The China Review, Vol. 1, No.

1 (Fall 2001), 137165

The Chinese Cultural Revolution

Revisited

Xing Li

This paper intends to construct a framework of understanding the Cultural

Revolution and the complexities of such an event on the basis of
historically novel forms of political, social and ideological relations. It
brings the Cultural Revolution back in a good light so as to show its
immense, autonomous historical importance as well as its continuing
relevance. It studies and establishes the relationship between Maos
political and ideological discourse manifested and practised in the
Cultural Revolution and the transformation of Chinas political economy
in the present era. It concludes that the theoretical and practical
problematics which the Cultural Revolution struggled to resolve can
transcend space and time and continue to yield to our reading in a new
light.

Introduction
Never before in history has Chinese society been so radically transformed
in so short a time. In the second half of the last century we have seen the
development and transformation of two contrasting Chinas: firstly, a
Maoist China that took a socialist development strategy characterized by
cooperative and state (public) ownership, control of the means of

Xing Li is a lecturer and research fellow in development studies, international

political economy and international relations at Aalborg University, Denmark. He
holds a Ph.D. in development studies and international relations. In recent years he
has published a number of articles, book chapters and essays on development
issues and international relations with a focus on China and East Asia, and other
topics related to debates on Marxism and Chinese socialism.
138 Xing Li

production, planned wealth distribution and resource allocation, struggle

for elimination of economic and political inequalities and class privileges,
utilization of human potentials, dominance of the interest of the immediate
producers at the workplace and of working people in all spheres of society
including control over politics and ideas. Secondly, a Dengist China that is
returning to market capitalism based on privatization of ownership,
marketization of the means of production and resource distribution, accep-
tance of economic inequities and political privileges, emphasis on science
and technology as the primary productive forces, promotion of the interests
of the privileged, professional and entrepreneur classes, and commercial-
ization of welfare and social security benefits.
This historical transformation from Mao to Deng represents a sharp
departure from the past as to national objectives, political agenda, eco-
nomic development, and, more importantly, ideological convictions. In the
era of Maos socialism, depending on how one assesses its successes and
failures, China was characterized by a historically unique experiment to
skip over the stage of capitalism and to bring about a socialist transforma-
tion of both the social structure and the consciousness of its people in ways
that defied conventional ideological and political norms in established
capitalist as well as socialist states. In the current era of Dengist market
socialism, China is undertaking a modernization process by embracing
capitalist practices, while at the same time incorporating itself into the
existing world system. The profound differences between revolutionary
socialisms emphasis on state ownership and welfare, collectivism and
egalitarianism and market socialisms increasing capitalist characteristics:
privatization, marketization, class polarization, regional disparities and
increasing inequality, have brought about serious contradictions which will
have to be tackled sooner or later.1
It is observable that events and changes taking place in China since
1976 have resulted in a situation in which the history that my generation
had learned and experienced is being totally rewritten: the Chinese Revo-
lution (19211949), which founded the new China, has been assessed by
radical reformist intellectuals as a mistake which prevented China from
becoming as developed as major Western industrial powers. Mao
Zedong, who used to be praised as a great leader, is criticized by them as
a dictator who created only disasters and was responsible for Chinas
backwardness. Mao Zedong Thought is often described as being political
madness or irrationalism. The cult of Mao is now viewed as proof of
the persistence of the traditions of oriental despotism or a manifestation of
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 139

feudal-fascism, and the Cultural Revolution (hereafter the CR), which not
long ago was widely praised as an innovative and revitalizing socialist
alternative for Chinas development, is described as a ten year disaster
that was responsible for causing a political and economic catastrophe and
for the severe setbacks and the heaviest losses suffered by the party and the
country.2 Chinese socialism, which a short while ago was seen as a revo-
lutionary model worldwide and as an ideological menace by both the US
and the USSR, is deemed to be a failure for delaying Chinas catching up
with the advanced nations, and the history of socialism in China has been
little more than a story of impractical, utopian dreams born from condi-
tions of backwardness.3 Socialist values such as collectivism and
egalitarianism, which were formerly praised as the source of Chinas
successful development and its position as a socialist world leader, are now
blamed for every backward aspect of Chinese society.4 In contrast, the
ongoing market socialism or socialism with Chinese characteristics is
portrayed as the only way of leading the nation to prosperity and to great
power status. 5
It seems that the current mainstream line of scholarship, both official
and intellectual, both in China and in the West is providing the expert
interpretations regarding all historical, political, economic and societal
questions presented by Chinese society. The disturbing feature of China
scholarship at present is its tendency to dissolve the so-called mainstream
expert interpretations into general public opinion. This is not surprising, for
as Jawaharla Nehru observed in 1946: History is almost always written by
the victors.
The aim of this paper is to call for a critical rethinking of the historical
issues with regard to Maos political thought and the CR even though they
have been described, interpreted, assessed and concluded both
officially and academically.6 It intends to evaluate Maos political ideology
dialectically and to bring the CR back in a good light so as to show its
immense, autonomous historical importance. It attempts to study and es-
tablish the relationship between Maos political and ideological discourse
manifested and practised in the CR and the transformation of Chinas
political economy in the present era. It endeavours to posit that, contrary to
conventional wisdom, the CR continues to provide us with a useful per-
spective to analyze and understand the contradictions unfolding after the
restoration of capitalism in China7 since the 1980s.
Methodologically, it attempts to offer a conceptualization of the CR
based on a framework of discourse analysis8 the role of political and
140 Xing Li

ideological thought as an approach to understanding the CR and its

continuing relevance in our present era. In other words, it attempts to
analyze the role of ideologies or the conscious elements in social life as the
driving-force for societal transformations and for a specific socio-political
project. It is not intended to provide the answers, rather, it aims at con-
structing a framework of understanding the CR and the complexities of
such an event on the basis of historically novel forms of political, social
and ideological relations. The analytical scope of this paper is mainly
centred at the internal/domestic level, although the author understands the
fact that there were external/international factors behind Maos motivation
to mobilize the CR movement.
The conclusion of this paper posits that the CR cannot be assessed
simply by the current market- and profit-based capitalist development
discourse. In one way or another, it is rather appropriate today to bring
back the analytical framework of the CR since it seems to be more relevant
today than in the 1960s. Contrary to the view that Maoism is a past episode
in Chinese history and the Cultural Revolution was irrational, the con-
sequence of Chinas socio-economic transformations since 1979 and the
direction in which China is moving indicate that the theoretical and prac-
tical problematics which the CR struggled to resolve can transcend space
and time and continue to yield to our reading in a new light.

Maos Political Thoughts and the Cultural Revolution

The search to ensure Chinas existence as a prosperous and strong nation
and political entity has been a key concern in modern Chinese history. This
issue confronting China was related to the necessity of creating a new
consciousness and viable culture capable of destroying the old feudal
system and of developing a new society. Earlier attempts by conservatives
and reformers were frustrated by the scope of the challenge and the pres-
sures from internal and external forces. Seeking a way to effect transforma-
tion and revival of China, Mao Zedong devoted his life to studying,
probing and looking for an answer to this dilemma. Although not particu-
larly attracted by the West, he eventually found some answers from the
Marxist-Leninist ideological value system. The success of the Chinese
Revolution is commonly recognized as the result of Maos efforts in
sinicising Marxism-Leninism.
After the Communist victory in 1949 and with the successful develop-
ment of the socialist economy and transformation in the early 1950s, few
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 141

people in the Communist leadership thought of revolution as a process to

be continued through a prolonged period of contention and struggle. Revo-
lution was mainly regarded as the act of seizing power, whereas the
building of a new economy and society would require a different method.
But the next three decades were to see the continuation of the revolution
through a progression of several mass movements, such as the Great Leap
Forward the Anti-Rightist Movement in the 1950s and the Great Proletar-
ian Cultural Revolution in the 19601970s. Maos theory of uninterrupted
revolution was put into practice in these experiments and it maintained that
even under socialist development the revolution must continue. Among
those experiences, the CR was perhaps the most dramatic example of a
nation in search of a development strategy that would avoid the shackles of
the old, resolve continuous contradictions and pursue an independent
and self-reliant development.
One of the problems facing post-revolutionary China, as in all former
socialist states, was that old relations were being constantly reproduced,
although the goal of the socialist project was to break down traditional
social relations. The traditional bureaucratic relations, i.e. the relations of
domination and subordination and the old divisions in the social, political
and economic domains, were still being endlessly reproduced in the ex-
socialist states. Antonio Gramsci is right in pointing out that hegemony can
never be taken for granted, and it has to be continually maintained even
after a social class or group has become dominant and achieved state
power.9 In Maos view, a solid socialist hegemony is determined by
whether such an ideology is able to occupy all positions throughout society
and control the whole process of social reproduction.10
A revolution in ideological consciousness and traditional values is a
critical precondition and an integrated part of any revolutionary social
transformation. Very often the delicate relationship between cultural
change and revolution, especially during the post-revolutionary period,
poses great challenges to the sustainability of the changes which the
revolution has achieved. In confronting the challenges, different revolu-
tionary leaders have different strategies. Some may struggle to continue
cultural revolution after the seizure of state power in order to combat and
eliminate the possibility of the re-emergence of cultural conservatism and
the return to the old. Others may have to yield to strong resistance from
cultural conservatism and accept a kind of adaptation or compromise. And
some may even have to go back to the old under strong pressure and
become revisionists.
142 Xing Li

During and after the completion of socialist transformation in China

in the 1950s, there emerged a number of familiar social symptoms both in
the countryside and cities: the tendency of former landlords and rich
peasants to resume capitalist practices, increasing government bureau-
cracy fuelled by rapid industrialization, and rising localism and political
regimentation. All these had their roots in the old society. This was perhaps
the logic and rationale behind Maos theory of uninterrupted revolution in
the cultural and political domains. The meaning of continuous revolution
should be understood as referring to the preservation of some important
continuities in Maos thought and practice. As Selden summarizes:
These include the fierce commitment to eliminate exploitation and property-
based inequality; the emphasis on political mobilization, class struggle, and
political and ideological transformation and their relationship to economic
development; the proclivity to replace the market and the household economy
by large cooperative, collective, and state institutions; and the emphasis on
self-reliance and the suspicion of intellectuals and technical personnel.11

Mao showed a keen awareness both in theory and practice of the

importance of continuous effort in coping with post-revolutionary contra-
dictions the problems inherited from the pre-revolutionary culture and
society. He understood that the struggle to resist various counter-
revolutionary forces was an extremely difficult and complex task which
entailed many unexpected occurrences and outcomes. After the initial
success of the transition to socialism, Mao constantly pondered the follow-
ing questions:
Was the aim of the revolution merely to build up Chinas wealth and power,
or was it to entail the creation of a new socialist man as well? Was a professional
party, equipped to lead Chinas industrialization through its mastery of planning
and scientific technology, the proper motivating force for building a socialist
society? Or was that force the creativity of the masses, liberated by new social,
political, cultural, and economic relationships?12

The difficulties facing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were

basically how to foster rapid industrialization in a traditional and backward
society, and how to deal with the problem of scarcity (technology,
resource, capital) while building a strong socialist society in the direction
of achieving common prosperity. Maos approach to resolving these diffi-
culties emphasized the role of ideology and organization as a substitution
for scarcity. Ideology as the motive force and organization as the instru-
ment were promoted to mobilize the sense of devotion and the spirit for
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 143

change among the masses. It was the peoples power, the mass line,
rather than technological productivity that was relied on as input for
mobilization.
Mao was convinced that human beings were capable of unleashing
tremendous power in terms of dedication, self-sacrifice and hard-work for
the cause of Chinese socialism. When people were given proper ideologi-
cal indoctrination and organizational discipline, they would in time be-
come imbued with these new values and traits. According to this view, to
transform society and pursue economic development is to first and fore-
most transform human beings, who must be guided to raise their con-
sciousness and strengthen their will. Here, Mao contributed dialectical
moralism as a new perspective to Marxist dialectical materialism by
stressing the role of ideology and morality in influencing peoples thought
and action. Mao firmly believed that:

In man, the producer, motivation derives from consciousness, which in turn

comes from social practice. Motivation is the source of moral energies, such as
dedication, devotion, determination, faith, frugality, industry, and simplicity.
Consciousness and motivation reinforce each other, and can be transformed
into material force through mans labor.13

This is a completely different world outlook from the Western eco-

nomic theories which highlight the market mechanism, technology and
individual profit-seeking as an invisible hand energizing economic
development. In Maos view, modern science and technology were not to
be viewed as a preserve of highly trained and specialised expert, but as a
field where experimenting and active participation by ordinary workers
and peasants was to be strongly encouraged.14 The fact that Mao seem-
ingly politicized the question of economic development was not due to his
intention to challenge the concept of economic development but due to his
attempt to use politics to maximize the mobility of human resources and
the efficiency of all social forces for economic development. Hence,
the aim of his mobilization of the CR was to revolutionize peoples
ideology and as a consequence to achieve greater, faster, better and more
economical results in all fields.15
In order to fully utilize human beings as a decisive factor and the
primary productive force in socialist economic development, Mao found it
important to establish a worldview in which the part is thought of in the
context of the whole. It aimed at broadening the concept of the whole,
which had been narrowed to imply loyalty to ones family, village and
144 Xing Li

clan, to include the consciousness of the class, the nation and beyond. The
goal was to form in society a gong-oriented (collective, public and broad)
outlook in contrast to the si-oriented one (selfish, individual and narrow).
Mao firmly believed that only collective socialism could save China and
build a strong nation, and in order to adopt such a worldview one needed
an uncompromisingly ethical and moralistic revolution. He very often
referred to the CR as a movement to establish the moral foundation of
socialism collectivity, which was advocated not only in terms of public
ownership as a socialist ideology but also in terms of devotion and selfless-
ness in the behavioural sense. Gong implied that socialist economic devel-
opment was a process based on collective effort rather than based on si,
individualistic self-oriented motivation.
Seen from the above perspective, one of Maos rationales in launching
the CR could be understood as an attempt to eliminate the consciousness
and motivation of the old semi-capitalist society and establish a just social-
ist worldview in conformity with the new socialist economic bases. In
other words, it was an endeavour to substitute egotistical motives (si) with
moral impulses (gong) as incentives to increase production and
development. The Maoist wage policy attempting to bridge income differ-
ences at that time reflected such incentives. In urban industries, wage
differences were under control and their reduction was encouraged,
whereas in the peoples communes, income through allotting workpoints
was based not only on the individuals physical contribution to production,
but also on the level of his/her political consciousness and socialist
devotion.
Chinese socialism, as Mao saw it, is a transitional stage between
capitalism and the future communism; in other words, a socialist society by
its nature is a transitional society, a society in constant change. One has to
understand the past as well as the future in order to comprehend a society
in transition. Learning from the negative experience of the Soviet Union
and given the transitional nature of Chinese society, Mao was keenly aware
of the possibility of a transition back to capitalism or semi-feudalism.16 He
realized that in the historical period of socialism, there were still classes,17
class contradictions and class struggles. Since there still existed a two-line
struggle between the socialist road and the capitalist one, the danger and
the possibility of capitalist restoration was still there. He was aware that
unless and until human beings were transformed into the antithesis of the
selfish, egotistical, and aggressive bourgeoisie, it was possible that capital-
ism could be restored; and that building a socialist economy was not
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 145

enough, man should be changed accordingly and a new social moral order
and political consciousness had also to be created.18
Mao believed that class struggle could emerge at different levels. He
was convinced that after the exploitative class relations based on owner-
ship of the means of production were abolished and Chinas modern
cultural struggle entered a new historical stage, the source of resistance to
the socialist project shifted from the socio-economic base of the old bour-
geoisie to a newly identifiable social stratum and ideology which emerged
within the party leadership19 itself revisionism. Those party and
government elites labelled as revisionists had two faces, combining both
proletarian and bourgeois qualifications. In their view, the Chinese revolu-
tion had already accomplished its goal, and class struggle had basically
come to an end, so certain bourgeois values could be utilized for socialist
construction.
As a result, the ideology of economism of high-level government
and party elites had a great impact on Chinas development policies pro-
ducing some practices in the countryside such as more plots for private
use, more free markets and more enterprises with sole responsibility for
their own profit or loss, and fixing output quotas on a household basis,
which were conceptualized by Mao as being capitalistic in nature. During
the CR these people were identified and criticized as capitalist roaders.20
According to Maos analytical conceptualization, the term capitalist
roaders had two connotations: firstly, it referred to those who held the
red flag and spoke the revolutionary language while supporting capitalist
practices. Secondly, and more importantly, it referred to people within the
highest hierarchy of the Communist organization who created organiza-
tional structures and promoted value systems that would allow the future
generation to privatise property and subvert the collective power of the
working class and peasants.21
Mao attempted to avoid any possibility that might lead the CCP, after
assuming the vanguard role of the working class, into becoming a hege-
monic class of its own. As the Communist Manifesto states, communists
have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a
whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which
to shape and mould the proletarian movement.22 However, as Wallerstein
observes, there were two dilemmas which Mao faced:
He saw first of all the dilemma suggested by Miliband: that an organization is
central to revolution but creates problems for revolution. If an organization has
146 Xing Li

state power, there tends to emerge a privileged stratum in the party and in the
state-structure, who develop interests that are not identical with those who are
direct producers. He saw, second of all, that the concept of an intermediate
socialist stage within which there were no contradictory classes could and did
serve as ideological protection for this privileged stratum.23

Mao had insight into the problem that after a long period of peaceful
development, the CCP as the dominant organization of Chinese society
could develop the tendency to design its own hegemonic project and to
identify its own agenda and interests, which did not necessarily correspond
exclusively with those of the peasantry and working classes. Under such
conditions, the Communist leadership would eventually become a new
form of hegemonic class. Within the CCP there was a long-lasting two-
line struggle between the Maoist socialist line and the revisionist line. The
ongoing market reform symbolizes the victory of the revisionist line. Seen
from todays perspective, it is an indication that the CCP is determined, in
the name of the working class, to pursue its own hegemonic project in
which many practices are actually harmful to the interests and welfare of
the working class.
Mao was also concerned with the gradual disappearance of a general
spirit of selflessness devotion, and willingness on the part of Communist
cadres to adhere to the revolutionary cause and to keep in close contact
with the masses. With the victory of the revolution and the move from the
rural areas into cities, many officials, as Mao observed, were becoming
bureaucratic in their working style and were concerned about their own
comforts and privileges. To tackle this problem, he assumed that the
Hundred Flowers Campaign would help create a more open atmosphere in
which a variety of thoughts, ideas and especially critical opinions could be
utilized to influence the CCP from the outside. This campaign was directed
to bring intellectuals into this atmosphere thus drawing them firmly behind
the socialist line.
The role of intellectuals, technocrats and management elites in the
process of socialist industrialization has been the subject of controversy.
Traditionally, higher learning in professional schools and universities was
seen as the preserve of a scholarly class consisting of Mandarin-like of
bourgeois intellectuals who usually looked down on those of peasant and
worker origin. Mao understood the importance of gaining the support of
bourgeois intellectuals for the development of Chinas socialist economy.
However, 80 percent of the intellectuals are the children of the landlords,
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 147

rich peasants and capitalists, and thus the class backgrounds of Chinas
intellectuals could become a considerable impediment to their commitment
to the cause of socialist construction.24 To Mao, the bringing of non-
revolutionary classes into the cause of socialist construction was an insepa-
rable part of the CR.
Due to the fact that people with a bourgeois family background
were financially able to obtain higher education and could easily gain a
monopoly in knowledge and bureaucratic skills, they were also able to play
a dominant role in Chinas political, economic and cultural spheres. This
was also a direct outcome of the socialist planned industrialization, which
favoured specialization and hierarchical leadership, and which helped to
develop a technical intelligentsia. Over-concentration of the productive
forces would eventually generate a new privileged class. Furthermore,
those who received foreign training were treated as indispensable because
of Chinas low economic foundation and its lack of advanced intellectual
resources. As an observer noted, after 1949 China had become a peoples
democratic dictatorship in theory, in practice both political and cultural
power came to be widely distributed among scholarly or bureaucratic
intellectuals who commanded vast influence and prestige in Chinese
society.25 Expertise in knowledge, including science and technology, does
not necessarily increase political consciousness.
Awareness of these possibilities was perhaps the motivation behind
Maos CR policy to halt the university entrance examinations and enrol
large numbers of poor peasants and ordinary workers into institutions of
higher learning. As early as 1957 Mao realized that the working class
must have its own army of technical cadres and of professors, teachers,
scientists, journalists, writers, artists and Marxist theorists for building
socialism.26 He could not allow elitist policies to widen the gap between
people, and he wished to create people who were both red and expert
politically conscious and professionally competent.
In a word, the CR was initiated by Mao, in a crucial emendation of
Marxist revolutionary theory, as a continuous part of the Chinese
revolution. Such a revolution was seen as necessary to facilitate and be
facilitated by the revolutionary transformation of the social and economic
foundations of Chinese society. It aimed to achieve both material transfor-
mation (objective condition) and ideological transformation (subjective
condition). And it intended to achieve an ideological hegemony as an
attempt to create the necessary subjective condition for consolidating
socialist development.
148 Xing Li

A Critique of the Current Assessments on the Cultural

Revolution
The present dominant assessments of the CR from the Chinese official,
semi-official lines and intellectual communities, as well as foreign scholars
all seem to blame Mao and a handful of other evil people for the unprec-
edented nationwide mass movement. In the context of studying the rela-
tionship between Maos ideology and its effect, we should be aware that
Maos power was embedded in his discourse, and when power is perceived
we can understand the effect unleashed from below. As the CR was
initiated and called for from above and answered and reacted to from
below, to condemn Mao alone was to condemn millions of Chinese,
including intellectuals, to the status of mindless animals, blindly following
the wrong path.27
For many people, their close relations with the Maoist discourse,
especially the CR, cannot just be abandoned by attributing their involve-
ment to the result of misinformation, erroneous evaluation and self-
misinterpretation. Attributing ones previous active participation in the CR
to erroneous ignorance fails to answer the key question why millions of
people, both inside and outside China, voluntarily and vigorously engaged
themselves in such a great error. The puzzling question that has to be
addressed is why so many people actively followed this so-called histori-
cal error even when there was some evidence of irrationality and
destructiveness. The post-Mao official verdict on the CR was very contra-
dictory when it said that the CR was devoid of mass support although it
involved large numbers of people.28
The negative assessment of Maos political theories in relation to the
CR is largely centred at an empirical level. This is obviously one-sided and
shows a lack of dialectics. As far as his vision is concerned, Maos CR
theories should not be evaluated or judged merely on a practical level
because they were based on a vision of a society which was subjectively
envisioned by Mao. Even though theory can serve as a guideline for
practice, Maos CR vision embedded in his political thought could hardly
be fully realized. The gap between theory and practice represents also the
contradiction between Maos revolutionary vision and the applicability of
such a vision to Chinas social reality. However, while criticizing Mao, we
have to look into his inner world for the projection that depicts a model
society. His vision of such a society did not only come from his wild
fantasy, it also conformed to the will and aspiration of the Chinese people
after a century of struggle.
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 149

Maos efforts in attempting to actualize his utopian ideal may be

subject to dispute. Until his death, China was still far from the just society
he envisioned. Chinas internal social conditions as well as external hostile
forces had placed constraints on the realization of such a vision. However,
as an ideology, his philosophical conception reflected popular sentiments29
even though nowadays it is under severe criticism. Seen from this
perspective, it can be said that the values embraced in Maos vision for
China can transcend space and time and serve the ideal according to
which China can always be modeled.30
One unanswered question encountered by China in both the past and
present is: if China wants to seek wealth and power so as to ensure its
existence as a nation and political entity, what are the changes necessary to
create a new consciousness and viable culture capable of demolishing
Chinas feudal system and developing a new society? Both earlier reform-
ers and conservatives found their attempts to build a new society hopeless
because of enormous challenges from different directions. The numerous
failures of the previous revolution made Mao aware of the vital role of
political consciousness and the importance of cultural and ideological
change. Chinas historical development since 1840 can be seen as a series
of cultural revolutions struggling to establish a new ethical value system
and worldview needed for building a new society. Seen in this perspective,
the CR can be understood as an integral part of the series of revolutions and
a new stage in that struggle.
One of Maos motivations in launching the CR was based on his
conviction that a new bureaucratic ruling class had emerged because of the
centralized and authoritarian nature of the political system, which provided
little hope for popular participation in the process of economic
development. During the CR, three-in-one production teams consisting of
workers, technicians and cadres were established as an attempt to raise
both production and productivity through workers active participation and
creative innovation. The objective of this mass line approach was to
design policies in closely linked to ideas from the masses, which should be
brought back to the masses in the form of concrete proposals which
reflected those ideas.
The CCPs indifference to criticism from the outside convinced Mao
of the emergence of a new elite class, and Chinas intellectuals had pro-
vided a further perimeter of defence around it, making it impossible for
critics to gain a hearing.31 He endeavoured to eliminate elitist and profes-
sional privileges and to narrow the three differences, i.e. differences
150 Xing Li

between mental and manual work, between workers and peasants, and
between cities and countryside. Although some practices of the CR proved
to be counter-productive in many ways, we must not ignore some positive
aspects which had already been shown in the decentralized, collective
development alternatives accompanied by the participation of farmers in
rural development operations and workers in industrial management as
well as intellectuals in a part-work and part-study system of education.
Maos assertion that a class of capitalist roaders and other antagonistic
forces blocking the advance of socialism came directly from within the
CCP was both unprecedented and surprising. Few people, including Maos
closest comrades, could really understand it. It deviated both from ortho-
dox Marxism and the traditional conception of the CCP itself. Former
Premier Zhou Enlai once asked the question to one of his assistants: the
contradictions within the party lines were usually defined as either leftism
or rightism, how could we conceptualize the theory that a capitalist class
existed inside the party?32 Most people were unable to comprehend it at
that time. This was explained by the leaders of the Communist Party from
Long Bow village in the following way:

We didnt really have any idea what the capitalist road was. Mao talked about
it, explained it, but we didnt have any clear idea of it, what it might mean in
practice to our lives. It is only now, since the reform, since the responsibility
system, since we have had to contract everything out for private profit that
we have had some experience of the capitalist road and can form an opinion
of it.33

It was until market reform tore down one sector after another of
Chinas socialist economic base that people began to understand what Mao
meant by capitalist roader.
The capitalist roaders came to power after Mao died. At this point, it
can be argued that Chinese socialism did not fall apart because of its
demerits. Rather, it was intentionally torn down by members of its own
elite who became increasingly pro-capitalist. The ongoing marketization
process was not the result of a revolution from below, since the majority of
Chinese obviously did not have the intention of totally destroying social-
ism in spite of its many limitations and flaws. Rather, it was enforced by a
revolution from above led by an elitist coalition that supported and
benefited from it. This proves that Maos conviction was accurate when he
pointed out that the anti-socialist forces capitalist roaders existed
right inside the central organization of the CCP.
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 151

In retrospect, we can well claim that the CR was basically right in

foreseeing the degeneration of the CCP and its abandonment of Marxism
as a theoretical guideline, as well as the restoration of capitalism in the
politics of its leadership. Those previous capitalist roaders have indeed
established themselves as todays compradors of market socialism. Even
the CR would not have been radical enough to predict the degree of what
is happening today: the widening gap between urban and rural living
conditions, class polarization, rampant official corruption, massive un-
employment, the return of drugs, prostitution and gangsters, child labour,
proto-capitalist exploitation, and external vulnerability and dependence.
Mao would hardly be surprised to see the restoration of capitalism in
China. But he could never have imagined the depth and breadth to which
his entire revolutionary cause would be subverted.
What is most interesting with regard to the CR is that it is still
profoundly relevant as a useful framework to understand the nature of the
contradiction of the Dengist model of modernization. The situation in
China today resembles so much what the CR was initiated to avoid:
economism and productivism; technocrat- and elite-led economic
development; centralization and concentration of wealth and means of
production through the exploitation of workers and migrant labours from
the countryside; corruption and regional inequality as a result of the let-
some-be-rich-first policy; economic growth based on extensive foreign
concessions and excessive dependence on foreign market and so on.
The mainstream condemnation of the CR is largely based on anti-CR
literature which describes the lives and sufferings of various intellectuals,
government officials and members of the petty bourgeoisie at different
levels. They generally revealed what had happened in cities and towns.
From these writings, it is understandable that Chinas bureaucratic and
intellectual classes, who were the target for ideological and political
remoulding during the CR, have been critical of Mao and the CR. Then, the
questions are: what about Chinas working class? and what about Chinas
vast countryside, where 80% of Chinas population reside? According to
some research findings, their attitudes are different and mixed.34 This is not
to deny the genuine evils involved in the CR movement, but if the writings
of the critics are true, they represent only a part of the truth and they cannot
and should not reject the other side of the story. Only in this way can we
understand the recurrent upsurge of public dissatisfaction over the post-
Mao regime and the re-emergence of Mao Re (Mao-Craze)35 and CR
nostalgia36 at a time when the Chinese peoples general living standard
152 Xing Li

has risen substantially. Contrary to the belief that China has de-Maoed or
buried Mao, as Russia did Stalin, Mao still remains the dominant central
figure in Chinese political culture.37
To many critics, the CR was the most depressed and constrained
period. Yet the CR has been both remembered and criticized as a period
of uncontrolled openness and mass democracy. It was characterized by
the four practices (in Chinese Si da): Speaking out freely; airing views
fully; holding great debates; and writing big-character posters. So, a nor-
mative understanding would interpret the CR as the most open and demo-
cratic period in the whole of Chinese history. It is understandable that
people who had to face public criticism and direct challenges from the
masses naturally felt depressed. In contrast, the vast majority of peasants,
workers and students, who actively participated in the movement, felt quite
liberated.
This is also related to the issue of class relations. Dengism posits that
science and technology rather than class struggle and human consciousness
are the prime productive forces behind social and economic development
and transformation.38 But ironically many of todays contradictions in
Chinas market socialism are of a class struggle nature. Not only has the
national labour force been divided into formal contract and temporary
workers with members of each group receiving differentiated salaries and
welfare benefits, but also the growth of class divisions has been enlarging
between various official-business classes that are enriched by the proto-
capitalist marketization process and the working class and various types of
wage labour whose welfare and security have been badly affected and
endangered.
What is ironic is that during the CR period (or socialist period in
general), as argued by some scholars, despite the fact that China was one
of the poorest countries in the world, its social security, especially for the
working class in terms of medical care, education, hosuing, and all sorts of
state subsidies, although at a low level, was relatively comprehensive
coverage.39 Some scholars argue that the workbased welfare system pro-
vides a level of coverage that would be considered comprehensive and
generous in comparison with the most advanced welfare states in the
West.40 These social welfare rights that the working class enjoyed in the
years of Chinese socialism and the CR not only implied material benefits,
but also had an important impact on the relations of production. These
social rights represent a significant degree of workers control of the
process of production, a right of much greater importance than the legal
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 153

and formal civil rights or human rights that are on the lips of reformist
intellectuals and political dissidents.
The Chinese constitution theoretically defines the working class as the
key socio-political component in control of society and work unit.
However, industrial labour today has in reality been turned by economic
marketization into a commodity owned, or at least controlled, by party
elites, private business groups and multinational corporations. The state is
more and more willing to sacrifice labour welfare and social stability in
exchange for rapid increase in productivity. Class divisions and struggles
at local and regional as well as national level will soon become the key
socio-political problem affecting Chinas industrialization.
The economic marketization has brought the transformation of social/
class relations in a number of areas: first, it makes economic calculations
the priority of guanxi,41 promoting economic antagonism and precluding
solidarity. Second, it absorbs peoples attention, energy, capacity and
resources, and confines them within a narrow framework of economism.
Third, it hides production/class relations and separates them from market
relations so that the exploitation or unequal social/class relations in pro-
duction are ignored while the equal relationship in market competition is
emphasized.
With the increase of privatization, the economic power of Chinas new
bourgeoisie (middle class) is also growing.42 The situation is very ironic:
the new capitalists today are much stronger and wealthier than they were
before the socialist transformation in 1953. To protect their interests, they
have demanded for political recognition and governing power. Besides
creating their own types of associations, a large number of private capital-
ists have already entered Peoples Congresses and Peoples Political Con-
sultative Conferences at different levels.43 The change in the compositions
of class relations and will sooner or later affect the existing political system
and power structure.
The post-Mao leadership the CRs capitalist roaders realized
that the only way to maintain both their political power and economic
interests was to transform themselves quickly into a new dominant class
that could continue to rule through new class relations under the market
economy. Breaking down the socialist economic system and replacing it
with the market mechanism would enable them to become not only de-
facto owners of the means of production but also managers of the new
economy. In this way they could capitalize on their official power while
turning their bureaucratic privileges into economic advantages. At the
154 Xing Li

same time they have resisted any political reforms under the banner of
maintaining social stability because such reforms would challenge their
privileged position.
Much criticism of the CR is also centred on Mao in connection with
the popularity of his authority and ideology which mobilize the mass
participation in the CR. Maos personal influence and the affection for him
is currently degraded as a personality cult or religious charisma. In my
view, it is too simplistic to use the term personality cult to explain a
social phenomenon with immense implications. There is no doubt that
during his heyday Mao had popular support and trust from the general
public. It also cannot be denied that the CCP leadership itself, including
people around him, was active in perpetuating the myth of Mao. Ironically,
the term Mao Zedong Thought was first established by the former
President Liu Shaoqi,44 who was the primary victim of the CR. As one
scholar rightly concluded: One further key element [of the CR] was the
acceptance by all leaders, , of Maos primacy in both ideological and
organizational terms, and his right to interpret events on behalf of the Party
and to seek compliance with that interpretation.45
Nevertheless, the personality cult types of argument consciously or
unconsciously reduce Chinese people into blind masses and fanatical
followers who uphold whatever is the dominant ideology. Following this
line of thinking, the personality cult of Mao is naturally connected to
religious worship: reverent love and devotion for a deity or sacred figure.
However, on the one hand, very few Western academics will dismiss
religions, including Christianity, as cults or belief systems, and on the
other hand, they tend to study and understand them in broader perspectives,
encompassing cultural, historical and social boundaries. That is to say,
even a purely religious cult must be understood in terms of the multiple
perspectives of the social sciences.
Furthermore, the personality cult of Mao is also attributed to the deep-
rooted Chinese tradition of obedience, filial piety and respect for
authorities. If this is so, then why did millions of people join the Chinese
Communist rebellions which struggled to overthrow the old socio-political
structure? Why did they continue to stand up and participate in the CR
against the state bureaucracy? In many ways Chinese people can be char-
acterized as adoring great heroic leaders, such as wise emperors, daring
generals; and especially leaders like Mao, who had the vision and determi-
nation to guide people to regain their lost pride and glory and to stand up
from the humiliations imposed by Western powers. Maos legacy was first
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 155

and foremost built on his image of being a symbol of a courageous

revolutionary rebel. His right to rebel46 influenced China not only in
having charted the countrys historical course, but also in the way of
thinking and behaviour of ordinary Chinese in their daily life.
Critics of the CR claim that Maos political writings were misused as
a de facto constitution. But they may forget that it was precisely through
his writings that people for the first time in Chinas history began to have
direct access to the countrys constitutions and the idea that everyone
should be equal in front of the national constitution regardless of his/her
position and status. The traditional ideology of Confucianism had devel-
oped China into a highly hierarchical state, and for a long time common
people only had the consciousness of duty rather than rights. It was com-
monly accepted that the state granted rights and determined their limits.
People were brought up to respect the established order and authority. Who
has ever given people the rights to enjoy equal political, economic and
social relationships? It was Maos writings that raised peoples awareness
and consciousness of their rights, and it was the CR that turned them into
social actors and give them an opportunity to practise their rights. Hence,
the significance of a certain democratic consciousness that the CR trans-
mitted to the masses should not be denied.

The Cultural Revolution Foundation of the Reform

Achievements
If we do not make a realistic assessment of the CR in the context of the
entire period of Chinas socialist development, in which China developed
from a backward agrarian society before the 1940s to a major industrial
power in the 1970s, we will not be able to understand the economic
problems inherited from that era. Before drawing any deterministic conclu-
sions on the CR, we have to keep in mind that what Dengs China has been
doing since the end of the 1970s is not economic reconstruction, but
economic reform aiming at correcting the irrational parts of the previous
policies.
The economistic ideology of the Dengist market reform emphasizes
the magical functions of the market mechanism which have brought about
phenomenal economic growth. But it ignores the fact that many fundamen-
tal changes and achievements during the reform period in the 1980s and
1990s are a clear indication of the success of the CRs socialist develop-
ment strategies rather than a sign of their failure.47
156 Xing Li

For example, it is commonly recognized that Chinas township and

village enterprises (TVEs) have been the engine of economic growth and
the most dynamic part of Chinas economy since the economic reform
started. According to the World Bank, the growth and performance of
Chinas TVEs have been extraordinary. Their share in GDP rose from 13%
in 1985 to 31% in 1994; output has grown by about 25% a year since the
mid-1980s; they now account for a third of total industrial growth in China;
and in the past 15 years TVEs have created 95 million jobs.48
The official wisdom posits that the rapid development and success
of TVEs is largely due to the role of the economic marketization under
the post-Mao leadership which unleashed enormous potential for
enterpreneurship. While such a view contains elements of truth, it is not
historically correct and can be seriously misleading. What we must not
forget is that the history of TVEs is not a product of the reform policy,
rather, it is the direct result of Maos development strategies of mass
mobilization and economic decentralization in order to promote rural in-
dustrialization and transform rural areas into centres of industrialization
alongside major industrial cities. What was behind Maos economic think-
ing was his standpoint that Chinese peasants would ultimately bear the
burden of industrial investment in one way or another. Instead of over-
taxing them and widening the rural-urban gap, the state should help them
develop their own industries. The essential rationale of this strategy was to
create a simultaneous process in which collectivization went hand-in-hand
with industrialization.
Therefore, TVEs are actually the natural extension of the new devel-
opment and new things which emerged during the period of the CR. In
other words, they are direct descendants of those enterprises previously
owned by communes and brigades. The roots of their current success
during the reform period can be traced back to the policies and institutions
of the CR era.49 The development of TVEs was a historic and gradual
process based on a number of creative innovations during the CR, such as
factory and commune linkage, young intellectuals going to the
countryside, cadres and technicians working in grass-roots units, and
linkage between industry and agriculture, and so on. About 28 million
people were employed in commune and brigade factories out of a total
labour force of about 300 million.50
During the CR, the policies of intellectuals going to the countryside
and agriculture linking with industry brought a large number of techni-
cians to the rural areas. As a result, the benefits to rural development were
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 157

far-reaching, and many communal and village technologies and enterprises

were developed during this period. Even some severe critics of the CR
admit that the policy of promoting communal and village enterprises
reduced the gap between urban and rural areas, and the present success of
township enterprises should be seen as an extension or continuation of
communal and village enterprises.51 Therefore, these developments, whose
impact remains significant, must receive an objective assessment. As Gao
(1997) points out,

we must look at the issues in a historical perspective, and should not view the
success of the reform as merely the victory of capitalism. The living standard
of Chinese people has indeed risen substantially in the 1980s, however, this is
not a sudden miracle, but a process of foundation and evolution. We must not
ignore the political and economic continuation between the Mao period and
the post-Mao period.52

Moreover, the phenomenal progress achieved during the post-Mao

period in terms of human development must also be understood in a
historical context. A recent report by the UNDP on Chinas overall
achievement during the pre-reform period in the most fundamental aspects
of human development, especially in terms of heath care, contains some
valuable observations:53 firstly, during the CR, Maos critique of urban bias
in public health care resulted in a substantial redistribution of health care
resources towards the countryside and remote areas. Secondly, the barefoot
doctor strategy of medical and health care in rural areas, along with a
system of local basic clinics and cooperative insurance programmes within
the rural peoples communes, contributed to an overall improvement in
health status and life expectancy of rural population.54 Especially, im-
proved life expectancy at birth was made possible by a broad and publicly
financed health policy which made primary health care widely accessible
for mothers and children. Thirdly, despite the fact that only a minority of
the urban population enjoyed full job and income security including gen-
erous health coverage and a pension, the rural majority were generally
assured of some degree of protection against the most extreme effects of
disease, injury and other misfortunes through commune insurance schemes
and the collective distribution system. As a result of these innovative
strategies and policies, Chinas human development (food, basic health
care and life expectancy), was claimed by the World Bank as outstandingly
high for a country at Chinas per capita income level.55
In sum, those unique alternative-seeking experiments during the CR,
158 Xing Li

which are blamed for being the obstacles to Chinas industrialization,

helped to lay a solid foundation and paved the way for a comparative
advantage in Chinas economic integration with the world market.56 The
present contradiction between China and the West, especially the US, is
that the latter wants to make sure that China competes in the world market
according to the established rules, because its comparative advantage
could be used to break these rules. Therefore, it is ahistorical to stress
present successes without giving a proper assessment of the contribution of
the CR and Chinese socialist achievements in general.

Concluding Remarks
The CR played an important role in shaping the direction of Chinas socio-
economic development. In this period, ideology provided the framework
for the designation of political and economic priorities as well as develop-
ment objectives. Chinas transformation from Maoist socialism to Dengist
capitalism represents, in my view, not only a generation change of leaders
and governments, but also more significantly a fundamental change of
political ideology and development thinking. More than ever, the CR has
profound relevance in the age of capitalist restoration.
The CR has been condemned as a failure. Yes, superficially and
practically this might be the case. Yet, seen from the perspective of its
social effects it can be noticed that the CR planted the seeds in society and
transmitted the ideas to the population. Based on this view, the CR was not
a total fiasco. Many positive democratic ideas, consciousness of political,
economic and social rights have penetrated into peoples way of thinking,
and they cannot be simply dismissed by denouncing the CR. The
Tiananmen incident in 1976,57 the Minzhu Qiang (Democracy Wall)
movement in the end of the 1970s,58 and especially the student demonstra-
tion in 1989, together with the support it received from citizens who stood
up to protest at the new social gaps and official corruption, all indicated a
great deal of spirit and courage inherited from the CR.59
In assessing the CR, the approach that the post-Mao leadership took
showed a deficiency of dialectical thinking. The total rejection of the CR
today has served to legitimize the Dengist reform programme ideologically
and politically. Being afraid of the possible consequences that mass move-
ment and political democracy would lead to anarchy and disorder, the post-
Mao regime refuses to consider any suggestion of using the participation of
the people to solve emerging societal problems. The failures of the govern-
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 159

ment to solve the countrys rampant corruption problems explain the fact
that the mobilization of peoples direct participation and active involve-
ment is as equally important as the legislation of various new laws and
regulations in order to solve Chinas growing social ills. Neither can the
post-Mao regimes political legitimacy be independently derived from any
socialist legal reform without popular support.60
This signifies that some of the CR political thoughts continue to be of
ideological significance in China. When we watch carefully the problems
emerging from the process of economic marketization which China is
painfully pursuing, it is worthwhile recalling some of Maos teachings and
insights. Many of his warnings and predictions in the course of the CR
have been confirmed today.
It is believed that the meaning and significance of Chinas future
development, whether political, economic or cultural, will inevitably in
one way or another be linked to some of the historical roots originating
from Mao and the CR.61 If such bases were overthrown and Maos thought
was totally repudiated, the real China would hardly exist. In order to be
objective to the historical significance of this period it is essential that the
history of the Chinese Revolution (19211976) and Maoism must not be
left only to the mainstream interpretation and market discourse. More
importantly, the CR should not be evaluated or even denounced on the
basis of the rationale of todays economism, since the two are founded on
completely different worldviews and ideological paradigms.
Finally, in assessing past history, such as Maos historical role and the
CR, it is perhaps worth remembering E. H. Carrs warning, issued upon
finishing his unprecedented history of Soviet Russia: The danger is not
that we shall draw a veil over the enormous blots on the record of the
Revolution, over the cost in human suffering, over the crimes committed in
its name. The danger is that we shall be tempted to forget altogether, and
to pass over in silence, its immense achievements.62

Notes
1. A recent new report from the Chinese Communist Partys inner sanctum,
China Investigation Report 20002001: Studies of Contradictions Within the
People Under New Conditions, frankly admitted that economic, ethnic and
religious conflicts in China are increasing and spreading, and relations between
party officials and the masses are tense, with conflicts on the rise. Inequality
and corruption are seen as overarching sources of discontent and social unrest.
160 Xing Li

See Erik Eckholm, Chinese Warn of Civil Unrest Across Country,

International Herald Tribune, 23 June 2001, p. 1.
2. This is the Chinese Communist Partys official critique of Mao Zedong and the
Cultural Revolution. See Resolution on CPC History: 19491981 (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1981).
3. Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner, Politics, Scholarship, and Chinese
Socialism, in Marxism and the Chinese Experience, edited by Arif Dirlik and
Maurice Meisner (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1989), pp. 79.
4. Ibid.
5. Zhang Kuiliang, Marxs Vision in His Late Years and Deng Xiaopings
Theory of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Social Science in
China, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1995).
6. There is a wealth of literature with an extensive descriptive and analytical
coverage of the CR ranging from history to politics. Here, only a few of them
are mentioned. Officially, the history of the Chinese Communist Party
including the CR and the role of Mao Zedong were concluded by the Third
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee Meeting of December 1978:
Resolution on CPC History: 19491981 (Note 2). Extremely negative
assessments of the Cultural Revolution and Mao Zedong came from various
high-level Chinese Communist Party research institutes and especially from
the Party School of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
For example, Xi Xuan and Jing Chunming, Wenhua da geming jianshi (A Brief
History of the Great Cultural Revolution) (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi
chubanshe, 1996).
Both Chinese and non-Chinese researchers have published extensive
accounts of the CR: the intense debate between Charles Bettelheim and Neil
Burton on China Since Mao, Monthly Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 (1978); Joan
Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China (London: Penguin Books, 1969);
Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Zhongguo wenge shinian shi (A History of the
Decade of Chinas Cultural Revolution) (Hong Kong: Dagongbao Press
1986); Roderick MacFarquhars three volumes: The Origin of the Cultural
Revolution, 1: Contradiction Among the People 19561957, 2: The Great Leap
Forward 19581960, 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm 19611966 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1974, 1983, 1997); Barbara Barnouin and Changgen
Yu, Ten Years of Turbulence (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993); Lynn
T. White III, Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in
Chinas Cultural Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989);
Shaoguang Wang, Failure of Charisma: Cultural Revolution in Wuhan
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Perry, Proletarian Power:
Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997).
However, few formal publications are currently available which emphasize
the contemporary relevance of the CR.
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 161

7. To define post-reform China as a capitalist society is problematic since it does

not fully meet one of the key criteria of capitalism private ownership of
means of production as defined by orthodox Marxism. The question of
ownership in China is still an issue of constant debate. Much corruption in
China today is in many ways connected with the ambiguity of ownership, for
example, private enrichment via non-private property. In my view,
capitalism in China cannot be entirely conceptualized only in terms of
ownership of means of production. In this paper, the use of capitalism in
China refers to economic calculations, rather than forms of property, that have
become the pivotal state ideology in post-Mao China, i.e. profit motivation,
capital accumulation, free wage labour, commercialization /marketization. In
other words, economism (profit-making, competition and the rule of capital) is
gaining priority as the determinant driving force of societal development. This
is also compatible with Maos understanding during the CR when he referred
to capitalist roaders and Soviet revisionism. See also the discussions on
property, exchange relations and property relations from A Dictionary of
Marxist Thought, edited by Tom Bottomore (England: Basil Blackwell
Publisher, 1983), pp. 399400, 48485; and on Chinas reform from
Marxism and the Chinese Experience (Note 3), p. 22 (note 13).
8. See also, for example, David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Dis-
course in Maos Republic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
9. The Gramscian theory of hegemony maintains that the capture of state power
does not mean the realization of complete hegemony. Hegemony had to be
built constantly even after the assumption of leadership. This indicates that the
proletarian class has to continue the struggle for hegemony and deal endlessly
with the relations of the elements of the new society. See Antonio Gramsci,
Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey
Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971); Roger Simon,
Gramscis Political Thought (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1982); and
Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramscis Politics (London: An Imprint of Century
Hutchinson Ltd., 1987).
10. Xing Li, A Gramscian Approach in Conceptualising the Crisis of Socialism:
Some Reflections on the Chinese Socialist Experience, Working Paper No. 62
(Department of Development and Planning, Aalborg University of Denmark,
1998).
11. Mark Selden, Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of Chinese
Development, in Dirlik and Meisner (eds) (Note 3), pp. 5455.
12. Victor Nee and James Peck, Introduction: Why Uninterrupted Revolution?
in Chinas Uninterrupted Revolution from 1840 to the Present, edited by
Victor Nee and James Peck (New York: Random House, 1975), p. 45.
13. Chungwu Kung, Cultural Revolution in Modern Chinese History, in Nee and
Peck (eds), ibid., pp. 29293.
162 Xing Li

14. Willem F. Wertheim, Evolution and Revolution, The Rising Waves of

Emancipation (England: Penguin Books, 1974), p. 345.
15. Joan Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China (London: Penguin Books,
1969), p. 95.
16. Kuang Huan Fan and K. T. Fan, From the Other Side of the River: A Self-
Portrait of China Today (New York: Anchor Books, 1975), p. vi.
17. The concept and definition of class during the CR was both economic, based
on family history (landlord, peasants, rich peasants, workers, capitalists, urban
poor people, etc.), and political (revolutionary cadres and soldiers, rightists,
anti-revolutionaries, reactionary intellectuals, capitalist roaders, etc.).
18. Fan and Fan (Note 16).
19. The social composition of the Chinese Communist Party consists of three
major groups: those of poor and lower-middle-class origins; the bourgeois and
landlord classes; and those who received Western and Russian training.
20. Refer to Note 7 for the meaning of capitalist roaders.
21. James Petras, The Chinese Cultural Revolution in Historical Perspective,
Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1997), pp. 44559.
22. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848),
Section II Proletarians and Communists.
23. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Politics of the World-economy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 91.
24. Nick Knight, Review Essay: Mao Zedongs Thought and Chinese Marxism
Recent Documents and Interpretations, Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1993), p. 61.
25. Chungwu Kung, Cultural Revolution in Modern Chinese History, in Nee and
Peck (eds) (Note 12), p. 288.
26. Tse-tung Mao, Selected Works, Vol. V (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
1977), p. 479.
27. Mobo C. F. Gao, Maoist Discourse and a Critique of the Present Assessments
of the Cultural Revolution, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 26,
No. 3 (1994), p. 30.
28. Xi Xuan, Had Cultural Revolution Mass Support? Beijing Review, No. 47
(1981), p. 20.
29. This can be seen from the popular support that the Chinese Communist Party
received during the period of the Chinese Revolution, and the mass
participation in the series of the political movements since the 1950s.
30. Francis Soo, Maos Vision for China, in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy,
edited by F. J. Adelmann (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publisher, 1982),
p. 76.
31. Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, China from the 1800s to the 1980s
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 335.
32. Ziyuan Cui, Mao Zedong wenge lilun de deshi yu xiandaixing de
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 163

chongjian (The Success and Failure of Mao Zedongs Cultural Revolution

Theory and the Reestablishement of Its Contemporary Relevance), China
and the World (Chinese electronic journal), February (1997). <http://www.
chinabulletin.com/indexe.htm>.
33. William Hinton, Mao, Rural Development, and Two-line Struggle, Monthly
Review, Vol. 45, No. 9 (1994), p. 12.
34. Yangyan Si, Wenhua da geming yu Zhongguo nongcun zhengzhi de
minzhuhua beifang nongcun wenge zhong de bianqian, (The Cultural
Revolution and the Political Democratization in Chinas Villages The
Transformation of Northern China During the Cultural Revolution), China and
the World (Chinese electronic journal), February (1997). <http://www.
chinabulletin.com/indexe.htm>.
35. This refers to the unexpected revival of interest in Mao Zedong which swept
China in the early 1990s.
36. This refers to a nostalgia for the era of those lost years of the 1960s,
suggesting a sentiment of rethinking and re-evaluation of the CR and its
positive and negative effects on individual development. Since the 1990s,
besides the emergence of personal accounts of the CR (stories and memoirs)
and TV documentary programmes, several Cultural Revolution restaurants
were opened in Beijing and other cities and were decorated with posters of
Mao. Many successful professional and administrative urbanites truly felt the
need to attribute the success of their career in one way or another to those years
of hardship when their characters were formed. See also, Robert Weil, Red
Cat, White Cat: China and the Contradictions of Market Socialism (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1996), pp. 9394.
37. Jacob Heibrunn, Mao More Than Ever, The New Republic, Vol. 216, No. 16
(1997), p. 21.
38. Shixing Feng and Weiming Lu, Deng Xiaoping jingji fazhan sixiang yanjiu
(The Studies of Deng Xiaoping Thought on Economic Development) (Beijing:
Jingji kexue chubanshe, 1996).
39. See also, for example, Mark Selden and Laiyin You, The Reform of Social
Welfare in China, World Development, Vol. 25, No. 10. (1997).
40. Joe C. B. Leung and Richard C. Nann, Authority and Benevolence: Social
Welfare in China (New York: St Martins Press, 1995), p. 61.
41. Guanxi means relations or relationship. It implies that in dealing with
social, business and personal relations, the human or the non-economic
aspects of these relations (i.e. friends and family) are placed higher than
economic calculations.
42. For further information on Chinas private ownership and employment, see
Sun Sheng Han and Clifton W. Pannell, The Geography of Privatization in
China, 19781996, Economic Geography, Vol. 75, No. 3 (1999).
43. Feng Chen, An Unfinished Battle in China: The Leftist Criticism of the
164 Xing Li

Reform and the Third Thought Emancipation, The China Quarterly, No. 158
(1999)
44. Shaoqi Liu, Guanyu xiugai dang de zhangcheng de baogao (Report on the
Revision of the Constitution), in Three Essays on Party Building (Beijing:
Foreign Languages Press, 1980).
45. Tony Saich, The Historical Origins of the Chinese Cultural Revolution,
China Information, Vol. 11, Nos 2/3 (1996), p. 34. Within the quotation, [of
the CR] is my addition.
46. Historically, the notion of the right to rebel is closely connected with the loss
of the Mandate of Heaven by an imperial dynasty. It has been used as
retroactive justification for rebellions which overthrew a corrupt regime.
47. Xing Li, Socialist Foundations of Market Reforms: Assessing the Chinese
Past, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 49 (1999).
48. World Bank, From Plan to Market: World Development Report (Oxford
University Press, New York, 1996), p. 51.
49. Louis Putterman, On the Past and Future of Chinas Township and Village-
Owned Enterprises, World Development, Vol. 25, No. 10 (1997).
50. Victor Lippit, Socialist Development in China, in The Transition to
Socialism in China, edited by Mark Selden and Victor Lippit (London: Croom
Helm, 1982), p. 128.
51. This view is also shared by the well-known Chinese scholar Fei Xiaotong, who
is a harsh critic of the CR. See Changfan Gao, Mao Zedong de youling hai zai
dalu paihuai: Mao si hou de Zhongguo jingji gaige yiji Zhongguo ren de taidu
(Mao Zedongs Ghost Is Still Pacing Up and Down in China: Post-Mao
Economic Reform and the Attitude of Chinese People), China and the World,
September (1997) <http://www.chinabulletin.com/indexe.htm>.
52. Gao, ibid.
53. UNDP, The China Human Development Report (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), pp. 2021.
54. The Chinese alternative strategy of medical and health care had a tremendous
impact on the World Health Organization (WHO) which later published many
books and materials, such as Health by the People, edited by Kenneth Newell
(Geneva: WHO, 1975) and Alternative Approaches to Meeting Basic Health
Needs in Developing Countries, edited by V. D. Djukanovic and E. P. Mach
(Geneva: WHO, 1975), emphasizing the decentralized approach to medical
and health care services including indigenous health workers and the
combination of traditional with modern medicine. See also, for example, Ruth
Sidel and Victor W. Sidel, The Health of China (London: Zed Press,1982),
p. xiv.
55. World Bank, World Development Report 1981 (New York: Oxford University
Press,1981).
56. Li (Note 47), pp. 346263.
The Chinese Cultural Revolution Revisited 165

57. This is a reference to the mass movements against the Gang of Four in the
spring of 1976.
58. During the winter months of 19781979, many people in Beijing put up written
protests about the problems of China on a stretch of blank wall on Changan
Avenue calling for political reforms and democracy. This became known as
Democracy Wall. One of the key figures of that movement was Wei
Jingsheng, a political dissident who is now living in exile in the United States.
59. See also, for example, Xiuyuan Lu, A Step Toward Understanding Popular
Violence in Chinas Cultural Revolution, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4
(1994), pp. 56162.
60. Pitman B. Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-
Mao China, The China Quarterly, No. 138 (1994).
61. See also, Xin He, Wei Zhongguo shenbian (Defending China) (Shandong:
Youyi chubanshe, 1996), p. 64.
62. Edward Hallett Carr, as quoted in Dirlik and Meisner (Note 3), pp. 1819.