[_] _Yu__ v.

Hon Tatad__ (Villonco) the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for
2012| BRION| Topic new trial or motion for reconsideration, litigants today need not concern
themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-
PETITIONER: Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara day period is now counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
RESPONDENTS: Cuneta-Pangilinan new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

SUMMARY: An Information for Estafa against the petitioner was filed with the
RTC. The RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
FACTS:
Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, 1. Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an
alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. In a
of the crime for which she was convicted. 2. May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
3. Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the
Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack of merit. RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would
exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. This was later denied
The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to our by the judge for lack of merit 4.
ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from 4. the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant to
the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial within which to file a notice Neypes v. Court of Appeals, she had a “fresh period” of 15 days from
of appeal. November 3, 2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up
to November 18, 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.
The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10 days late, 5. On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases. for being filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in
criminal cases.
ISSUE: 6. On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the
decision.
Whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in 7. On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for
criminal cases. resolution.
8. On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition
The “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
criminal cases. preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC from acting on the prosecution’s
The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the decision
provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day 9. The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s
appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary
interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the “fresh period rule”
litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15- enunciated in Neypes
day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the 10. The respondent People of the Philippines, through (OSG), filed a
order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal
order or resolution. actions since the evident intention of the “fresh period rule” was to set a
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s uniform appeal period provided in the Rules
pronouncement of a “fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period
for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of ISSUE:
Criminal Procedure. WON “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases
RULING: Yes, We find merit in the petition. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad
is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the
DOCTRINE: standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision
with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, RATIO:
Text.

1. “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do
away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus,
the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with
counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
2. fresh period” to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal
cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the
following reasons:
3. BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based,
makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal
case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that “*he period for appeal from final
orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be
fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award,
judgment, or decision appealed from.” Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to
recognize any distinction.
4. The provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently
worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two
provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon
the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon
receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this
situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases.
5. Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in
criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by certiorari to this
Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure