Research Journal of Finance and Accounting

ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online)

Vol.6, No.1, 2015

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The study effect agency theory and signaling theory on the level of
voluntary disclosure of listed companies in Tehran Stock
Exchange
Hamid Birjandi
Department of accounting, kerman Branch, Islamic Azad University, kerman, Iran

behruz hakemi
Fars electric distribution company , Fars , Iran

mohammad mehdi molla sadeghi

Fars electric distribution company , Fars , Iran
*Corresponding author email: [email protected]
ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effects of agency theory and signaling theory on the level of voluntary disclosure .
empirically the research data is collected from 45 firms in the Tehran Security Exchange (TSE) during 20082013.multiple regressions technique is used for examining the stated hypotheses. It is used for, two models. The
first model is based on agency theory and the second model is based on signaling theory.The relationship
between ratio of fixed assets, Leverage, ROE, Liquidity on the level of voluntary disclosure.. In order to examine
the hypotheses, data is collected from the annual reports of the companies using official bulletins of the Tehran
stock exchange, mainly, through Novin software, Tadbir Pardaz software, and stock sites such as www.rdis.ir &
www.irbourse.com.The results indicate that based on the models, ratio of fixed assets, and, Liquidity are
associated significantly and positively with the level of voluntary disclosure.
Keywords:agency theory, signaling theory, voluntary disclosure
INTRODUCTION
Financial reporting and disclosure is an important tool for management to effectively on vey information to
people outside the organization is.
In the existing literature , Hypotheses and theories have been expressed in relation to disclosure And economic
consequences of disclosure and the positive effects it has repeatedly been mentioned .
According to Butasan(1997) More information disclosure can reduce the cost of capital And thus increase the
value of the company .
According to signaling theory , Companies to achieve limited capital resources are competitive . If the company
is well known in financial reporting and expose more information about their activities Will be more capable of
attracting investment Because it will attract investors trust.
According to agency theory Due to a conflict of interest between managers and owners, Owners are seeking
contracts to minimize these conflicts of interest. Expenses incurred for overseeing the company's contracts with
agencies should be This can reduce the remuneration of managers . Managers To minimize the costs of
monitoring agency , The motivation to find The accounting information Reliable and timely way to allow people
outside the organization .
The purpose of the present study is effects of agency theory and signaling theory on the level of voluntary
disclosure.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Before presenting the theoretical framework of this research, we consider that its relevant to give thedefinition
of voluntary disclosure because it will limit the scope of our investigation. At this level, previous studies are

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divided into two parts (Pourtier, 2004): Those who do not define the voluntary disclosure (for example Xiao et
al. (2004) and those that present it in opposition to mandatory one (Chavent et al. 2005, Raffournier, 1995,
Cooke, 1992). But these definitions are incomplete because they dont care about the dimensions of voluntary
disclosure given by Pourtier (2004) which are: The content, the chronological sequence of publications and the
vector chosen for publications. Thus, in this study, voluntary disclosure consists in voluntary publications
regarding their content, disclosed in a mandatory vector (the annual report) and which are made in the
chronological sequence provided by law. So we are dealing with only one of the dimensions of voluntary
disclosure which is the content. Precisely we deal with two categories of the dimension "content" which are
information not provided in accounting laws and information which gives more details to mandatory
publications.
voluntary disclosure
We will classify determinants of voluntary disclosure in three groups (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, Wallace et al.,
1994, Camfferman and Cooke, 2002, Alsaeed, 2006). The first one is composed of the determinants related to
the structure of the firm (Size of the firm, leverage, ownership concentration, board independence and firm age).
The second group contain determinants related to firms performance (we will deal here only with one
determinant with is profitability). The latest group includes market related determinants (industry type and audit
firm size).
Firm size
The relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm size is explained essentially by the agency theory.
According to Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) accounting practices and voluntary disclosures are supposed to
control conflicts of interest between shareholders, creditors and managers. This conflict of interest depends on
some characteristics of the firm.They explained, based on the amount of external capital and referring to the
work of Jensen and Meckling (1986) and those of Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981), that agency costs
increase with the amount of external capital which increase with the size of the firm. This leads to an increase in
the benefits of the contract connecting shareholders, creditors and managers simultaneously with the size of the
firm. These benefits include financial disclosures. Disclosures costs are also used to explain the positive
association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the size of the firm (Raffournier 1995). In addition to
agency theory, political costss theory is also used. Indeed, large firms face high visibility and are subject to
governmental interventions. In order to reduce these political costs, larger firms are moving towards a greater
voluntary disclosure to reassure social and governmental groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). It is also
important to say that large firms have their place within their industry or at least have managed to create and
maintain their market share. So, the disclosure of favorable information about their activities is not likely to
threaten their competitive advantage, which is unfortunately the case for small firms (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
Ahmed and Courtis (1999) argue that large companies disclose more information due to their business portfolio
which is developed enough and the presence of several owners that have different information needs. The
majority of studies collected were able to prove the existence of a positive and significant relationship (to
different degrees of significance) between firm size and the level of voluntary disclosure. (Raffournier, 1995 for
Switzerland, Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987, for Mexico, Cooke, 1992, for Japan, and Zeghal et al. 2007 for
Canada).
Leverage
According to the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976), a situation of information asymmetry exists
between creditors and the company. Lenders have no idea about the activity of the firm, but they are convinced
that greater the amount of debt is, greater will be the managerial discretion to divert resources (Ahmed and
Courtis, 1999). To cope with this situation, creditors will introduce controls which costs will be borne by the
firm. To reassure them and reduce these costs, managers will have to disclose more information about the firm.
But for firms who propose to borrow capital, another explanation may be advanced. Indeed, firms tend to
disclose more information in the annual report when they are seeking to raise capital. These disclosures are
intended to lower the cost of debt. The estimated debt risk by lenders will be minimized in presence of
information on the activity of the firm and especially on its continuity (Ahmed 1994). Results related to this
determinant are non-conclusive (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Some researchers have been able to reach a positive
and significant relationship (Naser et al., 2006, Barako 2007) while others have not been able to prove the
existence of relationship between the level of voluntary disclosure and the level of debt (Chow and Wong-Boren,
1987, Raffournier, 1995).
Ownership concentration
According to Fama and Jensen (1983) when the capital of the firm is more dispersed there is more possibility to
conflicts of interest between principal and agent to occur.To reduce these conflicts, some shareholders will tend

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to require managers to disclose more information in order to evaluate the performance of the firm (Lakhal,
2004). So its intended that voluntary disclosure will be more important in capital diffused firms (Chau and
Gary, 2002). Ho and Wong (2001) explain that for companies with highly concentrated ownership, conflict of
interest is not between shareholders and managers but between majority and minority shareholders. In this
situation, managers are encouraged to act against the interests of small shareholders by withholding information.
Chau and Gray (2002) showed statistically, for companies of Hong Kong and Singapore, that more the capital of
the firm is diffused, more it will make disclosures voluntarily.
Lakhal (2004) empirically validated the hypothesis of a positive relationship between the diffusion of ownership
and disclosure of earnings forecasts. But, Raffournier (1995) and Naser et al. (2006) could not prove the
existence of a positive relationship between the dispersion of capital and the level of voluntary disclosure.
Board independence
The agency theory states that the presence of increasingly high external directors on the board helps to control
and limit the opportunism of managers thanks to their competence, independence and objectivity necessary for
the function of control (Ho and Wong, 2001). Indeed, Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the presence of more
outside directors (non-executive) makes the board more effective so the company will have to disclose more. In
the same vein, Forcker (1992) showed that a high percentage of non-executive directors on the board increase
the control of the quality of financial disclosures and reduced profits from withholding information. Ho and
Wong (2001), Zeghal et al. (2007) and Lakhal (2004) were unable to validate their hypotheses of a positive
relationship between the degree of independence of the board and the level of voluntary disclosure. Arcay and
Vasquez (2005), on a sample of Spanish companies, have been able to prove empirically that the independence
of the Board and subsequently the adoption of good governance rules promote voluntary disclosure. Contrary to
this, the results of Eng and Mak (2003) who worked on a sample of companies listed on the Singapore Stock
Exchange, showed the presence of a negative relationship between the degree of independence of the Board and
the level of voluntary disclosure. They explain their results by the fact that the presence of a fairly high
percentage of outside directors will act as a substitute for other governance mechanism namely the voluntary
disclosure.
Age of the firm
Studies of the relationship between voluntary disclosure and firm age are not multiple and rely very largely on
logical reason. Courtis (2004), in his study of the determinants of intentional release of non-clear and not
understandable information by firms, explains that a senior company have necessarily acquired habits of
disclosure through the development of an information system and sophisticated communication strategies in
addition to employing specialized staff for the preparation of annual reports which pushes them to publish clear,
comprehensible and more detailed reports than younger firms. Akhtaruddin (2005) in his study of the
determinants of voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh, argues that older firms are more experienced and are
therefore more likely to include more information in their annual reports to improve their image and reputation
on the market. In addition to this logical argument based on the experience of the firm, we believe that the theory
of competitive advantage can be invoked to argue the relationship that may exist between this determinant (age
of the firm) and voluntary disclosure. Indeed, an old company has certainly positioned itself in the market and
within its industry by acquiring a competitive advantage. Therefore, aged firms are not afraid of the reactions of
their competitors consequently to their publications because they were able over time to anticipate and knew
how to face them. We can say that these firms have acquired a competitive advantage even at the informational
level. Few studies have investigated this determinant. The age of the firm was quoted by Camferman and Cooke
(2002) as a new variable to consider in order enriching the literature on the determinants of voluntary disclosure.
Akhtaruddin (2005) investigated the relation between the age of the firm and its level of voluntary disclosure. He
has not been able to establish statistically a positive association between the level of voluntary disclosure and the
age of the firm. Alsaeed (2006) studied the impact of the age of Saudi firms on their level of voluntary disclosure
and has been able to prove a positive and significant association between these two variables. Ansha (1998) also
obtained a positive and significant relationship at 5%.
Performance- related determinants
Companies that are conducting or achieve a high degree of profitability will try to disclose more voluntarily to
report it to the market and reduce the information asymmetry (Eccles et al., 2001). Singhvi and Desai (1971)
argue that an important profitability motivates managers to disclose more information in order to increase the
confidence of investors who will be able to increase managers market compensation. The relationship between
the degree of profitability and the level of voluntary disclosure has been widely studied. But the results are far
from conclusive. Indeed, some authors have led to a positive relationship between the level of profitability of the
firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. We can mention at this level Lakhal (2004) who was interested in the

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French context and who confirmed the hypothesis that firms that have a higher degree of profitability will tend to
disclose more about their expected results. Similarly, Chavent et al. (2005) demonstrated empirically that the
greater the degree of profitability is greater the voluntary disclosure on provision will be for French firms. On the
other hand there are those who obtained statistically no relationship between the degree of profitability of the
firm and the level of voluntary disclosure. We can mention at this level Raffournier (1995) for the case of
Switzerland and Ahmed and Courtis (1999) for the meta-analysis.
There are studies, despite having made the assumption of a positive correlation between the degree of
profitability of the firm and the level of voluntary disclosure, their statistical results showed a negative
relationship. We can mention Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Balkaoui andKahl (1978) and Wallace and Naser
(1995).
Market-related determinants
The size of the audit firm
Raffournier (1995) argues that auditors in general play an important role in the definition of financial
communication policy for their customers. Large audit firms encourage companies to disclose audited additional
information and be more transparent. Against by, the smaller firms do not influence their customers but try to
align their needs for fear of losing them by forcing them to publish more information Alsaeed, 2006). Big audit
firmsand internationally renowned ones are found to have a positive influence on levels of disclosure of their
customers. But the empirical results are inconclusive at this level. Camfferman and Cooke (2002) and Nasser et
al. (2002) found a positive and significant relationship between the size of the audit firm and the level of
voluntary disclosure. Raffournier (1995) support this positive relationship only when he rejected the variable
firm size suggesting that this latter variable capted the effect of the variable size of the audit firm. Ahmed and
Courtis (1999), Ansah (1998) and Alsaeed (2006) led to the absence of relationship between firm size and the
level of voluntary disclosure. Wallace and Naser (1995), meanwhile, showed the presence of a negative
relationship between the size of the audit firm and the extent of disclosure level.
The type of industry
Some characteristics specific to an industry such as the degree of competition within the industry, product
differentiation, the industrys structure (monopoly or oligopoly) and growth can give rise to differences in the
policies of communications. (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). Cooke (1992) argues that the manufacturing sector
is exposed on the international level, thereby causing an effect on disclosure practices in this sector. Zeghal et al.
(2007) suggest several reasons that lead some firms in a sector to disclose more than others belonging to another
one. First, they argue that proprietary costs vary by industry due to the differences in the levels of
competitiveness, the type of private information and hazard due to entry of new firms in the sector. Second, and
based on the theory of signals, they explain that within the same sector, companies are required to align with
each other about their disclosure practices because any deviation will be considered as bad news by the market.
Several previous studies used the theory of political costs to highlight the influence of the industry type, to which
the company belongs on its level of disclosure. Raffournier (1995) has not been able to confirm the relationship
between the type of industry and the level of voluntary disclosure. But Ho and Wong (2001) and Cooke (1992)
showed that manufacturing firms voluntarily disclose more than others belonging to other sectors. Zeghal et al
(2007) argue that companies belonging to the sector of biotechnology industries disclose more about their
research and development activities. Lakhal (2004) also argues that firms in the high technology sector disclose
more about earnings forecasts. She adds that firms belonging to sectors subject to significant price volatility do
too. Meriem Jouirou, Mohamed Bechir Chenguel,(2014).
AGENCY THEORY
Basic agency paradigm was developed in the economics literature during 1960s and 1970s in order to determine
the optimal amount of the risk- sharing among different individuals (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Harris and Raviv 1976, 1978; Holmstrom, 1979).
However, gradually the domain of the agency theory was extended to the management area for determining the
cooperation between various people with different goals in the organization, and attainment of the goal
congruency (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 1980s, agency theory was also appeared extensively in the managerial
accoun-ting realms to determine the optimal-incentive contracting among different individuals and establishing
suitable accounting control mechanisms to monitor their behaviors and actions (Demski, 1980; Biaman, 1982;
Namazi, 1985). It is this last function of the agency theory that will be emphasized in this study. In its primitive
form, agency theory relates to situations in which one individual (called the agent) is engaged by another
individual (called the principal) to act on his/her behalf based upon a designated fee schedule. Since both
individuals are assumed to be utility maximizer, and motivated by pecuniary and non-pecuniary items, incentive

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problems may arise, particularly under the condition of uncertainty and informational asymmetry. That is, the
objective function of the principal and the agent may be incompatible, and therefore, the agent may take actions
which will jeopardize the principal's benefits. In addition, an agency operates under the condition of risk and
uncertainty. In effect, the basic agency theory usually assumes that both individuals are risk averse. Under this
circumstances, the amount and content of the produced accounting information and other information sources
would become a significant issue in risk sharing and controlling the agent's actions (Namazi, 1985; Baiman,
1982, 1990). The preceding basic agency model, however, has also been extended to cases in which there are
multiple agents (Holmstrom, 1979; Antle, 1982; Radner, 1981), private information (Penno, 1984), multiple
period performance (Radner, 1981), and multi-objective models (Namazi, 1983). In addition, the effect of
various cultures on the assumptions of the agency theory has also been investigated (Osterman, 2006; Kren and
Tyson, 2009). Given the agency theory paradigm, and following Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and
Meckling (1972), and Kaplan (1984), among others, a firm can be characterized as a nexuses of contractual
agreements among different individuals, Mohammad Namazi(2013). this study draws in the agency paradigms to
investigate the role of the agency theory and signaling theory on the level of voluntary disclosure of listed
companies in Tehran Stock Exchange
signaling theory
Signaling theory posits that firms with good performance tend to make voluntary disclosures more readily,
as doing so is regarded as an easy means of distinguishing themselves from others in the marketplace. Hence,we
conjecture that voluntary disclosure is positively related to firm performance and quality. Both Chow and WongBoren (1987) and Lang and Lundholm (1993) provide empirical support for this supposition.
Liquidity
Liquidity represents a firms ability to meet its short-term liabilities. Firms with greater liquidity are considered
to be operating better businesses. In accordance with signaling theory, these firms are prone to disclose
more information voluntarily (Cooke, 1989).2 Agency theory, in contrast, suggests the opposite conclusion: to
alleviate information asymmetry, firms with less liquidity are likely to release more information to investors,
creditors in particular. Indeed, several studies (e.g., Wallace et al., 1994) claim that weak liquidity may prompt
firms to amplify their disclosure to justify their liquidity status.
The empirical findings on the liquidity-disclosure relationship are also inconclusive. Wallace et al.
(1994)document a negative relationship between liquidity and disclosure in both listed and unlisted Spanish
companies, whereas Alsaeed
(2006) and Barako et al. (2006) find no significant relationship in Saudi Arabia or Kenya. No previous study in
China has taken liquidity into consideration. Using the current ratio as a proxy for liquidity, we conjecture that
there is generally a positive relationship between the two in Chinese public companies, as stated in the following
hypothesis.
Rate of return on equity of firm (ROE )
Under the signaling theory framework, firms with strong performance and good quality have more incentives to
voluntarily disclose information to distinguish themselves from under performing firms. Singhvi and Desai
(1971) claim that greater profitability may induce management to supply more information, to illustrate its
ability, to maximize shareholder value, and to elevate managerial compensation.
Auditor type (or rank) is popularly employed as a signal to the market. Financial reports audited by higher
ranking auditors are regarded as better in quality and more credible. However, the literature provides mixed
evidence in this respect. Using a relatively small dataset, Xiao et al. (2004) find a positive relationship between
the Big 5 (or Big 4) auditors and internet-based voluntary disclosure in China.3 However, several studies
(Hossain et al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Alsaeed, 2006) have shown that neither Big 5 (nor Big 6) auditors nor
ROE have a significant influence on managements disclosure decision. Yang Lan, Lili Wang,Xueyong
Zhang(2013)
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
This section develops hypotheses that are subjected to statistical testing. These hypotheses are developed
with reference to two well-known theories, agency theory, and signaling theory, which are briefly
reviewed here in the context of voluntary disclosure. This review and discussion provide the
foundation and justification for the explanatory variables extracted and considered in our hypothesis
development.
Hypotheses of this study are as follows:

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The first group of hypotheses:

There
H 1:
leverage.

is

significant

relationship

between

voluntary

disclosure

and

H2: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and fixed assets.
The second group of hypotheses:
H1: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and ROE.
H2: There is a significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and Liquidity.
VARIABLES DEFINITIONS

Independent variable:
Signaling theory variables:
Liquidity: It is the ratio of current assets to liabilities
ROE: It is the ratio of net income to equity
Agency theory variables:
Leverage:It is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets
ratio of fixed assets:It is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets
dependent variables:
Note that in this study we want to study signaling theory and agency theory on voluntary disclosure so the
variable of voluntary disclosure is as the dependent variable. As was stated in the study to quantify disclosure
variable is used from the list of points disclosure and transparency of companies Tehran Stock Exchange
These Variables are summarized in the table (1).
(Table 1) Description of the variables

Names
Variables

of

the

Proxies

DSCOREit

Disclosure of firm i
in period t

LMVit

Financial leverage of
firm i in period t

FA/Ait

Fixed assets of firm i

in period t

Liquidityit

Liquidity of firm i in
period t

ROEit

Rate of return on
equity of firm i in
period t

Calculations
The list of points disclosure and
transparency of companies Tehran
Stock Exchange
The ratio of total liabilities to total
assets
The ratio of fixed assets to total
assets
The ratio of current assets to
liabilities

The ratio of net income to quity

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METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS

In this study, the multiple regressions are used for data analysis. Initial data was inserted in Excel spreadsheet
and SPSS software was applied to analyze the data statistically. Also Rahavard Novin software, Tadbir Pardaz
software, stock organization library and stock sites such as www.rdis.ir & www.irbourse.com were used.
RESEARCH METHOD AND REGRESSION MODEL
Considering that the aim of this study was to examine the relationship between agency theory and signaling
theory on the level of voluntary disclosure
First of all variables in the model study in a multiple regression model tested general form it is as follows:

DSCOREit=0+1 LMVit+2FA/Ait+3Liquidityit+ 4ROEit+

SAMPLE SELECTION
The sample was chosen from the firms listed on the Tehran stock exchange (TSE), from 2008to2013, using
the following criteria:
1). Firms were listed in TSE during2008 -2013
2). Data was available for all the years under the study.
3). The companies didnt have changed the fiscal year for the period studied.
4). Banks, Insurance and Investment firms were not considered in this study.
DATA ANALYSIS
Testing Results of the first group hypothesis:
In the Model 1:

Table (2)
Variables Entered
Model
1

Variables Entered

Adjusted R Square
1160/

Durbin-Watson
652/1

Method
Step wise

We entered variables into the model respectively. models were defined and finally the last model including 1
variables was defined as an optimum model for predicting the voluntary disclosure. As a result, the regression
model came as the followings:

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Table (3)
Excluded Variables
model

Variable

Beta ln

LMVit

-0.041

Sig
-1.949

Partial
Correlation

0.52

VIf

-0.92

1.002

As it is seen,
significance level is equal to 0.52> 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model.
Optimum model was model 2, which had a more determination coefficient than the previous ones
Table (5)
Coefficients of model 2
Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

Model4
B

Constant

Stl.
Erro

37/205

2/457

13/132

5/790

Sig

15/14

0.000

2/368

0/024

VIF

Beta

0/110

1/2

The optimal regression model was written as the following:

DSCOREit=37/205+ 13/132FA/Ait +
The results of the first model tests :
According to the statistical results of the first group hypothesis to test the research, the first group, Of the two
independent variables one variable ratio of fixed assets the company has positive and a significant impact on the
voluntary disclosure. Also , as reflected in the relationship between the variables in the model can be seen, If
disclosure of corporate information is evaluated based on agency theory ; Variable ratio of fixed assets the
company has a direct connection with the disclosure of company ,. Thus expected to increase the proportion of
fixed assets , The extent of voluntary disclosure by companies to increase. Meanwhile, based on table (6) the
first group test suggests that ,one independent variable has a significant relationship with the company's
disclosure (F= @. /000), which together offer a 11 % (AdjR 2 = 0/116) Explains the behavior of the dependent
variable.
Testing Results of the second group hypothesis
In the Model 2:

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Table (4)
Variables Entered
Model
1

Adjusted R Square
2610/

Variables Entered
Liquidityit

Durbin-Watson
584/1

Method
Step wise

We entered variables into the model respectively. models were defined and finally the last model including 1
variables was defined as an optimum model for predicting the voluntary disclosure. As a result, the regression
model came as the followings:

DSCOREit=0+ 1Liquidityit+
Table (5)
Excluded Variables
model

Variable
ROEit

Beta ln

Sig

Partial
Correlation

-0.041

-1.949

0.52

-0.92

VIf
1.002

As it is seen ,ROE significance level is equal to 0.52> 0.05, therefore, this variable was not entering the model.
Table (6)
Coefficients of model 2
Standardiz
Unstandardized

ed
Coefficient

Coefficients
s

Model4
B

Constant

Liquidityit

Stl.
Erro

37/783

2/395

6/600

1/898

Sig

V
IF

Beta

14/525

0/167

3/477

0.000

0/001

1/4

The optimal regression model was written as the following:

DSCOREit=37/783+ 6/600 Liquidityit +

The results of the second model tests
According to the statistical results of the second group hypothesis to test the research, Of the two independent
variables one variable Liquidity has positive and a significant impact on the voluntary disclosure. Also , as
reflected in the relationship between the variables in the model can be seen, If disclosure of corporate
information is evaluated based on signaling theory ; Variable Liquidity company has a direct relationship with
the company's disclosure , Thus expected to increase Liquidity , The extent of voluntary disclosure by

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companies to increase. Meanwhile, based on table (6) the second group test suggests that ,one independent
variable has a significant relationship with the company's disclosure (F= @. /000), which together offer a 26%
(AdjR 2 = .261) Explains the behavior of the dependent variable..
Conclusion
In this study, the effect of agency theory and signaling theory has been assessed on the level of voluntary
disclosure of listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In this regard, two models was reviewed, the
relationship between ratio of fixed assets, Leverage, ROE, Liquidity on the level of voluntary disclosure.
According to the results of statistical models to test the research, the first model, the ratio of fixed assets was
extremely positive and significant, while Leverage was negative and significant. Thus, it can be claimed that the
increase in the ratio of fixed assets would increase the voluntary disclosure.
In the second model, , Liquidity of company was positive and significant. So when disclosure of corporate
information is evaluated based on signaling theory ; it confirms this with the increase in , Liquidity ,the
voluntary disclosure will increase.
we find evidence that differs from the findings of previous studies, For instance, Yang Lan, Lili Wang,Xueyong
Zhang(2013) Used a sample representing more than 80% of all public companies in China, they found that firm
size, leverage, assets-in-place, ROE, and ownership diffusion
are significantly associated with voluntary disclosure and that auditor type and the intermediary and
legalenvironments are highly significantly associated with voluntary disclosure.
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