India's Military Modernization-NBR
India's Military Modernization-NBR
India's Military Modernization-NBR
s military modernization:
plans and strategic underpinnings
As a key player in Asia and a large democracy with which
the United States shares common interests, India is emerging
as an important U.S. strategic partner. Tere is a broad
national consensus in India on the contours of this emerging
relationship with Washington, particularly with respect to
enhanced defense and civil nuclear energy cooperation.
During his visit to New Delhi in June 2012, U.S. defense
secretary Leon Panetta identifed India as a linchpin in
Washingtons emerging rebalancing strategy in the Asia-
Pacifc region. While there was no reaction from the Indian
government, it is clear that these two large democracies need
to work together militarily in order to maintain freedom of
the seas in the Indian Ocean region and to ensure peace and
stability in the Asia-Pacifc more generally. Should China
experience political instability or behave irresponsibly in
asserting its territorial rightsas it has shown a tendency to
do in the South China Seaboth India and the United States
will need strong strategic partners to face worst-case
scenarios efectively.
In order to meet future threats and challenges and achieve
interoperability with U.S. and other friendly armed forces
for joint operations in Indias area of strategic interest, the
Indian military needs to modernize and create force
structures that are capable of undertaking network-centric
September 2012 Produced by The National Bureau of Asian Research for the Senate India Caucus
policy
brief
warfare on land, at sea, and in the air. Gradually, but
perceptibly, the Indian armed forces are upgrading their
capabilities, enhancing their kinetic effectiveness and
command and control, and improving interoperability. Tis
brief analyzes the threats and challenges that India must
address, the measures being adopted to modernize the
countrys armed forces, and the strategic underpinnings
behind this slow but steady modernization efort.
Preparing for a Two-Front War
South Asia is among the worlds most unstable regions
due to the ongoing war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In
addition, growing fundamentalist terrorism; creeping
Talibanization in Pakistan; political instability in
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; unrest in Tibet
and Xinjiang; narcotics trafcking; and the proliferation of
small arms and light weapons are also destabilizing factors.
Unresolved territorial and boundary disputes with China
and Pakistan, over which India has fought four wars;
internal security challenges in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
and the northeastern states; and the rising tide of the Maoist
insurgency in the heartland further vitiate Indias strategic
environment. Further, many Indian security analysts worry
By GURMEET KANWAL
Sept ember 24, 2012
that China is engaged in the strategic encirclement of India
through its nuclear and missile nexus with Pakistan; the
sale of military hardware to Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar,
and Sri Lanka; and a string of pearls strategy to surround
India with naval bases in the northern Indian Ocean region.
India-China relations are stable at the strategic level.
Resolution of the territorial dispute is being discussed by
Indias national security adviser and Chinas vice foreign
minister, military confdence-building measures are holding
up, bilateral trade has increased to $60 billion, and both
countries are cooperating in international forums like the
World Trade Organization and the UN Climate Change
Conference. However, the relationship is more contentious
at the tactical level. For example, China refuses to issue
proper visas to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing
denied the commander-in-chief of Indias Northern
Command a visa for an ofcial visit because it believes that
J&K is a disputed territory, and the Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) has been making frequent forays across the Line of
Actual Control into Indian territory simply to push Chinese
territorial claims. China has also rapidly developed military
infrastructure in Tibet to allow for quicker induction of
troops and their sustenance over a longer period of time.
Another destabilizing factor is the large Chinese presence
in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.
Tese developments do not augur well for long-term peace
and stability.
Te prevailing strategic environment has forced Indias
armed forces to prepare for the possibility of a two front
war, while the army and other security forces are engaged in
fghting an ongoing half front internal security war. Even
though the probability of conventional confict remains low
due to steadily improving relations and military confdence-
building measures with China and Pakistan, this possibility
cannot be completely ruled out. Nuclear deterrence also plays
a positive role in conflict avoidance, but the prevailing
wisdom in India is that there is space for conventional confict
below the nuclear threshold. There is now increasing
realization that unless India takes immediate measures to
accelerate the pace of its military modernization, the gap with
China, which is only a quantitative gap at present, will soon
become a qualitative gap, given the rapid rate of PLA
modernization. Likewise, the slender edge that the Indian
armed forces now enjoy over the Pakistani armed forces in
conventional confict is being eroded as Pakistan is spending
considerable sums of money on its military modernization
under the garb of fghting radical extremism.
