A Himalayan Challenge PDF

A HIMAL AYAN CHALLENGE
Indias Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations

Forces along the Sino-Indian Border
Iskander Rehman
E ver since 1962, when soldiers from the Peoples Republic of China inflicted
a humiliating defeat on Indian forces, India and China have maintained an
uneasy coexistence along the worlds longest disputed frontier.1 While certain as-
pects of the Sino-Indian security dynamic have improved markedly, others have
given rise to growing unease. On the positive side of the ledger, the two nations
have succeeded in avoiding a direct, armed conflict since a bloody skirmish in
1967, and have developed a number of confidence-building measures to prevent
isolated incidents from spiraling out of control. Similarly, neither country any
longer actively sponsors proxies or foments insurgencies on the others soil. Ana-
lysts also have pointed to the relative stability of the Sino-Indian nuclear dyad,
which does not appear to present the same escalatory risks as the India-Pakistan
strategic relationship.2
Other issues and developments, however, are cause for concern. While the
Sino-Indian relationship may have become less overtly conflictual, the military
rivalry between the two rising Asian powers has taken on different aspects and
has spread to new theaters. In addition to their long-standing border dispute,
there is now a maritime component to the Sino-Indian rivalry.3 Meanwhile,
enduring sources of tensionsuch as Chinas
Iskander Rehman is a senior fellow at the Pell Cen- military support of Pakistan and Indias harboring
ter for International Relations and Public Policy at
Salve Regina University in Newport, Rhode Island.
of the Tibetan government in exilecontinue to
He holds a doctorate in political science, with dis- act as spoilers. Despite nineteen rounds of negotia-
tinction and a specialization in Asian studies, from tions at the time of this writing, India and China
Sciences Po (Paris).
have yet to define clearly the extent of many por-
Naval War College Review, Winter 2017, Vol. 70, No. 1 tions of their borderstill officially designated as
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the Line of Actual Control (LAC)let alone resolve the issue. Finally, certain
ongoing trends in Chinese strategic behaviorwhether in Chinas near seas or
along the Sino-Indian borderhave generated grave concern in New Delhi,
whose vocal strategic community regularly points to a perceived recrudescence
in Chinese border incursions.
Following one particularly tense standoff in 2013, the Indian government
confirmed the creation of a long-discussed new Mountain Strike Corps, with the
professed goal of reinforcing Indias conventional deterrent along the Sino-Indian
border. This massive accretion in manpower was presented as part of a larger,
more-sustained Indian effort to address a perceived growing military imbalance
with China. A core component of this effort has been to reinforce Indias basing
and transport infrastructure in a singularly austere operating environment. These
developments have been commented on widely, both in India and abroad. Yet
there has been a surprising lack of granular analysis of the Sino-Indian military
dynamic, whether in terms of the two states respective orders of battle, competi-
tive advantages and disadvantages, or theater strategies.
Drawing on field trips to the Himalayan border states of Sikkim, Himachal
Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir as well as close to thirty interviews with intelli-
gence officials and Indian Army (IA) and special forces officers, both serving and
retired, this article aims to give a clearer picture of the security situation along
the Sino-Indian border. In particular, it questions whether the Indian militarys
current operational concepts are sufficiently tailored to the nature of the terrain
and the evolving Chinese challenge. It suggests a more proactive approach to ter-
ritorial defense, one that places a greater emphasis on the integration of forward-
deployed, highly mobile teams of Indian special operations forces (SOFs) coupled
with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and precision-
strike capabilities, and complemented by an extensive network of tribal scouts
and militias.
To develop this argument, this article proceeds in three substantive parts. The
first briefly summarizes the current military state of play along the border, out-
lining both countries respective orders of battle, modernization plans, and op-
erational concepts. It argues that, while possibilities for greater escalation always
exist, in the near- to medium-term future any Sino-Indian territorial conflict is
likely to be relatively limited in scope and short in duration, rather than a pro-
tracted, large-scale, force-on-force campaign.4 Such a conflict also would differ
in a number of key characteristics from the war of 1962, most notably in that it
would take place under a nuclear shadow and with the likely involvement of air,
space, and cyber assets.
The second section conducts a survey of the literature on special operations
and mountain warfare, and reflects on the role that Indian SOFs could play in
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106 NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
the event of a limited Sino-Indian border war. Their potential function as a force
multiplier is examined along three axes, or spectra, of conflict: their ability to
counter acts of creeping coercion, or gray-zone aggression; their aptitude to
perform vital enabling functions in mutually denied or deeply contested areas;
and their capacity to wage special warfare campaigns across the Plateau of Tibet.
Throughout, the article draws attention to the distinct geographic characteristics
of the putative battle space; the high elevations, harsh temperatures, and rugged
topography of many critical subregions along the border would have a defining
impact on any combat operations.
The third and final section evaluates whether India has developed the requi-
site capabilities to implement such a nimble, proactive strategy. It examines this
question through a tripartite lens, focusing on the operational, institutional, and
political-strategic barriers to implementing such a strategic shift. The research
findings are summarized in the conclusion.
THE SINO-INDIAN MILITARY DYNAMIC ALONG THE LAC: THE

CURRENT STATE OF PLAY
Certain misperceptions endure regarding the military balance along the Sino-
Indian border. The most common is that Chinas localized military strength
along the LAC far outweighs Indias.5 In reality, India possesses a clear advantage
in sheer number of troops. With regard to airpower, New Delhi also holds some-
thing of an edge over its trans-Himalayan rival, even though it may be eroding
rapidlyin large part owing to the continued hemorrhaging of Indias fighter
fleet and the growing density and sophistication of Chinas integrated air defense
system (IADS) in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).6 The vulnerability of
Indias air-basing infrastructure to artillery and missile strikes is, as we shall see,
another concern. When it comes to mobile and lightweight artilleryperhaps
one of the most critical factors, given the nature of the terrainChina holds the
upper hand, in large part because of Indias unending procurement woes in this
domain.7
However, a simple bean-counting approach to the Sino-Indian military bal-
ance, based on various correlations of forces, rapidly reveals its limits. Indeed,
analysts long have pointed to the manifold difficulties inherent in measuring
military power and effectiveness. A nations conversion capability, or its capacity
to convert resources into a balanced, well-trained, and technologically proficient
force, is a key metric when gauging military power.8 Another is its ability to tailor
its strategies and force structure effectively to the nature of the threat it faces.9
When examining the continental dimensions of the Sino-Indian military ri-
valry, four factors are important to keep in mind.
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb 106 12/15/16 1:53 PM

MAP 1
6852_Rehman.indd 107
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER
Source: Authors construction, based on Google Maps.

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12/16/16 9:52 AM
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The first is the difference between the countries territorial defense postures.
Whereas India maintains a large (and growing) body of troops relatively close to
the border, Chinas military presence in the TAR is more limited. In accordance
with its doctrine on frontier defense, China stations most of its conventional
forces in its interior, to be surged in times of crisis.10 This posture has been facili-
tated by the impressive development of Chinas highway and high-speed railway
networks, particularly the extension of the QinghaiTibet railway.11 These logisti-
cal feats have not been lost on Indian planners, who estimate that Beijing could
dispatch several divisions to the LAC within a few days.12
The second defining factor is the nature of the climate and terrain. Topograph-
ically, different portions of the LAC vary substantially. Areas along the Indian
side are not amenable to mechanized warfare, except certain parts of Ladakh
and northern Sikkim. Owing to the high elevations of the Plateau of Tibet, Chi-
nese ground forces benefit from some commanding advantagesthey overlook
many Indian forward positions, rendering surveillance and artillery operations
easier to executeand are better acclimatized physiologically to high-altitude
warfare.13 On the other hand, the altitudes of the TAR make high-tempo air
campaigns more difficult: at very high altitudes jet engines take longer to ignite
owing to lower air density, and fighter aircraft are constrained in terms of their
overall payload capacity. The weather also can have an inordinate impact on the
planning and conduct of military operations: in mountainous environments, me-
teorological conditions are highly unpredictable and can shift drastically within
a few hours.14 Extreme cold, altitude, and weather affect almost every element of
military equipment, ranging from artillery cannon to helicopter rotors.15 Even
precision-guided aerial munitions can undergo significant performance varia-
tions at very high altitudes.16 During the harsh winters, certain mountain passes
can be inaccessible temporarily, while other regions, such as Aksai Chin, para-
doxically can be rendered more passable for heavy vehicles by the presence of a
thicker layer of frost and ice. In Arunachal Pradesh, some of the worlds heaviest
quantities of rainfall regularly cause landslides, disrupting motorized traffic and
troop movements.
The third major factor is the infrastructure disparity along the LAC. Whereas
Chinese troops can gain rapid access to most areas along the LAC, Indian troops
often have to trek several hours, if not days, to attain certain areas.17 The Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) also benefits from a much more robust, multilayered
communications architecture, having laid fiber-optic cabling and installed nu-
merous small-aperture terminal satellite stations.18
Finally, the two nations have erected very different command structures along
the border. Whereas in India the responsibility for the defense of the LAC is di-
vided among several regional army and air force commands, in February 2016

MAP 2
SINO-INDIAN BORDER DEPLOYMENTS
(DOES NOT INCLUDE PARAMILITARY UNITS, PAP, OR INFRASTRUCTURE STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION)
Source: Units located via IHS Janes database, August 2016.

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China announced a major military rezoning that folded the former Chengdu and
Lanzhou Military Regions into one unified western theater command.19 This will
have an impact on Chinas military effectiveness in the event of conflict, noted
one Indian defense analyst, allowing for greater unity of effort and a more ratio-
nalized marshalling of military resources.20
CHINAS REVITALIZED WAR-ZONE STRATEGY AND THE

EVOLUTION OF INDIAS TERRITORIAL DEFENSE
Chinas Revitalized War-Zone Strategy
Chinese war planning traditionally has placed a heavy emphasis on preemptive
military action as a means of seizing the initiative and throwing an adversary off
balance. Considered under the overarching rubric of active defense, PLA opera-
tions in the Korean War of the early 1950s, the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and the
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1979 all have been qualified by Chinese analysts as self-
defensive counterattacks, even though in each case it was Beijing that launched
general hostilities.21 For Chinese thinkers, there is no clear conceptual firewall
separating defensive grand strategies from offensive military tactics. To the con-
trary, preemptive military action is framed as an integral part of the Chinese con-
cept of escalation management, or war control.22 Beijings military planning with
regard to the Sino-Indian border is a reflection of this tradition, and of its broader
thinking on war-zone campaigns and winning informationized local wars.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, the PLA
began to redefine some of its core strategies and concepts. The war-zone cam-
paign doctrine, formulated in the 1990s, placed a new emphasis on jointness,
transtheater mobility, and the rapid massing of strength on a particular front.23
Writings called for the concentration of elite forces and sharp arms and stressed
the importance of gaining initiative from striking first and fighting a quick
battle to force a quick resolution. When it came to conflicts along Chinas ter-
restrial borders, it was argued that a growth in the effectiveness of transregional
support operationsprincipally via enhanced rail mobilitywould allow the
PLA to surge units stationed deep within Chinas interior rapidly. These forces
would be shielded by interlocking mobility corridors generated by early strikes
on an adversarys standoff platforms or the movement of mobile surface-to-air
missile (SAM) batteries.24 Chinas concept of informationized local wars, which
complements in many ways the war-zone campaign doctrine, attaches inordinate
importance to operations in the cyber and space domains and to prevailing in the
electromagnetic spectrum.25
Many of these key tenets permeate contemporary Chinese military thinking
with regard to future operations along the LAC. Thus, in the event of a conflict
with India, conventional forces would be surged from the Chinese interior, with

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the vast majority being deployed via rail, and another portion being flown in
via heavy airlifter, and potentially also via government-requisitioned civilian
aircraft.26 As Larry Wortzel has noted, the Chinese fully seem to expect that air,
cyber, and electronic operations will be part of any Sino-Indian border contin-
gency.27 A key role of the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), along with the PLA Rocket
Force (PLARF), would be to conduct standoff strikes to interdict, disrupt, and
delay the arrival of Indian forces coming from the lowlands. As one Chinese
military analyst notes, Along the Sino-Indian borders, where the IA enjoys . . .
manpower superiority vis--vis the PLA, the PLAAF will launch shielding bom-
bardment campaigns in a defensive land war to rebuff the enemys second-tier
infantry and logistical reinforcement. If Indias supporting units are delayed in
getting to the battlefield, PLA reinforcements from the rear can arrive at the front
line to consolidate the defense line and launch a counterattack.28
PLA SOF units no doubt would be central to Chinas concept of key counter-
attacks. According to the PLAs The Science of Campaigns, one of the key roles
of Chinese special operations units would be to assault enemy vital targets,
paralyze enemy operational systems, reduce enemy operational capabilities,
and interfere, delay, or disrupt enemy operational activities to create favorable
conditions for main force units.29 One recently retired Indian SOF general drew
attention to this aspect of Chinese thinking on special operations, noting, If a
divisional size attack is launched, say, in Tawang, then the Chinese could employ
SOFs to cut off all routes for buildup of reserves, attack specific sensors, and also
raid artillery and logistic locations. The deep induction of SOFs for providing
early warnings and information on the movement of Indian reserves could also
be tasked.30
Chinas Western Military Region possesses its own SOF brigade (formerly at-
tached to the Chengdu Military Region) and both the Xinjiang and TAR Military
Districts have large, dedicated SOF units, as well as elite, rapid-reaction units of
Peoples Armed Police (PAP).31
India also has been following, with a certain degree of trepidation, the rapid
development of Chinas airborne assault capabilities, in the form of the PLAAFs
15th Airborne Corps. Consisting of three divisions numbering over 35,000
troops, with a light artillery and mechanized component, the 15th Airborne
Corps is headquartered in Xiaogan, from which it is expected to reach any part
of China within ten hours.32 The Central Military Commission has prioritized its
modernization, and its capabilities recently were bolstered by the introduction of
the Y-20 heavy airlifter.33 The 15th Airborne Corps is considered key to the War
Zone Campaign Concept and would be used for the kind of disruptive deep
strikes that the War Zone Campaign calls for.34 Indian military planners have
monitored closely the growing number of large-scale airborne exercises the PLA

has conducted in the TAR over the past few years, with one retired air marshal
making the following observation: We are aware of Chinas increasing focus on
airborne assault operational capability, involving integrated forces. . . . A future
[limited] war could see the Chinese depending heavily on their airpower for
air defense and air support. Offensive operations would be SOF- and air assault
forcesintensive, unlike the simple infantry operations of 1962 vintage.35
Indias concerns over certain aspects of the PLAs war-zone campaign doctrine
and evolving force structure have been amplified by recent developments in
Chinas strategic behavior, most notably along the Sino-Indian border but also
in the South and East China Seas. Since the eastern Ladakh border standoff in
2013, there have been a number of similarly fraught confrontations.36 One such
incident in 2014 reportedly led to the deployment of close to one thousand troops
by each side.37 Territorial incursions have continued ever since, with notable ten-
sions flaring in September 2015 and, most recently, in March 2016.38
The Evolution of Indias Attitude toward Territorial Defense
Indias responses to Chinas intensified military coercion have been twofold. First,
the country has decided to augment its force structure significantly, with new
battalions of scouts; via the stationing of additional air, missile, and surveillance
assets; and by raising a new Mountain Strike Corps. Second, it has sought to
remedy one of its key defensive shortcomings: the paucity of rail and road infra-
structure in certain key border regions.
The latter represents an important shift away from the so-called scorched-
earth strategy that had held sway since 1962. For many decades Indian military
planners deliberately eschewed the development of border infrastructure, as
they feared it would facilitate Chinese ingress deep into the Indian plains and
lowlands.39 According to one informed journalistic account of the Indian mili-
tarys thinking vis--vis the Sino-Indian border, it was only in the middle of the
first decade of this century that the IA began to see the pitfalls of this approach
more clearly.40 The lack of solid infrastructure along the Indian side of the LAC
had rendered large tracts of contested land acutely vulnerable to Chinese prob-
ing and creeping forms of encroachment. Trudging through treacherous terrain
on foot or via mule train, Indian patrols often discovered Chinese preparation of
positions or infrastructure development only weeks after it had occurred. In the
depth of winter, when snow rendered some footpaths impassable, Indian forces
tacitly conceded certain areas, only to reinvest them in the spring. In the event of
a standoff, China could surge reinforcements more rapidly, with Indian troops
perhaps taking hours, if not days, to arrive at their destination. In short, while
an absence of infrastructure conceivably could help delay a large-scale invasion,
it had proved remarkably inadequate at deterring Chinese military coercion and
territorial encroachment.41

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It also had become gradually more apparent that a short-duration, limited,

border conflict is far more likely than a protracted, large-scale, force-on-force
campaign, not only because of the nature of current Chinese operational plan-
ning, but because both nations would be conducting military operations under a
nuclear overhang. As one much-discussed Indian report noted in 2012, Though
both countries have a doctrine of no first use, the nuclear factor can be expected
to impose caution on political decision makers on both sides. The stakes at issue
will again determine the degree of risk in political calculations. Generally, the
nuclear factor can be expected to limit the scale of conflict and impact the scope
of feasible political objectives.42
Finally, the longer the conflict lasts, the more likely it will attract third-party
intervention in the form of diplomatic or military assistance or both. According
to declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports, this was one of the
main reasons China planned for a short, limited war in 1962.43
Responding to a limited-war contingency requires operational agility and the
ability to respond rapidly and effectively to a crisis.44 This reinforces the need for
a tighter web of infrastructure that can enable Indian forces to react promptly to
any tremor felt along any one of its strands.45
Over the past few years, India has launched a bevy of large-scale border infra-
structure projects, albeit with chequered results. While some progress has been
made in certain areas, most of Indias road and rail construction projects have
fallen victim to considerable delays. As of May 2016, only twenty-one of sixty-one
border road projects designated strategic had been completed.46 Similarly, while
the Indian government sanctioned the construction of twenty-eight strategic rail-
way lines along Indias borders in 2010, six years later none have been finalized.47
The accretion of Indias conventional force structure along the LAC and the
attendant development in infrastructure provide two material indicators of the
shift in Indias defense strategy toward China. The most significant change, how-
ever, has occurred in the intellectual domain, as Indian defense planners have
adopted a much more vigorous, tactically offensive approach to territorial de-
fense. The creation of the Mountain Strike Corps, note Indian commentators,
was part of a larger movement toward deterrence by punishment and away from
what has been perceived to be an overreliance on deterrence by denial in the
past.48 Indeed, for many decades Indias two-front planning construct called for
India simply to hold along the border with China while its forces engaged in
more-offensive operations against Pakistan to the west.49
This approach progressively has been replaced with what has been described
to this author variously as a form of offensive defense, a quid pro quo strategy,
and a cross-border riposte strategy. Following Clausewitzs well-known dictum
that a swift and vigorous assumption of the offensive is often the most brilliant

point in the defensive, Indian military planners have adapted their concepts of
operation to the natures of both the opponent and the topography.50 As one army
colonel candidly noted, mountainous terrain can favor the first mover, adding,
Once the Chinese seize a position, it may be very difficult to dislodge them. Rather
than expend much blood and treasure attempting to storm impregnable positions, we
should pursue a strategy of horizontal escalation and capture territory elsewhere. If
you cannot counter symmetrically, you can effectively counter by shifting the locus of
the battlefield. The political compulsions of territorial defense make things very dif-
ficult for us in the Army. Our elected government will not tolerate us losing even one
centimeter of territory. This cannot be achieved without us seizing territorial chips
for bargaining purposes elsewhere. We have to think of conflict termination.51
Another IA officer concurred, observing, Raising the strike corps was part of a
move to create a more offensive defense. If Indias sovereignty is weakened, we
should have the ability to mount a riposte. If the PLA strikes at Tawang, we can
provide a mechanized Indian response via Ladakh. In the past we had a dissuasive
posture, solely focused on static defense. Deterrence is now being rebalanced.52
Both Ladakh and northern Sikkim are considered good locations for mount-
ing such a mechanized riposte, not only because they provide some of the few
staging areas along the Indian side of the LAC conducive to mechanized warfare,
but because they overlook main axes of approach (the plateau of Aksai Chin and
the Sora Funnel) and logistical lifelines, such as the China Western Highway.53
In the event of conflict, Indias mechanized forces would sweep down from these
mountain plains to conduct pincer movements behind advancing Chinese for-
mations, with the hope of breaking troop concentration.54
Indias mechanized counteroffensive would form only one component of a
wider theater strategy, however. In addition to these movements, Indian air and
missile power would be brought to bear on transport and communication nodes
deep within the TAR, with the goal of delaying or preventing the arrival of PLA
reinforcements.55
INCORPORATING SOFS INTO INDIAS CURRENT APPROACH TO

AREA DENIAL
Despite this shift toward a more offensive form of area denial, Indias current
approach to conventional deterrence along the LAC appears to suffer from
certain limitations. Indeed, while New Delhis overarching military strategy has
evolvedmost notably by more vigorously stressing the need for cross-border
strikesthe force structure changes it preconizes are remarkably similar to those
pursued in the wake of the 1962 war: a massive accretion in conventional land
power.56

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New Delhi also continues to rely on geographically dispersed conventional

units or on poorly equipped paramilitary forces, the latter in the form of the
Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), as Indias first line of defense in many of the
forward areas most vulnerable to Chinese aggression.57 The rugged nature of the
topography, along with the continued paucity of infrastructure, means that even
though India forward-deploys a large number of conventional screening forces
along some of the most obvious axes of approach (the five main river valleys in
Arunachal Pradesh, for instance), these troops are relatively static and could be
outflanked by small detachments engaging in rapid lateral movements.58
Meanwhile, a large portion of the IAs mechanized units still will be stationed
in the lowlands, with the expectation that they would be rushed to higher alti-
tudes in the event of conflict. Not only would this prove logistically challenging
owing to the enduring deficits in Indias road and rail infrastructure; it also would
prove physically taxing.59 In contrast to the first wave of PLA troops flowing from
the heights of the Plateau of Tibet, Indian troops deployed from interior garrisons
would be surged into combat before having been acclimatized properly.60 Medical
studies have shown that a physically fit soldier requires about two weeks to adapt
progressively to a new altitude, and three weeks to conditions of extreme cold.61
In the absence of proper acclimatization, soldiers operating at extreme altitudes
can suffer from acute mountain sickness, severe sleep disorders, high-altitude
pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema.62
Second, such a manpower-centered approach to deterrence already has proved
to be prohibitively costly. In April 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar
announced that the planned Mountain Strike Corps would be halved to approxi-
mately 35,000 troops for financial reasons, and that the formation budget for the
corps would be frozen at U.S.$6.1 billion, significantly less than the originally
sanctioned U.S.$13.8 billion.63 Scandal already had erupted a year earlier when
it was revealed that the IA had been compelled to dip into precious weapon and
ammunition reserves to equip its newly raised forces properly.64 While the Indian
defense minister appears to have reversed his prior decision, renewing assurances
that the Mountain Strike Corps would be resourced properly, Indias efforts to
add thousands more boots on the ground inevitably will prove onerous.65 Indeed,
Indias expansion of its ground forces has been accompanied by a rise in person-
nel costs, a trend that is slated to increase exponentially over time.66
Finally, the natural compartmentalization of much of the terrainwhich often
does not allow large units to maneuver effectivelydisincentivizes the massing of
force, especially when moving uphill.67 As Indias conventional forces wind their
way up narrow, mountain roads to higher elevations or are funneled through
mountain valleys, they could find themselves targeted by Chinese artillery bar-
rages, missile strikes, and shielding bombardment campaigns. They might

suffer disproportionate casualties when targeted by Chinese forces positioned

in height and depth or find their main axes of approach to certain remote areas
suddenly cut off.68
In short, Indias intense reliance on large, centralized, conventional forcesa
substantial portion of which are stationed at lower altitudeswould not be the
most operationally judicious approach in the event of a short, fast-moving, lim-
ited war launched from high elevations along the LAC.
One French study on mountain warfare notes that for conventional forces to
assail higher-altitude positions successfully, they must rely on a different yet
complementary force, that is, a force that is decentralized, highly trained, and
optimized for heliborne assault and the neutralization of enemy positions located
at higher vantage points.69 The next section of this article makes an argument
for providing the IA with a similarly different yet complementary forceone
that is forward deployed, distributed, and able to respond both rapidly and ef-
fectively to various contingencies. The candidate forcea mixture of SOFs and
locally raised scouting battalionswould be geared toward rapid reaction and
proactive defense.
The argument is not that large-scale conventional forces have no role to play
in the event of a Sino-Indian border contingency, or that India should rely exclu-
sively on special operations for conventional deterrence along the border. Many
of the missions at the heart of Indias operational conceptssuch as the seizure
of limited tracts of territoryare suited to mountain infantry, not SOFs.70 Rather,
the emphasis is on developing a better complementarity between these elements
rather than on clearly dissociating them. Indeed, it has been demonstrated re-
peatedly that modern militaries are at their most effective when they succeed
in integrating conventional and special operations within a common, clearly
defined, strategic framework.71
PROACTIVE DEFENSE AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

FORCES
This section evaluates the role of Indias SOFs within the framework of a more
proactive territorial defense strategy. India possesses a large number and variety
of elite units, some of which fall under the Home Affairs Ministry, such as the
National Security Guard (NSG), which focuses almost exclusively on counter
terrorism (CT) operations, and the Special Protection Group, a VIP-protection
unit. To add to the confusion, some units occasionally qualified as SOFs in In-
dia, such as the IA Ghatak platoons and the Sagar Prahari Balthe latter a unit
formed following the 2008 Mumbai attacks to provide better coastal security
are not so much special operators as specialized forces.

MAP 3
EXPLORING THE ROLES OF INDIAN SOFS ALONG THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER
- -
Source: Authors graphical construction superimposed on Google Maps.

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The primary focus of this discussion is the SOF units most likely to play a
role in the event of a Sino-Indian border conflict: the SOF-qualified elements of
the IAs Para Commando battalions and, to a lesser extent, the relatively newly
formed Garud unit of the Indian Air Force (IAF). At the time of this writing,
the IA possesses eight battalions of special operators (Para SFs), with plans for
future expansion, as well as five battalions (a brigade) of airborne paras, which
are more akin to airborne assault units.72 Each battalion nominally is pegged at
approximately seven hundred men, but many units reportedly are undermanned,
underequipped, and suffering from a 30 percent officer shortfall. The Garud,
which was formed in 2003, currently comprises about one thousand troops, and
their numbers will double in the aftermath of the attacks on Pathankot Air Base
in early 2016.73 The IAF has struggled to define the role of the Garud adequately,
beyond base protection. (While the Indian Navys SOF component, the Marine
Commando Force [MARCOS], has been stationed in small numbers at certain
high-altitude lakes in Jammu and Kashmir, its role would be minimal at best, and
therefore MARCOS will not be addressed further.)
Another unit, the fabled Special Frontier Force (SFF), will be discussed in ad-
dition to the Para SFs and the Garud.74 Formed in late 1962, following the Sino-
Indian War, the SFF is part of Indias external intelligence agency, the Research
and Analysis Wing (RAW), and answers directly to the Cabinet Secretariat.75
Modeled on the Kennedy-era Green Berets, the unit is rumored to contain about
ten thousand soldiers, trained to conduct operations behind enemy lines and en-
gage in special warfare.76 There is some debate over whether this secretive force
has preserved its elite status as well as its original mandate.
The roles of these units will be examined along three axes: their utility in coun-
tering gray-zone aggression, their aptitude for engaging in direct action behind
enemy lines, and their ability to conduct special warfare in the TAR.77
COUNTERING GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION

Over the past few years, numerous observers have drawn attention to the chal-
lenge that acts of creeping coercion pose to the international order. These con-
cerns have been compounded by revisionist powers shared predilection for so-
called gray-zone strategies, a combination of salami-slicing tactics, information
warfare, and military coercion.78
Certain aspects of gray-zone campaigns, such as the use of proxies, long have
been familiar to Indian security managers, who have had to contend with such
modes of Pakistani covert action since independence.79 Chinas historic use of
infrastructure development as a means of cementingliterallyits claim over
contested territory is also well known in New Delhi. After all, many past episodes
of border tension have occurred following Indian forces belated discovery of

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Chinese road and basing development in remote border areas. Despite Indias
familiarity with such forms of great-power competition, its strategic communitys
literature on the challenges that gray-zone aggression poses is surprisingly sparse.
Moreover, when Indian strategic thinkers reflect on such issues, they tend to do
so with Pakistan in mind rather than China. Yet as demonstrated in the first sec-
tion of this article, the threat of gray-zone aggression should not be perceived as
exclusive to Indo-Pakistani security dynamics.
Within U.S. strategic circles, it is the special operations community that per-
haps has thought the longest and hardest about how to counter such forms of
territorial encroachment effectively. As one recent official document notes, de-
mocracies can face certain disadvantages when confronting authoritarian rivals
whose decision-making and civil-military structures can facilitate unity of effort
in the gray zone.80
For the same reasons that SOFs can prove immensely attractive to democra-
cies when prosecuting CT operations overseastheir tactical agility, deniability,
and restricted oversightthey are emerging as the tools of choice in responding
to certain features of authoritarian aggression.81 For example, in the event of
Chinese operatives landing on the Senkaku Islands (claimed by both China and
Japan), disguised as fishermen, Japanese military planners view advance par-
ties of heliborne special forces as forming one of their first lines of defense.82
Similarly, central and eastern European states envision rapid-reaction SOF units
as providing some of the most effective counters to any future Russian attempt to
replicate a Crimean little green men strategy on NATO soil.83
SOFs provide democratic policy makers with the capacity to respond rapidly,
effectively, and in a tailored manner to such acts of infiltration, subversion, or
sabotage.84 In Indias case, a wide variety of scenarios were mentioned in the
course of private conversations with the author, such as Chinese clandestine
operatives or SOFs entering Arunachal Pradesh or Sikkim disguised as Tibetan
refugees, nomadic herdsmen, or economic migrants from Indias troubled north-
eastern territories.85 Indian military officers also expressed concern over their
past inability to detect Chinese infrastructure development in a timely fashion
and mentioned the possibility of Chinese engineers discreetly constructing small
landing grounds, hidden ammunition depots, and SAM sites during the off-
season when Indian soldiers no longer can gain access to certain areas close to
Chinese positions, owing to snow and the paucity of infrastructure on the Indian
side of the LAC.86
To respond with alacrity to such scenarios, Indian SOFs would need, first
and foremost, to be able to detect them. Indias advances in space-based surveil-
lance, along with the planned introduction of a large number of surveillance
platformsin the form of high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and

aerostatspromise to help in this regard, but the difficult nature of the terrain
imposes limitations.87 India has been contemplating erecting Israeli-type security
systems along certain portions of its border with Pakistan, complete with night-
observation cameras, long-range detection radars, motion sensors, and thermal
imaging.88 However, the deep valleys and craggy peaks that prevail across much
of the LACnot to mention the prohibitive expensepreclude such ambitious
technological solutions.89 Radio, radar, and even satellite communications sys-
tems have difficulty operating around terrain folds, and the very fact that the
Sino-Indian border has not been delineated officially means that China would
view any large-scale Indian fencing effort as a severe provocation.90
As a result, human intelligence (HUMINT) would prove absolutely critical in
detecting Chinese gray-zone operations, whether the latter were in the form of
cross-border infiltrations, illicit infrastructure development, or attempts at sabo-
tage and subversion. For decades, Indian intelligence services have depended on
the knowledge gleaned from nomadic herders, who frequently wander between
Indian- and Chinese-controlled territory along the LAC.91 Religious pilgrims
and resident tribal populations provide other valuable sources of information.
India should seek to sharpen its HUMINT capabilities further along the LAC,
by recognizing that the key to preserving long-term control lies in the degree of
influence it wields over the complex patchwork of border peoples. For example,
in Arunachal Pradesh alone there are more than twenty-six major tribes and one
hundred subtribes.92 India should focus on training more of its intelligence offi-
cers and SOFs in the languages and dialects of the many peoples along the border
and on fast-tracking the central governments much-delayed Border Area Devel-
opment Program (BADP), with a particular focus on the regions most likely to be
the targets of future Chinese incursions, i.e., Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.93 A
less heavy-handed policing approach in certain areas also might prove construc-
tive in terms of winning hearts and minds and might foster better information
sharing between local communities and Indian authorities.94
Finally, the addition of more tribal and local forcesin the vein of the Ladakh
Snow Tigers or the recently raised scout battalions from Sikkim and Arunachal
would buttress considerably Indias conventional deterrent in its border regions.95
Not only does this constitute a low-cost approach to frontier policing; it also
provides Indian security managers with a year-round, forward-deployed, trip
wire force whose members are physiologically acclimatized to high altitudes and
mountain warfare and have an innate knowledge of the terrain and local condi-
tions.96 Because of their familial ties with local villagers and herdsmen, these
scouts are better positioned to recognize signs of cross-border infiltration. Small
teams of Indian special forcesin the form of joint terminal attack controllers
(JTACs) or communications expertscould be attached to each battalion, much

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in the way the United States embedded small teams of SOFs among its Northern
Alliance partners during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.97 This would provide
lightly armed tribal and ethnic battalions with the ability to call on airpower or
follow-on conventional forces in the event of an encounter with a more formi-
dable foe. Equipping select teams of Sikkim and Arunachal Scouts with antitank
guided missiles, light mortars, and shoulder-mounted rocket launchers, in the
vein of the Ghatak platoons that act as the spearheads of conventional IA units,
also could prove valuable.98 The goal should be to provide the IA not only with
lightly armed reconnaissance units but also with hybridized structures that can
help mount a Fabian defense of their respective home states in the event of a
larger-scale Chinese incursion, by delaying, harassing, and attriting PLA forces.99
DIRECT ACTION AND ENABLING OPERATIONS

India, albeit somewhat more belatedly than China, has begun to attach more
importance to airborne assault operations, especially their utility for targeting
Chinese transport and communications infrastructure in the TAR in the event of
conflict.100 There is also a growing realization among some military thinkers that
Indian SOFs could be called on to play a critical role behind enemy lines, con-
ducting sabotage, reconnaissance, and direct-action operations. While one serv-
ing IA special forces colonel cautiously stated that Indian SOFs would be used
for direct action operations primarily on Indian soil, with the occasional cross
border deployment in a limited manner, another IA special forces brigadier was
less circumspect, observing that Indias dissuasive posture being based in part
on the threat of horizontal escalation, SOF operations behind Chinese lines will
necessarily be part of the mix.101 IA doctrine, for its part, defines special forces
as specially selected troops who are trained, equipped, and organized to oper-
ate in hostile territory, isolated from the main combat forces. They may operate
independently or in conjunction with other forces at the operational level. They
are versatile, have a deep reach, and can make precision strikes at targets of criti-
cal importance.102
It is this last functionthe ability to strike at rear-based targetsthat seems
to hold the most appeal for Indian military planners. There is a recognition that
the combat environment straddling the Sino-Indian border may morph progres-
sively into something of a no-mans-land for large clusters of ground forces and
high-signature platforms, owing to the growing ubiquity of extended-range,
precision-guided munitions. The PLAs increased focus on transtheater mobility
and the ability to deploy SAMs, truck-mounted UAVs, and land-attack cruise
missile batteries rapidly along its side of the LAC has engendered particular
anxiety in New Delhi.103 Indian advanced landing grounds and air bases are in-
creasingly vulnerable to missile and artillery bombardment.104 Furthermore, the

government has yet to finalize the construction of hardened shelters for the IAFs
squadrons of Su-30MKI aircraft.105 While Indian fighter pilots have begun to
train using sections of road and highway as dispersal runways, other passive de-
fenses could be implemented, such as investing in large numbers of subterranean
shelters with large stockpiles of munitions, lubricants, and petroleum.106 Absent
such efforts, Indian airpower near the border effectively may be crippled in the
first phases of conflict, or could suffer from virtual attritiondevoting the bulk
of sorties to defensive counterair missions or to suppressing enemy air defenses,
rather than conducting precision strikes against enemy air bases and ground tar-
gets.107 This role, note some Indian military officials, may need to be entrusted to
small demolition teams of SOFs, which could carve holes in Chinas reconnais-
sance strike complex and provide terminal guidance for standoff missile strikes
conducted from outside the range of Chinas IADS networks. In some ways, this
resembles Soviet thinking on the deployment of Spetsnaz SOFs behind NATO
lines for sabotage and demolition missions against mobile missile batteries.108
This penetrating role is in line with the conceptualization by some U.S.
analysts of SOFs as low-signature entry forces within heavily denied or contested
environments.109 IAF doctrine specifies that the destruction and degradation of
enemy air assets constitute one of the core functions of its dedicated SOF unit,
the Garud.110 One retired IA brigadier confided the following:
In the conceptualized role of the mountain strike corps, the future Air Assault Divi-
sion and Special Operations Forces will operate in tandem as part of Indias area
denial strategy. What is implied is, SOFs will be inserted up to and beyond an opera-
tional depth to disrupt the build-up of PLA forces, isolate and invest critical vulner-
able points and areas. These isolated vulnerable points will then be attacked via air
assaults through heliborne and airborne forces. It is important to keep in mind that
the Tibetan plateau is a plane with little undulations, which allows for the application
of both air assault forces as well as air assault mechanized forces.111
The challenge, however, would be to succeed in inserting SOF guidance and

demolition teams in the absence of dedicated, stealthy airlifters.112 Advances in
air-defense systems and long-range surface-to-surface fires have raised new ques-
tions about how to conduct airborne operations without incurring large-scale,
potentially catastrophic losses.113 Large, high-signature transport aircraft, such as
Indias C-17 Globemasters or C-130J Hercules, would be vulnerable to Chinese
radar-guided SAMsproviding the latter had not been suppressed prior to the
air assault. More-discreet modes of airborne insertion, e.g., via low-flying heli-
borne strike forces, still could be put at risk by lower-altitude air-defense systems
and antiaircraft guns.114 Indian troops most likely would need to establish drop
zones at a distance from the densest thickets of Chinese low-altitude systems
and rely on airborne light armored vehicles (LAVs) to gain greater mobility and

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firepower and compensate for the distances separating their lodgments from
their target points.115 The U.S. Army has been developing a new family of LAVs
designed for this particular role and Indian SOF officers expressed interest in ac-
quiring several such vehicles, with future airborne assault operations in mind.116
Once successfully inserted, Indian SOF teams may need to operate blind
within an environment characterized by the denial of command, control, com-
munications, computers, and ISR (i.e., C4ISR) capabilities, particularly if Indias
fragile space-based communications architecture has been degraded or disabled
preemptively. Mindful of this, the IA has released an updated request for infor-
mation (RFI) for mini battlefield UAVs, which senior officers have indicated
would enable two-man IA SOF teams to conduct over-the-hill surveillance be-
hind enemy lines.117 The introduction of longer-range, high-altitude UAVs, when
combined with a more-robust satellite and airborne communications network,
also could improve IA ability to locate and direct fire at enemy targets situated at
greater distances as well as to preserve communications among dispersed units.118
Finally, if a Chinese offensive indeed proves to be air assaultintensive, small
teams of Indian SOFs equipped with shoulder-mounted SAMs could prove in-
valuable. Given the rough, mountainous terrain, limited avenues of approach,
and growing ability of China to target larger formations of conventional forces,
SOFs could provide a key comparative advantage in this more defensive role.119
WAGING SPECIAL WARFARE IN THE TAR

The Tibetan issue always has been at the heart of Sino-Indian tensions.120 For
New Delhi, the PLAs absorption of the mountain territory in 1951 signified the
loss of a historic buffer zone, and the progressive hardening of Beijings Tibet pol-
icies has caused both anger and dismay. For China, Indias harboring of the Dalai
Lama and the Tibetan government in exile following the 1959 Tibetan uprising
amounted to an almost unforgivable affront. Throughout the late 1950s and up
to the 1962 border war, Chinese intelligence remained absolutely convinced that
India was attempting to foment unrest across the Plateau of Tibet.121
Following Indias defeat, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the fateful
decisionlong encouraged by certain of his intelligence czarsto aid and abet
insurgency movements within Tibet and to arm Indias sizable Tibetan refugee
community.122 A large paramilitary unit, the ITBP, was raised and entrusted with
patrolling forward areas along the LAC.
In addition, a much more secretive force was established: the SFF. Composed
of thousands of ethnic Tibetans, many of whom had been resistance fighters in
the TAR or part of the Dalai Lamas bodyguard, the SFF was an elite unit of para-
troopers trained in mountain warfare, sabotage, and demolition. Commanded
by IA officers on special assignment, the unit is managed by RAW and reports

directly to the Prime Ministers Office via the Directorate General of Security in
the Cabinet Secretariat. The CIA played an important role in shaping the SFFs
development in its early years, providing training and instruction in guerrilla
warfare tactics.123 Doctrinally, the unit is inspired heavily by Kennedy-era U.S.
Army Special Forces, with the Green Berets intellectual predilection for special
warfare and operations deep behind enemy lines.124 In fact, this was the SFFs
original mandate. Some claim that Nehru even went so far as to frame the SFF as
the potential vanguard of a future liberation of Tibet from Chinese rule.125 Since
its creation, the SFF has played an active role in Indias regional conflicts, fight-
ing behind enemy lines in Bangladesh alongside Indian-sponsored militiasthe
Mukti Bahiniin the war of 1971, detonating bridges, and suffering, according
to some accounts, dozens of casualties.126 Unconfirmed reports also have indi-
cated that the SFF played a role in the Indian military assault against the Golden
Temple, Operation BLUESTAR, in 1984 and in the Kargil War of 1999.127
The current state of the SFF is difficult to ascertain. The unit continues to ex-
ist and is based in the hill town of Chakrata, in the state of Uttarakhand. Details
pertaining to its force structure, equipment, and operational mandate in the
event of a Sino-Indian confrontation are considered extraordinarily sensitive.
Even retired IA special forces officers were distinctly uncomfortable when ques-
tioned on the matter. Some claimed complete ignorance, stating that the SFFs
operations and training regimen were strictly compartmentalized, with little to
no interaction with regular military SOFs. This is clearly not the case, as Para SFs
are seconded to SFF units frequently. When queried on its alleged elite status, one
former IA general dismissed the SFF as little more than a rag tag force, poorly
equipped and no longer commando-trained.128 A smattering of press reports has
drawn attention to troubling shortages in certain essential pieces of equipment,
such as parachutes.129 There is also uncertainty surrounding the forces dedicated
air-transport assets, now that the Aviation Research Center, RAWs private air
wing and border-surveillance unit, has been dissolved and split between the IAF
and the National Technical Research Organization, a signals-intelligence agency
created in 2004.130 Overall, however, other interviewees assessments were at odds
with those of the general. Many expressed a grudging admiration for the tough-
ness of those Tibetan boys, as well as that of the Gurkhas and hill tribesmen
who have swollen the SFFs ranks over the years.
The main question, however, relates to the contemporary role of what some
have referred to as Indias secret Tibetan army. Ever since the late 1970s and the
tentative beginnings of Sino-Indian rapprochement, a tacit quid pro quo arrange-
ment has been observed. China agreed to end its support for insurgent groups in
Indias troubled northeast, while India subscribed to a one-China policy and offi-
cially abandoned its clandestine efforts across the Tibetan border.131 However, the

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reality is somewhat more complex. Although China no longer directly supports

militancy in places such as Nagaland, Mizoram, and Assam, Chinese middle-
men have been known to funnel in weaponry via countries in Southeast Asia.132
Meanwhile, other countries, such as Pakistan, continue to play an active role in
the area, raising questions over whether China chooses to maintain close ties with
certain of these groups via a third party.133 When it comes to India and Tibet,
there is a similar sense that New Delhi could revert to older policies if it found
itself compelled.134
For this reasonfor purposes of what might best be described as a form of
unconventional deterrenceit would appear that the SFF has remained true to
its special warfare roots. One former planner within Indias Integrated Defence
Staff commented that, in his opinion, in light of current circumstances, I see no
reason to dilute the operational mandate.135 A recently retired Para SF lieuten-
ant general responded in a more oblique fashion, saying that envisioning what
role the Tibetan boys would play does not require much imagination.136 Serving
officers either refused to respond or simply suggested that there had been no
change in their tasking.137
One might question, however, whether the SFF would be able to prosecute
such a campaign successfully in todays environment. First, such an effort most
probably would be far more isolated than if it had occurred during the early to
mid-1960s, when the SFF was established. During that period, both Nepal and
the United States played an active role, alongside India, in supporting Tibetan
militancy. In fact, for many years it was the ancient kingdom of Mustang, in Ne-
pal, that served as the true epicenter and safe haven for Tibetan combatants.138 By
the end of that decade, however, China had succeeded in convincing Nepal to be-
tray the Tibetan cause, while the United States had sacrificed its anticommunist
freedom fighters on the altar of Nixonian rapprochement with China.139 In the
event of another conflict, India essentially would find itself conducting the bulk
of its covert campaigns alone. Depending on the circumstances, one could envi-
sion the United States discreetly providing a modicum of intelligence support,
but not much more. Even if SFF task forces are inserted successfully, it might
prove extremely challenging to sustain them, given the contested nature of the
aerial environment over Tibet. Investment in systems such as the U.S.-developed
Joint Precision Airdrop System, which can be dropped from a height of 25,000
feet, might alleviate this challenge.140
Another key difference lies in the extent of Chinas surveillance and control
over Tibet, which is far greater today than it was in 1962. Since the 2008 distur-
bances, in particular, Beijing has improved vastly its internal security apparatus
in the TAR. New, highly sophisticated frontier-monitoring systems, incorporat-
ing electro-optical devices, radars, unmanned aircraft, and tools for imagery

analysis, have been put in place. Tibetan communities in India have registered a
sharp drop in the number of incoming refugeesmany who seek to depart are
apprehended or shot while attempting to cross the border.141 China recently en-
acted a draconian new counterterror law that further curtails Tibetans freedom
of movement and expression, and Chinese intelligence officers have deeply pen-
etrated Tibetan monasteries and refugee networks.142 Surveillance of neighbor-
hoods has been amplified via the establishment of an intricate grid system and
facilitated by the forced sedentarization of historically nomadic populations.143
PAP forces, often formed from recently decommissioned PLA troops, have
grown ever more numerous in Tibet and increasingly militarized, incorporat-
ing heliborne rapid-reaction units and equipped with armored vehicles.144 Their
presence, in addition to the PLA element already stationed in the TAR, could
present a formidable challenge to Indian special warfare efforts. Moreover, it re-
mains unclear whether the majority of the younger generation of Tibetans living
on the Indian side of the border would be as willing to take up arms alongside
their brethren as some have claimed.145 Finally, as we shall see in greater depth
in a later section, Indias political leaders might be reticent to deploy the SFF in
such a role, either because they viewed such a step as too escalatory or because it
would lead to protraction, thus impeding war termination.
THE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OF

PROACTIVE DEFENSE
Technical and Operational Hurdles
The first and most immediate set of hurdles resides in the technical and op-
erational domain. Numerous observers, both within and outside Indias special
operations community, have drawn attention to chronic shortfalls in essential
equipment, such as parachutes, night vision devices, communications devices,
laser designators, and high-altitude clothing.146 U.S. SOFs, having observed their
Indian counterparts during training exercises, noticed that in many cases Indian
paratroopers preferred to discard their expensive Israeli-designed Tavor rifles
which are ill suited for Himalayan conditions and occasionally jamin favor of
the more reliable AK-47.147
Another common complaint was that the SOFs had expanded too rapidly in
size and in an ad hoc manner, without the benefit of careful, deliberate plan-
ning.148 As a result, noted one colonel, in numerous cases during the raising of
Para SF battalions existing equipment sourced from regular infantry regiments
was distributed among the new units, resulting in their soldiers having to make
do with inferior equipment.149 In some cases, observers pointed to seemingly
prosaic concerns as having genuine security implications. One example is the
continued absence of aluminum, belt-attachable water bottles. Indian Para SF

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personnel often are compelled to carry large, heavy, plastic bottles of potable wa-
ter in their rucksacks. When removed, these reflect very far out into the sunshine
and off the snowrunning the risk of revealing hidden positions.150
Another issue concerns officer manpower, especially declining retention rates.
Most Para SF units suffer from an estimated officer shortfall of 2530 percent.151
As one brigadier general stationed at IA headquarters noted, a growing number
of Indian SOF officers are leaving the service to pursue more-lucrative careers in
the private sector, where they often specialize in VIP protection.152 It is important
to note, in passing, that this problem is not specific to India; the United States
faces a similar challenge.153 The net result, however, is that Indias SOFs are in-
creasingly bottom heavy, with a large number of fresh, new recruits but too few
experienced officers and noncommissioned officers.
This overly rapid expansion also has exposed certain deficiencies in Indias
SOF training infrastructure. SOF officers warned in 2010 that it would take
many years for the IAs Special Forces Training School (SFTS)located in Na-
han, 300 km to the north of Delhito catch up with the expanded forces new
requirements.154 Foreign observers note that the SFTS still lacks key facilities,
such as vertical wind tunnels, next-generation simulators, and sufficient firing
ranges.155
Questions also were raised about the nature of certain aspects of the selection
and training processes, which often are delegated to each individual battalion,
and how to ensure consistent standards. Indian SOF officers, however, were of the
view that this more-decentralized system had its advantages, as it allowed units
to be highly specialized in certain niche competencies and to have excellent area
and terrain specialization.156
Organizational and Doctrinal Challenges
Perhaps the greatest set of challenges lies in the organizational domain. Absent a
restructuring of Indias special operations capability around a Joint Special Oper-
ations Command (JSOC), many of the more chronic problems affecting training,
procurement, and information sharing most likely will endure.157 Indian strategic
commentators long have called for the creation of a JSOC, via which Indias com-
munity of special operators could be provided with fully fused informational
support from the nations notoriously factionalized intelligence agencies.158 While
the formation of Indias Defence Intelligence Agency in 2002, following the rec-
ommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, has led to better integration
among the services respective intelligence wings, reportedly there is still much
scope for improvement.159 This would necessitate the permanent deputation
of civilian intelligence officers drawn from all the relevant agencies, including
the Intelligence Bureau, which, while theoretically domestically oriented, plays
an important role along certain tracts of the Sino-Indian border. Optimizing

the functionality of Indias (future) JSOC also would require providing it with
its own budget, requirements-validation process, and streamlined acquisition
procedures. This would enable it to fast-track much-needed items, such as night
vision devices and parachutes, bypassing the traditionally cumbersome procure-
ment process of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD).
The existence of a JSOC also would bring about greater strategic and doctri-
nal clarity, along with more institutionalized joint training. For the time being,
Indias Para SFs have no organic air wing, and the IA air arm as yet does not
possess its own ground-attack capability. After years of bitter wrangling among
services, the MOD arbitrated in favor of the IAF retaining control, for the time
being, over newly acquired heliborne platforms critical for special operations and
airborne assault, such as the Apaches and Chinooks purchased from the United
States.160 While this is projected to change in the near future, the process points
to the persistent dysfunctionality of interservice relations, which could affect
the effectiveness and reactivity of Indian SOFs in the event of a crisis. With each
service striving to create its own SOF unit, there also has been a certain amount
of duplication in terms of core competencies and a relative absence of profound
reflection on what some of these newly formed units could bring in terms of
added valuethis despite the existence since 2008 of a (classified) Indian Joint
Doctrine for Special Operations.161 The IAFs Garud, for example, has yet truly to
evolve beyond its primary objective of protecting air bases and installations, a
task that could be relegated to a force already designed for such a purpose: the
paramilitary Central Industrial Security Force. There is a broad consensus within
Indias SOF community that where the Garud truly needs to focus its efforts is
on developing a core of highly trained JTACs and forward-deployed air combat
control teams.162 Another core objective would be to specialize in the emergency
extraction of downed IAF pilots or groups of SFFs or Para SFs isolated behind
enemy lines.163 Yet, according to most interviewees, until now not much progress
has been made on these fronts.
When Prime Minister Narendra Modi came into office in May 2014, there was
hope in a few quarters that some long-advocated defense reforms, such as the
creation of a chief of defense staff, an aerospace command, a cyber command,
and a JSOC, finally would materialize. As time has gone by, hopes of sudden
and major reform under this governmentwhether in the realm of economy
or defensehave begun to dwindle. This does not mean, however, that there is
no movement.164 The current defense minister, Manohar Parrikar, reportedly
has sought inspiration from both past U.S. defense reforms and Israels ongoing
efforts to fashion a Depth Corps Force that would operate in symbiosis with a
new Israeli JSOC.165 During a visit to U.S. Pacific Command in early December
2015, Parrikar allegedly also sought details on the conduct of U.S. Air Force

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special operations, with the goal of applying these insights to the future develop-
ment of the Garud.166
Some Indian interviewees noted, rather pessimistically, that major organiza-
tional reform might occur only in the wake of some form of catastrophe. This was
the case, for example, for the United States, which created its Special Operations
Command in the wake of the humiliating debacle of 1980s Operation EAGLE
CLAW.167
Special Operations and the Question of Political Sponsorship
In his detailed, empirical study of the efficacy of past special operations, Colin
Gray points to the fundamental importance of permissive domestic conditions,
and a tolerant political and strategic culture.168 Owing to the unorthodox nature
of SOF tactics and the politically sensitive missions with which SOFs are often
entrusted, their use implies a certain risk tolerance on the part of political deci-
sion makers.
In 2015, the Indian government signed off on a much-publicized, and
relatively successful, Para SF raid into Myanmar. That operation, however, was
undertaken against lightly armed insurgents and with the acquiescence of the
Myanmar government.169 Most recently, IA SOFs allegedly carried out punitive
strikes against terror launchpads in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, in response
to a bloody terrorist attack on Indian soil.170 At the time of this writing, the
specifics of the operation remain shrouded in uncertainty and subject to heated
speculation, particularly in the Indian and Pakistani press.171 According to some
of this authors more-reliable sources, the operation was conducted by two units
of Para SFs (from the 4th and 9th Battalions), operating under cover of artillery
fire. Heliborne operations were limited to the drop-off and pickup points, from
which the SOFs proceeded on foot. Ghatak platoons drawn from regular army
units provided rear-area security, helping to ensure the safe extraction of the
Para SFs once their direct-action mission was completed.172 If this account is
accurateand it may prove impossible to verify completelyit would not be the
first time India (or Pakistan) has deployed SOFs for shallow thrusts across the
Indo-Pakistani Line of Control.173 It is important to stress, however, the inherent
differences from employing SOFs in some of the China-related contingencies dis-
cussed in this paper. Deploying Indian SOF teams for more-prolonged missions,
deeper into contested territory, and against a far more capable adversary would
require a much greater willingness to embrace risk, friction, and uncertainty.174
On a broader level, successful covert action hinges on a clear intellectual un-
derstanding of the strategic value of special operations rather than a fixation on
short-term tactical gains.175 A previous section demonstrated that Indian security
managers have yet to develop a truly joint vision for special operations. Within

the Indian media, for their part, commentary on SOF-related issues all too often
is confined narrowly to CT-related issues. A common refrain among Indian Para
SF officers is that Indias political leaders and public view special forces as little
more than glorified infantry, and through a narrow tactical lens rather than
strategically.176 What such statements imply is that SOFs frequently are reduced
to functioning as heavily armed substitutes for standard units, or are viewed as
shock troopsancillary forces whose role is to support a wider war effort. While
there is certainly a danger in overly fetishizing special operations and in neglect-
ing to integrate SOFs properly with conventional forces, there also are costs to
failing to appreciate the uniqueness of SOF attributes.177 As one U.S. study from
the 1990s eloquently articulated, A military structured for linear, attritional
warfare gains little leverage from SOF operations. It correspondingly sees little
value in SOFs and would prefer that SOF assets be distributed broadly to the force
as a whole. By contrast, a force structured for thrusting along fault lines will use
SOF units to gain leverage by initiating the breach and by generating chaos in the
enemys rear.178
A common criticism levied at the IA is precisely that it is structured for linear,
attritional warfare, not for thrusting along fault lines.179 Well-known South
Asianists have described Indias military strategy as one of restraint and as suf-
fering from an absence of strategic initiative.180 While there may be some truth
to these characterizations, they are also far too sweeping.
Indeed, Indias very unique model of civil-military dysfunction, somewhat
paradoxically, has provided the armed services with a lot of leeway in the pursuit
of operational planning.181 As evidenced in the section detailing Indias strategy
of offensive area denial vis--vis its trans-Himalayan neighbor, the IA concept
of operations for a LAC-related contingency is far from passive or reactive. To
the contrary, it places a strong emphasis on regaining the initiative rapidly, on
conducting surgical strikes deep within the Chinese interior, and on horizontal
escalation across multiple sections of the border.
The question, however, is whether Indias political leadership would be willing
to sign off on these plans. Even though Indias current government seems intent
on signaling that it is less reticent to use force and risk escalation, much would
depend on the circumstances of the conflict and the exact nature of Chinese
aggression. A number of important questions remain open. Would Indias politi-
cians be willing to accede to IA requests to extend the armys operational ambit
far beyond the LAC? Would airpower be employed for standoff strikes across
the border, or would it remain confined to the Indian side, as during the Kargil
War?182 If some of the priority targets are communication and transportation
nodes within the TAR and the PLAAF and PLARF have not yet entered the fray,

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would India consider it more judicious to employ ground-based, deniable SOFs

rather than initiating a cycle of vertical escalation via targeted missile strikes and
the use of air-launched ordnance?
Perhaps most importantly, would Indias political leadership draw on its Tibet
trump card and exercise the special warfare option? New Delhi may be leery to
do so, for several reasons. First, it may fear a Chinese counterescalation in Indias
northeast, with all the attendant implications for Indias long-term stability and
its ability to secure the narrow Siliguri corridor that connects its northeastern
states to the Indian subcontinent.183 Second, such a move could encounter hostil-
ity from the current Tibetan government in exile, which officially has renounced
violence and historically has perceived Tibetan guerrilla movements as com-
peting power structures within a heavily factionalized refugee community.184
Furthermore, within some segments of Indian society, sentiments toward the Ti-
betan community occasionally have verged on the hostile, and support for greater
Tibetan autonomy has not been uniformly robust.185 While the Modi government
has been more overtly supportive of the Tibetan cause than its predecessor, this
may not always be the case. Indian security managers may be unwilling to stoke
the flames of militancy for fear of inadvertently redirecting Tibetan nationalism
and thereby spawning yet another form of separatist movement on their own soil.
From a purely operational standpoint, an unconventional warfare campaign
would no doubt yield precious tactical dividends, by increasing Chinese rear-area
anxiety and compelling the PLA to tie down large numbers of troops in surveil-
lance and garrison duties. If Indias goal in the event of conflict, however, is to
conclude hostilities rapidly on favorable terms, such a move could prove coun-
terproductive, as it inevitably would lead to protraction, along with widespread
suffering among the Tibetan people, thus impeding war termination. In effect,
the wisest posture might be to maintain such a capability as a form of deterrent
and as part of a broader competitive strategy, and to resort to special warfare only
in the event of significant escalation on the part of China.186
The LAC constitutes the longest disputed land border in the world. For close to
six decades, the lack of resolution has served as a vivid reminder of the tensions
that linger at the heart of the Sino-Indian relationship. For New Delhi, the preser-
vation of local superiority along the Himalayan belt is of paramount importance
and continues to inform its defense planning and force-structure plans.
This article has summarized the various correlations of military force along
the Sino-Indian border and has charted the changes in New Delhis operational
concepts and attitudes toward territorial defense. While Indian planners have
moved toward adopting a more-offensive form of area denial, they continue to

rely, for the most part, on conventional forces that could be overcome or circum-
vented in the event of a fast-moving, localized, and limited border confrontation
launched from higher elevations. Taking into account the rugged nature of the
terrain and the continued paucity of infrastructure, a case has been made here
for a more reactive, distributed, and mobile force structure and for greater reli-
ance on special forces, working in tandem with locally raised battalions of scouts.
Despite the existence of a large number of SOFs, along with plans for further
expansion, India has yet to articulate their role clearly and continues to view such
units as ancillaries to conventional troops rather than as potential force multipli-
ers. While warning against an overreliance on special operators, this article has
laid out the operational benefits to be accrued from their tailored employment in
a number of potential Sino-Indian contingencies, ranging across a broad spec-
trum of conflict.
Before India is able to envisage such ambitiously minded concepts of opera-
tions, however, steps will need to be taken and reforms will need to be enacted.
These extend well beyond issues of equipment, training, and procurement;
defense management, political vision, and doctrinal definition will need to be
addressed. The long-discussed creation of a triservice JSOC would constitute
an important step forward. Perhaps most importantly, Indias security managers
will need to embrace an operational philosophy that places a greater emphasis
on rapidly regaining the initiative and on high-end asymmetric warfare. In short,
their mode of thinking may need to become more Chinese.
NOTES
The author is grateful to Ashley Tellis; To- Books, 2013). On the history of Sino-
shi Yoshihara; Arun Sahgal; Ajai Shukla; Indian relations, see John W. Garver, Pro-
Maj. Barret Bradstreet, USMC; Srinath tracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the
Raghavan; Maj. Steve Ferenzi, USAR, Twentieth Century (Seattle: Univ. of Washing-
SOF; three anonymous reviewers; and the ton Press, 2002). See also Srinath Raghavan,
participants at the 2016 workshop on Indian War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic
security at the Center for the Advanced Study History of the Nehru Years (New Delhi: Per-
of India, University of Pennsylvania, for their manent Black, 2010), pp. 227308.
helpful comments on an earlier version of this 2. Gaurav Kampani, China-India Nuclear
article. The author is also deeply indebted to Rivalry in the Second Nuclear Age (Oslo:
the Indian military and intelligence officials, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies,
both serving and retired, who agreed to be 2014), available at brage.bibsys.no/;
interviewed for the purposes of this article. Manjeet S. Pardesi, Chinas Nuclear Forces
Ryan Boone, Akash Goud, and Soumya and Their Significance to India, Nonprolifera-
Tiwari all provided stellar research assistance. tion Review 21, nos. 34 (2014), pp. 33755.
1. Some analysts have referred to this relation- 3. C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-
ship as one of cold peace. Jeff M. Smith, Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific (Washing-
Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the Twenty- ton, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
First Century (Lanham, MD: Lexington tional Peace, 2012).

133
REHMAN
4. For an overview of various Sino-Indian 13. On artillery use for reverse-slope defense, see
conflict scenarios, see Daniel S. Markey, I. M. Datz, Military Operations under Special
Armed Confrontation between China and Conditions of Terrain and Weather (New
India, Contingency Planning Memorandum Delhi: Lancer, 2004), pp. 500505.
27 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 14. Since 1984, India and Pakistan have engaged
2015), available at www.cfr.org/. sporadically in bouts of low-intensity combat
5. Subhash Kapila, China-India Military for control of the Siachen Glacier in the
Confrontation: Strategic Reality Check, Paper eastern Karakoram Mountains, at heights
5806 (New Delhi: South Asia Analysis Group, of over 6,440 meters (20,997 feet). The vast
2014), available at www.southasiaanalysis majority of casualties on both sides have been
.org/. attributed to frostbite and exposure. Ravi
6. See Ashley J. Tellis, Troubles, They Come in Baghel and Marcus Nsser, Securing the
Battalions: The Manifold Travails of the Indian Heights: The Vertical Dimension of the Sia
Air Force (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow- chen Conflict between India and Pakistan in
ment for International Peace, 2016), available the Eastern Karakoram, Political Geography
at carnegieendowment.org/. See also Rahul 48 (September 2015), pp. 2438.
Bedi, IAFs Depleting Assets Preclude Two- 15. Marcus P. Acosta, High Altitude Warfare: The
Front War Option, IHS Janes Defence Weekly, Kargil Conflict and the Future (Monterey, CA:
17 March 2016. Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), available
7. See Trials and Tribulations: Recounting In- at calhoun.nps.edu/. See also Lester W. Grau
dias Artillery Woes, IHS Janes International and Hernn Vzquez [Lt. Col.], Ground Com-
Defence Review, 13 June 2013. Whereas China bat at High Altitude (Fort Leavenworth, KS:
possesses more than 2,170 self-propelled Foreign Military Studies Office, 2009).
howitzers, India only has about 715 anti- 16. Anil R. Pustam, Mountain Air Support
quated mountain guns and self-propelled Demands Special Equipment and Training,
howitzers left in its inventory. The quantita- U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126/9/1,171
tive gap is even more stark with regard to (September 2000), p. 71.
multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRSs). 17. Sudha Ramachandran, Indias Worrying Bor-
India only fields around two hundred MLRSs, der Infrastructure Deficit, Diplomat, 19 June
whereas China possesses around 1,700. 2014, available at thediplomat.com/.
Authors calculations from data compiled
in IndiaArmy, IHS Janes World Armies, 18. National Seminar on China: Focus on Tibet,
updated 5 May 2016, and ChinaArmy, Seminar Report (New Delhi: Centre for Land
IHS Janes World Armies, updated 9 February Warfare Studies, 2015), available at www
2016, janes.ihs.com/. .claws.in/.
8. See Ashley J. Tellis et al., Measuring Na- 19. Chinas Military Regrouped into Five PLA
tional Power in the Postindustrial Age (Santa Theater Commands, Xinhua, 1 February
Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p. 143. 2016, available at news.xinhuanet.com/.
9. A. W. Marshall, Problems of Estimating Mili- 20. Ajai Shukla, interview by author, 13 May
tary Power (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1966). 2016. On the impact of Chinas military
reforms, see Phillip C. Saunders and Joel
10. M. Taylor Fravel, Securing Borders: Chinas Wuthnow, Chinas Goldwater-Nichols? Assess-
Doctrine and Force Structure for Frontier ing PLA Organizational Reforms (Washing-
Defense, Journal of Strategic Studies 30, nos. ton, DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2016),
45 (AugustOctober 2007), pp. 70537. available at inss.ndu.edu/.
11. Ben Blanchard, China to Build Second Rail 21. Chinas ambush of Soviet troops on Zhen-
Line into Tibet, Reuters, 4 March 2016, avail- bao, in 1969, is viewed in a similar light. See
able at www.reuters.com/. Michael S. Gerson et al., The Sino-Soviet
12. Sarah McDowall et al., Himalayan Discord: Border Conflict: Deterrence, Escalation, and
China and Indias Border Predicament, IHS the Threat of Nuclear War in 1969 (Arlington,
Janes Intelligence Review, 29 January 2013. VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2010), avail-
able at www.cna.org/. On Chinas concept of

self-defensive counterattack, see Andrew 28. See You Ji, Chinas Military Transformation
Scobell, Chinas Use of Military Force: Beyond (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2016), pp. 15456,
the Great Wall and the Long March (New and Liu Yongxin, The Guidance for Defen-
York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003), pp. 30 sive Campaigns in the Border Regions in
32, and Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, the Context of Armed Conflicts Elsewhere,
Patterns in Chinas Use of Force: Evidence Military Art Journal, no. 3 (2003), p. 37.
from History and Doctrinal Writings (Santa 29. Dennis J. Blasko, Chinese Special Operations
Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), available at www Forces: Not like Back at Bragg, War on the
.rand.org/. Rocks, 1 January 2015, warontherocks.com/;
22. On the Chinese concept of war control, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, A Global Expedition-
Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresh- ary Peoples Liberation Army: 20252030, in
olds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army in 2025,
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), pp. 5255. ed. Roy Kamphausen and David Lai (Carlisle,
23. On Chinas war-zone strategy, see Nan Li, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2015), pp.
The PLAs Evolving Campaign Doctrine and 20743.
Strategies, chap. 8 in The Peoples Libera- 30. A retired Para SF general, interview by au-
tion Army in the Information Age, ed. James thor, 12 June 2015.
C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa 31. China: Special Forces (Land), Janes Amphib-
Monica, CA: RAND, 1999). ious and Special Forces, 2 February 2016.
24. Ibid. 32. Ibid.
25. Dennis J. Blasko, Technology Determines 33. Richard D. Fisher Jr., Chinas Y-20 May Enter
Tactics: The Relationship between Technol- Service in 2016, IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 1
ogy and Doctrine in Chinese Military Think- March 2016.
ing, Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 3
(2011), pp. 35581; M. Taylor Fravel, Chinas 34. China: Procurement 2015, IHS Janes, 23
New Military Strategy: Winning Informa- November 2015, janes.ihs.com/.
tionized Local Wars, Jamestown Foundation 35. Matheswaran [Air Marshal, IAF (Ret.)], to
China Brief 15, no. 13 (2 July 2015), available author, 11 June 2015, privately held.
at jamestown.org/.
36. Gardiner Harris and Edward Wong, Where
26. On the PLAs intensified focus on joint train- China Meets India in a High-Altitude Desert,
ing and rapid mobilization, see Develop- Push Comes to Shove, New York Times, 2
ments in Chinas Military Force Projection May 2013, available at www.nytimes.com/.
and Expeditionary Capabilities: Hearing
37. Niharika Mandhana, Chinas President Talks
Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Trade in India as Troops Face Off at Border,
Review Commission, 114th Cong. (21 January
Wall Street Journal, 18 September 2014, avail-
2016) (testimony of Mark R. Cozad, PLA
able at www.wsj.com/.
Joint Training and Implications for Future
Expeditionary Capabilities). On the reori- 38. Ladakh Again: India, China in Standoff
entation of the Chinese army from theater over Surveillance Structure by PLA, Indian
defense to transregional mobility, see Dennis Express, 13 September 2015, available at
J. Blasko, The PLA: Mission, Equipment, indianexpress.com/; Arunava Chatterjee, In-
and Contingent War Plans of Chinas Land- dia Rejects China Claim of PLA Not Crossing
Based Forces, in The Routledge Handbook Border, Says Transgression Has Increased,
of Chinese Security, ed. Lowell Dittmer and India Today, 15 March 2016, available at
Maochun Yu (New York: Routledge, 2016), indiatoday.intoday.in/.
pp. 25760. 39. Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 9899; Arun
27. Larry M. Wortzel, PLA Contingency Plan- Sahgal, Chinas Military Modernization:
ning and the Case of India, in The Peoples Responses from India, in Strategic Asia
Liberation Army and Contingency Planning in 201213: Chinas Military Challenge, ed. Ash-
China, ed. Andrew Scobell et al. (Washington, ley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Seattle, WA:
DC: National Defense Univ. Press, 2015), National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012),
available at ndupress.ndu.edu/. p. 285.

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REHMAN
40. Shishir Gupta, The Himalayan Faceoff: Chi- Gilbert (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1941),
nese Assertion and the Indian Riposte (New p. 111.
Delhi: Hachette India, 2014), chap. 7. 51. Anil Raman [Col., IA], interview by author,
41. As Klaus Knorr has noted, attackers who 17 June 2015.
succeed in leveraging the effects of strategic 52. Vivek Chadha [Col., IA], interview by author,
surprise do not require superior forces to pre- 15 June 2015.
vail. Klaus E. Knorr, Lessons for Statecraft,
in Strategic Military Surprise: Incentives and 53. In the event of hostilities, however, Indian
Opportunities, ed. Klaus E. Knorr and Patrick officials may be unwilling to reactivate the
M. Morgan (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Sikkim front, as it is one of the zones along
Books, 1983), pp. 25253. the border whose boundaries have been
clearly delimited. The author is grateful to
42. Sunil Khilnani et al., Nonalignment 2.0: A Srinath Raghavan for this point.
Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the
Twenty-First Century (New Delhi: Centre for 54. Ajai Shukla, In a First, India Tank Brigades
Policy Research, 2012), p. 40. to Defend China Border, Business Standard,
17 September 2012, available at www.business
43. Chinese leaders were surprised by the -standard.com/. There are considerable
sharpness of Indias turn to the United States challenges, however, innate to tank opera-
and United Kingdom for assistance during tions at high altitudes. Indian armored troops
the conflict. Central Intelligence Agency, stationed in Ladakh thus have had to procure
The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: additional additives and lubricants to prevent
196162 (Washington, DC: 1964), pp. 6264. their tank fuel from freezing overnight. See
44. See W. Andrew Terrill, Escalation and Rahul Bedi, India Deploys 100 T-72 Tanks
Intrawar Deterrence during Limited Wars in along Disputed Border with China, IHS
the Middle East (Carlisle, PA: Army War Janes Defence Weekly, 26 July 2015.
College, 2009), available at www 55. Sahgal, Chinas Military Modernization,
.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/. p. 293; Mandip Singh, Critical Assessment
45. Recently retired Indian intelligence official, of Chinas Vulnerabilities in Tibet, IDSA Oc-
interview by author, 11 December 2015. casional Paper 30 (New Delhi: Institute for
46. Sushant Singh, Border Roads Organisation: Defence Studies and Analyses, 2013), avail-
Tight Funds, Uphill Goals in a Tough Ter- able at www.idsa.in/.
rain, Indian Express, 18 May 2016, available 56. The Indian Army nearly doubled in size
at indianexpress.com/. in the decade following its defeat, going
47. Sushant Singh, Borders without Railways: from 458,000 to 825,000 troops. Steven I.
The Missing Strategic Link, Indian Express, Wilkinson, Army and Nation: The Military
18 May 2016, available at indianexpress.com/. and Indian Democracy since Independence
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2015),
48. On the distinction between deterrence by chap. 4. There is a vast body of literature on
denial and deterrence by punishment, see military organizations resistance to change
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and and innovation. For a seminal study, see
Punishment (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow Wilson Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War:
School of Public and International Affairs, Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca,
1959). NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991). For an
49. A. K. Lal [Maj. Gen., IA (Ret.)], Transforma- overview of the literature, see Adam Grissom,
tion of the Indian Armed Forces 2025: Enhanc- The Future of Military Innovation Studies,
ing Indias Defence (New Delhi: VIJ Books, Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 5 (2006),
2012), pp. 11922; Vinod Anand, Review of pp. 90534. For an Indian perspective, see
the Indian Army Doctrine: Dealing with Two Vivek Chadha, An Assessment of Organisa-
Fronts, CLAWS Journal (Summer 2010), pp. tional Change in the Indian Army, Journal of
25764. Defence Studies 9, no. 4 (OctoberDecember
2015), pp. 2148.
50. Hans Rothfels, Clausewitz, in Makers of
Modern Strategy: Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Ed- 57. The ITBP, which has a total sanctioned
ward Mead Earle, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix strength of 89,430, currently mans 169 border

outposts all along the LAC. See Government Defence Budget, updated 21 January 2016,
of India, Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Re- janes.ihs.com/. See also Increases in Military
port 20152016 (New Delhi: 2016), p. 175. On Personnel Spending Elevate India to Worlds
the equipment and morale issues plaguing the Fourth Largest Defense Spending, IHS Janes
ITBP, see Dilip Kumar Mekala, Close to the Aerospace, Defense and Security, 30 March
Clouds: ITBP Jawans Endure Harsh Weather 2016.
and Modest Facilities to Guard Our Borders 67. See U.S. Army Dept., Infantry Small-Unit
in the Mountains, Force (August 2015). Mountain Operations, FM 3-97.6 (Washing-
58. Multiple Indian Army officers, interviews by ton, DC: Army Headquarters, 2000), chap. 4.
author, various dates. 68. On the importance of considering the impact
59. For example, it is estimated that a large of decentralized operations when conducting
conventional force departing from Ranchi, mountain operations, see ibid., chap. 2.
in Jharkhand, would take over twenty-seven 69. Herv de Courrges, Pierre-Joseph Givre,
hours to reach Tawang. Ibid. The Indian and Nicolas Le Nen, Guerre en Montagne:
Parliaments Standing Committee on Defence Renouveau Tactique (Paris: Economica, 2006),
noted, with regard to Tawang, While our pp. 2427. See also Cyrille Becker [Col.],
neighbouring countries can reach borders Actualit des Principes de la Guerre en Mon-
within two or three hours, our Army takes tagne, in Guerre en Montagne: Les Dfis de
more than a day to reach there. Lok Sabha la Verticalit, supplement, Dfense et Scurit
Secretariat, Standing Committee on Defence Internationale, hors-srie no. 46 (February
(20152016): Fifteenth Report (New Delhi: March 2016).
2016), p. 24.
70. For an overview of the role of mountain
60. This would also be the case for PLA re- infantry, see Jon D. Greer [Maj.], Mountain
inforcements surged via high-speed rail. InfantryIs There a Need? (Fort Leaven-
However, and in contrast to India, China has worth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General
built a number of oxygen-rich hyperbaric Staff College, 1988), available at www.dtic.mil/.
chambers to acclimatize its follow-on forces
more rapidly. See Xinhua, China Starts 71. See Kevin Christie [Col.], Synchronizing
Sichuan-Tibet Grid Construction, China Chaos: Command and Control of Special Op-
Daily, 19 March 2014, available at www erations and Conventional Forces in Shared
.chinadaily.com.cn/. Battlespace (paper, Joint Military Operations
Department, Naval War College, Newport,
61. Lester W. Grau [Lt. Col., USA (Ret.)] and Dr. RI, 2006), available at www.researchgate.net/,
William A. Jorgensen, Medical Implications and Linda Robinson, One Hundred Victo-
of High Altitude Combat, U.S. Army Medical ries: Special Ops and the Future of American
Department Journal (AprilJune 2003), pp. 27. Warfare (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), pp.
62. Ibid. 26169.
63. Rajat Pandit, Fund Crunch Hits Armys New 72. India: Special Operation Forces, IHS Janes
Strike Corps, Times of India, 16 April 2015, Amphibious and Special Forces, 12 June 2015;
available at timesofindia.indiatimes.com/. The Military Balance 2016 (London: Interna-
64. Vijay Mohan, Raising of Mountain Strike tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2016), p.
Corps Depletes Armys War Reserves, Tri- 250. India plans to add another two battalions
bune, 24 December 2014, available at www of Para SFs by 2018. See Rajat Pandit, Para-
.tribuneindia.com/. Special Forces Get Two New Battalions,
Times of India, 17 August 2014, available at
65. Sujan Dutta, China Strike Force Back on timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.
Course, Telegraph, 14 January 2016, available
at www.telegraphindia.com/. 73. 10 More Garud Squadrons, Electric Fences
to Be Put Up, Business Standard, 2 February
66. Personnel costs increasingly have dominated 2016, available at www.business-standard.com/.
the armys budget, rising from approximately
69 percent in 2013 to 72 percent in 2016. 74. The SFF is also occasionally designated under
Authors calculations, derived from data the moniker Establishment 22, chosen as an
compiled in IHS Janes Defence Budgets: India homage to the 22nd Mountain Regiment, the

137
REHMAN
regiment of the SFFs first commander, Sujan International Affairs, 1978); Michael Noonan,
Singh Uban, during World War II. The Seductiveness of Special Ops?, War
75. For a discussion of the formation of the SFF on the Rocks, 3 March 2015, warontherocks
(with U.S. assistance) following Indias defeat .com/.
in 1962, see John Kenneth Knaus, Orphans 82. See Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force,
of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Roles: Ground Defense Force as in the National
Struggle for Survival (New York: PublicAf- Defense Program Guidelines (Tokyo: 2014),
fairs, 1999), pp. 25570; Carole McGrana- available at www.mod.go.jp/.
han, Arrested Histories: Tibet, the CIA and 83. See Largest Baltic Special Forces Exercise
Memories of a Forgotten War (Durham, NC: Flaming Sword 2015 Culminates in Com-
Duke Univ. Press, 2010), pp. 15570; Kenneth bined Operation, Baltic Times, 4 June 2015,
Conboy and James Morrison, The CIAs Secret available at www.baltictimes.com/.
War in Tibet (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kan-
sas, 2002), pp. 18490; and Gyalo Thondups 84. According to some reports, India contemplat-
personal recollections in Gyalo Thondup ed deploying Para SF units during the 2014
and Anne F. Thurston, The Noodle Maker of standoff in Chumar, but only as a backup
Kalimpong: The Untold Story of My Struggle force to regular troops. See Rahul Singh,
for Tibet (New York: PublicAffairs, 2015), pp. India Was Prepared to Use Special Forces
22329. during Chumar Faceoff, Hindustan Times,
5 October 2015, available at www
76. Special warfare can be defined as special .hindustantimes.com/.
operations forces conducting combinations
of unconventional warfare, foreign internal 85. Recently retired Indian intelligence official
defense, and/or counter-insurgency through interview. This would not be without prec-
and with indigenous forces and personnel. edent: Chinese forces reportedly infiltrated
See U.S. Army Dept., Special Operations, U.S. parts of Arunachal Pradesh disguised as
Army Doctrine Publication 3-05 (Washing- Monpa herders during the 1962 war.
ton, DC: U.S. Army Headquarters, 2012). 86. IA officers, interviews by author, December
77. Direct action refers to short-duration strikes 2015.
and other small-scale offensive actions 87. Vijay Mohan, IAF to Procure 8 Aerostat
conducted as a special operation in hostile, Radars, Tribune, 3 February 2016, available
denied, or diplomatically sensitive environ- at www.tribuneindia.com/.
ments and which employ specialized military
88. Government Mulls Israel-Type Fencing
capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit,
along Pakistan Border, Indian Express, 24
recover, or damage designated targets. See
January 2016, available at indianexpress.com/.
U.S. Defense Dept., Special Operations, JP
3-05 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 89. A recent pilot project to establish a camera-
2011). based surveillance network at high-altitude
points near Pangong Lake in Ladakh failed,
78. Michael J. Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone:
with the cameras succumbing to the harsh
Understanding a Changing Era of Conflict
weather conditions. See Vijaita Singh, Sur-
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press,
veillance Camera Project Fails, Hindu, 23
2015), available at www.strategicstudiesinstitute
October 2015, available at www.thehindu
.army.mil/.
.com/.
79. C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The
90. See Lester W. Grau [Lt. Col., USA (Ret.)]
Pakistan Armys Way of War (New York:
and Jason Falivene [Lt., USMC], Mountain
Oxford Univ. Press, 2014), pp. 22661.
Combat: Hard to Move, Hard to Shoot, Even
80. Philip Kapusta, The Gray Zone, Special Harder to Communicate, Journal of Slavic
Warfare 28, no. 4 (OctoberDecember 2015), Military Studies 19 (2006), pp. 61925.
p. 23.
91. For a history of the role of these peoples in
81. Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: the border areas and Sino-Indian relations,
Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies, see Sulmaan Wasif Khan, Muslim, Trader,
Harvard Studies in International Affairs Nomad, Spy: Chinas Cold War and the People
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Center for

of the Tibetan Borderlands (Chapel Hill: Univ. knowledgeable foreign observers, but rather
of North Carolina Press, 2015). more-heavily armed infantry teams, similar
92. See Major Tribes, Govt. of Arunachal in some respects to U.S. Ranger weapons pla-
Pradesh, arunachalpradesh.gov.in/. toons. Foreign defense officials in New Delhi,
interview by author, 10 December 2015.
93. The BADP was launched in the early 1990s,
with an emphasis on infrastructure develop- 99. Fabian strategy draws its name from the
ment for border security forces. Its ambit scorched-earth approach adopted by Roman
subsequently was widened to incorporate general Quintus Fabius Maximus during the
socioeconomic elements such as health care Punic Wars. See Adrian Goldsworthy, The
and education. For a recent evaluation of its Punic Wars (London: Cassell, 2001), p. 352,
funding, initiatives, and impact, see Indian and James Holmes, Fabian Strategies, Then
Planning Commission, Evaluation Study on and Now, War on the Rocks, 17 September
Border Area Development Program, PEO 2015, warontherocks.com/.
Report 229 (New Delhi: 2015), available at 100. Sukhdeep Sangwan [Brig.], Integrated Force
niti.gov.in/. Projection by India (New Delhi: VIJ Books,
94. During this authors travels in Sikkim, Hima 2011), pp. 15052; Deepak Sinha [Brig.],
chal Pradesh, and Kashmir, locals frequently Airborne and Special Forces: Reassessing
complained about the pervasive corruption Role, Tasks and Organisations, Indian De-
and occasional brutality of the local police. fence Review 30, no. 3 (JulySeptember 2015),
available at www.indiandefencereview
95. The Ladakh Scouts, or Snow Tigers, were .com/.
raised in 1963, and most recently served with
distinction during the 1999 Kargil War. See 101. A serving Para SF colonel to author, 10 June
Ladakh Scouts, Global Security, www 2015; a serving Para SF brigadier, interview
.globalsecurity.org/. The Arunachal Scouts by author, 11 December 2015.
were formed in 2010. The first battalion was 102. Army Training Command, Indian Army Doc-
stationed in Riyang in the East Siang District trine Part II: Conduct of Operations (Shimla,
of Arunachal in 2012, and a number of ad- India: 2004), p. 12.
ditional battalions have been approved since. 103. China Deters India with Deployment of
The Sikkim Scouts began their recruitment in HQ-9 Air Defense Missile Systems Close to
2013 and, as of this writing, have raised two Kashmir, Missile Threat, 6 July 2015, avail-
battalions. Rahul Bedi, Indian Army Begins able at missilethreat.com/; China Rules Out
Recruitment for Sikkim Scouts Border Force, Air Defense Zone along India Border, Times
IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 4 April 2013; First of India, 28 November 2013, available at
Arunachal Scouts Battalion Arrives in State, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/.
Times of India, 2 May 2012, available at times
ofindia.indiatimes.com/. 104. Many of Indias advanced landing grounds,
particularly in the western sector, such as
96. This would present certain parallels with the Fukche, are within range of PLA artillery.
actions of the U.S. Civilian Irregular Defense
Group, a CIA-run program during the 105. Man Aman Singh Chhina, Parliamentary
Vietnam War that deployed Green Berets to Panel Concerned That Sukhoi-30 Fighters
help arm and train the Montagnards in South Have No Protective Shelters, Indian Express,
Vietnams Central Highlands. The author 6 May 2015, available at indianexpress.com/.
is grateful to Toshi Yoshihara for pointing 106. IAFs Mirage-2000 Lands on Yamuna Eway
this out. See Thomas L. Ahern Jr., Vietnam in Successful Runway Trial, Hindustan
Declassified: The CIA and Counterinsurgency Times, 21 May 2015, available at www
(Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 2010). .hindustantimes.com/.
97. See Doug Stanton, Horse Soldiers: The 107. On virtual attrition, see John Stillion and
Extraordinary Story of a Band of U.S. Soldiers Bryan Clark, What It Takes to Win: Succeeding
Who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan (New in 21st Century Battle Network Competitions
York: Scribners, 2010). (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
98. The Indian Armys Ghatak commando Budgetary Assessments, 2015), p. 4.
units are not considered SOFs by most

139
REHMAN
108. Tor Bukkvoll, Military Innovation under Finalizes $3B Blueprint for UAV Fleets, De-
Authoritarian Government: The Case of fense News, 20 March 2016, available at www
Russian Special Operations Forces, Journal of .defensenews.com/.
Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015), p. 604; Mark 119. The author is grateful to Maj. Steve Ferenzi,
Galeotti, Spetsnaz: Russias Special Forces USA, for this suggestion.
(Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2015), pp. 1420.
120. Dawa Norbu, Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations:
109. Jim Thomas and Christopher Dougherty, Be- The Centrality of Marginality, Asian Survey
yond the Ramparts: The Future of U.S. Special 37, no. 11 (November 1997), pp. 107895;
Operations Forces (Washington, DC: Center Manjeet S. Pardesi, Instability in Tibet and
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Sino-Indian Strategic Rivalry: Do Domestic
2013), pp. 6768. Politics Matter?, in Asian Rivalries: Conflict,
110. See Indian Air Headquarters, Basic Doctrine Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level
of the Indian Air Force: 2012 (New Delhi: Games, ed. Sumit Ganguly and William R.
2012), available at indianairforce.nic.in/. Thompson (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ.
111. Arun Sahgal [Brig., IA (Ret.)], to author, 10 Press, 2011), pp. 79118.
August 2015. 121. Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 3250; George
112. Joseph K. Michalak [Lt. Col.], The Need for N. Patterson, China and Tibet: Background to
the Next Special Operations Forces Mobility the Revolt, China Quarterly, no. 1 (January
Aircraft (paper, Air Force Fellows, Air Uni- March 1960), pp. 87102.
versity, 2012), available at belfercenter.ksg 122. See Thondup and Thurston, The Noodle
.harvard.edu/. Maker of Kalimpong, pp. 22324, and B. N.
113. John Gordon IV et al., Enhanced Army Mullik, My Years with Nehru: The Chinese
Airborne Forces: A New Joint Operational Betrayal (Bombay, India: Allied, 1971).
Capability (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014); 123. This is masterfully detailed in Kenneth Con-
John T. Sophie [Maj.], Chinas Anti-access / boy and CIA veteran James Morrisons book
Area Denial Capability and Its Implications for The CIAs Secret War in Tibet, pp. 184230.
Special Operations Forces Air Mobility (Fort 124. On the intellectual tradition of the Green
Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and Berets, see Charles M. Simpson and Robert
General Staff College, 2014), available at oai B. Rheault, Inside the Green Berets: The First
.dtic.mil/. Thirty Years; A History of the U.S. Army Spe-
114. India has expressed an interest in acquir- cial Forces (New York: Presidio, 1983).
ing the CV-22 Osprey aircraft for its SOFs. 125. Mullik, My Years with Nehru, p. 571.
Equipped with terrain-following radar and
forward-looking infrared sensors that allow it 126. See Sujan S. Uban, Phantoms of Chittagong:
to operate at low altitude in adverse weather The Fifth Army in Bangladesh (New
conditions, this could provide a better means Delhi: Allied, 1985), and Kalsang Rinchen
of insertion, although threats from Chinas (a Dharmsala-based journalist), director, Ti-
IADS would still remain. betan Guerrillas in Exile (2014), documentary
film.
115. Samuel R. Bethel, Sustainment in an Anti-
access / Area Denial Environment, Army 127. Amitava Sanyal, The Curious Case of Estab-
Sustainment (JanuaryFebruary 2016), avail- lishment 22, Hindustan Times, 15 November
able at www.alu.army.mil/. 2009, available at www.hindustantimes.com/.
116. Sydney Freedberg Jr., Charge of the Light 128. A former IA general to author, 6 June 2015.
Brigade: Army Seeks Air-Droppable Light Ve- 129. Saikat Datta, Indias Secret Army of Tibetans
hicles for Infantry, Breaking Defense, 8 June without Parachutes; Kickbacks Suspected,
2015, available at breakingdefense.com/. DNA, 9 March 2012, available at www
117. India Releases Updated RFI for Battlefield .dnaindia.com/.
UAVs, IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 27 August 130. Rahul Bedi, India to Close Down Covert
2015. Aviation Reconnaissance Wing, IHS Janes
118. For Indias ambitious UAV procurement Defence Weekly, 21 September 2015.
plans, see Vivek Raghuvanshi, India

131. Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 9496; Subir Propaganda Centers, Business Insider, 3 April
Bhaumik, The External Linkages in Insur- 2015, www.businessinsider.com/.
gency in Indias Northeast, in Insurgency in 143. Security in Tibet: Grid Locked, Economist,
Northeast India, ed. B. Pakem (New Delhi: 22 June 2013, available at www.economist
Omsons, 1997), pp. 89100; Bertil Lint- .com/; Andrew Jacobs, China Fences In Its
ner, Great Game East: India, China and the Nomads, and an Ancient Life Withers, New
Struggle for Asias Most Volatile Frontier (New York Times, 11 July 2015, available at www
Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2015). .nytimes.com/.
132. Edmund Downie, The Chinese Connection, 144. China Upgrades Status of Tibets Police Force
FP, 25 June 2015, foreignpolicy.com/; Neeraj to Military Body, Economic Times, 8 October
Chauhan, Thai Arms Dealer to Reveal N-E 2014, available at articles.economictimes
Militants China Link, Times of India, 9 .indiatimes.com/; Xuezhi Guo, Chinas Secu-
December 2015, available at timesofindia rity State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics
.indiatimes.com/. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press,
133. For an Indian take on Pakistans involvement 2012), pp. 23436.
in Indias northeast, see the memoirs of two 145. Mark Owen, Preparing for the Future: Reas-
former intelligence officers: Maloy Krishna sessing the Possibility of Violence Emanating
Dhar, Open Secrets: The Explosive Memoirs from Tibetan Exile Communities in India,
of an Indian Intelligence Officer (New Delhi: India Review 13, no. 2 (2014), pp. 14969.
Mainak Dhar, 2012), and B. Raman, The Looking beyond armed resistance, there may
Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane (New also be benefits to India fomenting nonvio-
Delhi: Lancer, 2013), chap. 2. lent protest movements, aiding them, or both.
134. Garver, Protracted Contest, p. 75. There is a growing literature on the utility of
135. Matheswaran to author, 11 June 2015. nonviolent action and its potential applica-
tions in an unconventional warfare scenario.
136. A recently retired Para SF lieutenant general, See Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson,
interview by author, 10 June 2015. Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to
137. Serving Para SF brigadier interview. Unconventional Warfare, Small Wars Journal
(December 2014), smallwarsjournal.com/.
138. Carole McGranahan, Tibets Cold War: The
CIA and the Chushi Gangdrug Resistance, 146. See Indian Army Went without Parachutes
19561974, Journal of Cold War Studies 8, no. for over a Decade: CAG, Hindustan Times,
3 (Summer 2006), pp. 10230. 19 December 2015, available at www
.hindustantimes.com/, and Rahul Bedi,
139. See Sanjay Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-
Pathankot Attack Exposes Equipment Short-
strategic Rivalry between China and India
comings of Indias NSG Special Forces, IHS
(New York: Routledge, 2012), chap. 6. For a
Janes Defence Weekly, 19 January 2016.
tragic account of the U.S. abandonment of its
Tibetan proxies, see Mikel Dunham, Buddhas 147. U.S. SOF officers and defense officials, inter-
Warriors: The Story of the CIA-Backed Tibetan view by author, 10 December 2015.
Freedom Fighters, the Chinese Communist 148. In his well-known study of special opera-
Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet (New tions, Adm. William McRaven, USN (Ret.),
York: TarcherPerigee, 2004), pp. 35197. cautions against such overly rapid expansion.
140. Robert Haddick, Improving the Sustainment of William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies
SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied in Special Operations Warfare; Theory and
Environments, JSOU Report 16-2 (Tampa, Practice (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996),
FL: Joint Special Operations Univ., 2016), pp. p. 10.
2425. 149. Serving Para SF colonel to author, 10 June 2015.
141. China Deploys Hi-Tech Surveillance System 150. Raman interview.
in Tibet, Other Borders, Defense World, 7
November 2015, www.defenseworld.net/. 151. India: Special Operation Forces.
142. Reuters, China Wants to Turn Tibets Bud- 152. An Indian brigadier general, interview by
dhist Monasteries into Communist Party author, 10 December 2015.

141
REHMAN
153. Christopher Spearin, Special Operations 165. Barbara Opall-Rome, Israel Mulls Revamp
Forces and Private Security Companies, Pa- of Special Ops Forces, Defense News, 15 June
rameters 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014), pp. 6173. 2015, available at www.defensenews.com/.
154. Rahul Bedi, Indias Special Forces Expanding 166. U.S. defense officials interview.
without Adequate Training or Support, IHS 167. Rod Lenahan, Crippled Eagle: A Histori-
Janes Defence Weekly, 26 November 2010. cal Perspective of U.S. Special Operations,
155. U.S. defense officials, interview by author, 10 19761996 (Charleston, SC: Narwhal, 1998).
December 2015. 168. Colin S. Gray, Handfuls of Heroes on Des-
156. Serving Para SF brigadier interview. perate Ventures: When Do Special Opera-
157. Iskander Rehman, Recasting Indias Special tions Succeed?, Parameters 29, no. 1 (Spring
Forces (Philadephia: Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1999), pp. 224.
Center for the Advanced Study of India, 169. See Indian Armys Myanmar Operations:
2015), available at casi.sas.upenn.edu/. 10 Insider Facts, India Today, 10 June 2015,
158. See Keynote Address: Air Chief Marshal available at indiatoday.intoday.in/.
P. V. Naik, in Employment of Special Forces: 170. Sushant Singh, Inside the Surgical Strike:
Challenges and Opportunities for the Future, Choppers on Standby, 7080 Soldiers,
ed. V. S. Yadav [Col.] (New Delhi: VIJ Books, Indian Express, 1 October 2016, available at
2012), p. 17; P. K. Vasudeva, Increase in Para- indianexpress.com/.
Special Forces without a Unified Structure Is 171. See Siddharth Varadarajan, Surgical Strikes:
an Exercise in Futility (New Delhi: United The Questions That Still Remain, Wire, 3
Service Institution of India, 2014), available October 2016, thewire.in/.
at usiofindia.org/; and P. C. Katoch [Lt. Gen.]
and Saikat Datta, Indias Special Forces: His- 172. Recently retired IA officers, e-mails with
tory and Future of Indian Special Forces (New author, 2 October 2016.
Delhi: VIJ Books, 2013). 173. See, for example, the firsthand account
159. Recently retired Indian intelligence official provided in H. S. Panag [Lt. Gen.], The Lost
interview. Operation against Pakistan in Chorbat La,
Newslaundry, 14 September 2016, www
160. The Indian MOD has declared that the .newslaundry.com/. A good, if somewhat out-
twenty-two AH-64 E Apache Longbow heli- dated, overview of Indian and Pakistani SOF
copters currently under acquisition contract operations can be found in Kenneth Conboy,
would accrue to the IAF, while future acquisi- Elite Forces of India and Pakistan (Oxford,
tions would go to the Army Aviation Corps U.K.: Osprey, 1992).
(AAC). The AAC has made a demand for
another thirty-nine Apaches, and hopes even- 174. Shlomo Gazit, Risk, Glory, and the Rescue
tually to replicate the U.S. Armys heliborne Operation, International Security 6, no. 1
units. See Indian Army, IHS Janes Sentinel (Summer 1981), pp. 11133.
Security AssessmentSouth Asia, updated 23 175. James D. Kiras, Special Operations and
February 2016, janes.ihs.com/. Strategy: From World War II to the War on
161. Amit Kumar, Indias Special Forces: An Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 51.
Appraisal, Journal of Defense Studies 9, no. 2 176. A retired Para SF lieutenant general to author,
(AprilJune 2015), pp. 15758. 8 June 2015.
162. On the role of SOF combat air controllers, see 177. On according too much importance to SOFs
Jason Porterfield, USAF Special Tactics Teams: in operational planning, see Niccol Petrelli,
Inside Special Operations (New York: Rosen, The Missing Dimension: IDF Special Op-
2009). erations Forces and Strategy in the Second
163. Matheswaran to author, 11 June 2015. Lebanon War, Small Wars & Insurgencies 23,
no. 1 (2012), pp. 5673. On the importance
164. Anit Mukherjee, The Big Military Chal- of appreciating the unique attributes of SOFs,
lenge, Indian Express, 25 January 2016, avail- see Michael W. Rauhut, Win in a Complex
able at indianexpress.com/. World (II): Why an Integrated Conventional

and Special Operations Force Will Work is geographically remote from the arena in
Best, Defense in Depth (blog), Council on question. See Chris Loveman, Assessing the
Foreign Relations, 22 October 2014, blogs.cfr Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention, Conflict,
.org/. Security & Development 2, no. 3 (2002), pp.
178. Steven L. Canby, SOF: An Alternative Aspect 4547.
on Doctrine, in Special Operations Forces: 184. These factional disputes are explored in
Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the McGranahan, Arrested Histories.
Cold War, ed. Richard H. Shultz Jr. et al. 185. See Jessica Falcone and Tsering Wangchuk,
(Collingdale, PA: Diane, 1995), pp. 17997. Were Not Home: Tibetan Refugees in India
179. G. D. Bakshi, The Indian Art of War: The in the Twenty-First Century, India Review
Mahabharata Paradigm (New Delhi: Sharada, 7, no. 3 (2008), pp. 16495. For a somewhat
2002). hostile Indian perspective, see P. Stobdan,
180. Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Tibet and the Security of the Indian Hima-
Arming without Aiming: Indias Military layan Belt, in Himalayan Frontiers of India:
Modernization (Washington, DC: Brookings Historical, Geo-political and Strategic Perspec-
Institution, 2010). tives, ed. K. Warikoo (New York: Routledge,
2009), pp. 10222.
181. Srinath Raghavan, Civil-Military Relations
in India: The China Crisis and After, Journal 186. One of the objectives of proxy war is to
of Strategic Studies 32, no. 1 (2009), pp. 14975. consume the resources and strategic atten-
tion of the target. This can be described as a
182. On the role of the IAF during the Kargil War, cost-imposing strategy, in the sense that the
see Benjamin Lambeth, Airpower at 18,000 targeted competitor feels obliged to expend
Feet: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War resources to preserve internal stability. See
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Thomas Mahnken, ed., Competitive Strategies
International Peace, 2012), available at for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and
carnegieendowment.org/. Practice, Stanford Security Studies (Stanford,
183. The academic literature has shown that CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2012).
proxy war is only low risk when the sponsor

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A HIMAL AYAN CHALLENGE

Indias Conventional Deterrent and the Role of Special Operations

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THE SINO-INDIAN MILITARY DYNAMIC ALONG THE LAC: THE

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Source: Authors construction, based on Google Maps.

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Source: Units located via IHS Janes database, August 2016.

CHINAS REVITALIZED WAR-ZONE STRATEGY AND THE

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It also had become gradually more apparent that a short-duration, limited,

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INCORPORATING SOFS INTO INDIAS CURRENT APPROACH TO

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New Delhi also continues to rely on geographically dispersed conventional

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suffer disproportionate casualties when targeted by Chinese forces positioned

PROACTIVE DEFENSE AND THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

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Source: Authors graphical construction superimposed on Google Maps.

COUNTERING GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION

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DIRECT ACTION AND ENABLING OPERATIONS

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The challenge, however, would be to succeed in inserting SOF guidance and

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WAGING SPECIAL WARFARE IN THE TAR

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reality is somewhat more complex. Although China no longer directly supports

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THE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING A STRATEGY OF

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would India consider it more judicious to employ ground-based, deniable SOFs

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