Stratagem

Power Play in the Indian Ocean:

A Threat to Regional Stability

Amna Tauhidi*
Muhammad Abbas Hassan**

Abstract

The evolving internaional order and changing security dynamics have pushed both
regional and extra-regional powers into more of a complex security framework. The
security dilemma of the exising internaional world order can be stated in terms of
anarchy. It is the existence of anarchy due to which states pursue self-interest which
ulimately sets the stage for power play. The same scenario seems to have arisen in the
IOR. The rising economic and geopoliical signiicance of the Indian Ocean by featuring
the strategic moves of India, China, and the US; as well as the impact of these moves
on the security of the overall region demand atenion. This needs to be analysed with
regards to the impact of three contenions i.e. the India-Pakistan security dyad, the
compeiive economic rivalry between China and India, and the third contenion in terms
of China and the US. Furthermore, the end result of power play in the Indian Ocean
can be studied under two dimensions i.e. break up of conlict or strategic compeiion
between the regional players and in the context of the states whose interests are at
stake by the shit of power balance in the region.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, Balance of Power, World Order, Nuclear Deterrence.

* Amna Tauhidi is a Research Associate at the Center for Internaional Strategic Studies.
** Muhammad Abbas Hassan is a Research Associate at the Insitute of Strategic Studies Islamabad

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 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

Introducion

The Indian Ocean holds rapidly increasing strategic and economic vitality. It is
at the crossroads of global economic powerhouses and major power posturing.
While promising signs of greater trade and economic connecivity loom on the
horizon, they are accompanied by sources of tension and insecurity; both new
and exising. However, these challenges are not limited to the security front as
contesing visions of regional order espoused by major powers have elements
of economic compeiion and strategic rivalry intertwined in them.1 The Indian
Ocean has been viewed as the key locale, as it includes every one of those
highlights that have a global impact. The criicalness of the Indian Ocean can
be understood in terms of its area and development.2 The Indian Ocean has a
history of both conlict and cooperaion. It has also served as a decisive theatre
for colonial powers like Britain and France, and also for rising superpowers like
the US and the Soviet Union, i.e. to either contain their enemies or strike a
balance of power in the region. This power balancing has pushed the region into
a complex security framework where interests of more than one state are now
at stake.3 It is a shit in the global economic and geopoliical landscape of the 21st
century that has reverted back the signiicance of the Indian Ocean, which now
has been ideniied as the newly expanded theatre of power compeiion. In
internaional relaions, the study of power poliics has been closely associated
with security studies. The actors – mainly states who are considered as the major
players in global power poliics – are ulimately being drawn into a compeiion
over power.

This very signiicance of the Indian Ocean sets the stage for researchers
and academia to frame the relaionship between strategic power play and

1
Sam Bateman, Jane Chan and Euan Graham, “ASEAN and the Indian Ocean: The Key Mariime Links,” S.
Rajaratnam School of Internaional Studies, last modiied November 2011, htps://www.jstor.org/stable/
resrep05921
2
Qamar Faima and Asma Jamshed, “The Poliical and Economic Signiicance of Indian Ocean: An
Analysis,” South Asian Studies 30, no. 2 (2015): 73.
3
W. Lawrence Prabhakar, “Growth of Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: Dynamics and Transformaion,”
Naional Mariime Foundaion, last modiied 2016,

Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018 9

 Stratagem

regional stability/security. Power play in the post-realist era can be deined as

an enduring struggle for power. In the structural realist theory, the balance of
power consitutes the primary logic by which states ensure their security. The
prominence of realism in security studies connects the sense that power poliics
primarily involves balancing behaviour, military force and expansion backed
by military capabiliies. On the other hand, the balance of power needs to be
complemented with alignment and alliance poliics.4

To understand the scenario of the Indian Ocean and its impact on regional
security, we can uilise Barry Buzan’s framework of security complex. A regional
security complex is deined as a geographically proximate group of states with
closely linked security concerns, usually entailing a high threat/fear percepible
mutually among two or more major states. Furthermore, Buzan asserts that
poliical and military interacion is more intense among the states comprising
the complex.

Another security framework that is developed by the analyst to address

the role of extra-regional powers can be stated in terms of the disincion
between higher and lower level security complexes. Lower level (i.e. regional)
complexes consist of states with relaively limited power-projecion capabiliies
and therefore have a relaively litle impact on security relaions beyond the
region. Higher level complexes involve great powers and are not geographically
bound based on force. The dynamics of higher level security complexes
reverberate throughout the internaional system, penetraing or impinging
upon regional complexes. This may take many forms, but most analysts agree
that arms transfer has been ‘the characterisic tool’ of intervening great powers
in almost every security complex.5 Another way to understand the complex
military dynamics of the Indian Ocean is in the form of the cascade efect. The
perceived asymmetries and responses in one nuclear deterrence relaionship

4
Stacie E. Goddard and Daniel H. Nixon, “The Dynamics of Global Power Poliics: A Framework for
Analysis,” Journal of Global Security Studies 1, no. 1 (2015): 4-18.
5
David Todd Kinsella, “Arms Transfers, Dependence, and Regional Stability: Isolated Efects or General
Paterns?,” Portland State University, last modiied 1999, htps://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?aricle=1009&context=polisci_fac.

10 Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018

 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

in the region have a cascading efect on the other, both in terms of nuclear and
convenional force.6

The Indian Ocean is a major tesing ground for great power relaions,
like between the US and the potenial emerging contenders like China and
India. Both India and China are staring to consider the Ocean in terms of
prerogaives and responsibiliies. While Pakistan coninues to assert its posiion
by establishing an alliance with China and by building its own capacity especially
in the domain of naval power, the rising economies of East Asia are acquiring
more and more purchasing power and are in search of a strategy to secure their
energy needs.7 This afects the vital sea lines of communicaion (SLOC) in the
Indian Ocean, which are becoming increasingly packed with cargo ships, oil
tankers and patrolling naval vessels. This would trouble the Ocean’s water and
pose a potenial threat to the stability and security of the region.8

It is essenial to evaluate the power scenario in terms of acts of

militarisaion and the already ensuing debate on stability-instability paradox
in South Asia; and also the impact of transfer of arms, economic and military
alliance on the security of the region. In light of the aforemenioned, the status
of strategic stability in South Asia and how the exising convenional and nuclear
dispariies can escalate the threat of nuclear proliferaion, the drivers of nuclear
escalaion in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), its implicaions for the security of
the region and the theoreical framework that seems applicable to power play
in the Indian Ocean need to be analysed. It is imperaive to ind out what needs
to be done to strike strategic stability in the region, likewise the condiions that
would ensure strategic stability.
6
Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Nuclear-armed submarines in Indo-Paciic Asia: Stabilizer or Menace?,”
Lowy Insitute for Internaional Policy, last modiied September 4, 2015, htps://www.lowyinsitute.org/
publicaions/nuclear-armed-submarines-indo-paciic-asia-stabiliser-or-menace.
7
Manuel Vermeer, “Mariime Power Poliics in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR),” Insitute for Strategy, Poliical
Security and Business Consuling, last modiied November 2017, htp://www.ispsw.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/519_Vermeer.pdf.
8
Van der Puten, Frans-Paul, Thorsten Wetzling, and Susanne Kamerling, “Geopoliics and Mariime Security
in the Indian Ocean: What Role for the European Union?,” Netherlands Insitute of Internaional Relaions, last
modiied August 2014, htps://www.researchgate.net/publicaion/270284311_Frans-Paul_van_der_Puten_
Thorsten_Wetzling_Susanne_Kammerling_2014_Geopolitics_and_Maritime_Security_in_the_Indian_
Ocean_What_role_for_the_European_Union_Policy_Brief_-_The_Hague_Insitute_for_Global.

Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018 11

 Stratagem

The Status of Strategic Stability in South Asia

Strategic stability comprises at least three elements: deterrence stability, crisis

stability and arms race stability.9 The basic logic of the concept of strategic
stability was to stabilise bipolar confrontaion by ensuring that each side had
the ability to strike back efecively. On the other hand, the element of crisis
stability focuses on miigaing any pressures that would push a crisis towards
spinning out of control. The third important variable for determining strategic
stability can be highlighted in terms of the arms race stability. It is a common
belief that the costly and possibly deadly spiral of arms race can be averted if
arms’ developments of each side are manifestly designed to conform to the
enduring reality of mutual vulnerability rather than as plausible atempts to gain
strategic superiority.10 It is in the context of these three menioned elements
upon which we can build our argument that the nuclearisaion of the Indian
Ocean would afect the principle of strategic stability.

The South Asian security dynamics has an extra element of confusion

which emerges out of an unconvenional geometry of the conlicing state to
state relaions in the region. The formaion of a triad security patern between
India, China and Pakistan has a dyad of threatening connecions, i.e. India and
Pakistan, and China and India. The challenges to the strategic relaionship in this
triad can be traced back to the security dilemma during the Cold War in which
acions taken by one state to secure itself made the other feel less secure. This
has given way to the ‘security trilemma’: acions taken by one state to protect
itself from the other make the third feel insecure. As states watch and respond
to the acions and perceived intenions of others, there is a ripple amongst all
the world’s nuclear powers, which are connected by diferent but intersecing
deterrence relaionships.11
9
Shaun Gregory, “Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia,” South Asian Strategy Stability Unit, last modiied
September 2005, htp://sassi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Rethinking-Strategic-Stability.pdf.
10
Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, “Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretaions,” Strategic Studies
Insitute and U.S. Army War College Press, last modiied February 2013, htp://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/
pdiles/pub1144.pdf.

Gregory D. Koblentz, “Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age,” Council on Foreign Relaions, last
11

modiied November 2014, htps://www.cfr.org/report/strategic-stability-second-nuclear-age.

12 Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018

 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

In the context of South Asia, it is not diicult to assume that the greater
the convenional military asymmetry between India and Pakistan, the lower
will be the nuclear threshold. The growing asymmetry is extremely prone to
inject instability in South Asia.12 The other challenge to the South Asian strategic
stability can be stated in terms of India’s limited war doctrine. The doctrine argues
that there is a space for limited convenional war under the nuclear overhang.
Moreover, India’s adopion of a ‘Proacive Operaions Doctrine’ commonly
known as the Cold Start Doctrine, once fully operaionalised would create the
perpetual fear of a surprise atack. Pakistan, on its part, has responded to this
provocaive doctrine by introducing short-range batleield nuclear weapons. In
this backdrop, any miscalculaion or misinterpretaion of intenions during the
course of a serious future crisis could lead to an escalaion of the conlict to a
strategic level.13

Regretably, the context of strategic stability in South Asia is more oten

built on the concept of convenional and nuclear stockpiles. In this regard the
China, India and Pakistan security relaionship is a case in point, wherein, China
might take certain steps to safeguard its security vis-a-vis the US which may
result in a cascade efect within the Sino-Indo-Pak security triangle by making
India feel insecure. The Indian response to the perceived Chinese threat would
in turn cause anxiety in Pakistan, which would then act to redress the imbalance
caused by Indian acions.14 The operaionalisaion of India’s nuclear-powered
submarines equipped with nuclear-ipped Submarine Launched Ballisic Missiles
(SLBMs) – which will surely be followed by Pakistan in due course – will certainly
pose serious challenges to the current policies of asserive centralised control
over their nuclear forces.15

12
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Strategic Stability in South Asia: The Role of USA,” Journal of Contemporary Studies
, no. 1 (2012): 1-15.
13
Naeem Salik, “Strategic Stability in South Asia: Challenges and Prospects,” Insitute of Strategic Studies,
Islamabad, last modiied February 2016, htp://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Nuclear-Paper-
Series-No.-3.pdf.
14
Ibid.
15
Khusrow Akkas Abbasi, “India’s Naval Development and Interests of Other Powers in the Indian Ocean
Region,” Strategic Insight 2, no. 1 (2014): 25-38.

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 Stratagem

Some analysts, however, believe that the introducion of the mariime legs
of the respecive nuclear triads would extend the nuclear compeiion between
India and Pakistan into a new domain with serious ramiicaions for the region’s
security.16 According to Koblentz, the major challenge to strategic stability in
South Asia can be stated in terms of technology. According to him, India and
Pakistan both possess sizeable stockpiles with uncertain command and control.
Blatant lexing of military muscle may boost a country’s power credenials, but
to its neighbours, it is indicaive of a disrupive and disquieing mindset. Such
acquisiions, which are way beyond a country’s legiimate defensive needs, can
only lead to trust deicit and regional instability.17

Another disturbing factor that hinders the concept of strategic stability

in the region is the acive involvement of the US. The US is now seeking to
pursue a diferenial rather than universal proliferaion policy. The argument
that a difereniated policy would embolden other potenial proliferators is
akin to the now-discredited contenion, that a closed nuclear club would only
encourage proliferaion.18 Although India opposes US involvement in the region,
it cooperates with Washington at the tacical level, as it gives India not only a
chance to project itself as a responsible stakeholder in the region but also helps
in recogniion of India’s role in maintaining security in the region.19

Some analysts have been mindful of the idea that although nuclear
weapons exercise has universal efects in relaion to global poliics, such
universality may erode or perhaps even break down enirely in speciic regional
contexts. As Hagerty pens down, ‘It is important to recognise that paterns of
proliferaion and modes of deterrence will vary across regions. For too long,
consideraion of these issues has stalled in a quicksand of irresolvable deducive
16
Ibid.
17
Pervaiz Asghar, “Mariime and Naval Power Play: Compeing Roles & Missions,” in Major Powers’ Interests
in Indian Ocean: Challenges and Opions for Pakistan, (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Insitute, 2015).
18
Brahma Chellaney, “The India-Pakistan-China Strategic Triangle and the Role of Nuclear Weapons,” Insitute
francais des relaions intemaionales in collaboraion with the Atomic Energy Commission, last modiied 2002,
htp://www.iaea.org/inis/collecion/NCLCollecionStore/_Public/37/066/37066507.pdf.
19
Khusrow Akkas Abbasi, “India’s Naval Development and Interests of other Powers in the Indian Ocean
Region,” Strategic Insight 2, no. 1 (2014): 25-38.

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 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

debates that neglect the disincive historical, poliical, cultural and geographic
circumstances, which shape nuclear behaviour in speciic regions’. Even more
troubling is the noion that many US analysts coninue to view the rest of the
world through outdated Cold War lenses, which raises the possibility that the
dynamics of regional nuclear compeiions may be profoundly misunderstood.20

Another criicism raised on the concept of strategic stability that its well
with the South Asian region is highlighted by Richard K. Bets. He is of the view
that less atenion is paid to the poliical dimension, whereas, it is far more
important since it governs incenives to change status-quo. It is evident from the
past that the disrupion in Pakistan-India strategic and poliical communicaion
has become a constant factor that is believed to afect the policy aitude. Due
to the existence of unresolved issues between India and Pakistan, both sides
would try to counter each other and maintaining deterrence would remain a
central theme of their security framework. To conclude, in the case of Pakistan
and India, military issues are more likely to coninue their dominaion in terms
of strategic stability.

Therefore, it is high ime that states in the South Asian region realise the
changing security dynamics of the 21st century. Instead of divering all their
material resources to strike a balance of power in terms of convenional and
nuclear build-up, they should focus more on developing economic deterrence,
ensuring social and poliical stability, and lastly look for means of strategic co-
operaion. This would not only contribute to their internal stability but to the
overall stability and prosperity of the region. The second approach that needs
to be reviewed in the context of ensuring regional stability is the framing of
a mulilateral framework to address the maters of regional signiicance and
prevent the region from falling prey to the power tacics of extra-regional
powers.

20
Shaun Gregory, “Rethinking Strategic Stability in South Asia,” South Asian Strategy Stability Unit, last
modiied September 2005, htp://sassi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Rethinking-Strategic-Stability.
pdf.

Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018 15

 Stratagem

The Current Status of Power Play in the Indian Ocean

The strategic framework being laid around the Indian Ocean by India and China
is the central theme of power poliics in the IOR. Jostling in the region is more
about how China and India place themselves at a strategically advantageous
posiion. The stability and security depend on what type of strategic means and
tools are used by both the countries to achieve supremacy.21

Before we proceed to the nuclearisaion of the Indian Ocean, it is

necessary to view the perspecives of the acive powers in the IOR regarding the
security of the SLOC. Speaking in terms of India, the security of SLOC is criical
to its future economic prosperity. To guarantee the security of SLOC, the Indian
Navy will ensure a measure of stability and tranquillity in the waters. On the
other hand, the US adopts an approach of ‘credible combat power’ in the Indian
Ocean to protect its vital interests.22 In comparison to the US and India, China is
more concerned with securing its economic pace. Therefore, China has focused
more on strengthening its mariime domain. Its mariime policy is itled as ‘Far
Sea Defence’. The two main strategic goals of China’s Far Sea Defence policy are
to conserve China’s mariime security (including its territorial seas and Exclusive
Economic Zones), and to enhance and secure its mariime economic interests,
speciically in the IOR.23

The IOR security landscape can be deined as both complex and

uncertain. Another factor in determining the status of power play in the
Indian Ocean and its consequences on the overall security of the region can
be stated in terms of the already exising conlicts along the important SLOC,
i.e. from the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Straits of Hormuz along the coastline of
South Asia to the Straits of Malacca, and by way of geographical extension to
21
Sajjad Ashraf, “Power Play in the Indian Ocean and what it means for Asean,” The Strait Times, last modiied
February 16, 2016, htps://www.straitsimes.com/opinion/power-play-in-indian-ocean-and-what-it-means-
for-asean.
22
Tim Swejis. “The Mariime Future of the Indian Ocean: Puing the G Back into Great Power Poliics,” The
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, last modiied October 25, 2010, htps://hcss.nl/sites/default/iles/iles/
reports/HCSS_FI-13_09_10_Indian_Ocean.pdf.
23
Qamar Faima and Asma Jamshed, “The Poliical and Economic Signiicance of Indian Ocean: An
Analysis,” South Asian Studies 30, no. 2 (2015): 73.

16 Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018

 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

the South China Sea.24 To cope with this structural challenge, countries in the
region have either sided with mulilateral insituions or have embarked on
mariime-force capacity building measures. In case of the Indian Ocean, the
mariime-force capacity seems more applicable.25 This puts forth the need to
address the causes of failure of mulilateral insituions.

A signiicant mariime build-up is taking place across ive strategic

categories, i.e. SLOC protecion, mariime dominance, power projecion,
submarine-launched nuclear second-strike capability and space dominance.26
Naval and air forces’ modernisaion in the IOR have been in momentum since
the year 2000 covering West Asia, Southern Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia.
It has been catalysed by the military and strategic modernisaion of the regional
powers and inluenced by extra-regional naval forces.27

Another approach being applied in the Indian Ocean to strike a balance of

power can be stated in terms of alliance formaion. Both China and India have
developed iniiaives to bolster infrastructure and connecions in the region,
which the World Bank describes as amongst ‘least economically integrated’.
China’s strategy of the ‘String of Pearls’ is an atempt in the same direcion,
whereas, the counter approach of India can be stated in terms of its perceived
role as a net security provider.28 The term net security describes the state of
actual security available in an area upon balancing against the ability to monitor,
contain and counter all of these.29 In contrast to India, Pakistan is defending
24
Peter Lehr, “The Challenge of Security in the Indian Ocean in the 21st Century?,” University of Heidelberg,
last modiied November 2002, htp://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/4124/1/hpsacp13.pdf.
25
Sam Bateman, Jane Chan and Euan Graham, “ASEAN and the Indian Ocean: The key mariime links,” S.
Rajaratnam School of Internaional Studies, last modiied November 2011, htps://www.jstor.org/stable/
resrep05921.
26
Tim Swejis. “The Mariime Future of the Indian Ocean: Puing the G Back into Great Power Poliics,” The
Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, last modiied October 25, 2010, htps://hcss.nl/sites/default/iles/iles/
reports/HCSS_FI-13_09_10_Indian_Ocean.pdf.
27
W. Lawrence Prabhakar, “Growth of Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: Dynamics and Transformaion,”
Naional Mariime Foundaion, last modiied 2016, htp://www.mariimeindia.org/View%20
Proile/636154745898022561.pdf.

Eleanor Albert, “Compeiion in the Indian Ocean,” Council on Foreign Relaions, last modiied May 19, 2016,
28

htps://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/compeiion-indian-ocean.
29
Daniel R. Rahn, Unlocking Indian mariime strategy (Monterey: Defense Technical Informaion Center, 2006).

Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2018 17

 Stratagem

itself with the approach of Brown Water Navy. Brown Water Navy is a term that
originated in the US Navy, referring to the small gunboats and patrol boats used
in rivers, along with some of the larger ships that supported them as ‘mother
ships’, from which they operated. Furthermore, a Brown Water Navy focuses
more on the coastal operaion and primarily takes a defensive role.30 It is in the
context of the build-up of naval capaciies by Pakistan, India and China that
the Ocean has become entangled in the grand oceanic designs and strategic
partnerships between the regional and extra-regional powers.31

Reviewing the strategic interest of China, India and Pakistan in the Indian
Ocean makes it easier for analysts and researchers to evaluate the nature of
power play in the Indian Ocean, in the near future. Three observaions are
worth highlighing which are believed to dominate the Indian Ocean. First, the
US will no longer be the single dominant mariime player in the Indian Ocean
due to the emergence of China and India. Secondly, the economic rise of China is
expected to run parallel to its rise as a mariime power in the Indian Ocean. And
thirdly, the observaion that keeps the security of IOR at stake is the unresolved
disputes, military alliance, exchange of arms and the ongoing internal and
border conlicts that would push the countries in the region towards ensuring
and strengthening their security framework.

To conclude, the geopoliical landscape of the Indian Ocean may unfold

in diferent ways. The future of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace or arc of

crisis depends upon the level and nature of the mariime build-up, the level of
cooperaion and/or confrontaion between the powers and the polarity of the
mariime system. The polarity of the mariime system and the nature of the
relaionships of the Indian Ocean’s mariime powers will invariably determine
and depend on whether they invest in ofensive or defensive capabiliies.

30
Neil Gadihoke, “Blue-water Navies in Brown Water Operaions,” SP’s Naval Forces, October-November 2012.
31
Chandra Kumar, “The Indian Ocean: Arc of Crisis or Zone of Peace?” Internaional Afairs 60, no. 2 (1984):
233-246.

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 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

Impact of Nuclearisaion on the Stability and Security of the South Asian

Region

As stated previously, strategic stability is based upon three core elements, i.e.
deterrence stability, crisis instability and arms race stability. Any unequivocal
relaionship in these can result in making deterrence unstable. In other words,
no nuclear power can deter without the requisite weapons, which mater
litle without the resolve to use them, which maters even less if not correctly
perceived by one’s foes.

In such a scenario, peace then becomes precarious and chances of nuclear

employment appear high. In a situaion of strategic instability and anarchy,
states indulge in the nuclear and convenional build-up to achieve stable
deterrence. This concept of an unequivocal relaionship is very much applicable
to the security environment in the Indian Ocean. This approach raionalises
the applicaion of acion-reacion model. As precisely considered by various
analysts, the ongoing nuclear race in the Indian Ocean is a vicious cycle, where
an acion by one results in an escalated reacion by the other two.

The lessons from the Cold War can help the policymakers beter
understand the impact of naval nuclearisaion in a more precise manner.
The Cold War debate revolves around two very diferent schools of thought.
Firstly, deterrence can be strengthened through the injecion of ambiguity and
secondly, the deliberate blurring of convenional and nuclear plaforms is far
more likely to heighten the risk of verical escalaion.32

The atainment of sophisicated and modern weapons by China and India

is seen with a suspicious eye that would push the region into an arms race. In
academic literature, an arms race is deined as compeiive, reciprocal, peaceime
increase or improvement in armaments by two states perceiving themselves to
be in an adversarial relaionship. The increased rivalry oten results in erosion
of conidence, diminuion of co-operaion and poses a signiicant danger of
32
Iskander Rehman, “Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean,” Carnegie Endowment
for Internaional Peace, last modiied March 09, 2015, htp://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/09/murky-
waters-naval-nuclear-dynamics-in-indian-ocean-pub-59279.

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 Stratagem

war between leading states.33 Whereas, in case of exising asymmetry between

the two nuclear powers of the region, i.e. India and Pakistan, it is far more
threatening to the overall peace of the region.

Unfortunately, in South Asia asymmetries exist both at the convenional

and the nuclear level. Because of the asymmetry, the topmost concern of states
is to ensure strategic stability. States interpret strategic stability on the basis
of their threat percepions formed by the adversary’s military capabiliies,
doctrines and postures. It is this threat percepion that keeps the chances
of nuclear proliferaion high in the region. For example, former US Assistant
Secretary of Defence Peter Lavoy contends that ‘India’s military modernisaion
programme has led to a growing disparity between the Indian and Pakistani
convenional military capabiliies, the result of which will be either a regional
arms race or the lowering of nuclear threshold’.34

The second point of argument regarding nuclearisaion of the Indian

Ocean is that nuclear deterrence does not exist in a vacuum. The deployment of
nuclear weapons to sea by India and China will cause other powers in the region
to follow suit.35 Moreover, Pakistan shapes its defence strategy to rely on nuclear
forces to ofset India’s massive superiority in convenional weapons.36

The advocates of the third set of argument are of the view that an increasing
number of submarines both in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is
alarming. It is believed that along with the development and deployment of
less detectable submarines, there could be a potenially increased chance of
collision between these vessels. A collision between submarines of potenially

33
Sidra Tariq, “Indian and Chinese military modernizaion – A means to Power Projecion,” Spotlight 34, no.
7&8 (July-August 2015): 5.
34
Khurram Abbas, “Indian Military Buildup: Impact on Regional Stability,” Journal of Current Afairs 1, no. 1&2
(2016): 123-137.
35
Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Nuclear-armed submarines in Indo-Paciic Asia: Stabilizer or Menace?,”
Lowy Insitute for Internaional Policy, last modiied September 4, 2015, htps://www.lowyinsitute.org/
publicaions/nuclear-armed-submarines-indo-paciic-asia-stabiliser-or-menace.
36
Anthony H. Cordesman, Abdullah Toukan, Michael Wang, and Eric P. Jones, “The Indian Ocean Region: South
Asia Subregion,” Centre for Strategic and Internaional Studies, last modiied April 24, 2016, htps://csis-prod.
s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publicaion/160425_IOR_South_Asia_Subregion.pdf.

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 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

hosile nuclear powers could be the red lag that could lead to escalaion. As
more countries deploy submarines and other convenional forces capable of
tracking Sub-Surface Ballisic Nuclear (SSBN) in the region, the higher is the
potenial for unplanned encounters and incidents between these forces.37 It is
in the context of interacion of convenional arms with SSBN’s that we can put
forth an argument that the growth of convenional naval arsenals could have
potenially deleterious efects on crisis stability; mainly if they come into contact
with strategic systems.38

The other school of thought that jusiies our research hypothesis argues
that oping to conlate convenional and nuclear assets at sea could have severe
ramiicaions in terms of crisis. This scenario has been precisely put into words
by a trio of US Naval War College Professors who have warned naval power
players in the following words: ‘If one navy staions nuclear weapons aboard
convenionally armed warships, its antagonist could end up inadvertently
destroying nuclear forces in the process of targeing convenionally armed
forces’.39

Both India and Pakistan are shiting their deterrence from land to sea, and
both are doing so in a dangerously haphazard manner; relying increasingly on
dual-use delivery vehicles. Such a deliberate blurring of plaform and mission
categories would, in the case of a conlict, add to the fog of war by rendering it
impossible to discriminate between nuclear and convenional atacks.

Another evidence of regional insecurity emanaing from the nuclearisaion

of the Indian Ocean or nuclearisaion, in general, can be stated in terms of
the coninued proliferaion of nuclear weapons, as well as ballisic and cruise
missiles. This is indicaive of the persistence of the tradiional state-centric
37
Brendan Thomas-Noone, “Nuclear-armed submarines in Indo-Paciic Asia: Stabilizer or Menace?,”
Lowy Insitute for Internaional Policy, last modiied September 4, 2015, htps://www.lowyinsitute.org/
publicaions/nuclear-armed-submarines-indo-paciic-asia-stabiliser-or-menace.
38
Diana Beth Wueger, “Deterring war or couring disaster: an analysis of nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean”
(PhD dissertaion, Naval Postgraduate School, 2015).
39
Iskander Rehman, “Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean,” Carnegie Endowment
for Internaional Peace, last modiied March 09, 2015, htp://carnegieendowment.org/2015/03/09/murky-
waters-naval-nuclear-dynamics-in-indian-ocean-pub-59279.

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 Stratagem

conlict and the coninuing relevance of the primacy of deterrence.40 Both

nuclear deterrence and convenional undersea warfare depend on perpetuaing
the sea’s status as a hideaway and exposing submarines to view could upset the
deterrent calculus in unforeseen ways.41

The other two scenarios that set the stage for unbalanced compeiion in
the Indian Ocean can be stated in terms of poliical and economic asymmetry;
the technological innovaion. In such a scenario compeiion could undulate
asymmetrically, distoring mutual vulnerability and thus the resilience of
deterrence. To state an illustraion, if one nuclear power could peer into the
depths and target submarines efecively, while its opponents remained
relaively backward, it could nullify the undersea component of another’s nuclear
deterrent while maintaining conidence in its own second-strike force. If such
conidence grew into overconidence, however, it could frighten compeitors
who might resort to use it or lose its strategies to preserve their deterrents,
boosing the chances of an atomic clash in the process.42

It is argued in the domain of internaional relaions that power is the

currency of internaional poliics. Great powers pay careful atenion to how
much economic and military power they have relaive to each other. To conclude
it would not be wrong to say that internaional poliics is synonymous with
power poliics.43

Conclusion

To conclude, the Indian Ocean is a major tesing ground for great power
relaions between the US and the potenial emerging contenders like China and

40
W. Lawrence Prabhakar, “Growth of Naval Power in the Indian Ocean: Dynamics and Transformaion,”
Naional Mariime Foundaion, last modiied 2016, htp://www.mariimeindia.org/View%20
Proile/636154745898022561.pdf.
41
James Holmes “Sea changes: The future of nuclear deterrence,” Bullein of the Atomic Scienists 72, no. 4
(2016): 228-233.
42
Ibid., 232.
43
John J. Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., Internaional
Relaions Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 71-88.

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 Power Play in the Indian Ocean: A Threat to Regional Stability

India. Even as China and India harbour ambiions to expand their forward naval
presence in the Indian Ocean, historically embedded mistrust is encouraging
suspicion concerning each party’s intenion. Profound mutual mistrust and
miscommunicaion is the ulimate reason for chaos and a conlicing situaion in
the South Asian region, and now the Indian Ocean. As China, India and Pakistan
possess atomic weapons, the Indian Ocean is slipping from a zone of peace to a
hotbed of atomic governmental issues.

To help lessen pressures, India and the US are occupied with agreeable
discourses regarding India opening up its army installaions to the US in return
for access to weapons’ innovaion to enable it to limit the gap with China. The
two sides likewise hold dialogues on ani-submarine warfare, a territory of
sensiive military innovaion and strategies. The procedure of India-US security
load partaking in the IOR should ill in as a building obstacle for preserving naval
to naval relaionship that ought to develop into a common Ani-Submarine
Warfare (ASW) ability. Lastly, the concept of proliferaion needs to be revised
keeping in view the context of asymmetry in South Asia.

Policy Recommendaions to Ensure Strategic Stability in the Indian Ocean

Keeping in view the above security dilemma in South Asia and the nuclearisaion
of the Indian Ocean, here are some recommendaions that can serve as a policy
guide for framing a broader co-operaive security framework for the Indian
Ocean.

If we recall Sun Tzu’s ideas of asymmetric response to threats, we will

realise that he taught that it was necessary to act not as the adversary wanted
you to act and not as the adversary acted itself, rather it was necessary to ind
opions that would maximise your strengths and minimise the adversary’s
capabiliies.

There should be greater emphasis on the formaion of mulilateral security

relaions rather than oping for bilateral partnerships. As we are operaing in the
age of globalisaion, the security framework should be framed in a way that

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 Stratagem

addresses the broader and more independent concept of security, more than
the tradiional military concept in order to maximise long-term regional security.

The reconciliaion of naval and nuclear strategies/doctrines is also criical.

Unfortunately, the nuclear doctrines have not played an efecive role in the
South Asian context, which as a result has complicated the situaion. This is
again the responsibility of the state and the internaional governing bodies to
ensure the principle of equality among the states of the region.

Promoing transparency among nuclear-armed states on their nuclear

doctrine, posture and modernisaion plans is very essenial. Such transparency
is necessary for a substanial dialogue to build mutual understanding and pave
the way for future reducions.

The other recommendaion can be stated in terms of regional framework

governance approach. Unfortunately, the South Asian region has been under
colonial rule and policies sill dominate our mindsets. The need of the ime is to
frame a regional approach by taking on board all the state paries. This approach
would also minimise the extra-regional inluence and create a win-win situaion
for all the member states.

The policymakers should frame a holisic security paradigm that takes

into consideraion the noion that security is a muli-dimensional concept
comprising military, economic, environmental, human and poliical factors.
The litoral states of the region which are either developing or in the phase
of development should focus more on building a stable poliical and economic
deterrent.

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