1
Although the Indian armed forces have drawn up
elaborate plans for modernizing and qualitatively upgrading
their capabilities for future combat, including the ability to
secure the sea lanes of communication and project power
in Indias area of strategic interest, the pace of modernization
has been slow due to the lack of adequate funding, delayed
decision-making, and a low-tech defense industrial base.
Indias defense budget is pegged at less than 2% of its GDP
at present, and the bulk of the expenditure is on the revenue
accountthat is, pay and allowances, rations, fuel, oil and
lubricants, ammunition, and vehicles.
2
Very little remains
in the capital account to be spent on modernization. In the
case of the army, spending on modernization is as little as
20% to 25% of total capital expenditure in 201213.
3
According to the Indian defense minister A.K. Antony,
New procurements have commencedbut we are still
lagging by 15 years.
4
Nonetheless, an inadequate defense
industrial baseimports constitute 70% of defense
1
Te India-Pakistan combat ratio is assessed by this author as 1.2 to 1.0 in
Indias favor.
2
Laxman K. Behera, Indias Defence Budget 201213, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), IDSA Comment, March 20,
2012, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2012-13_
LaxmanBehera_200312.
3
Ibid.
4
Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Armys Modernisation, India Strategic,
January 2012.
Gurmeet Kanwal is a Delhi-based defense
analyst and former Director of the Centre for
Land Warfare Studies. He can be reached at
<[email protected]>.
Policy Brief
Te pace of modernization
has been slow due to the lack
of adequate funding, delayed
decision-making, and a low-
tech defense industrial base.
2
integral combat aviation support and network centricity.
6
Te armys mechanized forces are still mostly night blind.
Its artillery lacks towed and self-propelled 155-mm
howitzers for the plains and the mountains and has little
capability by way of multi-barrel rocket launchers and
surface-to-surface missiles. Infantry battalions urgently
need to acquire modern weapons and equipment for
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to
increase operational efectiveness and lower casualties.
Main battle tanks (MBT) and infantry combat vehicles
(ICV) are the driving forces of Indias conventional
deterrence in the plains. Tis feet is being modernized
gradually by inducting two regiments of the indigenously
developed Arjun MBT and importing 310 T-90S MBTs from
Russia. A contract has also been signed for 347 additional
T-90S tanks to be assembled in India. Te BMP-1 and BMP-
2 Russian ICVs, which have long been the mainstay of the
mechanized infantry battalions, need to be replaced as well.
The new ICVs must be capable of performing internal
security duties and counterinsurgency operations in
addition to their primary role in conventional conficts.
Artillery modernization plans include the acquisition of
towed, wheeled, and self-propelled 155-mm guns and
howitzers for the plains and the mountains through import
as well as indigenous development. Te Corps of Army Air
Defence is also faced with problems of obsolescence. Te
vintage L-70 40-mm air defense (AD) gun system, the four-
barreled ZSU-23-4 Schilka (SP) AD gun system, the SAM-6
6
Modernisation Trusts of Indian Army: Interview with Deputy Chief
of Army Staf, CLAWS Journal (Winter 2010): 1, http://www.claws.in/
CJ-winter-2010.pdf.
acquisitionsand bureaucratic inefciency, rather than lack
of funds, are the main causes of the slow pace of
modernization. India is expected to procure defense
equipment worth $100 billion, most of it imported, over the
next two fve-year plans. Simultaneously, however, eforts
are being stepped up to enhance indigenous capabilities
and thereby reduce Indias dependence on imports by an
order of magnitude. Te following three sections will survey
Indias modernization of its army, navy, and air force.
Army Modernization: Enhancing Capabilities
without Reducing Manpower
With personnel strength of 1.1 million soldiers (6 regional
commands, a training command, 13 corps, and 38
divisions), the Indian Army has kept the nation together
through various crises, including four wars since
independence, Pakistans proxy war in J&K since 198990,
and insurgencies in many of the northeastern states.
