Quinio even thought the trouble was over as he started to get his tricycle. 1

The petitioner contends that after he had taken possession of' the gun from Macaraig, the latter tried to grab the gun back and, in the scuffle, the
gun went off twice, hitting the deceased. But, this claim was not given credence by the respondent court which said:

The theory of the defense that the two shots were fired while accused and deceased were grappling for the possession of
the gun, is fictitious. When Pat. Perez heard the two shots, deceased was "more or less" two meters from the accused (p 38,
TSN sess. i.d.) This jibes with the testimony of Pat. Quinio that after accused had wrested the gun from deceased, the latter
"somewhat backout" (p. 76, TSN sess. i.d.) More important, immediately after the two shots, accused was holding the gun
with his right hand and as demonstrated in Court, said "right hand stretched downward" (. p. 77, TSN sess. i.d.). This
demonstration is given credence by corroborative physical evidence. According to Dr. Luis Aclan who examined the body
of deceased, the trajectory of the bullet was downward (see Exh. "B-l") with the right armpit (No. 3) as the point of
entrance and the back of the body the point of exit (No. 5). The other slug had its point of entrance at No. 2 in Exhibit "B-
l." 2

In its resolution, denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision, the respondent court also said:

It cannot be correctly held, to quote the words of accused in his motion, that 'it was precisely when the two protagonists
were grappling for the possession of the gun that the two shots were suddenly fired resulting to the fatal wounding of the
deceased'. This would be contrary to the testimony of Pat. Perez, a witness whose credibility the defense does not impugn.
According to Pat. Perez, deceased was 'more or less' two meters from the accused when he heard two gun shots.
Immediately after they were fired, this witness looked at the direction where they came from. He saw accused holding a
gun with his right hand stretched downward. Under such scenario with a distance of two meters apart and the hand of
accused holding the gun stretched downward — it is clear that deceased and accused were not grappling for the possession
of the gun at the time the two shots were fired . 3

In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 7 of P.D. 1610 creating the Sandiganbayan, the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are entitled to great respect and only questions of law may be raised in the Supreme Court. 4

Moreover, well settled is the rule that when the resolution of a factual issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact of the trial
court will not be disturbed, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, mights affect the result of
the case. Herein petitioner failed to demonstrate that his case falls under the exception which would justify this Court to overturn the findings of
fact of the trial court, as heretofore cited and summarized thus —

Stated briefly, the initial illegal aggression staged by deceased had ceased after he was disarmed by accused. By then,
accused a taller and bigger man than deceased had the upperhand. He was in possession of the gun of deceased while the
latter was unarmed. In fact, it was probably because of this circumstance that deceased moved backward. Aside from
accused, his son who dared to fight deceased was there, not to say Pat. Perez and Quinio all under his supervision. Patently,
there was no further threat to the life and limb of accused.

Absent the element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense complete (Art. II, par. 1) or incomplete (Art. 13, par. 1,
RPC). 5

We agree with the Sandiganbayan that the petitioner failed to prove the defense he had raised. The primordial requisite of self-defense is unlawful
aggression. And for unlawful aggression to be present, there must be a real danger to life or personal safety. In the instant case, there was no
imminent and real danger to the life or limb of the petitioner when he shot the deceased, since the latter had already been disarmed. As former
Chief Justice Aquino states in his book on Criminal Law:

In order to justify self-defense, it is essential that the attack upon defendant be simultaneous with the killing, or preceded
the latter without an appreciable interval of time. (Ferrer, 1 Phil. 56),

xxx xxx xxx

The harm caused by one person to another who offended or caused him injury, sometime after he suffered such offense or
such injury, does not constitute an act of self-defense, but an act of revenge. (Banzuela 31 Phil. 564). 6

In imposing on the appellant the penalty of just one (11) year of prision correccional, the respondent Court held (which we here affirm):
 In People vs. Oanis and Galanta (74 Phil. 257), the court set forth two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty and
exercise of a right 7 may be considered as justifying circumstance, namely: (a) that the offender acting [sic] in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or office. If one is absent, accused
is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of right or office. 8

xxx xxx xxx

It is evident that accused was acting in the performance of his duty as supervisor of deceased and policemen when the
events that led to the shooting occurred. His attempt to discipline his men was resented by deceased who was one of them.
Such attitude did not diminish with the passage of hours; instead, deceased's rage heightened to violence. He not merely
uttered verbal insults to his superior but actually drew his gun and shot him. Fortunately, the latter overpowered deceased.
Unfortunately, accused did not stop at that point. He used unnecessary violence against the defenseless person of the
deceased. Thus, he exceeded the limits of his authority. 9

Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code vests discretion to [sic] the court in lowering the penalty either by one or two degrees
whenever incomplete justifying circumstance exists in a given case like the case at bar. The laudable patience of accused in
not retaliating despite repeated insults by a subordinate, his length of service in the government (since 1957), and most
important, his obsession to inculcate discipline in his men, to OUR mind, entitle accused to a two-degree reduction of the
penalty prescribed by law. Our attitude is a signal to the men in uniform that while WE condemn felonious violence WE
support efforts to maintain discipline in the service. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED. With costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125059 March 17, 2000

FRANCISCO T. SYCIP, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

For review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated February 29, 1996, in CA-G.R. CR No. 15993, which affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 95, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-25910 to 15, finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

The facts in this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On August 24, 1989, Francisco T. Sycip agreed to buy, on installment, from Francel Realty Corporation (FRC), a townhouse unit in the latter's
project at Bacoor, Cavite.

Upon execution of the contract to sell, Sycip, as required, issued to FRC, forty-eight (48) postdated checks, each in the amount of P9,304.00,
covering 48 monthly installments.

After moving in his unit, Sycip complained to FRC regarding defects in the unit and incomplete features of the townhouse project. FRC ignored
the complaint. Dissatisfied, Sycip served on FRC two (2) notarial notices to the effect that he was suspending his installment payments on the
unit pending compliance with the project plans and specifications, as approved by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Sycip
and 12 out of 14 unit buyers then filed a complaint with the HLURB. The complaint was dismissed as to the defects, but FRC was ordered by the
HLURB to finish all incomplete features of its townhouse project. Sycip appealed the dismissal of the complaint as to the alleged defects.

Notwithstanding the notarial notices, FRC continued to present for encashment Sycip's postdated checks in its possession. Sycip sent "stop
payment orders" to the bank. When FRC continued to present the other postdated checks to the bank as the due date fell, the bank advised Sycip
to close his checking account to avoid paying bank charges every time he made a "stop payment" order on the forthcoming checks. Due to the
closure of petitioner's checking account, the drawee bank dishonored six postdated checks. FRC filed a complaint against petitioner for violations
of B.P. Blg. 22 involving said dishonored checks.

