Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80953

July 1995

Vol. 8, No. 3

From the Commandant

Special Warfare

Doctrine is a subject that is much talked

about but often misunderstood.
Opinions regarding doctrine and its value
are at times diametrically opposed. Some
say doctrine is the engine of change; others
say it is the transmission of change. Some
say technology drives doctrine; others say
doctrine drives technology. Some say doctrine should be proscriptive; others say it
should provide a common framework within
which operators are free to make decisions.
Regardless of the side of the doctrine
argument we are on, it is important, as we
build the special-operations forces of the
future, that we get our doctrine as nearly
right as possible. Doctrine profoundly
affects the way in which SOF will train,
fight and operate.
In our efforts to get doctrine right, we
must be careful to keep a fresh perspective
as we consider future operations and evolving technology. General Pershing, when he
first viewed the airplane, remarked that it
would revolutionize getting hay to the horses. During the period between the world
wars, the French developed the most effective doctrine ever seen. To their detriment,
however, it was designed to win World War
I. In that same period, the Germans developed their doctrine for the blitzkrieg.
Doctrine should be authoritative, but it
is not inflexible it is only nearly right.
We must constantly fine-tune it by examining it against the changing operational
environment.
In this issue, the article Civil Affairs: A
Function of Command is the first of a
series of doctrinal white papers written at
the JFK Center and School. The need to
understand, plan for and coordinate civilmilitary operations has never been greater,
and the article suggests doctrinal changes
that could make CA equal to other functions of command.
Also in this issue, Lt. Col. James Dunn
and Maj. Jon Custer examine the experi-

ences of the XVIII Airborne Corps specialoperations coordination element during

Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. In
assessing those experiences, they suggest
ways in which joint doctrine can more
clearly address the role of the SOCOORD
at the JTF level.
Doctrine establishes operating principles,
lays the groundwork for force structure and
provides a basis for training, and it can
help to integrate SOF and conventional
forces. Christopher Lamb points out in his
article on emerging SOF roles that by
defining unique SOF characteristics, joint
SOF doctrine can ensure that SOF retain
their niche in U.S. military capabilities. By
holding firmly to that niche, we may be
able to prevent SOF being used, like Pershings aircraft, in getting hay to the horses, and make certain that our forces
receive only the missions for which they are
uniquely qualified.

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

Contents

PB 80953
July 1995

Special Warfare

Commander & Commandant

Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

Vol. 8, No. 3

Features

Editor
Jerry D. Steelman

Associate Editor
Sylvia McCarley

10

Emerging SOF Roles and Missions: A Different Perspective

by Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, U.S. Army (ret.)

13

Waterborne Infiltration Training: Maintaining a Battle

Focus
by Maj. David E. Johnson

16

A USSOCOM View of Doctrine

by Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

20

Civil Affairs: A Function of Command

26

Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the SOCOORD

as Part of a Joint Task Force
by Lt. Col. James L. Dunn and Maj. Jon M. Custer

38

As I Remember It: Delegation and Decentralization

by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

40

The Origin of the Crossed-Arrows Insignia

by Lt. Col. Charles King

Graphics & Design

Bruce S. Barfield

VE R

IT

AS

ET

LI B

ER

TAS

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of

the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its
mission is to promote the professional development of
special-operations forces by providing a forum for the
examination of established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented
in other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and
should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare,
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:
DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -5341.
Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where
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and the authors.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special-operations units. Individuals desiring private
subscriptions should forward their requests to:
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Joel B. Hudson
Acting Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
00313

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions

by Christopher Lamb

Departments
43

Letters

46

Officer Career Notes

47

Enlisted Career Notes

48

Foreign SOF

50

Update

52

Book Reviews

Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles

and Missions
by Christopher Lamb

Anyone who works with special-operations forces cannot help being impressed
with their skills and dedication. Nevertheless, an enthusiastic appreciation for SOF
capabilities can actually create a problem
in some circumstances.
A great appreciation for SOF capabilities may incline decision-makers to give
any tough mission to SOF whether or not
the mission actually qualifies as a special
operation. Such a tendency may also be
reinforced by our changing security environment. Our future is uncertain, the
problems we face are complex, and political-military operations short of war tax
the capabilities of our conventional forces.
So, some say in response, special-operations forces are flexible, sophisticated and
accustomed to nontraditional missions;
why not assign more of these evolving
post-Cold War missions to them? While
there is a lot of good sense in this line of
reasoning, it can also lead us astray.
What follows is an attempt to examine
the strategic significance of special operaThis article was originally presented at a
1994 conference co-hosted by Tufts Universitys Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by
the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions
in the Aftermath of the Cold War.
2

tions and to provide a more detailed look

at how we should assess future SOF roles
and missions. We will review the criteria
for judging roles and missions, discuss
appropriate SOF roles, look at some
emerging missions and review some rules
of thumb that could be useful as the SOF
community evaluates each prospective
mission individually. The intent is not to
provide the definitive statement of roles
and missions for SOF, but to establish
some general principles and to help define
the terms of debate as the special-operations community evaluates new and evolving missions.
Three factors must be taken into
account when assessing new roles and
missions for SOF:
The nature of the threats and the security environment we anticipate in the
future. We must prepare to meet the missions that will actually be required of our
armed forces.
The national security strategy that the
United States is adopting to deal with the
post-Cold War security environment. Different strategies may require different
missions and capabilities.
The nature of the forces themselves. If
special-operations forces are asked to conduct missions contrary to their current
nature, they will eventually evolve into
different types of forces. The risk inherent
in such change is that SOF will duplicate
the capabilities of conventional forces and
Special Warfare

will be unable to effectively conduct traditional special-operations missions.

Nature of SOF
We can begin by reviewing the essential
characteristics of special-operations forces.
This process not only helps define the traditional roles that SOF have played in
American military strategy but also serves
as a baseline against which we can judge
their alternative roles. The simple definition of SOF is that they are what conventional forces are not. Special operations
are those military operations that conventional forces cannot accomplish or undertake without unacceptable levels of both
risk and expense of resources. Special
operations have at least three, if not all, of
the following four characteristics:
Unorthodox approaches. Special operations require tactics, techniques and procedures that cannot be employed efficiently or effectively by conventional forces.
This does not mean that special operations
negate the traditional principles of war,
but rather that they put a different
emphasis on the combination or ranking of
those principles. For example, in special
operations, surprise achieved by speed,
stealth, audacity, deception, and new tactics and techniques is far more important
than mass. Special-operations forces can
target a conventional enemys weaknesses
through unorthodox approaches, or they
can counter unconventional adversaries on
the adversaries own unorthodox terms.
Unconventional training and equipment. All military training and equipment, from basic training to an Abrams
tank to the cockpit of a B-1 bomber, is special to some extent. Moreover, what is
defined as unconventional changes over
time. SOF have pioneered operations with
night-vision devices and deep-precision
strike capabilities, but such operations are
no longer considered unconventional. At
any given time, however, there are mission requirements that must be defined as
unconventional in comparison to existing
conventional capabilities. The fact that
special operations use a broad range of
specialized skills and are often conducted
July 1995

at great distances from support facilities,

beyond the limits of conventional military
forces, means that they often require special training and equipment compared to
that of their conventional counterparts.
Political context and implications.
Army Special Forces doctrine rightly identifies recognizing political implications as
a special-operations imperative. Political
considerations define the general parameters of almost all military operations, but
a special-operations mission is often conducted in a politically sensitive context
that constrains virtually every aspect of
the operation. Local mores may dictate
methods, and more general political considerations may require clandestine,

Political considerations define the general

parameters of almost all military operations, but
a special-operations mission is often conducted in a politically sensitive context that constrains virtually every aspect of the operation.
covert or low-visibility techniques as well
as oversight at the national level.
Special intelligence requirements. Special operations require special intelligence.
As a result, it is sometimes necessary to
collect fine-grained intelligence about a
difficult target; other times, it may be necessary to collect in-depth information on
political, social and cultural issues. In certain instances the intelligence picture not
only helps design the special operation, it
may in fact determine its very feasibility.
Whether we are talking about Civil
Affairs, hostage rescue, counterinsurgency training, unconventional warfare or
any other traditional, primary specialoperations mission, it will manifest at
least three of the four SOF characteristics. Understanding the nature of special
operations in reference to these critical
characteristics provides a workable,
although not perfect, approach. Such an
approach still requires an element of
judgment, but it is preferable to the circular definition that one often hears: Special-operations missions are missions con3

A PSYOP soldier hands

out leaflets to civilians in
Haiti, an example of the
unconventional-warrior role
of SOF.
U.S. Army photo

ducted by SOF, and SOF are the forces

that conduct special operations.

Traditional roles
The strategic value of special-operations
forces is derived from the ways they can
serve as a force multiplier in a major
regional conflict or expand the range of
options available in crises and conflicts
short of war. In carrying out strategic functions, American special-operations forces
have traditionally undertaken two broad,
enduring roles, which for lack of better
alternatives we can call the unconventional-warrior role and the commando role.
Special-operations forces execute the role
of the unconventional warrior when they
influence, advise, train and conduct operations with foreign forces and populations.
Unconventional-warfare missions and foreign-internal-defense missions, such as
training and advising counterinsurgency
forces, emphasize the indirect approach
through host-government or indigenous
forces. We can include Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations in the unconventional-warrior role because they also influence foreign forces and populations. The
unconventional-warrior role places a premi-

um on language skills and political sensitivity. It tends to involve missions that

require a patient, long-term commitment in
order to achieve national objectives.
Special-operations forces in the commando role use stealth, speed and audacity to undertake precision penetration and
strike operations in limited, specialized
contingencies across the conflict spectrum.
Such commando-style operations are
short, self-contained, direct-action missions that stress unorthodoxy, special
training and unique intelligence.
It would be a mistake to consider the
commando role only as a function of
warfighting and the unconventional-warrior role only as a function of operations
other than war. SOF undertake both roles
during war and operations other than war.
It would be a further mistake to identify
the two roles exclusively with specific
branches of special-operations forces. Our
most proficient special-operations forces
for commando-type missions must also be
able to undertake foreign training, and
some of our most proficient forces for
unconventional-warrior missions must be
prepared to conduct direct-action, commando-type missions. The distinction is
not between war and OOTW, or between
Special Warfare

one category of SOF and another, but

between the commando role and the
unconventional-warrior role.
Identifying these two traditional, generic roles for special-operations forces is
important for several reasons. First, the
focus on these roles highlights the particular functions that only special-operations
forces are trained to perform. Conventional forces cannot undertake these roles
without essentially transforming themselves into forces that are capable of special operations, thus duplicating SOF
capabilities.
Similarly, since all SOF missions traditionally fall predominantly into one of the
two categories, the roles serve as a helpful
reference in the evaluation of evolving and
emerging SOF missions. If a proposed mission does not fit into either role, it should
be examined especially closely. Odds are
that the mission will not properly constitute a special operation. If the concept of
special operations must be stretched to
include the new mission, we may be duplicating the capabilities of conventional
forces while compromising our preparedness for traditional SOF roles.
Finally, not every special operator need
be, first and foremost, a commando. Since
both the unconventional-warrior and commando roles equally support the strategic
SOF functions, they should receive equal
emphasis by the special-operations community. It is important to keep in mind
that the two roles may require some tradeoffs between different competencies. For
example, the cutting-edge physical and
technical requirements demanded of the
commando differ from the linguistic, cultural and political skills required of the
unconventional warrior. SOF must balance force structure, training, mission
assignment and public-education efforts to
ensure preparedness for both roles.

Suggested roles
It is occasionally suggested that in addition to unconventional-warrior and commando roles, SOF should be responsible for
performing all covert paramilitary operations and for providing support to domestic
July 1995

authorities. Reportedly, the commissions

established by Congress to review the
future of the Central Intelligence Agency
and the roles and missions of the Department of Defense are considering the merits
of turning over all covert paramilitary operations to the DoD and SOF. While we cannot prejudge the findings of these commissions, we can identify several concerns.
Given the sensitive political nature of
covert paramilitary operations, the elaborate legal and oversight requirements that
they entail and, most importantly, the
additional specialized tradecraft that they
require, SOF would have to significantly
expand their portfolio of capabilities in
order to successfully execute such responsibilities. Since no new resources appear to
be forthcoming, this process would most
likely demand a reduction in the resources
that support traditional SOF missions. Can

Since both the unconventional-warrior and

commando roles equally support the strategic
SOF functions, they should receive equal
emphasis by the special-operations community.
such a reduction be justified?
The passing of the Cold War and the
increased media exposure that all military
operations can expect in the future will substantially diminish the necessity and the
likelihood of such sensitive special operations. At the same time, the need for SOF to
execute missions emanating from the
unconventional-warrior and commando
roles will most likely grow. It seems questionable whether a major new role for SOF
in the covert paramilitary area and the
required associated resources could be justified. At a minimum, we must remember
that assuming these responsibilities, which
would constitute accepting a major new role
for SOF, should be viewed with caution.
Another major role sometimes suggested for SOF is that they support domestic
authorities aiding local law-enforcement, disaster-relief and development programs. Some argue, often with the disaster in Waco, Texas, in mind, that SOF
could assist, or assume responsibility
5

from, local and national law-enforcement

agencies in dealing with hostage or barricade situations. It is further argued that
the SOF skills that proved so relevant to
the humanitarian mission to the Kurds in
northern Iraq could be used to similar
effect during domestic emergencies; e.g.,
the catastrophic damage to south Florida
caused by Hurricane Andrew. There have
even been suggestions that SOF could use
their training and language skills to good
effect by teaching foreign languages in
inner cities.
First of all, the relevance of SOF skills
to these kinds of domestic missions is
questionable and would be open to debate
on a case-by-case basis. More fundamentally, however, there is no good reason to
exempt SOF from the general reluctance
of the American people to solve civil problems with military means. It is a fundamental principle of democracy that the
military is generally excluded from civilian affairs, to be called upon only in a limited fashion and in extraordinary circumstances. Routine military involvement in
civilian duties can also be questioned on
the grounds of readiness and efficiency.
While the military in general can bring
formidable capabilities to bear on nonmilitary problems martial efficiency, effective organization and training, massive
and sometimes unique assets tackling
domestic problems routinely would require
the military to become more like its civil-

ian counterparts and would blunt the very

characteristics that make the military efficient at waging war. If martial efficiency
and military organization and training are
relevant to domestic problems, the preferred solution should be to transplant
these characteristics to the civilian agencies normally tasked with such problems.
When these characteristics cannot be
transplanted, it is because the civilian
environment imposes more constraints
than does the military. Transferring these
constraints to the military through the
assignment of civilian missions, either on
a routine basis or for an extended period,
would reduce the militarys effectiveness
in fighting wars. Any military organization, including SOF, that assumes a major
role in support of domestic authorities
risks its readiness to participate in other
missions. Such a role also has the potential of duplicating the capabilities of civilian agencies charged with primary responsibility for the mission area.

Changed environment
Nothing we can ascertain about our
future security environment seems to
challenge the continued viability of the
traditional SOF unconventional-warrior
and commando roles. Nevertheless, some
tough questions should be raised about
old, new and emerging SOF missions. The
new security environment contains new
problems that argue for rethinking classic

Special Forces soldiers

provide medical assistance
to victims of Hurricane
Andrew in Florida.
Photo by Keith Butler

Special Warfare

missions of unconventional warfare, direct

action, special reconnaissance, foreign
internal defense and combating terrorism.
These problems may require a higher profile for those collateral missions usually
defined as security assistance, humanitarian assistance, antiterrorism, counterdrugs, personnel recovery, special activities and coalition warfare. The future may
also bring new emerging missions such as
counterproliferation and combat search
and rescue. The Secretary of Defense has
refused to rule out pre-emption as a counterproliferation option, and potential SOF
missions in a pre-emption scenario would
be most demanding.
Hostage rescue is rightly still a primary
mission for SOF. Classic terrorist-barricade situations are still a distinct possibility, but we should also consider personnelrecovery missions in the context of peace
operations, where the environment might
be more complicated and less permissive.
The unconventional-warfare mission is
more problematic. Training friendly
nations in popular defense may be a more
likely unconventional-warfare mission
than the extended, classic unconventional
warfare/guerrilla warfare mission. Critical
components of a successful populardefense movement unity of effort, popular support, will to resist, leadership,
intelligence, propaganda and outside
assistance are more easily initiated if
planned in advance. The deterrence value
of such planning and training for small
countries with larger, more powerful
neighbors is not insignificant, as the Swiss
experience attests. In any case, the unconventional-warrior mission merits continued attention since so many bedrock skills
emanate from it: training, language, crosscultural communication, small-unit tactics
behind the lines, and familiarity with
guerrilla warfare.
Peace operations will require SOF to
undertake coalition-support missions that
draw upon linguistic, cross-cultural, negotiation and training skills. Peace operations and other contingency operations
may also require SOF to assist in rudimentary training for indigenous national
police forces. With limited means availJuly 1995

Members of a United
Nations force train a hostcountry soldier in demining
operations.
United Nations photo

able for security assistance, we may have

to rely to a greater extent on small mobile
training teams in support of the foreigninternal-defense mission. Indeed, we have
seen an upswing in the number of MTT
deployments in recent years.
SOF also can expect more humanitarianassistance missions such as providing
training in mine awareness and demining,
and assisting with camp organization in
disaster-relief efforts. Humanitarian assistance should remain a collateral mission,
however, since the capabilities required are
subsumed by other primary SOF missions.
Changes in the military-technical environment as well as in the political-military
environment will force us to reconsider
some SOF missions. For example, we need
to assess the impact of long-range, precision-guided weapons on the direct-action
mission and the implications of the
increasing reliability and endurance of
unmanned aerial vehicles for the specialreconnaissance mission. Advanced
robotics may affect both mission areas.
The risks associated with putting men on
the ground may be justified only when on7

scene human judgment is required in fastevolving situations, or when humans or

material substances must be secured and
retrieved. Finally, the advent of new nonlethal technologies appears relevant to a
number of SOF missions and should be
integrated into the SOF capabilities portfolio. Nonlethal capabilities may help
transform the direct-action mission in particular. When one considers that SOF
direct action is often a viable option partly
because SOF can minimize collateral damage and unintended casualties, the value
of nonlethal capabilities is manifest.

Retaining focus
As mentioned at the outset, our objective is not to chart the specific direction
for each SOF mission area, but rather to

Because the overall resources available to

SOF will at best remain constant through the
remainder of the 1990s, every new program or
mission of a conventional nature will come
about at the expense of other capabilities.
establish some general principles. Clearly,
old missions should be re-evaluated in
light of the political-military and militarytechnical aspects of the evolving security
environment. Proposed new missions
should be evaluated in light of the intrinsic nature of special-operations forces and
the roles they can perform. In that evaluation, we should consider the following:
Does the mission have as a necessary
condition for success the requirement that
commandos/unconventional warriors
undertake it? If so, it should be considered
a primary SOF mission.
Will the odds for mission success significantly increase if SOF perform or participate in the mission? If so, their involvement might constitute a collateral mission.
Some important points to remember are:
It is often a characteristic of collateral missions that SOF cannot accomplish
them alone.
Collateral missions are often deriva8

tives of primary SOF missions.

Many, although not all, so-called
emerging missions fall into the collateralmission category.
Will the mission be only marginally
better performed by SOF? If so, it probably is not a SOF mission unless there are
special circumstances. As a general rule,
such a mission should not be formally
assigned to SOF, and the theater commander in chief should make the call on a
case-by-case basis as circumstances
demand.
If SOF do not perform the mission as
well as or better than conventional forces,
the mission obviously is inappropriate for
SOF.

Risks
If we ignore these general guidelines
and assign inappropriate missions to SOF,
we run the following risks:
Inefficient use of specialized assets for
conventional missions. This would
encroach on conventional-force capabilities
and waste scarce resources. Over time,
SOF probably would become increasingly
more guilty of the old criticism that they
rob general-purpose forces of talent needed throughout the military at the smallunit level.
Loss of an unconventional mentality.
Forcing SOF to build up expertise in conventional missions will inevitably take a
toll on unconventional thinking. Also,
because the overall resources available to
SOF will at best remain constant through
the remainder of the 1990s, every new
program or mission of a conventional
nature will come about at the expense of
other capabilities more appropriate to special operations.
Threat of reabsorption. If SOF are
increasingly undertaking missions that
one may reasonably argue could be performed by conventional forces, some
invariably will ask why SOF should not be
divided up and redistributed back to the
services. Obviously this is not the intent of
those who saw to the creation of USSOCOM in the first place.
If, on the other hand, SOF assume
Special Warfare

responsibility only for missions that are

appropriately understood to be special
operations, we retain our focus on what
makes SOF special:
Relevance. By constantly re-evaluating existing SOF missions and capabilities
for relevance to the security environment,
SOF can keep current with the nations
security needs.
Retain forward outlook. By constantly
re-evaluating existing SOF missions and
capabilities to ensure that they are consistent with the nature of SOF, we allow
SOF to pass on to conventional forces
those activities which no longer merit classification as special operations. Meanwhile, this frees resources for necessary
new missions and maintains SOFs
dynamic, forward-looking, unconventional
qualities.
Unique capability/value. A broad consensus on how SOF differ from conventional forces will increase the likelihood
that they will be used appropriately
SOF will neither be assigned missions
that rightly belong to conventional forces
nor will they be denied missions that they
ought to undertake.
By retaining this focus on what makes
SOF special, we can maintain their relevance and their special place in the
nations armory of military capabilities.
Such a focus will ensure that SOF will
continue to fulfill a unique niche in our
military supporting, not threatening,
the conventional forces as well as the
national command authorities.

Conclusion
The traditional roles that SOF have
played in the national military strategy
still seem appropriate. The roles of unconventional warrior and commando do not
duplicate the roles filled by conventional
forces, and they have continuing relevance
for the post-Cold War security environment. In considering new and emerging
SOF missions, several points are worth
noting:
With regard to a new mission, the
issue is not how important the mission is,
but rather who should perform it. The fact
July 1995

that the mission must be carried out does

not produce a convincing argument that
SOF should take responsibility for it.
Any new mission should fit the general characteristics required of a SOF mission: unconventional approaches, special
training and equipment, political awareness and special intelligence. If so, the
new mission will contribute to and reinforce SOFs core roles and competencies.
For a collateral mission, we should
ask whether it is a lesser-included case;
i.e., a derivative from competencies
required for primary missions. If not, we
must ask what mission capabilities will be
displaced, because, at best, SOF resources
will remain roughly constant in real
terms.
Finally, with respect to a collateral
mission in particular, if it is a special-operations mission only in very special circumstances, SOF probably should not assume
responsibility for the entire mission.
The element of restraint expressed here
is not to be misinterpreted as lack of
enthusiasm for or confidence in SOF. On
the contrary, SOF will be increasingly relevant to our problems of the future. For
this reason, it is important that we remain
focused on what makes special operations
special. The guidelines we have mentioned
are not rules to be applied mechanically.
There are too many other factors, such as
politics and budgets, that could influence
the assignment of roles and missions.
They are, however, good rules of thumb for
helping us keep SOF on course in the 21st
century, for ensuring SOFs relevance as a
strategic asset, for ensuring SOFs best
possible integration with conventional
forces, and for ensuring SOF will be used
appropriately and to maximum advantage.

Christopher Lamb is the director of policy planning in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict.

Emerging SOF Roles and Missions:

A Different Perspective
by Lt. Gen. William P. Yarborough, U.S. Army (ret.)

If the thoughts expressed in Christopher

Lambs article, Perspectives on Emerging
SOF Roles and Missions, reflect accurately those that guide current policy with
regard to roles, missions, tactics and strategy for special-operations forces, there is
some cause for concern.
The author sets the tone for much of his
thesis by giving his version of the nature
of special-operations forces as follows:
The simple definition of SOF is that they
are what conventional forces are not. Special operations are those military operations that conventional forces cannot
accomplish or undertake without unacceptable levels of both risk and expense of
resources.
Part of the problem with the above definition is that it is inaccurate. Only the
U.S. Armys Special Forces are capable of
performing missions that conventional
forces cannot accomplish, and even that
statement is open to compromise when we
consider the technical support that must
come from sources other than SOF, especially in connection with foreign-internaldefense missions.
Moreover, in submerging the identity of
the U.S. Armys Special Forces within the
general category of special-operations
forces, the unique characteristics of the
former that permit them to operate in foreign environments and that require language and area skills of a particularly
high order seem to have been either down10

graded or overlooked.
Other SOF components are heavily
dependent upon advanced technology and
hardware to carry out their missions. On
the other hand, Special Forces are a
human weapons system with skills that
allow them to accomplish an amazing
array of tasks that range from persuasion
by example to actual fire and movement
using indigenous, captured or even improvised equipment.
Within a SOF community overwhelmingly oriented toward the mechanics of
direct action, the subtle sophistication
that Special Forces can add to our national strategic arsenal could be overlooked.
Other than Special Forces, there is no
element of the U.S. armed services that is
capable of performing across the entire
spectrum of what is labeled, for want of a
better term, low-intensity conflict.
When the article addresses the question
of inefficient use of specialized assets for
conventional missions, a related caution
might well be that of counseling against
the use of the highly honed Special Forces
in direct-action roles. The exception would
be when such missions involve cooperation
with foreign underground, auxiliary or
other forces and call for language and area
training and the cross-training peculiar to
the U.S. Armys Special Forces. Special
Forces can perform as Rangers and
SEALs, but the reverse is true only in a
very limited sense.
Special Warfare

The presumption that Civil Affairs and

Psychological Operations are, per se, special operations should be examined closely. Civil Affairs are properly the concern of
any combat commander prior to, during or
following battle. To professional military
officers, Napoleons LXX Maxim means
that attention to the imperatives of Civil
Affairs must be part of the exercise of high
command. It is not a special operation
practiced only by special-operations forces.
Military psychological operations carried out by special-operations forces
should, except in occasional tactical situations, be products of policy-specific guidance and direction from the National Command Authority. The fact that this has not
always been the case should be of particular interest to the Director of Policy Planning. The interrelationship and modus
operandi that would require the Central
Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information
Agency and the PSYOP mechanisms of the
U.S. Army to coordinate and combine in
pursuit of various national PSYOP strategies should be goals that are constantly
sought by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense.
The articles observation that special
operations are often conducted at great
distances from support facilities, beyond
the limits of conventional military forces,
omits an equally valid note that the logistics capabilities of conventional forces may
be essential elements of the overall teamwork necessary to place and keep the special-operations forces on target. The differences between special-operations forces
and conventional forces stem from their
assigned missions, not from any deficiency
in imagination, innovation or daring on
the part of conventional soldiers and their
leaders.
Some unfamiliarity with the fundamentals of the unchanging art of war is implicit in the papers statement:
For example, in special operations, surprise achieved by speed, stealth, audacity,
deception, and new tactics and techniques
is far more important than mass.
It is certainly one criterion of military
professionalism to consider tactical and
strategic surprise, as compared to mass, to
July 1995

be of extraordinary importance in any military operation against a hostile opponent.

Surprise has historically been looked upon
as one of the major principles of war.
Final decisions as to which of Americas
strategic interests are of such value that
our nation will commit its armed forces to
safeguard them are not made by the military. In a perfect world, professional military advice would be an important factor
in shaping the overall national strategy.
The admittedly complex international
situation during the post-Cold War presents challenges to which the U.S. military can respond in a variety of ways.
However, unless these responses are carefully considered, coordinated elements of

American academic analysis of the specialoperations phenomenon dates back more

than a quarter of a century. SOF theory has
been examined and discussed from every
conceivable angle. What is needed now is
practical, pragmatic application of the accepted principles that have emerged from the volumes of philosophical conjecture.
an overall politico-military strategy, the
results will be counterproductive.
Within the corporate body of the armed
forces of the United States both the
active and reserve components there
are superb resources with which to supplement, complement and occasionally
replace the civil elements of the national
mechanism for projecting American power
and influence. For any segment of the
armed forces of the United States to
accomplish missions that fall within the
unorthodox or special category, there
are basic requirements that must be met.
Among these, the first and most important
is a clear statement of the goals to be
achieved, the resources to be provided and
the chain of command to be assigned for
every aspect of the overall enterprise.
The latter is especially important inas11

much as special operations frequently

involve, include or impinge upon areas
normally the responsibility and the turf
of nonmilitary elements of the national
power structure. Instead of being preoccupied at the Defense Department level with
the presumed differences between specialoperations forces and those of the conventional military establishment, it would be
most helpful and appropriate to pursue
questions involving national-level interagency coordination.
As Lamb confronts the complex and
sometimes abstract nature of special operations, he brings to mind the parable of
the blind men and the elephant. Some of
his observations and sensings are accurate, but his overall assessment of specialoperations forces, especially their roles
and missions, projects a picture with some
extremely fuzzy outlines.
American academic analysis of the special-operations phenomenon dates back
more than a quarter of a century. SOF
theory has been examined and discussed
from every conceivable angle. What is
needed now is practical, pragmatic application of the accepted principles that have
emerged from the volumes of philosophical
conjecture.

works relating to the special-operations

area include Terrorism The Past as an
Indication of the Future, included in
International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Greenwood Press, 1978;
Counterinsurgency: The U.S. Role (Chapter 8) in Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency, D.C. Heath, 1984; the sections
Low-Intensity Conflict, Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations in
Brasseys International Military and
Defense Encyclopedia, 1993; and the section Psychological Operations in the
Encyclopedia of the American Military,
Charles Scribners Sons, 1994. He is listed
in Whos Who in America and Whos Who
in the World.

Immediately following his

retirement from the U.S.
Army in 1971 after 36 years
of service, Lt. Gen. William
P. Yarborough undertook a
top-secret project for the
Department of the Army
that involved preparation of an operational concept and plan for the conduct of
irregular warfare in certain areas of
Southeast Asia. His other post-retirement
activities include serving as a consultant to
the Hudson Institute; Braddock, Dunn and
McDonald; and the BETAC Corporation of
Arlington, Va. He has also served as a
member of the Special Operations Policy
Advisory Group, reporting to the Secretary
of Defense. He is an honorary member of
the editorial board of Parabellum, the
Hungarian international magazine of special warfare and elite forces. His published
12

Special Warfare

Waterborne Infiltration Training:

Maintaining a Battle Focus
by Maj. David E. Johnson

A Special Forces combat-dive detachment leader and his team sergeant have
developed a concept for dive training that
costs next to nothing, includes training
with the Navy, is in the perfect location
and is incredibly challenging. However,
after briefing their battalion commander,
they are in full retreat. What happened?
Although the training they recommended was high-speed, the team leader and
team sergeant failed to tie their divetraining concept to the detachment mission-essential task list, or METL. The battalion commander justly pointed out that
the teams valuable training time would
be better spent on battle-focused training.
The existing war plans of the theater
commander drive the selection of the
METL through mission letters. Once targets have been identified and assigned to
specific teams, the teams generate plans
of execution for inclusion in their specialoperations mission-planning folders. The
theater special-operations command uses
these plans to write the group mission letter. Mission letters do not include specific
means of infiltration unless they are
called for in the plans of execution.
Units must be careful to focus their
training on the most likely tasks. This is
especially true for waterborne infiltration.
All theaters of operation have the potential for surface waterborne infiltration,
either coastal or inland. But given the
Special Forces mission profile, rotary-wing
July 1995

Photo by Al Petersen

technology, and the existence of other

units specifically designed for high-risk
water entry, a reasonable Special Forces
mission-letter analysis should identify
only a limited number of waterborne-infiltration tasks.
Any waterborne infiltration should be
trained as only a part of the mission cycle
and attached to a land infiltration and an
objective. Training should be prioritized,
with actions on the objective taking precedence over infiltration. Ideally, training
should focus on high-payoff tasks common
to most mission profiles. For example,
most Special Forces missions include the
task conduct preinfiltration activities.
The amount of time spent preparing for
13

SF Combat Diver Qualification Course

emphasizes waterborne infiltration
The Special Forces Combat Diver Qualification Course has recently changed
its program of instruction to place more emphasis on techniques of waterborne
infiltration.
During the four-week course, held at Key West, Fla., students receive training
in physical conditioning, equipment orientation, basic scuba, dive physics, underwater search techniques, dangerous marine life, dive tables, open-circuit diving,
submarine operations, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Students and instructors are challenged by 12- to 16-hour days, five days a week.
The new program of instruction, which began with Class 02-95 in March, eliminated the closed-circuit-diving portion of the SFCDQC and replaced it with training
in waterborne-infiltration techniques. The change affects an eight-day block of
instruction, according to Maj. Jose Olivero, commander of Company C, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, which teaches the SFCDQC.
Waterborne-infiltration techniques are designed to improve the infiltration and
exfiltration capabilities of SOF in over-the-horizon operations. Students study
topics such as beach-landing-site procedures; nautical chart reading; effects of
tides, currents and weather on small craft; navigation procedures; and dead-reckoning procedures. They also learn to operate and maintain small craft, including
kayaks and Zodiac boats. Students are required to perform waterborne-infiltration tasks during day and night, in all weather conditions, from distances as far
as 25 miles offshore.
The waterborne-infiltration techniques taught here are very mentally demanding, as opposed to the physical demands required of the closed-circuit portion of the
CDQC, said SFC Eddie Licon, an instructor with Company C.
The SFCDQC trains Army Special Forces and Rangers, Air Force Parachute
Rescue and Combat Air Traffic Controllers, Marines and military forces from
other nations. Company C also conducts the Diving Medical Technician Course
and the Combat Diving Supervisor Course. Paul D. Nelson, Public Affairs
Office, U.S. Army Special Operations Command

this task is doubly invested: Regardless of

which training scenario is involved, the
training will prepare the team for other
operations at the same time. The most
common, and most complex, phase of all
waterborne infiltrations is the transition
of personnel and equipment to land infiltration. High-payoff waterborne-infiltration tasks are common to missions that
require coastal or inland-waterway penetration, regardless of the delivery system.
Training on a scenario-dependent
delivery system that is only one of a myriad of possibilities is an inefficient use of
resources. For instance, the Naval Spe14

cial Warfare Command, the proponent

for maritime operations, envisions the
doctrinal use of closed-circuit rebreather
equipment in a scenario with underwater
infiltration, an underwater target and
underwater exfiltration.
In closed-circuit diving, a diver
rebreathes his own air. The rebreathing
unit recycles the divers breath, cleansing
it of carbon dioxide and mixing it with
oxygen. The rebreather produces no air
bubbles, allowing the diver to operate
undetected.
Other specific tactical scenarios may
call for a detachment to lock out of a subSpecial Warfare

marine, to conduct a deliberate water

jump using a special operations combatequipment platform, or to helocast. Some
of these scenarios are more likely to occur
than others. Infrequent training involving
every possible delivery system can serve
only as a means of familiarization and
does little to prepare the detachment for a
combat mission. Training on the use of
unique delivery systems such as closedcircuit diving gear or submarines should
be part of the preparation for a specific
operation or deployment.
Diving is not a Special Forces mission.
For Special Forces, diving is a subset of
waterborne infiltration, which is, itself, a
subset of infiltration. Other units in DoD
are tasked with beach reconnaissance and
targets close to the water. Special Forces
units are trained to infiltrate unobserved,
undefended shores to conduct operations
inland. Any number of airborne, surface or
submarine systems can deliver a detachment and its equipment to the transit
point in the water.
In view of the need for battle focus, the
JFK Center and Schools Special Forces
Combat Diver Qualification Course has
recently modified its program of instruction. Training on the closed-circuit
rebreather has been replaced by waterborne-infiltration tasks and practical exercises in an effort to help future combatdive and maritime-operations teams
become more proficient at transitioning
from water to land. Of particular utility
are the blocks of instruction on beachlanding-site operations, use of combat rubber raiding craft and kayaks, and waterproofing of equipment.
The enhanced battle focus of the
SFCDQC will provide detachments that
are better trained in those skills required
by the warfighting commanders. Operationally, only a few adjustments will be
required. Pre-scuba and SFCDQC will
continue to produce well-trained soldiers
for the combat-dive and maritime-operations detachments. Open-circuit diving
will continue, providing special-operations
forces the capability to serve as safety
divers for maritime operations, to conduct
subsurface search and recovery and hydroJuly 1995

graphic survey, and to adapt quickly when

more advanced training is required.
Support and logistics requirements will
remain almost unchanged. Dive locker
and maritime-operations support-maintenance facilities will continue to be inspected. Equipment will continue to be maintained under the Navy Material Maintenance Management System.
The late Vince Lombardi, coach of the
championship Green Bay Packers, began
each season by telling his players, Gentlemen, this is a football. In our excitement over the infinite number of tactics,
techniques and procedures available, we
should not lose sight of the basics. The
Special Forces soldier is a jack-of-alltrades. We must help him as much as possible by designing battle-focused training
and by limiting the number of skills in
which he must be an expert. With a more
solid battle focus, the force as a whole will
become more efficient in meeting the stated needs of the unified commanders. In
this period of diminishing resources, our
detachments should be spending valuable
training time, money and energy on highpayoff tasks with a go-to-war applicability.

Maj. David E. Johnson is

assigned to the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Operations, U.S.
Army Special Operations
Command, as the dive officer. He was formerly commander of ODA 565 (combat
dive) in the 2nd Battalion, 5th SF Group.
During Operation Desert Storm, he served
as commander of ODA 552; during Operation Restore Hope, he served as the J-3 for
the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia. Johnson is a 1984 graduate of the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point.

15

A USSOCOM View of Doctrine

by Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison

The United States Special Operations

Commands view of doctrine mirrors that of
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which is that doctrine must do four things:
Define the way we will train, fight and
operate.
Be authoritative and universally
practiced.
Be authored by our senior leadership
and by the best and brightest, operationally
proficient action officers.
Be accurate and easily understood,
and taught as well as used by operational
commanders.
With that in mind, we will examine three
points: USSOCOMs unique role in developing doctrine; what doctrine is and what it
does; and possibly most important, what
doctrine is not.
The principal role of USSOCOM is to
serve as a force provider to the regional
warfighting commanders in chief. The legislation that created USSOCOM assigned a
number of service-like authorities and
responsibilities to this unified or combatant
This article was originally presented at a
1994 conference co-hosted by Tufts Universitys Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
and USSOCOM. Papers from that conference have been collected and published by
the Fletcher School and USSOCOM as Special Operations Forces: Roles and Missions
in the Aftermath of the Cold War.
16

command. The most widely recognized of

these is the budgetary authority related to
Major Force Program 11. Less widely recognized, but in the long run possibly as significant, is the legislatively mandated authority
and responsibility for developing joint special-operations doctrine.
This authority, coupled with the strengthening of joint doctrine and its influence over
service doctrine (once again by legislation,
and by the interest and directives of past
and current chairmen of the JCS), places a
powerful tool in the hands of the USSOCOM
commander. The two means by which we
strengthen joint doctrine are by mandating
that service doctrine conform to joint doctrine and by placing increased pressure on
joint-force commanders to adhere to published joint doctrine.
The first of our three points is that unlike
other combatant commanders, the USCINCSOC owns a piece of joint doctrine specifically, joint special-operations doctrine. He
therefore controls service special-operations
doctrine and strongly influences the conduct
of operations by the regional combatant
commands. The importance of this authority
becomes apparent as we examine the second
point, what doctrine is and what it does.

Engine of change
Doctrine is an engine of change. As such,
it can serve as a tool for developing complementary and widely understood force strucSpecial Warfare

tures and operational procedures for the

SOF of all services. Doctrine is, and should
be, the principal instrument in effecting
deliberate, evolutionary change. In general,
today belongs to the operators, and
tomorrow is in the hands of the trainers
and training institutions. But the longterm future of the force depends on the doctrine-development process. This is not
meant to imply that doctrine has, or should
have, no influence on operations and training. On the contrary, doctrine provides a
basis for training as well as tools for the
operator. The intent here is to describe how
doctrine drives the force into evolving rationally in order to meet future challenges.
Doctrine comprises several elements. It
includes a distillation of past experience
into fundamental operating principles.
These are supplemented by tested and
proven tactics, techniques and procedures.
These historically derived portions of doctrine are combined with actual and anticipated technological advances and our best
guess of what future requirements and
operational environments will be. The
result is a description of how we see the
force operating in the future. This concept
of how and under what conditions we will
be operating is used to define organizational and materiel requirements. Doctrine, then, delineates our future capabilities and operational concepts.
As mentioned previously, doctrine is the
instrument of slow, deliberate change. Simply describing what we want the force to be
and to do does not cause significant things
to happen. Doctrine must be implemented
through changes in organization, training,
materiel and leader development. Evolutionary change, as described in doctrine, is
instituted by developing new force structures that embody doctrinal capabilities,
appropriate equipment for those structures,
institutional and unit training programs
that support new concepts and procedures,
and leader-development programs that
enable commanders to effectively employ
their forces. This clearly takes time.
Implicit in all of this is that doctrine is
not responsive enough to be the preferred
method of implementing minor changes or
fine-tuning the force. As we said, tomorrow
July 1995

belongs to the trainers. While fundamental

change is driven by doctrine, fine-tuning
and relatively minor changes are produced
in the infinitely more responsive realm of
training. Trainers must build upon the
base provided by doctrine.

Revolutionary change
Since doctrinal change requires time in
order to be effectively implemented, it is
evident that the ability to accurately forecast future requirements is a necessity for
good doctrine. Occasionally, because of
unanticipated technological advances, dramatic changes in the strategic environment
or other sudden changes affecting military
requirements and capabilities, revolution-

In general, today belongs to the operators, and tomorrow is in the hands of the
trainers and training institutions. But the
long-term future of the force depends on the
doctrine-development process.
ary, not evolutionary, change is required.
Doctrine must accommodate such change.
In such a situation, doctrine is no longer
the proactive engine of change, but rather a
reactive force attempting to fit change into
a workable framework.
The reaction to sudden, massive changes
rarely produces comprehensive, totally
coherent doctrine. Implementation of such
changes is also hampered by a force structure that may not be totally appropriate, by
the lack of institutional and unit training to
support the new concepts, by inadequate or
unfamiliar equipment, and by leaders who
are not comfortable with, or ready to implement, the new doctrine. The force requires
adequate time to fully accept and implement this kind of landmark change. As the
new concepts mature and become more
widely accepted and thoroughly implemented, we can achieve a return to orderly, disciplined, evolutionary progress.
The legislation that produced USSOCOM
and revitalized our special-operations capabilities illustrates such a change.1 Whether
17

the impending change was unpredicted,

ignored, or some combination of the two is
irrelevant. In the past few years, there have
been radical changes in SOF mission
requirements; force structure; materiel;
operational concepts; and command, control, communications and intelligence, or
C4I. Only now are we beginning to see the
new body of SOF doctrine begin to mature
and to be implemented and accepted.
We now stand at a critical point. It is
time to transition from a period of revolutionary change, in which SOF doctrine has
been reacting to drastic change, to a period
in which change is once again anticipated
and accommodated by evolutionary development driven by well-thought-out and systematically implemented doctrine. This con-

Doctrine is not a substitute for judgment,

mission analysis and good leadership. It is
not a comprehensive checklist or a template
that can be mechanically applied to any situation. In itself, doctrine does not win wars or
solve the operational problems of today.
version to systematic progress will eliminate, or at least vastly reduce, the time lags
and inefficiencies inherent in reacting to
unanticipated, externally imposed change.
The importance of making this conversion
was clearly articulated by Air Marshall
Giulio Douhet of Italy, who, referring to the
advent of air power as a force on the battlefield, stated, Victory smiles upon those who
anticipate the changes in the character of
war, not upon those who wait to adapt
themselves until after those changes
occur.2

Complementary capabilities
The function of doctrine as an engine of
change can be illustrated by its overall
effectiveness in rationalizing the roles,
missions, structure and operational procedures throughout the joint SOF community; and in integrating SOF with general18

purpose forces. The days are past of

redundant capabilities and service autonomy during operations. Escalating costs of
modern militaries, coupled with the reduction in resources available, make it simply
unacceptable to duplicate capabilities or to
fail to obtain optimal impact from the total
joint force through synchronization of
complementary capabilities.
USSOCOM inherited a diverse set of
forces from the various services. Each
force came with its own charter, history
and traditions derived from the requirements the services had placed upon them.
Before the creation of USSOCOM, not only
was there no mechanism for eliminating
redundancy and ensuring mutually complementary capabilities, standard equipment and operating procedures, there was
no real motivation to do so. The USSOCOM charter to develop joint special-operations doctrine provides the mechanism
for articulating the USCINCSOCs concept
of the roles and missions of the SOF service components.
Rationalizing the force structure and
defining who does what has been a
lengthy and painful process. But driven by
resource constraints and increasing operational requirements, this process of definition will continue. Joint SOF doctrine will
evolve and more precisely define the
extent and the limits of each component
forces functions and contribution to the
total joint force. As these definitions are
translated into service doctrine and subsequently into organization, equipment and
training, we will eliminate redundancy
and meet emerging mission requirements.
Similarly, joint special-operations doctrine will define concepts of employment,
C 4 I relationships and planning procedures. These embody the capabilities and
the limitations of the force, telling joint
staffs what they can and cannot expect of
SOF. They also tell joint staffs what is
required of them in order to receive the
full value of SOF as part of the total joint
force. Equally important, it tells SOF
units what they can reasonably expect in
the way of mission taskings, planning
guidance and support. In the absence of
coherent joint special-operations doctrine,
Special Warfare

joint headquarters cannot be expected to

accommodate different procedures and
doctrine for each of the SOF components,
and SOF are likely to be omitted or misused. As joint special-operations doctrine
becomes better-known and practiced,
rational and effective special operations
can be expected to contribute increasingly
to overall efforts.

No template
The third point deals with the limitations of doctrine. Doctrine is not a substitute for judgment, mission analysis and
good leadership. It is not a comprehensive
checklist or a template that can be
mechanically applied to any situation. In
itself, doctrine does not win wars or solve
the operational problems of today.
Operators, as stated earlier, own the
present. Remember that doctrine is based
upon an anticipated requirement or situation. The specifics of any operational mission or situation are bound to vary from
what was anticipated. Michael Howard,
the noted British military historian and
strategist, stated, I am tempted indeed to
declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the armed forces are working on
now, they have got it wrong.3
Does this make doctrine irrelevant or a
sterile effort? Of course not. The real purpose of doctrine is to come close enough in
anticipating the future to provide the
capabilities that will enable the operator
to adapt to any situation. Doctrine should
provide the standard procedures, C4I and
support mechanisms that will allow the
operator to focus on the unexpected
requirements of the situation and not
expend creative energies on the routine.
Michael Howard continues, I am also
tempted to declare that it does not matter
that they have got it wrong. What does
matter is their capacity to get it right
quickly when the moment arrives.4
If the doctrine developers have done
their jobs, the operator will have all the
tools organization, materiel, training
and procedures to accomplish his. And
the tools will be better than those of his
opponent. From that point forward, it is
July 1995

up to the operator.
The authority granted USSOCOM to
develop joint special-operations doctrine is
key to the long-term success of special
operations. As the command matures, doctrine will provide the impetus and the
focus for evolutionary change and
progress. And joint special-operations doctrine, if properly developed, will allow us
to field a capable, well-trained and wellequipped force prepared to meet the challenges of the future.

Maj. Gen. William F.

Garrison is commander of
the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School. In previous assignments, he
served as commander of the
Joint Special Operations
Command, as deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, and as deputy commander of
the U.S. Army Intelligence Security
Agency of the U.S. Army Intelligence and
Security Command.
Notes:
1 The Cohen-Nunn Amendment to the Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, as attached to
the Defense Authorization Act, FY 1987.
2 Giulio Douhet as quoted in Contrails; The Air
Force Cadet Handbook 23 (1977-78) : 147.
3 Michael Howard, Military Science in an Age of
Peace, speech given 3 October 1973 at the Chesney
Memorial Gold Medal Lecture. As quoted in Journal
of the Royal United Service Institute, March 1974, pp.
3-9.
4 Ibid.

19

Civil Affairs: A Function of Command

In war as well as in military operations

other than war, soldiers and leaders at all
levels will be forced to deal with unique
situations requiring interface with individuals and groups outside the normal
scope of traditional military operations.
Activities in Operations Urgent Fury,
Just Cause, Desert Shield/Storm, Provide
Comfort, Continue/Restore Hope, and
Uphold/Maintain Democracy have served
to convince the service chiefs that todays
maneuver commander must deal with
civilians, either as belligerents or as noncombatants. Whichever case applies,
some knowledge of Civil Affairs operations is of paramount importance if U.S.
commanders are to discharge their
responsibilities toward civilians within
the scope of U.S. national intent and
international agreements.
In planning for future operations and
assessing their ability to influence or
interact with civilians in their area of
responsibility,1 commanders should consider the following assumptions:
Noncombatants 2 have a significant
influence on military operations.

The number and the tempo of operations other than war will increase in the
future. With these unique missions come
requirements to conduct military operations in spite of, or in concert with, civilian
populations and agencies.3
Because of the character of these missions, military leaders at all levels must
be able to understand and to exploit cultural and infrastructure peculiarities of
the target population.
A fourth spectrum of conflict, 4 socalled information war, will require U.S.
forces to be especially sensitive to actions
which could be negatively interpreted or
represented by the media.
With the adoption of the concept of
force projection, it is essential that commanders exploit host-nation and targetcountry capabilities which facilitate or
support military operations.
The number of combined or coalition
operations is likely to increase.
Humanitarian and civic-assistance
operations, in concert with United Nations
peacekeeping operations, will also
increase.

Functions of command
This is the first of a series of white
papers to be published by the JFK Special
Warfare Center and School. The series is
intended to stimulate thought and discussion on SOF doctrinal issues.

20

Given these assumptions, it is time for

the services to aggressively pursue doctrinal and policy changes that will help to
ensure success in missions involving civilians. Although doctrine writers have conSpecial Warfare

A soldier from the 82nd Airborne Division watches a

group of Grenadians near
Point Salines Airfield during Operation Urgent Fury
in 1983.
U.S. Air Force photo

ceived new military terms for emerging

types of warfare and operations other than
war, the principles of war have remained
constant. The many recent contingency
operations have differed from anything
the U.S. has undertaken in the past, yet
no new principles of war have emerged
from them.
Like the principles of war, another set of
standards has evolved through the years
to delineate the major tasks for which
commanders bear sole responsibility.
These standards are the functions of command. They include personnel management, intelligence and security, operations
and training, administration, logistics,
communications, and Civil Affairs.5

CA Directive
Secretary of Defense William Perry has
recently issued the first definitive Civil
Affairs directive, DoD Directive 2000.13, a
much-needed first step in correcting Civil
Affairs planning and execution deficiencies throughout the Department of
Defense. It establishes policy and assigns
responsibilities under various DoD direcJuly 1995

tives for conducting DoD-wide Civil

Affairs activities. The directive applies to
The Office of Secretary of Defense, the
Military Departments (including the U.S.
Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy), the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified
Combatant Commanders, the Defense
Agencies, and the DoD Field Activities, ...
Non-DoD organizations that are participating in DoD civil affairs activities or are
requesting DoD civil affairs capabilities.
Secretary Perry establishes the DoD
policy that The DoD shall maintain a
capability to conduct a broad range of civil
affairs activities necessary to support DoD
missions and to meet DoD Component
responsibilities to the civilian sector in foreign areas in peace and war throughout
the range of military operations. He further directs that the Secretary of the
Army, in conjunction with USCINCSOC,
recruit, organize, train, equip, mobilize,
and sustain Army civil affairs forces.
The first step in preparing units and
leaders to conduct military operations
involving noncombatants is to recognize
that Civil Affairs is a function of com21

Soldiers of the Army Civil

Affairs and Psychological
Operations Command provide medical treatment to a
Thai woman during a medical civic-action project.

Photo by Keith Butler

mand, not merely an arcane specialty relegated to the role of an afterthought in the
planning cycle. U.S. Army Field Manual
101-5, Staff Organization and Operations,
states:
Command includes the authority and
responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the
employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to
accomplish assigned missions International law and the Law of Land Warfare
specify the commanders ethical responsibility in military operations and for the
indigenous population in an area of
operation. Command and control is the
process through which the activities of military forces are directed, coordinated, and
controlled to accomplish the mission. This
process encompasses the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures necessary to gather and analyze
information, to plan for what is to be done,
to issue instructions, and to supervise the
execution of operations.6
Commanders routinely plan for fire support, air defense and other components of
the battlefield operating systems. Planning for military contact with host-nation
and target-country civilians and for separate civil-military operations should also
be routine for all battalion-sized and larger units. As an example, even if a maneuver commander is not provided nonorganic
fire-support assets, he will certainly plan
22

for the employment of his organic assets

in a fire-support role. Planning for Civil
Affairs is no different. While conducting
intelligence preparation of the battlefield,
the commander should identify such
things as:
Large concentrations of civilian
populations,
Likely refugee and migrant escape
routes,
Potential camp sites for dislocated
civilians,
Potential civilian and host-nation
sources of supply,
Specific groups or concentrations of
third-country nationals, nongovernmental organizations, or private voluntary
organizations, and
Impacts of all the above on the
operation.

Planning for noncombatants

Commanders at all levels must learn to
anticipate and plan for the effects of noncombatants on the battlefield. Often when
units do not receive Civil Affairs augmentation, noncombatants are given minimal
or no consideration. This has been recognized by the Armys senior leadership.
Recent rotations at the Joint Readiness
Training Center have incorporated significant civilian play into the exercise scenarios. Commanders who experience the frustration and difficulties of dealing with
Special Warfare

noncombatants in these exercises learn

firsthand the value of treating Civil
Affairs as a function of command.
Despite these lessons from the field, the
services and the professional-military-education system have been slow to bring doctrine and force structure up to date with
reality. Civil Affairs is given little, if any,
mention in combat-arms officer basic and
advanced courses, and the students
receive no formal instruction in this vital,
emerging requirement. In fact, the only
Civil Affairs involvement that students
experience in the Command and General
Staff Officers Course at Fort Leavenworth
is relegated to an elective, which few students choose to attend, and minimal play
in a battle simulation. This in spite of the
fact that the most likely operational scenarios for the immediate future (military
involvement in Korea, Haiti, the Former
Republics of Yugoslavia, and Somaliastyle humanitarian assistance) either center around or involve significant play of
refugees and noncombatants.
On a positive note, the Special Warfare
Center and School has taken a significant
step toward integrating civilian and noncombatant play into exercises and schoolhouse instruction. The SWCS has recommended a modification to the age-old planning tool of mission, enemy, terrain, troops,
and time available, or METT-T, into
METT-T-C, to include the weighty factor of
civilians into the commanders planning
process. The new term has not, however,
been promulgated in service manuals.

Restructuring efforts
To assist commanders in the performance of their duties, the Army has developed branches that support the various
functions of command all are activecomponent branches except for Civil
Affairs. Civil Affairs is a branch in the
July 1995

Army Reserve only; it is a functional area

in the active component. Since World War
II, the rationale for such an active-component void has been that the one activecomponent battalion would provide a
rapid response (if sufficient forces were
available) and the remaining requirements would be fielded by the many Civil
Affairs units in the USAR.
After-action reports on simulations
ranging from command-post exercises to
computer-assisted games, as well as
reports on combat operations, attest to the
fact that commanders have little, if any,
knowledge of the Civil Affairs function of
command. Delegating that command function to nonorganic active- and reservecomponent units is not the commanders
best course of action in meeting his
responsibility toward civilians. The Special Warfare Center and School is working
to increase the number of CA positions in
the Army division.

CMO section
Two factors that preclude the effective
integration of the civil-military-operations
section into unit operations are the physical separation of the CMO section from
the intelligence and operations sections
and the mindset that Civil Affairs is an
issue detached from operational
planning.7
Unlike the personnel and logistics staff
sections, which are generally focused
inward toward sustaining unit operations,
the CMO section, like the intelligence and
operations sections, is focused on the
operational area. It exists primarily to
plan, facilitate and assist in the ongoing
execution of unit missions. To plan and
coordinate these missions, the operations
section must rely heavily on information
provided by the intelligence and CMO sections. Items such as situational and plan23

ning maps, overlays of movement routes

for dislocated civilians, sources of hostnation support, national religious and cultural monuments, hospitals and power
plants, and most importantly, analysis,
provide the operations officer with a
wider perspective. It is important that the
two sections have access to the operations
officer and to the immediate intent and
views of the commander.
The present structure of a typical CMO
section includes the primary CMO staff officer, staff section assistants (officers and
NCOs), and provisions for CA generalists or
functional specialists in times of deliberate
or crisis-action planning.
The lack of understanding and the
unwillingness to give credence to Civil
Affairs as a function of command have
caused the CMO section to be misused in
most cases. In many Army units the position of CMO staff officer has been downgraded to the point that it is one rank

lower than the other primary staff officers.

The CMO staff officer at division and
corps levels serves as the commanders
primary adviser on those aspects of military operations relating to civilians, the
impact of civil matters on military operations, and the consequences of military
operations on the civilian population.
Although the combat uses of this key
staff officer are many, in only a few units
has the CMO staff officer been allowed a
position in the main command post/tactical operations center a recognition of
Civil Affairs as a full-fledged, viable member of the intelligence/operations/CMO
team.
Current doctrine locates the CMO section in the rear command post during
deployment. Thus positioned, it cannot
fully analyze the impact of noncombatants
on the operation and provide the commander and the operations officer with the
civil-military operations estimate, which

Members of the U.S.

Marine Corps check rosters for names of Haitian
refugees coming in to
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Photo by M.T. Huff

24

Special Warfare

considers the commanders moral and

legal obligations.
The CMO section must be located where
it can better monitor the current situation
and provide advice to the commander, the
operations officer and the intelligence officer. The CMO staff officer can plan, coordinate and provide staff oversight of civilmilitary issues only through direct coordination with the unit operations officer,
who is charged with planning and integrating the overall operational effort.
The current concept of battlefield operating systems provides a superb missionanalysis tool. It includes every aspect of
what commanders may encounter on
todays battlefield except civilians. This
omission only reinforces the fact that
commanders rarely plan and prepare for
civilians caught in the chaos of military
operations.
If the Army is to seriously address those
tasks directed by the Secretary of
Defenses Civil Affairs directive, the following three actions must occur:
Include Civil Affairs instruction in
schools when teaching the other functions
and responsibilities of command.
Provide a capable CMO section to execute those duties required within the CA
functions of command.
Position the CMO staff officer in the
main command post/TOC, where interface
and exposure can occur, not only with current intelligence, situation, plans and situation reports, but also with the commander.

Conclusion
The challenges presented by noncombatants on the battlefield during military
operations, both in war and military operations other than war, will remain.
The main command post is the most
suitable place from which to monitor the
current situation, review all incoming
July 1995

information, develop input for courses of

action and maintain the civil-military
operations estimate.
The Army needs to properly structure
CMO sections at the corps and division levels and change doctrine to reflect that Civil
Affairs is an operations function, not a sustainment function. These enhancements
will allow commanders to exercise Civil
Affairs as a true function of command.
Notes:
1 Dislocated civilians.
2 Civilians, displaced persons, refugees and others
not openly carrying arms.
3 Nongovernmental organizations and private volunteer organizations.
4 The four areas and means of waging conflict, similar to the instruments of national power, being political, economic, military and informational. Informational refers to the advantages gained by an adversary in capitalizing on available media outlets to present the struggle in a favorable light, while simultaneously seeking to discredit the opponents activities,
whether that opponent be an actual military force or
simply the political situation within the area at the
time U.S. forces participate in such activities.
5 Per Annex L (Civil Affairs) of the current Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan; and the Secretary of
Defenses Civil Affairs Directive, dated January
1994.
6 Para 1-1, page 1-1, FM 101-5, dated 5 May 1984.
7 CA planning is normally done in isolation, separate from operational planning. Typically, once
courses of action have been identified and a concept
has been drafted by the S-3/G-3/J-3, a distinct
CMO/CA annex is prepared. The cycle remains that
the operational concept is conceived, and then the S5/G-5/J-3-CMO officer develops a plan to support the
base plan and intent. USAJFKSWCS contends that
integrating the S-5/G-5/J-3-CMO into the operational
planning cell would aid in both planning and execution, particularly in military operations other than
war.

25

Operation Uphold Democracy: The Role of the

SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force
by Lt. Col. James L. Dunn and Maj. Jon M. Custer

On the night of Sept. 18, 1994, nearly

100 U.S. Air Force C-141 and C-130 aircraft loaded with paratroopers and heavydrop equipment were either in the air or
preparing to take off from various bases in
the United States. Numerous U.S. Navy,
Coast Guard, and Army ships and support
vessels were taking their designated positions in the Caribbean. U.S. Marine Corps
personnel were boarding amphibious
assault vessels or aircraft, and specialoperations forces had been launched or

were preparing to do so.

As part of Joint Task Force 180, all of
these forces shared the same mission:
Conduct a forcible entry into Haiti, establish a secure environment, and restore
democratically elected President JeanBertrand Aristide, who was waiting in
exile in the United States. A few hours
earlier, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, commanding general of the XVIII Airborne Corps
and commander of JTF 180, had received
the execute order from U.S. Atlantic Com-

Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton,

commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps and of JTF
180, talks with Haitian military officials during Operation Uphold Democracy.

Photo by Joel Herard

26

Special Warfare

mand, or USACOM, and was aboard the

USS Mount Whitney en route to Haiti.
Through the various command, control,
communications, computer, intelligence,
and information, or C4I2, systems on the
USS Mount Whitney, Shelton and his staff
monitored the progress of JTF 180 and the
late-breaking developments in Haiti. Knowing that H-Hour was only five hours away,
JTF staff members followed the progress of
former President Jimmy Carter, Senator
Sam Nunn and retired Gen. Colin Powell,
who were in Haitis capital city, Port-auPrince, conducting last-minute negotiations
in an effort to solve the crisis without bloodshed. Soon the JTF received an abort message from USACOM the American delegation and the Haitians had reached an
agreement.
Upon the American delegations departure
from Haiti, JTF 180 received new guidance
from USACOM: In the early hours of Sept.
19, Shelton and a symbolic force were to
make an unopposed entry into Haiti, after
which Shelton was to meet with Lt. Gen.
Raoul Cedras to discuss further JTF 180
deployments. As millions of Americans
watched on television the next morning,
Operation Uphold Democracy began to
unfold.
Though it looked simple, the operation
required months of intensive planning and
coordination efforts which continued after
the operation began. JTF 180s special-operations coordination element, or SOCOORD,
played a small but important role in those
efforts.

SOCOORDs Army role

The SOCOORD is a relatively new element in the Army, having been conceptualized at the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command, or USASOC, in the late 1980s.
By 1992, a SOCOORD was established in
each of the Armys active corps headquarters. Each SOCOORD includes four members: the chief, a Special Forces lieutenant
colonel; the SF plans and operations officer,
an SF major; the Ranger plans and operations officer, an Infantry captain or major
with Ranger Regiment experience; and the
SOCOORD sergeant major, an SF sergeant
July 1995

major. The SOCOORD works as a separate

and distinct division within the corps G-3
staff.
The SOCOORD concept is simple: to integrate Army SOF, specifically SF and
Rangers, into the Armys conventional operations. According to the SOCOORD Handbook, published by the U.S. Army John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and
School, the SOCOORDs specific mission is:
To act as the principal adviser to the corps
commander and his staff concerning the
capabilities and limitations of Army SF and
Ranger units. The SOCOORD advises the
corps G3 which corps course of action best
allows for the optimal utilization of the capabilities of SF and Ranger units and develops
target nominations and mission require-

Operation Uphold Democracy required

months of intensive planning and coordination efforts. JTF 180s special-operations
coordination element played a small but
important role in those efforts.
ments for the corps to forward to the joint
force commander (JFC) ,which will result in
mission taskings appropriate for SF and
Ranger units. If SF or Ranger units are
attached or [under operational control] to the
corps (normally on a mission-by-mission
basis), [the SOCOORD will] act as their focal
point on the corps staff for coordination of
support (administrative, logistical, or intelligence) [those units] will require from the
corps and for synchronization of operations.
The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD
accomplishes its mission in numerous ways:
Works in conjunction with the G-3
plans division to conduct periodic reviews of
the corps war plans and rewrites SOF
annexes as required;
Prepares a SOF estimate and writes a
SOF annex for each operation or exercise of
the corps;
Coordinates with USASOC to ensure
availability of SF and Ranger units for
integration into corps- and division-level
exercises;
27

 Coordinates with USASOC for the

assignment of special-operations command-and-control elements, or SOCCEs,
at corps or divisional headquarters;
Serves as the SOCCEs focal point for
coordination and integration within the
corps staff;
Participates as a member of the corps
battle management cell to ensure optimal
use of SF and Ranger units and synchronization with the corps battlefield operating systems;
Serves as a member of the corps
assault command post;
Deploys with the corps and establishes a SOCOORD/ SOCCE work site within
the corps main command post in proximity
to the fire-support element, the G-3 current operations section, and the G-3 plans
division;
Serves as a member of the corps deep
operations coordination cell; and
Attends and provides input for corps
targeting board meetings.
How do these actions prepare the SOCOORD to work in a JTF headquarters? For
Army personnel, a joint organization can
appear complex: the presence of other service components and staff officers creates
an unfamiliar environment. The Army
emphasizes that its manuals on doctrine
and on tactics, techniques and procedures
be prepared in consistency with joint publications, but there are still differences that
require an understanding of joint terminology, organization, command relationships
and planning processes. Nevertheless, since
special operations are by nature joint, and
SOCOORD members normally have some
experience in the joint arena, the SOCOORD is well-suited for the work on a JTF.
The following discussion describes how the
XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD integrated itself into JTF 180s staff and accomplished its missions.

Complex planning
On Jan. 8, 1994, USACOM, through U.S.
Army Forces Command, tasked the XVIII
Airborne Corps to begin compartmented
development of OPLAN 2370 for a forcible
entry into Haiti. The XVIII Airborne Corps,
28

designated JTF 180 for this tasking,

formed a small joint planning group, or
JPG, with augmentation from various elements within the Department of Defense.
Initially, the XVIII Airborne Corps
SOCOORD was only minimally involved
in the development of the OPLAN because
of the small size and compartmented
nature of the JPG, and because the SOCOORD, not formally recognized in joint publications as part of a JTF, did not have a
clearly delineated role at the joint level.
The SOCOORD chief therefore attended
the early planning sessions primarily to
monitor the JPGs progress.
In coordination with USACOM, the U.S.
Special Operations Command, or USSOCOM, provided a small team of SOF planners to work on the JPG. The SOF planners received guidance from the JPG and
worked with their units to develop specialoperations concepts to support JTF 180.
USACOMs J-34 (special operations) provided guidance through the SOF portions
of USACOMs orders.
In the early stages of the planning process, USSOCOM designated a joint specialoperations task force, or JSOTF, which
included units from some of USSOCOMs
components. The JSOTFs planners, conducting parallel planning in close cooperation with JTF 180s JPG, developed initial
concepts for the employment of SOF in
direct action, in foreign internal defense
and in certain collateral activities. One of
the subordinate task forces of the JSOTF
was Task Force Raleigh. As the principal
force provider for Task Force Raleigh, the
3rd Special Forces Group had its own planning cell that developed and refined the
concept for the FID missions. The 3rd
Group planning cell coordinated its work
with the JSOTF and the JTF 180 planners.

JTF 180 SOCOORD

The expanding number and the multiple
levels of SOF planning cells and the growing
complexity of the OPLAN made clear that
JTF 180 needed SOF planners who would
answer directly to the JTF J-3. Such an
arrangement would ensure that the JTF
commanders guidance and missions for
Special Warfare

Operation Uphold Democracy

A Summary of Key Events

Jan. 8, 1994: XVIII Abn. Corps is designated

JTF 180 for planning; begins compartmented
planning for forcible entry (OPLAN 2370).
January-June 1994: Initial planning and rehearsals; JTF 180 forces and JSOTF designated; OPLAN 2370 essentially completed; fine-tuning and coordination continue.
July 1, 1994: USACOM directs planning for an
unopposed entry; JTF 180 staff begins work on
OPLAN 2380; staff-estimate process and rough
draft of new OPLAN completed; refinements
continue on OPLAN 2370.
July 29, 1994: 10th Mountain Division is designated JTF 190 for planning and assumes planning responsibility for OPLAN 2380; JTF 180
staff focuses on refining OPLAN 2370.
Sept. 2, 1994: USACOM directs JTF 180 to
maintain OPLANs 2370 and 2380 while merging both into OPLAN 2375; JTF 180 leads planning process; new concept calls for forcible entry by JTF 180 with quick transition to JTF 190.
Sept. 10, 1994: JTF 180 EOC begins 24-hour
operations; JTF 180 staff begins crisis-action
planning to continue development of OPLAN
2375.

SOF would be protected; that boundaries,

linkup plans and other control measures
between SOF and the 82nd Airborne Division in central and southern Haiti were clear
and fully coordinated; and that the interaction between SOF and the special Marine
air-ground task force, or SPMAGTF, in
northern Haiti was fully coordinated.
Though it is not addressed in joint publications, the SOCOORD was the perfect
element to perform such functions.
Accordingly, the SOCOORDs SF plans
and operations officer took on a full-time
planning and coordinating role in May.
His primary contacts were at the JSOTF;
however, this officer worked closely with
all the key planning cells. At the JPG, he
continually reviewed the JTFs developing
plan, integrated input from the various
special-operations planners, and developed two key appendices for the JTFs
OPLAN 2370: Appendix 5 (Special OperaJuly 1995

Sept. 11, 1994: JTF 180 staff begins 24-hour

operations; continues refinements necessary to
merge OPLANs 2370 and 2380 into OPLAN
2375; JTF 180 components involved in loading
of equipment, deployment to JOA or ISBs, and
final mission preparation.
Sept. 18, 1994: JTF 180 command group and
principal staff embark on USS Mount Whitney;
components forces in place to begin forcible entry; U.S. delegation in Port-au-Prince reaches
agreement with Haitians; JTF 180 aborts forcible entry; USACOM provides new guidance.
Sept. 19, 1994: Operation Uphold Democracy
begins when JTF 180 commander and initial
JTF 190 forces go ashore; OPCON of TF Raleigh/ARSOTF Haiti shifts from JSOTF to JTF
190.
Oct. 12, 1994: Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras departs
Haiti.
Oct. 15, 1994: President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returns to Haiti.
Oct. 24, 1994: JTF 180 relinquishes control of
JOA to JTF 190 at 2400 Zulu.
Oct. 25, 1994: JTF 180 commander and staff
redeploy to the U.S.

tions) and Appendix 21 (Linkups) to

Annex C (Operations). Over the next few
months, key-leader rehearsals and continuing coordination allowed the SF plans
and operations officer to develop updated
versions of both appendices.