5
Given
its large-scale operational commitments on border
management and counterinsurgency, the army cannot aford
to reduce its manpower numbers until these challenges are
overcome. Many of its weapons and equipment are
bordering on obsolescence and need to be replaced. Te
next step would be to move gradually toward acquiring
network-centric capabilities for efects-based operations so
as to optimize the armys full combat potential for defensive
and ofensive operations. Te army is also preparing to join
the navy and the air force in launching intervention
operations in Indias area of strategic interest when called
on to do so in the future.
Lieutenant General J.P. Singh (retired), former deputy
chief of the army staf (planning and systems), stated in an
interview with the CLAWS Journal that the critical
capabilities that are being enhanced to meet challenges
across the spectrum include battlefield transparency,
battlefeld management systems, night-fghting capability,
enhanced frepower, including terminally guided munitions,
integrated maneuver capability to include self-propelled
artillery, quick reaction surface-to-air missiles, the latest
assault engineer equipment, tactical control systems,
5
Tis section draws from the authors analysis in Indian Army
Modernisation Needs a Major Push, India Strategic, February 2010,
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories482.htm.
Policy Brief
Given its large-scale
operational commitments
on border management and
counterinsurgency, the army
cannot aford to reduce its
manpower numbers until
these challenges are overcome.
3
level battlefeld management system likewise need to be
hastened. Despite being the largest user of space, the army
does not yet have a dedicated military satellite for its space
surveillance needs. Cyberwarfare capabilities are also at a
nascent stage. Te emphasis thus far has been on developing
protective capabilities to safeguard Indian networks and
C4I2SR (command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance)
from cyberattack. Ofensive capabilities have yet to be
adequately developed. All these capabilities will make it
easier for the army to undertake joint operations with
multinational forces when the need arises and the
government approves such a policy option.
Naval Modernization: Major Fleet Expansion
The Indian Navys ambitious Maritime Capabilities
Perspective Plan seeks to dominate the Indian Ocean region
by acquiring blue water operational capability while
efectively countering current and emerging threats closer
to the coastline. Tere is a perceptible shif in emphasis from
an increase in the number of platforms to the enhancement
of capabilities. According to a report tabled in the Indian
Parliament in the last week of April 2012 by the Standing
Committee on Defence, the navys modernization plan seeks
to achieve the following objectives:
Augment airborne maritime surveillance, strike,
anti-submarine warfare [ASW] and air defence
capability through induction of shore-based aircraf,
integral helos, carrier based aircraf, space based
[assets] and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], along
with suitable weapons and sensors.
Develop ASW capability through induction of
suitable platforms, weapons and sensors.
Build adequate stand of capability for sea lif and
expeditionary operations to achieve desired power
projection force levels, infuence events ashore and
undertake military operations other than war.
Induct assets and develop suitable infrastructure to
augment forces available for low intensity maritime
operations (LIMO), protection of of-shore assets and
[for] coastal security.
(Kvadrat), and the SAM-8 OSA-AK, among others, need to
be replaced by more responsive modern AD systems that
are capable of defeating current and future threats.
The modernization of Indias infantry battalions is
moving forward but at a similarly slow pace. Tis initiative
is aimed at enhancing the battalions capability for
surveillance and target acquisition at night and boosting
their frepower for precise retaliation against infltrating
columns and terrorists hiding in built-up areas. Tese plans
include the acquisition of shoulder-fred missiles, hand-held
battlefeld surveillance radars, and hand-held thermal
imaging devices for observation at night. A system called
F-INSAS (future infantry soldier as a system) is also under
development. One infantry division has been designated as
a rapid reaction force for employment on land or in
intervention operations and will have one amphibious
brigade and two air assault brigades.
Similarly, the Indian Army proposes to substantially
enhance the operational capabilities of army aviation,
engineers, signal communications, reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition branches in order to
improve the armys overall combat potential by an order of
magnitude. Modern strategic and tactical level command
and control systems need to be acquired on priority for
better synergies during conventional and sub-conventional
confict. Plans for the acquisition of a mobile corps-to-
battalion tactical communications system and a battalion-
Policy Brief
Te Indian Army proposes
to substantially enhance the
operational capabilities of
army aviation, engineers,
signal communications,
reconnaissance, surveillance,
and target acquisition
branches in order to improve
the armys overall combat
potential by an order of
magnitude.
4
proposed to center both feets around an aircraf carrier.
Eventually the navy plans to graduate to three carrier battle
groups. Te INS Chakra, a nuclear-powered submarine
leased from Russia, will join the feet later in 2012, while
the INS Arihant, the frst of three to four indigenously
designed and developed nuclear-armed submarines, is
expected to become fully operational by late 2014. India has
also begun to induct Russian Nerpa-class submarines, which
will give the navy a much needed fllip to the submarine
feet and considerably enhance sea-denial capabilities. Tree
stealth frigates have only recently been added to the feet.
Te Indian Navys modernization plans, though much
delayed, have thus fnally begun to pick up steam. Pointing
out the navys role as a key facilitator in promoting peace
and stability in the Indian Ocean region, Defence Minister
Antony observed while commissioning a stealth frigate in
July 2012 that the present operating environment of the
Indian Navy dictates that we balance our resources with
a strategy that is responsive across the full range of blue and
brown water operations.Te maintenance of a strong and
credible navy and strengthening cooperation and friendship
with other countries to promote regional and global stability
is the need of the hour.
9
9
Vinay Kumar, Credible Navy Need of the Hour: Antony, Hindu,
July 21, 2012.
Induct force multipliers like satellite based global
communications, reconnaissance and network
enabled platforms to achieve battle-space dominance
capability and perform network centric operations.
Induct state-of-the-art equipment and specialized
platforms for special forces to enhance niche
capabilities to conduct maritime intervention
operations and other envisaged roles.
Develop support infrastructure in island territories
to support the planned force levels as well as support
infrastructure for ships/submarines/aircrafs at ports
and airbases.
7
According to Admiral Arun Prakash (retired), former
chief of naval staf, Indias naval modernization plans are
designed to meet the following aims:
8
Acquiring a capability for maritime domain awareness
in the area of responsibility, including space-based
surveillance, maritime reconnaissance, airborne early
warning and control (AEW&C), and UAVs
Developing the capability for expeditionary and joint
warfare, supported by special operations
Acquiring reach and sustainability through long
endurance, tankers, turnaround facilities in friendly
foreign ports, and longer intervals between
maintenance cycles
Acquiring modern capabilities in felds of tactical
aviation, ASW, anti-air/anti-missile, land-attack,
mine countermeasures, and electronic warfare
Networking ships, submarines, and airborne
platforms via satellite
Committing to self-reliance and indigenization, with
the objective of harnessing national strengths in
shipbuilding, engineering, electronics, and IT
Te Indian Navy has two operational feetsthe Eastern
Naval Command and Western Naval Commandand has
7
Standing Committee on Defence, Indian Ministry of Defence,
Demands for Grants (20122013), April 30, 2012, 7071,
http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/FINAL%20DFG%20%20
REPORT%20-2012-13.pdf.
8
Authors email interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (retired),
July 27, 2012.
Policy Brief
Te Indian Navy is on
the cusp of acquiring the
capabilities necessary to
join key strategic partners
such as the U.S. Navy in
safeguarding the sea lanes
of communication in the
northern Indian Ocean and
ensuring unfettered freedom
of the seas for trade and
commerce.
5
power and to project power where necessary in order to
defend vital national interests. According to Kapil Kak, a
retired air vice marshal and senior defense analyst, although
there is a gap between vision and capability with regard to
shaping Indias strategic neighborhood, forward movement
is now visible. In his view, the modernization plans of the
air force are aimed at achieving the following objectives:
10
Air dominance and control of the air
Deterrence, by both denial and punishment
Long-range ofensive reachpenetration, precision,
persistence, and parallelityin simultaneous operations
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels
Strategic air-lift capability for power projection
t hrough bot h hard and sof t power, such as
humanitarian assistance and disaster rel ief
operations and diaspora evacuation
Build-up of capability for coercion
Acquisition of force enablers and multipliers and
related combat-support systems, i ncludi ng
networking for tri-service command and control
Capability of conducting cyberspace and information
operations
Indigenization of future capabilities for design and
development
From a sanctioned strength of 39 squadrons, the Indian
Air Force is down to 34 squadrons at present, due to decades
of neglect, but hopes to enhance its strength to 42 squadrons
by 2022. Yet plans to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium-
range combat aircrafin order to maintain an edge over
the regional air forcesare stuck in the procurement
quagmire. Tejas, the indigenously designed light combat
aircraf, which is expected to replace the obsolescent Mig-21,
is still a few years away from becoming fully operational.
India is also developing a ffh-generation fghter jointly
with Russia and aims to fy it in 2015. New fghter bombers
include a feet of 272 Sukhoi-30 MKIs, half of which have
10
Authors email interview with Kapil Kak, July 27, 2012.
Te navy plans to expand to a feet of 150 ships in the
next ten to fifteen years, with 50 warships now under
construction and 100 new vessels in the acquisition pipeline.
The navy is also engaged in setting up operational
turnaround bases, forward-operating bases, and naval air
enclaves with a view to enhancing Indias surveillance eforts
in the Indian Ocean region. Plans for accretions to the naval
aviation feet are likewise progressing smoothly: Boeing 737
P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraf have begun to be
inducted, and 5 additional Kamov Ka-31 AEW helicopters
will be added to the existing feet of 11 helicopters. Further,
the navys amphibious landing capability has been enhanced
considerably by the acquisition of the INS Jalashwa (exUSS
Trenton) and other landing ships, and additional capabilities
for amphibious warfare are being rapidly developed. As a
result of these eforts, the Indian Navy is on the cusp of
acquiring the capabilities necessary to join key strategic
partners such as the U.S. Navy in safeguarding the sea lanes
of communication in the northern Indian Ocean and
ensuring unfettered freedom of the seas for trade and
commerce.
Air Force Modernization: Air Dominance and Force
Projection
Until recently, Indias traditional strategic sphere lay
between the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca; but
with Indias global footprint expanding, the Indian Air
Force should be ready to serve wherever the countrys future
strategic interests lie. Te air force is gearing up to provide
the strategic outreach that India needs as a growing regional
Policy Brief
Te air force is gearing up to
provide the strategic outreach
that India needs as a growing
regional power and to project
power where necessary in
order to defend vital national
interests.
6
than 72 hours, even though the countrys eastern seaboard
had itself sufered considerable casualties and damage.
Likewise, Indian Navy ships on a goodwill visit to European
countries during the Lebanon war in 2006 lifted and
brought back 5,000 Indian civilian refugees.
From the ongoing modernization plans described above,
it is evident that India is preparing to join the worlds major
powers in terms of the ability to undertake out-of-area
contingency operations. Further, the acquisition of SU-30
MKI long-range fghter bombers with air-to-air refueling
capability, C-130J Hercules transport aircraf, and airborne-
warning-and-control-system and maritime-surveillance
capabilities over the next fve to ten years will give India
considerable strategic outreach. New Delhi has consistently
favored military intervention only under a UN umbrella.
Tough that position is unlikely to change in the near term,
India is likely to join future coalitions of the willing even
without UN approval when vital national interests are
threatened and need to be defended. Shiv Shankar Menon,
Indias national security adviser, stated in a speech in August
2011: As a nation state India has consistently shown tactical
caution and strategic initiative, sometimes simultaneously.
But equally, initiative and risk-taking must be strategic, not
tactical, if we are to avoid the fate of becoming a rentier
state.
11
He went on to mention that India was cooperating
extensively with other militaries to fght piracy of the Horn
of Africa. Such cooperation will increase in the future as
India adds to its intervention capabilities.
Given that India faces complex strategic scenarios and is
located in an increasingly unstable neighborhood, it is in
New Delhis interest to encourage a cooperative model of
11
Shiv Shankar Menon, India and the Global Scene (16th Prem
Bhatia Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, August 11, 2011), http://www.
maritimeindia.org/article/india-and-global-scene.
already been built. AEW aircraf are being acquired from
Israel as well as being developed indigenously. India has
also acquired 6 C-130J Super Hercules aircraf for its special
forces and will likely order 6 more from the United States.
C-17 Globemaster heavy-lif aircraf are also likely to be
acquired shortly, which will take Indias defense cooperation
with the United States to a new level. Although a contract
has been signed with a Swiss frm for 75 Pilatus PC-7 basic
trainer aircraf, Indias feet of jet trainers continues to be
defcient. In the rotary-wing category, the indigenously
manufactured Dhruv utility helicopter has entered service.
Te air force is also in the process of acquiring medium-lif
transport helicopters and attack helicopters.
In keeping with developments in the region, Indias
strategic forces are also modernizing at a steady pace. Te
Agni-I and Agni-II missiles are now fully operational.
Immediate requirements include the Agni-V intermediate-
range ballistic missile, which has a 5,000-km range, and
nuclear-powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles
to provide genuine second-strike capability. As noted above,
the INS Arihant, Indias frst indigenously built nuclear
submarine, will likely become fully operational by late 2014.
While Indias emphasis is on mobile missile launchers, a
small number of hardened silos are also being constructed.
Te armed forces do not currently have a truly integrated
tri-service C4I2SR system suitable for network-centric
warfare, which would allow them to optimize their
individual capabilities; however, plans have been made to
develop such a system in the next fve to ten years. In fact,
all new weapons and equipment acquisitions are now being
planned on a tri-service basis to ensure interoperability.
Indias Quest for Strategic Outreach
Given its growing power and responsibilities, India has
been steadily enhancing its expeditionary and military
intervention capabi l ities, which have been amply
demonstrated in recent times. During the 1991 Gulf War,
India airlifed 150,000 civilian workers, who had been forced
to leave Iraq, from the airfeld at Amman, Jordan, over a
period of 30 days. Tis was the largest airlif since the Berlin
airlif at the end of World War II. During the 2004 tsunami,
the Indian armed forces were at the forefront of rescue and
relief operations. Over 70 Indian Navy ships transported
rescue teams and relief material to disaster zones in less
Policy Brief
It is evident that India is
preparing to join the worlds
major powers in terms of the
ability to undertake out-of-
area contingency operations.
7
Policy Brief
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regional security and work with all friendly countries
toward that end. At the same time, New Delhi finds it
pragmatic to hedge just in case worst-case scenariossuch
as the collapse of China or Chinas use of military force for
territorial gainsbegin to unfold and threaten Indias
economic development or territorial integrity. The
increasing emphasis on maritime cooperation, particularly
with the United States, is part of Indias continuing eforts
to fulfill growing obligations and responsibilities as a
regional power. New Delhi is now working to cooperate
with all the major Asian powers in order to maintain peace
and stability in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacifc more
generally, though without aligning militarily with any one
power. Toward this end, the armed forces are working
together to achieve joint warfare capabilities for intervention
operations in Indias area of strategic interest. In sum, a
rising India will soon become a net contributor to security
in the Indian Ocean region, together with strategic partners
such as the United States.
Nonetheless, Indias modernization plans are moving
ahead at a very slow pace. Policy paralysis in New Delhi due
to the vagaries of coalition politics in a parliamentary
democracy, along with the reduction in the defense budget
as a share of Indias GDP due to sluggish growth in the
economy, has further exacerbated the difficulties in
increasing the pace of modernization. However, the process
is certainly underway, and there is hope that it will receive
bipartisan support across the political spectrum because of
the realization that no alternative exists for addressing
emerging threats and challenges but for India to quickly
modernize its armed forces.
Indias military modernization, however slow it might be,
will lead to a qualitative increase in defense cooperation
with the United States and other strategic partners by
enhancing the capabilities of the Indian armed forces for
joint coalition operations, if they are in Indias national
interest. Overall, India will gradually acquire the capability
to act as a net provider of security in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean region. Tis positive development will allow
strategic partners like the United States to reduce their
military commitments to the region to a limited extent.
Hence, Indias modernization eforts will enhance and
further cement U.S.-India relations.
Indias military
modernization, however slow
it might be, will lead to a
qualitative increase in defense
cooperation with the United
States and other strategic
partners