[G.R. No. 157163. June 25, 2014.

]
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L.
HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY,
SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM
FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
Injunction should not issue except upon a clear showing that the applicant has a right in esse to
be protected, and that the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of such right. A preliminary
injunction should not determine the merits of a case, or decide controverted facts, for, being a
preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury, and irreparable
harm or injustice until the rights of the parties can be settled.
The Case
Under review at the instance of the defendant, now the petitioner herein, is the decision
promulgated on July 9, 2002, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the order issued on
July 5, 2001 in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 entitled Spouses Silverio & Zosima Borbon, et al. v.
Bank of the Philippine Islands by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, in Cebu City,
presided by Hon. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.
Antecedents
On May 22, 2001, respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and
Erlinda Facultad, and XM Facultad and Development Corporation commenced Civil Case No.
CEB-26468 to seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes, real estate and chattel
mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner. They
further sought damages and attorney's fees, and applied for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
or writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the petitioner from foreclosing on the mortgages
against their properties.
The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and had
executed promissory notes binding themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the sum borrowed;
that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted real estate mortgages on several
parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a continuing surety
agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero.
It appears that the respondents' obligation to the petitioner had reached P17,983,191.49, but they
had only been able to pay P13 Million because they had been adversely affected by the economic
turmoil in Asia in 1997. The petitioner required them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan

under threat of foreclosing on the mortgages. Thus, the complaint sought a TRO or a writ of
preliminary injunction to stay the threatened foreclosure.
On June 6, 2001, the petitioner filed its answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaim, as
well as its opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that the
foreclosure of the mortgages was within its legal right to do. 2 HETDAC
Also on June 6, 2001 the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss reiterating its affirmative defenses,
to wit:
I)
THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE VENUE IS
IMPROPERLY LAID. (RULE 16, SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH (C));
II)
THAT THE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CLAIM BECAUSE THE PROPER LEGAL FEES HAS NOT BEEN PAID
IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 14, OF THE RULES OF COURT AND CIRCULAR NO. 7
OF THE SUPREME COURT, SERIES OF 1988;
III)
THAT ZOSIMA BORBON'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE
PLAINTIFF ZOSIMA BORBON HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE BEING
DECEASED, SPOUSE OF PLAINTIFF SILVERIO BORBON. (RULE 16, SECTION 1(d));
IV)
THAT THE ESTATE OF ZOSIMA BORBON BEING AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY,
THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE THE ESTATE OF ZOSIMA
BORBON. (RULE 16, SECTION 1(j));
V)
THAT THE COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF XM FACULTAD AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THERE IS NO BOARD
RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING THE FILING OF THIS CASE. [RULE 16, SECTION 1 (d)];
VI)
THAT THE PLEADING ASSERTING THE CLAIM STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION. 3
On July 5, 2001, the RTC denied the petitioner's motion to dismiss for being unmeritorious, 4 but
granted the respondents' application for preliminary injunction, 5 to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for preliminary injunction is GRANTED.
Upon filing by the plaintiff-applicants of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000 in favor of
defendant to the effect that applicants will pay to adverse party all damages which it may sustain
by reason of the injunction, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued directing the defendant
and its agents or representatives, to cease and desist from commencing foreclosure and sale
proceedings of the mortgaged properties; from taking possession of the Mitsubishi Pajero subject
of the chattel mortgage; and from using the questioned post-dated checks as evidence for the

filing of complaint against plaintiffs Facultad for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, while the
present case is pending litigation.
This writ of preliminary injunction shall continue until further orders from the Court.
Notify the parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED. 6
The RTC later denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration through its order 7 of August
22, 2001.
Ruling of the CA
Dissatisfied, the petitioner assailed the orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari in the CA,
submitting the lone issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED AN ORDER DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS AND
GRANTING THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION.
On July 9, 2002, however, the CA rendered the adverse decision under review, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 16 dated July 5, 2001 and August 22, 2001 are hereby AFFIRMED. Let the
original records of this case be remanded immediately to the court a quo for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 8
The CA held that the petitioner's averment of non-payment of the proper docket fee by the
respondents as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was not substantiated; that even if the
correct docket fee was not in fact paid, the strict application of the rule thereon could be
mitigated in the interest of justice; 9 and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being a personal
action, was properly filed in Cebu City where respondent XM Facultad and Development
Corporation's principal office was located.
The CA further held that Zosima Borbon's death rendered respondent Silverio Borbon, her
surviving spouse, the successor to her estate; that although there was a valid transfer of interest
pending the litigation, the dismissal of the complaint would not be in order because it was
permissible under the rules to continue the action in the name of the original party; 11 and that
the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
because it thereby only applied the pertinent law and jurisprudence.
The CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration through its resolution of February 12,
2003.

