G.R. No.

169712 March 14, 2008

MA. WENELITA TIRAZONA, Petitioner,

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed in this Special Civil Action for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals dated 24 May 2005 and 7 September 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85065. The appellate court’s Decision dismissed petitioner Ma.
Wenelita Tirazona’s Special Civil Action for Certiorariand affirmed the Decision4 dated 30 January
2004 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 034872-03, which ruled
that petitioner’s dismissal from employment was legal; and its Resolution which denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Philippine EDS-Techno Services Inc. (PET) is a corporation duly registered
under Philippine laws and is engaged in the business of designing automotive wiring harnesses for
automobile manufacturers. Private respondents Ken Kubota, Mamoru Ono and Junichi Hirose are all
Japanese nationals, the first being the President and the latter two being the directors of PET.

On 21 July 1999, PET employed Ma. Wenelita S. Tirazona (Tirazona) as Administrative Manager.
Being the top-ranking Filipino Manager, she acted as the liaison between the Japanese
management and the Filipino staff.

On 15 January 2002, Fe Balonzo, a rank-and-file employee, wrote a letter5 that was addressed to
nobody in particular, but was later acquired by PET management. In her letter, Balonzo complained
that Tirazona humiliated her while she was reporting back to work after recuperating from a bout of
tuberculosis. Balonzo explained that Tirazona insinuated, in a manner loud enough to be heard from
the outside, that Balonzo still had the disease. This allegedly occurred despite Balonzo’s possession
of a medical clearance that proved her fitness to return to work. Balonzo thus requested that the
necessary action be undertaken to address the said incident.

Upon receiving the letter, the PET management directed Tirazona to file her comment. Tirazona
replied accordingly in a letter6 wherein she denied the accusations against her. Tirazona stated that
her only intention was to orient Balonzo about the latter’s rights as a sick employee, i.e., that under
the law, if the latter planned to resign, the company can give her separation pay. Tirazona likewise
asked for an independent investigation and threatened to file a libel case against Balonzo for
allegedly trying to destroy her reputation and credibility.

After weighing the situation, PET director Ono sent a memorandum to Tirazona, which reads:

February 8, 2002

To: Mrs. W. Tirazona

This is to advise you that Management is satisfied that you did not intend to humiliate or embarrass
Ms. Balonzo during the incident on January 14, 2002. It also appreciates the concern you profess for
the welfare of PET employees.

Nonetheless, Management finds your handling of the situation less than ideal. Considering the
sensitive nature of the issue, a little more circumspection could have readily avoided the incident
which it cannot be denied caused unnecessary discomfort and hurt feelings to Ms. Balonzo.
Certainly, you could have discussed the matter in private and allowed her to first deliver her piece
rather than pre-empt her declaration. As it turned out, your assumption (that Ms. Balonzo would
request for a leave extension) was in fact wrong and she had a medical certificate attesting her
fitness to return to work.

Management therefore would like to remind you of the high expectations of your position.

Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you that it does not
view with favor your notice to file legal action. Management believes that you share the idea that
issues regarding employee relations are best threshed out within the Company. Resorting to legal
action is unlikely to solve but on the contrary would only exacerbate such problems.

We trust that, after emotions have calmed down, you would still see it that way.

(Sgd.)
Mamoru Ono
Director7

On 6 March 2002, Tirazona’s counsels sent demand letters8 to PET’s business address, directed
separately to Ono and Balonzo. The letter to Ono states:

February 27, 2002

MR. MAMORU ONO

Dear Mr. Ono:

We are writing in [sic] behalf of our client, Ms. MA. WENELITA S. TIRAZONA, Administrative
Manager of your corporation.

We regret that on February 8, 2002, you delivered to our client a letter containing among others,
your conclusion that Ms. Tirazona was guilty of the unfounded and baseless charges presented by
Ms. Fe Balonzo in her letter-complaint dated January 15, 2002. You may please recall that in Ms.
Tirazona’s letter to Mr. Junichi Hirose, she presented point by point, her side on the allegations
made by the complainant. In the same letter, Ms. Tirazona requested for an independent
investigation of the case in order to thresh out all issues, ferret out the truth and give her the
opportunity to be heard and confront her accuser. These were all denied our client.
As a result of the foregoing, Ms. Tirazona’s constitutional right to due process was violated and
judgment was rendered by you on mere allegations expressed in a letter-complaint to an unknown
addressee.

Considering the position and stature of Mrs. Tirazona in the community and business circles, we are
constrained to formally demand payment of P2,000,000.00 in damages, injured feelings, serious
anxiety and besmirched reputation that she is now suffering.

We are giving you five (5) days from receipt hereof to make favorable response, otherwise, much to
our regret, we will institute legal procedures to protect our client’s interests.

Please give this matter the attention it deserves.

Very truly yours,

PRINCIPE, VILLANO, VILLACORTA & CLEMENTE

By:

(Sgd.)
PEDRO S. PRINCIPE

(Sgd.)
GLICERIO E. VILLANO

The letter sent to Balonzo likewise sought the same amount of damages for her allegedly baseless
and unfounded accusations against Tirazona.

Because of Tirazona’s obstinate demand for compensation, PET sent her a Notice of Charge,9 which
informed her that they were considering her termination from employment by reason of serious
misconduct and breach of trust. According to the management, they found her letter libelous, since it
falsely accused the company of finding her guilty of the charges of Balonzo and depriving her of due
process.

On 26 March 2002, Tirazona explained in a letter10 that her counsels’ demand letter was brought
about by the denial of her repeated requests for reinvestigation of the Balonzo incident, and that the
same was personally addressed to Mamoru Ono and not to the company. She also reiterated her
request for an investigation and/or an open hearing to be conducted on the matter.

The PET management replied11 that the Balonzo incident was already deemed a closed matter, and
that the only issue for consideration was Tirazona’s "ill-advised response to the Management’s
disposition to the Fe Balonzo incident," for which an administrative hearing was scheduled on 4 April
2002.

On 3 April 2002, Tirazona submitted a written demand12 to PET that the Balonzo incident be included
in the scheduled hearing. She further stated that since the management had already prejudged her
case, she would only participate in the proceedings if the investigating panel would be composed of
three employees, one each from the rank-and-file, supervisory, and managerial levels, plus a
representative from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The PET management rejected Tirazona’s demands in a letter 13 and informed her that the hearing
was reset to 10 April 2002, which would be presided by PET’s external counsel.

On 10 April 2002, Tirazona and her counsel did not appear at the administrative hearing. The PET
management informed them through a memorandum14 dated 12 April 2002 that the hearing was
carried out despite their absence. Nevertheless, Tirazona was granted a final chance to submit a
supplemental written explanation or additional documents to substantiate her claims.

Tirazona’s written explanation15 dated 17 April 2002 merely reiterated, without further details, her
previous claims, to wit: that Balonzo’s charges were unfounded and baseless; that she had been
denied due process; and that she would not submit herself to an investigating panel that had already
prejudged her case. Tirazona also stated that her claim for damages would be justified at the proper
forum, and that she admitted to reading a confidential letter addressed to PET directors Ono and
Fukuoka, containing the legal opinion of PET’s counsel regarding her case.

After finding the explanations unsatisfactory, PET sent Tirazona a Notice of Termination,16 which
found her guilty of serious misconduct and breach of trust because of her demand against the
company and her invasion of PET’s right to privileged communication.

Tirazona then instituted with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries,
and damages against PET, docketed as NLRC-CA No. 034872-03.

In the Decision17 dated 22 January 2003, Labor Arbiter Veneranda C. Guerrero ruled in favor of
Tirazona, holding that the latter’s termination from employment was illegal.

The Arbiter declared that there was no breach of trust when Tirazona sent the demand letter, as the
same was against Ono in his personal capacity, not against the company. The decision also ruled
that PET failed to discharge the burden of proving that the alleged breach of trust was fraudulent and
willful, and that the company was careless in handling its communications. The Arbiter further stated
that Tirazona was deprived of her right to due process when she was denied a fair hearing.

On appeal by PET, the NLRC reversed the rulings of the Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated 30
January 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated January 27, 2003 and a new one is entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.18

Contrary to the Labor Arbiter’s findings, the NLRC concluded that Tirazona’s termination from
employment was in accordance with law. It ruled that Tirazona’s demand letter addressed to Ono
constituted a just cause for dismissal, as the same was "an openly hostile act" by a high-ranking
managerial employee against the company.19 The NLRC likewise found that PET complied with the
notice and hearing requirements of due process, inasmuch as Tirazona’s demand for a special panel
was without any legal basis. Furthermore, petitioner breached the company’s trust when she read
the confidential legal opinion of PET’s counsel without permission.

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Tirazona was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated 31
May 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Complainant-Appellee’s Motion for Reconsideration is

In a Decision dated 24 May 2005, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC and ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the petition is perforce dismissed.21

Her Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 7
September 2005, Tirazona now impugns before this Court the Court of Appeals Decision dated 24
May 2005, raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER THERE WAS BREACH OF TRUST ON THE PART OF PETITIONER TIRAZONA

II.

WHETHER DUE PROCESS WAS SUFFICIENTLY AND FAITHFULLY OBSERVED BY

In essence, the issue that has been brought before this Court for consideration is whether or not
Tirazona was legally dismissed from employment.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that Tirazona elevated her case to this Court via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The appropriate remedy would have been for
Tirazona to file an appeal through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

For a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to prosper, the following requisites
must be present: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions: (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there
is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.22

There is grave abuse of discretion "when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law."23

The Petition for Certiorari shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the sixty (60)-day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.24

On the other hand, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pertains to a Petition for Review
on Certiorari whereby "a party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals x x x may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review
on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."25
The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration
filed in due time after notice of the judgment.26

In the present case, the assailed Decision is the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of Tirazona’s
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Said Decision partakes of the nature of a judgment or final
order, thus, is reviewable only through an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

As aptly declared by the Court in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals27:

[s]ince the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the petition under Rule 65, any alleged errors
committed by it in the exercise of its jurisdiction would be errors of judgment which are
reviewable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. If the aggrieved party
fails to do so within the reglementary period, and the decision accordingly becomes final and
executory, he cannot avail himself of the writ of certiorari, his predicament being the effect of his
deliberate inaction. [Emphasis ours.]

Even just a cursory glance at the issues raised by Tirazona before this Court readily reveals that
these pertain to purported errors of judgment committed by the appellate court in its appreciation of
the allegations, evidence, and arguments presented by the parties. There is no question here of the
Court of Appeals acting on Tirazona’s Petition in CA-G.R. No. 85065 without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

A review of the rollo of the Petition at bar divulges even further that Tirazona’s resort to a wrong
remedy was not an innocent mistake but a deliberate choice.

On 5 October 2005, Tirazona filed with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to File a Petition
for Review on Certiorari.28 Tirazona stated therein that she received the notice of the Court of
Appeals Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration on 23 September 2005. Since she only
had fifteen (15) days after the said date to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari, or until 8 October
2005, Tirazona prayed for an extension of thirty (30) days, with her counsel citing extreme pressures
of work.

In a Resolution29 dated 19 October 2005, the Court granted Tirazona’s Motion for Extension. The
extended period was to end on 7 November 2005. However, Tirazona failed to file a Petition for
Review on Certiorari within the said period. Instead, she filed the present Petition for Certiorari on 5
December 2005, seventy-three (73) days after notice of the Court of Appeals Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration.

From the foregoing, it is fairly obvious that Tirazona was aware that she was supposed to file an
appeal through a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. That she filed the instant Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 and only after an inexplicably long period of time leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the same was merely an afterthought, nothing more than a desperate
attempt to revive a lost appeal.

The special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of
as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if
such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.30 It also
bears to stress the well-settled principle that the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive. Under Rule 56, Sec. 5(f) of the Revised Rules of Court,
a wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal merits an outright dismissal.31
Tirazona, in her Reply32 before this Court, even admits that although the instant Petition is one of
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, her petition is in reality an appeal under Rule 45 as
her petition raises pure questions of law. Tirazona herself acknowledges the formal defects of her
own Petition and attributes the same to the haste and inadvertence of her former counsel, who
allegedly prepared the instant Petition without her participation.33 She thus urges this Court to
suspend the application of its own rules on grounds of equity and substantial justice, considering that
it is her employment that is at stake in this case.

In this regard, it needs to be emphasized that before the Court may treat the present petition as
having been filed under Rule 45, the same must comply with the reglementary period for filing an
appeal. This requirement is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional such that failure to do so
renders the assailed decision final and executory, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction to alter the
final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.34 Since the instant petition was filed after the lapse
of the extended period for filing an appeal, the same should be dismissed outright.

Nevertheless, the Court finds it essential that we discuss the case on its merits, bearing in mind that
the paramount consideration in this case is an employee’s right to security of tenure, and in order to
provide Tirazona the amplest opportunity to know how the Court arrived at a proper and just
determination of her case.

Even if the Court were to ignore the conspicuous procedural defects committed by Tirazona and
treat her Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, it still finds that the Petition must be denied for lack of
merit.

Petitioner contends that, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, her dismissal from
employment was illegal for having lacked both a legal basis and the observance of due process.

In employee termination cases, the well-entrenched policy is that no worker shall be dismissed
except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due process. Clearly, dismissals
have two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes substantive due process;
and second, the legality in the manner of dismissal, which constitutes procedural due process.35

Under Article 282(c)36 of the Labor Code, loss of trust and confidence is one of the just causes for
dismissing an employee. It is an established principle that loss of confidence must be premised on
the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of trust and confidence. This situation obtains
where a person is entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as care and protection,
handling or custody of the employer’s property. But, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal,
the act complained of must be "work-related" such as would show the employee concerned to be
unfit to continue working for the employer. Besides, for loss of confidence to be a valid ground for
dismissal, such loss of confidence must arise from particular proven facts.37

Tirazona claims that her demand letter was merely an expression of indignation by a disgruntled
employee against a director, not against the company and, by itself, cannot constitute a breach of
trust and confidence. The company’s notice of charge allegedly insinuated Tirazona’s guilt in the
Balonzo incident; hence, the need to defend herself. Tirazona likewise asserts that she is an
ordinary rank-and-file employee as she is not vested with the powers and prerogatives stated in
Article 212(m)38 of the Labor Code. As such, her alleged hostility towards her co-workers and the
PET management is not a violation of trust and confidence that would warrant her termination from
employment.
At the outset, the Court notes that the issues set forth above are factual in nature. As the Court is
asked to consider the instant Petition as an appeal under Rule 45, then only pure questions of law
will be entertained.39

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while
there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on
what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a
review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.40

In the instant case, Tirazona would have the Court examine the actual wording, tenor, and
contextual background of both her demand letter and the PET’s notice of charge against her.
Similarly, the determination of whether Tirazona is a managerial or rank-and-file employee would
require the Court to review the evidence that pertains to Tirazona’s duties and obligations in the
company. Also, in order to ascertain whether the breach of trust was clearly established against
Tirazona, the Court will have to sift through and evaluate the respective evidence of the parties as
well. These tasks are not for the Court to accomplish.

The Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all
over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support
or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.41

In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own
the latter’s factual findings. Long established is the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
bodies like the NLRC are accorded with respect, even finality, if supported by substantial evidence.
When passed upon and upheld by the Court of Appeals, they are binding and conclusive upon the
Supreme Court and will not normally be disturbed.42Though this doctrine is not without
exceptions,43 the Court finds that none are applicable to the present case.

Thus, on the matter of Tirazona’s demand letter, this Court is bound by the following findings of the
Court of Appeals:

Clearly, petitioner Tirazona’s letter to respondent Ono dated 27 February 2002, as DIRECTOR of
PET was addressed to an officer and representative of the corporation. The accusations in the
aforesaid demand letter were directed against respondent Ono’s official act as a representative of
respondent PET. Suffice it to stress, an attack on the integrity of his (Ono) corporate act is
necessarily aimed at respondent PET because a corporation can only act through its officers, agents
and representatives.

xxxx

A thorough and judicious examination of the facts and evidence obtaining in the instant case as
could be found in the records, would clearly show that petitioner Tirazona has absolutely no basis for
a P2 million demand, coupled with lawsuit if the same was not paid within the five (5) days [sic]
period. Her justification for the demand of money is that she was allegedly found by the respondent
PET through respondent Ono guilty of the charges filed by Ms. Balonzo. As the records would
indubitably show, petitioner Tirazona was never charged of any offense with respect to the Fe
Balonzo’s [sic] incident. She was never issued a Notice of Charge, much less a Notice of
Disciplinary Action. What was issued to her by respondent Ono in his letter x x x was a gentle and
sound reminder to be more circumspect in handling the incident or situation like this [sic]. As fully
evidenced in the last paragraph of the said letter, it states that:
xxxx

Management considers this matter closed, and finds it appropriate to convey to you that it does not
view with favor your notice to file legal action. Management believes that you share the idea that
issues regarding employee relations are best threshed out within the Company. Resorting to legal
action is unlikely to solve but on the contrary would only exacerbate such problems.

But for reasons only known to petitioner Tirazona, she treated respondent Ono’s letter as an affront
to her honor and dignity. This, instead of seeking a dialogue with respondent PET on her felt
grievance, petitioner Tirazona through her lawyer sent the questioned demand letter to respondent
Ono. Suffice it to state, this act of petitioner bared animosity in the company and was definitely not a
proper response of a top level manager like her over a trivial matter.

xxxx

In fine, the confluence of events and circumstances surrounding the petitioner Tirazona’s actions or
omissions affecting her employer’s rights and interest, would undoubtedly show that she is no longer
worthy of being a recipient of the trust and confidence of her employer. x x x.44

Likewise conclusive upon this Court is the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that Tirazona is in fact
a managerial employee, to wit:

The records would indubitably show that it is only now that petitioner Tirazona is asserting that she is
not a managerial employee of respondent PET. From the very start, her dismissal was premised on
the fact that she is a managerial and confidential employee, and she never denied that fact. It was
never an issue at all before the Labor Arbiter and the public respondent NLRC. Therefore, she is
estopped to claim now that she is [just a] rank and file employee of respondent PET, especially that
she herself admitted in her pleading that she is a managerial employee:

xxxx

If the respondent Company has to protect Respondent Mamoru Ono, the Complainant [petitioner]
has also the right to be protected from the baseless accusations of a Rank and File Employee for
she [petitioner] is a part of the management like Mr. Mamoru Ono" (par. 5, Complainant’s Rejoinder
[to Respondent’s Reply] dated 2 September 2002 (note: unattached to the petitioner [sic]) [attached
as Annex "1" hereof]. (p. 263, Rollo).45

Tirazona next argues that she was deprived of procedural due process as she was neither served
with two written notices, nor was she afforded a hearing with her participation prior to her dismissal.

Tirazona’s arguments are baseless.

Procedural due process is simply defined as giving an opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process, and neither of those elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the constitutional
guaranty.46

The employer must furnish the employee two written notices before termination may be effected.
The first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought, while the second notice informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him.47
It is fairly obvious in this case that Tirazona was served with the required twin notices. The first was
embodied in the Notice of Charge dated 25 March 2002 where PET informed Tirazona that it was
considering her termination from employment and required her to submit a written explanation. In the
said Notice, PET apprised Tirazona of the ground upon which it was considering her dismissal: (1)
her letter that contained false accusations against the company, and (2) her demand for two million
pesos in damages, with a threat of a lawsuit if the said amount was not paid. The Notice of
Termination dated 22 April 2002 given to Tirazona constitutes the second notice whereby the
company informed her that it found her guilty of breach of trust warranting her dismissal from
service.

Equally bereft of merit is Tirazona’s allegation that she was not given the benefit of a fair hearing
before she was dismissed.

It needs to be pointed out that it was Tirazona herself and her counsel who declined to take part in
the administrative hearing set by PET 10 April 2002. Tirazona rejected the company’s appointment
of its external counsel as the investigating panel’s presiding officer, because her own demands on
the panel’s composition were denied. As correctly held by the NLRC and the Court of Appeals,
Tirazona’s stance is without any legal basis. On the contrary, this Court’s ruling in Foster Parents
Plan International/Bicol v. Demetriou48 is controlling:

The right to dismiss or otherwise impose disciplinary sanctions upon an employee for just and valid
cause, pertains in the first place to the employer, as well as the authority to determine the existence
of said cause in accordance with the norms of due process. In the very nature of things, any
investigation by the employer of any alleged cause for disciplinary punishment of an employee will
have to be conducted by the employer himself or his duly designated representative; and the
investigation cannot be thwarted or nullified by arguing that it is the employer who is
accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. x x x Of course, the decision of the employer
meting out sanctions against an employee and the evidentiary and procedural bases thereof may
subsequently be passed upon by the corresponding labor arbiter (and the NLRC on appeal) upon
the filing by the aggrieved employee of the appropriate complaint. [Emphasis ours.] 1avvphi 1

This Court has held that there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted,
where the party was given a chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is
the denial of the opportunity to be heard.49 Tirazona in this case has been afforded a number of
opportunities to defend her actions. Even when Tirazona failed to attend the scheduled hearing, PET
still informed Tirazona about what happened therein and gave her the chance to submit a
supplemental written explanation. Only when Tirazona again failed to comply with the same did PET
terminate her employment.

As a final plea for her case, Tirazona asserts that her dismissal from employment was too harsh and
arbitrary a penalty to mete out for whatever violation that she has committed, if indeed there was
one.

Tirazona ought to bear in mind this Court’s pronouncement in Metro Drug Corporation v.
NLRC50 that:

When an employee accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust
and confidence, she gives up some of the rigid guaranties available to ordinary workers. Infractions
which if committed by others would be overlooked or condoned or penalties mitigated may be visited
with more severe disciplinary action. A company’s resort to acts of self-defense would be more
easily justified. x x x.
Tirazona, in this case, has given PET more than enough reasons to distrust her. The arrogance and
hostility she has shown towards the company and her stubborn, uncompromising stance in almost
all instances justify the company’s termination of her employment. Moreover, Tirazona’s reading of
what was supposed to be a confidential letter between the counsel and directors of the PET, even if
it concerns her, only further supports her employer’s view that she cannot be trusted. In fine, the
Court cannot fault the actions of PET in dismissing petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 24 May 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.