Parallel plans
As long as planning efforts were compartmented, the other SOCOORD members
were not involved in the planning process.
On July 1, however, new guidance from
USACOM revised the focus of the planning
effort: Develop a plan for an unopposed
entry into Haiti (OPLAN 2380), while continuing to refine OPLAN 2370. A key
assumption in OPLAN 2380 was that political developments, negotiations and United
Nations political pressure would cause the
de facto Haitian leadership to leave the
island, opening the way for Aristide to
29

invite U.S. military intervention; or that

the de facto leadership, sensing the futility
of its actions, would itself open the door for
such an unopposed intervention. The new
plan would not be compartmented, so more
planners could be involved.
Although the 82nd Airborne Division was
the principal Army force for OPLAN 2370,
the 10th Mountain Division took on the
role under OPLAN 2380 (the SPMAGTFs
basic role would not change). The unopposed nature of OPLAN 2380 also negated
the need for SOF DA missions envisioned
under the forcible-entry option.
On July 5, the new SOCOORD chief
began reviewing and supervising the

A key assumption in OPLAN 2380 was that

political developments, negotiations and
United Nations political pressure would
cause the de facto Haitian leadership to
leave the island, opening the way for Aristide to invite U.S. military intervention.
SOCOORD planning efforts. As the former
executive officer for the 3rd SF Group, he
was already familiar with the concepts of
operation for the 3rd Group and the JSOTF
under OPLAN 2370.
Since overall planning now involved the
parallel development of two separate
OPLANs, the SOCOORD chief had the SF
plans and operations officer continue to
work primarily on OPLAN 2370 while the
Ranger plans and operations officer and the
SOCOORD sergeant major worked on
OPLAN 2380. The SOCOORDs normal
business also continued as the corps staff
began to focus on the upcoming Corps
Warfighter exercise (part of the Battle
Command Training Program, or BCTP)
scheduled for December 1994.

JTF 190
As work progressed on OPLAN 2380, no
one knew whether the unopposed-entry
option would be feasible. Indications from
Haiti in July were that the de facto govern30

ment appeared to be more entrenched and

hostile than ever, and JTF 180s staff felt it
should put a more intensive effort into
OPLAN 2370, since the forcible-entry plan
was more complex and required fine-tuning
of countless details. Therefore, with many
key members of the corps staff involved in
both OPLAN working groups, and with
preparation for the Corps Warfighter still
ahead, Shelton recommended to
FORSCOM and USACOM that the 10th
Mountain Division, as JTF 190, assume
responsibility for the planning of OPLAN
2380. The recommendation was approved,
and on July 29, JTF 180 transferred
OPLAN 2380 to JTF 190s planners.
Since JTF 190 was based on an Army
division and not a corps, it had no SOCOORD. But OPLAN 2380 involved extensive
SOF roles, and JTF 190s staff needed dedicated SOF planners. JTF 180s SOCOORD was committed to OPLAN 2370 and
to the preparation for Corps Warfighter.
Therefore, during the SOF portion of the
hand-off briefs to JTF 190s planners, the
XVIII Corps SOCOORD recommended
that JTF 190 seek long-term augmentation from USACOMs Special Operations
Command-Atlantic, or SOCLANT, and
USSOCOM. The SOCOORD also offered
to send one or two of its members to the
10th Division headquarters at Fort Drum
as a short-term fix.
Because of the 3rd SF Groups extensive
FID role in OPLAN 2380, JTF 190 opted
to accept 3rd Groups offer to provide a
temporary planning team. This solution
worked in the short term, but it left the
JTF with no long-term dedicated SOF
planning and coordination cell. A full-time
cell could assist with initial planning and
deploy with the JTF to continue working
on SOF issues.

Third OPLAN
As the political and economic situations in Haiti worsened, USACOM provided new OPLAN guidance on Sept. 2:
Continue to refine OPLANs 2370 and
2380, while merging them into a third
OPLAN that would envision a forcible
entry by JTF 180, quickly followed by
Special Warfare

the deployment of, and the transition to,

JTF 190. JTF 180s staff called this new
version OPLAN 2375.
In conjunction with the JTF 180 staff,
the SOCOORD reviewed OPLANs 2370
and 2380 in an effort to bridge gaps
between the two. The most significant
challenge was to ensure that SOF command-and-control channels remained
clear during and after the transition
between JTF 180 and JTF 190. In
preparing OPLAN 2375s synchronization matrix, the SOCOORD set a relatively firm schedule for the transfer of
operational control of TF Raleigh from
the JSOTF to JTF 190 on or about D+4,
after which TF Raleigh would become
Army Special Operations Task Force
Haiti, or ARSOTF Haiti.
On Sept. 8, after receiving guidance
from USACOM, JTF 180 activated its
emergency operations center and placed
its personnel on a four-hour recall.
Because the synchronization matrix
included numerous time-sensitive
actions (including force deployments)
that had to be accomplished, the EOC
began 24-hour operations Sept. 10.
In the meantime, the JTF battle-management cell, directed by the J-5, began
daily sessions to complete OPLAN 2375.
SOCOORD members participated in all
these sessions, which produced a warning order and the completed synchronization matrix.
On Sept. 11 (D-9), the JTF 180 staff
began 24-hour operations in the corps
battle-simulation center. The JSOTF
team of liaison officers collocated with
the SOCOORD the same day. Additional
joint augmentees and numerous teams
of LNOs arrived during the next few
days.
During the next week, the SOCOORD
and the JSOTF LNO team participated
in the JTF staffs crisis-action planning.
Once the JTFs components began their
final preparations and the forces began
deploying to their designated maritime
locations and intermediate staging
bases, the bridging between OPLANs
2370 and 2380 was essentially complete.
The SOCOORD monitored the
July 1995

progress of SOF deployments and conducted final reviews and the coordination of critical issues that could affect
the operation. For example, the SOCOORD reviewed the boundaries between
SOF and the other JTF forces to ensure
complete understanding by all parties;
it confirmed linkup procedures through
discussions with the 82nd Airborne
Division staff and the JSOTF LNOs;
and it updated the final changes to execution checklists.
Additionally, the SOCOORD and the
JSOTF LNOs, in conjunction with the
J-3 chief of operations, prepared for
their deployment with the JTF staff.
Working under the assumption that the
JTF 180 commander would embark on
D-1 aboard the USS Mount Whitney,
the SOCOORD agreed that its chief
should do the same. The SOCOORD further agreed that the JSOTF LNO currently with the JTF staff would jump
with the JTFs assault command post on
D-Day, and that the SOCOORDs SF
and Ranger plans and operations officers would airland with the JTF main
CP on both D-Day and D+1. The SOCOORD sergeant major would remain at
Fort Bragg with the JTF rear CP; he
would be joined by a one-man JSOTF
LNO and an augmentation officer from
the Army Special Forces Command, or
USASFC, in order to maintain 24-hour
operations.
During this period, USACOM pushed
the countdown ahead one day. Consequently, Sept. 15 became D-4. Having
completed all coordination, the JTF
staff began the final stages of its own
deployment on Sept. 18 (now D-1). The
SOCOORD chief embarked on the USS
Mount Whitney, and the SF and Ranger
plans and operations officers prepared
for their own deployments.
By 1700 Zulu on D-1, the JTFs command group and principal staff, the
LNO teams, the Navy forces staff, and
the joint rescue coordination center
were aboard the USS Mount Whitney,
which was steaming toward its designated position near Port-au-Prince. It
would arrive in position around H31

Hour, D-Day, designated as 0400 Zulu,

Sept. 19.

Fourth plan
After receiving the abort message and
new guidance from USACOM, JTF 180s
staff realized it had less than 12 hours to
execute a variation of the three OPLANs.
The JTF was no longer conducting a
forcible entry into a hostile environment,
but it could not assume entry into a permissive environment. Accordingly, the
staff recommended and received approval
for an unopposed entry into an uncertain
environment, with JTF 190 as the main
effort. The staff called this the 2380(+)
option, since it involved more aspects of
OPLAN 2380 than of the other two
OPLANs.
Within the special-operations realm, the
JTF needed to involve SOF in the new
plan as quickly as possible, since TF
Raleighs primary role was to establish
security in the outlying areas of the country through its presence and through close
contact with and monitoring of the
Haitian military. Transfer of the operational control of TF Raleigh from the
JSOTF to JTF 190 was scheduled for D+4,
after which TF Raleigh would become the
Army Special Operations Task Force.
However, JTF 180 decided to transfer TF
Raleighs operational control on D-Day,
after JTF 190 had established initial security positions in the Port-au-Prince area.
The JSOTF would retain responsibility for
the ARSOTFs insertions into Haiti.
The early transfer of control caused
gaps in the information flow for the following reasons:
JTF 190 did not have a SOCOORD or a
special-operations cell that could monitor
and plan for ARSOTF Haitis operations.
During the first few days, JTF 190
focused on its buildup of conventional
forces and on the establishment of a
secure environment in the Port-au-Prince
area. It was not prepared to monitor or
influence efforts to expand into the outlying areas.
ARSOTF Haiti had a significant LNO
package with the JSOTF, ensuring an
32

effective command, control and communications link; it had no similar arrangement with JTF 190. By D+1, the ARSOTF
did have a one-man LNO at JTF 190, but
a one-man shop cannot conduct 24-hour
operations.
JTF 180s SOCOORD chief was a oneman SOCOORD who was aboard the USS
Mount Whitney.

Plan execution
Commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard Potter, ARSOTF Haiti began its initial insertions into the Port-au-Prince area on D+1,
followed by subsequent insertions into a
few of the outlying areas on D+2 and D+5.
JTF 180, however, did not have a clear
report of the ARSOTFs progress.
The SOCOORD chief worked closely
with the JSOTF LNO over the next few
days to follow ARSOTF Haitis progress.
The two worked through ARSOTF Haitis
LNOs at the JSOTF headquarters to
establish indirect communications with
the ARSOTF. During the same period,
JTF 180s J-3 repeatedly emphasized to
JTF 190s J-3 the importance of monitoring and reporting ARSOTF Haitis
progress. By D+1, the SOCOORD chief
had also established limited communications with the ARSOTFs one-man LNO at
JTF 190; however, this communications
link remained sporadic and generally
unusable until D+6.
After JTF 180s assault and main CPs
arrived in Haiti on D+1 and D+2, their
personnel (along with the SOCOORDs SF
and Ranger plans and operations officers)
assisted JTF 190 in establishing barracks
and staff worksites near the airfield in
Port-au-Prince. Most of the JTF 180 command-post personnel who had been ashore
were redeployed to the U.S. by D+4; the
two SOCOORD officers were among them.
On Sept. 24 (D+5), the SOCOORD chief
went ashore for 24 hours to visit the
ARSOTF Haiti staff and its LNO at JTF
190. They discussed methods for improving the information flow and clarified
questions concerning the JTF 180 commanders intent for SOF. Convinced that
the problems concerning the information
Special Warfare

Brig. Gen. Richard Potter

meets with the Haitian
base commander in Portau-Prince. Potter, the commander of ARSOTF Haiti,
was in constant coordination with the senior Haitian
military staff.
Photo by Brian Gavin

flow had been resolved, the SOCOORD

chief returned to the USS Mount Whitney
on Sept. 25.
Potter, supporting efforts to expand
outward as quickly as the security situation allowed, was aggressively involved
in daily meetings and constant coordination with the senior Haitian military
staff. Shelton met with Cedras each
morning, and Potter met with Cedras
principal staff members each afternoon
to make sure they understood what they
had to accomplish to improve the security posture.
Meanwhile, the ARSOTF staff was planning and issuing orders for an aggressive
expansion. Special Forces forward operating bases, B-detachments and A-detachments, accompanied by Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations specialists,
would move into more than 20 towns
countrywide.
Over the next few weeks, JTF 180 continued its on-shore buildup of conventional forces and SOF. With an improved
information flow, the SOCOORD closely
monitored ARSOTF Haitis expansion,
contacts with military and civic leaders
in the outlying areas, and efforts to
restore basic services to the populace.
July 1995

Working closely with the J-5 and the

JSOTF LNO, and coordinating with
ARSOTF Haitis LNO at JTF 190, the
SOCOORD also continued to review the
developing JTF 180 taskings in order to
coordinate SOF operations with those of
other forces. The SOCOORD chief came
ashore three more times to keep coordination channels open with the ARSOTF
and its LNO at JTF 190.
During the same period, the SOCOORD
worked on or monitored several other
issues related to ARSOTF Haiti. Periodic
coordination with the joint-force fires coordinator helped ensure that the ARSOTF
had support from AC-130 gunships during
insertions. Discussions with the JTF engineer helped ensure that the JTF efforts to
provide power to outlying areas complemented the ARSOTFs similar efforts. The
SOCOORD worked in conjunction with
the J-4 to monitor and recommend
changes to the time-phased force deployment data as it related to ARSOTF Haitis
deployments. Finally, the SOCOORD initiated coordination with the J-6 to identify
conventional communications support,
such as mobile subscriber equipment, for
the ARSOTF.
After the establishment of the interim
33

public-security force, and with the

departure of Cedras on Oct. 12 and the
return of Aristide on Oct. 15, JTF 180
prepared to transition control of the
joint operations area, or JOA, to JTF
190. The SOCOORD made a series of
final checks with the JSOTF LNOs and
ARSOTF Haitis LNO at JTF 190 to
ensure a seamless hand-off of any working SOF issues.
At 2400 Zulu on Oct. 24, 1994 (D+35),
JTF 180 relinquished control of the JOA to
JTF 190. The following day, Shelton and
his staff, having completed their missions

in Operation Uphold Democracy, returned

to the U.S.

Lessons learned
The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD
learned the following lessons in preparing
for and conducting Operation Uphold
Democracy:
To ensure that the joint-force commander has the information necessary for
timely decision-making, SOF must establish and maintain well-understood, flexible and responsive command-and-control

President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide salutes Haitian
troops in Port-au-Prince
during his return to Haiti
Oct. 15, 1994. Ten days
later, the commander and
the staff of JTF 180
returned to the U.S.
Photo by Alejandro Cabello

34

Special Warfare

relationships. Before transferring operational or tactical control of significant

forces, such as an ARSOTF, we should
ensure that the receiving headquarters is
prepared to provide command and control
and to handle monitoring and reporting
requirements.
By not clearly identifying the need for
SOF-specific planners on a JTF staff, joint
doctrine leaves room for oversights in the
planning process. Because JTF 180 was
based on an Army corps, it had a SOCOORD. JTF 190, on the other hand, never
had full-time SOF planning and coordination support. Using SOF planners or
LNOs from a JTFs subordinate specialoperations units is an option, but it does
not give the JTF its own SOF planning
staff. SOF planners who are part of the
JTF staff will have the JTF commanders
guidance in mind as they prepare the
JTFs SOF annex and work SOF issues;
planners from a subordinate unit will
probably have their own commanders
guidance in mind. During Operation
Uphold Democracy, the various planning
staffs worked well together, but JTF 190
could have profited from having its own
SOF planners.
The SOCOORD can make significant
contributions to SOF planning and coordination if it is involved early on. From the
start, it should aggressively pursue involvement in the planning process of any operation that anticipates a need for SOF.
With only four men, a SOCOORD is
hard-pressed to support 24-hour operations at more than one location. During a
critical period at the beginning of Operation Uphold Democracy, the SOCOORDs
four men were at three different locations.
Throughout JTF 180s involvement, the
SOCOORD chief was the only SOCOORD
representative aboard the USS Mount
Whitney because of the ships berthing
limits. This shortage of personnel was a
particular problem during the first week,
when the major SOF transitions occurred.
The JSOTF LNOs aboard the USS Mount
Whitney and those ashore in Port-auPrince provided excellent communications
and coordination assistance, and USASFC
provided augmentation for JTF 180s
July 1995

SOCOORD at the rear CP at Fort Bragg.

Nevertheless, the SOCOORD was
stretched thin. For future operations that
might involve staggered deployments or
the need for multiple headquarters locations with SOCOORD support, the SOCOORD will need augmentation, and it
should strive to have at least two men at
any one location.
Close cooperation between the SOCOORD, the JSOTF and the ARSOTF proved
beneficial. To foster such cooperation,
SOCOORD members must develop effective working relationships with the JTFs
subordinate special-operations units. Its
members must understand the SOF supporting plans, and they must work closely
and effectively with the SOF LNOs. By fostering cooperation, SOCOORD members
open doors to the sharing of ideas and to a
mutual understanding of perspectives.
Nothing is more effective than face-toface contact for coordination and information flow. During the planning process,
SOCOORDs daily meetings with JSOTF
and 3rd Group planners proved invaluable. During the operation, the SOCOORD
chief was able to exchange more information in each of his short visits ashore than
in any other two or three days on the ship.
SOCOORDs are well-suited to work in
the JTF environment. Though their contributions may be small compared to the
overall size of the operation, they provide
an important service in planning, coordinating and monitoring special operations.

Unanswered questions
Integration of the SOCOORD into the
JTF 180 staff went smoothly because of
the SOCOORDs daily working relationship with the corps staff. The corps staff
understood the SOCOORD and knew how
it fit into the staff processes. As the XVIII
Airborne Corps staff transitioned into the
JTF 180 staff, the SOCOORD performed
its normal functions.
But some questions remain. With the
steadily growing emphasis on joint operations, and with the proven value of SOCOORDs at Army corps level, shouldnt joint
doctrine and publications address SOCO35

ORD-like functions and responsibilities at

the JTF level? If not, who conducts SOF
planning and coordination for a JTF headquarters not formed from an Army corps
headquarters? Who takes on that role for
a JTF formed by a Marine Expeditionary
Force or by an Army division? Finally, if
we recognize the need for a SOCOORD at
the JTF level, how should it be manned in
order to integrate joint SOF with other
operations?
Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations; Joint Pub 3-05.3, Joint Special

With the steadily growing emphasis on

j o i n t o p e r a t i o n s , a n d w i t h t h e p rov e n
value of SOCOORDs at Army corps level,
shouldnt joint doctrine and publications
a dd r e s s S O C O O R D - l i k e f u n c t i o n s a n d
responsibilities at the JTF level?
Operations Operational Procedures; and
Joint Pub 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations
Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, describe at length the planning roles
of theater special-operations commands,
joint-force special-operations component
commands, and special-operations missionplanning agents. All three publications
emphasize the importance of the planning
performed by those who will execute the
mission. Joint Pub 3-05.3 also details the
planning procedures and responsibilities at
the theater level while stressing the importance of LNOs in resolving any conflict
between special operations and other jointforce operations.
None of the publications clearly address
the preparation and the coordination of
the SOF portions of a JTFs OPLAN.
Undoubtedly, the joint-force special-operations component command for a JTF must
provide input for the JTFs plan, but
should its staff prepare the SOF portions
of the JTFs overall plan? They have to
prepare their own supporting plan. LNOs,
who usually arrive just prior to the execution of an operation, could assist with the
coordination of SOF issues, and they could
36

assist with SOF planning, but the deliberate planning conducted prior to the operation would probably be beyond the scope of
the LNO. Wouldnt the JTF J-3 be better
served by a SOF planning and coordination cell that works for him and can prepare the SOF portions of the JTF plan as
well as coordinate SOF issues with the
JFSOCC LNOs/staff and the JTFs other
component staffs?
Though joint doctrine does not address
the need for a SOCOORD-like cell at the
JTF level, the experiences in Operation
Uphold Democracy justify its existence.
The SOCOORDs role during the planning
and execution was comparatively small,
but it was important. The SOCOORD
wrote two appendices for OPLAN 2370 and
one for OPLAN 2380, and it contributed to
the development of both the warning order
and the synchronization matrix for OPLAN
2375. It contributed to the development of
OPLAN 2380(+) and continually coordinated JTF-level issues related to ARSOTF
Haiti. If the SOCOORD had not performed
these functions, who would have?
USSOCOM, as the unified command for
all SOF, is in a unique position to influence
joint doctrine and publications as they
relate to special operations. The commands
Joint Special Operations Forces Institute
should review the issue of JTF SOCOORDs
to determine if, how and where SOCOORDs should be addressed, what their
sources should be (e.g., USSOCOMs components, theater SOCs, etc.), and how they
should be organized for various types of
JTF missions. The JSOFI is reviewing
Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint
Operations; Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for
Joint Special Operations; and Joint Pub 50, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.
As it conducts these reviews, it may be able
to determine how SOCOORD-like functions
should be addressed at the JTF level.
The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD is
taking steps to begin addressing these
issues. In an attempt to help standardize
some elements of the JTF staff processes,
the corps is working with USACOM to
develop JTF standing operating procedures. The SOCOORD is contributing to
that effort in several ways:
Special Warfare

First, it developed a proposed manning

document for a joint SOCOORD. In addition to the four positions currently in Army
SOCOORDs, the document adds a Naval
special warfare plans and operations NCO,
a Ranger plans and operations NCO, and
an SF plans and operations NCO. The document places the three plans and operations NCOs in augmentation positions.
These positions could be activated depending upon the type of joint SOF involved in
the JTFs concept of operations.
Second, the SOCOORD requested and
received permission to include a SOF
annex in the JTF SOP. The completed
annex includes a brief list of references,
sections on the characteristics of special
operations, the mission and the battle
tasks of the Joint SOCOORD, duty
descriptions of SOCOORD personnel, and
brief descriptions of the joint special-operations targeting and mission-planning
processes.
Third, as part of an XVIII Airborne
Corps effort, the SOCOORD reviewed the
first draft of the Joint Task Force Headquarters Mission Training Plan, a proposed joint publication being developed by
USACOM for the Joint Staff. This document, similar to the Armys mission training plans, should provide effective guidance for the training, planning and operations of JTF staffs. The review focused on
clarifying and highlighting JTF staff
responsibilities with respect to SOF. In
every case, the responsibilities could be
performed by a robust SOCOORD. The
draft document did not make clear whose
responsibilities they would be in the
absence of a JTF SOCOORD.
Fourth, the SOCOORD is rewriting the
XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD SOP to
incorporate lessons learned from Operation Uphold Democracy and joint-exercises. The purpose of the rewrite is to ensure
that procedures are in place to provide the
XVIII Airborne Corps with effective
SOCOORD support, whether the corps
operates as an Army corps or as a JTF.
Operation Uphold Democracy has been
successful in its efforts to restore stability
and democracy to Haiti. SOFs quiet professionals, with their unique skills, have
July 1995

played major roles in the operations successes. The XVIII Airborne Corps SOCOORD made comparatively small contributions to the overall operation, but its planning, coordination and monitoring efforts
were important at the JTF staff level. By
realizing that SOCOORDs have a valid
and required role in joint operations,
incorporating that requirement into joint
doctrine, and putting that doctrine into
practice, we can help ensure that future
JTFs are prepared to integrate SOF more
effectively and more efficiently into their
operations.

Lt. Col. James L. Dunn is

the SOCOORD chief for the
XVIII Airborne Corps. In
previous assignments, he
commanded an SF detachment and a company in the
3rd Battalion, 10th SF
Group; served as a security-assistance staff
officer in the African Security Assistance
Division of J-4 at Headquarters, U.S.
European Command; served in the JFK
Center and Schools 1st Special Warfare
Training Group as commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, and as executive officer
for the 3rd Battalion; and served as the
executive officer for the 3rd SF Group. He
is a graduate of the Army Command and
General Staff Officer Course.
Maj. Jon M. Custer is the
SOCOORD Special Forces
plans and operations officer
for the XVIII Airborne
Corps. In previous assignments, he commanded several SF detachments and
Company A in the 3rd Battalion, 7th SF
Group. He served as the civil defense
adviser in El Salvador, commanded an SF
detachment in Operation Just Cause and
served as an SF battalion staff officer during Operation Desert Storm. He is a graduate of the Army Command and General
Staff Officer Course and the Army War
College Defense Strategy Course.

37

As I Remember It: Delegation

and Decentralization
by Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, U.S. Army (ret.)

There is an urgent need in special-operations forces today for leaders with the
ability to think and act decisively under
the pressures and the complexities of the
post-Cold War era.
Only one philosophy adequately
describes the organizational requirement
of the current operational environment:
decentralization. Decentralization requires
the confidence that ones associates serving
in decentralized positions will have the

Military organizations have traditionally been

more left-brained and more authoritarian
than civilian corporations or comparable
government agencies. This lingering authoritarianism dies hard one of its invidious
legacies is a refusal to delegate and decentralize authority to subordinate levels.
capacity to make sound decisions in the
majority of cases.
Such confidence starts at the senior
level. Decentralization cannot work
when responsibility is exacted of the subordinate but the authority to decide has
been withheld. When this occurs, the
senior commander is at fault, for he has
not made a genuine delegation of authority. He shows a lack of confidence by
38

withholding part of the resources that

the subordinate needs to get the job
done, yet he expects the subordinate to
carry out the assigned mission. The
senior may pay lip service to an abstraction called delegation, but when the
chips are down, he shows that he does
not trust his subordinates.
Some claim that this is one of the penalties of a narrow span of control that seeks
to ensure that each i is dotted and each
t is crossed. Others assert that although
every military person subscribes to the
principle of delegation and decentralization, in practice it is diluted because we
are products of our own experiences.
Accustomed to being closely supervised
throughout our careers, we find it difficult
to refrain from looking over a subordinates shoulder. As years pass, the habit
becomes ingrained. When we finally reach
the higher echelons, we behave in the pattern we have developed.
At a recent dinner party I was exposed
to another possible explanation of this
behavior. My dinner partner was a neurologist from Canada. During the course of
the meal, he explained to me that the
brain is divided into two equal parts
the right and left hemispheres. Each part
has unique functions.
The left hemisphere manages language
functions and does the linear, analytical
deductive thinking. The right hemisphere
handles spatial-perceptual matters. It sees
Special Warfare

the big picture and engages in integrative,

creative thinking.
One can assume that an evenly balanced individual uses the left hemisphere
to logically organize step-by-step procedures and to express himself coherently.
He uses the right hemisphere to take the
overview necessary to understand the
meaning of the left-brain details and their
relationship to one another. This kind of
individual would more readily accept delegation and decentralization.
What happens, however, when one side
dominates? It would be reasonable to conclude that a right-hemisphere-dominated
person, when confronted with a problem
requiring analysis of detail, would either
deal in broad generalizations or ignore
the details and jump to conclusions
impulsively.
A left-hemisphere-dominated person
would deal in details and analysis, compulsively making rules and regulations
but never seeing the whole picture. He
would be immersed in the process and
never see or understand the meaning of
his activity in a larger context. This kind
of person would tend to be authoritarian
and prefer a centralized organizational
environment.
In other words, our approach to problems is preordained; it is all in the head.
Training and education have only a limited impact.
One could argue that I rushed to judgment and drew the above conclusion
unscientifically. However, the dinner only
lasted several hours, and with my lefthemisphere-dominated thinking, that was
the best I could do .
The bottom line is that military organizations have traditionally been more leftbrained and more authoritarian than civilian corporations or comparable government agencies. This lingering authoritarianism dies hard one of its invidious
July 1995

legacies is a refusal to delegate and decentralize authority to subordinate levels.

Commanders must recognize that oversupervision will disappear only when
those closest to the scene of the action
make the operating decisions. This
means that staffs must be reduced in size
and improved in quality to the point that
they can fulfill their proper roles of giving advice and counsel to the commander
instead of concerning themselves with
the review and approval of operating
decisions.
Of course we recognize that neither centralization nor decentralization should be
allowed to go too far: an equilibrium is
always necessary. Unfortunately, until
such time as this equilibrium can be
found, the superiors eraser will wear out
before his pencil is used up, and it will be
the subordinate who develops an ulcer or
has a coronary.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnows commissioned service

spanned more than 30 years,
during which he served as
either a commander or a staff
officer with Infantry, Mechanized Infantry, airmobile,
airborne, and Special Forces units. He
served as commanding general of the JFK
Special Warfare Center and School, of the
Army Special Forces Command and of U.S.
Army-Berlin. He holds a bachelors degree
from the University of Nebraska and a masters degree from Shippensburg University,
Shippensburg, Pa. He retired from the
Army in August 1994.

39

The Origin of the Crossed-Arrows Insignia

by Lt. Col. Charles King

Officers and NCOs who wear the

crossed-arrows insignia of Special Forces
are members of the Armys newest branch,
but the crossed arrows themselves have a
history that dates back more than 100
years.
Of the first soldiers to wear the crossed
arrows, their theater commander said:
Being armed, mounted, supplied, and
backed by troops, they cheerfully lead the
way into the middle of their enemies. In
the late expedition they have done most of
the fighting and killing. They have also
proven themselves very efficient when acting alone.
The speaker was Gen. Fredrick Steele,
commanding general of the Department of
the Columbia. The year was 1867, and
Steele was describing the Indian members
of the Regular Army, or as they were colloquially known, the Indian Scouts.

Indian Scouts
By act of Congress, as implemented by
General Order 56 of 1866, 1,000 Native
Americans were authorized to be recruited
into the Regular Army. Their recruitment
was supported by such military leaders of
the day as Steele, William T. Sherman,
George Crook and Henry Halleck. 1
Although the recruitment of Native Americans was never as extensive as Congress
had envisioned, it was a significant force
multiplier throughout the Indian Wars of
40

the next 30 years.2

The Indian Scouts had four functions: to
serve as guides and intelligence-gatherers,
to keep order on the reservations, to reinforce military government and to fight.
Recruited primarily from Pawnee, Navajo
and Seminole tribes, they were employed
extensively throughout the west. Maj.
Gen. George Crook, perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency fighter of his
time, owed his success in capturing Geronimo to his Indian Scouts.3
These Indian Scouts were neither auxiliaries nor civilian scouts of the Quartermaster Department; they were duly enlisted members of the military establishment.
As such they wore the U.S. Army uniform,
were bound by military discipline, and
could and did receive military awards
15 Scouts received the Medal of Honor
between 1869 and 1890.4 No Native Americans ever became officers, however,
because of the significant cultural and linguistic barriers that they would have had
to cross and because of the racial prejudices of the time.
Recommended by supporters as a means
of assimilating the Indian population, the
recruitment of Indian Scouts was not
warmly greeted by all. Some of the field
commanders, specifically Gen. Philip
Sheridan, opposed it on the grounds that
it was counter to the perceived aims of the
Indian campaign, which were subjugation
and annihilation, not assimilation.5 This
Special Warfare

resistance precluded the Indian Scouts

from ever becoming full strength.6

U.S. Scouts
Nonetheless, the idea of Native Americans in the Army persisted. In 1889, Gen.
John Schofield, then commanding general
of the Army, attempted to institutionalize
the Indians within the Army force structure. He added a Scout company, which
was to be manned by Indian Scout soldiers
and NCOs and led by white officers, to
most of the regiments. Army Circular 10
of 1890 laid out detailed uniform and
insignia specifications, which included the
crossed arrows on lapels, campaign hats
and guidons. This was the first official
recognition of the crossed-arrows insignia.
General Order 28 of 1891 directed that the
L troop of each cavalry regiment and the
I company of each infantry regiment be
made up of Native Americans to be known
officially as U.S. Scouts.
As with the less formally organized
Indian Scouts, the U.S. Scouts were never
manned anywhere near their authorized
levels because of resistance from the field.
Various reasons are put forward for this
resistance, ranging from the language barrier, to the desire to imitate continental
and more conventional armies, to racial
prejudice. In any event, the numbers of
U.S. Scouts remained small. According to
one source, fewer than 200 were ever on
active duty at one time.7
The last combat seen by the organized
U.S. Scouts was with Gen. John J. Pershing in Mexico.8 During the early 20th
century the scouts led a quiet existence on
Army posts across the West. On Nov. 30,
1943, the last U.S. Scout detachment was
disbanded at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The last
three Indian Scouts were retired in 1947.

New requirement
As the Scout units were being disbanded, a new requirement was being raised:
In response to the need for an unconventional-warfare force during World War II,
the U.S. and Canada established a combined commando force known as the First
Special Service Force. In July of 1942, this
July 1995

Photo courtesy Nebraska State Historical Society

unit asked the War Department for permission to wear the insignia of the Indian
Scouts inasmuch as the entire motif of
this force has been set up along Indian
lines.9
By August 1942 the crossed arrows were
approved for wear by the officers and men
of the force both U.S. and Canadian.
Myth has it that several members of the
force made a trip to Fort Huachuca to ask
the surviving Indian Scouts for their permission. Whether or not this actually happened, it is certain that the force requested to wear the crossed arrows because
they had been the insignia of the Indian
Scouts.
Although the First Special Service Force
was deactivated in the fall of 1944 after a
brief but illustrious life, the arrows lived
on. In Canada, they survive as the

A member of the U.S.

Scouts wears the early
crossed-arrows insignia.

41

insignia worn by the pipes and drums of

the First Special Service Force at Canadian Forces Base, Pettawawa. In the U.S.
Army, the arrows were revived in 1952
when Col. Aaron Bank activated the first
Special Forces unit, the 10th Special
Forces Group, whose guidons and colors
bore the crossed arrows.

SF insignia
For the next 30 years, the crossed
arrows were unofficially recognized as the
insignia of Special Forces, but they were
present in its heraldry only on the colors.
As the argument for a separate Special
Forces combat arm gained support, so did
the status of the arrows. In July 1984, the
Chief of Staff of the Army approved the
wearing of the crossed arrows by enlisted
members of Special Forces, in recognition
of the establishment of a distinct NCO
career-management field, CMF 18. 10 In
1986, following the re-establishment of the
First Special Forces as a regiment within
the Army regimental system, officers affiliated with the regiment who were serving
in Special Forces billets were allowed to
wear the insignia.11 Finally, on April 9,
1987, the Secretary of the Army approved
the establishment of a new combat arm
the Special Forces Branch.
The insignia that was first worn in combat by the Indian Scouts, then worn by the
soldiers of the First Special Service Force,
and worn unofficially by the officers and
men of Special Forces since its inception,
was approved as the insignia of the Army
Special Forces Branch on May 22, 1987.12
The war-fighting role of Special Forces
in todays Army is not dissimilar to the
role played by the Indian Scouts. We still
grapple with the intellectual and physical
tasks necessary for overcoming insurgencies and small wars. The Indian Scouts
were an unconventional solution to unconventional problems, as was the Devils
Brigade, as is Special Forces. The unsettled relationship that existed between the
Indian Scouts, their supporters and the
Army establishment was not altogether
different from that which existed between
Special Forces and the rest of the Army.
42

One of the goals of todays Special

Forces community is to become better
integrated into the mainstream Army,
both doctrinally and professionally.
Although much has been accomplished
toward that goal, much remains. Understanding the lineage of Special Forces, as
embodied in its insignia, will assist soldiers in understanding that Special Forces
has a legitimate history and tradition as a
part of the Regular Army.

Lt. Col. Charles King is

commander of the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Warfare
Training Group, JFK Special Warfare Center and
School. His previous Special
Forces assignments include
the 10th SF Group, where he served as a
company commander, an operations officer
and the group executive officer; the 5th SF
Group, where he served as a detachment
commander; and the Special Forces
Branch, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, where he served as a branch assignments officer.
Notes:
1 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States
Indian Policy 1865-1903 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1988), p. 128.
2 Ibid., p 140.
3 Fairfax Downey and Jacques N. Jacobsen, The
Red-Bluecoats (Fort Collins, Colo.: The Old Army
Press, 1973), p. 104.
4 The Congressional Medal of Honor (Forest
Ranch, Calif.: Sharp and Dunnigan, 1984).
5 Wooster, p. 51.
6 Wooster, pp. 35, 128.
7 Edward M.Coffman, The Old Army (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 259.
8 Downey, p. 155.
9 Memo, HQ FSSF, Subject: Request for Authorization of Insignia, 26 July 1942.
10 Memo, DCSPER, Subject: Collar Insignia for
CMF 18, 26 June 1984.
11 Memo, CG, USAJFKSWCS, Subject: Request for
Wear of Crossed Arrow Insignia, 15 September 1986.
12 Memo, CG, USAJFKSWCS, 2nd End, Subject:
Request for Wear of Crossed Arrows, 22 May 1987.

Special Warfare

Letters
Special Warfare

SF soldiers provided
stability to Haitians
The following letter was written
to the commander of the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command by a
missionary in Haiti. Editor
I am writing you concerning the
men of (ODA 363) C Company, 2nd
Battalion, 3rd SF Group, who were
stationed in Leogonne, Haiti, until
late February. They came to our
community during a very uncertain
period just following the peaceful
intervention in October. They gave
to us, the missionaries, and to the
local Haitian people, a sense of
security and stability at a time
when Haiti had no law enforcement
to speak of.
The reason I am personally writing is to share with you the superb
conduct these men exemplified to
all while they were here. Their ability to be firm and compassionate
portrayed Americans well. It was
my pleasure to be around these
men and watch the reaction of the
local citizens.
After the devastating hurricane,
it was these men and the missionaries who came to the rescue of
many people. The Haitian government still has done little to aid
these desperately poor people.
Actually, this government seems to
be in worse shape now than before.
The future looks dim.
I had never before been around
the U.S. military, so I only had preconceived ideas of their behavior.
How pleasantly surprised I was to
find such courteous and helpful
men! Please relay to them just what
a void they left here. I commend
you for any role you may have had
July 1995

in their training. May God bless you

and them and America!
Kathy Land
Christianville Foundation, Inc.
Port-au-Prince, Haiti

SF needs warfighting
emphasis
During my time in Special
Forces, I have seen a new orientation of thought and action that
concerns me. This concern is the
shift from SF being a warfighting
unit to becoming a Civil Affairs
component.
Each issue of Special Warfare
testifies to the fact that we are ever
evolving into a weapon-toting
Peace Corps. The thoughts
expressed in the magazine the
majority of the time are not combat-oriented articles. We attach
new names that mask our true mission, such as an unconventional
operations or unconventional warfare, to a mission that consists of
handing out food. Feeding Kurds or
feeding Haitians is a CA mission.
This is not our primary mission, as
FM 31-20 clearly states.
It is our actions that speak
louder than our words. When we
spend six months vegetating in a
town in Haiti, years going in and
out of Turkey, or wasting away in
a camp in Panama or Guantanamo, our combat skills are
diminishing at an incredible rate,
and they cannot be retrieved at a
moments notice. Our students in
the SF Qualification Course are
already being taught the new
direction. With two or three days
remaining at the end of Robin

Sage, they now pack it in and go

cut wood or paint fences. Running
another patrol would be more
appropriate.
A captain comes to Special
Forces with certain combat skills:
He is a graduate of the Infantry
Officer Advanced Course and
often Ranger-qualified and from a
combat-arms branch. In addition
to those skills, he must ultimately
be capable of maneuvering a battalion. But what about the SF
warrant officer? Should not the
warrant officer, who must be
ready to take command of an
ODA, possess the same warfighting capabilities as the captain?
These are the actions that depict
our new direction.
My ODA, as with most in Special
Forces, is made up mostly of soldiers from Infantry and other combat-arms MOSs who came to this
unit to advance their knowledge in
an international realm, whether in
peace or war. Handing out cupcakes is not what anyone I know
came to do. If we continue the way
we are going, we will have very little in common with the men who
first earned the Green Beret.
SFC (P) Brian Duffy
3rd Battalion, 3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.
The two preceding letters are
timely in that they highlight current
discussions about the relevance and
applicability of Special Forces in
todays world. While they are based
on completely different points of
view, each letter is on the money.
The two letters illustrate the vastly
different roles that Special Forces
43

play in the spectrum of conflict and

the way that we see ourselves fitting
into that spectrum.
SFC(P) Duffys frustration in not
being able to focus at least the
majority of his training efforts on
preparation for conflict is understandable. The image of the Special
Forces soldier in the commando role
is one that is prevalent in many
peoples thinking. This view, however, fails to account for the full value
and utility of Special Forces. Why
does our national and military
leadership decide to commit a Special Forces unit to a task which
does not involve the application of
violence? Is it because we have
become so adept at handing out
cupcakes that we are viewed as the
best to accomplish this role? Or is it
that our reputation of being able to
accomplish violence gives us the
instant credibility to accomplish
these other missions successfully?
Our ability to fulfill the commando role, as well as other SF
unique attributes such as language
and cultural awareness, give us
the credibility required to work
successfully in a myriad of activities. Numerous recent examples
illustrate this point of view: A Special Forces team is able to walk
into a Kurdish camp and immediately begin to organize and focus
the people of the camp. More
recently, Special Forces soldiers
provided assistance to Cuban
refugees during Operation Safe
Haven. Each of these examples
points out the utility of Special
Forces and their ability to establish instant credibility.
The second point of view revolves
around the question of why Special
Forces are chosen to execute these
missions. Some people argue that
there are other forces who perhaps
are better trained to accomplish
missions of this type. While this is
true in some instances, soldiers
from Special Forces are often chosen because they possess the operational awareness to accomplish the
44

mission as well as the political

aptitude and maturity to accomplish missions with minimum
attention. A recent article in the
magazine of the Center for Army
Lessons Learned contained an article on how an infantry unit prepared to conduct operations in
Haiti. Included were some very
revealing comments: This isnt
war. Respect the nationals. The
command directs that soldiers stop
every 20 to 30 minutes during
patrols and speak to the people on
the street. If soldiers do not do this,
they quickly lose perspective and
regard for the people.
Special Forces soldiers do not
need such reminders. The very attitudes which conventional forces
must teach their soldiers are the
natural modes of operation for Special Forces. This is one reason why
SF has drawn positive comments
from our national leadership.
Ultimately we return to the
source of SFC Duffys frustration:
the lack of time required for him to
keep his team highly trained and
capable of conducting combat operations. As long as there are sensitive
missions requiring soldiers of
unique skills, SF soldiers will find
themselves fighting to find the most
valuable resource of all time.
(This response was prepared by
the staff of the Special Forces Doctrine Division, Directorate of
Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS Editor.)

CSM has role in tactical

operations
As my battalion prepared for its
rotation to the National Training
Center, I asked myself What does
the command sergeant major do
during tactical operations?
The Army charges the CSM with
overseeing the individual training
program and the professional
development of the NCO Corps,
and with taking care of soldiers

and their families. The CSM role

during tactical operations is not as
well-defined.
The CSM is one of the most experienced members of the SF battalion. It is therefore only natural that
he participate in the tactical decision-making process, or TDMP. The
CSM has unlimited access to every
section in the forward operations
base, or FOB, allowing him to identify problems and to influence corrective action without involving the
commander.
Thanks to his relationship with
the commander, the CSM knows
the commanders intent better than
anyone in the unit. This knowledge
is invaluable when an operational
detachment or staff section has a
question about the commanders
guidance.
Before our NTC rotation, the battalion conducted a two-week deserttraining program and one week of
full mission profiles. Six detachments were given a mission, isolated
and launched on a short 24- to 48hour FTX. It is obligatory that the
CSM spend time with these detachments. The company sergeants
major can provide information to
the commander during pre-mission
activities concerning detachment
strengths and weaknesses, but
when the operation starts, they perform duties in the isolation facility,
special-operations command-andcontrol element, and advanced operations base, thus restricting their
input. By concentrating on the
players, the CSM can provide
information the commander would
normally get from the companys
leadership. By attending staff mission briefs and briefbacks, by studying the enemy and friendly situation, by reading all incoming and
outgoing messages and by sitting in
on the commanders update briefing,
the CSM accumulates a tremendous
amount of information and can keep
the commander informed on the
whole operation.
During tactical operations, the
Special Warfare

CSM is the commanders troubleshooter. Experienced as a Special Forces operator and leader, the
CSM can contribute to the success
of the mission through his mentoring, problem-solving and maintaining the momentum of the battalions efforts.
CSM Michael W. Jefferson
3rd SF Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.

Publication needs ideas

from SF thinkers
I was heartened to see the article
Ambushing the Future by Dr.
James J. Schneider in the April
1995 issue of Special Warfare. For a
long time, I have felt that the Special Forces community should be as
concerned about where we are going
as about where we have been.
Many of his points were
thought-provoking and do deserve
comment. For example, I find it
hard to envision a Special Forces
group being augmented by conventional armor, infantry and
artillery. Running an SFOB is
enough work for a group staff.
However, that mix could be handled by a joint special-operations
task force. It would be interesting
to let a JSOTF take on that job
down at the JRTC in a peacekeeping/peace-enforcement scenario.
I would like to see more articles
like Dr. Schneiders, but coming
from our own communitys
thinkers. I have always been
impressed that the British Special
Air Service cultivated thinkers as
well as operators in their community. On one hand, their post-WWII
rebirth had been operator-driven
with their ability to quickly and
ingeniously respond to a requirement for deep-penetration operations during the Malaysian Insurgency, followed by similar employment in Borneo and Oman. However, their ability to respond to the
Princess Gate hostage crisis was
July 1995

thinker-driven as a result of a
strategic repositioning set in motion
years before in anticipation of the
threat of terrorism.
We in Special Forces have also
been able to take advantage of
opportunities and, because of the
superb quality of our operators,
perform marvelously. The CIDG
and recon programs in Vietnam,
the work of the 5th Group on MTTs
and the work of the 7th Group in
Latin America in the 70s and 80s
that played a large part in our own
rebirth, the coalition-support teams
of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and
the 10th Groups work on Provide
Comfort are just a few cases that
come to mind. All have been precedent-setting demonstrations of Special Forces unique abilities, and, I
would argue, all have been operator-driven.
On the other hand, the only roles
we could fashion against our major
Cold War threat were special
reconnaissance and direct action on
main supply routes. We didnt really have any thinker-driven alternatives that could meaningfully
employ the full range of Special
Forces capabilities.
If Dr. Schneider could be so conceptually innovative, why cant
some of our own SF operators? The
real issue now is one of strategic
positioning, and its a job for our
thinkers. The thinkers in the SAS
solved it in time for Princess Gate.
We need to start solving it as well,
and one of the best places to start is
by advancing creative ideas in our
own professional journal.
Col. Page Duffy
U.S. Army Reserve (ret.)
Andover, Mass.

Tofflers missed importance

of nonlethal weapons

The single most important point

made by Mr. Swett is that of the
importance of nonlethal weapons.
Perhaps more than any other new
technology, effective nonlethal
weapons can transform special
operations as we currently know
them. Mr. Swett correctly points
out that the Tofflers missed the
critically important issue of how
(nonlethal weapons) can help ease
domestic political constraints
against intervention overseas.
Domestic political constraints
are the collective wisdom of our
people and political leaders that
acts as a brake against precipitous
military action. However, situations involving weapons of mass
destruction may demand early
action. The proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction
among extremist states is growing
every day, and there is a very real
danger of these weapons falling
into the hands of terrorists. In certain cases, early action, taken
before a political consensus can be
developed, may be required. In
those few cases, effective nonlethal
weapons may make early intervention a politically viable option.
Currently, the Dismounted Battle Lab at Fort Benning is the proponent for the development of
these weapons for the Army.
USASOC is providing input; however, its influence is limited. The
requirements of the Infantry and
Military Police will dominate and
will probably not overlap perfectly
with those of special operations.
USSOCOM will have to take the
lead, to ensure that our special
requirements are addressed.
Lt. Col. Robert Brady
USASOC
Fort Bragg, N.C.

The review essay of War and

Anti-War by Charles Swett that
appeared in the January edition of
Special Warfare was outstanding.
45

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

FA qualification important
for SF officers

The Total Army Personnel Command recently completed functional-area

designations for officers in year group 1989. As the proponent for the Special
Forces branch, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School makes an annual recommendation to PERSCOM for the FA breakout of each year group
during its fifth year of service. SWCS bases its recommendation on projected
long-term branch FA requirements. The proponent FA model envisions the
following percentages of SF officers in each FA by the year 2010:
FA39 (PSYOP/CA)
FA41 (Personnel Programs Management)
FA45 (Comptroller)
FA46 (Public Affairs)
FA48 (Foreign Area Officer)
FA49 (ORSA)
FA53 (Automation)
FA54 (Operations, Plans and Training)

9 percent
14 percent
15 percent
10 percent
6 percent
8 percent
2 percent
36 percent

SF officers, in coordination with the SF Branch at PERSCOM, should strive

for FA qualification as soon as possible after completing ODA command. FA
training and assignments not only provide rewarding opportunities for service to the SOF community, they also support the integration of the SF
Branch throughout the Army and joint community. Depending on the specific FA, FA qualification can also provide enhanced opportunities for
advanced civil schooling, command (FA 39) and promotion.

SWCS to publish guide for

SF warrant officers

46

The Special Forces Warrant Officer Professional Guide is scheduled to be

published Oct. 1, 1995. The guide will provide approved career guidance,
doctrinal duties, job descriptions and principal duty titles and will assist
commanders and their senior warrant advisers in establishing unit professional-development programs. During the review process, copies will be furnished to all Special Forces groups for comment. Comments will be
reviewed during the Warrant Officer Advanced Course in August 1995.
Special Forces-qualified officers in National Guard units who are interested in a direct appointment into MOS 180A should apply through their
chain of command. Training requirements may vary; all officers must
have a successful performance history and a minimum of three years on a
Special Forces A-detachment.
Commanders are encouraged to interview all MOS 180A applicants as
part of their unit recruiting program. To enhance the quality of the interviews, the unit senior warrant-officer adviser and the command sergeant
major may be invited to attend.
The point of contact on MOS 180A issues is CWO3 Shaun Driscoll or
the incoming manager, CWO3 Wayne Searcy, at DSN 239-2415/9002 or
commercial (910) 432-2415/9002.

Special Warfare

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

Authorizations increase
for CMF 18 drill sergeants,
detailed recruiters

As part of the initiative to obtain more personnel authorizations, CMF 18

has secured 50 drill-sergeant and detailed-recruiter positions. Twenty
SFC detailed-recruiter authorizations and 30 drill-sergeant authorizations (staff-sergeant and sergeant-first-class) will be available to CMF 18
soldiers who currently hold an 18B, 18C, 18E or 18F primary MOS. The
Special Forces Branch has already received and screened several packets
for both programs. These packets have been sent to the PERSCOM
Recruiting and Retention Team and the drill-sergeant program manager
for consideration. The majority of these authorizations will be filled by
the end of FY 95. Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison, commander of the Special Warfare Center and School, has approved the acquisition of 30 more
drill-sergeant and 10 more detailed-recruiter authorizations. These additional authorizations will most likely be filled in FY 96.

SF medics assigned
to the Ranger Regiment

The commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command has

directed that 12 SF medical sergeants (18D) be assigned to the Ranger
Regiment. The addition of SF medics will enhance the regiments traumamanagement capabilities and give selected 18Ds a unique opportunity to
work with another unit of the Army Special Operations Command.

PERSCOM points of contact

The following is a list of the staff of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch,
Enlisted Personnel Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command:
Capt. Adrian Erckenbrack
SF Enlisted Branch chief
MSgt. Terry Palmore
Senior career adviser
SFC Stewart Marin
37F career adviser, CMF 18/37F
NCOES manager
Mrs. Faye Matheny
1st, 3rd, 5th, 7th and 10th SF
groups, JFKSWCS, USASOC,
SF Command, SATMO, 96th CA,
ROTC assignments, and JRTC
assignments
Ms. Dyna Amey
SFQC student manager
Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager and career-development questions to the senior career adviser. Students
attending the SF Qualification Course who have questions on assignments
should contact their student PAC. Questions regarding NCOES should first
be directed to the SF group schools NCO. The branch phone number is
DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395, fax -0524. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPCEPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0454.

July 1995

47

Foreign SOF
Special Warfare

Mujahedin intensify
operations in Bosnia

Mujahedin units, possibly supported by Iranian SOF, have once again

intensified their activities in central Bosnia now that the weather has
become conducive to offensive combat operations. Their increasing influence on both the Muslim government in Sarajevo and the three army
corps located west of the city has alienated much of the local populace
and has developed into another source of irritation for the U.N. peacekeeping forces there. Detachments of Mujahedin have assisted in the
training of selected Bosnian army elements for the past two years, but
last summer they also began to spearhead many of the tactical-level
attacks against Bosnian Serb forces. The potential for the Mujahedin to
escalate their activities remains high and will further threaten regional
stability in the republics hinterland.
Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and by various
other Islamic states that have an interest in expanding extremism into
the European theater. Additionally, international radical groups, such as
Hizbollah, have been added to the suspected list of sponsors. Bosnian government sources have grudgingly admitted the presence of the Mujahedin, but they publicly intimate that they have accepted the Mujahedin
presence as a necessary evil to maintain the flow of aid from international Islamic contributors. Aid has been distributed in forms ranging
from hard currency to clandestine arms shipments.
Although the numbers of Mujahedin currently operating in Bosnia
remain a matter of speculation, most credible estimates indicate approximately 2,500 members. However, professional holy warriors constitute
only a minority among them. Many of the others are indigenous Bosnian
Muslims who demonstrate appropriate religious zeal and allegiance to
the organization. In the near term, the Mujahedin are expected to continue to focus on local military operations and on the most effective means of
establishing their influence with the Bosnian Muslim government. In
time, they will likely surpass these original objectives and divert their
attention to politicizing the Muslim population and attempting to establish an Islamic republic obedient to fundamentalist doctrine.

Ninja violence reported

in East Timor

Indonesian military forces have reacted with patrols and greater vigilance in the streets of East Timors capital of Dili in reaction to attacks on
the local population by gangs consisting of 12-15 individuals. Known as
ninjas, because they wear black clothes and masks, these groups roam
the city at night terrorizing the population. Typically, their activities
include entering private residences and beating and torturing the occupants, assaulting nighttime strollers, and killing pets and poultry. This
increased activity, coupled with the killing of six East Timorese by
Indonesian military forces earlier in 1995 near Dili, has heightened security concerns in Indonesias troubled 27th province.
Formerly a Portuguese colony, East Timor was annexed into the Republic

48

Special Warfare

of Indonesia in 1976 following an invasion the year before. Since then, its
pro-independence forces have been waging war against Indonesian forces.
According to current estimates, there are approximately 200 East Timorese conducting a guerrilla war against approximately 5,000 Indonesian
troops. The ninja activity is the most recent twist in the battle for East
Timor. Both sides deny ownership of the gangs. Catholic priests in Dili
claim that the ninjas are members of Indonesias special forces, with the
specific mission to intimidate opponents of Jakartas rule. Dissidents in
Dili claim that the government is trying to suppress their activities,
which include the international embarrassment experienced when 29
East Timorese occupied the U.S. Embassy compound during President
Clintons November 1994 visit to Indonesia.
The Indonesian government claims that the ninjas are gangs of dissident
East Timorese youths. It points to the February 1995 arrest of 12 East
Timorese who were said to have confessed both to their role in masterminding ninja activity and to their efforts in tarnishing the image of the
Indonesian military occupation. However, in the minds of many Timorese, the real identity of the ninjas and their agenda remains an issue
that is far from resolved.

Private security groups

turn to crime, espionage

Many states around the world face high levels of crime and violence that
are beyond the capabilities of their police or military forces to handle. As a
result, these states are becoming host to large numbers of private justice
groups, some of which have turned to vigilantism, crime or subversion. In
Central and South America, for example, private security organizations
have long existed to deal with the spillover from wars and terrorism as
well as violent crime. Their relative merits, spotty performance and clear
abuses continue to be debated. Despite concerns, private security organizations are expected to play an important role in helping the South
African government cope with high levels of crime and violence as it works
to consolidate democratic gains and to reorganize its police and security
forces. It is the former USSR and Eastern Europe, however, where crime
and turmoil have led to remarkable growth in private security organizations. As of April 1994, 6,605 Russian private security enterprises and
security services had been officially registered, with some 26,000 individuals many former military or security-service personnel acquiring
private investigative licenses. A number of these firms and individuals
have become involved in organized crime or have turned into small private
armies for individuals or organizations. An analogous situation exists in
Eastern Europe. Romania, for example, now a crossroads of drug and
arms trafficking and other forms of organized and random crime, and a
periodic stopover for terrorists, has more than 160 private-detective agencies. A number of these are manned by personnel formerly of the communist military (police), Department of State Security and Ministry of
Defense. Technologically, some agencies are well-equipped, and three are
reportedly working for foreign espionage services. These kinds of developments have appeared throughout Eastern Europe, highlighting the need
to consider private-security elements as a growing security consideration
there and in other areas of the world.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., Lt. Col. John E. Sray and Maj. Thomas E.
Sidwell of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
July 1995

49

Update
Special Warfare

tact their local Army recruiters;

reservists should contact their
strength-management office; and
soldiers leaving the active Army
should contact their units transition NCO, DeRocco said. Jerry
Healy, USASOC PAO

Army SF Command gets

new commander
Brig. Gen. William P. Tangney
took command of the U.S. Army
Special Forces Command in a ceremony at Fort Braggs Main Post
Parade Field May 1.
A native of Worcester, Mass.,
Tangney was formerly the deputy
commanding general and chief of
staff of the U.S. Army Special
Operations Command. He has also
served as commander, Special
Operations Command, U.S. Central
Command; commander of the 10th
SF Group; chief of the SF Officer
Branch at the Army Military Personnel Center; and commander of
the 3rd Battalion, 5th SF Group.
Lt. Gen. J.T. Scott, commander of
the Army Special Operations Command, praised Tangneys experience at every level in Special
Forces. He has the personal and
professional credentials required to
lead the command into the 21st
century, Scott said.
Tangney replaced Maj. Gen.
Harley C. Davis, who is now deputy
commanding general of the Fifth
Army at Fort Lewis, Wash.

Reserve SOF positions

still available
Despite downsizing in the U.S.
Army reserve components, there
are still numerous reserve-component special-operations forces positions available, according to the
chief of strength management for
the U.S. Army Special Operations
Command.
Positions for Civil Affairs soldiers
(38A) and Psychological Operations
specialists (37F) are currently avail50

MFF instructor sets

parachuting record

Photo by Mike Brantley

Brig. Gen. William P. Tangney receives the

colors of the Special Forces Command.

able in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs

and Psychological Operations Command, which has units located in 26
states and in Washington, D.C.,
said Lt. Col. Samuel A. DeRocco.
Although there are vacancies in
some company-grade officer and E-7
positions in those units, most of the
vacancies are for soldiers in the
ranks of E-3 through E-6.
CA soldiers are required to have
a skill-technical score of 100 or
greater, a high-school diploma and
a secret clearance (or eligibility for
the clearance). PSYOP soldiers are
required to have a skill-technical
score of 105 or higher, a high-school
diploma, a Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 85 or higher
for seven specific languages and 89
or higher for all other languages,
and a secret clearance (or eligibility
for the clearance).
Interested civilians should con-

A military free-fall instructor

from the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School has set a new
record for the most parachute
jumps in a 24-hour period.
CWO3 Jay Stokes, assigned to
Company B, 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, made
331 jumps at the Raeford Municipal
Airport, Raeford, N.C., May 30-31.

A-Frame lifts burden

for SOF units
A special-operations soldier who
invented an A-frame hoist has seen
the idea he drew on a paper napkin
built and field-tested within a matter of months.
Lt. Col. Richard C. Burmood,
commander of the 528th Special
Operations Support Battalion, had
been in Haiti just two weeks when
he pinpointed a problem with water
distribution to Special Forces soldiers in Haitis hinterlands.
Water was stored in 500-gallon
water bags, or blivits, which lie on
the ground. Gravity will drain only
about 400 gallons from the bags,
leaving them too heavy to be lifted
except by helicopter or wrecker.
Burmood thought of the idea of
using an A-frame to manually lift
and drain the blivits, but it was
during a briefing that he saw a way
Special Warfare

of getting his idea off paper and

into the field.
Bill Chadwick was giving a briefing on combat developments in the
pre-command course (at the JFK
Special Warfare Center and School),
Burmood said. Lt. Col. William
Chadwick is the director of Systems
Acquisition, Directorate of Force
Integration, U.S. Army Special
Operations Command. I drew it on
a paper napkin; he took it and ran.
Burmoods idea was passed to
Maj. Todd Wendt, a test coordination officer for Systems Integration.
The napkin showed up here, and I
was asked, What can you do with
this? Wendt said. Three months
later, the A-frame was fielded.
The 528th surveyed the Army
system and the local economy for a
device to lift and drain the blivits.
The closest thing on the economy
was $240, but it also weighed 3-4
times as much as the A-frame,
Wendt said. The next steps were to
develop specifications and to find
someone to construct the device.
Wendt contacted the Airborne and
Special Operations Test Directorate
at Fort Bragg to develop and build
the A-frame. The project took two
weeks and cost $850.
The A-frame was engineered to
be small enough to fit into a duffle
bag but strong enough to lift a halffull blivit completely off the ground.
The result was a 60-70 pound, aluminum A-frame, with harness and
ratchet straps, that can be easily
broken down and reassembled by
two or three people.
Combat development usually
takes years, Wendt said. Usually,
it is not as simple as this one. We
just didn't have to go through the
formal system, because it was simple. Even though the informal
process was used for the project,
Wendt said, standards for safety,
engineering and market analysis
were thoroughly researched and
adhered to during the A-frame's
design and construction.
The 160th Special Operations
July 1995

Aviation Regiment has expressed

an interest in the A-frame to drain
fuel blivits, Wendt said. If SOF
units decide to buy the A-frames,
the Systems Acquisition Branch
will find a contractor to build a
number of the devices at a cost
much lower than that of the prototype. Carol Jones, USASOC PAO

SODARS helps SOF soldiers

in mission planning
Soldiers involved in mission
planning for an overseas deployment may not be aware that they
can take advantage of lessons
learned by other teams that have
operated in the same areas.
The Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval System, or
SODARS, is an automated information system designed to capture
special-operations mission debriefing reports, store them and make
them available to the SOF community. These reports are to be used
to prepare teams/individuals for
future OCONUS deployments.
Through the SODARS program,
OCONUS-deploying personnel can
provide valuable, mission-specific,
operational information which will
significantly enhance the mission
planning of future OCONUS
deployments, said CWO2 Bill
Crawford, the USASOC SODARS
manager.
USASOC Regulation 381-1
requires the debriefing of Army
SOF personnel (active and reserve
components) returning from
OCONUS deployments. Information obtained from these debriefings is entered into a data base
maintained by USSOCOM. This
information is accessible to the
SOF community via the Special
Operations Command Research,
Analysis, and Threat Evaluation
System, or SOCRATES.
To support SOF elements not
connected to SOCRATES, USSOCOM has developed a collateral
dial-up program that is currently

being field-tested. The system, the

Collateral Users Bulletin Board, or
CUBB, will allow all SOF, active
and reserve, to retrieve SODARS
reports.
In October 1994, USASOC completed production of the USASOC
SODARS Reference Guide. This
guide contains a checklist outlining
each step of the SODARS process.
The guide also contains the
SODARS annexes which correspond to each type of SOF mission.
Each annex is followed by a corresponding debriefing guide designed
to assist debriefers in the questioning phase of the debriefing. By
closely following the checklists and
other recommendations in the
guide, users can save hours in the
debriefing and reporting process.
Soldiers participation is essential in developing a SODARS program that will achieve its goal of
being the best and most comprehensive mission-planning tool
available to the SOF community,
Crawford said.
For more information on
SODARS, contact CWO2 Bill Crawford, USASOC SODARS manager,
at DSN 239-5754 or commercial
(910) 432-5754.

Special Forces increase

as Army shrinks
While the Army has decreased in
size over the last 10 years, authorizations for Special Forces soldiers
have increased.
In fiscal year 1987, according to
historical data from the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office,
there were 4,015 SF soldiers in an
Army of 676,745, giving SF 0.59
percent of the Armys authorizations. The projection for FY 97 is
5,802 SF soldiers in an Army of
495,000, giving SF 1.17 percent of
the Army authorization.

51

Book Reviews
Special Warfare

Leadership and the New Science. By Margaret J. Wheatley.

San Francisco: Barrett-Koehler
Publishers, 1992. ISBN 1-88105201-X. $22. 164 pages.
It is not often that a book is truly
surprising this one is. Margaret
J. Wheatley, Professor of Management at Brigham Young University, has made a unique contribution
to our understanding of leadership
and its relationship to the newest
discoveries in science.
At 164 pages, the book is clear
and concise. But watch out for that
first step: The new science is not
immediately comprehensible to all.
The author makes a convincing
argument that 17th-century Newtonian principles have led us collectively down the wrong leadership
path. Her thesis is that we have
become victims of our own science,
and that repeated attempts by a
Western, linear and mechanistic
culture to reduce humans to quantifiable entities is doomed to failure.
We may all have an aversion to
the conduct of human affairs by
the numbers, yet this anti-human
methodology has infected CEOs and
senior military officers alike. We
create questionnaires, take polls
and collect data, all in a vain
attempt at prediction. Our correct
focus should be on the process of
leadership and the establishment of
productive and mutually beneficial
relationships with co-workers and
subordinates.
Rigidly hierarchical organizations, like the Army, are the very
antithesis of Wheatleys conception.
Yet even the Army and its soldiers
can benefit from the authors
52

unusual approach to the topic. One

of the keys is informal leadership.
We all have memories of poor
leaders who, because they were
bright enough to trust in a highquality senior NCO or subordinate
officer, succeeded. Perhaps they
werent so dumb after all. Even
loyal subordinates will seek the
leadership they need, perhaps outside the chain of command, when
the boss is not up to the challenge.
Wheatley recognizes that organizations develop their own kind of
consciousness. Soldiers who have
been present for the deactivation of
a beloved unit know that it is like
attending the funeral of an old
friend. Our memories and the energies that all former members
expended in that unit make it so,
creating a very human reality.
The point is that organizational
energy is the result of the contributions made by every member, not
the leader or CEO alone. The best
leaders manage to control their
own egos and to develop the collective energies of all to meet organi-

zational ends.
One of the most radical departures taken by Wheatley from conventional wisdom is reflected in this
quote, Growth is found in disequilibrium, not in balance. The things
we fear most in organizations
fluctuations, disturbances, imbalances need not be signs of
impending disorder that will
destroy us. Instead, fluctuations are
the primary source of creativity.
Creative solutions to problems
encountered during ARTEPs, for
instance, are generally not wellreceived by evaluators prescriptions based on doctrine are. In the
attempt to measure intangibles like
combat readiness, we are compelled
to create only those situations
which can provide us measurable
results, in something like an
ARTEP. The result is a skewed perception of reality. Is the unit truly
combat-ready or just ARTEPsmart?
Lenin said Freedom is good, but
control is better. Wheatley points
out, If organizations are machines,
control makes sense. If organizations are process structures, then
seeking to impose control through
permanent structure is suicide.
Although it is overstated, her
assertion contains an underlying
truth. Overarching control and the
failure to give subordinates decision-making authority can destroy
any chance for a positive command
climate.
Information, according to the
author, is the primary ingredient in
creating a successful organization.
This comes as no surprise to senior
Army leaders, but putting information to work is often problematic.
Special Warfare

The senior leaders task is twofold:

(1) create a vision of where the unit
needs to go (2) articulate that
vision so it is understood by every
member of the organization.
Those interested in quantum
mechanics, nonlinear equations,
fractals, chaos theory and self-organizing systems will find this book
particularly interesting. Wheatley
makes some startling connections
between these new sciences and the
art of leadership connections
most of us wouldnt look for. Her
unconventional approach to the
topic, in this reviewers opinion,
possesses extraordinary merit. The
book is well worth the price.

promised by a young Iraqi goat

herder, leading to a firefight and a
subsequent escape-and-evasion
attempt of 120 kilometers toward
the Syrian border.
Three patrol members died. Four
were captured and endured captivity and torture in Baghdad for a
month before repatriation. Their
interrogation, described in brutal
detail, provides a classic contemporary case study of resistance to
interrogation, reiterating some
points taught in our own SERE
course. One man successfully evaded capture, completing a 300-kilometer march to arrive at the

Lt. Col. Robert B. Adolph Jr.

Joint Special Operations Cmnd.
Fort Bragg, N. C.
Bravo Two-Zero. By Andy McNab.
London: Bantam Press, 1993. ISBN:
0-593-03421-X. 374 pages.
The author, a British Special Air
Service NCO, provides a candid
first-person account of his patrols
action in the 1991 Gulf War. The
eight-man patrol (call-sign Bravo
Two-Zero) received two missions: to
locate and destroy Iraqi telecommunication land lines which paralleled a main supply route; and to
identify and destroy mobile Scud
missile launchers. Inserted 100
miles northwest of Baghdad by
helicopter five days after the air
war began, the dismounted patrol
quickly encountered a series of incidents that doomed the mission.
Radio frequencies for the operation were inoperative, causing the
patrol to lose communication with
its base. Contrary to intelligence
reports, 3,000 Iraqi troops were
present in the immediate area of
operations. The patrols four survival radio beacons proved incapable of contacting orbiting
AWACS aircraft, eliminating any
possible close air support or aerial
extraction. The hide site was comJuly 1995

British Embassy in Damascus.

According to the author, It was
one of the most remarkable E&Es
ever recorded by the Regiment.
As the patrol leader, the author
gives an honest, often anguished,
overview of the mission planning
and execution. While some terminology, equipment and tactics
might differ from our own, U.S. soldiers will find the concepts and
techniques familiar. He is blunt in
explaining the circumstances and
the rationale for his decisions, providing ideal points for the reader to
contemplate, What would I have

done?
The straightforward narrative
dispels some of the popular myths
and mystique of the SAS while providing frank observations and
insight into the unit. For instance,
the authors comments on the
essentials of the regiments professionalism, Its all very well doing
all the exciting things abseiling,
fast-roping, jumping through buildings but what being Special
Forces is mostly about is thoroughness and precision. The real motto
of the SAS is not Who Dares Wins
but Check and Test, Check and
Test.
The brief discussion of lessons
learned and why things went
wrong is disappointing, possibly
leaving the reader with unanswered questions. With the benefit
of hindsight, one can speculate,
Was the pre-mission planning thorough enough? Why was intelligence
on the area insufficient? What
specifically caused the failure of the
patrols communications? Was the
combination of direct-action and
special-reconnaissance missions
excessive for the size and composition of the unit?
Not surprisingly, Bravo Two Zero
reportedly became the most decorated patrol in the British Army
since the Boer War. The story
leaves one staggered by the sheer
courage, tenacity and endurance of
the participants. It should evoke
discussion and introspection from
the professional soldier, reminding
him that exceptional individuals
must always be the foundation of
any special-operations organization.
Erik Syvertsen
Waynesville, Mo.

53

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army

JFK Special Warfare Center and School
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