Westmont
Westmont
Westmont
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
ABAD,
- versus - MENDOZA,
SERENO, and
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
CECILIA ZAMORA,
INC.,
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
THE FACTS:
On March 27, 2001, respondents Amos P. Francia, Jr., Cecilia Zamora and
Benjamin Francia (the Francias) filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money and Damages[4] arising from their investments against petitioner Westmont
Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc.
(Pearlbank) before the RTC.
Wincorp and Pearlbank filed their separate motions to dismiss.[5] Both motions
were anchored on the ground that the complaint of the Francias failed to state a
cause of action. On July 16, 2001, after several exchanges of pleadings, the RTC
issued an order[6] dismissing the motions to dismiss of Wincorp and Pearlbank for
lack of merit.
Wincorp then filed its Answer,[7] while Pearlbank filed its Answer with
Counterclaim and Crossclaim (against Wincorp).[8]
The case was set for pre-trial but before pre-trial conference could be held,
Wincorp filed its Motion to Dismiss Crossclaim[9] of Pearlbank to which the latter
filed an opposition.[10] The RTC denied Wincorps motion to dismiss crossclaim.[11]
The pre-trial conference was later conducted after the parties had filed their
respective pre-trial briefs. The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts,
as contained in the Pre-Trial Order[12] issued by the RTC on April 17, 2002:
3. On April 13, 2000, they again tried to get back the principal
amount they invested plus interest but, again, they were frustrated.[17]
After the testimony of Amos Francia, Jr., the Francias filed their Formal
Offer of Evidence.[19] Pearlbank filed its Comment/Objection,[20] while Wincorp
did not file any comment or objection. After all the exhibits of the Francias were
admitted for the purposes they were offered, the Francias rested their case.
Thereafter, the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of
Wincorp. On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp
filed a written motion to postpone the hearing on even date, as its witness, Antonio
T. Ong, was unavailable because he had to attend a congressional hearing.
Wincorps substitute witness, Atty. Nemesio Briones, was likewise unavailable due
to a previous commitment in the Securities and Exchange Commission.
On August 14, 2003, Pearlbank filed its Demurrer to Evidence.[23] The RTC
granted the same in its Order[24] dated January 12, 2004. Hence, the complaint
against Pearlbank was dismissed, while the case was considered submitted for
decision insofar as Wincorp was concerned.
On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision[25] in favor of the Francias
and held Wincorp solely liable to them. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
SO ORDERED.
Wincorp then filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC in
its Order[26] dated November 10, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
The CA explained:
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
Not in conformity, Wincorp seeks relief with this Court via this petition for
review alleging that −
ISSUE
The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA is correct in finding
Wincorp solely liable to pay the Francias the amount of ₱3,984,062.47 plus interest
of 11% per annum.
While it goes without saying that only questions of law can be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the same admits of exceptions,
namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when
the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.[32]
The Court finds that no cogent reason exists in this case to deviate from the
general rule.
Wincorp insists that the CA should have based its decision on the express terms,
stipulations, and agreements provided for in the documents offered by the Francias
as the legal relationship of the parties was clearly spelled out in the very
documents introduced by them which indicated that it merely brokered the loan
transaction between the Francias and Pearlbank.[33]
Wincorp would want the Court to rule that there was a contract of agency
between it and the Francias with the latter authorizing the former as their agent to
lend money to Pearlbank. According to Wincorp, the two Confirmation Advices
presented as evidence by the Francias and admitted by the court, were competent
proof that the recipient of the loan proceeds was Pearlbank.[34]
As to Pearlbank, records bear out that the Francias anchor their cause of action
against it merely on the strength of the subject Confirmation Advices bearing the
name PearlBank as the supposed borrower of their investments. Apparently, the
Francias ran after Pearlbank only after learning that Wincorp was reportedly
bankrupt.[38] The Francias were consistent in saying that they only dealt with
Wincorp and not with Pearlbank. It bears noting that even in their Complaint and
during the pre-trial conference, the Francias alleged that they did not have any
personal knowledge if Pearlbank was indeed the recipient/beneficiary of their
investments.
Although the subject Confirmation Advices indicate the name of Pearlbank as the
purported borrower of the said investments, said documents do not bear the
signature or acknowledgment of Pearlbank or any of its officers. This cannot prove
the position of Wincorp that it was Pearlbank which received and benefited from
the investments made by the Francias. There was not even a promissory note
validly and duly executed by Pearlbank which would in any way serve as evidence
of the said borrowing.
Another significant point which would support the stand of Pearlbank that it was
not the borrower of whatever funds supposedly invested by the Francias was the
fact that it initiated, filed and pursued several cases against Wincorp, questioning,
among others, the latters acts of naming it as borrower of funds from investors.[39]
It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings
before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason
that, as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were not formally offered
as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other parties
the right to examine and rebut them. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides:
The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest
its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by
the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or
purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight.[40]
The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as to
the evidence presented by the Francias. It is elementary that objection to evidence
must be made after evidence is formally offered.[41] It appears that Wincorp was
given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the formal offer of
evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error in rendering the assailed July 27,
2010 Decision and in issuing the challenged October 14, 2010 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.