Issues
Hence, this appeal, with the petitioner positing as follows:
1.
Whether or not Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed for (a) non-payment of
the correct amount of docket fee; and (b) improper venue;
2.
Whether or not the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the petitioner, its
agents and representatives, was in order.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
1.
Civil Case No. CEB-26468
was a personal action; hence,
venue was properly laid
The CA and the RTC held that Civil Case No. CEB-26468, being for the declaration of the
nullity of a contract of loan and its accompanying continuing surety agreement, and the real
estate and chattel mortgages, was a personal action; hence, its filing in Cebu City, the place of
business of one of the plaintiffs, was correct under Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner contends, however, that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a real action that should
be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real
property involved, or a portion thereof, was situated; and that consequently the filing and docket
fees for the complaint should be based on the value of the property as stated in the certificate of
sale attached thereto.
We sustain the lower courts' holdings.
The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the
Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real property, or an interest therein. Such
action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein
the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also
referred to as a local action. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal
actions. 15 Such actions may include those brought for the recovery of personal property, or for
the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of
damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property. 16 The venue of a personal
action is the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the

defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff, 17 for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one.
The complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 pertinently alleged as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

3.1
Plaintiffs signed blank pre-printed forms of promissory note no. 501253-000, continuing
surety agreement, real estate mortgages, chattel mortgage which violates the principle of
mutuality of contracts. These contracts are in the nature of contracts of adhesion with provisions
favouring defendant bank and plaintiffs had nothing to do except to sign the unjust stipulations
which should be declared as NULL AND VOID. These contracts do not reflect the real
agreement of the parties and the stipulations are tilted in favor of defendant bank.
3.2
Moreover, these real estate mortgages, chattel mortgages and continuing surety
agreement are securing specific amounts of obligation and upon the payment of P13,000,000 to
defendant bank, automatically, these became functus de oficio and should be released
immediately without the encumbrance.
3.3
As the chattel mortgage involving the Mitsubishi Pajero secured only P600,000.00, upon
liquidation of more than P800,000.00 principal payment, the same became null and void, and
defendant bank should be ordered to cancel the mortgage and to be directed not to take any
appropriate action to take possession.
3.4
In addition, Penbank Checks Nos. 11237 to 11242 with amounts of P200,000.00 each and
BPI Check Nos. 019098 & 019099 with amounts of P400,000.00 each, issued against the will of
plaintiffs Facultad and without any consideration, should be declared null and void. Defendant
bank should be directed not to deposit the same for collection with the drawee bank.
xxx

xxx

xxx

3.6
Furthermore, the total obligation of plaintiffs is void and baseless because it is based on
illegal impositions of exorbitant interest and excessive charges. Interest was converted into
principal which in turn earns interest. These illegal impositions are considered by law and
jurisprudence as null and void. These excessive interest and charges should be applied to the
principal unless there is application, defendant bank is enriching itself at the expense of
plaintiffs.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Based on the aforequoted allegations of the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468, the
respondents seek the nullification of the promissory notes, continuing surety agreement, checks
and mortgage agreements for being executed against their will and vitiated by irregularities, not

