Report No.

3 of 2009-10

3 Handling Operations

All the 11 major ports had facilities to handle different types of cargo and they handled 530 MT of
cargo in 2008-09.

The nature of cargo was categorised into

liquid bulk 31, dry bulk 32, containers 33 and
break bulk 34 cargo. In terms of actual
handling, the predominant share in the
cargo mix was liquid bulk for Kandla,
Mumbai, Cochin and New Mangalore,
dry bulk for Mormugao and Paradip and
containers for JNPT. Other ports handled
multiple cargo types in relatively even
Fig 3.1 proportions. Four ports on the east coast,
viz. Chennai, Kolkata, Paradip, and Visakhapatnam played a predominant role in handling
dry bulk. Dry bulk handling at Kolkata Port Trust was mainly carried out at the Haldia Dock
Complex. The other three types of cargo were mainly handled at the six ports on the west
coast (Fig 3.1) with JNPT alone handling
60 per cent of the total containers during
2008-09.

The nature of cargo has nowadays become

specialized with POL, dry bulk (mainly iron ore,
coal and fertilizers) and containers comprising
more than 85 per cent of the traffic at ports.
Fig 3.2 With increasing containerization of cargo
globally, the share of break bulk cargo, which
involves labour intensive handling, is presently as low as six per cent in India. For increasing handling
efficiency, it is imperative that the ports create specialised high capacity berths, supported by
modern equipment and an efficient labour force. It was, however, noticed (See Fig 3.2) that the
share of specialised berths at the major ports was low, with 64 per cent of the berths being of

31
Petroleum oil and lubricants (POL), liquid chemicals, etc
32
Coal, iron ore, alumina, fertilizers, etc.
33
Standardised boxes measuring 20 feet or 40 feet in length carrying a variety of cargo.
34
Cargo shipped in non- standard packages, e.g.: project cargo, steel components, etc.

23
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

general35 nature. Only in the case of liquid bulk cargo, almost the entire handling was occurring at
specialized berths and Single Buoy Moorings (SBM36). The factors that affected efficient handling
of each type of cargo were examined in audit and the findings are discussed below:

3.1 Liquid Bulk

For handling of liquid bulk, all ports had

specialised berths where marine loading arms
(MLAs 37) had been installed. During 2007-08,
44 such berths handled 125 MT of liquid cargo
with significant handling occurring in five out of
11 ports, viz. Haldia, Kandla, New Mangalore,
Mumbai and Visakhapatnam as shown in Fig 3.3.
Although 1.05 MT of liquid cargo was handled
during 2007-08 at the Kolkata Dock
System, no MLAs were installed
there.

Apart from this, 28.6 MT of POL was

handled at three offshore SBMs at
Kandla, which was the highest liquid
bulk handling port. More than 90

Fig 3.3

per cent of the liquid cargo was handled in

specialised berths or SBMs. The average TRT
of liquid bulk vessels, however, ranged from
1.76 days at JNPT to 5.59 days at Tuticorin
(See Fig 3.4).

Fig 3.4

35
Berths with equipment support that enable handling of various categories of cargo.
36
Offshore handling facility where a temporary floating platform with pipe arrangement allows removal of cargo
while a ship is anchored in the sea with the help of tugs.
37
Specialised equipment installed at berths, connected to pipelines that enable transfer of liquid bulk cargo
between a vessel and a storage tank. Capacity of an MLA is expressed in tonnes per hour. A specialised liquid
berth has 3-5 MLAs.

24
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

3.1.1 Low capacity utilization of marine loading arms

For efficient handling, it is imperative that the MLAs have adequate throughput capacity which is
higher than the pump capacity38 of the liquid bulk vessels. The actual discharge rates depend on
other parameters like size, distance and height of storage tanks, draft availability at the berths
and size of the vessels.

It was, however, found that in four

out of 11 ports, viz. Chennai, Kandla,
Mumbai and Tuticorin, which handled
close to 30 per cent of the liquid bulk
traffic, the actual rates of discharge
along MLAs were significantly below
capacity (See Fig 3.5).

Underutilisation of capacity of MLAs

was 39 per cent at Mumbai to 70 per
Fig 3.5 cent at Tuticorin, indicating inefficient
handling at these ports, resulting in
higher TRT. The significant low actual rate of discharge at Kandla was due to the fact that
none of the seven MLAs at the liquid berths was in working condition since 2001-02. The
six specialised berths at Kandla handled 22 per cent (9.59 MT) of liquid cargo in 2007-08
whereas the three SBMs there, handled 67 per cent (28.6 MT) at an average of 9.5 MT per
SBM. In Mumbai, the actual discharge was low due to the low receiving capacity of the
refineries. The Mumbai port, in its reply, accepted (June 2009) the observation and stated
that the low discharge rates at certain cases were also due to the pump capacity of the
vessels. Moreover, the port could not decide the rates of transfer independently as the
users, viz. the oil companies, planned the rates of handling based on their resources and the
port was maintaining the system to ensure maximum utilisation.

3.1.2 Inadequate handling infrastructure

It was observed that the installed discharge capacity of the MLAs at all the ports was less than
2000 tonnes per hour except at Mumbai. Further, at Tuticorin, the capacity of the loading arms
was significantly lower than that at other ports. Thus, only vessels of smaller size could be
handled at these ports. Low discharge capacity of the arms resulted in higher TRT of these
vessels during the sample months, when compared to Mumbai, which handled vessels of similar
size at berth no JD-2. The details are provided in Table 3.1 below:

38
For efficient transfer, the capacity of MLAs must match those of the vessel pumps (2500 tonnes per hour (TPH)
for mid-sized tankers that commonly call at Indian ports.)

25
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Capacity of Marine Loading Arms and TRT (sample months July 2007 and December 2007)
Port /Berth Quantity No of Capac- Avg size of TRT in Avg size TRT in days
handled MLAs ity of MLAs vessels July days in of vessels in Decem-
in MT (tonnes/hr) 2007(GRT) July 2007 December ber 2007
2007(GRT)
Mumbai/JD-1 3.891 5 2000 34500 2.3 32000 1.91
Mumbai/JD-2 1.29 3 2000 20000 1.9 13000 2.07
Mumbai/JD-3 4.73 5 2000 35000 1.78 34000 2.19
Mumbai/JD-4 13.444 5 3000 62000 1.58 57000 1.57
Tuticorin/B1 0.481 5 275-600 11000 2.38 11000 3.06
Table – 3.1

At the Kolkata Dock System, the liquid bulk vessels were constrained by the low drafts and faced
inadequate handling infrastructure. As a result, 72 per cent of the handling was occurring at the
anchorage and particular locations on the access channel, resulting in high TRT (4.1 days compared
to 1.76 days at JNPT) of liquid bulk vessels.
The Ministry replied (August 2009) that the number of vessels calling at some ports was low and
there was not much waiting time for such vessels. As the revamping of the MLAs was capital
intensive in nature, ports were revamping them according to their requirements. While the
Ministry’s argument is valid to some extent, it, however, needs to be stressed that in ports like
Mumbai where large volume of liquid cargo was handled, investment in revamping of MLAs at
berths with low capacity would result in efficiency gains in operation. Further, in ports where the
volumes handled are presently low, improvements in handling efficiency are necessary for them
to remain competitive.
It was found in Cochin that liquid cargo was being backloaded followed by diversion to other ports.
The details are given below:

Backloading of crude at Cochin:

At Cochin port, backloading of crude/POL took place when there was excess receipt of crude
oil from the SBM as compared to KRL39 storage capacity. The excess quantity of crude was
backloaded to Mangalore or Mumbai refineries through NTB and COT berths and handling
charges at Rs 65 per tonne were fully waived to relieve the port users from making double
payments on the ground that wharfage on this account had already been collected at the
SBM. The action of Cochin port was not justified as the handling charges collected at the
SBM were Rs 25 per tonne whereas wharfage on the quantity backloaded from the berths
was leviable at Rs 65 per tonne, resulting in a loss of Rs 40 per tonne. Moreover, the berths
were also engaged in multiple handling of the same cargo, already handled once at the SBM.

39
Kochi Refineries Limited

26
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

The port, in its reply, stated (May 2009) that the decision to waive wharfage for backloaded
POL was taken to reduce idling at the liquid berth in the post-SBM scenario and ensure
revenue from vessel-related charges for additional throughput proposed by KRL. While the
port’s effort to utilise the idle berth was understandable, the argument regarding additional
revenue was not acceptable as the port’s revenue expectation of additional throughput at
the SBM did not actually materialise.

The Ministry stated (August 2009) that the backloading of cargo was an essential operation and
was planned so as to ensure minimum berth occupancy. The fact, however, remains that due to
infrastructural constraints, multiple handling had to be done resulting in increased berth occupancy.
Consequently, the port also suffered financially due to lower rates allowed for the SBM on one
hand and for their inability to use their berths on the other hand.

3.1.3 Draft restrictions compelling shift to SBMs and other ports

At the Haldia Dock Systems at Kolkata, which ranked fifth among the major ports in terms of volume
(19.66 MT) of liquid bulk handled in 2007-08, draft restrictions above eight metres at the two oil
jetties together with inefficient handling had become serious limitations to smooth operations.
The principal user, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IOCL), shifted (November 2008) its handling
operation to Paradip port in Orissa even though the cargo would eventually come to IOCL’s storage
facilities at Haldia through underground pipelines. The port had failed to take any proactive action
to minimise the significant business loss.

Even at Cochin, the single largest customer, KRL, shifted (December 2007) the handling point from
the liquid berths dedicated to them since 1986 to the SBM. The shift resulted in reduction of
revenue along with idling of the berths. Even the business plan of Cochin port had identified that
the port’s revenues were linked to the capacity of KRL refinery.

3.1.4 System of measurement of liquid cargo not standardised

For safeguarding the financial interests of the ports and for making inter-port comparisons
meaningful, the method of measurement of volume of handling of liquid cargo and the system of
billing should have been standardised. It was, however, found that the method varied from port to
port as shown in Table 3.2 below:

Names of the ports Method of measurement/ documents Figures accepted for billing purposes
accepted for verification
Chennai Ship- Captains’ and users’ certificates Manifested quantities in import applica-
tions, Outturn Report, bill of lading and
approved surveyor report.
Cochin Requisitions filed by importers Importers’ quantities

27
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Haldia, Paradip, Ullage40 report of the independent Ullage quantity

Tuticorin surveyors
JNPT Bills of lading of Customs and ullage re- Higher quantity between BL and ullage
ports of independent surveyors quantity
Kandla, Mormugao Outturn reports of oil companies Outturn reports of oil companies
Kolkata Ullage survey Outturn reports of oil companies
Mumbai Quantity shown in Import General Mani- Quantity shown in Import General Mani-
fest fest
New Mangalore International standard draft survey Measured quantity
Vizag Displacement method (ship figure) Ship discharge quantities
Table 3.2

The absence of any standard norm for measurement of liquid bulk resulted in discrepancies
between the actual cargo handled and the quantities billed. In Chennai, a discrepancy of Rs.87.90
lakh in collection of revenue was noticed during the years 2006-07 and 2007-08. The port, in its
reply, accepted (June 2009) the discrepancy, stating that it was due to data entry mismatch, and
assured that the differences would be reconciled.

Recommendations
Ø Ports should address the problem of under-utilisation of existing discharge capacities of
Marine Loading Arms. To reduce TRT of liquid vessels, low capacity MLAs should be replaced
with high capacity arms.
Ø Adequate draft for tankers should be maintained to avoid unnecessary diversion of cargo.

Ø The Ministry should fix a standard system of measurement of liquid cargo and notify a
standard document for verification of the quantities handled and claiming of wharfage.

3.2 Dry Bulk

Dry bulk cargo constituted 40.55 per cent of the total cargo handled at major ports by volume in
2007-08.

40
Empty space available inside fuel tanks. The ullage quantity indicates the volume of oil cargo that has been
transferred out/into the fuel tank.

28
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

The ports on the eastern coast played a predominant role by handling 65.92 per cent of this
quantity (see Fig 3.6).

In Mormugao, Paradip, Tuticorin and Visakhapatnam, dry bulk cargo constituted 94, 91, 56 and 64
per cent of the total cargo respectively.

3.2.1 large volume handled at non-

mechanized berths

For ensuring efficient handling of this type

of cargo, it was necessary that specialized
mechanised 40berths41 were available in the
ports. It was, however, found that handling
of dry bulk at the ports was predominantly
being carried out by non-mechanised
means that included multiple handling. Fig 3.6

Although dry bulk constituted more than 40 per cent share of cargo by volume, only eight per cent
of the berths were specialised dry bulk berths. In three out of 11 ports handling dry bulk, viz. JNPT,
Kandla and Mumbai, there were no mechanised berths. In the eight other ports, there were 19
specialised berths for handling dry bulk, which had mechanised facilities. It was noticed that only
37 per cent of the dry bulk cargo was handled at these 19 mechanised berths. In 2007-08, 125 MT
of dry bulk cargo was handled at non-mechanised berths.

This indicated significant inefficiencies in the handling of dry bulk at the ports.

40
41
Berths fitted with conveyor systems connecting them to stackyards and handling plants. Non- mechanized berths
transfer the cargo from the stackyards to tippler trucks to the quays. The material is then aggregated with the help
of dozers, picked and loaded on to the ships by the use of the ships’ own gear (grabs). Such multiple handling is
avoided at mechanised berths.

29
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Audit scrutiny of six major dry bulk

handling ports such as Chennai, Haldia,
New Mangalore Paradip, Tuticorin and
Visakhapatnam revealed that dry bulk
vessels faced higher TRT at non-mechanised
berths during 2007-08, as shown in
Figure 3.7.

Fig 3.7

The business plans of three of these ports, viz.

New Mangalore, Paradip and Visakhapatnam
also identified non-mechanised dry
bulk handling as a critical weakness in
them. Tuticorin port accepted the audit
observation and stated (April 2008) that
more mechanised berths were being planned
for the future. They also stated that as and
when specific proposals for privatisation
of bulk cargo handling were received, they
would be examined in conformity with the
Government’s policy on public private partnership (PPP) projects.

Recommendation

Ø Dry bulk should be handled exclusively in specialised berths with mechanised handling

facilities to arrest the increasing trend of TRT of dry bulk vessels.

3.3 Containers

With the rising global trend towards containerization,

the major ports witnessed a significant increase
in container traffic by 72 per cent during the
performance audit period. The volumes were,
however, driven by JNPT which alone handled 60
per cent of the total containers arriving at these
Fig 3.8 ports during 2007-08 (Fig 3.8)

30
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Three other ports viz. Chennai, Kolkata, and Visakhapatnam also witnessed very high
growth rates during 2003-2008. Despite the high growth of containerized cargo, only
five ports viz. Chennai, Cochin,
JNPT, Kolkata and Tuticorin,
handled significant volumes of this
emerging variety of cargo. Handling
was mostly done at 28 specialized
berths at eight out of the 11 ports
with the exception of Mormugao,
New Mangalore and Paradip. It was
noticed that although five ports, viz.
Chennai, JNPT, Kandla, Mormugao
and Mumbai had planned schemes
costing Rs.3079 crore for increasing
their container handling capacity by 2009, only one new container terminal 42 at JNPT had
come up till March 2009. Construction of terminals at Chennai, Kandla and Mumbai were
under progress.

3.3.1 High performance achieved in select container terminals

The container handling capacity of a port is determined by several parameters which, inter
alia, include the number of specialised terminals, the quay lengths of the same, the number
of shore cranes, the size of container stack yards and the ratio of shore to yard equipment.
The efficiency in handling containers depends on the speed of movement of the cranes and
the optimal equipment ratio and is measured in terms of moves per crane hour, TEUs per
metre length of quay and the number of vessels handled with the least possible TRT. It was,
therefore, imperative that the ports created optimal handling facilities for efficient handling
of containers.
It was found that the handling
efficiency achieved at some of the
container terminals, especially the
privately operated ones at JNPT and
Tuticorin, compared favourably with
international benchmarks.
The status of container handling
facilities along with the volumes
handled at the five main container ports
in 2007-08 is shown in Table 3.3 below:

42
A contiguous set of berths handling containers collectively known as a terminal.

31
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Table 3.3: Handling performance at the main container terminals at major ports
Terminals No of No of No. of yard Total TEUs No of moves TEUs handled
at ports berths quay equipment43 TEUs handled per crane hour per metre
cranes handled per berth as per Min- quay length
in 07-08 in 07-08 istry’s report as per Min-
(norm44 = 25) istry’s report
(norm45=1500)
Chennai 6 7 24 1052993 175499 21 1267
Cochin 3 4 11 253715 84572 14.6 469
GTICT 46
3 8 36 1290862 430287 23.7 1813
JNPCT 3 8 23 1260923 420308 16.2 1756
Kolkata 4 2 16 297287 74322 19.5 NA
NSICT 47
2 8 35 1508056 754028 23 2513
Tuticorin 1 3 9 450398 450398 27 1283

Only two ports, JNPT and Tuticorin, handled more than four lakh containers per berth as may be
seen from Fig- 3.9. 43444546
47
The privately operated terminals at these two
ports registered higher performance. The port
operated terminal at JNPT achieved high handling
efficiency. It was noticed that with identical
equipment support and larger yard space, JNPCT,
the port operated terminal at JNPT, showed 3.38
per cent reduction of containers during 2007-08
against 10.96 per cent increase at the adjoining
NSICT, a privately operated terminal at JNPT. In
the case of Cochin, where the container terminal Fig 3.9
was under private operation, the operational
parameters were much below all the benchmarks as seen in Table-3.3. The nature of the agreement48
with the operator at Cochin also failed to incentivise high standards of performance. It was also
noticed that other major container handling ports like Chennai, Cochin and Kolkata registered
lower TEUs per berth. An important factor for such low handling was that the terminals at these
ports had less equipment support and the equipment ratios per berth and yard were less than that
at JNPT or Tuticorin.
43
Rubber Tyred Gantry Cranes (RTGC), Rail Mounted Gantry Cranes (RMGCs), Reach Stackers
44
Crane moves per hour norm taken from the Port of Rotterdam Advisory Report, 2007.
45
TEUs handled per metre quay length, Norm taken from UK benchmark (consultant’s study report, Port of
Chennai)
46
Gateway Terminals India Container Terminal - privately operated.
47
Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal – privately operated.
48
Deficiencies in the licence agreement at Cochin have been separately commented upon in the chapter on
implementation of schemes in this report.

32
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Although Kandla had a good ratio of berth and shore cranes, it handled only 165092 TEU containers
during 2007-08. This indicated underutilization of facilities and called for optimization of the
container handling operations at Kandla. It was found that Mumbai port suffered a steady decline
in the volume of containers handled during the period covered in the report (40.15 per cent during
2003-08). The port outsourced its entire container handling operations to a private operator from
June 2008 onwards.

3.3.2 Variations in standards for conversion of container TEUs to tonnes

In order to exhibit a port’s performance, the number of container TEUs handled is expressed in
terms of volume, i.e tonnage handled. Although the Ministry had set a conversion norm where one
TEU should be taken as 12.5 MT on an average, different ports adopted different conversion factors,
leaving no scope for comparing their performance. Audit observed that during the period from
2003-04 to 2007-08, ports adopted variable conversion factors in determining their performance,
as evident from Table 3.4 below:

Table 3.4: Factors used for conversion from TEUs to tonnes

Chennai Cochin JNPT Kandla KDS Mormugao Mumbai New Man- Paradip Tuticorin Visakha-
galore patnam

16 12-13 12-13 14-16 14-17 10-12 12-14 14-16 14-16 11–13 13-16

As a result of adopting different standards, the reported tonnage handled differed from the actual
volume of containerized cargo handled by these ports. As per the Ministry’s instructions (2002)
regarding standardization of definitions and concepts for reporting port performance, the tare
weight of containers was not to be included in the commodity-wise traffic handled for export and
import except for computing container traffic, where tare weight had been included for estimation
purposes. It was, however, observed that at Tuticorin, the tare weight of the containers was being
taken into account for computation of the port’s performance, resulting in overstatement of cargo
by 73977 tonnes and 71329 tonnes in July 2007 and December 2007 respectively. Moreover, due to
inclusion of empty containers in the total figure for cargo handling, the total handling was inflated
by 4.7 MT during the period 2003-08.

Tuticorin port stated (June 2009) that no specific instructions had been received from the Ministry
in this regard. The reply was, however, not acceptable as the practice was in contravention of
the Ministry’s guidelines and the inclusion of empty containers was against the benchmark for
operational efficiency as stated in the consolidated business plan for major ports made by the Port
of Rotterdam.

33
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Recommendations

With the increasing trend of containerisation of cargo, ports should create facilities of
Ø
specialised container berths. Possibilities for conversion of existing general cargo berths
into such berths should be explored.
Ø Equipment ratios between berths and yards should be enhanced to the levels of JNPT and

Tuticorin at ports having significant container cargo.
Ø The Ministry should fix a standard conversion factor for computation of tonnage from TEUs

handled at ports so that performance reports are not distorted.

3.4 Adequacy of Equipment Support

The major ports, so far, have followed a service model49 orientation where the port authorities
have taken upon themselves, the responsibility of cargo handling and maintenance of equipment.
All the ports owned and maintained large fleets of equipment which, inter alia, included a variety
of shore cranes, yard cranes, trucks, pay loaders, and stackers. The numbers of equipment owned
were particularly high in the older city-based ports of Kolkata and Mumbai, which had large
numbers of general cargo berths.

3.4.1 Old and outlived equipment

As handling efficiency and in turn, the TRTs of vessels depended on the nature of equipment support,
it was necessary for the ports to ensure the availability of suitable and well-maintained equipment.

Fig 3.10

49
A business model traditionally followed by ports the world over where responsibility of all commercial opera-
tions like cargo handling, storage etc is taken upon by the ports themselves.

34
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

It was found that in all the ports except JNPT, 55

per cent of the equipment were existing beyond
their economic life. The presence of outlived
equipment varied from 22 per cent at Tuticorin
to 94 per cent at Cochin (see Fig 3.10.). The
position was far worse in the case of dry bulk
cargo handling equipment50. Kolkata, Mumbai
and JNPT had no ancillary equipment for handling
of dry bulk. At Tuticorin, which had one fully
mechanized and one semi-mechanized berth for
handling dry bulk that accounted for 56 per cent of cargo, there was no ancillary equipment other
than one grab crane, although dry bulk was the major cargo handled there. The users at Tuticorin
were using private equipment for handling. Except for three pieces of equipment in Paradip and
two at Cochin, all dry bulk handling equipment in the ports were outlived. In all, 94 per cent of the
ancillary equipment for handling of dry bulk at ports had crossed their economic life on or before
2007-08.

Table 3.5 :Availability and utilisation of port owned 3.4.2 Low demand for port equipment
equipment (2007-08) and hiring from private parties
Average
Average availability
utilisation It was noticed that although the ports
Major Ports were ensuring high availability of shore
(Ministry norm:
(Ministry norm:
minimum 90%) cranes, yard cranes, pay-loaders, top
minimum 60%)
lift truck, fork lifts etc, their average
Chennai 65.00 15.60
utilisation was very low in eight ports51.
Cochin 84.42 15.54
Kandla 94.00 52.00 This indicated their unsuitability and low
Kolkata 66.92 26.10 demand for port-owned equipment. The
availability and utilisation of port-owned
Mormugao 88.60 20.80
equipment during 2007-08 was as shown
Mumbai 79.00 18.00
in Table 3.5 .
New Mangalore 96.74 10.75
It is evident from the table that three
Paradip 71.60 21.73
ports, viz. Kandla, Tuticorin and
Tuticorin 97.19 42.36
Visakhapatnam could ensure compliance
Visakhapatnam 90.70 39.52
with the Ministry’s availability norms.

50
Ancillary equipment for handling dry bulk mainly comprising pay loaders, fork lift trucks, tractors, dozers, etc.
Except Kandla, Tuticorin and Visakhapatnam.
51

35
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

However, utilisation of all equipment belonging to the ports was much below the minimum
utilisation norms of 60 per cent prescribed by the Ministry.

During 2007-08, the utilization of 26 pieces of equipment at Cochin, Mormugao, New Mangalore
and Visakhapatnam was less than 5 per cent despite the availability being above 80 per cent. In
Chennai, two pay loaders were not used even once despite 52 per cent52 availability.

Case Study: Crane utilisation at Chennai

Three 20-tonne gantry cranes were procured and commissioned by Chennai port at a cost of
Rs 35.77 crore in 2000. Their utilisation declined steadily as shown below:-

Year Percentage utilisation

2002-03 18.12
2003-04 4.61
2004-05 1.06
2005-06 0.72
2006-07 0.0

It was found that the users of the port were not willing to hire the cranes as the hiring charges
levied by the port were high. The users, instead, preferred to hire private equipment having grabs
of higher capacity. Apprehending a safety threat reported by the Inspectorate of Dock Safety, action
for disposal of the entire lot was taken by the port in April 2007.The highest offer received was
Rs.4.67 crore. The port approached the Ministry in November 2007 for writing off the eventual loss
on disposal. Approval of the Ministry was awaited as of February 2009. While accepting the facts,
the Management, stated (February 2009) that the primary cause of underutilisation was that the
users had the option to use their own or private equipment and the cranes available with the port
were unable to work with grabs of higher capacity as preferred by the users. It was further stated
that reduction of hire charges below the ceiling rate approved by the Tariff Authority for Major Ports
(TAMP) would have only drastically reduced the return on investment (ROI) made on acquisition
of the cranes without improving the level of utilisation. The reply was not tenable as the ROI had
become very low since 2003-04 due to poor utilisation.

At Haldia, which featured among the top five ports in terms of volume of dry bulk cargo handled,
11 pay loaders had suffered breakdowns and the users were hiring private equipment to carry out
operations. The users of Visakhapatnam port indicated that low productivity of port equipment
made cargo handling uneconomical. The demand for port equipment was low as they had outlived
their economic life.
As port equipment was often unsuitable for meeting user requirements, users at all ports except
Cochin, New Mangalore and Visakhapatnam were resorting to hiring of equipment directly from
52
The availability of these two payloaders was much below the Ministry’s norms due to frequent breakdowns.

36
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

private vendors. In Cochin, private equipment was not allowed in any of the docks and the users
were thus compelled to use old and obsolete port equipment. In Mormugao and Kolkata, the
users were hiring container handling equipment. No ports, however, maintained any systematic
records relating to the extent of such hiring. The performance of port-owned equipment vis-à-vis
private-supplied equipment could not be compared due to the absence of sufficient records.

Equipment maintenance

Fig 3.11

Although the demand for port-owned equipment was low and a large share of the fleet
was beyond economic life, the ports were found to be incurring substantial expenditure
on maintenance. The maintenance policies, however, varied from port to port. The entire
fleet was being maintained internally at five ports (Fig 3.11). Only in Visakhapatnam,
repairs and maintenance of 73.53 per cent of the equipment was outsourced. High-priced
modern equipment like RMQC, RTYGC 53 were, however, being maintained by OEM 54 at all
ports except JNPT, where equipment availability was more than 90 per cent. At Kolkata,
which had the largest equipment fleet following Mumbai, with only 26 per cent utilisation,
the expenditure on the maintenance setup per annum was highest at Rs 22.21 crore.
In spite of this, the equipment availability at the port was the least (66.92 per cent)
among the ports and was far below the minimum availability norms set by the Ministry.
At Haldia, although the container traffic was low, the container handling cranes (RMQCs)
maintained by OEM registered 32 per cent downtime during 2007-08 indicating improper
maintenance.

Rubber Tyred Yard Gantry Crane

53

Original Equipment Manufacturers

54

37
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

3..4.4 Replacement of equipment

Replacement and procurement of new equipment was being done at all ports except Kandla where
the port extended the life of nine outdated equipment by two years, leaving Rs.108.33 crore in the
Replacement Fund unutilized till 2007-08. In order to synchronise the equipment support with
the emerging cargo mix, it was imperative that the ports factored in their own business plans,
their traffic projections and preferences of users of equipment. It was found that equipment
replacement was being done mostly on immediate need basis and all the factors mentioned earlier
were not being taken into consideration. Further, no port was found to have paid attention to
the preferences of users regarding procurement or replacement of equipment during 2007-08.
Procurement and replacement were not commensurate with the cargo mix handled by the ports,
future diversification plans and user preferences as described in the examples given below:

= At Chennai, although the port planned to gradually phase out dry bulk cargo like coal and
iron ore, it invested Rs.47.83 crore on installation and operation of a semi-mechanised
coal handling plant in 2007. The Management stated (June 2009) that as coal handling was
on the rise due to capacity constraints at Ennore, installation of the system had become
necessary to control dust pollution. Moreover, due to overall recession in the shipping
trade, shifting of coal elsewhere would have affected the port’s revenue. The reply is not
acceptable as the contention of the port is inconsistent with its long term vision. Further,
the argument of recession is not valid as the investment was made in 2007 when maritime
cargo in Chennai and in India overall, was witnessing high growth.

= Although dry bulk handling was significant at Haldia (Kolkata port), no dry bulk handling
equipment had been procured for the port during the last five years. Instead, six container
handling equipment were purchased at a cost of Rs. 71.19 crore, which remained
underutilized as container cargo at Haldia remained low.

= At Visakhapatnam, the port did not have adequate equipment to effectively meet user
requirements. There were demands from the users for better capacity equipment like
mobile cranes of 150 tonne capacity, shore cranes of 40 tonnes capacity, etc which could
not be provided by the port.

Further, the ports had reoriented their business models from ‘service’ port to the new ‘landlord’
port model under NMDP, framed in 2006. According to the ‘landlord’ model, a port focuses on trade
facilitation by making investments on creation of common user facilities. Commercial operations
like cargo handling are undertaken by private players who share revenue with the ports. Under
this new model, although the ports were expected to move away from commercial operations like

38
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

cargo handling, it was noticed that 41 schemes for procurement and replacement of equipment
valuing Rs 1622.67 crore were planned by the ports under NMDP (2005-06).

The Ministry, in its reply (August 2009), did not comment on the need to factor in user preferences,
future diversification plans or the decisions to move away from the service model and its impact on
equipment procurement. It simply stated that the ports had undertaken major capacity expansion
plans that included modernization and addition of cargo handling equipment.

Recommendation

Ø Concerted efforts should be made by the ports to phase out outlived equipment. Selection of
equipment should reflect the port’s business plan, trend and type of major cargo handled,
and users’ preferences.

3.5 Labour Engagement

As cargo handling operations had been highly labour- intensive in the past, an assured supply
of a large number of dock workers was necessary to provide competitive advantage to ports. In
India, Dock Labour Boards (DLBs) had been set up at seven major ports, viz. Chennai, Cochin,
Kandla, Kolkata, Mumbai, Mormugao and Visakhapatnam under the Dock Workers (Regulation of
Employment) Act, 1948 for ensuring optimum labour utilization. This Act was amended in 1997 to
merge the DLB pool with the port labour. This had been achieved in all ports except Kolkata.

The process of handling,

however, witnessed increased
mechanisation as cargo
packaging became more
standardised. This led to a
sharp fall in labour intensity of
cargo transfer operations over
the past decade, along with a
rise in demand for new skills
to operate the mechanised
Fig 3.12 facilities.

Although the legislation governing DLBs was amended in 1997, leading to merger of the entities
with the ports, old ports like Mumbai and Kolkata continued to remain heavily staffed organizations,
resulting in high cost of services provided. The position of labour at the ports is shown in Figure

39
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

3.12. The overall staff positions at newer ports varied significantly with those of the old ports
which were heavily staffed at all levels. The DLB at Kolkata continued to remain a separate entity.

3.5.1 Adequacy of labour supply

For ensuring effective and efficient cargo handling operations, it is necessary that the supply55 of
labour by ports is adequate. Audit observed that eight out of 11 ports, except Chennai, Paradip
and Tuticorin reported shortfalls56 in supply. The shortfalls at Kandla (25 per cent), Kolkata (30
per cent) and Visakhapatnam (59 per cent) were particularly high. In contrast, a surplus of 39 per
cent was noticed at Paradip during 2007-08. The Chennai port business plan identified surplus
labour as a weakness of the port. Mormugao was unable to supply enough workmen to operate
a minimum of three hook57 points at the berths. At Visakhapatnam, the shortfall was due to short
supply of labour by the DLB. The users of the port indicated that the short supply of labour had
seriously hampered onboard operations on many occasions. The users were, therefore, compelled
to engage private labour.

The Ministry stated (August 2009) that the Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board had been merged
with the port and Visakhapatnam Port had also implemented the tribunal award on manning
scales. This changed scenario could take care of the shortage of labour at Visakhapatnam.

3.5.2 Labour Productivity

To attain high operational efficiency in cargo handling, the ports should ensure that the available
labour pool is properly trained, disciplined and productive. Further, the Ministry should also
facilitate the laying down of proper standards for productivity assessment under the present
equipment and handling conditions. Also, a standard format for reporting of productivity should
be put in place to enable monitoring of performance.

The assessment of labour productivity at the ports was being made as per certain standards,
viz. manning scales and datum. While manning scales determined the number of persons
required for carrying out each type of activity, the datum determined the minimum output
of labour per hook per shift, fixed on the basis of 80 per cent of the average tonnage handled
during previous three years. For proper assessment, therefore, it was critical that the scales
and the datum were reviewed and revised on a regular basis as new equipment and handling
procedures were introduced in the ports.
55
The ports supply labour to users on requisition. Deployment is made in terms of gangs for the number of hooks
to be operated, and billing is done on the basis of period of engagement.
56
Shortfall has been measured in terms of number of gangs supplied against number of requisitions.
57
A location on the berth where cargo is transferred from the vessel by cranes/ grabs etc.

40
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

In this regard, Audit observed the following:

= The scales and datum at most of the ports had been fixed long back and had not been revised
for more than 10 years.

= At Kolkata, an average of Rs 3.55 crore per annum was being paid on overtime allowances.
Further, the ports were also incurring substantial expenditure on incentives to workers, as
overall cargo volumes had shot up. For example, incentives were being paid in 2007-08 at
Tuticorin under the piece rate incentive scheme, 1996 on the basis of datum fixed in 1998,
although cargo volume had more than doubled at the port. Consequently, the users were also
facing the high cost burden of port labour.

= At New Mangalore, the standards agreed upon in 1974 were being followed without revision,
even though large scale mechanisation of handling facilities viz. conveyors, MHCs, etc had
been made subsequently at the port. The norms were prescribed at Kandla in 1979, but no
revision had been carried out so far. Due to such non-revision, the productivity assessment
was distorted. As the manning scales were outdated, the deployment of persons for handling
activities was higher, resulting in large overtime payments incurred by the ports.

= The business plan of New Mangalore port noted that the private sector was being forced to
make use of the port’s labour for cargo handling, which was more expensive. This was identified
by its consultant as one of the main weaknesses of the port. The users of New Mangalore port
felt that the manning scales for deployment and the datum required downward revision,
which would reduce the cost of labour.

During the exit conference, the Ministry accepted (June 2009) the audit observation and stated
that the matter of revision of manning scales had been referred to a National Tribunal. As per the
recommendations received in 2006, orders were being issued in May 2009 for implementation.
The Ministry accepted that with such implementation, the unjustifiable overtime payments would
be significantly reduced.

The Ministry stated (August 2009) that the issue of standardization of manning scales and rates
was referred to the National Industrial Tribunal in the year 2000, but the award could not be
implemented due to a stay by Andhra Pradesh High Court. The stay was vacated in April 2009 and
all ports were asked to implement the award. The Ministry felt that the implementation would
bring uniformity and also bring down excess overtime payments. It was, however, seen that apart
from Cochin, Mormugao, Paradip and Visakhapatnam ports, the other ports were yet to implement
the award.

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Report No. 3 of 2009-10

It was also noticed that the nature of reporting of productivity by ports was dissimilar and
incorrect. The productivity was being reported in terms of gangs58 or hooks. As composition of
gangs and deployment per hook varied from port to port and also from cargo to cargo, inter-
port comparison was difficult. It was further noticed that although the ports stated that they
were not engaging any private labour, users at Chennai, NMPT, Tuticorin and Visakhapatnam
clearly indicated that they had to engage private labour at additional cost, as the port labour was
unproductive, inhibiting efficient handling. The extent of such handling done by private labour
was neither being recorded nor segregated by the ports and the entire handling contribution
was being attributed to port labour. Thus, the labour productivity reported by the ports to the
Ministry was inflated and incorrect. While factoring in such distortions, inter-port comparison
indicated that productivity at Cochin was very low. Business plan of Cochin port also identified
this as a major weakness. Further, the labour rates at Cochin were substantially higher. The
Management of Cochin Port accepted (May 2009) the observation and stated that steps to
improve productivity through rationalization were being taken. They further offered to examine
the reasons for variation in labour rates.

Reasons for low productivity of labour were mainly lack of training, aging labour force and
indiscipline. Port users at Goa, Mumbai and Visakhapatnam stated that the available labour
pool was unskilled and the skills of the labourers, especially those who handled steel and project
cargo were inadequate. Hence, training was required for them. It was also noticed that the
average age of the 5720 labourers at Mumbai was 51 years, which could have been a reason
for low efficiency. Users also pointed out that labour indiscipline was inhibiting efficiency at
Visakhapatnam. Effective work time in a day was only seven to eight hours there due to erratic
punctuality, resulting in higher cost of operations. Visakhapatnam port, in its reply, stated (June
2009) that effective steps had been taken to improve punctuality of the labour. However, the
Management also pointed out that delays in handling occurred as untrained hired labour was
being engaged by the users in case of shortfall of port labour. At Cochin, the work was affected
on 11 occasions in 2007-08 due to unrest by the port’s own labour. On three occasions, the work
down was extended up to 23 days, 17 days and 37 days, resulting in diversion of cargo. The port
communicated to the Ministry that in addition to strikes called by the port’s own employees,
there were many instances of dislocation of work due to flash strikes, etc called by workers
of different stakeholders like steamer agents, Customs agents, truck operators, etc. affecting
productivity adversely.

58
Deployment is made in terms of gangs for the number of hooks to be operated, and billing is done on the basis
of period of engagement. Composition of a gang varies from nine to 17 workers.

42
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Recommendations

Ø For making correct assessment of labour productivity, ports should revise the manning

scales and datum as recommended by the National Tribunal in 2006.

Ø The extent of engagement of private labour and their output should be recorded to

distinguish their output from that of port labour, to avoid misreporting to the Ministry.

3.6 Storage of Cargo

Availability of large storage areas at ports enables larger handling capacities and efficient
accumulation of cargo. Moreover, ports earn significant revenue by leasing and renting out storage
spaces.

3.6.1 Adequacy of storage area

To ensure efficient landward

transfer of cargo handled at
the berths, it was necessary
for the ports to have adequate
storage areas. It was noticed
that the storage areas
available at ports, apart from
Kandla and Visakhapatnam
were less than 60 hectares59
as shown in Fig 3.13.
Fig 3.13

Further, the scope of expanding the available storage areas also had its limitations. For example,
at JNPT which faced shortage of space, further expansion possibility was limited as the process
of land acquisition behind the terminal was fraught with rehabilitation risks.. Unlike international
ports like Singapore, the major ports were generally not undertaking expansion by reclamation of
land from the sea. Only at Tuticorin, the port had undertaken such reclamation.

59
Against 60 hectares for three terminals at JNPT, the land availability for four container terminals at the Port of
Singapore is 425 hectares.

43
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Revenue earned from storage It was also noticed that the revenue earned by the ports from
Port Storage and demurrage storage operations varied widely as seen from Table 3.660.
receipts 2007-08 (Rs in
crore) In spite of having more space, Kandla and Visakhapatnam,
ChPT 6.07 which handled the highest volumes of cargo among major ports,
KPT 7.06 earned low revenue from storage services. The business plan
MbPT 76.97 of Kandla port also identified sub-optimal utilisation of space
NMPT 1.72 around the port, as one of its major weaknesses. The users of
TPT 6.00
most ports felt the availability of storage areas was inadequate.
VPT 8.54
Table 3.6 Faced with scarcity of land for storage and limited scope for
expansion, optimal utilisation of storage space was necessary
to avoid congestion and to earn more revenue for the ports.

3.6.2 Undeveloped spaces/sheds hindered optimal utilization of storage area

At the ports, while some areas were earmarked for storage of containers and bulk cargo, most of
the storage areas were for multipurpose use. Port users felt that the storage areas were of poor
quality as detailed below:

= At Cochin, there was no exclusive storage area for foodgrains and other perishable cargo.
Users complained about the poor maintenance of covered storage space resulting in
deterioration in the quality of wheat stored and heavy losses. Sheds for storing cement
were reportedly leaking.

= In Kolkata, the areas available within the port premises were not developed and properly
allocated for storage. Port users at Kolkata felt that the hardstands61 and the storage areas
were of poor quality and the lease rates sought for these marshy and unsuitable areas were
relatively high. A number of godowns (at Garden Reach jetty) were presently filled with
scrap and remained unused. The users felt that obsolete sheds and spaces at a number of
locations (like Alifnagar and southern parts of Kidderpore and Netaji Subhash Docks) could
be developed into proper storage areas.

= At Mumbai, there was a shortage of covered storage sheds. Consequently, roofless sheds
were being allotted for foodgrains. Further, for automobile cargo, the parking area allotted
was far away from the berth, causing inconvenience to users in loading, leading to higher
TRT. The poor storage conditions also invited damage claims amounting to Rs 1.92 crore.

At MGPT, storage and handling charges are collected together, and cannot be bifurcated.
60

Built up spaces (concrete surfaces) used for storage.

61

44
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

At Kandla, a joint inspection carried out by Audit along with the port officials, revealed that there
was no proper demarcation of plots, the storage areas were not clean and cargo was not being
stacked properly as shown in Figure 4.2 that follows:.

Plot No. 1 at KPT Plot No.7 at KPT

= Verification of records at Mattancherry and Ernakulam wharfs at Cochin for the period 2003-
08 revealed that food items such as wheat, soybeans oil, copra cake, etc. were stored in the
same shed where chemicals and minerals like calcium bauxite, industrial salt, sponge iron,
murate of potash, coal, etc were stored.

= At Haldia, the users indicated that although sheds in the back-up area of Berth no. 9 had been
allotted for storing food and agricultural products, these could not be utilised due to handling
of iron ore at the berth. Therefore, the foodgrains had to be stored in other sheds.

= Apart from Mormugao and Mumbai, none of the ports had a laid down system for regular
maintenance of storage areas. At Mormugao, temporary partitions were being used to
segregate cargo. In Mumbai, the port had an annual budget of over Rs one crore whereas at
Visakhapatnam, less than Rs 15 lakh per annum was incurred during the last three years for
maintenance of the storage areas.

3.6.3 Storage policy and review of storage areas

At the ports, allotment of space inside the wharf areas was done by the Traffic Managers and
outside these areas, by the Estate Officers of the concerned ports, based on the land policy
guidelines issued by the Ministry in 2004.

As per the policy framed by the Ministry, the validity period for allotment of licences inside the
port area was 11 months, with an option for renewal by paying five per cent escalation charges.
Further, the licensees were required to follow all conditions stipulated in the Scale of Rates. Users

45
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

of the port at Kolkata felt that the quality of land allotted for storage was poor, compelling the
licensees to make substantial investments in cleaning and construction of hardstands for making
the areas suitable for storage.

Audit observed that as the validity period of the lease was only up to 11 months, it was a disincentive
for making long-term investments and the 11-month ceiling on validity of lease was not in the
interest of long -term users of the ports.

It was noticed that storage area plans were being reviewed annually in four ports, monthly at
Visakhapatnam and as and when required in three other ports. At Kolkata, there was no system of
regular review of storage area plan. At Chennai, it was found that the port had introduced a good
practice, i.e if space licensed by a firm was not utilised and kept vacant for a period exceeding
two months, the licence issued to it was to be terminated and the firm advised to surrender the
space.

Recommendation

Ø The 11-month ceiling on storage area licences may be modified in the interest of long-term

users.

Ø The Chennai model of storage area review may be adopted at other ports.

3.7 Cargo Handling and Environment

As handling of liquid bulk (POL, chemicals, etc) and dry bulk (coal, iron ore) carry significant
environment pollution risks, it was necessary that the ports ensured compliance with extant
regulations and implemented good practices to mitigate them. The issues relating to the
environmental risks noticed during audit are described in the succeeding paragraphs.

3.7.1 Precautions for handling oil cargo

To prevent and minimise risks to marine environment posed by the handling of POL62 cargo, vessels
handled at berths should be surrounded by oil booms63, so as to restrict the spillage of oil.

Further, the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) regulations stipulate that ports should install
oil sensors, oil spill response equipment, fire sensors, etc, and also periodically report compliance
to the Pollution Control Boards.

62
Petroleum Oil and Lubricants
63
Protective floating barriers that surround the ship to restrict the impact of spillage of oil.

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 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Greasy oil jetty at KDS

Audit observed that at Mumbai port, one of the highest POL cargo handlers in India, marine pollution
equipment procured at Rs. 2.63 crore between 1991 and 1995 was not being utilised properly
due to the absence of trained staff and proper maintenance. Non- removal of old pipelines also
constituted safety hazards. At Tuticorin, there was no oil spill response equipment. Unlike JNPT
which had scuppers64 at the jetty. no such structures were found installed at Kolkata, although
significant oil handling was occurring at jetties (at Budge Budge) outside the dock systems. In the
absence of these, the oil jetties and installations at Kolkata remained greasy. There was no ballast65
facility at the berths at Cochin.

Good practices in India:

In Visakhapatnam, oil booms were being placed on all sides of liquid bulk vessels to suck spilled oil.
Fire watches were also being placed near the vessels. User charges were being levied for such services.
Such booms were also being used at Chennai where an oil recovery vessel was also available. At New
Mangalore, de-ballasting facilities were provided for tankers in its premises to avoid pollution. The
port was also recovering cleaning charges from users.

3.7.2 Precautions for handling dry bulk

To mitigate the impact of dust, air and noise pollution due to handling of dry bulk, CPCB stipulated
that ports should restrict the heights of iron ore and coal stacks; surround them with wind-screens;
load vehicles carrying such dry bulk cargo up to the brim and cover them with tarpaulin; install
sensors for automatic water sprinkling at dust generating locations and install anemometers66 to

64
Openings in side walls allowing draining out of liquids.
65
Water filled devices used on ships for stability. To avoid marine pollution by introduction of invasive species dur-
ing ballast discharge from tankers, specific facilities need to be created.
66
Devices for measuring wind speed.

47
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

carry out ambient air quality measurements. Ports were also required to report periodically on a
number of air quality parameters to respective State Pollution Control Boards and ensure that air
quality indicators like suspended particulate matter (SPM), etc were within prescribed limits.

Audit observed the following:

= The business plan of Chennai identified exposure to dust-filled environment as a serious

weakness of the port. A large number of measures had been taken in Chennai to restrict
such pollution and independent monitoring was being done by Richardson & Crudass Ltd, a
Government of India undertaking.

= At Haldia, although sprinklers and tarpaulin covers were in use, wind protection screens
around coal stacks were not found to be in use. Users at New Mangalore indicated high levels
of pollution at bulk handling berths like ore and coal berths.

= At Mumbai, the Pollution Control Cell was inadequately manned, there was poor maintenance
of pollution control equipment and the air quality was not being adequately monitored.

= Proper procedures were also being followed at major bulk handling ports like Mormugao and
Paradip.

= At New Mangalore, the port engaged an independent agency, viz. the National Institute of
Technology, Karnataka (NITK), Suratkal for monitoring environmental parameters including
ambient air quality on monthly basis. Although the port put in place all the requisite measures, the
NITK reports revealed high dust pollution within the port premises in two out of the three months
surveyed by them. Critical parameters like SPM and RPM were beyond tolerance limits.

= At Visakhapatnam, the port had introduced some good practices like usage of leak proof
grabs, deployment of leak proof dumpers for transportation, etc.

Recommendations

Ø Ports should consistently deploy oil booms and other protective measures while handling

POL cargo to restrict the impact of oil spillage. Oil sensors to detect spillage of oil in the
water front and oil-water separators, skimmers, dispersant spray systems etc. should be
used to remove pollutants from water bodies as per international best practices.

Ø Ports should make provisions for levying fines on tankers/vessels polluting harbour waters

and berths and recover the cost of consumables used for cleaning operations of oil spillages
from the users.

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 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

3.8 Handling and Documentation

In order to ensure minimum idle time of vessels and post-handling detention at berths, it was
necessary that the information interfaces between the port, the Customs authorities and the users
were efficient. The users of most of the ports mentioned that there were delays due to cargo
clearance formalities both at Customs and clearance points at the ports. Users at Cochin mentioned
that over 35 sheets had to be filled in for clearances from the Customs and port authorities.
Although all the ports had LAN based information systems and displayed multiple information on
their websites, none of the websites had the status of clearances of bills or other information like
berthing schedules, etc which were of immediate use to the users. At Mormugao, information
on status of refunds being processed by the port was not available to the users. It was noticed in
Tuticorin that online procedures did not reduce the burden of manual procedures. Import/export
applications, after being filed electronically, had to be also produced physically for processing,
defeating the very purpose of e-filing/booking. At Visakhapatnam, erroneous bills were being
generated from the online system and the same had to be subsequently corrected manually.
Similarly, in spite of having e-booking facilities for berths, users could not get reservations for
the berths at once, unlike leading ports in China, Singapore etc. Moreover, ports did not have
fixed time limits for processing information requests online. At Paradip, for example, out of eight
information requests received online in July and December 2007, two had not been addressed
till December 2008, indicating slow response. The port users at Kolkata indicated the need for a
friendly information interface between port users, Customs and the ports.
Problems noticed at Visakhapatnam are presented in the box below:
IT interface at Visakhapatnam Port Trust: A system study
At Visakhapatnam, computerization began in 2002. However, several processes remained
dependent on earlier manual data generation. The vessel-related inputs for the berthing
programme meetings (where agents met the Traffic Manager’s staff to decide the day’s
berthing, unberthing, shifting movements) were not generated through the Visakhapatnam
Port Operation and Management System (VPOMS) application. Daily reports like shed position,
ore berth position, etc were also not being generated. Berth information was noted in manual
registers and conveyed to the control room over phones for data entry into the computerised
system, indicating time lags and duplication. Video-conferencing systems supplied to the Traffic
Manager and Dock Managers had not been put to use so far. Six levels for approving the bills
extant in the manual system continued even after computerization, indicating no business
process reengineering. As all the information was not being captured at source, certain bills
continued to be generated manually. Problems were also faced in generation of lease bills in the
case of new agents who did not have deposit accounts. The processes generated dissatisfaction
among users. Agents complained that services were not provided on Saturdays after 12 noon
due to server shutdowns.

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Report No. 3 of 2009-10

At JNPT, although high operational efficiency in handling was noted, the users, in the absence
of a single window system, were required to file papers at different locations, viz. the Marine
Department, Operations Department, the Cash Section under the Finance Department as well as
at the gate. These points were dispersed, causing delays in transmission of papers and information.
An EDI system linking the port, Customs and the container freight stations at the port was still to be
fully implemented. Port users felt that Customs clearance was a big hurdle and stated that in spite
of computerization, hard copies of documents were being insisted upon. Although information on
location of containers at the yard was available online to users and agents due to the implementation
of a container tracking system, the users felt the need for more accuracy in the system. They also
pointed out that the private container terminals provided quick and accurate responses queries
made on their websites. Such procedures made identification of cargo and doing business easier.

The Inter-Ministerial Group constituted by the Committee on Infrastructure had identified

information technology (IT) as a strategic tool that would eliminate 23 person-to-person interfaces
and 50 minutes in pre-arrival documentation besides 23 hours in import and 15 hours in export
documentation. Towards this objective, the Ministry was funding the development of a Port
Community System (PCS) for all ports through the Indian Port Association (IPA) complying with the
uniform forms as per UN EDIFACT67 standards. The PCS would enable ordering of berth and pilot
services, smooth documentation, acceptance of digitally signed documents, enquiry and tracking,
linkage to port authorities and existing port user systems and billing. It was noticed that the PCS
was not fully functional till December 2008, in spite of the targeted completion time of December
2007. Moreover, the linkages to the ports and the existing systems of the ports appeared remote
in light of the fact that each port had developed its system independently without integration as
an objective. For example, the IT systems of Kolkata Dock System and Haldia Dock Complex under
the same port authority still remained to be integrated in spite of computerisation plans under
implementation since the last 10 years.

67
United Nations/Electronic Data Interchange for Administration, Commerce, and Transport

50
 Report No. 3 of 2009-10

Best Practices in documentation:

The Port of Singapore provides a single window environment to users as shown below:

Ø A user at Singapore files a single document online which is communicated to statutory

bodies online for approvals, thus reducing the TRT and labour costs.

Ø Port of Rotterdam.com, launched in December 2000, is one of the most cited instances of how

best a port authority can make use of the Internet medium to cater to the diversified needs
of various players in a port community. The Rotterdam port’s Internet platform consists of a
main website with five sub-portals; a news site, a job site, a business index, a database with
sailing times and information about the Port of Rotterdam Authority. Additional thematic
sub-portals are being planned as more port-related companies develop online applications
for their businesses. In addition to the thematic sub-portals, many categories will give access
to relevant websites. The site is in many ways, a microcosm of the port itself. Rotterdam is
a hub where flows of various goods converge. Cargo such as oil, ore and coal, fruit and dry
goods are handled by specialised companies, which are located in designated areas of the
port. The online portal reflects this multi-operation/ multi-location character of the port.
Various information flows are managed by external business partners but converge in one
centrally coordinated site.

Ø Mundra Port in India has a clear berthing policy displayed on the webpage of its website

51
Report No. 3 of 2009-10

The Ministry, in its reply, stated (August 2009) that the ports had been directed to computerise
their activities. They assured that the time taken in documentation would be significantly reduced
once the PCS system was properly implemented. They also pointed out that the users needed to
be properly involved for the new system to be effective.

Recommendation

To reduce delays in documentation, the ports should strive to achieve single window
Ø
clearance systems and implement the Port Community System effectively.

52