On November 8, 1991, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office filed with the RTC of Quezon City six Informations docketed as Criminal Cases No.
Q-91-25910 to Q-91-25915, charging petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

The accusative portion of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910 reads:

That on or about the 30th day of October 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of Francel Realty Corporation a
check 813514 drawn against Citibank, a duly established domestic banking institution in the amount of P9,304.00 Philippine Currency
dated/postdated October 30, 1990 in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that she/he did not have any
funds in the drawee bank of (sic) the payment of such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for payment, the same
was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof, accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. did not have any funds therein, and despite
notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still fails and refused (sic) to redeem or make good said check, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Francel Realty Corporation in the amount aforementioned and in such other amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Criminal Cases No. Q-91-25911 to Q-91-25915, with Informations similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. Q-91-25910, except for the dates,
and check numbers2 were consolidated and jointly tried.

When arraigned, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to each of the charges. Trial then proceeded.

The prosecution's case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, is as follows:

The prosecution evidence established that on or about August 24, 1989, at the office of the private complainant Francel Realty
Corporation (a private domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business) at 822 Quezon Avenue, QC, accused Francisco Sycip,
Jr. drew, issued, and delivered to private complainant Francel Realty Corporation (FRC hereinafter) six checks (among a number of
other checks), each for P9,304.00 and drawn pay to the order of FRC and against Francisco's account no. 845515 with Citibank, to
wit: Check No. 813514 dated October 30, 1990 (Exh. C), Check No. 813515 dated November 30, 1990 (Exh. D), Check No. 813518
dated February 28, 1991 (Exh. E), Check No. 813516 dated December 30, 1990 (Exh. F), Check No. 813517 dated January 30, 1991
(Exh. G) and Check No. 813519 dated March 30, 1991 (Exh. H), as and in partial payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price
of the house and lot subject of the written contract executed and entered into by and between FRC as seller and Francisco as buyer on
 said date of August 24, 1989 (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). The total stipulated purchase price for the house and lot was P451,700.00, of
which Francisco paid FRC in the sum of P135,000.00 as down payment, with Francisco agreeing and committing himself to pay the
balance of P316,000.00 in 48 equal monthly installments of P9,304.00 (which sum already includes interest on successive monthly
balance) effective September 30, 1989 and on the 30th day of each month thereafter until the stipulated purchase price is paid in full.
The said six Citibank checks, Exhs. C thru H, as earlier indicated were drawn, issued, and delivered by Francisco in favor of FRC as
and in partial payment of the said 48 equal monthly installments under their said contract (Exh. B, also Exh. 1). Sometime in
September 1989, the Building Official's certificate of occupancy for the subject house — a residential townhouse — was issued (Exh.
N) and Francisco took possession and started in the use and occupancy of the subject house and lot.1âwphi1.nêt

When the subject six checks, Exhs. C thru H, were presented to the Citibank for payment on their respective due dates, they were all
returned to FRC dishonored and unpaid for the reason: account closed as indicated in the drawee bank's stamped notations on the face
and back of each check; in fact, as indicated in the corresponding record of Francisco's account no. 815515 with Citibank, said account
already had a zero balance as early as September 14, 1990 (Exh. 1-5). Notwithstanding the fact that FRC, first thru its executive vice
president and project manager and thereafter thru its counsel, had notified Francisco, orally and in writing, of the checks' dishonor and
demanded from him the payment of the amount thereof, still Francisco did not pay or make good any of the checks (Exhs. I thru K). .
.3

The case for the defense, as summarized also by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

The defense evidence in sum is to the effect that after taking possession and starting in the use and occupancy of the subject
townhouse unit, Francisco became aware of its various construction defects; that he called the attention of FRC, thru its project
manager, requesting that appropriate measures be forthwith instituted, but despite his several requests, FRC did not acknowledge,
much less attend to them; that Francisco thus mailed to FRC a verified letter dated June 6, 1990 (Exh. 2) in sum giving notice that
effective June 1990, he will cease and desist "from paying my monthly amortization of NINE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FOUR (P9,304.00) PESOS towards the settlement of my obligation concerning my purchase of Unit No. 14 of FRC Townhomes
referred to above, unless and until your Office satisfactorily complete(s) the construction, renovation and/or repair of my townhouses
(sic) unit referred to above" and that should FRC "persist in ignoring my aforesaid requests, I shall, after five (5) days from your
receipt of this Verified Notice, forthwith petition the [HLURB] for Declaratory Relief and Consignation to grant me provisional relief
from my obligation to pay my monthly amortization to your good Office and allow me to deposit said amortizations with [HLURB]
pending your completion of FRC Townhomes Unit in question"; that Francisco thru counsel wrote FRC, its president, and its counsel
notices/letters in sum to the effect that Francisco and all other complainants in the [HLURB] case against FRC shall cease and desist
from paying their monthly amortizations unless and until FRC satisfactorily completes the construction of their units in accordance
with the plans and specifications thereof as approved by the [HLURB] and as warranted by the FRC in their contracts and that the
dishonor of the subject checks was a natural consequence of such suspension of payments, and also advising FRC not to encash or
deposit all other postdated checks issued by Francisco and the other complainants and still in FRC's possession (Exhs. 3 thru 5); that
Francisco and the other complainants filed the [HLURB] case against FRC and later on a decision was handed down therein and the
same is pending appeal with the Board (Exhs. 6, 7, & 12 thru 17, also Exh. 8); that as of the time of presentation of the subject checks
for payment by the drawee bank, Francisco had at least P150,000.00 cash or credit with Citibank (Exhs. 10 & 11) and, that Francisco
closed his account no. 845515 with Citibank conformably with the bank's customer service officer's advice to close his said account
instead of making a stop-payment order for each of his more than 30 post-dated checks still in FRC's possession at the time, so as to
avoid the P600.00-penalty imposed by the bank for every check subject of a stop-payment order.4

On March 11, 1994, the trial court found petitioner guilty of violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 in each of the six cases, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in each of Crim. Cases Nos. Q-91-25910, Q-91-25911, Q-91-25912, Q-91-25913, Q-91-25914 and Q-91-25915, the
Court finds accused Francisco T. Sycip, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Sec. 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and,
accordingly, he is hereby sentenced in and for each case to suffer imprisonment of thirty (30) days and pay the costs. Further, the
accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended party, Francel Realty Corporation, as and for actual damages, the total sum of fifty-five
thousand eight hundred twenty four pesos (P55,824.00) with interest thereon at the legal rate from date of commencement of these
actions, that is, November 8, 1991, until full payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, Sycip appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. His appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 15993. But on February 29, 1996,
the appellate court ruled:

On the basis of the submission of the People, We find and so hold that appellant has no basis to rely on the provision of PD 957 to
justify the non-payment of his obligation, the closure of his checking account and the notices sent by him to private complainant that
he will stop paying his monthly amortizations.6

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 18, 1996, but it was denied per Resolution dated April 22, 1996.

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:

 I

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE ANY JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE TO STOP OR OTHERWISE PREVENT THE
PAYMENT OF THE SUBJECT CHECKS BY THE DRAWEE BANK.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT MUST BE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED
HIS RIGHT TO COMPLAIN AGAINST THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOWNHOUSE UNIT AND THE TOWNHOUSE
PROJECT.

