Special Warfare

The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80 93 2

May 1993

Vol. 6, No. 2

From the Commandant

Special Warfare
I recently had an opportunity to read a study by
the Rand Corporation concerning demographic
patterns in the less-developed world. The implications of these patterns for SOF are significant.
While the population of the developed world will
increase by 12 percent from 1990 to 2025, the population of the less-developed world will increase by
75 percent. Economically deprived countries of the
less-developed world will account for most of that
growth.
Not only will the worlds population grow, but
increasingly, it will live in cities. Urban population
will increase from 2.2 billion in 1990 to 5.1 billion
in 2025, with the less-developed world accounting
for most of the increase. The urban growth rate
will be fastest in Africa, where the urban population may double between 1985 and 2000. During
the same period, the absolute growth rate will be
greatest in Asia, where cities will gain about 500
million people. From 1990 to 2025, the proportion
of the population living in urban areas will
increase from 72 percent to 85 percent in Latin
America, 30 percent to 53 percent in Asia, and
from 35 percent to 58 percent in Africa.
A third trend is the increasing number of
refugees throughout the world, particularly in lessdeveloped regions. Between 1980 and 1992, the
worlds refugees nearly doubled. There are more
than 40 million displaced people in the less-developed world. Around 20 million of them are in
Africa and just over 15 million are in the Near
East and South Asia.
Individually and collectively, these trends can
foment domestic instability and create or exacerbate interstate tensions. This is especially true for
the poorest countries they are the least able to
deal effectively with the problems posed by the
changes and the most affected.
Urbanization can have a potentially destabilizing effect, especially in the poorest countries. A
lack of infrastructure, social services, adequate
housing and proper sanitation contribute to their
poverty. Insurgent movements are often able to
take advantage of these problems. Mass discontent
provides an opportunity for insurgents to make
headway in establishing urban support bases and
even alternative shadow governments.
As I mentioned, these trends are significant for

the Army and the SOF community. The affected

countries will typically have poorly developed
infrastructures, suggesting that our Civil Affairs
capabilities will be in great demand. Since we are
dealing with masses of people, there will be a great
need to alter attitudes and adjust behavior, indicating that there will be opportunities for PSYOP
to excel.
For Special Forces and Rangers, combat operations in the less-developed world could increasingly involve the likelihood of urban warfare and its
related problems. For example, they could be
called upon to deal with missions in densely-populated urban areas, and there would be considerable pressure to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties. This would require us to harness
our combat power, and it is conceivable that some
of our most formidable weapons systems might not
be used. Rules of engagement could be very restrictive and affect our doctrine and the way we
fight.
It seems prudent for us in the special-operations
community to monitor and study these developments to ensure that our training, modernization,
organization, doctrine and leader development
sustain their excellence and relevance.

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow

Contents

PB 80 93 2
May 1993

Special Warfare

Features

Commander & Commandant

Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow
Editor
Jerry D. Steelman
Graphic Art Director
Bruce S. Barfield

VE R

IT

AS

ET

LI B

ER

TAS

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission
is to promote the professional development of special
operations forces by providing a forum for the examination
of both established doctrine and new ideas.
Views expressed herein are those of the author, and do
not necessarily reflect official Army position. This
publication does not supersede any information presented in
other official Army publications.
Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and
should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare,
USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone:
DSN 239-5703 or commercial (919) 432-5703. Special
Warfare reserves the right to edit all material.
Published works may be reprinted, except where
copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and
the author.
Official distribution is limited to active and reserve
special operations units. Individuals desiring a private
subscription should forward their requests to:
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Special Operations Forces: Strategic Potential for the Future

by Gen. Carl W. Stiner

10

Air Force Special Operations School: An Emphasis

on Education

14

Naval Special Warfare Center: Schoolhouse for Naval

Special Operations

18

CAC3I: The Area Study Comes of Age

by Capt. Bill Franklin and 1st Lt. Ken MacGarrigle

21

SOF Roles and Missions: Re-examining the Environment

by Terry Doherty

24

When Forces Work Together: Army PSYOP & the FBI

in St. Croix
by Clinton R. Van Zandt

26

Advising Host-Nation Forces: A Critical Art

by MSgt. Melchor Becena

29

Using MILES on Foreign Weapons

by SFC Michael E. Lopez

30

Task Force Communications: The Special Operations

Paradigm
by Lt. Col. Donald Kropp

33

Interview: James R. Locher III, ASD-SO/LIC

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

36

Enlisted Career Notes

Official:

39

Officer Career Notes

40

Foreign SOF

42

Update

46

Book Reviews

Milton H. Hamilton
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Departments

03370

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Vol. 6, No. 2

Cover: Computer graphic by Bruce S. Barfield

Special
Operations
Forces:
Strategic Potential for
the Future
by Gen. Carl W. Stiner

n Army reconnaissance team

is deployed 200 miles deep
behind Iraqi lines and for the
five days of Operation Desert
Storms ground campaign sends
back critical intelligence on Iraqi
movements along a major line of
communications.
Another team on a similar mission is flushed by Iraqi children and
engages in a six-hour running gun
battle with hundreds of Iraqi soldiers before the team is extracted
by an Army helicopter, a helicopter
that takes several hits from smallarms fire during the extraction.
An Army master sergeant helps
the crew of an Air Force C-141 to
safely traverse restricted Russian
airspace, using his Russian language fluency to communicate with
ground controllers.
Reprinted from Army magazine,
April 1993. Copyright 1993 by the
Association of the United States
Army. Used with permission.
2

On the ground in Russia, this

same NCO and his team help Russian spetsnaz troops unload urgently needed humanitarian supplies
destined for the local population.
A team of Air Force officers and
noncommissioned officers trains
the Ecuadorian armed forces on the
use of aviation in stability operations. This is the first time the
Ecuadorians have combined Army,
Air Force and civilian assets into a
joint operation.
A Navy team is deployed to the
Ivory Coast to train Ivory Coast
military personnel in the use of
riverine craft. This mission is part
of an effort by the Ivory Coast to
protect its environment from poachers who are depleting the countrys
natural resources.
An Air Force helicopter flies deep
into Iraq, evading Iraqi air-defense
systems and ground forces, to rescue a downed Navy pilot during
Desert Storm. The flight, with refuelings, lasts more than eight hours.

A small Army team, working deep

in the mountains of northern Iraq,
under harsh environmental conditions, and resupplied only by air,
works day and night to save 250
Kurdish children abandoned by a
civilian medical team who deemed
their cases hopeless. Of these 250
children with cholera, all but four
are eventually saved.
All of these missions were conducted in a 19-month period from
January 1991 to July 1992. They
represent operations across the
spectrum of conflict, from largescale conventional war to small, forward-presence operations.
All of them, and hundreds more,
were conducted by forces assigned
to the U.S. Special Operations Command. These are just a tiny sample
of the diverse and important missions USSOCOM conducts as part
of the nations defense establishment in support of U.S. national
security policies.
Special operations have been a
Special Warfare

part of American military history

since Rogers Rangers in the French
and Indian War, but modern special-operations forces trace their origin to the Office of Strategic Services in World War II; however, it
was the failed hostage-rescue
attempt in Iran in 1980 and problems with the employment of special-operations forces in Grenada in
1983 that resulted in congressional
concern over the nations specialoperations capability.
This concern eventually resulted
in the Cohen-Nunn Amendment to
the fiscal year 1987 Defense Authorization Act, which created the
assistant secretary of defense for
special operations and low-intensity
conflict, and USSOCOM.
USSOCOM was established as a
unified command at MacDill Air
Force Base, Fla., on April 16, 1987,
and all SOF of the Army, Navy and
Air Force were assigned to it.
USSOCOM has two missions: as
a supporting command, to provide
trained and ready special-operations forces to regional commanders
in chief, or CINCs, and, as a supported command, to plan and conduct selected special operations, if
so directed by the president or the

secretary of defense.
Within the U.S. national military
strategy, USSOCOM has two roles,
which in turn drive its two priorities of combat readiness and maximum employment of forces in
peacetime. These roles are:
Deter or counter violence. Capable of conducting complex, precise,
crisis-response operations, SOF provides the national command authorities a selective, flexible crisisresponse capability falling between
diplomatic initiatives and the committing of conventional forces.
The NCA is never forced to
choose too much force or none at
all in itself, a powerful deterrent to aggressors. SOF units must
be ready to accomplish their missions on short notice with minimal
additional preparation, which
requires trained and ready personnel, units and equipment. Maximizing readiness drives SOF training and procurement.
Nation assistance. Many
emerging democracies have problems that lead to insurgency if not
handled effectively. SOF can provide assistance to these nations in
developing successful counters to
insurgency and to many of the

problems themselves.
SOF must be employed to the
maximum extent possible in these
peacetime activities, to help prevent
small problems from developing
into major problems. Concurrently,
SOF units gain invaluable training
for wartime missions.
All SOF commanders and staffs
are expected to be active, informing
those responsible for establishing
U.S. policy and programs overseas
of the capabilities SOF can bring to
their programs.
In fulfilling these two roles,
USSOCOM is charged with accomplishing the following missions:
Unconventional warfare.
Strategic reconnaissance.
Direct action.
Foreign internal defense.
Counterterrorism.
Psychological operations.
PSYOP is one of the most effective
weapons in the arsenal of a commander. An effective PSYOP campaign can reduce casualties on both
sides of the fight.
Civil affairs. It is no longer
enough to win a war. Setting up the
postwar government is as important
as winning the war. This is the key
to postwar recovery, the establishment of a stable democracy, and the
resolution of problems that caused
the war. CA missions involve all
aspects of the civil dimension of
warfare and peacetime military
operations, from coordinating hostnation support for deployed U.S.
forces, to managing civilians displaced by combat, to assisting governments in restoring essential services in the aftermath of combat.
Coalition warfare, those tasks
undertaken to facilitate the interaction of coalition partners and U.S.
military. This mission was added
following Desert Storm and reflects
the key role SOF played in integrating coalition forces into the fight.

Characteristics
U.S. Air Force photo

The AC-130 Spectre gunship is capable of applying surgical firepower

important to a number of special-operations missions.
May 1993

A list of roles and missions does

not adequately capture the uniqueness of what USSOCOM brings to
U.S. security policies. The demands
3

of special operations require forces

with distinctive capabilities and
characteristics. These characteristics and capabilities allow SOF to
contribute in the diverse ways that
were highlighted earlier. An examination of these characteristics will
clarify what makes SOF special:
High-quality, mature personnel.
The most important characteristic
is the selection and retention of
high-quality personnel, enabling
SOF to meet challenges across a
broad spectrum of mission requirements with skill and initiative. Volunteers for SOF units first demonstrate their maturity, intelligence,
combat skills and physical toughness in their parent services, and
then complete an extensive, rigorous selection process. Thus, SOF
personnel are usually more experienced and more mature than those
in conventional units and are better
able to work with local military,
political and civic leaders.
Intense training as joint teams.
SOF training includes regular joint
training with conventional forces,
and constant joint training with all
SOF components. SOF units are
capable of integrating joint teams at
the lowest levels. An Army Special
Forces A-detachment, working with
Air Force combat controllers and
Navy SEALs, can put together a
team to train several kinds of hostnation forces in multiple environments, or conduct complex contingency-response operations, without
having to spend long train-up periods before the deployments. SOF air
and maritime mobility assets can
deliver SOF teams to any spot in
the world on short notice and under
adverse conditions.
Regional orientation. Special
Forces, PSYOP, CA and some SEAL
units are regionally oriented on specific areas of the world. This allows
them to develop expertise in the culture, language, traditions, geography, infrastructure, politics and
environmental conditions of a particular area. As a result, these
teams can be deployed rapidly, with
little train-up, and be immediately
4

Photo by David Bass

Members of an Air Force special-operations unit use a radio during field

operations as part of Operation Just Cause.
effective when they arrive.
Combine these characteristics
and you have the key to SOF versatility the ability to deploy in
small, self-contained teams, with
the following capabilities:
Gain access to denied areas by
numerous means, including air,
land and sea.
Provide limited security for
themselves and others.
Organic communications, capable of communicating worldwide.
Self-contained medical support,
able to take care of themselves in
all except extreme emergencies.
Live in austere, harsh environments without extensive support
structures.
Survey and assess local situations, determine what additional
support is needed, and communicate
this assessment to a distant post.
Assess and control air-delivered
relief and assistance.
Work closely with local militaries and populations, with due
respect for local customs.
Organize groups of people into
coherent, working teams.
These characteristics make it possible to deploy SOF teams without
large overhead, far from support

infrastructures, in areas cut off

from communications and medical
support, and in potentially dangerous areas.
SOF teams are particularly suited to unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense and disaster
relief, all of which may be conducted under adverse environmental
conditions, in lesser-developed
countries, and in environments of
incipient insurgency or lawlessness.
SOF can make initial contacts
and report back on the risks, opportunities and challenges follow-on
forces might face.
The joint nature of SOF makes it
particularly effective in missions
such as direct action, strategic
reconnaissance and counterterrorism, where ground forces, infiltration and exfiltration platforms, and
firepower may come from different
components and sometimes includes
conventional transportation and
fire-support elements.
Terrorism, in particular,
requires a highly disciplined and
precise response. A unit must be
carefully trained for this specific
mission and must have an extensive array of specialized techniques
and equipment.
Special Warfare

The rules that govern the effective use of force in a counterterrorist role are much different, more
complex and far more restrictive
than they are in conventional warfare. SOF is ideally suited for this
mission.

Spectrum of conflict
The versatility built into SOF by
its selection, training, organization
and equipment translates into utility across the spectrum of conflict.
SOF plays key roles from humanitarian relief through peacetime
engagement, through crisis
response, to large-scale regional
conflict. Lets examine the more traditional role of SOF in combat first.
Special-operations forces perform
their missions at the strategic, operational and tactical levels to influence deep, close and rear operations. SOF must be integrated into
the campaign at every stage of planning and execution, including the
transition from war to peacetime
stability operations.
A liaison team works directly
with the operational commander to
ensure SOF integration into the
campaign plan.
In the preparation stage for open
hostilities, SOF can be used to integrate reconnaissance and intelligence efforts for U.S. and coalition
forces, set up clandestine and
unconventional operations, work
with coalition forces, and develop a
PSYOP strategy.
Once hostilities start, SOF
attacks key targets of operational or
strategic significance and participates in the campaign deception
plan. As the battle progresses, SOF
directly supports operational
maneuver forces with DA, UW and
PSYOP directed at tactical centers
of gravity, by providing intelligence,
and through economy-of-force operations to delay, disrupt or divert
enemy forces.
As the battle nears its conclusion,
SOF emphasis shifts to CA, PSYOP
and reconnaissance operations to
exploit decisive maneuver and set
the stage for postwar operations,
May 1993

including refugee support and the

establishment and restoration of
public institutions and essential
services.

Recent employment
The successes of Operations Just
Cause and Desert Storm clearly
demonstrate the value of SOF when
employed extensively with conventional forces.
Of the 27,000 troops employed in
Operation Just Cause in Panama,
more than 4,000 were SOF. The plan
called for 27 critical targets to be hit
simultaneously the first night. SOF
provided the precombat intelligence
necessary for commanders to successfully neutralize these targets.
Army, Navy and Air Force SOF
worked together to secure critical
bridges, communication sites and
terrain, eliminating enemy resistance, and preventing the Panamanian Defense Force from interfering
with future operations.
Fire support for these missions
consisted of Air Force SOF AC-130
Spectre gunships and AH-6 attack
helicopters, and Army AH-64
Apaches.
U.S. Central Command effectively
integrated SOF into every facet of

Operation Desert Shield/Desert

Storm. SOF performed in all its mission areas, including the collateral
mission of combat search and rescue.
Army Special Forces and Navy
SEALs were among the first to
deploy to Saudi Arabia. Special
Forces teams were attached to
every Arab coalition unit and assisted these units with communications, liaison, training and combat
support. SOF was the primary
trainer for the reconstituted
Kuwaiti military. Gen. H. Norman
Schwarzkopf stated that specialoperations forces were the glue
that held the coalition together.
On the evening of Jan. 16, 1991,
SOF MH-53J helicopters, selected
for their electronic countermeasures
and navigation capabilities, crossed
into Iraqi airspace leading Army
AH-64 Apache helicopters. These
teams knocked out key Iraqi airdefense radars, successfully creating a corridor for allied air forces
enroute to key targets throughout
Iraq.
Just before the ground war started, Special Forces deployed deep
behind Iraqi lines by SOF helicopters on special-reconnaissance
missions to provide critical intelli-

Photo by Thomas Witham

U.S. Navy SEAL and Saudi Special Forces troops train on the use of
claymore mines during Operation Desert Storm.
5

War, that are now rising as serious

challenges.
A world emerging from a bipolar
confrontation will have to deal with
many of the following: ethnic, tribal
and religious warfare; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
the rise of religious fundamentalism;
disease, poverty and the population
explosion; terrorism; narcotrafficking and narcoterrorism; emerging
democracies and the conversion from
demand to market economies and
the attendant problems these processes create; and the revolution of
rising expectations brought about by
worldwide communications.
These factors have combined to
make the world, in many ways, less
stable than it was during the Cold
War. Yet tremendous opportunities
exist for increasing freedom, as
many nations are now searching for
ways to achieve democracy, a market economy and stability.
One key to world stability is providing these nations with the tools
to fend off destabilizing forces while
they develop democracies.

In this photo,
taken through
night-vision
goggles,
special-operations
troops fast-rope
from an MH-53J
Pavelow III
helicopter
during
Operation
Desert Storm.

Photo by Greg Ford

gence. Navy SEALs supported

deception and maritime embargo
operations, conducted area reconnaissance and supported countermine warfare.
PSYOP units created a multimedia campaign directed at the morale
of Iraqi troops. Executed in conjunction with the bombing campaign,
the results were spectacular. Interrogation of Iraqi prisoners determined that some 70 percent of the
estimated 62,000 prisoners who surrendered to U.S. forces were at least
in part influenced to do so by the
PSYOP campaign.

Changing environment
SOFs role in todays military goes
far beyond those roles in combat
just related. These nontraditional
roles are a result of the changing
security environment in the world
today.
In the fall of 1989, the Berlin
Wall fell, and communism collapsed
6

in Eastern Europe. Within two

years, the Soviet Union ceased to
exist, and Germany was unified.
Many thought that peace had broken out worldwide. The gains to
world peace brought about by these
momentous changes are spectacular. The threat of a catastrophic
nuclear war and massive theaterwide conventional war has diminished greatly.
But Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990 highlighted other
facets that are still shaping the
post-Cold War security environment, including regional instability,
the demise of Soviet influence, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
With the demise of Soviet influence, many states are now free to
adopt more adventurous policies,
endangering regional stability. A
sober reassessment of the postCold War world reveals problems,
long submerged during the Cold

SOFs contribution
SOF can make a significant contribution to developing nations, and
at the same time help shape the
security environment of the United
States, helping to forestall problems
that might eventually result in
large expenditures of American
lives and treasure.
Some of the best-trained combat
troops in the world, Army Special
Forces, Navy SEALs and Air Force
SOF crews are often known more
for their training ability than their
combat skills.
Many governments will accept
SOF units because of this reputation, but they would not accept a
conventional unit because of
sovereignty issues.
The low profile of SOF units, their
ability to accomplish much with few
people, and their reduced support
requirements make their employment in many countries possible,
where the publicity and size of other
units would make it prohibitive.
Special Warfare

SOF missions overseas contribute

greatly to stability. These contributions include:
Military-to-military contacts.
Successful joint and combined
exercises with the militaries of
developing nations significantly
improve these nations capabilities
to create a stable security environment. SOF also provides an example of the role of the military in a
democracy. SOF is ideally suited
for training militaries to deal with
insurgencies, terrorism, lawlessness and narcoterrorism.
PSYOP. In many lesser-developed countries, getting the governments message to the population is
a major challenge. Many nations do
not have the money, infrastructure
or capability to do this effectively.
PSYOP units can be of great assistance in promoting counterdrug
activities, democratic institutions,
human rights, regional stability and
a favorable image of the United
States.
Nation assistance. Civil Affairs
units are uniquely suited to helping nations create the infrastructure and programs required to provide a wide range of services to the
population. This helps create a
prosperous and stable nation. Civil
Affairs personnel work with other
U.S. and host-nation agencies to
coordinate and enhance their
efforts to conduct disaster-relief
operations and disaster-preparedness planning and training. They
can also act as a liaison between
government, military and private
volunteer organizations.
Humanitarian assistance and
relief. SOF are well-suited to assist
humanitarian activities in remote
areas. They are often the first on
the ground and are ideally suited to
do an initial assessment and coordinate immediate aid. PSYOP units
can communicate to a stricken people how they will get relief and how
to prepare for it. CA units assist in
managing refugee camps and setting up local infrastructures to help
people through the disaster.
Medical/dental/veterinary
May 1993

assistance. The impact of even a

small number of medical specialists
in remote areas can be dramatic.
Regional orientation for SOF medical assets includes additional training in regional diseases and health
problems, as well as cultural idiosyncrasies affecting medical care.
SOF normally trains a core of
host-nation medical personnel,
focusing on the use of existing
resources, so care can continue after
SOF leave. Training focuses on preventive medicine, including mass
immunization, maternal-care programs, and projects to ensure safe
drinking water and appropriate
sewage disposal.
Direct support to the ambassador. SOF can support noncombatant-evacuation operations in both
permissive and nonpermissive environments. They can assist the
ambassador with early warning,
organization, interface with local
officials, liaison with other U.S.
forces, enhanced communications,
emergency medical services, and
counterterrorist and hostage-rescue
capabilities.
The counterdrug war. SOF provides counterdrug training, assistance and operational support to

host-nation forces, supported

CINCs and other U.S. government
agencies. The primary focus is
training on military skills to assist
the host nation in dealing with
increasingly dangerous narcotraffickers and narcoterrorists.
SOF also plans and conducts
counterdrug operations in support
of U.S. national security objectives
when so directed by the national
command authorities.

Forward presence
Special-operations forces carry
out peacetime-engagement missions
to assist the host nation, but they
are also benefiting the United
States, helping to shape the security environment to favor the longterm interests of the United States.
These contributions take many
forms:
Access. The employment of SOF
in areas not seen or visited by other
U.S. organizations provides
increased information about the
geography, social infrastructure,
militaries and societies of many
nations.
This information might otherwise
be unavailable and can be of great
value in U.S. support of host-nation

U.S. Army photo

Veterinary assistance can have a dramatic impact on people in remote areas

who depend heavily on livestock for transportation and agriculture.
7

forces in hostage-rescue or humanitarian-assistance operations. If the

United States has to commit forces
to protect U.S. interests, this information can be among the most
detailed and up-to-date available.
Area knowledge. Overseas SOF
missions allow SOF units to develop
detailed, firsthand knowledge of the
culture, language, terrain, weather
and infrastructure in countries
where they are employed and where
they might have to work during
contingency operations.
Promoting stability. Effective
SOF deployments help alleviate
conditions of incipient insurgency
and the disastrous effects of drug
trafficking. They strengthen hostnation institutions of democracy
and promote the use of the military
to increase stability.
By heading off problems at the
lowest level, before they become
full-blown insurgencies, and by
helping to keep friendly, democratic
governments in power, SOF can
help prevent the United States from

having to commit larger forces at a

later date to deal with more serious
problems.
Good will. The benefits SOF
brings to developing countries build
good will toward the United States.
This can result in support for U.S.
positions in the United Nations and
for U.S. goals and interests
throughout the world, commitment
of forces to U.S.-led coalitions, and
increased access to lines of communication for peaceful commerce, to
support humanitarian-relief operations, and to support U.S. forces
deployed in contingency operations
around the world.
Reduced instability leads to
increased wealth and economic
activity, benefiting both U.S. businesses and the people of developing
nations.
Counternarcotics. By helping
nations cope more effectively with
drug problems, SOF CD efforts will
decrease the flow of illegal drugs to
the United States and help in our
own drug war.

A Turkish relief
worker for CARE
stands with children of a Kurdish
refugee camp. U.S.
special-operations
forces provided the
initial care to thousands of such
refugees during
Operation Provide
Comfort.

CARE photo by Nancy Blum

Military-to-military contact.
The contacts made by SOF units
among foreign militaries facilitate
combined operations in future coalitions and support for contingency or
humanitarian-assistance operations
within the country.
Human rights. SOF is specifically charged to observe for and
train foreign units on respect for
human rights. SOF can have a significant impact on the observation
of human rights by militaries that
formerly paid little attention to it.
Training benefits. Many SOF
wartime missions focus on training
local populations on the same skills
that SOF units train host-nation
militaries on during peacetime
engagement. Thus, these deployments directly improve SOF
wartime capabilities.

Increasing use
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall,
the employment of special-operations forces has been steadily
increasing. Employment of SOF in
all kinds of missions rose 35 percent
in fiscal 1992 over fiscal 1991.
SOF employment in counterdrug
operations has gone up by more
than 104 percent. Each of these
deployments represents one mission, which could be as small as one
or two specialists assisting an
ambassador with language expertise, or as large as a deployment
numbering in the hundreds to
assist victims of a natural disaster.
SOF was employed in 103 countries in every geographical region of
the world in fiscal year 1992, and
during the year, the average weekly
commitment of SOF, both in the
United States and overseas, was
2,600 men and women, deployed on
115 missions, in more than 40 countries and 15 states.
The growth of SOF deployments
reflects both the less-stable postCold War world and a growing
awareness on the part of country
teams and regional CINCs that
SOF provides unique and valuable
capabilities in dealing with many of
the problems that exist in these
Special Warfare

countries.
The utility of special-operations
forces in peacetime engagement,
supporting U.S. national security
interests, has been demonstrated
repeatedly over the the past few
years.
In Cameroon, a small team of
Civil Affairs medics and doctors
from the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, working with the local military, inoculated 58,000 people
against the deadly meningitis disease and treated an additional
1,700 people for a wide range of
ailments.
The skills taught to the Cameroonian army medical personnel
allowed them to continue this program and administer an additional
170,000 doses of vaccine after the
SOF team left. All this took only
three weeks and cost only $86,000.
According to our ambassador, nothing has been of more utility in furthering our relationship with the
people and government of
Cameroon.
In the immediate aftermath of
the Gulf War, soldiers from the
10th Special Forces Group were dispatched to Turkey and northern
Iraq to assess the situation and provide initial care to thousands of
Kurdish refugees.
These SOF soldiers provided
medical aid, provided sources of
uncontaminated drinking water and
arranged for the aerial delivery of
needed supplies to help the Kurds
establish camps in the mountains of
northern Iraq. In one camp, the
death rate was hovering at more
than 250 a day from malnutrition,
disease, exposure and wounds. SOF
efforts reduced the death rate to

May 1993

four or five a day within two weeks.

Trained and ready

The global interests of the United
States, and the growing complexity
of the international environment,
demand special-operations forces be
versatile, trained and ready for
unprecedented challenges in the
years ahead. Our nations specialoperations forces, as integral members of the joint-service team, provide the national command authorities, and the theater CINCs, with a
wide range of alternatives for dealing with the challenges we are most
likely to face in the future, ranging
from specialized peacetime operations to equally specialized conflict
and post-conflict support.
SOF represents a great value to
the nation but is only 1.7 percent of
Department of Defense manpower,
and only 1.1 percent of the DoD
budget. SOF are specialized by
region and ideally suited for peacetime engagement.
They are politically acceptable
where other forces are not. SOF,
working with conventional forces,
maximize the force potential and
capability of U.S. armed forces in
ways not otherwise possible.
SOF are a key and essential component of the total equation of military readiness. They stand ready to
respond to contingencies worldwide,
support theater peacetime-engagement activities, and act as instruments of national policy.
In Operations Just Cause and
Desert Storm, 31 SOF soldiers
gave their lives in combat, and 100
were wounded more, proportionately, than any service. With their
continuing dedication to the ser-

vice of the United States, specialoperations forces will continue to

make significant contributions to
our foreign policy and national
security strategy.
SOF soldiers will continue to give
our nation their very best, and they
are ready to lay their lives on the
line if that is what the nation asks
of them.
There is no better investment for
our future, or that of countless millions around the world who suffer
from disease, poverty and oppression, and who now, more than ever,
look to the United States for leadership and hope.

Gen. Carl W. Stiner

is the commander-inchief of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Commissioned
as an Infantry officer
in 1958, General Stiner has served as the chief of staff for
the Rapid Deployment Joint Task
Force, as commander of the Joint
Special Operations Command, as
commander of the 82nd Airborne
Division and as commander of the
XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort
Bragg. Designated the commander
of Joint Task Force South, he served
as operational commander of all
forces employed in Operation Just
Cause in Panama in December
1989. General Stiner holds a bachelors degree from Tennessee Polytechnical Institute and a masters
degree in public administration
from Shippensburg State College.

Air Force
Special Operations
School:
An Emphasis on Education

n April 1992, a 25-year milestone

in support of the special-operations community was passed by
one of the most unique schools in
the U.S. Air Force: The Air Force
Special Operations School. Through
those years, the schools reputation
has grown, and now USAFSOS is
recognized across the Department
of Defense as a jewel in the Air
Force crown.
In April 1967, the USAF Special
Air Warfare School the original
name of the school was activated
at Hurlburt Field under the Special
Air Warfare Center, then located at
Eglin AFB, Fla. It would be a year
before the schools name would
change to the Special Operations
School.
In the beginning the schools
focus was the preparation of Air
Force personnel for duty in Southeast Asia. Since then, the USAFSOS curriculum has grown from a
single course of instruction to 13
courses covering the geopolitical,
psychological, sociological and military considerations of special operations. The list of annual graduates
has grown as well from 300 to
nearly 10,000 in-residence and off10

station students.
Those arent the only areas of
growth; in those early days, there
was only one staff member with a
masters degree and he was the
librarian. Today in the schoolhouse,
there are 21 masters degrees and
three instructors within a year of
completing their Ph. Ds.
Regarding the past years, Col.
Michael M. Flynt, USAFSOS commandant, stated the schools life
spans the Southeast Asia period of
the 60s, the advisory period of the
70s, the revitalization of special
operations in the 80s, and now the
challenges of the 90s.
The school staff is typical of the
newly emerging Air Force of the
90s. It consists of special-operations
flyers fixed wing and rotary
intelligence officers, geographicalarea specialists, educators, clinical
social workers, behavioral scientists
and others. The 13 courses run the
gamut of special-operations education from an introduction to the
special-operations community to
revolutionary warfare, regional orientation, joint operations planning,
cross-cultural communications and
international terrorism, as well as a

three-day crisis-response course.

USAFSOS is one of three schoolhouses in USSOCOM, the other
two being the Naval Special Warfare Center at Coronado, Calif., and
the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare
Center and School at Fort Bragg,
N.C. All three schools coordinate
their curricula and meet regularly to
discuss training programs. USAFSOS is unique from the other two
organizations in that no Air Force
specialty codes or military occupational specialties are changed or
awarded. USAFSOS courses are
designed to complement training
received elsewhere. Army JFKSWCS personnel appear as guest
lecturers for USAFSOS and frequently attend USAFSOS courses.
Flynt stresses the schools emphasis on education vis-a-vis training:
USAFSOS is an educational institution as opposed to a training organization. We dont change anyones
AFSC or MOS, we educate them.
The low-threat environment of the
school (no final exams) contributes
to this educational process, since
students can focus on learning vs.
passing a test.
According to Lt. Col. Dann D.
Special Warfare

Mattiza, USAFSOS vice-commandant, one of the objectives of the

school is providing education that
will act as a force enhancer in the
special-operations arena. For
instance, understanding why the
indigenous personnel behave the
way they do, contrasted to what
they do, has been proven repeatedly
as the smart way to conduct specialoperations missions. Operation
Desert Shield/Storm is an excellent
example of how quickly and
effectively USAFSOS training is
used. USAFSOS Middle East
experts traveled the country, briefing departing personnel as the
buildup in the Gulf accelerated. In
the final count, 12,000 uniformed
personnel and more than 3,000 local
civilians and dependents were
briefed. Many of the lectures were
videotaped and dispersed throughout DoD, providing USAFSOS
expertise to many thousands of DoD
personnel.
Organizationally, USAFSOS has
two academic divisions; Special
Operations and Regional Affairs.
Lt. Col. James D. Lawrence, chief of
the Special Operations Division,
describes his courses as curriculum
designed to address all the various

aspects of special operations from

mission planning to psychological
operations. Special operations is
fundamentally a joint operation,
and the people who deal in special
operations must know how to function in the joint arena. USAFSOS
helps to educate special-operations
personnel in the capabilities and
requirements of that arena.

Special ops courses

The Introduction to Special Operations Course is a three-day course
covering the basics of special operations and designed to introduce students to joint U.S. special-operations mission activities, organization and forces. Included in the
course is a static display of USAF
special-operations aircraft and combat-control-team equipment. The
course also studies the Navys special-warfare forces, and the Armys
Special Forces and Rangers. Students get a clear understanding of
special operations through case
studies of Desert One the Iran
rescue attempt, the Son Tay raid in
Vietnam and Operations Just
Cause and Desert Storm.
The Revolutionary Warfare
Course provides U.S. personnel with

U.S. Air Force photo

An instructor in a regional-studies course refers to a map of the Middle East

during a lecture at the Air Force Special Operations School.
May 1993

a knowledge of geopolitical, sociological and cultural implications of

U.S. involvement in revolutionary
warfare. The five-day instruction
includes insurgencies, unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. The course covers U.S. methodology in combating insurgencies and
includes lectures on some CIA capabilities along with the CIAs current
and historical relationship with the
military services. During this
course students learn about the
components of psychological operations, civil affairs, security assistance and the internal-defense-anddevelopment strategy. A secret
clearance is required.
The Joint Special Operations
Planning Workshop, 10 days long, is
one of the longest USAFSOS courses. It provides principles and techniques, including deception, to plan
for the rapid deployment, employment and redeployment of specialoperations forces under overt, clandestine or crisis guidelines. The
course has four functional areas:
definition and orientation, planning
factors, organizational relationships, and a practicum. The threeday practicum is held in the second
week of the course to reinforce the
lessons learned. A top secret clearance is required.
The Joint Special Operations
Staff Officer Course is a 10-day
introduction to USSOCOM jointstaff activities, with special emphasis on unique functions and interrelationships peculiar to a specialoperations staff. It is designed for
the joint special-operations staff
officer. The course provides an indepth examination of USSOCOM
mission activities, roles and working relationships with the services,
USSOCOM components, sub-unified special-operations commands
and U.S. government agencies. A
top secret clearance is required.
The Crisis Response Management
Course is a three-day course
designed for officers and civilians
filling or programmed for command
or senior staff positions. According
to Operations Division Chief Lt.
11

Col. James D. Lawrence, We have

tried to tailor this course for selected U.S. senior officers and civilians
to help them effectively control crisis situations. We try and take the
pinging out of crisis management.
The course provides an overview of
the national structure and DoD elements of crisis-response management. It includes national-level crisis recognition, coordination and
support agencies, the JOPS Vol. IV
Crisis Action Procedures, and case
studies of previous national-level
crises. Instruction is given primarily through lectures, with ample
time allowed for discussion of the
subject and related issues. Case
studies amplify and support major
instructional areas such as proper
crisis-action procedures, contingency communications, and the use of
intelligence in a crisis. A top
secret/SI/TK clearance is required.
The Joint Psychological Operations Course creates an awareness
of PSYOP doctrine, organization,
techniques, equipment and capabilities. It provides an understanding
of the planning of psychological
operations in support of U.S.
national objectives throughout the

spectrum of conflict. This five-day

course covers many areas of PSYOP
operations, from U.S. military
employment of PSYOP to the psychology of the insurgent. The course
concludes with a PSYOP exercise in
which students recommend possible
solutions in a case study. A secret
clearance is required.
The Joint Senior Psychological
Operations Course is a 2 1/2-day
course designed to provide colonels,
equivalents and above an awareness of PSYOP and its contributions
to U.S. national objectives during a
conflict. The course covers the
national policy directives, hostile
PSYOP activities and DoD capabilities. A top secret clearance is
required for the course.

Regional affairs courses

The Regional Affairs Division
deals with the soft side of SOF. It
provides non-technical information
on intercultural communications,
antiterrorism awareness and the
cultural, historical and geopolitical
aspects of four specific regions of
the world: Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and
Southeast/Northeast Asia. The

U.S. Air Force photo

Students attend a lecture at the Air Force Special Operations School. The
schools 13 courses range from an introduction to special operations to joint
operations planning.
12

courses are designed for personnel

being assigned overseas or having a
professional interest in these areas
and subjects.
Latin America Orientation
Course This five-day course
familiarizes students with selected
historical U.S. economic, political
and military activities in Latin
America and their effects. Narcotics
in Latin America is discussed, from
cultivation, processing and transport to its effect on Latin American
societies, as well as U.S. counterdrug operations. The course emphasizes understanding Latin America
and the varied socio-political backgrounds found in this extremely
diverse area. A secret clearance is
required.
Middle East Orientation Course
The five-day MEOC focuses on
desert culture, Islam and the Arabic
language, as well as the contrasts
and similarities found across the
Middle East. It specifically addresses
historically volatile issues such as
the Arab-Israeli dispute and provides specific country briefs on Saudi
Arabia and other Gulf states. The
course is taught at the unclassified
level.
Africa Orientation Course
Africa is a multifaceted region with
many influencing factors. AOC
addresses many of them, including
U.S. foreign policy and the sociopolitical history of the continents.
Focused upon the Sub-Saharan
region, AOC also provides students
a complete package of regional
information on Africa. This contributes to their effectiveness in
support of U.S. interests and prepares them for a rewarding and safe
tour in the region. Issues discussed
during this four-day course range
from staying healthy in Africa to
understanding the wide spectrum of
African cultures. A secret clearance
is required.
Asia-Pacific Orientation Course
APOC provides historical, cultural,
religious, social and political insight
into the vast and complicated region
of Southeast and Northeast Asia. Its
emphasis is on the Association of
Special Warfare

How to Apply
To apply for training at the Air Force Special Operations School, contact your unit training officer or:
Army active duty and civilians:
Total Army Personnel Center
Attn: TAPC-OPB-D
200 Stovall St.
Alexandria, VA 22332-0411
Message address: CDRUSTAPC ALEXANDRIA VA//TAPC-OPB-D//
Phone: DSN 221-3160/4593; commercial (703) 325-3160/4593.
Army Reserve:
U.S. Army Reserve Personnel Center
Attn: DARPMOT-S
9700 Page Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63132
Message Address: CDRARPERCEN ST LOUIS MO//DARPMOT-S//
Phone: DSN 892-2336; commercial (314) 538-3362.
Army National Guard:
ARNG Operating Activity Center
Attn: NGB-ARO-E
Military Education Branch, Bldg. E-6814EA
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5420
Message Address: CNGB ARNG OAC ABERDEEN PROVING
GROUND MD//NGB-ARO-E//
Phone: DSN 584-1726; commercial (301) 671-1726.

Southeast Asian Nations, Japan and

Korea, with class content weighted
to allow for specific interests. The
five-day, unclassified course gives
student a broad look at the region
and some of its most important
issues.
Cross Cultural Communications
Course CCC is designed to
improve the communications and
problem-solving skills of DoD personnel working with personnel from
the Middle Eastern, Latin Ameri-

May 1993

can, Asian-Pacific or African

regions. The five-day class is
unclassified.
Dynamics of International Terrorism DIT provides military and
civilian personnel with a basic
awareness and appreciation of the
psychology, organization, techniques, operational capabilities and
threat posed by terrorist groups.
Strong emphasis is placed on protective measures that government
personnel and their families can

employ to minimize the threat. A

half-day of the course is spent at
the schools specially equipped firing range, where the terrorists
tools of the trade (Molotov cocktails,
letter bombs, automatic weapons,
etc.) are demonstrated. The students also witness the effect of a
few ounces of plastic explosive on
an automobile and what a cinderblock wall wont do to protect you. A
secret clearance is required for this
five-day course.
On the horizon, the entire USAFSOS staff is looking forward to moving to a new 28,700-square-foot
schoolhouse in 1994. Since the bulk
of the USAFSOS facilities are more
than 20 years old, this is a muchneeded improvement.
Also on the horizon is renewed
interest in foreign internal defense,
and internal defense and development. Interestingly, this brings the
school full circle. After 25 years, the
USAF Special Operations School is
still responding to the needs of the
special-operations community, still
developing new courses to meet the
ever-changing requirements of our
rapidly changing world, and still
putting the special in joint specialoperations training.

This article was written by the

Public Affairs Office, U.S. Air Force
Special Operations Command,
Hurlburt Field, Fla.

13

Naval Special Warfare

Center: Schoolhouse
for Naval Special
Operations

he Naval Special Warfare Center, located at the Naval

Amphibious Base in Coronado,
Calif., is the Navys special-operations schoolhouse.
Although it is widely known for
its Basic Underwater Demolition/
SEAL training course, or BUD/S,
the Center provides both basic and
advanced SEAL training in fact,
three-fourths of its students attend
advanced courses.

BUD/S
BUD/S itself is 25 weeks long. It
takes candidates, all volunteers,
from a variety of sources. Most of
the enlisted applicants come from
the fleet and sailors advanced individual training following boot camp.
Officer volunteers come from the
fleet, the Naval Academy, NROTC
units and Officer Candidate School.
Because of the inherent dangers
of Naval special operations, or in
Navy terms, special warfare,
prospective SEALs go through
what is considered by some to be
the toughest training in the world.
14

This intense training tests men to

weed out those who will quit when
they get too cold, too wet or too
tired.
BUD/S training is based on the
philosophy that every individual is
capable of reaching physical standards much higher than he perceives
his limits to be. Determination and
the ability to work as a team are
repeatedly tested. Success in BUD/S
requires an extremely high level of
personal commitment, discipline and
dedication to complete the course.
Teamwork is the key to SEAL success, and producing team players is
the goal of BUD/S training.
BUD/S is organized into three
phases, but before students begin
training, they must complete seven
weeks of preconditioning and indoctrination known as Fourth Phase.

Fourth Phase
All students are required to pass
a physical screening test before they
begin Fourth Phase. This pretraining phase introduces them to
BUD/S-specific physical training,

including running, swimming and

the obstacle course, to get them
physically and mentally ready for
BUD/S. Students who begin in the
middle of a cycle may be cleared to
start training without going
through the entire Fourth Phase.
Students who begin late in the
cycle or who have injuries or medical problems which prevent them
from beginning regular classes may
remain in Fourth Phase for an
entire cycle. If they are not ready to
begin classes at the end of that
time, the School re-evaluates their
suitability for BUD/S training.
Students who have begun regular
training and have been held back
because of medical or performance
failures are rolled back. These
students follow a medically supervised program of rehabilitation
until they are ready to return to
training. Repetitive medical problems requiring a rollback will cause
a student to be carefully evaluated
to see if he can adapt to the physical
rigors of the training.
To begin training, students must
Special Warfare

pass a screening test consisting of

the following:
500-yard swim in 11:30 or less;
60 push-ups in two minutes;
75 sit-ups in two minutes;
10 pull-ups (no time limit);
Two-mile run in 14:40 or less;
25-meter underwater swim completion (no time limit).
The purpose of Fourth Phase is to
take the cuts up front, lowering
BUD/S attrition, avoiding the hazards of training men who have no
chance of success and preventing
unnecessary sports-related injuries
to students who arrive ill-prepared.
Fourth Phase also teaches discipline, nutrition, the basics of physical training and history of Naval
special warfare.

First Phase
The nine-week First Phase of
BUD/S training focuses on the use
of SEAL equipment and physical
conditioning. While students swim,
run, exercise and run the obstacle
course, they learn the other basic
SEAL skill teamwork. Physical
exertion for extended periods tests
each students physical and mental
ability. Simple tasks, such as smallboat handling under arduous conditions, teach teamwork.
First Phase reaches a peak during its sixth week, Hell Week,
when, for six days, trainees perform
drills in 5-7 man boat crews with
little or no sleep. They learn to
endure more than they ever
dreamed possible and, through
sleep deprivation and physical
exhaustion, learn if they have the
makings of a SEAL.

er equipment they might need.

As the school was being set up, an
emergency team was assembled
from the Dynamiting and Demolitions School at Camp Perry, Va.
This small unit received an accelerated course in underwater demolition and small-boat handling and
was shipped to Sicily. After the
Sicilian operation, most of the members of the new Navy Combat
Demolition Unit reported to Fort
Pierce, Fla., where they became
instructors at the new NCDU
School.
The major emphasis of NCDU
training was on demolition of beach
obstacles. Teams were filled with
volunteers from the Navy Sea Bees,
Bomb and Mine Disposal and the
Navy/Marine Scouts and Raiders
who were already based at Fort
Pierce.
Training of the new units
stressed the physical capabilities of
the men. The theory behind this

level of physical demand had been

developed by the Navy/Marine
Scouts and Raiders. Kauffman
agreed with the basic idea and
ordered his instructors to design the
physical training program for the
NCDUs. An intense period of this
program became known as Motivation Week.
During those six days, the men
were driven to their limits of
endurance. They were given impossible objectives, and lack of sleep
and constant harassment made
them groggy and prone to mistakes.
Any mistake was grounds for immediate expulsion from training, and
it took fortitude and motivation to
pass the course without quitting.
In fact, the grueling training did
cause 40 percent of the original volunteers to quit. Those who stayed
became completely confident of
their abilities to endure and accomplish any task, and most later credited their training for sustaining

SEAL trainees
climb cargo nets
during physical
training at the
Naval Special
Warfare Center,
Coronado, Calif.

Hell Week
On May 6, 1943, Adm. Ernest J.
King, then-chief of naval operations, issued a directive to form the
Naval Demolitions Units. Lt. Cmdr.
Draper L. Kauffman, founder and
commander of the Navy Bomb Disposal School, was assigned the task
of training the new units and given
a free hand in locating the school,
recruiting men from in and out of
the Navy, and in obtaining whatevMay 1993

U.S. Navy photo

15

them during their most difficult

combat operations.
Graduates of the training took
part in Operation Overlord, D-day
in Europe, where the physical training at Fort Pierce paid off. NCDUs
were able to stand the punishing
pace when other units were unable
to keep up. Split into two groups,
one for Omaha Beach and the other
for Utah Beach, NCDUs sustained
85-percent casualties but still
accomplished their missions.
In the Pacific, the NCDUs, operating under a new name, underwater demolition teams, were pressed
into action in a new role of reconnaissance. Covered under an
umbrella of heavy naval bombardment, these men performed in an
environment of flying fragments
from a multitude of explosions. To a
man, they credited the harshness of
their training for sustaining them.
The lessons of the past are
embodied in todays Hell Week
training. The content of the course
is treated as confidential to prevent compromise to future students.
No one event is difficult; it is only
when events are accomplished
under the stresses of lack of sleep,
the unknown and physical exertion

that Hell Week serves its intended

purpose.
Tailored to the environment, Hell
Week must have a different character in winter than in summer
because of the differences in air and
water temperature. There are several Hell Week schedules consisting
of varying degrees of water exercises, land movement, physical exercises and rubber-boat work.
The objective is to cause students
to use, under stress, the skills
taught in the first five weeks of
training. Stress is controlled and
induced by a number of factors,
including sleep deprivation.
Those who complete Hell Week
spend the remaining three weeks of
First Phase learning hydrographic
reconnaissance techniques, used in
beach survey and underwater mapping operations.

Second Phase
Second Phase, diving, is seven
weeks long. Students learn basic
diving techniques using open- and
closed-circuit scuba. Academic ability is also tested as students study
diving physics and medicine.
Physical conditioning continues;
emphasis is placed on long-distance

U.S. Navy photo

SEAL trainees learn there is more than one way to maneuver rubber boats
during their training at Coronado, Calif.
16

compass swims, with the goal of

training students to become basic
combat swimmers, using swimming
and diving techniques as a means of
transportation from their launch
site to their combat objective. Fitness standards are also increased.
Students in Second Phase must
complete a 5.5-nautical-mile timed
swim and four-mile timed runs, and
complete the obstacle course in 10
minutes or less.

Third Phase
Third phase is nine weeks long
and is broken down into three curriculum blocks: tactics, weapons
and demolitions. Training is conducted at Coronado and at San
Clemente Island, approximately 70
miles west of San Diego.
During the first four weeks, students concentrate on land-warfare
tools, equipment and terminology.
Tactical patrols emphasize equipment awareness and mental discipline and are designed to gradually
build students ability to move while
carrying a basic fighting load. Students also learn rudimentary skills
of land navigation. Two days of
classroom instruction are reinforced
by three days of field work.
After the first four weeks, the students are mentally and physically
prepared for the rigorous schedule
at San Clemente Island. There, for
five weeks, they apply their training in a practical environment, carrying their basic fighting equipment
and M-16s.
Combat-conditioning courses, tactical marches up to 12 miles and
nightly situation patrols emphasize
the basic principles of SEAL land
warfare. Each student develops into
a basic rifleman. Qualification with
the M-16 and the Smith & Wesson
686 revolver is mandatory. Students
also learn basic SEAL squad-reaction drills, working up to night livefire execution. The final two weeks
cover UDT and SEAL demolitions.
After graduation, trainees receive
three weeks of basic parachute
training at Fort Benning, Ga. They
are then assigned to a SEAL or
Special Warfare

SEAL delivery vehicle team to complete a six-month probationary

period.
SEALs are made on the teams,
not at the Center. The B in BUD/S
stands for basic, and the course
teaches only basic warfare techniques. The court of final judgment
is in the Navy special-warfare operational commands, and it isnt until
the BUD/S graduate is assigned to a
team and tested by his peers that
he is awarded the designation of
SEAL.

Because of the
demands of the
Naval special-warfare mission,
SEAL training is
rigorous, testing
students ability to
work as a team
and their determination to complete
the course.

Advanced training
In addition to BUD/S, the Naval
Special Warfare Center conducts 11
advanced courses:
MK 15 UBA Course. This twoweek course teaches use of the MK
15 underwater breathing apparatus, a self-contained, closed-circuit,
mixed-gas system and the most
complex diving equipment that
Naval special warfare uses.
SEAL Delivery Vehicle Course.
This course, 10 weeks long, covers
all SDV systems and standard operating procedures. It is required
before students are permitted to
dive and operate SDVs.
SDV Electronic Maintenance
Course. Eight weeks long, this
course gives Navy electronic technicians hands-on experience in troubleshooting and repair of all SDV
electronic systems.
Special Operations Technician
Course. This two-week course
teaches corpsmen going to NSW
commands to diagnose and treat
diving-related disorders.
Diving Supervisor Course. This
two-week course is designed for personnel in pay grades E-5 and higher
from joint special-operations-forces
commands. Students learn to give
diving-supervisor briefs and inspections on open-circuit and closed-circuit diving equipment.
Diving Maintenance Course.
One week long, this course emphasizes disassembly, reassembly and
maintenance of open-circuit diving
rigs and the LAR V rebreather.
Maritime Operations Course.
May 1993

U.S. Navy photo

This three-week course emphasizes

long-range, over-the-horizon navigation of combat rubber raiding craft,
using dead reckoning, the compass
and global-positioning systems.
Military Freefall. This course,
three weeks long, teaches the techniques and safety procedures of
free-fall parachuting.
Static Line Jumpmaster Course.
This two-week course teaches NSW
personnel to conduct static-line
parachute operations.
Ram Air Parachute Transition.
This week-long course, currently
taught only to explosive-ordnancedisposal personnel, teaches
parachuting with the MT1-X3
parachute, using a static line.
SEAL Weapons System Course.
Two weeks long, this course teaches
advanced underwater-demolition
techniques and equipment.
For Navy SEALS, training is
never complete. Whether assigned
to a SEAL or SEAL delivery vehicle

team or a special-boat squadron,

SEALs constantly train, refining
their special talents and learning
new skills that will better prepare
them for tomorrows missions.
Regardless of their eventual assignment, the first step in that long
training process comes at the Naval
Special Warfare Center.

This article was prepared by the

Public Affairs Office, Naval Special
Warfare Center.

17

CAC I:

ing locations were taken from a collection of tourist maps. The system
will show CA resources as circled
numbers, ranging from 1-17, which
indicate the type of resource. If the
user clicks on a number with the
mouse, a pop-up window appears
containing a description, notes and
photograph of the resource.

The Area Study Comes of Age

Possible Uses

by Capt. Bill Franklin & 1st Lt. Ken MacGarrigle

FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, calls the area study the basic
intelligence document for specialoperations forces. An accurate,
timely, and complete area study can
provide valuable information on
locales where military actions are
probable.
A system called the Civil Affairs
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence System can
provide the SOF community with
the second-generation software
tools needed to produce such area
studies in the age of multimedia
and X-windows capabilities. CAC3I
(pronounced kak-ee) will allow SOF
units to easily identify local
resources, facilities and other support available for their operations.
Members of the 403rd CA Battalion, Syracuse, N.Y., developed the
software, which uses a point-andclick, object-oriented X-windows
graphical user interface or a laptop
interface. CAC3I has various capacities, including the ability to scan
maps for inclusion in reports and
on-screen planning and editing.
The system can produce printed
reports by city neighborhoods, by
resource type or by grid-coordinate
ranges. It can also produce computer-generated overlays of CA information for use with any scale
Defense Mapping Agency maps. In
addition to data analysis, CAC3I
18

can be used to guide CA and tactical

teams through a city based on
descriptions of their surroundings
(a feature called Where am I?),
and will soon allow battle simulations through what if changes to
the database.
The figure shows all the government buildings (indicated by circled
2s) of downtown Lima, Peru, plotted on a screen. The map itself
came from a tourist map, and build-

Lt. Col. A. Dwayne Aaron, current commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training
Group, Special Warfare Center and
School, said CAC3I could provide a
good alternative to meet Corps CArelated intelligence requirements.
As the G-5 of the XVIII Airborne
Corps, Aaron had his staff use the
system during an exercise. The
greatest advantage (of the system)
would be the maintenance and
updating of data on a regular basis.
If all CA brigades and commands
are to be regionally focused, it
would seem to make sense that a
part of the units mission and one of
its most important mission-essential tasks should be to establish and
maintain a database on countries in
its area of responsibility. That

This diagram of the downtown section of Lima, Peru, printed from the CAC3I
system, shows all government buildings marked by 2s.
Special Warfare

would allow a regional concentration and provide Corps units with a

single point of contact, Aaron said.
One problem with area studies in
the past has been the unreliability
of data from various sources: CA
databases, official intelligence information, the changing nature of
cities (fires, construction), human
error, etc.
There is a lot of duplicated effort
in researching area studies, Aaron
said. Often area studies are completed, read once, filed and never
seen again. When the next person
requires the study, it often cant be
located or hasnt been updated in so
long that it is assumed to be outdated. This system could provide a better methodology for CA information
management, saving time and
allowing CA operators to focus on
problem solution versus basic
research.
With the data-entry procedures
and audit methods in CAC3I,
database errors can be significantly
reduced. Once an analyst types in
data, it is marked No Verify. The
record goes in the database, but this
mark tells the user that it has not
yet been through the proper checks.
It takes two editing analysts,
reviewing that entry against all
known information for a city, to
change the original No Verify to a
verified record. Audit features of
the system also keep track of the
time, date and a unique analyst ID
number. It records the nature of all
additions and changes to a record
from its creation throughout its life
cycle.
If a soldier adding records to the
database does not have the capability to scan in photographs at the laptop, the system generates a unique
tag which is then used as the
name for the photograph should it
be scanned and included in the
database later. The soldier simply
writes the tag on the back of the
photograph or image and sends it to
the 403rd CA Battalion, CAC3I Support Group, for scanning.
While the laptop version of CAC3I
does not support the display, editMay 1993

Reservists Create Software

to Aid Refugees
As Europes refugee problem threatens to spiral out of control, the
United Nations, the U.S. State Department and possibly NATO are
seeking help from two U.S. Army Civil Affairs reserve officers who
have quietly developed a computerized system for tracking the delivery
of emergency relief supplies.
Capt. Mark A. Wolfenberger does software equity research at Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, a major Wall Street firm, and 1st Lt. Angela D.
Blevins runs a womens clothing store in the Washington, D.C. area. Both
are members of the 353rd Civil Affairs Command in the Bronx, N.Y.
Wolfenberger and Blevins developed the software program called
DALIS (Disaster Assistance Logistics Information System) during a
six-week period following Desert Storm.They had been sent to Turkey
as part of a task force to aid the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish
refugees who were at the time clinging to the mountains between
Turkey and Iraq without food or water.
The response to that crisis from private emergency relief organizations had been literally overwhelming. Supplies were pouring in from
all over the world, but nobody knew exactly what was there, Blevins
said. Pallets were coming in from everywhere and just sitting there.
People were screaming for blankets in one place, not knowing that half
a mile down the road were all the blankets they could use. A flight
manifest showed that 100 tons of medical supplies had been delivered,
but no one could figure out where they were, she said.
Blevins, who arrived in Turkey before Wolfenberger, was astounded
to find that there was no software for what was basically an inventory
function. She called Wolfenberger, who was serving in Germany with
the European Command at the time, to see if he could help. He was
soon assigned to Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, where he worked with
Blevins to develop the DALIS software. Mark designed the program,
and I shaped it to what we needed based on conversations with volunteers in the field, Blevins said.
Blevins and others took the program into the field and worked
directly with the volunteers to fine-tune it. The United Nations office
in Zakho, Iraq, became the focus of the DALIS efforts. Donated goods
were entered into the computer there, while city teams in other areas
generally communicated with requirements by phone or paper, because
they did not have computers. The volunteers in Zakho were then able
to match up supply and demand.
DALIS can also provide up-to-date information on the whereabouts of
donated goods, Blevins said. We were always getting calls from donors
asking what happened to their donations. With DALIS, we could generate a report telling them exactly who received their aid. DALIS also
allows donors to designate a distributor through a camp code.
It appears the military will be involved in many humanitarianassistance missions in the future, Blevins said, and with its adaptability to any humanitarian-relief effort, she sees the possibility of a much
wider application for DALIS.
Capt. Cynthia Crosson, PAO, 353rd Civil Affairs Command

19

ing and manipulation of images,

laptop users receive hard-copy versions of all maps and photographs
associated with the databases in
use on their systems.
Besides keeping the audit history
in a text file attached to each
database record, CAC3I has the
capability to use this text for different notes about a specific record.
Examples might include: quotes
and references from tourist guides,
books and military documents;
quotes from officers who may have
lived in that country; interviews
with host-nation personnel regarding that record; CA and tactical
comments and concerns about that
resource; or information on changes
in resource status.
Note files are included in the
printout of any report. Audit information and information about analyst names and numbers are deleted
before the report prints.

Desert Storm
During Operation Desert Storm,
the 403rd and the 3rd Civil Affairs
Group, USMC, produced a detailed
and comprehensive neighborhoodby-neighborhood area study of
Kuwait City. A group of 20 people
worked around the clock to build a
database for a metropolitan area
with a peacetime population of
more than 1 million.
Work took place in shifts, 24
hours per day, seven days a week.
Finished products included a full
set of universal transverse Mercator-gridded plot maps and a computer-generated civil-military-operations estimate for 64 designated
Kuwait City neighborhoods. It also
included a CMO estimate for additional rural areas of Kuwait.
The 403rd produced an updated
product every 48 hours. During that
time an average of 800 additional
resource points were located, verified and added to the database.
The study became the CA reference study for the Kuwaiti Theater
of Operations and a focal point for
operations and intelligence activities for a number of Army and
20

Marine units.
The study was disseminated to
various commands and was useful
in planning for operations in the
city, said Lt. Col. John Butler, who
was commander of the 403rd during
Desert Storm.

Transition to peacetime
The 403rd now has the capability,
upon request from CAPSTONE
units, to perform unclassified studies in peacetime based on five
increasing levels of detail: noncombatant-evacuation-operations level,
terrorism-assessment level, civicaction level, command-support level
and military-government level.
NEO-level city studies, which
consist of identifying and verifying
the roughly 50 data points of CA
information per million population
of a city, are helpful in conducting a
NEO. Particularly in NEO operations, Butler said, It would be
very useful to have the precise
intelligence on areas of the city
where evacuations may have to
take place.
Terrorism-level city studies
expand on the NEO studies by identifying possible host-nation, U.S.,
and U.S.-owned targets. They also
include neighborhood narratives
describing demographics, etc. This
type of study would contain the
kind of information needed for civicaction or command-support missions. This level targets roughly 200
data points per million inhabitants.
Civic-action-level city studies, the
highest level of peacetime study,
comprises roughly 1,000 data points
per million inhabitants. These would
be used in planning for or continuing
with a civic-action program.
Command-support-level city studies are used for large-scale military
operations such as Operation
Desert Storm. They comprise roughly 4,000 data points per million
inhabitants and cover everything
needed to assess the needs of the
urban population and to start
repairs on essential services. The
time and personnel resources
required for such a level of detail

would be justified only under largescale operations.

Military-government-level studies
would be developed by CA assets in
an occupied area, based on day-today CA activities and requirements,
and might grow to as many as
20,000 data points per million
inhabitants.
Butler also sees possible uses for
CAC3I for relief operations. When
CA commands an operation for
civilian relief, one of the important
things to know is all of the
resources available in a civilian
community from which the people
could be housed, fed, and treated for
illnesses and wounds, he said.
For more information on the
CAC3I system, current available
studies, or the Desert Storm/Kuwait
City area study, contact Commander, 403rd CA Battalion; Attn:
CAC3I Project Officer; 1099 E. Malloy Rd.; Mattydale, NY 13211-1399.

Capt. Bill Franklin

is assigned to the
403rd Civil Affairs
Battalion, Syracuse,
N.Y., and attached to
the 354th Civil Affairs
Brigade, Riverdale,
Md. A Signal Corps officer, he was
the system architect and primary
developer of the CAC3I system. He
holds a BA degree in engineering
from Johns Hopkins University and
is a graduate of the Civil Affairs
Officer Advanced Course.
1st Lt. Ken MacGarrigle is assigned to the
403rd Civil Affairs
Battalion, Syracuse,
N.Y., and attached to
the 354th Civil Affairs
Brigade, Riverdale,
Md. An Adjutant General Corps
officer, he holds a BS degree in journalism from Southern Illinois University and is a graduate of the Civil
Affairs Officer Advanced Course.

Special Warfare

SOF Roles and Missions:

Re-examining the Environment

by Terry Doherty

he goals of containment have

been realized and, in fact, surpassed. The Soviet Union has
not only been contained, but has
self-destructed. U.S. military roles
and functions so long directed
toward containment now must be
re-examined to address a changed
and evolving global environment
suddenly free of the potentially
combustible Cold War.
National security policy and plans
must now identify and address new
opportunities, objectives, threats
and strategies. Military roles and
functions will flow from U.S. policy
goals and strategy reflecting a
changing U.S. world role in an interdependent multinational community
no longer constrained by restrictive
bipolar perspectives.
National security interests
demand a quality military force,
highly skilled, efficiently organized
and properly equipped. In a period
of a rapidly downsizing military
force, it is especially critical to identify military roles and functions
May 1993

accurately and to assign specific

functions precisely to the most suitable and most capable military arm.
While the military will continue
to fulfill its many traditional roles
and functions, it must also be ready
to assume emerging non-traditional
roles and functions which may call
for and effectively employ a multitude of military skills and expertise.
For example, the future may find
the military involved in a wide
range of nation-assistance activities, both foreign and domestic.
A smaller military force undertaking expanding non-traditional
military missions is likely to produce increased emphasis on special
operations and the unique skills of
special-operations forces. Military
roles and missions in the post-containment era will increasingly
require a highly skilled military
force with significantly more skills
than those customarily associated
with combat operations.
Regional knowledge, including a
firm appreciation of historical, polit-

ical, cultural and socio-economic

realities, will be essential. Strong
interpersonal skills demonstrated
by an ability to work effectively
with people from diverse backgrounds, both U.S. and foreign, will
become imperative as the military
increasingly operates in a multicultural arena, frequently without
hitherto customary U.S. hegemony.
Moreover, future military roles and
functions are likely to be characterized more and more by interagency
efforts in which the military contributes to the overall governmental
effort.
Special operations are activities
conducted by specially organized,
trained and equipped military and
paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objectives. According to public law (10 USC 167), special operations include direct action, special
reconnaissance, unconventional
warfare, foreign internal defense,
civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitar21

ian assistance, search and rescue

(in the context of special operations)
and such other activities as may be
specified by the National Command
Authorities. Special-operations
forces are those forces specifically
organized, trained and equipped to
conduct special operations.
Army SOF include Special Forces,
Rangers, Special Operations Aviation, Psychological Operations and
Civil Affairs units, and units
designed to support and sustain
SOF. SF, PSYOP and CA units are
particularly well-suited to contribute to nation-assistance operations, combatting terrorism, counterdrug operations, contingency
operations and activities involving
international organizations. SOF
participation normally occurs as an
interagency effort.
SOF provide a variety of skills
especially well-suited for the likely
missions of the future. Their regional orientation provides culturally
attuned, specially trained personnel
for activities in sensitive politicalmilitary environments. Language
proficiency further enhances their
unique ability to work effectively
and efficiently in a cross-cultural
international environment.
SOF are ideally suited to assist
other nations and have a primary
capability to organize, train,
advise and assist security forces.
SOF capabilities include extensive
medical skills, a wide range of
sophisticated informational activities and competence in civil-military operations.
Civil Affairs expertise encompasses such non-military functions as
agriculture, animal husbandry,
community development, economics
and commerce, education, public
health, public information, public
safety and sanitation. Essentially,
SOF are multitalented problemsolvers whose special talents transcend combat power to provide a
valuable capability to support a
broad variety of U.S. policy options.
With expertise in a multitude of
civilian and military fields, including engineering, communications,
22

weaponry, tactics, medicine,

instruction, organization and security, SOF provide a versatile and
particularly flexible capability to
respond to a wide range of politicalmilitary challenges and to fulfill or
contribute to a number of critical
military roles and functions.
The versatility, language capabilities and relatively low profile of
SOF are particularly valuable if the
level of U.S. involvement is a sensitive issue within a region or country. In short, special-operations
forces are dependable, skilled, experienced, flexible and ready forces
especially appropriate to contribute

With expertise in
a multitude of civilian and military
fields, including engineering, communications, weaponry,
tactics, medicine,
instruction, organization and security,
SOF provide a versatile and particularly
flexible capability to
respond to a wide
range of political-military challenges.
to most military roles and functions.
The dangerous proliferation of
internecine ethnic conflicts throughout the world demonstrates a growing need to identify potential areas
of conflict and to analyze regional
problems long before bloody confrontations occur. Regional, area
and country expertise, coupled with
a thorough knowledge and understanding of indigenous military and
insurgent groups, must be encouraged within the military with a
view to reducing or preventing conflict or war.
Similarly, foreign-area expertise
is indispensable for the military to
play its essential role if called upon

to alleviate suffering or to establish

or restore effective governmental
operations after a conflict or war.
Moreover, foreign-area expertise is
critical for effective planning and
operating as part of any multinational or coalition force and is
essential at all levels of military
command to produce success in
either unilateral or multinational
military operations. In short, an
overall smaller military force will
require substantial detailed knowledge of the global national security
environment to ensure efficient and
effective employment of the military
arm.
The peril of rampant local and
regional conflicts in a period of
growing nuclear proliferation suggests a new mission for military
forces in the last decade of the 20th
century and beyond. Preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weaponry
becomes increasingly relevant as
opposing factions engaged in ethnic,
internal or regional conflicts seek
the overwhelming advantage that a
nuclear capability promises. Prevention of proliferation includes the
full range of efforts to prevent the
spread of nuclear weaponry and
includes, in certain extreme cases,
offensive measures undertaken to
eliminate a nascent or existing
nuclear capability.
The military may also be called
upon to play a new role and function in the refurbishing and rebuilding of the United States. Skills
honed and perfected in assisting
foreign nations, along with conventional military know-how, may be
applied effectively to address
domestic needs, with the military
contributing to a domestic nationassistance program in areas such as
education, infrastructure rejuvenation, civic action, organization and
leadership. The military could play
a valuable role, from planning
through implementation, in an
interagency program undertaken to
address the nations urgent domestic problems.
Section 167 of Title 10 states that
the principal function of the U.S.
Special Warfare

Special Operations Command is to

prepare special-operations forces to
carry out assigned missions, and
assigns the responsibility for training assigned forces to the commander of USSOCOM. However, DoD
Directive 5100.1, section F, paragraph 6, assigns the responsibility
to train forces for the support and
conduct of special operations to
each of the services. This paradox
should be addressed in the review of
appropriate roles and functions.
It is most fitting that we re-examine military roles and functions during this period of a rapidly changing
domestic and global environment.
Similarly, the unique capabilities of

May 1993

special-operations forces must be

fully understood, properly recognized and thoughtfully utilized to
ensure an effective and efficient
military capability in the century
ahead.

Terry Doherty is a
social scientist currently assigned to the
Combat Developments
Division of the Army
Special Operations
Commands Force
Development and Integration Directorate. A retired Army officer, he
served in a variety of active-duty

assignments which included duty as

a military attach, serving as director of three separate departments at
the JFK Center, advisory and command tours in South Vietnam, and
service as assistant professor of military science at Fordham University.
He has earned a BA from Providence College, an MA in political
science from Villanova University
and a master of technology for international development from North
Carolina State University.

23

When Forces Work Together:

Army PSYOP & the FBI
in St. Croix
by Clinton R. Van Zandt

n Sept. 18-19, 1989, Hurricane Hugo, prior to causing

extensive damage along the
U.S. eastern seaboard, swept
through the island of St. Croix, U.S.
Virgin Islands. Hundreds of businesses and private residences were
either damaged or destroyed by
Hugos winds, and most, if not all
vital services, including electricity
and fresh water, were disrupted.
Anarchy raced through the otherwise placid streets of St. Croix
even faster than Hugos 100 mileper-hour winds. Looters were
everywhere; local police response
was all but suspended, and the citizens of St. Croix took to the streets
with guns to protect what little
remained of their businesses and
homes. The walls of the local
prison were also damaged, and 150
prisoners escaped, adding to the
chaos already generated by the
natural disaster.
At the direction of the U.S. Attorney General, FBI agents, including
the FBIs Hostage Rescue Team and
two members of the FBI Academys
National Center for the Analysis of
Violent Crime, were immediately
deployed to St. Croix to function as
the lead federal-response agency.
The FBI was given the responsibility, along with a force of military
police from Fort Bragg, N.C., and
Fort Hood, Texas, to cooperate with

24

the local government in restoring

law and order to St. Croix. Attached
to the Fort Bragg MP contingent
was a detachment of soldiers from
the AV Platoon, Company A, 6th
PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP
Group.
Members of the FBIs NCAVC
normally deploy with the HRT to
coordinate hostage negotiations.
Examples of such deployments
include the 1987 federal prison riots
in Oakdale, La., and Atlanta, Ga.,1,2
and the 1991 federal prison riot in

Talladega, Ala.3 In St. Croix, they

functioned as behavioral advisers to
the special-agent-in-charge of all
FBI personnel deployed there, and
they initiated liaison with the
PSYOP detachment.
With the approval of both the FBI
special-agent-in-charge and the
commander of U.S. Army personnel
in St. Croix, the FBI negotiators
and PSYOP soldiers developed an
assessment of the psychological
mood of the local residents. They
provided their respective commanders with proactive ways to stop the
looting of local businesses. The looting had to be halted to prevent the
situation from escalating into a fullscale riot.
This combined assessment
revealed a strong undercurrent of
animosity between the haves and
the have-nots on St. Croix, aggravated by racial issues. The response
from local citizens to the joint
FBI/military presence varied from
outright relief to obscene gestures.
The negative responses were due
partially to a misunderstanding of
the role these forces were to play in
the crisis, and partially to unfounded rumors4 as to the length of time
the forces would be deployed to St.

Photo by Joseph Picone

This street in Christiansted on the island of St. Croix shows the damage left
in the wake of Hurricane Hugo.
Special Warfare

Croix. There was also resistance by

local officials to any action that gave
the appearance the U.S. was taking
over local-government functions.
After a number of fact-finding
patrols to record citizens reactions
and interviews with many St. Croix
residents, the FBI advisers and
their PSYOP counterparts made the
following recommendations to the
FBI and the U.S. Army on-scene
commanders:
The PSYOP detachment should
obtain current information on
distribution sites for food, water
and medical aid from the local
office of the Virgin Islands Emergency Management Agency.
The PSYOP detachment should
be authorized to disseminate that
information via mobile broadcast
units and leaflets and to provide
taped messages for broadcast by
local radio stations when they
became operational.
To ensure that the image of U.S.
forces was one of providing assistance, public-service leaflets
should be distributed by FBI and
military personnel while on
patrol throughout St. Croix.
Perceived animosity could be
reduced by having all U.S. lawenforcement and military personnel strive to create a positive,
helpful image, while maintaining
a professional appearance. Long
weapons should not be exhibited
to the local population, and combat helmets should be replaced
by soft caps.
The recommendations were discussed between the FBI specialagent-in-charge and his military
counterpart and subsequently
implemented. FBI psychological
advisers and PSYOP-detachment
personnel assisted in the implementation and assessment of the recommendations results.
Once the local citizens saw the
FBI and the U.S. military forces
providing information, aid and
assistance, they began to view the
joint operation as one of assistance,
not occupation. Local residents
began to provide FBI and military
May 1993

Photo by Joseph Picone

A soldier makes loudspeaker broadcasts along a road overlooking Christiansted. Broadcasts informed residents of food, water and medical-aid sites.
personnel with information concerning the location of escaped prisoners
and the identity of looters, and
order soon returned to paradise.

Conclusion
During September 1989, a unique
combination of psychological assets
from the FBI and the U.S. Armys
6th PSYOP Battalion, under joint
FBI/military leadership, joined to
support an urgent law-enforcement
and humanitarian mission to
restore order to St. Croix in the
aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. This
blending of psychological thought
and direct application supported the
mission of U.S. government forces
deployed there, and broke new
ground in joint civilian law-enforcement and military operations.

Clinton R. Van
Zandt is a supervisory
special agent at the
FBI Academy, Quantico, Va. As an Army
counterintelligence special agent, he served
with the 524th MI Detachment in
Vietnam and with the 113th MI
Group in Chicago, Ill., prior to join-

ing the FBI. A 22-year FBI veteran,

he is a member of the FBIs National
Center for the Analysis of Violent
Crime. He holds a bachelors degree
from Southern Illinois University
and a masters degree from the State
University of New York. Mr. Van
Zandt serves as an adjunct faculty
member at the University of Virginia
and is the author of a number of
articles concerning crisis negotiations and crisis management.
Notes:
1 G. Dwayne Fuselier, Clinton R. Van
Zandt and Fred J. Lancely, Negotiating the
Protracted Incident: The Oakdale and
Atlanta Prison Sieges, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, July 1989.
2 Clinton R. Van Zandt and G. Dwayne
Fuselier, Nine Days of Crisis Negotiation:
The Oakdale Siege, Corrections Today, July
1989.
3 Thomas J. Fagan and Clinton R. Van
Zandt, Negotiating the Non-Negotiable Situation: The Talladega Prison Incident, Paper
submitted for publication, September 1992.
4 Stuart E. Wahlers, Rumors, Military
Intelligence, July-September, 1991.

25

Advising
Host-Nation
Forces:
A Critical Art
by MSgt. Melchor Becena

U.S. military agencies and personnel have demonstrated their

professional excellence in training
foreign personnel and units in technical skills. In some cases, however,
U.S. personnel have not performed
up to their potential due to a lack of
background and training in advising skills and techniques.
The critical skill or art of advising is not taught in any of the various courses currently offered within
the JFK Special Warfare Center
and School. A case can be made that
advising skills can be learned away
from the schoolhouse, on the job.
Learning adviser skills on the job,
however, particularly in a politically sensitive environment, can needlessly jeopardize the mission and
create a situation detrimental to
U.S. interests.
The purpose of this article is to
provide a set of general guidelines
that can be used temporarily to fill
the existing doctrinal gap on the
subject of adviser training and techniques. FM 31-20-3, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures for Special Forces, to be
published later this year, is intend26

ed to provide a more permanent

doctrinal fix and address the current doctrinal shortfalls in this and
other areas related to foreign internal defense.

Environment
Within DoD, the principal element charged with providing advisory assistance to a foreign nation
is the security-assistance organization, or SAO. The United States tailors each SAO to the needs of the
host nation. For this reason, there
is no typical or standard SAO organization. The SAO may be known
in-country by a number of names,
according to the number of persons
assigned, the functions performed
or the desires of the host nation.
Typical SAO designations include
joint U.S. military advisory group,
joint U.S. military group, U.S.
military training mission and military group. The SAO is a joint
organization. Its chief is essentially
responsible to three authorities: the
ambassador, who heads the country
team and controls all U.S. civilian
and military personnel in country;
the commander-in-chief of the uni-

fied command; and the director of

the Defense Security Assistance
Agency. The ambassador has operational control of all matters affecting his diplomatic mission, including security-assistance programs.
Special Forces may provide advisory assistance to a host-nation military or paramilitary organization
as a detachment or as individual SF
soldiers. During peacetime, this
assistance is provided under the
operational control of the SAO chief
in his role as the in-country U.S.
defense representative. The U.S.
adviser may often work and coordinate with civilians of other U.S.
country-team agencies and, as such,
must know their functions, responsibilities and capabilities. This is
important, since many activities
cross jurisdictional lines.
The adviser should have a full
understanding of his status in the
host nation. This is normally established by a status-of-forces agreement, or SOFA, between the U.S.
and the host nation (primarily in
NATO countries). These agreements may provide for full diplomatic immunity or very little immunity. In the absence of an agreement, the adviser is subject to local
laws and customs, and to the jurisdiction of local courts. Regardless of
the diplomatic immunity afforded
him, the adviser is expected to
observe local laws, as well as the
applicable laws of war and all U.S.
Army regulations and directives.
In formulating a realistic policy
for the employment of advisers, the
Department of Defense must carefully gauge the psychological climate of the U.S. and the host
nation. The introduction of military
advisers requires a thorough psychological preparation of the hostnation populace with which the
advisers will be in contact. Before
advisers enter a country, their mission should be carefully explained
and the benefits of their presence
clearly emphasized to the host
nations citizens. A credible justification, well in advance of their
arrival, will minimize the propaganSpecial Warfare

da benefits that dissenting elements

within the host nation might derive
from the advisers presence.

Rapport
Websters New World Dictionary
defines rapport as a close or sympathetic relationship. Good rapport describes a relationship
founded on mutual trust, understanding and respect. Bad rapport
describes a relationship characterized by personal dislike, animosity,
mistrust and other forms of friction. The need to establish rapport
with the host-nation counterparts
is the result of a unique military
position in which the adviser has
no direct authority or control over
their actions. In order to execute
the mission, the adviser must
establish an effective rapport which
will allow him to influence his
counterparts actions despite this
absence of formal authority.
Psychological pressure such as
threats, pressure, intimidation or
the use of bribes should never be
used against a counterpart.
Although they may offer quick
results, these methods have very
negative side effects and cause the
counterpart to feel alienated and
possibly hostile. Psychological pressure may irreparably damage the
relationship between the adviser
and his counterpart.
The most effective rapport is
based on shared interests or goals.
This relationship is characterized
by mutual trust, respect and understanding. This is achieved when
each of the individuals perceives the
other as competent, mature and
responsible. The adviser must make
it clear that he and his counterpart
are both working toward a common
goal. Conveying this attitude to the
host-nation counterpart will establish long-lasting, effective rapport.

to ones environment. An adviser

must constantly bear in mind that
he is an adviser, not a commander.
He is not there to lead troops. The
counterpart, not the adviser, is the
expert in his country. The counterpart must be treated as an equal or
superior and given the respect the
adviser himself expects. Advising
the counterpart to select a particular course of action is only effective
if the counterpart perceives that the
adviser is professionally competent
to give sound advice.
The adviser should have a knowledge of host-nation socio-political
and military organizations and
interrelationships, including personalities, political movements,
forces involved and social drives.
Military actions are subordinate to
and supportive of the economic and
social actions required to remove
the causes of the state of lawlessness or insurgency. In situations
where the host-nation government
may have been in existence only a

short time, the administrative

machinery may still be developing.
Money needed for programs to cure
social and economic ills may instead
be directed toward security needs.
Advisers should be aware of such
situations and not be too critical.
Advisers should ask their predecessors for the units files and make
sure they are thoroughly debriefed,
to avoid reinventing the wheel.
Try to learn what the previous
adviser has attempted and has or
has not accomplished. Keep an open
mind and judge things for yourself.
Begin preparing a folder about the
advisory area and duties as soon as
possible. By posting a worksheettype folder during the tour, the
adviser will gain a better understanding of the job, and follow-on
advisers will have a complete file to
assist them in completing important projects. An adviser must
never make promises that he cannot or should not carry out. U.S.
assets must never be committed

A Special Forces
NCO instructs Salvadoran soldiers
during training in
basic marksmanship. Success in
such missions
requires strong
interpersonal skills
and respect for the
host-nation
counterpart.

Techniques
Advisers must be able to sell the
most indefinite commodity themselves. The traits of an adviser
encompass all the traits of leadership as well as the ability to adapt
May 1993

Photo by Douglas Wisnioski

27

U.S. Army photo

A Special Forces NCO instructs Salvadoran soldiers in small-unit tactics.

Advisers must be perceived as fully competent in order to be effective.
unless the adviser has the authority
and capability to deliver them.
An adviser must be extremely
flexible, patient and willing to
admit mistakes. He must persevere
in implementing sound advice. He
must be a diplomat of the highest
caliber and possess an unusual
amount of tact. The adviser must
also possess a thorough knowledge
of the organization, equipment and
tactics of the unit being advised.
Possibly the greatest asset that an
adviser may possess is common
sense. Ultimately, this uncommon
commodity separates the effective
adviser from the ineffective one.
With common sense, everything is
possible; without it, nothing but
failure can be expected.
The usual cause of an advisers
failure is his inability to maintain a
good working relationship with his
counterpart, normally because of
cultural ignorance, and at times,
even arrogance. The unsuccessful
adviser often fails to understand
why his counterparts do not feel the
sense of urgency that he does. Advisors must also realize that Third
World countries do not have the
necessary assets or resources to perform to U.S. standards, nor it is
28

necessary for them to do so. The

advisers effort should be directed to
upgrading the capability of the host
nations forces to the point where
they can effectively address internal
or regional threats. Advisers are
transient: They must realize that
their counterparts will remain and
continue to face the sometimes
hopeless situation long after the
adviser has returned to the safety
and comfort of the United States.

Adviser training
Training in adviser skills and
techniques has received very little
emphasis prior to and since the
Vietnam War. During the Vietnam
era, The Military Assistance Training Adviser course, taught at Fort
Bragg, provided personnel slotted
for advisory duty in Vietnam the
basic skills necessary for a successful tour. The MATA course consisted of 125 hours of instruction, 37 of
which were dedicated to language
training. The MATA course was
later modified and improved, based
on input provided by returning
course graduates. After Vietnam,
however, formal adviser training
ceased.
The current Special Forces Quali-

fication Course includes blocks of

instruction on foreign internal
defense, unconventional warfare
and coalition-warfare missions. It is
obvious that highly refined advising
skills are invaluable to the accomplishment of all these missions. Yet,
a substantive block of instruction on
adviser skills and techniques is not
offered as part of the present SFQC
curriculum.
The expanding role of Special
Forces, and the military in general,
in humanitarian-assistance and
other non-traditional roles, make
adviser skills more important now
than ever before. On the job training is no longer sufficient. The possibility of mission failure would be
considerably diminished if a formal
block of instruction on advising
skills and techniques were included
as part of Special Forces training.
This block of instruction could be
inserted into the language-training
phase or included as part of MOS
training during the SFQC. It is time
to re-emphasize the importance of
advising skills and techniques.
These are the skills that made Special Forces special. A look at
todays headlines seems justification enough.

MSgt. Melchor Becena is assigned to the

Doctrine Development
Branch of the Directorate of Training and
Doctrine, JFK Special
Warfare Center and
School. His previous assignments
include service with the 10th and
7th SF Groups and with the U.S.
MILGROUP in El Salvador.

Special Warfare

Using MILES
on Foreign
Weapons

by SFC Michael E. Lopez

or more than 10 years the U.S.

Army has been using the Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System, or MILES, to enhance
its training involving fire and movement. There is nothing more instrumental in fine-tuning battle drills
or assessing the effectiveness of a
movement to contact, a deliberate
attack or an ambush.
Unfortunately, without modifications, the MILES transmitter
mount accepts only U.S. weapons.
Until a universal mount is designed
and supplied with the transmitter,
alternate methods of mounting and
zeroing it to foreign weapons must
be used.
Last year, SFODA-736 took 100
sets of MILES on a deployment for
training to Punto de Rieles,
Uruguay, to teach a light-infantry
program of instruction to soldiers in
the 1st Infantry Florida Battalion.
The rifle used by the Uruguayan
soldiers was the 7.62mm FN FAL,
and the method which follows is the
one we employed to modify the
MILES for use with the FAL.
Conventional mounting is imposMay 1993

sible, since the height of the MILES

transmitter exceeds that of the
front sight post by 1/4 of an inch.
This problem is alleviated by
mounting the transmitter to the
underside of the barrel, with the
forward sling swivel between the
two prongs which normally house
the front sight post of the M-16. If
the newer transmitter, which
accepts either the A1 or the A2 barrel, is to be used, the sliding bar
should be used in the A1 position.
The FAL barrel is slightly larger
in diameter
than the A1
barrel, and
the fit is really
snug. Care
should be taken not to disfigure the
mounting clamp, as it will lose its
spring effect. Since some clamps
may pop open while firing, put two
wraps of duct tape around the
transmitter and mount. Place the
tape so that none of it touches the
barrel, to keep it from melting or
burning when the barrel is hot.
When zeroing the transmitter to
the rifle, follow the process outlined
in the MILES manual provided
with the zero boxes. However, when
firing from five, 15 and 25 meters,
multiply the corrections by three,
two and one, respectively. With the
transmitter mounted underneath
the barrel, corrections to elevation
and windage will be applied in the
opposite direction indicated by the
zero box. Bore sighting is complete
when the right and bottom correction panels both read 3 (with a tolerance of three clicks in either
direction). This also compensates
for the transmitter being mounted
underneath the rifle. To expedite
the zeroing process, request one
zero box for every 40 soldiers.
Soldiers should also anticipate
that some MILES sets will not work
properly. Of 100 sets we deployed,
12 did not work, so add a 10-percent
buffer to the number needed, to be
safe. Another pitfall to watch for is
the type of blanks used. Crimped
ones work fine; the ones with paper

wadding do not feed well. Finally,

although the training and audiovisual support center will replace
lost transmitter keys, you cannot
afford to lose them, since each lost
key renders a transmitter inoperable. The keys no longer have a cable
and clip to secure them; therefore,
secure them with wire or cord.
Our deployment to Uruguay was
more successful than we could ever
have hoped, and we found the
MILES training to be invaluable.
This view was shared by the hostnation brigade commander, who
expressed to the U.S. Military
Group in Uruguay his desire to
obtain the MILES system. In being
able to shoot at someone and register a kill, the host-nation soldiers
developed a more realistic idea of
how to accomplish their missions.
Getting officers to take part in
training is sometimes a problem,
but the MILES technology drew
maximum participation from the
whole unit officers eagerly participated in the training alongside
their soldiers. We attribute a good
deal of the success of our deployment for training to the MILES,
and we believe that soldiers from
other countries may respond just as
favorably.

SFC Michael E. Lopez is currently

serving as the senior weapons
sergeant on SFODA-731, Company
C, 1st Battalion, 7th SF Group. His
previous assignments include serving as a machine gunner with the
1st Ranger Battalion at Hunter
Army Airfield and as a scout assistant squad leader with the
3rd/327th Infantry, 1st Brigade,
101st Airborne (Air Assault) at Fort
Campbell, Ky. SFC Lopez is a graduate of the U.S. Army Ranger
School, the Special Operations
Weapons Course, the Static Line
Jumpmaster Course, the Special
Operations Target Interdiction
Course and the Special Operations
Training Course.

29

Task Force Communications:

The Special Operations Paradigm
by Lt. Col. Donald Kropp

ecent special-operations experience in Panama and Southwest Asia, as well as disaster

relief in Florida, all point to a
requirement for a powerful roll-on,
roll-off SOF communications
capability.
That capability needs to deploy
with the warfighter to provide a
communications network. Creating
that network, however, requires air
transport to move its people and
equipment, and often the physical
size of the communications package
will dictate the extent of the capability that is deployed.
The 112th Special Operations
Signal Battalion provides a good
model of the near-term packaging of
Army transportable communications support. The 112th, an Army
signal battalion, is unique in that it
is funded from the joint SOF budget
and deployed in support of Army
and joint SOF units. In fact, the
112th is the only battalion-level
communications unit in the force
structure totally dedicated to sup30

port of special operations.

With the mission to support a
deployed joint special-operations
task force, or JSOTF, and an Army
special-operations task force, or
ARSOTF, the 112th must be capable of packing the maximum possible communications capability into
the smallest possible package. Communications support is therefore
phased into theater in a building
block fashion.
Each communications package is
configured to fit on a C-130 or C-141
aircraft, making maximum use of
the airframe available. The initial
communications-support package is
heavy in single-channel radio
assets, augmented with a multichannel capability for entry into the
Defense Communications System.
Once the JSOTF is established,
follow-on signal packages build up
the communications infrastructure
supporting the JSOTF and
ARSOTF. The result is a SOF theater-communications network with
transmission and switching systems
connecting the JSOTF to subordi-

nate and adjacent headquarters,

the conventional theater headquarters and the Defense Communications System.
The following is an overview of
the rapid-deployment communications systems employed by the
112th Special Operations Signal
Battalion:

Single-channel
The 112th has developed and procured a unique communicationsliaison system using off-the-shelf
technology and standard military
hardware. The equipment, called
the Special Operations Communications Assemblage, provides a large
capability in a very small package.
Configured in transport boxes small
enough to be loaded on a civilian
airline, SOCA provides the following capabilities:
HF radio with automatic link
establishment
UHF tactical-satellite radio
Secure facsimile
Secure teletype, compatible with
all Army and joint systems
Special Warfare

Secure video imagery

Scanner
Wire-line interface
Communications security interface with encryption devices such
as the KG-84, KY-57, KYV-5 or
Sunburst processor
Commercial power interface
Generator power
Using the SOCA, battalion communicators can deploy on the first
aircraft load and provide secure
communications between the
JSOTF commander and subordinate
units. Often the limitations of aircraft or numbers of personnel dictate that the SOCA is the only communications package deployed.
However, the JSOTF and
ARSOTF cannot operate on singlechannel equipment alone. Multichannel systems are required for
voice and data entry into the
Defense Communications System,
intelligence circuits or wideband
video transmissions. The 112th
meets this requirement through
satellite and high-frequency multichannel systems.

CUCV and one trailer, and the

112th can now deploy three SATCOM systems in the same airframe
space formerly required for one.

HF multichannel
In addition to satellite multichannel, the Special Operations Signal
Battalion was the first in the Army
to receive high-frequency multichannel equipment. Like the satellite equipment, the HF multichannel system can provide access to the
DCS and used to link subordinate
headquarters as the mission
expands.
In 1989 the 112th received prototype HF multichannel radio sys-

tems. These four-channel systems

were first deployed to Honduras in
support of a joint special-operations
training exercise. About the size of
a radio-teletype rig, the system
allowed easy roll-on, roll-off deployment and provided long-distance
multichannel communications.
Since that time, the prototype
equipment has been replaced by the
Army standard AN/TSC-122.

Next Generation Switch

One limitation in the capability of
the Special Operations Signal Battalion is the dependence on analog
voice-switching equipment. This
limitation is being corrected

Satellite multichannel
One serious limitation in the
deployment of the current Army
satellite-communications multichannel system is the size of the
equipment. The AN/TSC-93 terminal was originally configured as a
shelter mounted on a five-ton truck,
with a separate antenna truck and
two 10-kilowatt generator trailers.
Its size made it virtually nondeployable: Combat commanders
are not willing to trade an entire
airframe for one communications
van.
Since that first configuration, several modifications have reduced the
size of the TSC-93: The shelter was
removed from the five-ton truck and
mounted on a dual-wheel M-1028
CUCV pickup. The antenna system
was replaced with a commercialdesign, lightweight antenna that
fits in the aisle space of the shelter.
The two 10kw generators were
mounted on a single trailer. The
entire TSC-93 now fits on one
May 1993

U.S. Army photo

Above: The Special Operations

Communications Assemblage
provides the 112th Signal Battalion a lightweight deployable
means of providing joint-taskforce communications.
Left: The Next Generation
Switch provides a digital
switchboard capability in a
small unit that can easily be
detached from its shelter.

31

tion missions in areas without an

established communications infrastructure. Some day, commanders
will have access to a global information system that will support all of
their warfighting needs, but in the
meantime, we must fit our current
and near-term systems to the needs
of the rapid-deployment model.
Initiatives taken to downsize
equipment in the 112th Special
Operations Signal Battalion provide
a blueprint for other communications assets and make the 112th
truly deployable, capable of configuring support for any contingency,
from a single-channel radio to
wartime theater support of a joint
special-operations task force.
The Lightweight Deployable Communications System, or LDC-1, provides
networked or stand-alone communications capability for the 112th.
through the acquisition of a new
digital switchboard, the Next Generation Switch. In FY 1994 the battalion will receive four NGS systems. The NGS has a 1,500-line
capacity and can interface with
commercial systems, the conventional AN/TTC-39D switchboard
and the Armys mobile subscriber
equipment, similar to cellular
phones. Best of all, NGS comes in a
18x19x15 package that can be dismounted from the shelter.
In the interim, the battalion is
planning to modify the currentissue SB-3614 switchboards to provide a digital subscriber capability.
Once the NGS is fielded, the SB3614 switchboards can be moved
down to the Special Forces-group
level to augment their switching
capabilities.

Message switch
Currently the 112th has no automated message-switching capabili-

32

ty. This limitation will be corrected

by the planned procurement of a
small (S-280 shelter size) messagepreparation and switching system
that will separate classified message traffic under both the General
Service and Defense Special Security Communications System. The
workstation to interface with the
message switch is already in operation at the 112th the AN/GSC-59
workstation, also known as the
Lightweight Deployable Communications System, or LDC-1.
The LDC-1 is a self-contained offthe-shelf item that provides a networked or stand-alone automated
communications terminal. It can
operate over secure HF, VHF and
UHF radio systems or wire-line
interface. The entire system fits in a
suitcase, and its size and transportability make it likely to ride on
one of the first aircraft in.
Future military operations are
likely to be short-notice, short-dura-

Lt. Col. Donald

Kropp is commander
of the 112th Special
Operations Signal
Battalion. A Signal
Corps officer, he has
served in a number of
special-operations assignments,
including service as a signal platoon
leader, signal company commander
and group CE officer in the 7th Special Forces Group; CE officer for the
4th PSYOP Group; battalion S-3
and executive officer for the 112th
Signal Battalion; and tactical signal officer in the 1st Special Operations Command. His military
schooling includes the Command
and General Staff College, the Joint
Staff Course (Phase 2), the Special
Forces Qualification Course, and
Airborne, Ranger and Pathfinder
Schools.

Special Warfare

Interview:
James R. Locher III,
Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict

James R. Locher III became the

first U.S. Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and
Low-Intensity Conflict in October
1989. A 1968 graduate of the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, he
has more than 20 years of professional experience in both the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government. From 1978
until his appointment as ASDSO/LIC, Mr. Locher served on the
staff of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. During this period,
he directed the bipartisan staff effort
that resulted in the GoldwaterNichols Department of Defense
Reorganization of Act of 1986.
SW: In your opinion, what are the
most significant accomplishments
that ASD-SO/LIC has made since it
was established in 1986?
Locher: I would say the most significant contribution of ASDSO/LIC has been its effort to focus
in the policy area, laying out policy
May 1993

for low-intensity conflict, what we

call the environment short of war,
and also laying out policy for special-operations forces. We were created at the same time as the U.S.
Special Operations Command,
because the Congress felt that the
Department of Defense was ignoring special operations and lowintensity conflict. Right now were
in the midst of developing a longrange policy paper for special-operations forces, which were hoping
that the Secretary of Defense will
sign in the near future. In some of
the low-intensity-conflict activities,
SOF plays an important role, but in
others, general-purpose forces can
play an important role, or other
government agencies get involved.
In low-intensity conflict, the military plays the supporting role, so
we have the diplomatic, the economic, the informational, and the judicial instruments of power of the
United States government that can

be brought to bear. Another area

that we have contributed to is in the
interagency process. Almost everything we do in the special-operations world depends upon effective
interagency planning and coordination. Given our role in Washington,
weve been fairly heavily involved in
interagency matters, both in various interagency groups and in bilateral relations with important
departments and agencies. When I
talk about interagency, Im really
talking about the Department of
State, Central Intelligence Agency,
U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development,
the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the National Security
Council. ASD-SO/LIC has also
played an important role in terms of
getting resources for the specialoperations community. Weve done
several analytical studies to justify
the top line of our budget, and weve
had a fair amount of success in get33

ting what we call fiscal guidance

the levels for our Major Force Program 11 that funds special-operations forces.
SW: What do you foresee for the special-ops budget? Does it look like it
may hold steady for the next few
years?
Locher: Right now (January 1993),
the budget for special-operations
forces is going to hold steady. Its
protected against inflation, so in
absolute terms, its going to grow a
little bit, but it will be zero real
growth. The special-operations community is in the minority, because
its been able to hold on to both its
funds, and for the most part, the
majority of its force structure. As I
look to the future, I think specialoperations forces are going to play
an increasingly important role. I
think that has been recognized by
the national leadership and by the
Congress, which has continued to be
very supportive, and I think that we
will see the same degree of fiscal
support in the future that weve
seen so far.
SW: What are some of the highestpriority things that still need to be
done?
Locher: There are a number of
things I think need to be undertaken. First of all, the special-operations community is not understood
well enough by the rest of the
Department of Defense or the rest
of the U.S. government, so we need
to continue to focus on an education
and information campaign. We need
to work hard to integrate ourselves
with general-purpose forces in
training and exercises. We dont
have enough attention to specialoperations forces in the contingency
planning by the regional CINCs and
by others, so thats something that
we need to focus on. If they dont
include us in their contingency
plans, theyre not likely to effectively employ us, or at least not right
away. We need better intelligence
support; weve made a fair amount
of progress in the intelligence area,
34

but special operations are very

heavily dependent upon precise
intelligence, so thats an area that
we need to continue to work on.
Weve had a fair amount of cooperation from the intelligence community, but we need to work those
issues. Access to technology
thats an area in which we could
make some substantial improvements. Weve done fairly well, but

Our special-operations forces are the

most effective special
operators around the
world. I am extremely
pleased with how
theyve developed over
the last six years.
our ability to access advanced technology and field it quickly is an area
that I would focus upon. I think the
language and cultural training in
the special-operations community is
an area that we need to continue to
emphasize, and because were going
to be operating in highly political
environments, we need to make certain that our personnel are politically aware and that they can effectively operate with other departments and agencies. Often theyre

going to be working with personnel

on a country team from different
departments and agencies. Weve
actually talked about special-operations forces becoming the interagency force for the Department of
Defense, since they can easily work
in that environment. Another area
that I would mention is the theater
special operations command. Each
of the regional unified commanders
has a subordinate unified command
for special operations, and we call
those theater SOCS. Those commands need to be strengthened.
Right now they only have roughly
52 percent of their peacetime manpower and only a small portion of
their operations and maintenance
funding, and thats an area that we
need to give some attention to.
SW: Are we going to see heavier use
of SOF in the future, possibly new
missions, or different interpretations
of the old missions?
Locher: I think that SOF will play
an increasingly important role in
the Department of Defense, and
overall, Im very optimistic about
the future of special-operations
forces. Recently weve seen some
dramatic growth in their deployments; in the past year, deployments overseas have grown by 82
percent. We are increasingly finding
that the theater CINCs are very
interested in having special-operations forces they understand
their utility. I think if you look at
whats happening around the world
right now, you have all of these
ambiguous political-military threats
and situations, and special-operations forces, given the kinds of skills
they have, are ideally suited to
countering those threats. In terms
of new missions, counterproliferation is going to be a growth area for
special-operations forces. The counterdrug area is one that SOF has
been heavily involved in, and I
think that well continue to be
involved there and may see some
additional growth. The humanitarian-assistance/foreign disaster-relief
efforts are likely to grow, as is coaliSpecial Warfare

tion warfare, a new mission for SOF

that was performed during Desert
Shield and Desert Storm. Peacekeeping and peacemaking are going
to be growing mission areas for the
Department of Defense. While were
not expecting SOF to be the principal peacekeeping or peacemaking
force, certain SOF components will
have important roles in almost all
of those situations, Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations forces in
particular. In the special-operations
community, we have two broad mission areas: one is the direct-action,
commando area, where we do our
counterterrorism and other directaction activities. The other area is
foreign internal defense/nation
assistance. Direct action will continue to be important to us, and well
need to develop advanced technology to permit us to take on those
missions, but generally weve
already seen a shift toward foreign
internal defense, and I think that
will continue.
SW: Could you clarify counterproliferation?
Locher: As we try to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the United States government
is going to be involved in very broad
efforts. Well have diplomacy, well
have arms-control agreements, and

May 1993

well put economic pressure on people to try to prevent them from

either acquiring weapons of mass
destruction or the components to
produce them. But there is also the
possibility that in the end, the
National Command Authority may
decide that there has to be some
sort of military effort to prevent
somebody from acquiring, developing or using a nuclear, chemical or
biological weapon. And given the
capabilities of special-operations
forces, particularly in special reconnaissance and direct action, you can
see how SOF can provide the
National Command Authority with
a wider range of options, should the
need for military activity be
required.
SW: Generally, what do you think of
the capabilities of our SOF forces to
handle the new demands that are
going to be placed on them?
Locher: I think theyre highly
capable. Some areas like counterproliferation are going to be very
demanding, and were going to have
to look at advanced technology to
assist us, but our special-operations
forces are the most effective special
operators around the world. I am
extremely pleased with how theyve
developed over the last six years
since the legislation created the

U.S. Special Operations Command,

and I think they have the skills to
take on these missions.
SW: Is there any message youd like
to address to the SOF community?
Locher: There is one thing that I
would like to mention thats the
issue of integrity and credibility.
For the special-operations community, which has had some image
problems in the distant past, developing trust and confidence by the
national leadership is extremely
important, and as we do our business, I think we need to focus on
our integrity and how that translates into credibility for our community. We need to have quality control and know what it is that were
doing. We need to make certain that
we conduct ourselves in accordance
with the guidance that were given,
because if we make a misstep, its
going to be blown way out of proportion and will damage the community for a considerable amount of
time. Thats a message that I think
needs to be clearly understood
throughout the special-operations
community.

35

Enlisted Career Notes

Special Warfare

SQI S approved for SOF

support soldiers

The skill-qualification identifier S for special-operations support personnel has been approved by DA PERSCOM. Information regarding eligible
MOSs, prerequisites, etc., has been published in the April 1993 update of
AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields and Military Occupational Specialties. Questions regarding SQI S should be directed to unit
PACs and, if necessary, to Sgt. Maj. William L. Frisbie of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Questions dealing with proposed, existing, or former SQIs and additional-skill identifiers related to CMF 18
should be directed to SFC R.B. Gardner, also in SOPO. Phone DSN 2392415/9002, commercial (919) 432-2415/9002 (fax -9406).

SOPO clarifies SFQC

attendance by 98G, 98H

The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office has issued the following
clarification on SFAS and SFQC attendance by 98G/98H soldiers assigned to
Special Forces groups:
These soldiers may apply through their respective SF groups. Each SF
group has a limited number of allocations for these soldiers.
98G/98H soldiers who are selected will attend the SFQC, 18E track.
Upon successful completion of the SFQC, these soldiers will be awarded
the Special Forces Tab, but generally, they will remain in the Military
Intelligence CMF. Soldiers in 98G who are language-qualified in Polish,
German or Czech are eligible to enter CMF 18 upon graduation, according
to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOMs Special Forces Enlisted Branch.

ANCOC attendance
important for SF NCOs

CMF 18 NCOs who have reserved seats in the SF Advanced NCO Course
and are deferred from attendance twice will be removed from the attendance
roster, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOMs Special Forces
Enlisted Branch. SF units receive consideration lists from the SF Branch
prior to each ANCOC class. Units tell the Branch which soldiers will be
available for the specific class, and Branch develops a final attendance roster
and reserves seats. Exceptions from this final roster are granted only in
extreme circumstances, i.e., illness or injury, operational emergency, etc.
Timely attendance to ANCOC cannot be overemphasized ANCOC will be
required for promotion to sergeant first class effective Oct. 1, 1993.

Promotion board defines

categories for promotion to
master sergeant

CMF 18 sergeants first class should be aware of the April 1993 promotion
boards definitions of CMF 18 SFCs fully qualified and exceptionally
qualified for promotion to master sergeant:
Fully Qualified:
Successful service as an SFODA member
Graduate of appropriate level of NCOES (ANCOC)
Exceptionally Qualified:

36

Successful service above SFODA level

SF instructor
Graduate of one or more skill-enhancing courses
Demonstrated maintenance of foreign-language skills
Special Warfare

Quality of file important

for soldier promotion

Taxiera new senior enlisted

career adviser

SF Group affiliation builds on

regional, language skills

As competition for CMF 18 promotions becomes more competitive, the

quality of an NCOs file will take on even greater importance, according to
Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOMs Special Forces Enlisted Branch. By
the end of FY 93, the aggregate SF enlisted force will exceed authorizations. What this means is that the days are over when seven out of 10 Special Forces SFCs eligible for promotion were selected to master sergeant.
My personal opinion is that we have seen the low mark for selection in FY
1992, with 44 selected to master sergeant. We should continue to exceed
the Army average, but only three or four out of 10 may be picked up. In
this more competitive environment, the quality of a soldiers file takes on
new importance. Anything you can do to enhance your record may make
the difference. Remember that the object of an NCOER is to influence a
board, not to make a soldier feel good. Well-written EERs with solid bullets, good AERs, military schools, credit for civilian education and a sharp
DA photo will make the difference between qualified and best-qualified.
Each board is different, but they tend to select people who have done well
in a variety of jobs. From a boards point of view, four years as a weapons
sergeant, followed by two years in the S-3, followed by two more years on
an ODA, are better than eight years as a weapons sergeant, Allen said.
Soldiers should excel in any job, but should seek the tough jobs like first
sergeant, ODA team sergeant, JRTC, etc. As a rule of thumb, first sergeant
or B team sergeant are not substitutes for ODA team sergeant. They are
great file enhancers, Allen said, but do not think that these by themselves will ensure your promotion.

Sgt. Maj. Thomas Rupert moved to the SWCS in April after three years as
the SF Enlisted Branchs senior enlisted career adviser. He has been
replaced by MSgt. Philip Taxiera, formerly of Company C, 3/7th SF Group.

Once soldiers are affiliated with an SF group, they will continue to serve
with that unit throughout their careers, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief
of PERSCOMs Special Forces Enlisted Branch. We must improve our ability to contribute to a CINC by continually building on regional experience
and language expertise rather than starting from scratch with each change
of assignment, Allen said. Changing group affiliation is done by exception
to policy only and must be based on some pretty strong reasons. The SF
Enlisted Branch has furnished the following chart to show the breakdown
on enlisted SF positions:
SF Jobs
Operational
3,661

Training
629

Other
175

Other breakdown
SOSC
40

Staff
39

RG
32

ROTC
26

AHS
13

JOTC
8

Other
17

The majority of jobs are in operational units, including the 96th Civil
Affairs Battalion and special-management units. The second greatest job
sector is in training each soldier has a responsibility to share his group
experiences with new or less-experienced soldiers to enhance the quality of
the force, Allen said. The majority of jobs in the other category are master-sergeant positions. In general, they are filled by NCOs who have strong
files with at least two years of ODA team-sergeant time.
May 1993

37

SF language slots
open at DLI

In general, Special Forces does not fill all its Defense Language Institute
slots. Staff sergeants or SFCs with less than two years time in grade who
have two years time on station and a Defense Language Aptitude Battery
score that meets Army requirements can be scheduled for a DLI course that
supports their groups target region. This applies even to 18Ds. Soldiers
should count on returning to their group or one of its OCONUS elements
upon completion of training, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOMs Special Forces Enlisted Branch. Soldiers who have already been to
DLI should not expect to go again.

O&I not a requirement

for promotion

All Special Forces soldiers should have the opportunity to attend the SF
O&I Course, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOMs Special
Forces Enlisted Branch, because the course seems to have an impact on promotion boards. A lot of 18Ds tell me they are not getting a fair shake at
promotion to master sergeant because they cannot be reclassified to 18F
until they are no longer in a shortage situation, Allen said. Proponency
researched this perception and found that over a three-year period, 26.2
percent of eligible 18Ds were promoted to master sergeant. During that
same period, 18B had 22.7 percent, 18C had 27.3 percent, 18E had 22.5
percent, and 18F had 22.5 percent. O&I and other schools may have an
impact on a board, but the most important factors are the jobs held and the
manner of performance.

18Bs, Cs and Es may attend

medical training

SF Branch controls four seats per 18D class to allow suitable 18Bs, Cs, and
Es to take medical training. Criteria are SSG(P) or lower with two years
time in a group in current MOS and strong chain-of-command endorsement. New SFCs are granted training only as a rare exception to policy
because of limited utilization potential, according to Maj. Chris Allen, chief
of PERSCOMs Special Forces Enlisted Branch. Upon completion, graduates
will return to the group that sent them to training.

SF NCOs should talk

to assignments manager

Each NCO should initiate a dialogue with his assignment manager. Their
charter makes them move you and your family around the world in accordance with the needs of the Army, said Maj. Chris Allen, chief of PERSCOMs Special Forces Enlisted Branch. You may be sent to other assignments or remain at your current assignment despite your input. However, if
you do not let us know what your preferences are, you will be assigned
where we need you. Allen encourages NCOs to write or fax information on
desires or family situations. We will put these in your files so that when
your number comes up, we can at least consider your input before we move
you. Each soldier gets individual consideration. As Special Forces soldiers we
would rather meet the needs of the Army and the desires of the NCO, as
opposed to despite the desires of the NCO. Contact the Enlisted Branch at
DSN 221-8340/6044, fax 221-0524, commercial (703) 325-8340/6044/0524.

38

Special Warfare

Officer Career Notes

Special Warfare

Officers may qualify for

advanced civil schooling

Attend CAS3 early

if time permits

Assignments manager
gives tips for SF majors

May 1993

Although the severe shortage of captains prevents the Special Forces

Branch from sending large numbers to advanced civil schooling, some officers will be afforded the opportunity to pursue a masters degree in their
functional area. PERSCOM has recently completed the academic-year 1993
selections, and Special Forces will participate to the following extent: one
officer each to FAs 45, 46 and 53, and two to FA 49. Approximately eight
will attend the FA 39 program at Troy State University, and a number of
officers will attend school to support their training in FA 48. Officers interested in the ACS program must submit DA Form 1618R, copies of undergraduate transcripts and scores for the GRE or GMAT, as appropriate. A
minimum undergraduate grade-point average of 2.5 and at least 500 in
each category of the GRE is required, although partial waivers may be
granted if an officers performance has been consistently outstanding. ACS
programs usually run between 12 and 18 months, and officers pay the
Army back with a follow-on utilization tour of three years. Most functionalarea managers attempt to use graduates within the SOF community, but
there are no guarantees. Applications for academic year 1994 should reach
the SF Branch during August 1993. The target year-group for AY 94 will be
YG 86, but YGs 85 and 87 will be considered. For more information contact
Capt. Christopher Perkins, SF Branch company-grade assignments manager, at DSN 221-3175, commercial (703) 325-3175.
The Special Forces Branch, while continuing to endorse the policy of officers attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School prior to a
staff assignment, advises officers to consider going during their ODA command time, if their situation permits. According to Capt. Christopher
Perkins, company-grade assignments manager, Branch has recently
encountered situations in which several officers were unable to take some
excellent career opportunities because they were not CAS3 graduates.
Maj. Charles T. Cleveland, field-grade assignments manager in the SF
Branch at PERSCOM, has the following tips for majors:
Your hard-copy file gets handled a lot. Keep your ORB correct and
your photo up-to-date.
Do CSC by correspondence if you are not selected on your first look.
Your MEL level is an important factor affecting your reassignment.
Since majors can be expected to make a move after 24 months with
troops, it will ensure you are competitive for a better assignment.
We have a lot that we are supposed to do as Special Forces majors. For
example, field-grade troop duty, JRTC or SOCORD duty, joint or CSC
attendance, etc. Choose wisely what you want to do with that limited
period of time.
You live or die in the Army by your manner of performance, no matter
what the job.

39

Foreign SOF
Special Warfare

40

Arms trafficking serious

problem in former USSR

Widespread arms trafficking in the former Soviet Union continues to fuel

ethnic, national and criminal violence throughout the region. The theft and
illicit sale of arms has sparked periodic countermeasures since the problems
became acute in the late 1980s. Over the 1990-1991 period, for example,
some 440,000 weapons were handed over to the then-Soviet Army by guard
units and training facilities, with some 73,000 confiscated by the Army in
centers of ethno-national conflict. What seemed remarkable two years ago,
however, with the hemorrhage of weapons and explosives from Soviet units,
depots and manufacturing facilities, is a commonplace problem now. Ministry of Internal Affairs figures indicate that some 2.5 million hunting
weapons, mostly shotguns, are legally registered in Russia itself, but Russian estimates in the summer of 1992 put the total number of uncontrolled
arms throughout the former Soviet Union at some 30 million weapons, many
of them military automatic weapons. Heavier weapons, including armored
vehicles and artillery, are available as well, especially in conflict areas
beyond Russia. There are well-developed smuggling routes across the former
Soviet Union (and Eastern Europe), and substantial weapons caches are discovered almost daily in some areas. Groznyy, the capital of the secessionist
Chechen Republic on the north slope of the Caucasus in Russia, is a major
step on the arms-trafficking route through the southern republics. Arms continue to flow into some Central Asian republics from Afghanistan, despite
the presence of Russian border guards along the volatile Afghan-Tajikistan
frontier. From May to mid-December 1992, Russian border guards detained
more than 600 illegal crossers and seized 500 weapons. The uncontrolled
arms trafficking promises to shape the security environment in the region
for years to come. The ready availability of weapons has enabled extremist
groups, whether motivated by ethnic, national, religious or criminal agendas, to pursue their goals by armed conflict, terrorism and violence.

Broadcast describes
elite Guatemalan
counterinsurgency unit

The Spanish-language television network Univision recently carried an

extensive report, the first ever permitted, on the Guatemalan Armys rigorous counterinsurgency training at the Kaibil training center. The report
depicts in graphic detail the demanding training methods said to be used for
los Kaibiles, who were described as the most feared soldiers in
Guatemala, with a high degree of combat morale and a questionable humanrights record. The schools own program of instruction refers to the Kaibiles
as killing machines. Unlike other Guatemalan Army units, the Kaibiles
are tasked exclusively with engaging the communist guerrillas of the
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union, the URNG. Much of the training is familiar to special-operations forces around the world: obstacle and
infiltration courses, training in camouflage, sharpshooting, ambushes, explosives and booby traps. The fatigue uniforms are patterned after those of the
U.S. Army, and much U.S. equipment was evident in the report. Training is
non-stop, and according to the report, the students are not given a training
schedule, so that each minute is a surprise. In garrison, the trainees are
shown being fed in a mess hall, and they must complete a meal in less than
three minutes. In the jungle, they are given no food or water and must forSpecial Warfare

age to survive. Motivation also appears to be a major ingredient in the program. One sign read: If I advance, follow me; if I stop, grab me; if I retreat,
kill me. Each barracks is named for a Kaibil who was killed in combat. The
school also instills a sense of comradeship. Each student is paired with a
buddy, called a guas, which in the Mayan language means inseparable comrade. According to the report, 95 soldiers are trained in each eight-week
iteration. While the training proves too demanding for some, it was not indicated what percentage drops out. The most common injuries were said to be
broken bones and dehydration. After a month and a half of training, the students are sent out in six-man combat patrols for real-world training against
the URNG. The last man in the patrol walks backward and erases footprints. No details were given on actual combat encounters.

Soviet SOF restructured,

resubordinated

Despite turmoil and force drawdowns in the former USSR, its special-operations forces have far from disappeared. Since the demise of the Soviet
Union, the subordination and structure of military and security service
(spetsnaz) units has continued to evolve in the former USSR republics. The
Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff, the GRU, for
example, stood at the pinnacle of Soviet military intelligence. It had direct
control of centrally subordinated spetsnaz units and oversight of those spetsnaz forces assigned to operational commands. With the dissolution of the
USSR at the start of 1992, the GRU became for a time the principal intelligence body of the Main Command of the Commonwealth of Independent
States Armed Forces. Following the April 1992 creation of a Russian Ministry of Defense, however, the GRU became Russias military-intelligence
arm. While most GRU spetsnaz units likely fell to Russian control, at least
some elements in Ukraine, for example opted to swear allegiance elsewhere. As of mid-1992, GRU special-operations groups reportedly remained
trained to operate in 3-7 man groups for intelligence-gathering and directaction missions in enemy rear areas. They likely are assigned missions in
interethnic conflict areas, as well. Their prominent role in the new Russian
mobile force components now being planned (comprising largely airborne,
naval infantry, air assault and transport aviation) seems assured. At least
some of the spetsnaz units formerly assigned to the KGB are now to be subordinated to a new T Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Security,
responsible for counterterrorism and said to have both field and analytical
components. The foreign arm of Russian intelligence now is designated the
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Formed from the KGBs First Chief
Directorate, it may also retain those former KGB special-operations units
oriented against foreign targets. Internal troop spetsnaz units fell under the
control of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the MVD, in 1992. They
continue to be deployed from trouble spot to trouble spot and are among the
most experienced and effective of all Russian forces in dealing with
interethnic conflict. Activated in 1978, these forces have grown substantially and are currently organized in brigade, battalion and company increments. Paralleling these forces, but oriented more to dealing with violent
criminal acts, are Russian Militia Detachments of Special Designation, or
OMON, that have been retained under the Russian MVD. As of late summer 1992, there were 5,500 OMON personnel organized into 20 detachments around Russia. These units, intended principally to deal with violent
criminal activities and local terrorist incidents, also are deployed to conflicts beyond their immediate operating areas.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign
Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
May 1993

41

Update
Special Warfare

Butler new commander

of 1st Battalion, 7th Group
The 7th Special Forces Group
welcomed its newest battalion commander in a change-of-command
ceremony Jan. 7 at Fort Braggs
JFK Special Warfare Memorial
Plaza.
Lt. Col. Remo Butler received the
group colors from Col. James G. Pulley, 7th Group commander. Previously assigned to the Armed Forces
Staff College, Butler is uniquely
qualified to assume command of the
1st Battalion, Pulley said.
This is a very proud day for me,
Butler said. First of all to be selected to command the best soldiers in
the U.S. Army; and secondly, I
started my Special Forces career in
the 7th Group, and now Im back.
Speaking of the outgoing commander, Lt. Col. Geoffrey Lambert,
Pulley said, He always led by
example, going the extra mile to
ensure his soldiers were prepared,
trained and physically capable of
overcoming all obstacles. Lambert
is now deputy commander of the
7th SF Group.

11th SF Group seeks

applicants for MI units
The 11th Special Forces Group is
now seeking applicants to fill vacancies in its military-intelligence
detachments.
Available positions, all for immediate fill, are in the military-intelligence, communications and administrative occupational specialities.
Positions range in grade from
sergeant to sergeant first class,
although a limited number of captain positions are available, primarily at the battalion level.
Prerequisites for selection are
42

that applicants be fully qualified in

their appropriate military occupational specialty; be airborne-qualified or willing to volunteer for airborne training; be a U.S. citizen; be
able to pass a special background
investigation; and attain a minimum score of 210 on the Army
Physical Fitness Test.
Unit locations are at Fort Meade,
Md.; Newburgh, N.Y.; Columbus,
Ohio; and Perrine, Fla. For more
information, contact 2nd Lt. Steven
Adragna at DSN 923-3606, extension 3301; commercial (410) 6721173, extension 3301.

4th PSYOP Group gets

new commander
Col. Jeffrey B. Jones replaced Col.
Layton G. Dunbar as commander of
the 4th Psychological Operations
Group Jan. 14 during a ceremony at
Fort Braggs JFK Special Warfare
Memorial Plaza.
Jones was formerly assigned to
Washington, D.C., where he was
Director for Defense Policy and
Arms Control on the National Security Council at the White House. No
stranger to the PSYOP community,
he commanded the 4th POGs 8th
PSYOP Battalion from August 1989
to July 1991, leading the unit during Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama, and Operations Desert Shield/Storm in the
Persian Gulf.
The 4th POG has a worldwide
responsibility, Jones said. I plan
to exercise my expertise and use my
energies to keep the unit alive.
The 4th PSYOP Group is the
Armys only active-component
PSYOP unit. Under Dunbars command since December 1990, the
unit participated in the Persian

Gulf War, assisted refugees in

Turkey and Cuba, helped victims of
Hurricane Andrew in Florida and
deployed troops to U.S. relief efforts
in Somalia.

CA enlisted course
begins at SWCS
A new course at the John F.
Kennedy Special Warfare Center
and School recently graduated 12
soldiers into the Army Reserves
newest military occupational specialty Civil Affairs.
The Civil Affairs Specialist
Course graduated its first class at
the JFK Special Warfare Center
and School March 31. The 11-week
course, advanced individual training for MOS 38A, focuses on preparing soldiers for roles in Civil Affairs
units stationed around the U.S.
Our goal is to graduate fully
qualified Civil Affairs specialists
who are area-oriented and validated
to the standards of the Army Civil
Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, said Capt. Harry
K. Whittaker, Company B, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training
Group.
Civil Affairs personnel help to
coordinate populace and resource
control, rebuilding and restoration
to war-torn or disaster areas.
Wars solve immediate problems,
but following the missions, we keep
people from dying of starvation or
disease, said MSgt. Danny R. Malone, NCOIC of the 38A AIT.
The course covers more than 100
critical tasks, each subdivided into
hundreds more enabling tasks. Students learn to solve problems, conduct area studies and coordinate
projects with government and legal
officials in host nations. They are
Special Warfare

introduced to computers, research

techniques and communications in
the Army.
Along with the Civil Affairs regimen, the course includes commoncore instruction and SOF history,
as well as extra requirements not
found in all AITs. Students are
required to march 10 kilometers
with 55-pound packs in less than
two hours and complete a fourpoint land-navigation course before
graduating.
They have to be able to read
maps before they can set up a civilian dislocation plan. They have to
know what it feels like for soldiers
to go 10 miles or starving civilians
to go on a route they plan, Whittaker said. We want the students
to stomp some ground, too.
The course is expected to run four
times a year. Enrollment will gradually increase to 40 students per
class. SSgt. Keith Butler,
USASOC PAO

praised his solid performance as

training group commander. Chrietzbergs new assignment is as deputy
chief of staff for force development
and integration with the U.S. Army
Special Operations Command.
The 1st Special Warfare Training
Group, comprising three training
battalions and a support battalion,
teaches the Special Forces Qualification Course, specialized and advanced SF skills, psychological operations and civil affairs, regional studies and foreign language courses.

Getty takes command

of SWCS Training Group
Col. Kenneth W. Getty Jr. took
command of the 1st Special Warfare
Training Group from Col. Walter
Chrietzberg on Feb. 11 in a ceremony at the JFK Memorial Plaza.
Formerly director of operations
for the Special Operations Command - Europe, Getty participated
in Operation Elusive Concept, U.S.
European Commands support to
Operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort. His other SOF assignments were with the 1st and 10th
Special Forces Groups.
Getty challenged the members of
his new command to ensure the best
training possible for special-operations soldiers. These are turbulent
times for the Army and for Army
special-operations forces, he said.
Downsizing the Army and reduced
resources challenge us to make maximum use of what we have.
Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow, commander of the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School, presented Chrietzberg the Legion of Merit and
May 1993

JFK Special Warfare Museum

Museum seeks to update

donor files
The JFK Special Warfare Museum is looking for names of patrons
who donated items to the museum
between 1962 and 1981.
We would be really interested in
any papers documenting donations,
loans or transfers, said Roxanne
Merritt, curator for the museum.
Merritt and her staff are attempting to reconstruct records of donations for historical pieces including
mementos, books and military
equipment.
For more information, contact
Roxanne Merritt or Clenon Freeman at DSN 239-4272/1533, commercial (919) 432-4272/1533 or
write the museum staff at: Com-

mander; U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Attn: AOHS-MU;

Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

SF ANCOC no longer
required for O&I
Graduation from the Special
Forces Advanced NCO Course is no
longer a prerequisite for attendance
in the resident or nonresident Special Forces Assistant Operations
and Intelligence Sergeants Course,
taught by the JFK Special Warfare
Center and School.
The change, effective Dec. 11,
1992, is based on guidance from the
chief of the SWCS Directorate of
Training and Doctrine, according to
CWO 2 Michael Last, O&I Detachment commander. A memorandum
of instruction will soon be distributed to formally list the change.
Other prerequisites for SF O&I
are outlined in DA Pamphlet 351-4,
The Army Schools Catalog, and the
SFO&IS course memorandum of
instruction dated 25 August 1992,
Last said. Waivers for any prerequisites must be approved prior to the
class start date.
Requests for waiver should be
addressed to Commander, 1st Special Warfare Training Group; Attn:
AOJK-GP-ST; Fort Bragg, NC
28307-5000. For more information,
contact Company A, 2nd Battalion,
1st Special Warfare Training
Group, at DSN 239-4414/3823, commercial (919) 432-4414/3823.

Schools NCOs should check

course prerequisites
The 2nd Battalion, 1st Special
Warfare Training Group reports
numerous problems during FY 1992
of soldiers arriving at the Special
Warfare Center and School who
were not ready to begin training.
Problems most often encountered
were students who did not meet the
course prerequisites, students without physicals stamped by the Army
Special Operations Command surgeon, students without proper
waivers and students missing TA50
field gear. Such problems waste
43

training time and often require that

a soldier be dropped from training
and returned to his unit.
The battalion encourages SF
team sergeants and unit schools
NCOs to check DA Pamphlet 351-4,
The Army Schools Catalog, and
course memorandums of instruction, which have been distributed to
all group and regimental headquarters, to ensure that soldiers meet all
course prerequisites.
The 2nd Battalion conducts training in advanced Special Forces
skills, including the Military Free
Fall Course, the Combat Diver
Qualification Course, the Survival,
Evasion, Resistance and Escape
Course, and the Special Forces
Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeants Course.

and is capable of transmitting narrowband secure voice and data up

to 24 kilobytes per second. The
UHF subsystem, the AN/URC-130,
works in the 225-400 MHz frequency range and provides wideband
secure voice, data, video and facsimile at 16 kbps and narrowband
secure voice, data, video, facsimile
and teletype at 2.4 kbps. The
AN/CSZ-1A Sunburst processor provides the encrypting/decrypting
functions for both wide and narrowband voice and data security.
The system weighs 416 pounds
and comes in four transit cases,

Projects offer lightweight

communications equipment
New communications equipment
currently being fielded and developed will provide special-operations
forces with lightweight systems
capable of performing a variety of
functions.
The Special Operations Communications Assemblage, AN/GRC-233,
is a lightweight package of terminal
equipment and radios designed to
provide special-operations forces
the capability to transmit and
receive voice, data, compressed
video imagery and facsimile.
Designed for use by the Special
Operations Command, the Theater
Army Special Operations Support
Command, the Joint Special Operations Task Force and Army Special
Operations Task Force, it can serve
as a command-and-control, administrative and logistics, or non-SI
intelligence link.
The heart of the system is a 286
computer which manages all functions, according to Capt. John
Miller, project officer in the Combat
Developments Division of the
USASOC Force Development and
Integration Directorate.
The HF subsystem, AN-PRC-133,
works in 2-30 MHz frequency range
44

Hand-crank generator from the SOPS

Miller said. It can be set up and

operated in 30 minutes by two operators. It will serve as a replacement
for the Special Operations Communications Liaison Assemblage, the
SOLCA, which weighs more than
1,200 pounds.
SOCA is currently being fielded
to the SF groups, the 112th Signal
Battalion, the 4th PSYOP Group
and the SWCS, Miller said.
The Special Operations Power
Source will be a set of devices
intended to supply power to various
pieces of existing Army, Air Force
and Navy radio and special equipment. The SOPS consists of solar
panels, a small hand-cranked generator and assorted power connectors and cables.

The need for a set of small,

lightweight and durable power
sources, including high-energy
rechargeable batteries and interconnecting devices for SOF communications equipment, was identified in
the 1983 Special Operations Mission Area Analysis. SOF elements
currently use the G-76 handcrank
generator.
SOPS will be used to provide the
required power for SOF communications devices and to recharge batteries. It will be compatible with all
standard SOF communications
equipment, according to MSgt. Ron
Schuman, equipment specialist in
the Combat Developments Division
of the USASOC Force Development
and Integration Directorate. The
components will be lightweight and
small, e.g., a one-pound solar panel
or a six-pound hand-crank generator, and the components can be tailored to the mission. The system
will produce power ranging from 550 watts to charge 12- and 24-volt
batteries.
The system must be rugged
enough to withstand underground
caching and various infiltration
means. It must also operate with
the standard rechargeable batteries
within the SOF communications
system. The SOPS will be issued
two per A-detachment. It is scheduled for fielding during the first
quarter of FY95, Schuman said.

Data base preserves SOF

lessons learned
A new computer data base makes
it possible for special-operations soldiers to share their lessons learned
and to profit from the historical and
contemporary experiences of other
SOF units.
The Special Operations Lessons
Learned Management Information
System provides a single library of
lessons learned to aid special-operations units in planning their training and operational missions.
Developed at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the system,
called SOLLMIS, also provides
Special Warfare

SWCS training developers a source

of information to assist them in
developing SOF doctrine, training,
organization and materiel.
SOLLMIS is a user-friendly, fully
automated library containing observations and experiences of soldiers
assigned to special-operations and
security-assistance missions. Users
make selections from a succession of
menus in order to find or enter
data. They need to type data only
when recording observations,
lessons learned or recommendations. Since there are no codes or
commands to memorize other than
a password, users do not need
extensive training or experience to
use the data base.
A unique feature of the SOLLMIS
program is its ability to search for
previously entered lessons learned.
This function allows users to search
for information through the use of
categories, countries, dates, keywords or record numbers that have
already been entered.
SOLLMIS categorizes data
according to a number of factors,
including climate, terrain, geographic region, mission and SOF element
involved. The extensive categories
give the program more search
capability. In addition, the data
include points of contact so users
can follow up on recommendations.
SOLLMIS is not the only lessonslearned data base the Center for
Army Lessons Learned at Fort
Leavenworth, Kan., has a system
known as CALL, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System, or
JULLS. However, these systems
contain very little SOF-unique data.
The main sources of SOLLMIS
data are special-operations activeand reserve-component units, security-assistance organizations,

mobile training teams and historical analysis. CALL and JULLS are
also continuously searched for
SOF-related information. This
eliminates the need for SOF soldiers to search other systems for
SOF data, and makes SOLLMIS
the single-source, official data base
for SOF operations.
Currently, there are approximately 500 unclassified lessons-learned
in SOLLMIS, including lessons
learned from Operation Provide
Comfort. A separate, classified data
base is being collected which
includes lessons learned from
Desert Storm. These are already
being used to brief security-assistance teams whom the SWCS Security Assistance Training Management Office sends to countries
throughout the world.
Eventually, SOLLMIS will be
available to SOF units through a
computer network as well as by
telephone modem. Units with specific needs to get more information about any of the systems or to
submit lessons learned, for example should contact Lt. Col.
Frank Bush or Holly Boniek;
USAJFKSWCS, Attn: AOJK-DE,
Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000, phone
DSN 239-1548/5255, commercial
(919)432-1548/5255.

SWCS courses evaluated

for education credit
Twenty-two courses taught at the
JFK Special Warfare Center and
School were recently recommended
for higher civilian education credit
by an evaluation team from the
American Council on Education.
For the past 50 years, ACEs Center for Adult Learning and Educational Credentials has evaluated
formal military courses in terms of
their equivalent civilian educational

credit, according to Paula Collins of

the SWCS Individual Training
Materials Management Office.
Credit recommendations of the
team are included in ACEs Guide
to the Evaluation of Educational
Experiences, published every two
years. The Guide is used by civilian
institutions of higher learning to
award credit for military training.
The ACE team, composed of
seven subject-matter experts from a
variety of disciplines, visited SWCS
in December 1992 and reviewed 42
programs of instruction, including
the new Civil Affairs Specialist
Course - RC (MOS 38A), Collins
said. Of the courses evaluated, 22
were awarded a higher credit recommendation than that published
in the 1990 Guide. Seventeen
course recommendations remained
unchanged, and three were reduced
slightly, because of changes in ACE
evaluation standards.
The Regional Studies Course,
which replaced the Foreign Area
Officer Course, received a recommendation for both baccalaureate
and graduate credit. The new Civil
Affairs Specialist Course was
awarded 18 semester hours of recommended college credit. The
results of the latest evaluation visit
are expected to appear in the 1993
Guide.
During this period of downsizing,
the need to transfer military training into the civilian arena has
become increasingly important,
Collins said. For further information, contact Paula Collins; Individual Training Materials Management Office; Attn: AOJK-DT-ITM;
USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC
28307-5000, phone DSN 2391652/7259, commercial (919) 4321652/7259.

Special Warfare is available for private subscription through the Superintendent of Documents; Government
Printing Office; Washington, DC 20402. For telephone orders, call (202) 783-3238. The current subscription
price is $8 per year. Limited back copies of some issues are still available from the Editor, Special Warfare;
USAJFKSWCS; Attn: AOJK-DT-PD-B; Fort Bragg, NC 28307.

May 1993

45

Book Reviews
Special Warfare
Operation Just Cause: The U.S.
Intervention in Panama. Edited
by Bruce W. Watson and Peter G.
Tsouras. Boulder Colo.: Westview
Press, 1991. ISBN: 0-8133-7981-4.
245 pages. $29.95.
This book is about an important
but idiosyncratic operation, the
invasion of Panama. The heavy
Army and Army special-operations
flavor of the action make it worth
the study, and Operation Just
Cause is worthwhile reading. It is
well-organized, well-written and
filled with good information for the
military reader. Not perfect by any
means, it is one of the better treatments of the subject this reviewer
has seen.
The book has an adequate organization. It has four major sections,
Background (Chapters 1-3), Prelude (Chapter 4), The Operation
(Chapters 5-10), and The Aftermath (Chapters 11-13). Chapters 1
and 2 are redundant, both covering
the historical overview of U.S.Panamanian relations. You only
need to read one of these; I recommend Chapter 2. The first is a totally slanted, anti-American diatribe.
After reading this chapter, a novice
would think that all the ills of
Panama were deliberately caused
by the U.S. The second chapter is
far more balanced, and therefore of
much more use. The third chapter
deals with the role of drugs in the
bilateral relations, and it is relevant
and interesting. There is also some
redundancy between the last few
pages of Chapter 2 and the coverage
in Chapter 3.
The fourth chapter, the only one
in Section II, looks at indicators and
warning factors. The strange part
about this one is that the author, an
46

intelligence analyst, admits that the

indicators were neither important
nor accurate in this case, but she
spends 12 pages telling you about
them. She also labors for far too
many pages convincing us that
Noriega should have recognized
that we were going to invade. You
can skip this one unless you are an
intel type.
Section III, The Operation, is
the heart of the book. However, it is
actually one chapter, Chapter 5,

The Anatomy of Just Cause, and

five short articles that support it.
This could (and maybe should)
stand alone as a monograph. It covers all the forces, how they prepared, how they deployed and how
they fought. You can buy the book
just for this chapter.
The other chapters are about
command, control, communications
and intelligence; air power; logistics; civil affairs; and press access.
These are all fairly good reading,

but none are particularly substantial. The press-access chapter looks

in great detail at this controversy,
but never comes close to resolution.
The author, one of the editors,
admits that most Americans are
willing to sacrifice a bit of immediate need to know if it saves American lives. The rub comes when the
press and the liberal intelligensia
scream about the intrusion, something we should spend less time
worrying about than we do.
The final section covers the fallout of the Presidents action with
regard to the future of U.S troops in
Panama and the international community. It is interesting to see, two
years after the book was published,
how these analyses hold up: They
did not do badly. The summary
chapter, written by the editors, is
also well-done. They note the areas
of improvement made between
Grenada and Panama, but they are
quick to caution against forgetting
that this was a unique operation,
not a panacea for all future endeavors. The lessons they do point out
are legitimate and worth reading.
They also add a detailed chronology
that is a real boon to the researcher.
The books main strengths are the
fifth chapter, the good summary
and the chronology. The other chapters are all either weakly written, of
no consequence, or slanted to the
point of uselessness. This may
sound like a negative assessment,
but frankly, the strengths make the
book worth having. Even the bad
parts can be a source of good information, you just have to work for it.
For a member of the SOF community, this book is definitely worth
having. Not the best book in the
world, it is an above-average treatment of this very important subject.
Special Warfare

There is much to be investigated so

that we may learn and apply knowledge when needed. This book will
provide a good base for such an
investigation.
Maj. Steven Bucci
CGSC
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.
Lost Victory: A Firsthand
Account of Americas SixteenYear Involvement in Vietnam.
By William Colby, with James
McCargar. Chicago: Contemporary
Books, Inc. 1989. ISBN: 0-80924509-4. 448 pages. $22.95.
For once, here is a book whose
title accurately foretells its content.
The author, William Colby, was CIA
station chief in Saigon, then chief of
the agencys Far East Division in
the 1960s, afterward deputy to the
commander, Military Assistance
Command-Vietnam, and, finally
director of central intelligence until
his retirement in 1976. If not present at the creation, Colby was
deeply involved in the pacification
of the South Vietnamese countryside from almost the earliest days of
the republic.
Colbys account is a contribution to
what might currently be termed the
revisionist interpretation of Americas involvement in the Vietnamese
wars: for all of its mistakes, the
United States supported the right
side and, with the government of
South Vietnam, had succeeded more
or less by 1970 in winning the other
war in the countryside.
Certainly it was not pajama-clad
South Vietnamese peasant guerrillas
who broke down the gates to the
Saigon presidential palace at the
final debacle in 1975, but armored
divisions sent south directly by
Hanoi.
And finally, whatever havoc was
wrought by Americas supposed
insensate destruction of South Vietnams fragile economy, the people
stayed close to the bones of their
ancestors. Now a united Vietnam,
supposedly free from the machinaMay 1993

tions of the imperialists, has suffered

a massive hemorrhage of the best of
its population the boat people.
Colby goes beyond even many of
the revisionists, however, when he
contends that the reviled President
Ngo Dinh Diem was an effective
leader, and that the Americanapproved coup that toppled and
killed him was a disaster for the
fledgling nation.
But Colby also feels that Nguyen
Van Thieu, who eventually succeeded Diem, ably mobilized the Republic of Vietnam and cannot be held
responsible for the war-weariness,
misinformation and disinformation
that led Congress virtually to cut off

aid to South Vietnam. At the same

time, China and the Soviet Union
vied with each other to supply
North Vietnam, in blatant violation
of the Paris accords.
Colby is critical of the conventional U.S. war effort in the South,
arguing that it was almost irrelevant in the face of the war of massive insurgency, subversion and terror launched by the communists in
the south.
For Colby, such programs as Civil
Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support, or CORDS,
and the Phoenix-program attack on
the Viet Cong infrastructure repre-

sented the real war-winning potential of the U.S. effort. Certainly the
evidence is coming in that seems to
affirm Colbys thesis, as well as his
contention that Tet was a disaster
for the VC worker and peasant
cadres.
But at the time, Walter Cronkite
was telling U.S. TV audiences that
the bloody experience in Vietnam
was to end in a stalemate at best.
In fact, this reviewer recalls distinctly at the time hearing another
newscaster assert that Americans,
who had always felt that they might
not win the war in Vietnam, now
had to face the possibility that they
might actually lose it.
Yet in the wake of Tet, most of
the countryside was gradually
pacified, the government commitment to land reform was serious,
and the administration of President Thieu, after standing for
meticulously-examined free elections, had won at least acceptance
from the population.
But, as the communists had fully
anticipated, this war had now to be
won on the U.S. home front. All of
the shortcomings of the Thieu government were exaggerated in the
more influential media, and its successes buried.
Colby gives a particularly vivid
example of the climate in Washington in the early 1970s. President
Nixon could invite President Thieu
to visit him only at his San
Clemente retreat; protests inside
the Washington beltway at the
meeting of these two war criminals would have probably have
reached critical mass. More tangibly, U.S. aid dropped from $2.8 billion in 1973 to a mere $700 million
the following year. The point was
not lost on either Hanoi or Saigon.
One year later, the Republic of Vietnam fell to a conventional armored
blitzkrieg from the north.
It was indeed, as Colby puts it, a
double defeat. Not only was an
ally whom the United States had
pledged to defend defeated in a war
of aggression, but the painstaking
and successful work of nation-build47

ing had been shattered.

Today a united Vietnam has a
standard of living roughly on a par
with that of Haiti. Yet, as Colby
points out, Vietnam had the potential of becoming the economic fifth
tiger of Asia. Had matters turned
out differently, we might well be
hearing today congresspersons complaining bitterly of unfair competition from South Vietnamese VCRs
or even compact cars. This sobering
book is a basic resource for
researchers, students and instructors interested in Americas postWorld War II Vietnam policy and
execution.

values in joint warfare, fundamentals in joint warfare and the conduct of joint campaigns. These
chapters capture the essence of
joint warfare by using historical
examples and simple, straightforward language. This is not a publication just for strategists and operational warfighters soldiers of all
ranks can benefit from a better
understanding of how we, as Americans, fight.
According to Gen. Colin Powell, in
his letter at the beginning of the
booklet, When a team takes to the
field, individual specialists come
together to achieve a team win. All
players try to do their very best

Stanley Sandler
Office of the Historian
USASOC
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of
the Armed Forces. By the Office of
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991. 79
pages.
The recommended distribution of
Joint Pub 1 includes each officer in
the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above in the U.S.
Armed Forces, active and reserve ...
(and) each sergeant major, master
chief petty officer, and chief master
sergeant in the U.S. Armed Forces,
active and reserve, and for good
reason. Joint Pub 1 is the armed
forces capstone manual detailing
the philosophy for the conduct of
joint warfare by all the American
military services. As such, it is an
extremely important booklet. And,
at a mere 79 pages, it is an easy
read.
Joint Pub 1 has its roots in the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act. This act created a more powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs and
strengthened the roles and responsibilities of the combatant and unified commands. The booklet is organized into four short chapters which
discuss American military power,
48

forces within his theater. His strategy for defeating the Iraqis reflected
that authority. He chose to pound
the Iraqi military first with U.S. air
power. Then he used the very credible threat of a Marine amphibious
assault across the beaches of
Kuwait in a masterful deception
operation. Finally, he used his
ground forces to perform an end
run around Iraqi fortified positions
in the western Iraqi desert.
Additionally, Schwarzkopfs skill
as a joint commander prepared him
well for the role of a coalition commander for the armies and air
forces of many nations. Without the
authority vested in Schwarkopf by
the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the
story in the Iraqi desert might have
been much different.
The pub is full of pictures and
maps that help illustrate points
made in the text, and demonstrates
that joint-warfare considerations
have been important throughout
the history of conflict. This is an
important booklet. It is well worth
your time to acquire it and read it
thoroughly.
Maj. Robert B. Adolph Jr.
4th PSYOP Group
Fort Bragg, N.C.
Make for the Hills: Memories of
Far Eastern Wars. By Sir Robert
Thompson. Hamden, Conn.: The
Shoe String Press, 1989. ISBN 085052-761-9. 218 pages. $30.

because every other player, the

team, and the home town are counting on them to win.
It was not always thus within the
American military establishment.
Interservice rivalry was one of the
crippling problems that eventually
led to our withdrawal from Vietnam. And, as we have seen with our
lopsided victory over the tyrant
Saddam Hussein, joint warfare
works.
In fact, Desert Shield was the litmus test for the Goldwater-Nichols
Act and joint warfare. The act gave
Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf complete authority over all American

Many consider Britains Sir

Robert Thompson the worlds leading counterinsurgency expert. He
earned his deserved reputation the
old fashioned way by doing it.
World War II experience in
China and Burma and later in
Malaya schooled him in small-unit
operations, guerrilla warfare and
counterinsurgency planning. He
eventually applied his knowledge
advising the Thai, Vietnamese and
U.S. governments.
Thompsons autobiographical
sixth book, Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars, is not a
Special Warfare

counterinsurgency manual, though

it contains gems of counterinsurgency wisdom along with strategic
insights. His reflections on the Vietnam War alone make the book well
worth reading.
As a critic of Americas continuing
failure to understand insurgency,
Thompson candidly assesses U.S.
officials of the Vietnam era such as
Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara,
Nixon, Kissinger, Westmoreland
and Abrams.
A member of the Malay Colonial
Service, Thompson was visiting
Hong Kong during the December
1941 Japanese invasion. He escaped
with a small party into southern
China to link up with Chinese
forces. He operated behind
Japanese lines in Burma as an RAF
air-support coordinator with Maj.
Gen. Orde Wingates Chindits.
During the Malayan Emergency
(1948-60), the 12-year campaign of
British and Malayan forces against
communist insurgents, Thompson
performed a variety of administrative functions in the Home and
Defense Ministries.
In 1961 Thompson became chief
of the British Advisory Mission in
Vietnam. He arrived in the middle
of the Diem governments disastrous misapplication of the strategic-hamlet concept that Thompson
had helped successfully administer
in Malaya.
The U.S. advisory effort then
fared little better. Following some
U.S. advisers briefings in the
Mekong Delta, Thompson noted

May 1993

that no Americans at that time had

even looked at the French record in
that region nor had read Mao. The
trouble with you Americans, he
observed, is whenever you double
the effort you somehow manage to
square the error.
Thompson correctly saw pacification and nation-building not as the
other war secondary to the combat
thrust, but properly as part of one
unitary effort. He emphasized organization a coordinated political,
military and administrative endeavor as the key to winning.
As a consultant in the Rand Corporation, a defense think tank,
Thompson served as an adviser to
President Nixon. He supported
Vietnamization and urged a low
cost, long haul strategy as the

British had used in Malaya.

For all their value, some of
Thompsons assessments require
qualification. Though sympathetic
to the problems of Asian leaders, he
overrates the leadership qualities of
South Vietnamese presidents Ngo
Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu.
Thompson glosses over how ineptitude and government by cronyism
exacerbated popular disaffection
with the Saigon government.
He scores Americas failure of will
and leadership toward the end of
the war and in the immediate postVietnam era. The end of the Cold
War has blunted many of Thompsons dire predictions. Still the
results of Indochina show that Sir
Robert Thompson remains more
widely recognized and quoted than
understood.
Lt. Col. James K. Bruton
4156th USARF School
Tulsa, Okla.

Book reviews from readers are

welcome and should address subjects of interest to special-operations
forces. Reviews should be about 400500 words long (approximately two
double-spaced typewritten pages).
Include your full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably
DSN) and your mailing address.
Send review to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg,
NC 28307-5000.

49

Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army

JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK DT PD B
Fort Bragg, NC 28307 5000

PIN: 070901000