the recovery of the possession or title to the properties burdened by the mortgages. There was no
allegation that the possession of the properties under the mortgages had already been transferred
to the petitioner in the meantime. Applying the determinants, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was
unquestionably a personal action, for, as ruled in Chua v. Total Office Products and Services
(Topros), Inc.: 19
Well-settled is the rule that an action to annul a contract of loan and its accessory real estate
mortgage is a personal action. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal
property, the enforcement of a contract or the recovery of damages. In contrast, in a real action,
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as indicated in Section 2 (a), Rule 4 of the
then Rules of Court, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the recovery of
possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property.
In the Pascual case, relied upon by petitioner, the contract of sale of the fishpond was assailed as
fictitious for lack of consideration. We held that there being no contract to begin with, there is
nothing to annul. Hence, we deemed the action for annulment of the said fictitious contract
therein as one constituting a real action for the recovery of the fishpond subject thereof.
We cannot, however, apply the foregoing doctrine to the instant case. Note that in Pascual, title
to and possession of the subject fishpond had already passed to the vendee. There was, therefore,
a need to recover the said fishpond. But in the instant case, ownership of the parcels of land
subject of the questioned real estate mortgage was never transferred to petitioner, but remained
with TOPROS. Thus, no real action for the recovery of real property is involved. This being the
case, TOPROS' action for annulment of the contracts of loan and real estate mortgage remains a
personal action.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. provides the proper
precedent in this case. In Hernandez, appellants contended that the action of the Hernandez
spouses for the cancellation of the mortgage on their lots was a real action affecting title to real
property, which should have been filed in the place where the mortgaged lots were situated. Rule
4, Section 2 (a), of the then Rules of Court, was applied, to wit:
SEC. 2.
Venue in Courts of First Instance. (a) Real actions. Actions affecting title
to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage
on, real property, shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
thereof lies.
The Court pointed out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the rule on real
actions only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It does not include an
action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage. Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The

latter thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the
above-cited section, to wit:
SEC. 2.
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the same vein, the action for annulment of a real estate mortgage in the present case must fall
under Section 2 of Rule 4, to wit:
SEC. 2.
Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
Thus, Pasig City, where the parties reside, is the proper venue of the action to nullify the subject
loan and real estate mortgage contracts. The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
upholding the orders of the Regional Trial Court denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the case
on the ground of improper venue.
Being a personal action, therefore, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was properly brought in the RTC
in Cebu City, where respondent XM Facultad and Development Corporation, a principal
plaintiff, had its address.
Upon the same consideration, the petitioner's contention that the filing and docket fees for the
complaint should be based on the assessed values of the mortgaged real properties due to Civil
Case No. CEB-26468 being a real action cannot be upheld for lack of factual and legal bases.
2.
Respondents were not entitled
to the writ of preliminary injunction
In their application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the respondents averred
that the nullity of the loan and mortgage agreements entitled them to the relief of enjoining the
petitioner from: (a) foreclosing the real estate and chattel mortgages; (b) taking possession, by
replevin, of the Mitsubishi Pajero; and (c) depositing the postdated checks; that respondents
Spouses Facultad would suffer injustice and irreparable injury should the petitioner foreclose the
mortgages and file criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against them;
and that such threatened acts, if done, would render ineffectual the judgment of the trial court. 20
They prayed that the petitioner be enjoined from doing acts that would disturb their material
possession of the mortgaged properties, manifesting their willingness to post a bond for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. 21

As mentioned, the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction on July 16, 2001 based on the
foregoing allegations of the respondents' application, 22 and the CA upheld the issuance in its
assailed July 9, 2002 decision. 23
The petitioner submits that the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction constituted a
violation of Administrative Circular (AC) No. 07-99 dated June 25, 1999, and thus subjected
respondent Judge to administrative sanction; 24 that injunction could not issue to enjoin the
prosecution of the criminal offenses because such prosecution was imbued with public interest;
25 and that the petitioner, as the mortgagee, could not be prohibited from exercising its legal
right to foreclose the mortgages because foreclosure of the mortgages was its proper remedy
under the law. 26
AC No. 07-99 was issued as a guideline for lower court judges in the issuance of TROs and writs
of preliminary injunctions to prevent the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure
and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs, viz.:
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 07-99 June 25, 1999
TO: ALL JUDGES OF LOWER COURTS
RE: EXERCISE OF UTMOST CAUTION, PRUDENCE, AND JUDICIOUSNESS IN
ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS AND WRITS OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS
Despite well-entrenched jurisprudence and circulars regarding exercise of judiciousness and care
in the issuance of temporary restraining orders (TRO) or grant of writs of preliminary injunction,
reports of complaints on abuses committed by trial judges in connection therewith persist. Some
even intimated that irregularities, including corruption, might have influenced the issuance of the
TRO or the writ of preliminary injunction.
No less than the President of the Philippines has requested this Court to issue a circular
reminding judges to respect P.D. No. 1818, which prohibits the issuance of TROs in cases
involving implementation of government infrastructure projects. The Office of the President has
likewise brought to the attention of this Court orders of judges releasing imported articles under
seizure and forfeiture proceedings by the Bureau of Customs.
Judges are thus enjoined to observe utmost caution, prudence and judiciousness in the issuance
of TRO and in the grant of writs of preliminary injunction to avoid any suspicion that its
issuance or grant was for considerations other than the strict merits of the case.
Judges should bear in mind that in Garcia v. Burgos (291 SCRA 546, 571-572 [1998]), this
Court explicitly stated:

Sec. 1 of PD 1818 distinctly provides that "[n]o court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any
case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project . . . of the government, . . . to
prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding with, or continuing
the execution or implementation of any such project . . . or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or operation." At the risk of being repetitious, we
stress that the foregoing statutory provision expressly deprives courts of jurisdiction to issue
injunctive writs against the implementation or execution of an infrastructure project.
Their attention is further invited to Circular No. 68-94, issued on 3 November 1994 by the OCA
OIC Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez, on the subject "Strict Observance of
Section 1 of P.D. 1818 Envisioned by Circular No. 13-93 dated March 5, 1993, and Circular No.
20-92 dated March 24, 1992.
Finally, judges should never forget what the Court categorically declared in Mison v. Natividad
(213 SCRA 734, 742 [1992] that "[b]y express provision of law, amply supported by well-settled
jurisprudence, the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture
proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it to
naught."
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that this circular is immediately
disseminated and shall monitor implementation thereof.
STRICT OBSERVANCE AND COMPLIANCE of this Circular is hereby enjoined.
AC No. 07-99 was irrelevant herein, however, because Civil Case No. CEB-26468 did not
involve the implementation of infrastructure projects, or the seizure and forfeiture proceedings
by the Bureau of Customs. Consequently, the petitioner's urging that respondent Judge be held
administratively liable for violating AC No. 07-99 was misplaced.
However, the RTC's issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from
proceeding with the foreclosure of the mortgages was plainly erroneous and unwarranted.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or
final order requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts.
27 It is the "strong arm of equity," an extraordinary peremptory remedy that must be used with
extreme caution, affecting as it does the respective rights of the parties. 28 The requirements for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO are enumerated in Section 3, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3.
Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction may
be granted when it is established:

(a)
That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b)
That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or HTaSEA
(c)
That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
In City Government of Butuan v. Consolidated Broadcasting System (CBS), Inc., 29 the Court
restated the nature and concept of a writ of preliminary injunction, as follows:
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order requiring a party or a court, an agency, or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which
case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Thus, a prohibitory injunction is one that
commands a party to refrain from doing a particular act, while a mandatory injunction
commands the performance of some positive act to correct a wrong in the past.
As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who
possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is
proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint,
which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments
must in the minimum constitute a prima facie showing of a right to the final relief sought.
Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be
protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and
(c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An
injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and
may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent
the perpetration of an act prohibited by statute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction,
means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.
Under the circumstances averred in the complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-26468, the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. They
had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of
their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on
their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid. The
foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact
payment. 30 In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner's allegations that they had not fully paid
their obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to

stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been
compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements.
It is true that the trial courts are given generous latitude to act on applications for the injunctive
writ for the reason that conflicting claims in an application for the writ more often than not
involve a factual determination that is not the function of the appellate courts; 31 and that the
exercise of sound discretion by the issuing courts in injunctive matters ought not to be interfered
with except when there is manifest abuse. 32 Nonetheless, the exercise of such discretion must
be sound, that is, the issuance of the writ, though discretionary, should be upon the grounds and
in the manner provided by law. 33 Judges should always bear in mind that the writ of
preliminary injunction is issued upon the satisfaction of two requisite conditions, namely: (1) the
right to be protected exists prima facie; and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that
right.
According to Saulog v. Court of Appeals, 34 the applicant must have a sufficient interest or right
to be protected, but it is enough that:
. . . for the court to act, there must be an existing basis of facts affording a present right which is
directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined. And while a clear showing of the right
claimed is necessary, its existence need not be conclusively established. In fact, the evidence to
be submitted to justify preliminary injunction at the hearing thereon need not be conclusive or
complete but need only be a "sampling" intended merely to give the court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits. This
should really be so since our concern here involves only the propriety of the preliminary
injunction and not the merits of the case still pending with the trial court.
Thus, to be entitled to the writ of preliminary injunction, the private respondent needs only to
show that it has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in its complaint . . . .
It is also basic that the power to issue a writ of injunction is to be exercised only where the
reason and necessity therefor are clearly established, and only in cases reasonably free from
doubt. 35 For, truly, a preliminary injunction should not determine the merits of a case, 36 or
decide controverted facts. 37 As a preventive remedy, injunction only seeks to prevent
threatened wrong, 38 further injury, 39 and irreparable harm 40 or injustice 41 until the rights of
the parties can be settled. As an ancillary and preventive remedy, it may be resorted to by a party
to protect or preserve his rights during the pendency of the principal action, and for no other
purpose. 42 Such relief will accordingly protect the ability of the court to render a meaningful
decision; 43 it will further serve to guard against a change of circumstances that will hamper or
prevent the granting of proper relief after a trial on the merits. 44 Verily, its essential function is
to preserve the status quo between the parties until the merits of the case can be heard. 45
SACHcD

Moreover, the applicant must prove that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injustice. 46 But the respondents failed to establish the irreparable injury they would
suffer should the writ of preliminary injunction not be issued. They principally feared the loss of
their possession and ownership of the mortgaged properties, and faced the possibility of a
criminal prosecution for the post-dated checks they issued. But such fear of potential loss of
possession and ownership, or facing a criminal prosecution did not constitute the requisite
irreparable injury that could have warranted the issuance of the writ of injunction. "An injury is
considered irreparable," according to Philippine National Bank v. Castalloy Technology
Corporation, 47
. . . if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had
therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured
with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing
necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of
compensation.
The injury being feared by the herein respondents is not of such nature. Ultimately, the amount
to which the mortgagee-bank shall be entitled will be determined by the disposition of the trial
court in the main issue of the case. We have explained in Equitable PCI Banc, Inc. v. OJ-Mark
Trading, Inc. that all is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by
creditors-mortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the
right of redemption granted to them under the law. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures,
mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is
retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone will not affect the
validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
As a general rule, the courts will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction whether
preliminary or final in order to enjoin or restrain any criminal prosecution. 48 But there are
extreme cases in which exceptions to the general rule have been recognized, including: (1) when
the injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4) when the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) when the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) when the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) when it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (9) when the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance;
and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied. 49 However, the respondents did not sufficiently show that Civil
Case No. CEB-26468 came under any of the foregoing exceptions. Hence, the issuance by the
RTC of the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the petitioner from instituting criminal
complaints for violation of BP No. 22 against the respondents was unwarranted.

Every court should remember that an injunction should not be granted lightly or precipitately
because it is a limitation upon the freedom of the defendant's action. It should be granted only
when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it, 50 for no
power exists whose exercise is more delicate, which requires greater caution and deliberation, or
is more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction.
In view of the foregoing, the CA grossly erred in not declaring that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in granting the application of the respondents as the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. CEB-26468. The RTC apparently disregarded the aforecited well-known norms and
guidelines governing the issuance of the writ of injunction. Thereby, the RTC acted capriciously
and arbitrarily. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power
was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 52
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;
MODIFIES the decision promulgated on July 9, 2002 by annulling and setting aside the writ of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. CEB-26468 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch
16, in Cebu City for being devoid of factual and legal bases; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, in Cebu City to proceed with dispatch in Civil Case No. CEB-26468; and DIRECTS
the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.