III

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS WITH THE DRAWEE BANK TO COVER THE SUBJECT CHECKS
UPON PRESENTMENT FOR PAYMENT THEREOF.

IV

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND AWARDING DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.7

The principal issue before us is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law.

Petitioner argues that the court a quo erred when it affirmed his conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, considering that he had cause to stop
payment of the checks issued to respondent. Petitioner insists that under P.D. No. 957, the buyer of a townhouse unit has the right to suspend his
amortization payments, should the subdivision or condominium developer fail to develop or complete the project in accordance with duly-
approved plans and specifications. Given the findings of the HLURB that certain aspects of private complainant's townhouse project were
incomplete and undeveloped, the exercise of his right to suspend payments should not render him liable under B.P. Blg. 22.

The Solicitor General argues that since what petitioner was charged with were violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the intent and circumstances
surrounding the issuance of a worthless check are immaterial.8 The gravamen of the offense charged is the act itself of making and issuing a
worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Mere issuing of a bad check is malum prohibitum, pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. In his view, P.D. No. 957 does not provide petitioner a sufficient defense against the charges against him.

Under the provisions of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. No. 22), 9 an offense is committed when the following elements are present:

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. 10

In this case, we find that although the first element of the offense exists, the other elements have not been established beyond reasonable doubt.

To begin with, the second element involves knowledge on the part of the issuer at the time of the check's issuance that he did not have enough
funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. B.P. No. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second
element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. 11 But such evidence may be rebutted. If not rebutted or
contradicted, it will suffice to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue, which it supports. 12 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, such
knowledge of the insufficiency of petitioner's funds "is legally presumed from the dishonor of his checks for insufficiency of funds." 13But such
presumption cannot hold if there is evidence to the contrary. In this case, we find that the other party has presented evidence to contradict said
presumption. Hence, the prosecution is duty bound to prove every element of the offense charged, and not merely rely on a rebuttable
presumption.

Admittedly, what are involved here are postdated checks. Postdating simply means that on the date indicated on its face, the check would be
properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then. 14 The checks in this case were issued at the time of the signing of the
Contract to Sell in August 1989. But we find from the records no showing that the time said checks were issued, petitioner had knowledge that
his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when presented for encashment. 15 On the contrary, there is testimony by
petitioner that at the time of presentation of the checks, he had P150,000,00 cash or credit with Citibank.

As the evidence for the defense showed, the closure of petitioner's Account No. 845515 with Citibank was not for insufficiency of funds. It was
made upon the advice of the drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each time petitioner issued a "stop payment" order to prevent
encashment of postdated checks in private respondent's possession. 16 Said evidence contradicts the prima facie presumption of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds. But it establishes petitioner's state of mind at the time said checks were issued on August 24, 1989. Petitioner definitely
had no knowledge that his funds or credit would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment. He could not have foreseen
that he would be advised by his own bank in the future, to close his account to avoid paying the hefty banks charges that came with each "stop
payment" order issued to prevent private respondent from encashing the 30 or so checks in its possession. What the prosecution has established is
the closure of petitioner's checking account. But this does not suffice to prove the second element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22, which
explicitly requires "evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds" by the accused at the time the check or checks are presented for encashment.

To rely on the presumption created by B.P. No. 22 as the prosecution did in this case, would be to misconstrue the import of requirements for
conviction under the law. It must be stressed that every element of the offense must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, never presumed.
Furthermore, penal statutes are strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Under the Bouncing Checks Law, the
punishable act must come clearly within both the spirit and letter of the statute. 17

While B.P. Blg. 22 was enacted to safeguard the interest of the banking system, 18 it is difficult to see how conviction of the accused in this case
will protect the sanctity of the financial system. Moreover, protection must also be afforded the interest of townhouse buyers under P.D. No.
957. 19 A statute must be construed in relation to other laws so as to carry out the legitimate ends and purposes intended by the
legislature. 20 Courts will not strictly follow the letter of one statute when it leads away from the true intent of legislature and when ends are
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 21 More so, when it will mean the contravention of another valid statute. Both laws have to be
reconciled and given due effect.

Note that we have upheld a buyer's reliance on Section 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payments until such time as the owner or developer had
fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. 22 This exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments, is to our mind, a valid defense against
the purported violations of B.P. Blg. 22 that petitioner is charged with.

Given the findings of the HLURB as to incomplete features in the construction of petitioner's and other units of the subject condominium bought
on installment from FRC, we are of the view that petitioner had a valid cause to order his bank to stop payment. To say the least, the third
element of "subsequent dishonor of the check. . . without valid cause" appears to us not established by the prosecution. As already stated, the
prosecution tried to establish the crime on a prima facie presumption in B.P. Blg. 22. Here that presumption is unavailing, in the presence of a
valid cause to stop payment, thereby negating the third element of the crime.1âwphi1

Offenses punished by a special law, like the Bouncing Checks Law, are not subject to the Revised Penal Code, but the Code is supplementary to
such a law. 23 We find nothing in the text of B.P. Blg. 22, which would prevent the Revised Penal Code from supplementing it. Following Article
11 (5) 24 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner's exercise of a right of the buyer under Article 23 of P.D. No. 957 is a valid defense to the charges
against him.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner Francisco T. Sycip, Jr., is ACQUITTED of the charges against him under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the offenses charged beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105002 July 17, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIARANGAN DANSAL, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Appellant claims that he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. Because he admits in effect the commission of a punishable act, he
must prove the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.

Statement of the Case

This appeal seeks the reversal of the December 4, 1990 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case No. 3141
convicting Appellant Diarangan Dansal of the crime of murder.

A complaint against appellant was filed on March 28, 1990 by INP3 Station Commander Cabsaran C. Azis of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. After
preliminary investigation, Provincial Prosecutor IV Felix Fajardo charged appellant with murder on September 7, 1990 in an Information which
reads:4

That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1990, at Matungao, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with 4 John Does,
who are still at large and whose case is still pending in the lower court, with treachery, evident premeditation, taking
advantage of superior strength, and with intent to kill, did then & there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one Abubacar Pagalamatan with a Garand rifle thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Upon arraignment, appellant with the assistance of counsel de oficio pleaded nor guilty. In due course, the trial court rendered its assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:5

WHEREFORE, finding accused DIARANGAN DANSAL guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and he is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Abubakar Alamat, also known as Abubakar Pagalamatan the amount of P30,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay costs.

Accused is entitled in full for the period of his detention.

Hence, this appeal.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution sought to establish that on March 2, 1990 in Pasayanon, Matungao, Lanao del Norte, appellant, armed with a Garand rifle like
his four (4) other companions, fired the fatal shots which caused the death of Abubakar Alamat, also known as "Abubakar Pangalamatan."

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Cosain Dowa, Dr. Marilyn Rico, Amina Oticol, Panda Antalo and Timal Mosa. Their
testimonies may be synthesized as follows:

Panda Antalo testified that at three o'clock in the afternoon of March 2, 1990 in Matungao, Lanao del Norte, he and Timal Mosa were walking
through a barrio road on their way to see Mayor Asis.6 They saw Abubakar Alamat, the victim, conversing with five (5) persons, one of whom
was appellant. However, Antalo did not recognize appellant's companions. When he and Mosa were five (5) meters away from the group, he
heard gunshots. He turned his head and noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's rifle and empty shells were falling therefrom. The
Garand rifles of appellant and his companions were pointed at the victim who was lying on the ground face upwards. Seven (7) shots were fired.
At that time Antalo was "immobile as he was frightened." Thus, he was unable to run and take cover. After appellant and his companions ran
towards the coffee plantation, Antalo approached the victim and discovered that the latter had sustained seven (7) wounds. 7
Timal Mosa corroborated Antalo's account. He testified that at 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, he and Antalo were on their way to Mayor Asis'
house in Pasaupnon, Matungao. He saw the victim, the appellant and four (4) other persons talking to one another. Then he heard a gunshot from
behind. When he turned to look, he noticed that smoke was coming out of appellant's gun and that empty shells were dropping from it as
appellant continued to fire at the victim. Appellant's rifle was pointed at the victim who had fallen on the ground. He heard seven (7) gunshots.
Appellant's companions also carried Garand rifles, but Mosa concluded that these were not fired because he did not notice any smoke from their
barrels. He was not frightened. Neither did he take cover, as he knew both the victim and the appellant. After firing at the victim, appellant
together with his four companions fled towards Mayor Asis' coffee plantation. He and Antalo approached the victim, whom they found already
dead. Thereafter, they reported the shooting to the victim's wife. 8

Cosain Dowa, a Rural Sanitarium Inspector of the Health Office of Matungao, Lanao del Norte, testified that on March 5, 1990 he prepared the
victim's Certificate of Death (Exh. "A"). Although his main duty was to inspect food establishments, construct barangay toilets, and assist in
watershed constructions in the municipality, he also helped the health officer in the preparation of death certificates. 9 When the body of the victim
was brought in, he observed gunshot wounds on his right foot, right thigh and right breast. The right knee was distorted. There was a bullet hole
at the victim's back which he believed was the entry point leading to the gaping wound on the breast. 10

Dr. Marilyn Rico testified that she was the Rural Health Officer of Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She signed Abubakar Alamat's Certificate of
Death (Exh. "A-2") 11 which was prepared by Dowa.

Amina Oticol, the widow of the victim, testified that, around 3:00 p.m. of March 2, 1990, she was at their house in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao
del Norte. Antalo and Mosa came and informed her that appellant killed her husband. She had her husband's corpse brought to their house. Her
husband was buried in Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. She incurred expenses for the burial in the amount of P15,000.00, but she asked for
P100,000.00 as compensation therefor. 12

Version of the Defense

Appellant was the lone witness for the defense. He testified that on March 1, 1990, he went to Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte to visit his elder sister
Saramina Dansal. At his sister's house, Mimbalawang Dorado, together with his sons Macod, Talente and Talente's son Usop, all surnamed
Dorado, seized appellant and brought him to their house at Tongkol, Tagolo-an, Lanao del Norte for reasons undisclosed to him. 13

The next day, March 2, 1990 at 7:00 a.m., they all left Tagolo-an for Matungao and arrived there at 11:00 a.m. He was given a Garand rifle that
was not serviceable. They proceeded to the victim's house at Panta-on, Matungao, Lanao del Norte. They asked the victim to come out and then
they fired their guns at him as soon as he appeared. Appellant said that the Dorados killed the victim to avenge the killing of one of
Mimbalawag's sons named Ali by a certain "Salonga," the victim's paternal cousin.

After shooting the victim, the Dorados allegedly aimed their guns appellant and told him to run away. As he was also related to the victim, the
latter's mother being his paternal aunt, appellant wanted to shoot the Dorados. Finding that his rifle was not operational, he fled with the Dorados.
Thereafter, they rode a truck to Karomatan. They left their guns at the house of Mimbalawag's sister in Bangko, near Matungao. 14 He went home
and afterwards told the mayor of Tagolo-an that the Dorados killed his cousin. He was subsequently summoned and detained by the mayor of
Panta-on. 15

Ruling of the Trial Court

As stated earlier, the court a quo convicted appellant of murder. It gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It disbelieved
appellant in view of the absence of any improper motive on the witnesses' part to testify wrongly against him.

The trial court noted that appellant and the four (4) Dorados were all armed with Garand rifles; that they immediately fired their guns at the
victim as he came out of his house; and that the victim was not in a position to defend himself. From these facts, it concluded that the offenders
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by them to ensure the accomplishment of their
purpose with impunity. Thus, treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation were appreciated in the conviction of the appellant.

Hence, this appeal.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant through the Public Attorney's Office ascribes the following errors to the trial court:

The lower court erred in not finding that accused-appellant's presence in the crime scene was under a compulsion of an
irresistable (sic) force.

II
 16
The lower court erred in considering the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength.

In a nutshell, appellant invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion under an irresistible force under paragraph 5, Article 12 of the
Revised Penal Code. Further, he argues that, if at all, he should be convicted only of homicide because the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstances of treachery and/or abuse of superior strength.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Preliminary Issue: Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

Without specifically raising it as an error, appellant nonetheless laced his brief with attacks on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Hence,
we shall dispose of this matter.

Well-settled is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. 17 Such
findings are conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any showing that the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. 18 We have carefully scrutinized the records of
this case and the arguments of appellant, and we have found no reason to reverse the findings of the trial court.

The two prosecution eyewitnesses positively and clearly identified appellant as the assailant who alone fired his rifle at the victim. Their
testimonies corroborated each other. Antalo testified thus: 19

PROSECUTOR BADELLES:

q Now, in the afternoon of March 2, 1990, around 3:00 o'clock more or less, did (sic) you remember
where were you?

a I can remember, sir.

q Where were you?

a I was on my way to see Mayor Asis that day, sir.

q While on your way to Mayor Asis, were you walking, riding or what?

a I am walking with Timal, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

q While on your way to the house of Mayor Asis in that afternoon of March 2, 1990, with Timal, did
you notice anything along the road?

a Yes, there was.

PROSECUTOR BADELLES:

q What was that you noticed?

a While we are on our way to the Mayor's house, we saw Abubacar Alamat that he had 5
companions and I recognized one of them. (Witness pointing to the accused Abubacar Pagalamatan
[sic]).

q Now what were they doing when you saw them?

a They were having conversation, sir.

q Now, you said you saw them, now how far were you [from] the groups?
 a About 5 meters far, sir.

q Were they in front of you or at the back of you when you saw them first?

a At my back, sir.

q And then after that was there any unusual [event] that happened?

a There was, sir.

q What was that unusual thing that happened?

a I heard a shound (sic) of gun burst sir.

q What did you do when you heard that gun burst?

a I glanced at them and I noticed that the gun of Diarangan Dansal the tip of his gun has smoke and I
also noticed empty shells falling down.

q Now how far were you when you saw Diarangan Dansal with the tip of his gun having smoke and
the empty shells falling down from his gun?

a About 5 meters, sir.

q Now, how many burst all in all that you heard?

a Seven burst, sir.

q Now you said that you saw empty shells falling down from the gun of Diarangan. Dansal, how
many empty shells that you saw that fell down from the gund (sic) of Diarangan Dansal?

a I have not seen the others sir.

q By the way what was gun of Diarangan Dansal hold that time? (sic)

a Garand, sir.

q When you saw Dirangan (sic) Dansal holding a Garand and when you saw that tip of his gun
smoking, to was direct (sic) that his gun pointing?

a Pointing to Abubacar Pagalamatan, sir.

q Now how about Abubacar Pagalamatan at the time when you saw him holding a gun which was
pointed to Abubacar Pagalamatan with smoke coming out from the tip of the gun and the empty
shells falling down, what was the relative position of Abubacar Pangalamatan to Diarangan Dansal?

a Abubacar Pangalamat was lying down, his face upward, sir.

q Now, after you heard those 7 burst of a gun, what did you do next?

a I was immovilized (sic) sir.

q How about Diarangan Dansal and his companions, what did he do after the 7 burst you heard?

a They were running toward the coffee trees, sir.

Mosa corroborated Antalo's account in this wise: 20

PROS. BADELLES:

Q On or about March 2, 1990 at 3:00 in the afternoon, can you remember where were you?

xxx xxx xxx

A We were then going to the house of Asis at Pasayano, Matungao.

Q You used the word (')we(') who was your companion at that time?

A Panda Andalo.

Q While on your way to the house of Asis at Pasayano Matungao, along the way did you see any
person?

xxx xxx xxx

A I saw Diarangan Dansal and Abubakar Pangalamatan.

Q They have compnaion (sic) if any at that time?

A Yes, sir, I did not recognize him.

Q How many of them?

A Four (4).

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now waht (sic) was the position of these persons in relation to your position at the time you saw
them?

A I was ten (10) meters from them and they are talking to each other.

Q Were they in front of you or back of you?

A They are at my back.

Q Now, when you were about ten (10) meters from them, this ten (10) meter at your back were there
anything happened unusual (sic)?

xxx xxx xxx

A I heard gun shot and then I looked back.

Q Towards what direction after hearing the shot?

A I looked back at them.

Q Who was (')them(') that you are referring to?

A Abubakar Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal.

Q And when you look back at them what did you see?
A I saw firearm of iarangan (sic) Dansal and the firearm was smoking and the empty shells were
coming out from the rifle.

Q Towards what direction was the firearm (sic) of Diarangan Dansal pointed to when see him at that
time?

A The firearm was pointed to at Abubakar Pangalamatan.

Q When you look back at them and saw Diarangan Dansal pointed his firearm to Abubakar
Pangalamatan what was then the position of Abubakar Pangalamatan?

A When the firearm exploded, Abubakar Pangalamatan fell down.

xxx xxx xxx

Q By the way how many shots that you hear (sic)?

A Seven shots.

Q The first shots that you hear was immediately, was prior to the looking back where Abubakar
Pangalamatan and Diarangan Dansal were located (sic)?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about the second shots, when did you hear it?

A As I look back.

Q Did you see who fire (sic) the shot?

A Diarangan Dansal.

Q How did you know that it was Diarangan Dansal who fired the (sic) second shot?

A Because there was a smoke coming from his gun and the empty shells coming from his rifle.

Q In the second shot, was shooting (sic) by Diarangan Dansal to what direction was the firearm of
Diarangan Dansal point to? (sic)

A It was he who was still pointing his gun to Pangalamatan.

Q How about the third shot, when did you hear it?

A Well, I suspect that it was still at the gun of Diarangan Dansal and I heard that the same gunshot
coming from the guaran (sic) of Diarangan Dansal.

Q How did you know that the same shot was coming from the same barrel of Diarangan Dansal?

A Because smoke was coming out from the barrel of his gun.

Q And the 4th the 5th, the 6th and the seven (7) shots you hear it when?

A Still from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal.

Q How do you know that it was coming from the firearm of Diarangan Dansal?

A Because the smoke was still coming out from his gun and the empty shell coming from his gun.
 Q How about the companion of Diarangan Dansal was they arm (sic) at that time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What firearm?

A Garand.

Q All the while when you hear the gunshots and all these six (6) successive gun shots and saw
Diarangan Dansal shot what did the companion of Diarangan Dansal do?

A They were around Diarangan Daniel holding their gun.

Q Did you notice if they fired their gun?

A No, sir.

Q How did you know that they did not shot their firearm?

A Because there was no smoke coming from their firearm.

Q After the 7th shot, do you know what the group of Drainage Daniel (sic) did?

A They Fled (sic).

Q Towards what direction?

A Towards the coffee plantation.

Both testimonies are straightforward, clear and consistent and they point categorically to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime.

Furthermore, appellant has not alleged, much less proven, ill motive on the part of said witnesses to accuse appellant of such a grave offense. In
his brief, appellant admits that he cannot discern any reason for Antalo and Mosa to testify falsely against him. 21 In this light, we cannot fault the
court a quo for holding that: 22

The court is constrained to believe that the testimonies of witnesses Panda Antalo and Timal Mosa are credible for failure
by the defense to show that said witnesses were prejudiced against the accused or that said witnesses had an existing
improper motive in imputing to the accused the crime for which he is charged. When there is no evidence showing that the
witnesses are prejudiced against the accused, the witnesses would not have imputed to the accused the commission of such
a grave offense as that of murder if it was not true that he was really guilty thereof (People vs. Ali, 29 SCRA 756). The
absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly tends to sustain
the conclusion that such improper motive did not exist, and that their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit (People
vs. Saroah, 5 SCRA 385; People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910).

The defense assails the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Antalo and Mosa because their conduct during the commission of the crime was
allegedly contrary to common experience. Appellant finds it unlikely for said eyewitnesses to keep on "standing despite the burst of gunfire as if .
. . watching a movie in the making" and to remain unmoved by the violent shooting incident. Ordinarily, a man in a similar situation would either
take cover or run for safety. Because the eyewitnesses did not so conduct themselves, appellant concludes that their testimonies were
preposterous and untrue.

We disagree. Antalo said that he was so scared of what was happening that he could not move, while Mosa admitted that he "was afraid" but he
did not take cover, as he knew both the appellant and the victim. Their reactions, although the exact opposite of each other, are valid and
probable. Taking cover or running away is not the only natural reaction possible under the circumstances. There is no standard form of human
behavioral response to a strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. 23

First Issue: Exempting Circumstance Insufficiently Proved

Appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, because he allegedly acted under the
compulsion of an irresistible force. He allegedly joined the armed Dorados against his will because of fear for his own safety. He claims in his
brief that the Dorados were guarding him so closely that "escape was risky and protection by lawfully constituted authorities was, at the moment,
out of reach." 24

We cannot sustain such defense. A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force must prove his
defense by clear and convincing evidence. 25 He must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted not only without
will but also against his will. 26 The compulsion must be of such character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.

The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not enough. 27 A speculative, fanciful or remote
fear, 28 even fear of future injury, 29 is insufficient.

In this case, appellant failed to show such compulsion. In his testimony, he did not mention that the Dorados physically or morally threatened to
kill or hurt him. He did not even make any attempt to resist. He simply took for granted that they would kill or hurt him if he did not allow them.
No evidence was presented to establish how, if at all, he was compelled to join the Dorados in killing the victim. In other words, appellant failed
to prove that the Dorados made a real and imminent threat on his life or climb sufficient to overcome his free will.

Indeed, the Court finds no acceptable basis for appellant's assertion that he was compelled and intimidated by the Dorados. Even without him, the
Dorados could have easily carried out the crime, if such was their intention. If we believe appellant's story, there was no need for the Dorados to
mortally threaten appellant to join them. Besides, forcing appellant, a relative of the victim, to join them complicated rather than facilitated their
criminal endeavor. With the appellant present among them, they would have had to guard themselves from possible resistance and double cross in
case he did not consent to their plan. Furthermore, it would have been highly illogical for the Dorados to force appellant to take part in their
crime, only to give him an unserviceable rifle. 30

Moreover, his story does not inspire belief for reasons other than the obvious one that it is uncorroborated. According to appellant, he was taken
against his will from his sister's house in Tagolo-an the day before the commission of the crime. It is strange why his sister was not presented as
witness to corroborate his account. Even the mayor of Tagolo-an, to whom he reported that he had been forced to participate in a killing, could
have testified in his favor. But said official, who could have injected credence to his defense, was not presented to corroborate his testimony. The
non-presentation of these witnesses tends to show that they would not have corroborated appellant's allegations had they testified.

Second Issue: Qualifying Circumstances

The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength.

The evidence of the prosecution, however, adequately established only treachery. Treachery is appreciated when a frontal attack is directed at an
unarmed victim who is totally unaware of and unprepared for said assault. 31 There is treachery where the attack on an unarmed victim, who has
not given the slightest provocation, is sudden, unexpected and without warning. 32 According to Prosecution Witness Mosa, the victim, the
appellant and his companions were talking to one another prior to the shooting. It would have been impossible to hide Garand rifles from
someone who was so close. Thus, it is safe to assume that the victim knew that appellant and his companions were carrying them. If the victim
suspected that they would use those rifles to commit the crime, then he would have avoided them. But instead, the victim stayed and spoke with
them. The victim, therefore, had no idea that he was going to be shot by appellant who, after all, was his relative. Even if he eventually did come
to know that appellant intended to shoot him, he — being alone and unarmed — could not have defended himself against all five of them.

Abuse of superior strength, on the other hand, was not established, as there was no testimony to the effect that appellant and his companions took
advantage of their collective strength in order to kill the victim. 33 Witness Mosa even said that only appellant fired at the victim. Mere superiority
in number after all is not necessarily indicative of this aggravating circumstance.

The prosecution also failed to establish evident premeditation. For this qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, there must be a lapse of
sufficient time to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection that would allow the conscience of the actor to attempt to overcome the
resolution of his will. 34 But the prosecution was unable to establish this time element as its evidence dealt merely with the circumstances of the
actual shooting itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with modification as regards the civil indemnity which is
hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) in line with current jurisprudence. 35

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89684 September 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERARDO SAZON, alias "INSIK," accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

For the death of Wilfredo Longno, alias, "Inday," on September 17, 1983 at Barangay Progreso, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City, herein accused-
appellant Gerardo Sazon, alias "Insik," and Cornelio Altejos, alias "Toto," were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, 1 in an amended information dated October 18, 1983.2 However, only herein accused was arraigned, and pleaded not guilty, since Cornelio
Altejos was not apprehended and has since remained at large.

After trial, appellant was found guilty and sentenced to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was further ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased the amount of P16,628.40 representing hospital bills, expenses for the coffin, tomb, wake and attorney's fees, and P30,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of the victim.

The antecedental facts which led to the filing of the criminal action below are herein under set forth as synthesized by the court a quo from the
testimonies of the witnesses, 3 and as clarified and amplified by us from the transcripts of the notes of the hearings.
On September 15, 1983, in the barangay aforementioned, a certain Ernesto Romualdez was accosted by appellant near the barangay hall for
allegedly circulating the rumor that appellant and his companions were engaged in stealing. Upon confrontation, appellant boxed Romualdez
which caused the latter to fall. Wilfredo Longo, who was then present at the scene, approached and helped the fallen Romualdez and pushed
appellant away. This apparently angered appellant who, in his native dialect said "Andam ka lang Inday kay patyon ta guid," ("Watch out Inday
for I will kill you") to which Longno retorted, "Just do it."

Two days later, or on September 17, 1983, at about 8:00 o'clock P.M., appellant and his cousin, Cornelio Altejos, were drinking softdrinks at the
shire of Gloria Aposaga when Longno passed by. Thereupon, appellant and Altejos left their softdrinks half-assumed and followed Longno.

Longno eventually reached the bench near the public faucet where the group of Massulini Dullete, Samuel Canoso and Nathaniel Ramos were
sitting. He joined the group in their conversation by saying, "Upon ako dira." ("I'll go with what you say."). Shortly thereafter, appellant and
Altejos arrived and appellant accosted and pointed a gun at Longno, saying, "Maano ka?" ("What are you going to do?"). Longno then faced
appellant and said, "Brod, tiruha lang." ("Brod, just shoot.")

Apparently irked by the response, appellant fired the gun, hitting Longno in the left forearm. Dullete, Canoso and Ramos then scampered for
safety as appellant and the wounded Longno grappled for the gun. It was while the two were thus struggling that Altejos stabbed Longno in the
chest, after which both appellant and Altejos ran away.

Longno then came out of the footwalk shouting, "Tay tiniro ako ni Insik, binuno ako ni Toto." ("Father, I was shot by Insik and stabbed by
Toto."). He was able to run about thirty (30) meters before he fell. His father, Julio Longno, ran to his son who was then lying sprawled on the
ground. Rushed to the St. Paul's Hospital, Wilfredo Longno died. Later, it was established that the cause of death was hemorrhage, secondary to
stab wound.

Appellant's version of the incident, however, differs. He admits having shot Longno but pleads self-defense. He claims that on September 17,
1983, he left the house of his father-in-law at about 8:00 o'clock P.M. with his cousin, Altejos. The latter had asked for help to have a .22 caliber
revolver repaired and appellant was taking the revolver to a policeman friend of his. On their way, appellant saw Longno from a distance. Upon
his approach, Longno allegedly said, "Insik, I heard that you are not afraid of me. Maybe you want to be taught a lesson." 4

Appellant claims that the deceased had a revolver tucked in his waist and was about to draw the same. He, therefore, parried the gun but it fired
hitting one of appellant's left fingers which was later amputated. It was then that appellant pulled out his gun and shot Longno in the forearm.
Appellant and Longno afterwards grappled for the gun. Altejos allegedly tried to separate appellant and Longno but he was brushed aside by the
latter. In the course of their struggle, Altejos then shouted to appellant, "I stabbed Inday, run," and so he and Altejos ran away. 5

Appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for having acted in complete self-defense.

2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder and in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when the prosecution has not established by competent evidence the existence of conspiracy and the presence of
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. 6

Appellant's version does not inspire credence. Well-entrenched is the rule that where the accused invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on
the weakness of the prosecution. For, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted
the killing. 7

It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the presence of unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against
the person defending himself.8

In the present case, the burden of evidence having been shifted, we hold that the defense failed to establish the primary element of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim and, therefore, the plea of self-defense must fail. The narrations of the sequence of events by the accused, and
by the lone alleged eyewitness for the defense, Jose Randera, are unconvincing primarily on account of their inherent inconsistency and conflict
with each other.

Appellant on cross-examination testified as follows:

Q How far were you from Inday Longno when he allegedly fired a shot at you?

A One (1) meter.

 Q At one (1) meter distance did (sic) you not able to recognize what kind of a gun was that allegedly
used by Inday Longno?

A No, sir, at first I only saw the handle of the gun and I did not see the body of the gun.

Q But you can recognize between a pistol and a revolver?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that allegedly used by Inday Longno, was that a pistol or a revolver?

A Because immediately after he said those words 'Maybe you want to learn a lesson he immediately
drew his gun and I was able to parry.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When you fired at Inday Longno hitting him on his left arm near the elbow, was he still holding
that gun he used in shooting you hitting you at the left palm?

A No, sir, because of too much force the gun fell.

Q Did you not pick up the gun?

A No, sir.9

On the other hand, defense eyewitness Jose Randera stated in his testimony:

ATTY. SORONGON: (To the witness)

Q While Wilfredo Longno alias Inday was pointing a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, what was
Gerardo Sazon doing?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

A When Inday said something, Insik Sazon brushed aside the gun and the gun fired.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said, that Wilfredo Longno alias Inday pointed a gun at Gerardo Sazon alias Insik, with what
hand was he holding that gun when he was pointing that gun to Gerardo Sazon?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

A His right hand.

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q You said that Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun which was being pointed to him, what hand
did Gerardo Sazon used (sic) in brushing that gun?

A His left hand.

Q When Gerardo Sazon brushed aside the gun pointed to him, what else if any did he do?

A Insik also drew a gun and shot Inday,

COURT: (To the witness)

 Q What hand?

A Right hand. He drew a gun with his right hand and shot Inday.

xxx xxx xxx

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q You said that there was a brushing, who was brushing aside and who was brushed aside?

WITNESS JOSE RANDERA:

Q Inday parried Cornelio Artejos (sic).

COURT: (To the witness)

Q And, what happened next?

Cornelio Artejos (sic) pulled out a knife and stabbed Inday.

Q This happened when Inday was already hit by Sazon?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. SORONGON (To the witness)

Q When Cornelio Artejos (sic) stabbed Wilfredo Longno alias Inday, what was Gerardo Sazon and
Wilfredo Longno doing if they were doing anything.?

A They were graffling of (sic) the weapon.

Q You are referring to whose weapon they were graffling (sic) at that time?

A Inday's weapon.10

The testimonies aforequoted reveal an inconsistency on the matter of the gun for which appellant and the victim supposedly grappled. While
appellant claimed that the victim's weapon fell to the ground, witness Randera stated that appellant and the victim still grappled for the latter's
gun. The latter statement is itself difficult to imagine since appellant at that precise moment was also allegedly holding with his right hand the
gun which he used in shooting Longno.

It is necessary to stress that such inconsistency cannot be considered a minor detail since the homogeneity of the answers to the inquiry could
very well have established the existence of not only a single gun. Had this prevarication not been exposed, said testimonies could have bolstered
the defense theory that the victim himself carried a gun which he used to assault the appellant and thus establish the element of unlawful
aggression contrived by the defense.

Furthermore, the credibility of witness Randera is shattered by this finding of the trial court which is sustained by the evidence:

The testimony of security guard Jose Randera deserves scant consideration not only because he admitted that he was one of
those threatened by the deceased Wilfredo Longno but also because he wilfully falsified the truth when he testified that the
deceased was shot and hit by the accused on the body and that he saw blood come out just below the right breast of the
deceased. The physical evidence in this case showed that there was no wound on the right breast of the deceased nor on
any part of his body. The gunshot wound sustained by the deceased was only on his left forearm. Considering that he
testified that there were no other persons there during the incident except the accused, the deceased and Cornelio Altejos
when the overwhelming weight of evidence is that there were a lot of other people during the incident (this) showed that
this witness had small regard for the truth. 11

Coming back to appellant's representations in court, his vacillation as to what he allegedly did after Altejos stabbed the victim is another instance
which renders his version highly suspect. While stating on direct examination that he ran to the main road, 12 he claimed on cross-examination
that he only walked a short distance and then went to the hospital upon seeing that his hand was wounded. 13 The latter statement is itself
 14
inconsistent with his earlier declaration during the same proceeding that he was brought by a policeman to the hospital. This irresolution on the
part of the appellant was obviously to avoid any imputation of guilt against him arising from his flight. 15

At any rate, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is further negated by the physical evidence in the case. Again, we quote the trial court
with approval:

The testimony of the accused Gerardo Sazon that the deceased was armed with a gun and fired at him is not borne out by
the physical evidence in this case. The paraffin test conducted on the cadaver of the deceased showed that the hands of the
deceased were negative for gunpowder residues indicating that he did not fire a gun during the incident. The other parts of
his body like his forearm and his abdomen bore strong traces of gunpowder residues because of the burst of the gun of the
accused. The court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that there was only one gun during the incident and that the gun
belonged to and/or was used by the accused Gerardo Sazon. That a part of one of his fingers was blown off at very close
range, according to Dr. Ely Canja strongly indicated that the accused accidentally hit his finger when he and the deceased
grappled for the possession of the gun. 16

In contrast, appellant was found positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates). While the presence or absence of nitrates cannot
indeed be considered conclusive proof that one has or has not fired a gun, the following testimony on direct examination by prosecution witness
Zenaida Sinfuego a forensic chemist whose expertise on the matter was sufficiently established, yields this verification:

Atty. E. Original:

Q Now, have you conducted also a paraffin examination on the person of Wilfredo Longno?

COURT:

Q On the cadaver?

Atty. E. Original:

Q On the cadaver?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Have you brought with you the result of that examination?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now I have here a carbon original of Chemistry Report No. C-200-83, result of the paraffin test on
the cadaver of Wilfredo Longno, please compare this carbon original to the original copy in your
possession whether it is the same?

A The same.

xxx xxx xxx

Q This report says specimen submitted, one pair of paraffin casts taken from the left and right hands
of the cadaver of one Wilfredo Longno, one piece of paraffin cast taken from left forearm of same
subject and one piece paraffin last taken from the left side of the abdomen. Purpose of laboratory
examination: to determine the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) on the above-mentioned
specimens. Findings, cast from hands-negative for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates).
Cast from forearm-positive for the presence of gunpowder residues (nitrates) in the 1 1/2 in, 2 1/2 in,
3 in, and 4 in radius. Cast from the left side of the abdomen-positive for the presence of gunpowder
residues (nitrates) in the center and in the 1 and 2 in radius. In the layman's language Mrs. Sinfuego,
will you please explain to the Honorable Court these findings 1, 2 and 3?

A Casts from the hands, negative for the presence of gunpowder residues that means that, no blue
specks were found in the hands of the cadaver.

COURT:
 Q Before we go on, what is the implication when the finding is negative?

A Probably, the subject never fired a gun.

Q Within what time-span?

A The gunpowder will stay only within three days.

Q When was this examination conducted?

A Last September 18,1983.

Q Now before we go on, on that Chemistry Report which has been marked as Exhibit 'D' regarding
the paraffin test conducted on the right hand of the accused Gerardo Sazon, your finding there states,
positive for gunpowder residues, what is the implication?

A The implication states positive, that Sazon have (sic) fired a gun.

Q Within what time-span?

A Within three days.

Q Within three days?

A Within three days.

Q From the examination?

A Three days from the subject firing of a gun.

Q And when was the examination conducted?

A Last September 19,1983, Your Honor.

Q September?

A Nineteen.

Q So he could have fired a gun on September 17,1983?

A I think that depends, Your Honor on the requesting party.

Q I am asking you if it was possible that he fired a gun which left the powder burns, was it possible
that he fired a gun on September 17?

A Yes, Your Honor. 17

On cross-examination, Sinfuego further testified as follows:

Q Is it possible for a person who has not fired a firearm and could be (sic) positive for nitrates?

A Yes, Sir.

Q In what instance?

A For example, if he is near to the person firing a gun it is possible that it was carried by the wind.
 Q So that is the only case wherein you find nitrates on the person who has not fired a gun?

A Also from the fertilizer.

Q You mean, a person handling fertilizers could also be positive for nitrates?

A Yes, Sir but we have to consider also the time of reaction, from contaminance (sic) for the nitrates
will take effect between two to three minutes.

COURT:

Q Can you determine on your examination whether the nitrates found was (sic) the nitrates left by
gunpowder residues or by fertilizer can you distinguish that?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And this (sic) nitrates found on the hands of the accused, could you determine where did it (sic)
come from?

A Gunpowder residues. 18

Parenthetically, it is true that the bad moral character of the offended party may be proven in evidence to establish in any reasonable degree the
probability of the offense charged, 19 e.g., the quarrelsome nature of the victim may tend to establish that he started the unlawful aggression.
Nonetheless, such evidence, seeking to establish as it does only a probability, cannot prevail over facts sufficiently proven by the prosecution
during the trial belying such aggression. These observations find application in the instant case where the defense presented and now argue on
character evidence consisting of criminal charges involving minor offenses which had been filed against the deceased, but not one of which
resulted in conviction and were in fact dismissed except for one case which was sent to the archives. 20

Obviously, whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. Being so and in the absence of any showing that the
Court a quo failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having
seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, lies for this
Court to disturb the trial court's finding that appellant did not act in self-defense. 21

The Court, however, holds that appellant, albeit guilty, can only be convicted of homicide and not murder. The trial court correctly held that the
killing was not accompanied by treachery. It, however, ruled that there was evident premeditation on the part of appellant. We find the records
sorely wanting in evidence to support the latter conclusion.

The fact that appellant told the deceased that he would kill him and that two days later, after the deceased passed by the store where appellant and
Altejos were drinking softdrinks the latter followed the former and inflicted the fatal blows, cannot adequately sustain a conclusion of
premeditated killing.

To justify its attendance, the prosecution must prove (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 22

In the case at bar, the first and second elements are lacking. The angry outburst of appellant in that incident of September 15, 1983, warning the
victim that the former would kill him, does not convince us that, under the circumstances therein, appellant as of that time had already decided to
kill the victim. A homicidal premeditation is studiedly conceived and not impulsively adopted just like that and, worse, publicly announced. It
was more of a spontaneous expression of resentment or bravado on the part of appellant.

Again, the circumstance that appellant and Altejos were by chance at the store when the victim passed by cannot be taken as manifestly indicating
that appellant had clung to his determination to kill the victim. No evidence was presented to show that appellant purposely waited there for the
deceased. Nor was there any showing that the deceased frequently passed by the same route as to warrant and explain appellant's waiting for the
former at that place. Indeed, that the meeting may have been purely accidental is not a remote possibility. We are more inclined to believe that it
was the belligerent and defiant demeanor of the victim when confronted by appellant near the public faucet that precipitated assault.

Under such considerations and there being no other evidence to prove that the death of the victim was the result of meditation, calculation or
reflection, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. 23The circumstances qualifying or aggravating the act
must be proved in an evident and incontestable manner. They must be proved as conclusively as the acts constituting the offense.24 Thus, for the
same reason, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Superior strength may aggravate or
qualify a crime, only if it is clearly shown that there was deliberate intent to take advantage of it. 25 In the absence of any evidence to show that the
accused purposely sought to use their superior strength to their advantage in the present case, a finding to that effect by the trial court cannot be
sustained.

Finally, the fact that appellant did not inflict the mortal wound upon the deceased is of no moment, since the existence of conspiracy was
satisfactorily shown by the evidence. The coordinated acts of appellant and Altejos of immediately following the victim and jointly confronting
him thereafter reveal a concordance and unity of thought which resulted in the encounter. The circumstances that after the accused shot the victim
in the forearm and, while he and the victim were grappling for appellant's gun, Altejos stabbed the victim to death, indicate closeness and
coordination of their action geared towards a common purpose, that is, to kill the victim. 26 Proof of a previous agreement to commit the crime is
not absolutely essential to establish a conspiracy. It is sufficient that the accused be shown to have acted in concert pursuant to the same
objective, 27 as such circumstance is invariably indicative of a conspiratorial agreement.

It bears mention, at this point, that while we have ruled out evident premeditation in the case, this does not negate the existence of a conspiracy.
True, conspiracy generally involves evident premeditation, but this circumstance requires for its raison d' etre a sufficient time in a juridical sense
for the accused to meditate and reflect on the consequences of his intended action. Such time element is not an indispensable requirement for a
conspiracy to exist. 28 Consequently, we find that there was a conspiracy between appellant and Altejos although, for lack of conclusive showing,
we cannot consider evident premeditation against appellant.

The rule is that where a conspiracy is proven, a showing as to who inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 29 The act of
one in killing the victim becomes the act of all the accused. Insofar as Cornelio Altejos is concerned, however, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over him and he can neither be convicted nor exculpated herein. References in this judgment to him are, therefore, obiter and with no
binding effect on him. 30

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Gerardo Sazon is declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.

The award by the lower court of the items of civil liability to be paid by accused-appellant to the heirs of the deceased is hereby MODIFIED by
disallowing the grant of attorney's fees for lack of basis, and increasing the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted
by the Court en banc on August 30,1990.

SO ORDERED.