Republic of the Philippines appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military

SUPREME COURT service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite
Manila of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the
information.
EN BANC
The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense
G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938 that they have not registered in the military service because Primitivo
de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has
vs. no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.
Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance
----------------------------- to one month and one day of imprisonment, with the costs.

G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938 In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which
the accused were sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the Constitution of the
vs. Philippines provides as follows:
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.
SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of
Severino P. Izon for appellants. government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee. may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.
AVANCEÑA, J.:
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory
In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but
Tranquilino and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the
section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of
and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein.
and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had
been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that
appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to the compulsory military service adopted by reason of the civil war

1
and the world war does not violate the Constitution, because the
power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to
declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because
the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is
a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with
its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the
case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
385), it was said that, without violating the Constitution, a person
may be compelled by force, if need be, against his will, against his
pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country,
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In the case of
United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was also said that this is not
deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its
just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.

The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by

reason on the actual existence of war does not make our case any
different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis, what justifies compulsory
military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or whether
in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The
circumstance that the appellants have dependent families to support
does not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before
the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they can
ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they
can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family
responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1).

The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with

the costs to the appellants. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

2
 Republic of the Philippines On October 3, 1975, the private respondents were advised that their
SUPREME COURT employment had been converted from permanent full-time to
Manila permanent part-time, effective October 18, 1975. 6 Their reaction
was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings
FIRST DIVISION conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the U.S.
Department of Defense. The result was a recommendation from the
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988 hearing officer who conducted the proceedings for the reinstatement
of the private respondents to permanent full-time status plus
DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, petitioners, backwages. The report on the hearing contained the observation that
vs. "Special Services management practices an autocratic form of
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, as Presiding Judge, Branch I, Court supervision." 7
of First Instance of Zambales, Olongapo City, ANTHONY M. ROSSI
and RALPH L. WYERS, respondents. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau on May 17, 1976 (Annex
"A" of the complaint), Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's
report and asked for the rejection of the abovestated
recommendation. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr.
CRUZ, J.: Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs.
Rossi and Wyers have proven, according to their immediate
The basic issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the supervisors, to be difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even
petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the though the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case with
acts for which they have been sued for damages by the private anyone, (they) placed the records in public places where others not
respondents. Once this question is decided, the other answers will involved in the case could hear."
fall into place and this petition need not detain us any longer than it
already has. On November 7, 1975, before the start of the grievance hearings, a-
letter (Annex "B" of the complaint) purportedly corning from
Petitioner Sanders was, at the time the incident in question occurred, petitioner Moreau as the commanding general of the U.S. Naval
the special services director of the U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA) in Station in Subic Bay was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel
Olongapo City. 1 Petitioner Moreau was the commanding officer of explaining the change of the private respondent's employment status
the Subic Naval Base, which includes the said station. 2 Private and requesting concurrence therewith. The letter did not carry his
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence in signature but was signed by W.B. Moore, Jr. "by direction,"
the Philippines,3 as so was private respondent Wyer, who died two presumably of Moreau.
years ago. 4 They were both employed as gameroom attendants in
the special services department of the NAVSTA, the former having On the basis of these antecedent facts, the private respondent filed
been hired in 1971 and the latter in 1969. 5 in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a for damages against

3
the herein petitioners on November 8, 1976.8 The plaintiffs claimed narrated acts of the respondent court are tainted with grave abuse
that the letters contained libelous imputations that had exposed of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
them to ridicule and caused them mental anguish and that the
prejudgment of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their We return now to the basic question of whether the petitioners were
personal and proprietary rights. acting officially or only in their private capacities when they did the
acts for which the private respondents have sued them for damages.
The private respondents made it clear that the petitioners were being
sued in their private or personal capacity. However, in a motion to It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a government
dismiss filed under a special appearance, the petitioners argued that functionary is being sued in his personal capacity will not
the acts complained of were performed by them in the discharge of automatically remove him from the protection of the law of public
their official duties and that, consequently, the court had no officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state immunity. By the
jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. same token, the mere invocation of official character will not suffice
to insulate him from suability and liability for an act imputed to him
After extensive written arguments between the parties, the motion as a personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority.
was denied in an order dated March 8, 1977, 9 on the main ground These well-settled principles are applicable not only to the officers of
that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that their acts the local state but also where the person sued in its courts pertains
were official in nature and not personal torts, moreover, the to the government of a foreign state, as in the present case.
allegation in the complaint was that the defendants had acted
maliciously and in bad faith. The same order issued a writ of The respondent judge, apparently finding that the complained acts
preliminary attachment, conditioned upon the filing of a P10,000.00 were prima facie personal and tortious, decided to proceed to trial to
bond by the plaintiffs, against the properties of petitioner Moreau, determine inter alia their precise character on the strength of the
who allegedly was then about to leave the Philippines. Subsequently, evidence to be submitted by the parties. The petitioners have
to make matters worse for the defendants, petitioner Moreau was objected, arguing that no such evidence was needed to substantiate
declared in a default by the trial court in its order dated August 9, their claim of jurisdictional immunity. Pending resolution of this
1977. The motion to lift the default order on the ground that question, we issued a temporary restraining order on September 26,
Moreau's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference was the result 1977, that has since then suspended the proceedings in this case in
of some misunderstanding, and the motion for reconsideration of the the court a quo.
denial of the motion to dismiss, which was filed by the petitioner's
new lawyers, were denied by the respondent court on September 7, In past cases, this Court has held that where the character of the act
1977. complained of can be determined from the pleadings exchanged
between the parties before the trial, it is not necessary for the court
This petition for certiorari, prohibition and preliminary injunction was to require them to belabor the point at a trial still to be conducted.
thereafter filed before this Court, on the contention that the above- Such a proceeding would be superfluous, not to say unfair to the

4
defendant who is subjected to unnecessary and avoidable officer's criticism—in effect a direct attack against him—-that Special
inconvenience. Services was practicing "an autocratic form of supervision."

Thus, in Baer v. Tizon, 10 we held that a motion to dismiss a complaint As for Moreau,what he is claimed to have done was write the Chief
against the commanding general of the Olongapo Naval Base should of Naval Personnel for concurrence with the conversion of the private
not have been denied because it had been sufficiently shown that the respondents' type of employment even before the grievance
act for which he was being sued was done in his official capacity on proceedings had even commenced. Disregarding for the nonce the
behalf of the American government. The United States had not given question of its timeliness, this act is clearly official in nature,
its consent to be sued. It was the reverse situation in Syquia v. performed by Moreau as the immediate superior of Sanders and
Almeda Lopez," where we sustained the order of the lower court directly answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving the
granting a where we motion to dismiss a complaint against certain special services department of NAVSTA In fact, the letter dealt with
officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown to be acting officially in the financial and budgetary problems of the department and
the name of the American government. The United States had also contained recommendations for their solution, including the re-
not waived its immunity from suit. Only three years ago, in United designation of the private respondents. There was nothing personal
States of America v. Ruiz, 12 we set aside the denial by the lower court or private about it.
of a motion to dismiss a complaint for damages filed against the
United States and several of its officials, it appearing that the act Given the official character of the above-described letters, we have
complained of was governmental rather than proprietary, and to conclude that the petitioners were, legally speaking, being sued as
certainly not personal. In these and several other cases 13 the Court officers of the United States government. As they have acted on
found it redundant to prolong the other case proceedings after it had behalf of that government, and within the scope of their authority, it
become clear that the suit could not prosper because the acts is that government, and not the petitioners personally, that is
complained of were covered by the doctrine of state immunity. responsible for their acts. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it
is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment of damages,
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the such award will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in personal capacities but by the United States government as their
the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the principal. This will require that government to perform an affirmative
special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had act to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the necessary
supervision over its personnel, including the private respondents, amount to cover the damages awarded, thus making the action a suit
and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, against that government without its consent.
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed that the letter
he had written was in fact a reply to a request from his superior, the There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot
other petitioner, for more information regarding the case of the prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable
private respondents.14 Moreover, even in the absence of such has given its consent to' be sued. So we have ruled not only in Baer
request, he still was within his rights in reacting to the hearing but in many other decisions where we upheld the doctrine of state

5
immunity as applicable not only to our own government but also to This case must also be distinguished from such decisions as Festejo v.
foreign states sought to be subjected to the jurisdiction of our Fernando, 23 where the Court held that a bureau director could be
courts. 15 sued for damages on a personal tort committed by him when he
acted without or in excess of authority in forcibly taking private
The practical justification for the doctrine, as Holmes put it, is that property without paying just compensation therefor although he did
"there can be no legal right against the authority which makes the convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was not necessary to secure
law on which the right depends.16 In the case of foreign states, the the previous consent of the state, nor could it be validly impleaded
rule is derived from the principle of the sovereign equality of states as a party defendant, as it was not responsible for the defendant's
which wisely admonishes that par in parem non habet imperium and unauthorized act.
that a contrary attitude would "unduly vex the peace of
nations." 17 Our adherence to this precept is formally expressed in The case at bar, to repeat, comes under the rule and not under any
Article II, Section 2, of our Constitution, where we reiterate from our of the recognized exceptions. The government of the United States
previous charters that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted has not given its consent to be sued for the official acts of the
principles of international law as part of the law of the land. petitioners, who cannot satisfy any judgment that may be rendered
against them. As it is the American government itself that will have
All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as to perform the affirmative act of appropriating the amount that may
such without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are be adjudged for the private respondents, the complaint must be
a number of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
officer may be sued as such to compel him to do an act required by
law, as where, say, a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of The Court finds that, even under the law of public officers, the acts of
sale; 18 or to restrain a Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good faith,
a law claimed to be unconstitutional; 19 or to compel the national which has not been overturned by the private respondents. Even
treasurer to pay damages from an already appropriated assurance mistakes concededly committed by such public officers are not
fund; 20 or the commissioner of internal revenue to refund tax over- actionable as long as it is not shown that they were motivated by
payments from a fund already available for the purpose; 21 or, in malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.24 This, to, is well
general, to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy settled .25 Furthermore, applying now our own penal laws, the letters
by himself without the government itself having to do a positive act come under the concept of privileged communications and are not
to assist him. We have also held that where the government itself has punishable, 26 let alone the fact that the resented remarks are not
violated its own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the defamatory by our standards. It seems the private respondents have
government even without first filing his claim with the Commission overstated their case.
on Audit as normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity
"cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice." 22 A final consideration is that since the questioned acts were done in
the Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the performance of
their official duties and the private respondents are themselves

6
American citizens, it would seem only proper for the courts of this Our Temporary restraining order of September 26,1977, is made
country to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and to treat PERMANENT. No costs.
it as coming under the internal administration of the said base.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners' counsel have submitted a memorandum replete with
citations of American cases, as if they were arguing before a court of Narvasa, Gancayco, Grino-Aquiño and Medialdea, JJ., Concur.
the United States. The Court is bemused by such attitude. While
these decisions do have persuasive effect upon us, they can at best Footnotes
be invoked only to support our own jurisprudence, which we have
developed and enriched on the basis of our own persuasions as a 1 Rollo, pp. 2, 26.
people, particularly since we became independent in 1946.
2 Ibid.
We appreciate the assistance foreign decisions offer us, and not only
from the United States but also from Spain and other countries from 3 Id.
which we have derived some if not most of our own laws. But we
should not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard 4 Id., p. 319.
them as indispensable mental crutches without which we cannot
come to our own decisions through the employment of our own 5 Id., pp. 4, 27, 91.
endowments We live in a different ambience and must decide our
own problems in the light of our own interests and needs, and of our 6 Id., pp. 5, 91.
qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our
own concept of law and justice. 7 Id., p. 5, 28, 91.

The private respondents must, if they are still sominded, pursue their 8 Id., pp- 26-34.
claim against the petitioners in accordance with the laws of the
United States, of which they are all citizens and under whose 9 Id., pp- 90-94.
jurisdiction the alleged offenses were committed. Even assuming
that our own laws are applicable, the United States government has
10 57 SCRA 1.
not decided to give its consent to be sued in our courts, which
therefore has not acquired the competence to act on the said claim,.
11 84 Phil. 312.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders dated
12 136 SCRA 487.
March 8,1977, August 9,1977, and September 7, 1977, are SET ASIDE.
The respondent court is directed to DISMISS Civil Case No. 2077-O.

7
13 Lim v. Brownell, et al., 107 Phil. 344; Parreño v. 23 50 O.G. 1556.
McGranery, 92 Phil. 791; Lim v. Nelson, 87 Phil. 328;
Marvel Building Corp. v. Philippine War Damage 24 Philippine Racing Club, Inc., et al. v. Bonifacio, et
Commission, 85 Phil. 27. al., 109 Phil. 233.

14 Rollo, pp. 35-40. 25 Cabungcal, et al. v. Cordova, et al., 11 SCRA 584,

cited in Mabutol v. Pascual, 124 SCRA 867; Mindanao
15 Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, supra; Marvel Building Realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814; U.S. v. Santos,
Corp. v. Philippine War Damage Commission, supra; 36 Phil. 853. 2'
Lim v. Nelson, supra; Philippine Alien Property
Administration v. Castelo, 89 Phil. 568; Parreño v. 26 Art. 354, par. 1, Revised Penal Code; see also U.S.
McGranery, supra; Johnson v. Turner, 94 Phil. 807-all v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731; and Deano v. Godinez, 12
cited in Baer case; United States of America v. SCRA 843.
Ruiz, supra.

16 Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349.

17 De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 QB 171.

18 Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461.

19 Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30:

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

20 Treasurer of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. L-42805, August 31, 1987.

21 National Development Company v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 151 SCRA 472.

22 Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360, reiterating

Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 40 SCRA
464.

8
 FIRST DIVISION Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the
legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the
Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained:

[G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996] According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA objects that are associated with an event, achievement,
MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, characteristic, or modification that makes a turning point or stage in
HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Philippine history.Thus, the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni
Metro Manila, Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made
CLARAVAL, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as
Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with
PHILIPPINES, respondents. unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of
eminent domain may be authorized x x x.
DECISION
In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as
VITUG, J.: an agency of the Government charged with the maintenance and
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the care of national shrines, monuments and landmarks and the
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. development of historical sites that may be declared as national
SP No. 24969 (entitled Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. shrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may initiate the institution of
Pelayo, et al.), this Court is asked to resolve whether or not the public condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in
use requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of
expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedings should be instituted by
so declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a national the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic.
historical landmark.
Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office
The facts of the case are not in dispute. of the Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, expropriation[3] before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in
Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia, that:
ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by
the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National
of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, Historical Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was
pursuant to Section 4[2] of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the approved on January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture
land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06 and Sports, declaring the above described parcel of land which is the
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a

9
National Historical Landmark. The plaintiff perforce needs the land as an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in any case, had
such national historical landmark which is a public purpose. failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdictional
competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the
At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992
for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate possession resolution of the appellate court.
of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. After a
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few
hearing, the trial court issued, on 03 August 1989,[4] an order fixing
known postulates.
the provisional market (P54,120.00) and assessed (P16,236.00)
values of the property and authorizing the Republic to take over the Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and,
property once the required sum would have been deposited with the with less frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and
Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila. taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed
with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis
Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather than
that the intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and,
to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so
incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public
described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining
funds, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia
in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose
ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2),
through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.[9] It
Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution.[5]Petitioners sought, in the
is a right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state
meanwhile, a suspension in the implementation of the 03rd August
for public use or to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential
1989 order of the trial court.
part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent inseparable from sovereignty.[10] The only direct constitutional
Republic of its reply to petitioners motion seeking the dismissal of the qualification is that private property shall not be taken for public use
case, the trial court issued its denial of said motion to without just compensation.[11] This proscription is intended to
dismiss.[6] Five (5) days later, or on 20 February 1990,[7] another provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well
order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and academic the the individual against whose property the power is sought to be
motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 enforced.
August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners motion to dismiss.
Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the
Petitioners motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990
guidelines set by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress
order was likewise denied by the trial court in its 16th April
Administration,[12] to wit: (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the
1991 order.[8]
large number of people benefited; and, (c) the extent of social and
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition economic reform.[13] Petitioners suggest that we confine the concept
with the Court of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January of expropriation only to the following public uses,[14] i.e., the -
1992 decision, the appellate court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law was

10
x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, use concerning the whole community as distinguished from
bridges, ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including particular individuals. But each and every member of society need
schoolhouses, parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian not be equally interested in such use, or be personally and directly
wells, water supply and sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public want or
and railroads. exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County,
262 U.S. 700, 43 S.Ct. 689, 692, 67 L.Ed. 1186. The term may be said
This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive. to mean public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive
of general benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or
The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent
restricted locality, but must be in common, and not for a particular
of the Presidents power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to,
individual. The use must be a needful one for the public, which
specifically, acquire private lands for subdivision into smaller home
cannot be surrendered without obvious general loss and
lots or farms for resale to bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in
inconvenience. A public use for which land may be taken defies
this particular context of the statute that the Court had made the
absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society,
pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were not meant to be
new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and
preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent
functions of government, and other differing circumstances brought
domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the
about by an increase in population and new modes of
expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.[15]
communication and transportation. Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521,
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the 245 A.2d 579,586.[17]
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a
public need or a public exigency.[16] Black summarizes the The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
characterization given by various courts to the term; thus: traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis traditional uses. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear
for taking property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, cases of use by the public has long been discarded. This Court in Heirs
public use is one which confers same benefit or advantage to the of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,[18] quoting from Berman v. Parker
public; it is not confined to actual use by public. It is measured in (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held:
terms of right of public to use proposed facilities for which
condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of use, We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or
whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public is not desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and
advantage or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public inclusive. See DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96
use. Montana Power Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773. L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the of the legislature to determine that the community should be
right to take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced

11
as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the Congress and The other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate
account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nations for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.[20]
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the
Fifth Amendment that stands in the way. Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason &
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration,[21] has viewed the Constitution a
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to dynamic instrument and one that is not to be construed narrowly or
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately whatever
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. See problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a noted
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co. 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, has
810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v. Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad
668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427. as public welfare.[22]
Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that
It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad
[19] the expropriation of (Felix Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to
Co., that:
be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would
x x x A historical research discloses the meaning of the term public
benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
use to be one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the
upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to which
principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow
the resources of the individual may be devoted. x x x for whatever is
from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the marker
beneficially employed for the community is a public use.
is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be
it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not
is not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.[23]
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play.
As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in
doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of the fixing of the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need
lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of

12
opportunity to be heard;[24] contrary to petitioners argument, (2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid,
the records of this case are replete with pleadings[25] that could have or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of
dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional value of the property. any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious
Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher,
sustaining the trial courts order which considered inapplicable the
minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
case of Noble v. City of Manila.[26] Both courts held correctly. The
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
Republic was not a party to the alleged contract of exchange between
[6]
the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners which (the contracting parties) Rollo, pp. 68-69.
alone, not the Republic, could properly be bound. [7]
Rollo, p. 70.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in [8]
Rollo, pp. 71-76.
accord with law and jurisprudence.
[9]
Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., p. 523.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
[10]
Visayan Refining Company vs. Camus, 40 Phil. 550.
SO ORDERED.
[11]
Sec. 9, Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
[12]
84 Phil. 847.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 38-39.
[14]
[1]
Penned by Justice Nathanael De Pano, Jr., with the concurrence of Rollo, p.42.
Justices Luis Victor and Fortunato Vailoces. [15]
See Province of Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA
[2]
The National Museum and the National Historical Commission are 173.
hereby vested with the right to declare other such historical and [16]
See U.S. vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85.
cultural sites as National Shrines, Monuments, and/or Landmarks, in [17]
accordance with the guidelines set forth in R.A. 4846 and the spirit of Blacks Law Dictionary, p. 1232.
this Decree. [18]
125 SCRA 220.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 77-82. [19]
42 Phil. 102.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 66-67. [20]
Enrique Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd ed.,
[5]
Sec. 29. xxx. pp. 523-524.
[21]
31 SCRA 413.

13
[22]
Joaquin Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1987 ed., p. 282.
[23]
Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis, 228 SCRA 668.
[24]
Capuno v. Jaramillo, 234 SCRA 212.
[25]
Those pleadings include:
(a) An urgent motion that the hearing on the fixing of the propertys
provisional value and the taking of possession by the Republic over
the same be held in abeyance until after petitioners shall have
received a copy of the complaint and summons (Rollo, pp. 86-88;
(b) A motion to dismiss, dated 08 August 1989, seeking to dismiss the
complaint instituted by the Republic on the ground that the
expropriation in question is not for a public purpose and contrary to
Section 29(a), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution (Rollo, pp. 90-91);
(c) A motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the
implementation of the 03 August 1989 Order (Rollo, pp. 93-95); and
(d) A motion for reconsideration of the orders dated 15 and 20
February, 1990 (Rollo, pp. 103-111).
[26]
The Noble case holds that where there is a valid and subsisting
contract between the owners of the property and the expropriating
authority, there is no need or reason for expropriation (67 Phil. 1).

14