01 Rodriguez V PP
01 Rodriguez V PP
01 Rodriguez V PP
*
ROLEX RODRIGUEZ y OLAYRES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and ALLIED DOMECQ SPIRITS AND
WINES, represented by ALLIED DOMECQ PHILS., INC.,
respondents.
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* THIRD DlVlSION.
581
VOL. 684, OCTOBER 24, 2012 581
which to file his or her notice of appeal.―It is now settled that the fresh
period rule is applicable in criminal cases, like the instant case, where the
accused files from a judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or
reconsideration which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a
fresh 15-day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file
his or her notice of appeal. Verily, the application of the statutory privilege
of appeal must not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same
statutory privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day
period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of their
motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and incongruous
that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is more stringent than
those of civil cases. If the Court has accorded litigants in civil cases―under
the spirit and rationale in Neypes―greater leeway in filing an appeal
through the “fresh period rule,” with more reason that it should equally
grant the same to criminal cases which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct
right to liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
VELASCO, JR., J.:
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1 Rollo, pp. 69-81. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernandez
and concurred in by Associate Justices Japar B. Dimaampao and Francisco P. Acosta.
582
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2 Id., at pp. 82-83.
3 Id., at pp. 62-63. Penned by Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr.
4 Id., at pp. 56-59, dated January 29, 2009.
5 G.R. No. 241524, April 14, 2005, 469 SCRA 633.
583
Henceforth, this “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule
42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be
counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion
for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.6
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 644-645.
7 See Panolino v. Tajala, G.R. No. 183616, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 309, 315.
8 Sec. 1 of Rule 42; Sec. 4 of Rule 43; and Sec. 2 of Rule 45.
584
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has
been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of
the period begins to run. (Emphasis supplied.)
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s
pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to
the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure x x x.10
xxxx
Were we to strictly interpret the “fresh period rule” in Neypes and make
it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively
foster and encourage an absurd situation where a litigant in a civil case will
have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case―a situation
that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against
the accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we
favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation
where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must emphatically reject this
double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts
have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to
reason is not allowed in law―Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem
non permissum est in lege.
Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an
appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice in civil actions,
with more reason should the same treatment be accorded to the accused in
seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and
_______________
9 G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011, 642 SCRA 421.
10 Id., at p. 428.
585
It is, thus, now settled that the fresh period rule is applicable in
criminal cases, like the instant case, where the accused files from a
judgment of conviction a motion for new trial or reconsideration
which is denied by the trial court. The accused will have a fresh 15-
day period counted from receipt of such denial within which to file
his or her notice of appeal.
Verily, the application of the statutory privilege of appeal must
not prejudice an accused who must be accorded the same statutory
privilege as litigants in civil cases who are granted a fresh 15-day
period within which to file an appeal from receipt of the denial of
their motion for new trial or reconsideration. It is indeed absurd and
incongruous that an appeal from a conviction in a criminal case is
more stringent than those of civil cases. If the Court has accorded
litigants in civil cases―under the spirit and rationale in
Neypes―greater leeway in filing an appeal through the “fresh period
rule,” with more reason that it should equally grant the same to
criminal cases which involve the accused’s “sacrosanct right to
liberty, which is protected by the Constitution, as no person should
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law.”12
Consequently, in light of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner
seasonably filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2009, within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from January 19, 2009, the date of
receipt of the RTC Order denying his motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the April 14, 2009 Order of the RTC, Branch 24 in Manila and the
assailed March 2, 2010 Decision and June 29,
_______________
11 Id., at p. 430.
12 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 1; Macasasa v. Sicad, G.R. No. 146547, June 20,
2006, 491 SCRA 368, 383.
586
Petition granted.
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** Acting member per Special Order No. 1343 dated October 9, 2012.
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