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Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan
Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan
Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan
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Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan

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The purpose of this study is to examine the nature of the command and control relationship between Special Forces and conventional forces. Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan serves as a case study in practice and doctrinal application. Against the backdrop of World War II, Operations in Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this thesis provides an analysis of the complex issues arising from the necessity to fight jointly.
LanguageEnglish
Release dateNov 6, 2015
ISBN9781786253118
Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan

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    Special Forces Command And Control In Afghanistan - Major Richard G. Rhyne

    2002

    CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

    The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.—Abraham Lincoln

    From the very beginning of Special Forces-type missions, there has been an overarching problem with command and control (C2) as a function of integration with conventional forces. Special Forces are considered unconventional in tactics, techniques, and procedures. After 1986, joint publications (JPs) provided the strategic, operational, and tactical guidance for future campaigns including guidance for integration. However, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 ushered in an era of warfare that continues to challenge conventional wisdom about integration and C2 relationships.

    The Research Question

    Using the operational situation in Afghanistan, what is the optimal C2 relationship between Army Special Forces and conventional forces?

    Subordinate Questions

    1. Why is C2 so important?

    2. What has been the historical precedent for C2 of Special Forces?

    3. What is the joint doctrine for C2 of Special Forces?

    4. How was doctrine implemented in Operation Enduring Freedom?

    5. Did the C2 of Special Forces in Afghanistan work?

    6. How does a C2 relationship effect integration of Special Forces and conventional forces?

    7. What change if any should be considered in joint doctrine?

    Limitations

    1. This thesis does not use any classified documents. The term special operation forces, denotes special operation forces not included under the highest categories of classification. The units that are conducting operations that are top secret mission are called Tier 1 forces. Special operation forces have the ability to work in a full spectrum of classified and non-classified environments. The units in this study fall under the heading of tier 3 forces. No reference occurs to units under the Joint Special Operations Command in Afghanistan.

    2. The majority of the information of C2 in Afghanistan constitutes very recent raw data. In June 2002, Joint Task Force-180 had the full control of all operations in Afghanistan. Materials on Operation Enduring Freedom do not benefit from the kind of perspective that comes with time.

    3. Interviews have their own advantages and disadvantages. To reduce bias this study relies on multiple interviews for purposes of cross-checking. This study uses interviews to point out how doctrine was interpreted to dictate the C2 relationships that exist today in Afghanistan. Materials for analysis include interviews with commanders or personnel who were in staff positions in the Joint Special Operation Task Force and Joint Task Force in Afghanistan.

    4. The information in this thesis focuses on Army Special Forces in Afghanistan.

    5. Historical precedent informs much of the comparison and analysis, but fuller examination of the precedent lies outside the parameters of this thesis.

    Author’s Qualification

    The author of this thesis was introduced to special operations in 1992. Upon completion of the Special Forces qualification course, and after serving as a detachment commander, the author was tasked in 1996 to support the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, supporting GEN Henry Shelton, the XVIII Airborne Corps Commander. The author was designated as the special operations C2 cell for the XVIII Airborne Corps BCTP.

    In 2000, the author commanded Bravo Company 1st Battalion 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), and was selected to take his company to Bosnia under the 3rd Infantry Division (3ID) Commander MG Walter Sharp. MAJ Rhyne commanded six Special Forces teams under the guidance of Joint Special Operation Task Force (JSOTF) in Sarajevo. He provided the C2 and the coordination efforts as the special operation C2 cell (SOCCE). The Special Forces teams were Administrative Control (ADCON) to the SOCCE and OPCON to the JSOTF. Under the SOCCE’s leadership, the operational detachments conducted operations as Joint Commissioned Observers. Operational detachments that conducted direct action missions were placed TACON to the SOCCE. The author was present for all meetings by the JTF, JSOTF, and SFOR commanders’ discussions on C2 relationships of Special Forces in theater.

    In April 2002, the author became operations officer for the 3rd Special Forces Group. When the group deployed to Afghanistan, the author became the Deputy J3 of the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) in Afghanistan, and the Joint Operation Center director. The Joint Operation Center director is the current operations officer of the JSOTF. He spent ten months in Afghanistan as the current operations officer and deputy J3 during the integration with the 10th Mountain Division, the 82nd Airborne Division, and the Joint Task Force Afghanistan whose nucleus was the 18th Airborne Corps.

    Methodology

    The heart of this thesis lies in a historical case study of C2 relationships pertaining to the employment of Special Forces in Afghanistan during

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