G.R. No.

170979               February 9, 2011

JUDITH YU, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
105, and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa
Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Judith Yu, et
al."1

The Factual Antecedents

The facts of the case, gathered from the parties’ pleadings, are briefly summarized below.

Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against
the petitioner was filed with the RTC.

In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a
penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of ₱3,800,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as
the fine.2

Fourteen (14) days later, or on June 9, 2005, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC,
alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for
which she was convicted.3

In an October 17, 2005 order, respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for lack
of merit.4

On November 16, 2005, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that pursuant
to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,5 she had a "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3,
2005, the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18, 2005, within
which to file a notice of appeal.6

On November 24, 2005, the respondent Judge ordered the petitioner to submit a copy of Neypes for
his guidance.7

On December 8, 2005, the prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being filed 10
days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in criminal cases.8

On January 4, 2006, the prosecution filed a motion for execution of the decision.9

On January 20, 2006, the RTC considered the twin motions submitted for resolution.
On January 26, 2006, the petitioner filed the present petition for prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the RTC
from acting on the prosecution’s motions to dismiss the appeal and for the execution of the
decision.10

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she
filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court,
applying the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
manifestation in lieu of comment, stating that Neypes applies to criminal actions since the evident
intention of the "fresh period rule" was to set a uniform appeal period provided in the Rules.11

In view of the OSG’s manifestation, we required the Spouses Casaclang to comment on the
petition.12

In their comment, the Spouses Casaclang aver that the petitioner cannot seek refuge in Neypes to
extend the "fresh period rule" to criminal cases because Neypes involved a civil case, and the
pronouncement of "standardization of the appeal periods in the Rules" referred to the interpretation
of the appeal periods in civil cases, i.e., Rules 40, 41, 42 and 45, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure among others; nowhere in Neypes was the period to appeal in criminal cases, Section 6
of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mentioned.13

Issue

The core issue boils down to whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes applies to
appeals in criminal cases.

The Court’s Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

The right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of
statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.14 The period to appeal is
specifically governed by Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129),15 as amended, Section 3
of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

Section 39 of BP 129, as amended, provides:

SEC. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas
corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.
Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:

SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for
perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon
the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within
which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion
for reconsideration within which to appeal, thus:

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the
speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals,
particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and
compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or
more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the
Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or
any final order or resolution.16

The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that
constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case.

The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules
and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the
15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day
period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.
While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh
period" to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:

First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based, makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129
categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to
recognize any distinction.17

Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.

Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case,
it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to
the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals by
certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section
3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42.

xxxx

Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme
Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the CA (in cases where the RTC exercised its appellate
jurisdiction) and to this Court in civil and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason exists why
the periods to appeal from the RTC (in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) to the CA in civil and
criminal cases under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be treated differently.

Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes and make it applicable only to the
period to appeal in civil cases, we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation where a
litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case – a
situation that gives undue favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the accused-
appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment when we favor a situation where property
interests are at stake, as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We must
emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for being contrary to reason. Over time, courts
have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law
– Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non permissum est in lege.18
Thus, we agree with the OSG’s view that if a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on
grounds of substantial justice in civil actions, with more reason should the same treatment be
accorded to the accused in seeking the review on appeal of a criminal case where no less than the
liberty of the accused is at stake. The concern and the protection we must extend to matters of
liberty cannot be overstated.1avvphi1

In light of these legal realities, we hold that the petitioner seasonably filed her notice of appeal on
November 16, 2005, within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from November 3, 2005, the date of
receipt of notice denying her motion for new trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-

Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the
prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent Judge is
also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioner’s appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698,
and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on
the merits.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice