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FIRST DIVISION

GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, G.R. No. 186592

JR., AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR.,
EMERLINDA S. T A LENTO, and Present:
RODOLFO H. DE MESA,
Petitioners, SERENO, CJ,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
-versus- VILLARAMA, JR., and
REYES,JJ

Promulgated:
LEO RUBEN C. MANRIQUE,
Respondent. 1.0 OCT 2012
X--------------------------------------------------------------------------- - -----------X

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of

Comi filed against respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique (Manrique) for
allegedly publishing statements which tend to directly impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice.

Factual Antecedents

The instant case stemmed. from an article in Luzon Tribune, a

newspaper of general circulation wherein respondent Manrique is the
Decision 2 G.R. No. 186592

publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements against

the Supreme Court.

The petitioners, namely: Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. (Gov.

Garcia), Aurelio C. Angeles, Jr. (Angeles), Emerlinda S. Talento (Talento)
and Rodolfo H. De Mesa (De Mesa) alleged that the subject article
undermines the peoples faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion
that they employed bribery in order to obtain relief from the Court,
particularly in obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No.
185132. The pertinent portions of the article which was entitled, TRO ng
Korte Suprema binayaran ng P20-M? and published in the January 14 to
20, 2009 issue of the Luzon Tribune, are reproduced as follows:1

Bukod sa mga kontrobersiya na bumabalot ngayon sa Korte Suprema

dahil sa isyu ng umanoy pagpapatalsik kay Chief Justice Renato Puno,
hindi maalis sa isip ng ilang Bataeo ang pagtatanong kung totoo nga
kayang binayaran ng kampo ni Bataan Governor Enrique Garcia, Jr. ang
isa o ilang Mahestrado ng Korte upang mag-isyu ng Temporary
Restraining Order ang Korte na humarang sa implementasyon ng anim na
buwang suspensyon ng Punong Lalawigan.

Marami umano ang nagdududa kung papaano nakakuha ng TRO

si Garcia gayung malinaw na ang kaso ay kasalukuyang dinidinig noon
ng Court of Appeals. Ito umano ay paglabag sa tinatawag na Forum
Shopping.

xxxx

Dalawang Division ng Court of Appeals ang tumanggi na dinggin

ang petisyon ni Garcia para sa TRO hanggang sa dininig ito ng isang
division. Nagpadala ng liham ang Court of Appeals sa mga
magkakatunggaling partido upang simulang dinggin ang kaso.
Nakapagtataka umano kung bakit hindi ito binigyang galang ng Korte
Suprema.

Nang inilabas ng Korte ang TRO, malinaw na naihain na ang

suspension order kay Garcia ng DILG kayat opisyal ng epektibo ang
suspensyon. Ano pa ba kaya ng na-TRO gayung sinisimulan na ni Garcia
ang kanyang suspensyon.

May mga nagsasabing binayaran umano ng hanggang sa [P]20-

Milyon ang isang mahestrado ng Korte upang pagbigyan ang kahilingan
ni Garcia.

1
Rollo, p. 23.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 186592

Madiin naman itong itinanggi ni Garcia at nagsabing hindi dapat

bahiran ng dumi ang Korte Suprema at dapat igalang ang desisyon nito.

Gayunpaman, marami ang nagtataka at laging nakakakuha ng

TRO sa Korte Suprema si Garcia lalu na sa mga mahahalagang kasong
kanyang hinaharap.

xxxx

Ang kompiyansa ni Garcia umano ay kitang-kita sa mga miting

kung saan siya ay nagsasalita na kayang-kaya niyang lusutan ang lahat
ng mga kaso niya at maging kung mayroon pang kasunod na mga kaso na
isasampa sa kanya.

Kaya naman hindi maalis ng ilan ang magduda na ang taong gipit
sa kaso ay maaaring magbayad ng milyung-milyon piso upang upuan ng
Korte Suprema ang kaso at manatiling habang buhay ang TRO.

Prior to the publication of the foregoing article, two (2) interrelated

petitions were filed before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 185132 and
181311, entitled Governor Enrique T. Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
and Province of Bataan v. Hon. Remigio M. Escalada, respectively.

In G.R. No. 185132, the Provincial Government of Bataan ordered for

the conduct of a tax delinquency sale of all the properties of Sunrise Paper
Products Industries, Inc. (Sunrise) situated in Orani, Bataan. When no
public bidder participated in the delinquency sale, the provincial government
acquired all the properties of Sunrise which consisted of machineries and
equipment, including the parcel of land where the factory stood.
Subsequently, Sunrise filed a petition for injunction which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 8164, to annul the auction sale and prevent the provincial
government from consolidating its title over the properties. Two (2) other
creditors of Sunrise intervened in the proceedings. The provincial
government entered into a compromise agreement with Sunrise and the
intervening creditors and thereafter filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
8164. However, the trial court refused to dismiss the case and proceeded to
hear the same on the merits. Subsequently, it rendered a Decision dated
June 15, 2007, which was thereafter challenged in another petition docketed
as G.R. No. 181311.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 186592

Meanwhile, former workers of Sunrise, namely: Josechito B. Gonzaga

(Gonzaga), Ruel A. Magsino (Magsino) and Alfredo B. Santos (Santos),
filed criminal and administrative charges against petitioners Gov. Garcia,
Angeles, Talento and De Mesa, among others, before the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as OMB-L-A-08-0039-A. Subsequently, Deputy
Ombudsman Orlando S. Casimiro (Ombudsman Casimiro) issued an Order
dated October 28, 2008, preventively suspending the petitioners.

Unyielding, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the

Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the Order dated October 28, 2008 of
Ombudsman Casimiro, with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a TRO and
a writ of preliminary injunction. The CA, however, deferred the resolution
of the prayer for the issuance of TRO and instead issued Resolution dated
November 14, 2008, requiring Gonzaga, Magsino and Santos to file a
comment. Dissatisfied with the action of the CA, the petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction with this Court, which
was docketed as G.R. No. 185132. On November 19, 2008, this Court
issued a TRO enjoining the public respondents in OMB-L-A-08-0039-A
from implementing the Order dated October 28, 2008 of Ombudsman
Casimiro, specifically the order for the petitioners preventive suspension,
until further orders of the Court. The issuance of this TRO is the incident
mentioned in Manriques article.

In his Comment,2 Manrique alleged that there was nothing malicious

or defamatory in his article since he only stated the facts or circumstances
which attended the issuance of the TRO. He likewise denied that he made
any degrading remarks against the Supreme Court and claimed that the
article simply posed academic questions. If the article ever had a critical
undertone, it was directed against the actions of the petitioners, who are
public officers, and never against the Supreme Court. At any rate, he

2
Id. at 30-35.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 186592

asseverated that whatever was stated in his article is protected by the

constitutional guaranties of free speech and press.

The subject article falls under the

second type of contemptuous
publication.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether the contents of Manriques

article would constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court which reads:

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts as it is

indispensable to their right of self-preservation, to the execution of their
powers, and to the maintenance of their authority; and consequently to the
due administration of justice.3 It must however be exercised on the
preservative not vindictive principle, and on the corrective not retaliatory
idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish for
contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise.4

The power to punish for contempt does not, however, render the
courts impenetrable to public scrutiny nor does it place them beyond the
scope of legitimate criticism. Every citizen has the right to comment upon
and criticize the actuations of public officers and such right is not
diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at judicial

3
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 330 Phil. 420, 435 (1996), citing In re Kelly, 35 Phil. 944, 950 (1916);
In re Lozano and Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801 (1930); Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil. 271 (1933);
Commissioner of Immigration v. Hon. Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 (1967).
4
Oclarit v. Paderangga, 403 Phil. 146, 153-154 (2001), citing Commissioner of Immigration v.
Cloribel, 127 Phil. 716 (1967); Nazareno v. Hon. Barnes, 220 Phil. 451, 463 (1985); Atty. Pacuribut v.
Judge Lim, Jr., 341 Phil. 544, 548 (1997); Austria v. Hon. Masaquel, 127 Phil. 677, 690-691 (1967);
Angeles v. Gernale, Jr., A.M. No. P-96-1221, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 10.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 186592

authority.5 It is the cardinal condition of all such criticisms however that it

shall be bona fide, and shall not spill the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand; and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty to respect courts6 and
therefore warrants the wielding of the power to punish for contempt.

In his erudite dissenting opinion in People v. Alarcon,7 which was

impliedly adopted in subsequent cases dealing with contempt,8 Justice
Manuel V. Moran noted the two kinds of publication which are punishable
with contempt, to wit:

Contempt, by reason of publications relating to court and to court

proceedings, are of two kinds. A publication which tends to impede,
obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by courts. This is the rule announced in the cases
relied upon by the majority. A publication which tends to degrade the
courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal
contempt, and is equally punishable by courts. In the language of the
majority, what is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of
the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first, there is no
contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the
second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. x x x Courts
would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.9 (Italics
ours)

Succinctly, there are two kinds of publications relating to court and to

court proceedings which can warrant the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt: (1) that which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence
5
In re Almacen, G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562, 576, citing United States v.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); In re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376 (1922); Salcedo v. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724
(Malcolm, J., dissenting); Austria v. Hon. Masaquel, id.; Cabansag v. Fernandez, et al., 102 Phil. 152
(1957).
6
Id. at 580.
7
69 Phil. 265 (1939).
8
People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 1012 (1995), citing In re Francisco Brillantes, 42 O.G. 59; In re
Almacen, supra note 5.
9
Supra note 7, at 274-275, citing 12 Am. Jur. pp. 416-417.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 186592

the courts in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding; and (2)

that which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in
them or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute.

We find the subject article illustrative of the second kind of

contemptuous publication for insinuating that this Courts issuance of TRO
in G.R. No. 185132 was founded on an illegal cause. The glaring innuendos
of illegality in the article is denigrating to the dignity of this Court and the
ideals of fairness and justice that it represents. It is demonstrative of
disrespect not only for this Court, but also for the judicial system as a whole,
tends to promote distrust and undermines public confidence in the judiciary
by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially.10

This Court has always exercised utmost restraint and tolerance against
criticisms on its decisions and issuances, bearing in mind that official actions
are subject to public opinion as a means of ensuring accountability.
Manriques article, however, has transgressed the ambit of fair criticism and
depicted a legitimate action of this Court as a reciprocated accommodation
of the petitioners interest. Contrary to Manriques claim of objectivity, his
article contained nothing but baseless suspicion and aspersion on the
integrity of this Court, calculated to incite doubt on the mind of its readers
on the legality of the issuance. It did not simply dwell on the propriety of
the issuance on the basis of some sound legal criteria nor did it simply blame
this Court of an irregularity in the discharge of duties but of committing the
crime of bribery. The article insinuated that processes from this Court may
be obtained for reasons other than that their issuance is necessary to the
administration of justice. Judging from the title alone, TRO ng Korte
Suprema binayaran ng P20M? the article does not aim for an academic
discussion of the propriety of the issuance of the TRO but seeks to sow
mistrust in the dispositions of this Court. To suggest that the processes of
10
In Re: Published Alleged Threats against Members of the Court in the Plunder Case Hurled by
Atty. Leonard De Vera, 434 Phil. 503, 510 (2002), citing Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Sanchez, 238 Phil.
543 (1987).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 186592

this Court can be obtained through underhand means or that their issuance is
subject to negotiation and that members of this Court are easily swayed by
money is a serious affront to the integrity of the highest court of the land.
Such imputation smacks of utter disrespect to this Court and such temerity is
deserving of contempt.

Manrique claims that he was only being critical of the actions of the
petitioners as public officers and that no disrespect was meant to the Court.
While he claims good faith, the contents of his article bespeak otherwise. A
persons intent, however good it maybe, cannot prevail over the plain import
of his speech or writing. It is gathered from what is apparent, not on
supposed or veiled objectives.

The truth is we consider public scrutiny of our decisions and official

acts as a healthy component of democracy. However, such must not
transcend the wall of tolerable criticism and its end must always be to
uphold the dignity and integrity of the justice system and not to destroy
public confidence in them. In People v. Godoy,11 we stressed:

Generally, criticism of a courts rulings or decisions is not

improper, and may not be restricted after a case has been finally disposed
of and has ceased to be pending. So long as critics confine their criticisms
to facts and base them on the decisions of the court, they commit no
contempt no matter how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass
beyond that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by
improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was affected by
political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to create distrust and destroy
the confidence of the people in their courts.12

There is thus a need to distinguish between adverse criticism of the

courts decision after the case has ended and scandalizing the court itself.
The latter is not criticism; it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as
such, in which case it shall be dealt with as a case for contempt.13

11
Supra note 8.
12
Id. at 1018-1019, citing 17 C.J.S, Contempt, Sec. 25, p. 64.
13
Id. at 1018, citing State v. Hildreth, 74 A. 71.
Decision 9 G.R. No. 186592

A reading of the subject article shows that Manrique was not simply
passing judgment on an official act of the Court. He was actually intimating
that the petitioners were able to obtain a TRO through illicit means, with the
complicity of this Court. As he hurls accusation of corruption against
petitioners, he also unfairly smeared the reputation of this Court by stirring
the idea that one or some members of this Court yield to said illegal act. By
no means can such an imputation be justified by mere curiosity or suspicion.
That he was only mulling on the thought that such an illegal act transpired
does not make his insinuation any less contemptuous. Manriques article no
longer partakes of an adverse criticism of an official act but an indecent
attempt to malign the petitioners which ultimately brought equal harm to the
reputation of this Court.

It bears stressing that the Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under
the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to
obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result.14 Thus, the inflexible
demand to adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct is imposed upon
all members of the judiciary. They are required to keep their private as well
as official conduct at all times free from all appearances of impropriety and
be beyond reproach.15

Malicious publications cannot seek

the protection of the constitutional
guaranties of free speech and press.

Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the constitutional guaranties

of free speech and press, albeit unpersuasively, to extricate himself from
liability. However, said constitutional protection is not a shield against

14
In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602 (1949).
15
De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira, 402 Phil. 671, 680 (2001).
Decision 10 G.R. No. 186592

scurrilous publications, which are heaved against the courts with no apparent
reason but to trigger doubt on their integrity based on some imagined
possibilities. Contrary to nourishing democracy and strengthening judicial
independence, which are the expected products of the guaranties of free
speech and press, the irresponsible exercise of these rights wounds
democracy and leads to division.

In Alarcon, we emphasized:

It is true that the Constitution guarantees the freedom of speech

and of the press. But license or abuse of that freedom should not be
confused with freedom in its true sense. Well-ordered liberty demands no
less unrelaxing vigilance against abuse of the sacred guaranties of the
Constitution than the fullest protection of their legitimate exercise. As
important as is the maintenance of a judiciary unhampered in its
administration of justice and secure in its continuous enjoyment of public
confidence. x x x.16

Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced

with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the
maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice.17 For the protection and maintenance of freedom
of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning
and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the
general community.18

Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the

Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free
speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and

16
Justice Manuel V. Moran, Dissenting Opinion, People v. Alarcon, supra note 7, at 275-276.
17
In Re: Published Alleged Threats against Members of the Court in the Plunder Case Hurled by
Atty. Leonard De Vera, supra note 10, at 508, citing Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 79690-707, October 7,
1988, 166 SCRA 316, 354.
18
Zaldivar v. Gonzales, id..
Decision 11 G.R. No. 186592

confidence therein. 19 Therefore; Manrique's article, lacking in social value

and aimed solely at besmirching the reputation of the Court, is undeserving
of the protection of the guaranties of free speech and press.

The critical role of the Supreme Court as the court of last resort
renders it imperative that it maintains the ideals of neutrality, integrity and
independence:) the characteristics in which the people's trust and confidence
are built, alive and unscathed. Thus, justices and judges alike are constantly
reminded to live up to the stringent standards of the profession or else suffer
the consequences. In return, the people are expected to respect and abide by
the rulings of this Court and must not be instrumental to its disrepute.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, respondent

Leo Ruben C. Manrique is hereby adjudged GUILTY of INDIRECT
CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

19
In Re: l'ublished A 1/cged Threats against Members of' the Court in the !'Iunder Case Hurled hy
Attr. Leonard De Vera, supra note I 0, at 508.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 186592

~~~~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursua~1tto Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certifY that

the conclusi~ns in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice