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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL
ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-33965 December 11, 1971
ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, and CHIEF, PHIL. CONSTABULARY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33973 December 11, 1971
LUZVIMINDA DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, COL. N. C. CAMELLO, in his
capacity as Chief of Staff, Philippine Constabulary and HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE in his capacity as
Secretary, Department of National defense, respondents.
G.R. No. L-33982 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE FELICIDAD G.
PRUDENTE, petitioners,
vs.
GENERAL MANUEL YAN, GEN. EDU GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34004 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF GERARDO TOMAS, ALSO
KNOWN AS "GERRY TOMAS" AND FOR RETURN OF DOCUMENTS ILLEGALLY SEIZED. DOMINGO E. DE
LARA, in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance, Philippine Bar Association, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34013 December 11, 1971
REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.

BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, respondent.

G.R. No. L-34039 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUSIN BEHALF OF SGT. FILOMENO M. DE
CASTRO AND HIS WIFE, MRS. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO. CARLOS C. RABAGO, in his capacity as
President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA),petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. EDUARDO M. GARCIA, Chief, Philippine Constabulary, respondent.
G.R. No. L-34265 December 11, 1971
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTOLIN ORETA, JR. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR.,
petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA and COL. PROSPERO OLIVAS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-34339 December 11, 1971
GARY B. OLIVAR, assisted by his father, GEORGE OLIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
GEN. EDUARDO GARCIA, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine Constabulary, et al., respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioners Teodosio Lansang, et al.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Rogelio V. Arienda.
E. Voltaire Garcia II for petitioner Luzvimindo David.
Verzola, Africa and Atencio, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Wigberto E. Taada, Fortunato de Leon, R. G. Suntay and Juan T.
David for petitioner Felicidad G. Prudente.
Ruben L. Roxas for petitioner Reynaldo Rimando.
Nuez, Acob, Del Rosario and Ramos for petitioner Carlos Rabago, etc.
E. Voltaire Garcia II and M. P. Vivo for petitioner Gary Olivar, etc., et al.
Jose W. Diokno and Juanito R. Remulla for petitioner Antolin Oreta, Jr.
Domingo E. de Lara for and in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio and Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public
meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for
November 8, 1971, two (2) hand grenades were thrown, one after the other, at the platform where said candidates
and other persons were. As a consequence, eight (8) persons were killed and many more injured, including
practically all of the aforementioned candidates, some of whom sustained extensive, as well as serious, injuries
which could have been fatal had it not been for the timely medical assistance given to them.
On August 23, soon after noontime, the President of the Philippines announced the issuance of Proclamation No.
889, dated August 21, 1971, reading as follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that lawless
elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal
and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed

by a well trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional
liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and
banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of actually staging, undertaking and waging an
armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the
duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political social, economic and legal order with
an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose conception of God and
religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and whose political, social and economic
precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teachings and beliefs;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are seemingly
innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their
memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among
our peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through
such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every
segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social,
economic and moral foundations of our existing government and to influence many peasant, labor,
professional, intellectual, student and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and
depredations against our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public
safety and the security of the State, the latest manifestation of which has been the dastardly attack on
the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has resulted in the death and serious injury
of scores of persons;
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain
peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the persons presently detained, as well as others who may be
hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses
committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith.
Presently, petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed, in the above-entitled cases, by the following persons, who,
having been arrested without a warrant therefor and then detained, upon the authority of said proclamation, assail
its validity, as well as that of their detention, namely:
1. TEDORO LANSANG, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO and BAYANI ALCALA, the petitioners in Case No. L-33964
filed on August 24, 1971 who, on August 22, 1971, between 8 a.m. and 6 p.m., were "invited" by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary which is under the command of respondent Brig. Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia to go and
did go to the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for interrogation, and
thereafter, detained;
2. ROGELIO V. ARIENDA, the petitioner in Case No. L-33965 filed, also, on August 24, 1971 who was picked
up in his residence, at No. 55 Road, 3, Urduja Village, Quezon City, by members of the Metrocom and then
detained;
3. Soon after the filing of the petition in Case No. L-33965 or on August 28, 1971 the same was amended to
include VICENTE ILAO and JUAN CARANDANG, as petitioners therein, although, apart from stating that these
additional petitioners are temporarily residing with the original petitioner, Rogelio V. Arienda, the amended petition
alleged nothing whatsoever as regards the circumstances under which said Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang are
said to be illegally deprived of their liberty;
4. LUZVIMINDO DAVID, petitioner in Case No. L-33973 filed on August 25, 1971 who was similarly arrested in
his residence, at No. 131-B Kamias Road, Quezon City, and detained by the Constabulary;
5. Felicidad G. Prudente, who filed the petition in Case No. L-33982 on August 27, 1971 upon the ground that
her father, Dr. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, had, on August 22, 1971, at about 8 p.m., been apprehended by
Constabulary agents in his house, at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, and then detained at the Camp Crame
stockade, Quezon City;
6. ANGELO DE LOS REYES, who was allowed on August 30, 1971 to intervene as one of the petitioners in
Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, he having been arrested by members of the Constabulary on August

22, 1971, between 6:30 and 7:30 p.m., in his residence, at 86 Don Manuel Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City,
and brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
7. VICTOR FELIPE, who was similarly allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in said three (3) cases, upon
the ground that, on August 23, 1971, at about 8 a.m., he was, likewise, apprehended at Sta. Rosa, Laguna, by
members of the Philippine Constabulary and brought, first to the Constabulary headquarters at Canlubang, Laguna,
and, then, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained and restrained of liberty;
8. TERESITO SISON, who was, also, allowed to intervene as one of the petitioners in the same three (3) cases, he
having been arrested in his residence, at 318 Lakandula St., Angeles City, on August 22, 1971, between 6 and 7
p.m., and taken to the PC offices at Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, then to Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
and eventually to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is restrained and deprived of liberty;
9. GERARDO TOMAS, alias Gerry Tomas, a 17-year old second year college students of St. Louis University,
Baguio City, on whose behalf, Domingo E. de Lara in his capacity as Chairman, Committee on Legal Assistance,
Philippine Bar Association filed on September 3, 1971, the petition in Case No. L-34004, upon the ground that
said Gerardo Tomas had, on August 23, 1971, at about 6 a.m., been arrested by Constabulary agents, while on his
way to school in the City of Baguio, then brought to the Constabulary premises therein at Camp Holmes, and,
thereafter, taken, on August 24, 1971, to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, and thence, on August 25, 1971, to the
Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
10. REYNALDO RIMANDO, petitioner in Case No. L-34013 filed on September 7, 1971 a 19-year old student
of the U.P. College in Baguio city who, while allegedly on his way home, at Lukban Road, Baguio, on August 23,
1971, at about 1 a.m., was joined by three (3) men who brought him to the Burnham Park, thence, to Camp Olivas
at San Fernando, Pampanga, and, thereafter, to Camp Crame, Quezon City, where he is detained;
11. Sgt. FILOMENO M. DE CASTRO and his wife, Mrs. BARCELISA C. DE CASTRO, on whose behalf Carlos C.
Rabago as President of the Conference Delegates Association of the Philippines (CONDA) filed the petition in
Case No. L-34039 on September 14, 1971 against Gen. Eduardo M. Garcia, alleging that, on August 27,
1971, at about 3 p.m., Mrs. De Castro was arrested, while at Liamzon Subdivision, Rosario, Pasig, Rizal, by agents
of the Constabulary, and taken to the PC headquarters at Camp Crame, where, later, that same afternoon, her
husband was brought, also, by PC agents and both are detained;
12. ANTOLIN ORETA, JR., who filed the petition in Case No. L-34265 on October 26, 1971 against said Gen.
Garcia, as Chief of the Constabulary, and Col. Prospero Olivas, Chief of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS),
Philippine Constabulary, alleging that, upon invitation from said CIS, he went, on October 20, 1971, to Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City, to see Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, who referred
petitioner to Col. Laroya of the CIS; that the latter, in turn, referred him to CIS Investigator Atty. Berlin Castillo and
another CIS against, whose name is unknown to the petitioner; and that, after being interrogated by the two (2),
petitioner was detained illegally; and
13. GARY OLIVAR, petitioner in Case No. L-34339 filed on November 10, 1971 who was apprehended, by
agents of the Constabulary, in the evening of November 8, 1941, in Quezon City, and then detained at Camp
Crame, in the same City.
Upon the filing of the aforementioned cases, the respondents were forthwith required to answer the petitions therein,
which they did. The return and answer in L-33964 which was, mutatis mutandis, reproduced substantially or by
reference in the other cases, except L-34265 alleges, inter alia, that the petitioners had been apprehended and
detained "on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion;" that "their
continued detention is justified due to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889 of the President of the Philippines;" that there is "a state of insurrection or rebellion" in this
country, and that "public safety and the security of the State required the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus," as "declared by the President of the Philippines in Proclamation No. 889; that in making said
declaration, the "President of the Philippines acted on relevant facts gathered thru the coordinated efforts of the
various intelligence agents of our government but (of) which the Chief Executive could not at the moment give a full
account and disclosure without risking revelation of highly classified state secrets vital to its safely and security"; that
the determination thus made by the President is "final and conclusive upon the court and upon all other persons"
and "partake(s) of the nature of political question(s) which cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry," pursuant to
Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87, and Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882; that petitioners "are under detention
pending investigation and evaluation of culpabilities on the reasonable belief" that they "have committed, and are
still committing, individually or in conspiracy with others, engaged in armed struggle, insurgency and other
subversive activities for the overthrow of the Government; that petitioners cannot raise, in these proceedings for
habeas corpus, "the question of their guilt or innocence"; that the "Chief of Constabulary had petitioners taken into
custody on the basis of the existence of evidence sufficient to afford a reasonable ground to believe that petitioners

come within the coverage of persons to whom the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended"; that
the "continuing detention of the petitioners as an urgent bona fide precautionary and preventive measure demanded
by the necessities of public safety, public welfare and public interest"; that the President of the Philippines has
"undertaken concrete and abundant steps to insure that the constitutional rights and privileges of the petitioners as
well as of the other persons in current confinement pursuant to Proclamation 889 remain unimpaired and
unhampered"; and that "opportunities or occasions for abuses by peace officers in the implementation of the
proclamation have been greatly minimized, if not completely curtailed, by various safeguards contained in directives
issued by proper authority."
These safeguards are set forth in:
1. A letter of the President to the Secretary of National Defense, dated August 21, 1971, directing, inter alia, in
connection with the arrest or detention of suspects pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, that, except when caught in
flagrante delicto, no arrest shall be made without warrant authorized in writing by the Secretary of National Defense;
that such authority shall not be granted unless, "on the basis of records and other evidences," it appears
satisfactorily, in accordance with Rule 113, section 6(b), of the Rules of Court, that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of the acts mentioned in the proclamation; that, if such person will be charged with a crime subject to
an afflictive penalty under the Anti-Subversion Act, the authorization for his arrest shall not be issued unless
supported by signed intelligence reports citing at least one reliable witness to the same overt act; that no
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in effecting arrests; and that arrested persons shall not be subject
to greater restraint than is necessary for their detention;
2. Communications of the Chief of the Constabulary, dated August 23, 27, and 30, 1971, to all units of his command,
stating that the privilege of the writ is suspended for no other persons than those specified in the proclamation; that
the same does not involve material law; that precautionary measures should be taken to forestall violence that may
be precipitated by improper behavior of military personnel; that authority to cause arrest under the proclamation will
be exercised only by the Metrocom, CMA, CIS, and "officers occupying position in the provinces down to provincial
commanders"; that there shall be no indiscriminate or mass arrests; that arrested persons shall not be harmed and
shall be accorded fair and humane treatment; and that members of the detainee's immediate family shall be allowed
to visit him twice a week;
3. A memorandum of the Department of National Defense, dated September 2, 1971, directing the Chief of the
Constabulary to establish appropriate Complaints and Action Bodies/Groups to prevent and/or check any abuses in
connection with the suspension of the privilege of the writ; and
4. Executive Order No. 333, dated August 26, 1971, creating a Presidential Administrative Assistance Committee to
hear complaints regarding abuses committed in connection with the implementation of Proclamation No. 889.
Respondents in L-33965 further alleged that therein petitioners Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang had been released
from custody on August 31, 1971, "after it had been found that the evidence against them was insufficient."
In L-34265, the "Answer and Return" filed by respondents therein traversed some allegations of fact and
conclusions of law made in the petition therein and averred that Antolin Oreta, Jr., the petitioner therein, had been
and is detained "on the basis of a reasonable ground to believe that he has committed overt acts in furtherance of
rebellion or insurrection against the government" and, accordingly, "comes within the class of persons as to whom
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended by Proclamation No. 889, as amended," the validity
of which is not contested by him.
On August 30, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-A, amending Proclamation No. 889, so as to read
as follows:
WHEREAS, on the basis of carefully evaluated information, it is definitely established that lawless
elements in the country, which are moved by common or similar ideological conviction, design and goal
and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed
by a well-trained, determined and ruthless group of men and taking advantage of our constitutional
liberties to promote and attain their ends, have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and
banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of [actually] staging, undertaking, [and] wagging
and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in order to forcibly seize political power
in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our existing political, social,
economic and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws,
whose conception of God and religion, whose notion of individual rights and family relations, and
whose political, social and economic precepts are based on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist teaching and
beliefs;

WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through front organizations that are seemingly
innocent and harmless, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their
memberships through sustained and careful recruiting and enlistment of new adherents from among
our peasantly, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through
such sustained and careful recruitment and enlistment have succeeded in infiltrating almost every
segment of our society in their ceaseless determination to erode and weaken the political, social,
economic and moral foundations of our existing government and influence many peasant, labor,
professional, intellectual, student and mass media organizations to commit acts of violence and
depredations against our duly constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement
agencies, and worst of all, against the peaceful members of our society;
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, by their acts of rebellion and insurrection, have created a state of
lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and security of the State, the latest manifestation of
which has been the dastardly attack on the Liberal Party rally in Manila on August 21, 1971, which has
resulted in the death and serious injury of scores of persons;
WHEREAS, public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain
peace and order, secure the safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State;
NOW THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the persons presently detained, as well as all others who may
be hereafter similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion [,] and [all] other [crimes and
offenses] overt acts committed by them in furtherance [or on the occasion] thereof[,]. [or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith.] 1
On September 1, 1971, Cases Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33973 and L-33982 were jointly heard and then the parties
therein were allowed to file memoranda, which were submitted from September 3 to September 9, 1971.
Soon thereafter, or on September 18, 1971, Proclamation No. 889 was further amended by Proclamation No. 889-B,
lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the following provinces, sub-provinces and cities
of the Philippine, namely:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Batanes 15. Negros Occ.
2. Ilocos Norte 16. Negros Or.
3. Ilocos Sur 17. Cebu
4. Abra 18. Bohol
5. Abra 19. Capiz
6. Pangasinan 20. Aklan
7. Batangas 21. Antique
8. Catanduanes 22. Iloilo
9. Masbate 23. Leyte
10. Romblon 24. Leyte del Sur
11. Marinduque 25. Northern Samar
12. Or. Mindoro 26. Eastern Samar
13. Occ. Mindoro 27. Western Samar
14. Palawan.
B. SUB-PROVINCES:
1. Guimaras 3. Siquior
2. Biliran
C. CITIES:
1. Laog 10. Bacolod
2. Dagupan 11. Bago
3. San Carlos 12. Canlaon
4. Batangas 13. La Carlota
5. Lipa 14. Bais
6. Puerto Princesa 15. Dumaguete
7. San Carlos (Negros 16. Iloilo

Occ.) 17. Roxas

8. Cadiz 18. Tagbilaran
9. Silay 19. Lapu-lapu
20. Cebu 24. Tacloban
21. Mandaue 25. Ormoc
22. Danao 26. Calbayog
23. Toledo
On September 25, 1971, the President issued Proclamation No. 889-C, restoring the privilege of the writ in the
following provinces and cities:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Surigao del Norte 8. Agusan del Sur
2. Surigao del Sur 9. Misamis Or.
3. Davao del Norte 10. Misamis Occ.
4. Davao del Sur 11. Zamboanga del Norte
5. Davao Oriental 12. Basilan
6. Bukidnon 13. Pagadian
7. Agusan del Norte
B. CITIES:
1. Surigao 8. Tangub
2. Davao 9. Dapitan
3. Butuan 10. Dipolog
4. Cagayan 11. Zamboanga
5. Gingoong 12. Basilan
6. Ozamiz 13. Pagadian.
7. Oroquieta
On October 4, 1971, the suspension of the privilege was further lifted by Proclamation No. 889-D, in the following
places:
A. PROVINCES:
1. Cagayan 5. Camarines
2. Cavite 6. Albay
3. Mountain Province 7. Sorsogon
4. Kalinga-Apayao
B. CITIES:
1. Cavite City 3. Trece Martires
2. Tagaytay 4. Legaspi
As a consequences, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is still suspended in the following eighteen (18)
provinces, two (2) sub-provinces and eighteen (18) cities, to wit:
A. PROVINCE:
1. Bataan 10. North Cotabato
2. Benguet 11. Nueva Ecija
3. Bulacan 13. Pampanga
4. Camarines Sur 14. Quezon
5. Ifugao 15. Rizal
6. Isabela 16. South Cotabato
7. Laguna 17. Tarlac
8. Lanao del Norte 18. Zambales
9. Lanao del Norte
B. SUB-PROVINCES:
1. Aurora 2. Quirino

C. CITIES:
1. Angeles 10. Manila
2. Baguio 11. Marawi
3. Cabanatuan 12. Naga
4. Caloocan 13. Olongapo
5. Cotabato 14. Palayan
6. General Santos 15. Pasay
7. Iligan 16. Quezon
8 Iriga 17. San Jose
9 Lucena 18. San Pablo
The first major question that the Court had to consider was whether it would adhere to the view taken in Barcelon v.
Baker, 2 and reiterated in Montenegro v. Castaeda, 3 pursuant to which, "the authority to decide whether the exigency has
arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his 'decision is final
and conclusive' upon the courts and upon all other persons." Indeed, had said question been decided in the affirmative the
main issue in all of these cases, except
L-34339, would have been settled, and, since the other issues were relatively of minor importance, said cases could have
been readily disposed of. Upon mature deliberation, a majority of the Members of the Court had, however, reached, although
tentatively, a consensus to the contrary, and decided that the Court had authority to and should inquire into the existence of
the factual bases required by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ; but before proceeding to do so,
the Court deemed it necessary to hear the parties on the nature and extent of the inquiry to be undertaken, none of them
having previously expressed their views thereof. Accordingly, on October 5, 1971, the Court issued, in L-33964, L-33965, L33973 and L-33982, a resolution stating in part that

... a majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889 and
889-A (suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for all persons detained or to be detained
for the crimes of rebellion or insurrection throughout the Philippines, which area has lately been
reduced to some eighteen provinces, two subprovinces and eighteen cities with the partial lifting of the
suspension of the privilege effected by Presidential Proclamations Nos. 889-B, 889-C and 889-D) and
thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III,
sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution; and considering that the
members of the Court are not agreed on the precise scope and nature of the inquiry to be made in the
premises, even as all of them are agreed that the Presidential findings are entitled to great respect, the
Court RESOLVED that these cases be set for rehearing on October 8, 1971 at 9:30 A.M.
xxx xxx xxx
On October 8, 1971, said four cases were, therefore, heard, once again, but, this time jointly with cases Nos. L34004, L-34013, and L-34039, and the parties were then granted a period to file memoranda, in amplification of their
respective oral arguments, which memoranda were submitted from October 12 to October 21, 1971.
Respondents having expressed, during the oral arguments, on September 1 and October 8, 1971, their willingness
to impart to the Court classified information relevant to these cases, subject to appropriate security measures, the
Court met at closed doors, on October 28 and 29, 1971, and, in the presence of three (3) attorneys for the
petitioners, chosen by the latter, namely, Senator Jose W. Diokno, Senator Salvador H. Laurel, and Atty. Leopoldo
Africa, as well as of the Solicitor General and two (2) members of his staff, was briefed, by Gen. Manuel Yan, Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gen. Felizardo Tanabe,
Col. Tagumpay Nanadiego, Judge Advocate General, JAGS (GSC), and other ranking officers of said Armed
Forces, on said classified information, most of which was contained in reports and other documents already
attached to the records. During the proceedings, the members of the Court, and, occassionally, counsel for the
petitioners, propounded pertinent questions to said officers of the Armed Forces. Both parties were then granted a
period of time within which to submit their respective observations, which were filed on November 3, 1971, and
complemented by some documents attached to the records on November 6, 1971, and a summary, submitted on
November 15, 1971, of the aforesaid classified information.
In the meantime, cases Nos. L-34265 (Oreta) and L-34339 (Olivar) had been filed and the parties therein were
heard in oral argument on November 4, and 16, 1971, respectively.
On November 15, 1971, the Solicitor General filed manifestations motions stating that on November 13, 1971,
the following petitioners were:
(a) released from custody:

(1) Teodosio Lansang -- G.R. No. L-33964

(2) Bayani Alcala -- " " L-33964
(3) Rogelio Arienda -- " " L-33965
(4) Nemesio Prudente -- " " L-33982
(5) Gerardo Tomas -- " " L-34004
(6) Reynaldo Rimando -- " " L-34013
(7) Filomeno M. de Castro -- " " L-34039
(8) Barcelisa de Castro -- " " L-34039
(9) Antolin Oreta, Jr. -- " " L-34264.
(b) charged, together with other persons named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, with a violation of Republic
Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the City Fiscal's Office of Quezon City:
(1) Angelo de los Reyes -- G.R. No. L-22982 *
(2) Teresito Sison -- " " L-33982 *
(c) accused, together with many others named in the criminal complaint filed therefor, of a violation of section 4 of
Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal:
(1) Rodolfo del Rosario -- G.R. No. L-33969 **
(2) Luzvimindo David -- " " L-33973
(3) Victor Felipe -- " " L-33982 *
and continue under detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and praying that the petitions in G.R.
Nos. L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013 and L-34039 be dismissed, without prejudice to the resolution
of the remaining cases. Copy of the criminal complaint filed, as above stated, with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of said court which was appended to said
manifestations-motions of the respondent as Annex 2 thereof shows that Gary Olivar, the petitioner in L-34339, is
one of the defendants in said case.
Required to comment on said manifestations-motions, Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, in his comment
dated November 23, 1971, urged the Court to rule on the merits of the petitions in all of these cases, particularly on
the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation No. 889, as amended, upon the ground that he is still detained and
that the main issue is one of public interest involving as it does the civil liberties of the people. Angelo de los Reyes,
one of the petitioners in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, Nemesio E. Prudente and Gerardo Tomas, for whose
respective benefit the petitions in L-33982 and L-34004 have been filed, maintained that the issue in these cases is
not moot, not even for the detainees who have been released, for, as long as the privilege of the writ remains
suspended, they are in danger of being arrested and detained again without just cause or valid reason. In his reply,
dated and filed on November 29, 1971, the Solicitor General insisted that the release of the above-named
petitioners rendered their respective petitions moot and academic.
I
Petitioners herein, except Antolin Oreta, Jr. in L-34265, question the formal validity of the proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In this connection, it should be noted that, as originally formulated,
Proclamation No. 889 was contested upon the ground that it did not comply with the pertinent constitutional
provisions, namely, paragraph (14) of section 1, Article III of our Constitution, reading:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, in any way of which events the same may
be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.
and paragraph (2), section 10, Article VII of the same instrument, which provides that:
The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus,
or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Regardless of whether or not the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in case of
"imminent danger" of invasion, insurrection or rebellion which is one of the grounds stated in said paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution, but not mentioned in paragraph (14), section 1 of its Bill of Rights
petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or
rebellion or imminent danger thereof," and that, consequently, said Proclamation was invalid. This contention was

predicated upon the fact that, although the first "whereas" in Proclamation No. 889 stated that "lawless elements"
had "entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the avowed purpose of
actually staging, undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion," the actuality so alleged refers to the
existence, not of an uprising that constitutes the essence of a rebellion or insurrection, but of the conspiracy and the
intent to rise in arms.
Whatever may be the merit of this claim, the same has been rendered moot and academic by Proclamation No.
889-A, issued nine (9) days after the promulgation of the original proclamation, or on August 30, 1971. Indeed, said
Proclamation No. 889-A amended, inter alia, the first "whereas" of the original proclamation by postulating the said
lawless elements "have entered into a conspiracy and have in fact joined and banded their forces together for the
avowed purpose of staging, undertaking, waging and are actually engaged in an armed insurrection and rebellion in
order to forcibly seize political power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted government, and supplant our
existing political, social, economic and legal order with an entirely new one ...." Moreover, the third "whereas" in the
original proclamation was, likewise, amended by alleging therein that said lawless elements, "by their acts of
rebellion and insurrection," have created a state of lawlessness and disorder affecting public safety and the security
of the State. In other words, apart from adverting to the existence of actual conspiracy and of the intent to rise in
arms to overthrow the government, Proclamation No. 889-A asserts that the lawless elements "are actually engaged
in an armed insurrection and rebellion" to accomplish their purpose.
It may not be amiss to note, at this juncture, that the very tenor of the original proclamation and particularly, the
circumstances under which it had been issued, clearly suggest the intent to aver that there was and is, actually, a
state of rebellion in the Philippines, although the language of said proclamation was hardly a felicitous one, it having
in effect, stressed the actuality of the intent to rise in arms, rather than of the factual existence of the rebellion itself.
The pleadings, the oral arguments and the memoranda of respondents herein have consistently and abundantly
emphasized to justify the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the acts of violence and
subversion committed prior to August 21, 1971, by the lawless elements above referred to, and the conditions
obtaining at the time of the issuance of the original proclamation. In short, We hold that Proclamation No. 889-A has
superseded the original proclamation and that the flaws attributed thereto are purely formal in nature.
II
Let us now consider the substantive validity of the proclamation, as amended. Pursuant to the above-quoted
provisions of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the
privilege to the writ, to wit: (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2),
section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the
suspension of the privilege. The Presidential Proclamation under consideration declares that there has been and
there is actually a state of rebellion and
that 4 "public safety requires that immediate and effective action be taken in order to maintain peace and order, secure the
safety of the people and preserve the authority of the State."

Are these findings conclusive upon the Court? Respondents maintain that they are, upon the authority of Barcelon v.
Baker 5 and Montenegro v. Castaeda. 6 Upon the other hand, petitioners press the negative view and urge a reexamination
of the position taken in said two (2) cases, as well as a reversal thereof.

The weight of Barcelon v. Baker, as a precedent, is diluted by two (2) factors, namely: (a) it relied heavily upon
Martin v. Mott 7 involving the U.S. President's power to call out the militia, which he being the commander-in-chief of all
the armed forces may be exercised to suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, and is, accordingly, much broader than his authority to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, jeopardizing as the latter does individual liberty; and (b) the privilege had been suspended by the
American Governor-General, whose act, as representative of the Sovereign, affecting the freedom of its subjects, can hardly
be equated with that of the President of the Philippines dealing with the freedom of the Filipino people, in whom sovereignty
resides, and from whom all government authority emanates. The pertinent ruling in the Montenegro case was based mainly
upon the Barcelon case, and hence, cannot have more weight than the same. Moreover, in the Barcelon case, the Court held
that it could go into the question: "Did the Governor-General" acting under the authority vested in him by the Congress of
the United States, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions "act in conformance with
such authority?" In other words, it did determine whether or not the Chief Executive had acted in accordance with law.
Similarly, in the Montenegro case, the Court held that petitioner therein had "failed to overcome the presumption of
correctness which the judiciary accords to acts of the Executive ...." In short, the Court considered the question whether or
not there really was are rebellion, as stated in the proclamation therein contested.

Incidentally, even the American jurisprudence is neither explicit nor clear on the point under consideration. Although
some cases 8 purport to deny the judicial power to "review" the findings made in the proclamations assailed in said cases,
the tenor of the opinions therein given, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the court's conviction that the conditions
essential for the validity of said proclamations or orders were, in fact, present therein, just as the opposite view taken in other

cases 9 had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said conditions were absent. Hence, the dictum of
Chief Justice Taney to the effect that "(e)very case must depend on its own circumstances." 10 One of the important, if not
dominant, factors, in connection therewith, was intimated in Sterling v. Constantin, 11 in which the Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that:

.... When there is a substantial showing that the exertion of state power has overridden private rights
secured by that Constitution, the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate
proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the transgression. To such a case the Federal
judicial power extends
(Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the authority appropriate to its
exercise. .... 12
In our resolution of October 5, 1971, We stated that "a majority of the Court" had "tentatively arrived at a consensus
that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889-A ... and thus determine the constitutional sufficiency of such bases in the light of
the requirements of Article III, sec. 1, par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par 2, of the Philippine Constitution...." Upon
further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the conviction that it has the authority to
inquire into the existence of said factual bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority conferred by
the Constitution, both under the Bill of Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception thereto. What is more, it postulates
the former in the negative, evidently to stress its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended ...." It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege "in
cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or, under Art VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof"
"when the public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period
the necessity for such suspension shall exist." 13 For from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of
the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its
existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the
aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power, beyond
which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative
department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice.
Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could
not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in futility.

Much less may the assumption be indulged in when we bear in mind that our political system is essentially
democratic and republican in character and that the suspension of the privilege affects the most fundamental
element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and connotes, as well as
demands, the right of every single member of our citizenry to freely discuss and dissent from, as well as criticize and
denounce, the views, the policies and the practices of the government and the party in power that he deems unwise,
improper or inimical to the commonwealth, regardless of whether his own opinion is objectively correct or not. The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the
highest order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth
and development.
Manifestly, however, the liberty guaranteed and protected by our Basic Law is one enjoyed and exercised, not in
derogation thereof, but consistently therewith, and, hence, within the framework of the social order established by
the Constitution and the context of the Rule of Law. Accordingly, when individual freedom is used to destroy that
social order, by means of force and violence, in defiance of the Rule of Law such as by rising publicly and taking
arms against the government to overthrow the same, thereby committing the crime of rebellion there emerges a
circumstance that may warrant a limited withdrawal of the aforementioned guarantee or protection, by suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, when public safety requires it. Although we must be forewarned against
mistaking mere dissent no matter how emphatic or intemperate it may be for dissidence amounting to rebellion
or insurrection, the Court cannot hesitate, much less refuse when the existence of such rebellion or insurrection
has been fairly established or cannot reasonably be denied to uphold the finding of the Executive thereon,
without, in effect, encroaching upon a power vested in him by the Supreme Law of the land and depriving him, to
this extent, of such power, and, therefore, without violating the Constitution and jeopardizing the very Rule of Law
the Court is called upon to epitomize.
As heretofore adverted to, for the valid suspension of the privilege of the writ: (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection or rebellion" or pursuant to paragraph (2), section 10 of Art. VII of the Constitution "imminent
danger thereof"; and (b) public safety must require the aforementioned suspension. The President declared in
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, that both conditions are present.

As regards the first condition, our jurisprudence 14 attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines,
especially in Manila, from the late twenties to the early thirties, then aimed principally at incitement to sedition or rebellion, as
the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have
waned notably; but, the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc, and the
proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation,
brought about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to organize and
operate in Central Luzon an army called HUKBALAHAP, during the occupation, and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
Bayan (HMP) after liberation which clashed several times with the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then
President Quirino to issue Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v. Castaeda. 15 Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation,
or on October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in Manila. Subsequently
accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective sentences. 16

The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were concerned. Still, on June
20, 1957, Rep. Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, was approved, upon the ground
stated in the very preamble of said statute that.
... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by force and
violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien domination and control;
... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines constitutes a clear,
present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines; 17 and
... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but international
in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its activities, there is urgent need for
special legislation to cope with this continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country....
In the language of the Report on Central Luzon, submitted, on September 4, 1971, by the Senate Ad Hoc
Committee of Seven copy of which Report was filed in these cases by the petitioners herein
The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations,
notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the Philippines) among the workers; the
Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the Kabataang Makabayan
(KM) among the youth/students; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among
the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these
organizations in promoting its radical brand of
nationalism. 18
Meanwhile, the Communist leaders in the Philippines had been split into two (2) groups, one of which composed
mainly of young radicals, constituting the Maoist faction reorganized the Communist Party of the Philippines early
in 1969 and established a New People's Army. This faction adheres to the Maoist concept of the "Protracted
People's War" or "War of National Liberation." Its "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" states, inter
alia:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a
people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy
cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and
completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous ...
xxx xxx xxx
The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The Communist Party of the
Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable
of asking the road of armed
revolution ... 19
In the year 1969, the NPA had according to the records of the Department of National Defense conducted
raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over 230, in which it inflicted 404
casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its records of violent incidents was about the same, but the
NPA casualties more than doubled.
At any rate, two (2) facts are undeniable: (a) all Communists, whether they belong to the traditional group or to the

Maoist faction, believe that force and violence are indispensable to the attainment of their main and ultimate
objective, and act in accordance with such belief, although they may disagree on the means to be used at a given
time and in a particular place; and (b) there is a New People's Army, other, of course, that the arm forces of the
Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion,
especially considering that its establishment was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement
is in the nature of a public challenge to the duly constituted authorities and may be likened to a declaration of war,
sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual commencement of
hostilities.
We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms
to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
In fact, the thrust of petitioners' argument is that the New People's Army proper is too small, compared with the size
of the armed forces of the Government, that the Communist rebellion or insurrection cannot so endanger public
safety as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This argument does not negate,
however, the existence of a rebellion, which, from the constitutional and statutory viewpoint, need not be widespread
or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining
the crime of rebellion, 20 which may be limited in its scope to "any part" of the Philippines, and, also, from paragraph (14) of
section 1, Article III of the Constitution, authorizing the suspension of the privilege of the writ "wherever" in case of
rebellion "the necessity for such suspension shall exist." In fact, the case of Barcelon v. Baker referred to a proclamation
suspending the privilege in the provinces of Cavite and Batangas only. The case of In re Boyle 21 involved a valid
proclamation suspending the privilege in a smaller area a country of the state of Idaho.

The magnitude of the rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the suspension of
the privilege namely, that the suspension be required by public safety. Before delving, however, into the factual
bases of the presidential findings thereon, let us consider the precise nature of the Court's function in passing upon
the validity of Proclamation No. 889, as amended.
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government,
the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not
absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is
supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere allotted to him
by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial
Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant 22 the Executive, or
to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested
in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to determine the validity of the contested
proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated
thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin.

Under the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review
decisions of administrative bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said
decisions. Under the English law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for
the contested administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The
administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof, and said
finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. This view has been adopted by some
American courts. It has, likewise, been adhered to in a number of Philippine cases. Other cases, in both
jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a mere
scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," 23 even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.

Manifestly, however, this approach refers to the review of administrative determinations involving the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions calling for or entailing the reception of evidence. It does not and cannot be applied, in its
aforesaid form, in testing the validity of an act of Congress or of the Executive, such as the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for, as a general rule, neither body takes evidence in the sense in which
the term is used in judicial proceedings before enacting a legislation or suspending the writ. Referring to the test
of the validity of a statute, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts,
expressed, in the leading case of Nebbia v. New York, 24 the view that:
... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial

determination to that effect renders a court functus officio ... With the wisdom of the policy adopted,
with the adequacy or practically of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and
unauthorized to deal ...
Relying upon this view, it is urged by the Solicitor General
... that judicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the
Court not that the President's decision is correct and that public safety was endanger by the rebellion
and justified the suspension of the writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act
arbitrarily.
No cogent reason has been submitted to warrant the rejection of such test. Indeed, the co-equality of coordinate
branches of the Government, under our constitutional system, seems to demand that the test of the validity of acts
of Congress and of those of the Executive be, mutatis mutandis, fundamentally the same. Hence, counsel for
petitioner Rogelio Arienda admits that the proper standard is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
Did public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No.
889, as amended? Petitioners submit a negative answer upon the ground: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that,
prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the
courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and
unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety
to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
As above indicated, however, the existence of a rebellion is obvious, so much so that counsel for several petitioners
herein have admitted it.
With respect to the normal operation of government, including courts, prior to and at the time of the suspension of
the privilege, suffice it to say that, if the conditions were such that courts of justice no longer functioned, a
suspension of the privilege would have been unnecessary, there being no courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, petitioners' reference to the normal operation of courts as a factor indicative of the illegality of the contested
act of the Executive stems, perhaps, from the fact that this circumstance was adverted to in some American cases
to justify the invalidation therein decreed of said act of the Executive. Said cases involved, however, the conviction
by military courts of members of the civilian population charged with common crimes. It was manifestly, illegal for
military courts to assume jurisdiction over civilians so charged, when civil courts were functioning normally.
Then, too, the alleged absence of any untoward incident after August 21, 1971, does not necessarily bear out
petitioners' view. What is more, it may have been due precisely to the suspension of the privilege. To be sure, one of
its logical effects is to compel those connected with the insurrection or rebellion to go into hiding. In fact, most of
them could not be located by the authorities, after August 21, 1971.
The alleged July-August Plan to terrorize Manila is branded as incredible, upon the theory that, according to
Professor Egbal Ahman of Cornell University, "guerrilla use of terror ... is sociological and psychologically selective,"
and that the indiscriminate resort to terrorism is bound to boomerang, for it tends to alienate the people's symphaty
and to deprive the dissidents of much needed mass support. The fact, however, is that the violence used is some
demonstrations held in Manila in 1970 and 1971 tended to terrorize the bulk of its inhabitants. It would have been
highly imprudent, therefore, for the Executive to discard the possibility of a resort to terrorism, on a much bigger
scale, under the July-August Plan.
We will now address our attention to petitioners' theory to the effect that the New People's Army of the Communist
Party of the Philippines is too small to pose a danger to public safety of such magnitude as to require the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The flaw in petitioners' stand becomes apparent when we
consider that it assumes that the Armed Forces of the Philippines have no other task than to fight the New People's
Army, and that the latter is the only threat and a minor one to our security. Such assumption is manifestly
erroneous.
The records before Us show that, on or before August 21, 1971, the Executive had information and reports
subsequently confirmed, in many respects, by the abovementioned Report of the Senate Ad-Hoc Committee of
Seven 25 to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift
armed uprising; that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative
local official; that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that
there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970; that the Constitutional Convention
Hall was bombed on June 12, 1971; that, soon after the Plaza Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe, at the Quezon CitySan Juan boundary, was bombed; that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC
building, the Congress Building and the MERALCO substation at Cubao, Quezon City; and that the respective residences of

Senator Jose J. Roy and Congressman Eduardo Cojuangco were, likewise, bombed, as were the MERALCO main office
premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Building, in Caloocan City.

Petitioners, similarly, fail to take into account that as per said information and reports the reorganized
Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of protracted people's war, aimed at the
paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the
people themselves; that conformably to such concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most
extensive and intensive program of subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the
organization of armed city partisans and the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional
groups; that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations; that it has
exploited the youth movement and succeeded in making Communist fronts of eleven (11) major student or youth
organizations; that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests,
among which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the
Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the
Samahang Molave (SM) and the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino(MPKP); that, as of August, 1971, the
KM had two hundred forty-five (245) operational chapters throughout the Philippines, of which seventy-three (73)
were in the Greater Manila Area, sixty (60) in Northern Luzon, forty-nine (49) in Central Luzon, forty-two (42) in the
Visayas and twenty-one (21) in Mindanao and Sulu; that in 1970, the Party had recorded two hundred fifty-eight
(258) major demonstrations, of which about thirty-three (33) ended in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and
over five hundred (500) injured; that most of these actions were organized, coordinated or led by the
aforementioned front organizations; that the violent demonstrations were generally instigated by a small, but welltrained group of armed agitators; that the number of demonstrations heretofore staged in 1971 has already
exceeded those of 1970; and that twenty-four (24) of these demonstrations were violent, and resulted in the death of
fifteen (15) persons and the injury of many more.
Subsequent events as reported have also proven that petitioners' counsel have underestimated the threat to
public safety posed by the New People's Army. Indeed, it appears that, since August 21, 1971, it had in Northern
Luzon six (6) encounters and staged one (1) raid, in consequence of which seven (7) soldiers lost their lives and two
(2)others were wounded, whereas the insurgents suffered five (5) casualties; that on August 26, 1971, a well-armed
group of NPA, trained by defector Lt. Victor Corpus, attacked the very command port of TF LAWIN in Isabela,
destroying two (2) helicopters and one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier; that the NPA had in Central Luzon a
total of four (4) encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1) BSDU
killed and three (3) NPA casualties; that in an encounter at Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KM-SDK leader, an
unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of the dissident group were killed; that on August 26, 1971,
there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro. Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the NPA, in
which a PC and two (2) KM members were killed; that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces
have been rendered more complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid-1971, a KM group, headed by
Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higa-onan tribes, in their settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and
offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teach-ins in the reservation;
that Esparagoza an operation of the PC in said reservation; and that there are now two (2) NPA cadres in Mindanao.
It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to intelligence findings,
definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available materials; that the bomb used in the
Constitutional Convention Hall was a "clay-more" mine, a powerful explosive device used by the U.S. Army, believed
to have been one of many pilfered from the Subic Naval Base a few days before; that the President had received
intelligence information to the effect that there was a July-August Plan involving a wave of assassinations,
kidnappings, terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurence would signal the
beginning of said event; that the rather serious condition of peace and order in Mindanao, particularly in Cotabato
and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation; that a sizeable part of our
armed forces discharge other functions; and that the expansion of the CPP activities from Central Luzon to other
parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs, the Cagayan Valley, Ifugao, Zambales, Laguna, Quezon and
Bicol Region, required that the rest of our armed forces be spread thin over a wide area.
Considering that the President was in possession of the above data except those related to events that happened
after August 21, 1971 when the Plaza Miranda bombing took place, the Court is not prepared to hold that the
Executive had acted arbitrarily or gravely abused his discretion when he then concluded that public safety and
national security required the suspension of the privilege of the writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike
simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the two hundred forty-five (245) KM chapters, all over the
Philippines, with the assistance and cooperation of the dozens of CPP front organizations, and the bombing or water
mains and conduits, as well as electric power plants and installations a possibility which, no matter how remote,
he was bound to forestall, and a danger he was under obligation to anticipate and arrest.
He had consulted his advisers and sought their views. He had reason to feel that the situation was critical as,
indeed, it was and demanded immediate action. This he took believing in good faith that public safety required it.

And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had substantial grounds to entertain such belief.
Petitioners insist that, nevertheless, the President had no authority to suspend the privilege in the entire Philippines,
even if he may have been justified in doing so in some provinces or cities thereof. At the time of the issuance of
Proclamation No. 889, he could not be reasonably certain, however, about the placed to be excluded from the
operation of the proclamation. He needed some time to find out how it worked, and as he did so, he caused the
suspension to be gradually lifted, first, on September 18, 1971, in twenty-seven (27) provinces, three (3) subprovinces and twenty six (26) cities; then, on September 25, 1971, in order fourteen (14) provinces and thirteen (13)
cities; and, still later, on October 4, 1971, in seven (7) additional provinces and four (4) cities, or a total of forty-eight
(48) provinces, three (3) sub-provinces and forth-three (43) cities, within a period of forty-five (45) days from August
21, 1971.
Neither should We overlook the significance of another fact. The President could have declared a general
suspension of the privilege. Instead, Proclamation No. 889 limited the suspension to persons detained "for crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance or on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith." Even this was further limited by Proclamation No. 889-A,
which withdrew from the coverage of the suspension persons detained for other crimes and offenses committed "on
the occasion" of the insurrection or rebellion, or "incident thereto, in or connection therewith." In fact, the petitioners
in L-33964, L-33982 and L-34004 concede that the President had acted in good faith.
In case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, the President has, under the Constitution,
three (3) courses of action open to him, namely: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called
out the armed forces, which measure, however, proved inadequate to attain the desired result. Of the two (2)other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.
In view of the foregoing, it does not appear that the President has acted arbitrary in issuing Proclamation No. 889,
as amended, nor that the same is unconstitutional.
III
The next question for determination is whether petitioners herein are covered by said Proclamation, as amended. In
other words, do petitioners herein belong to the class of persons as to whom privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
has been suspended?
In this connection, it appears that Bayani Alcala, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Gerardo Tomas, petitioner in L34004, and Reynaldo Rimando, petitioner in L-34013, were, on November 13, 1971, released "permanently"
meaning, perhaps, without any intention to prosecute them upon the ground that, although there was reasonable
ground to believe that they had committed an offense related to subversion, the evidence against them is insufficient
to warrant their prosecution; that Teodosio Lansang, one of the petitioners in L-33964, Rogelio Arienda, petitioner in
L-33965, Nemesio Prudente, petitioner in L-33982, Filomeno de Castro and Barcelisa C. de Castro, for whose
benefit the petition in L-34039 was filed, and Antolin Oreta, Jr., petitioner in L-34265, were, on said date,
"temporarily released"; that Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Victor Felipe, an intervenor in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973, as well as Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, are still under detention and, hence, deprived of their liberty, they
together with over forty (40) other persons, who are at large having been accused, in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, of a violation of section 4 of Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act); and that Angelo delos Reyes and
Teresito Sison, intervenors in said L-33964, L-33965 and
L-33973, are, likewise, still detained and have been charged together with over fifteen (15) other persons, who
are, also, at large with another violation of said Act, in a criminal complaint filed with the City Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City.
With respect to Vicente Ilao and Juan Carandang petitioners in L-33965 who were released as early as August
31, 1971, as well as to petitioners Nemesio Prudente, Teodosio Lansang, Rogelio Arienda, Antolin Oreta, Jr.,
Filomeno de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro, Reynaldo Rimando, Gerardo Tomas and Bayani Alcala, who were
released on November 13, 1971, and are no longer deprived of their liberty, their respective petitions have, thereby,
become moot and academic, as far as their prayer for release is concerned, and should, accordingly, be dismissed,
despite the opposition thereto of counsel for Nemesio Prudente and Gerardo Tomas who maintain that, as long as
the privilege of the writ remains suspended, these petitioners might be arrested and detained again, without just
cause, and that, accordingly, the issue raised in their respective petitions is not moot. In any event, the common
constitutional and legal issues raised in these cases have, in fact, been decided in this joint decision.
Must we order the release of Rodolfo del Rosario, one of the petitioners in
L-33964, Angelo de los Reyes, Victor Felipe and Teresito Sison, intervenors in L-33964, L-33965 and L-33973,

Luzvimindo David, petitioner in L-33973, and Gary Olivar, petitioner in L-34339, who are still detained? The
suspension of the privilege of the writ was decreed by Proclamation No. 889, as amended, for persons detained "for
the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts committed by them in furtherance thereof."
The records shows that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Rodolfo del Rosario, Victor Felipe, Angelo de los Reyes,
Teresito Sison and Gary Olivar are accused in Criminal Case No. Q-1623 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal with
a violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and that the similar charge against petitioners Angelo de los Reyes and
Teresito Sison in a criminal complaint, originally filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, has, also, been filed with
said court. Do the offenses so charged constitute one of the crimes or overt acts mentioned in Proclamation No.
889, as amended?
In the complaint in said Criminal Case No. 1623, it is alleged:
That in or about the year 1968 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter up to and including August
21, 1971, in the city of Quezon, Philippines, and elsewhere in the Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused knowingly, wilfully and by overt acts became officers
and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of the Philippines, a subversive association as defined
by Republic Act No. 1700, which is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government of the
Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a communist totalitarian regime subject to alien domination
and control;
That all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of the Communist Party of
the Philippines conspiring, confederating and mutual helping one another, did then and there
knowingly, wilfully, and feloniously and by overt acts committed subversive acts all intended to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines, as follows:
1. By rising publicly and taking arms against the forces of the government, engaging in
war against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, exacting contributions or diverting public lands or property from the law purposes
for which they have been appropriated;
2. By engaging by subversion thru expansion and requirement activities not only of the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the united front organizations of the
Communist Party of the Philippines as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), Movement for the
Democratic Philippines (MDP), Samahang Demokratikong Kabataan (SDK), Students'
Alliance for National Democracy (STAND), MASAKA Olalia-faction, Student Cultural
Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP), KASAMA, Pagkakaisa ng
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (PMP) and many others; thru agitation promoted by rallies,
demonstration and strikes some of them violent in nature, intended to create social
discontent, discredit those in power and weaken the people's confidence in the
government; thru consistent propaganda by publications, writing, posters, leaflets of
similar means; speeches, teach-ins, messages, lectures or other similar means; or thru
the media as the TV, radio or newspapers, all intended to promote the Communist pattern
of subversion;
3. Thru urban guerilla warfare characterized by assassinations, bombings, sabotage,
kidnapping and arson, intended to advertise the movement, build up its morale and
prestige, discredit and demoralize the authorities to use harsh and repressive measures,
demoralize the people and weaken their confidence in the government and to weaken the
will of the government to resist.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense:
a. That the offense was committed in contempt of and with insult to the public authorities;
b. That some of the overt acts were committed in the Palace of the Chief Executive;
c. That craft, fraud, or disguise was employed;
d. That the offense was committed with the aid of armed men;
e. That the offense was committed with the aid of persons under fifteen(15) years old.
Identical allegations are made in the complaint filed with the City Fiscal of Quezon City, except that the second

paragraph thereof is slightly more elaborate than that of the complaint filed with the CFI, although substantially the
same. 26
In both complaints, the acts imputed to the defendants herein constitute rebellion and subversion, of in the
language of the proclamation "other overt acts committed ... in furtherance" of said rebellion, both of which are
covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ. It is clear, therefore, that the crime for which the
detained petitioners are held and deprived of their liberty are among those for which the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has been suspended.
Up to this point, the Members of the Court are unanimous on the legal principles enunciated.
After finding that Proclamation No. 889, as amended, is not invalid and that petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor
Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito Sison are detained for and actually
accused of an offense for which the privilege of the writ has been suspended by said proclamation, our next step
would have been the following: The Court, or a commissioner designated by it, would have received evidence on
whether as stated in respondents' "Answer and Return" said petitioners had been apprehended and detained
"on reasonable belief" that they had "participated in the crime of insurrection or rebellion."
It is so happened, however, that on November 13, 1971 or two (2) days before the proceedings relative to the
briefing held on October 28 and 29, 1971, had been completed by the filing 27 of the summary of the matters then
taken up the aforementioned criminal complaints were filed against said petitioners. What is more, the preliminary
examination and/or investigation of the charges contained in said complaints has already begun. The next question,
therefore, is: Shall We now order, in the cases at hand, the release of said petitioners herein, despite the formal and
substantial validity of the proclamation suspending the privilege, despite the fact that they are actually charged with offenses
covered by said proclamation and despite the aforementioned criminal complaints against them and the preliminary
examination and/or investigations being conducted therein?

The Members of the Court, with the exception of Mr. Justice Fernando, are of the opinion, and, so hold, that, instead
of this Court or its Commissioner taking the evidence adverted to above, it is best to let said preliminary examination
and/or investigation to be completed, so that petitioners' released could be ordered by the court of first instance,
should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their arrest could be issued, should a
probable cause be established against them. Such course of action is more favorable to the petitioners, inasmuch
as the preliminary examination or investigation requires a greater quantum of proof than that needed to establish
that the Executive had not acted arbitrary in causing the petitioners to be apprehended and detained upon the
ground that they had participated in the commission of the crime of insurrection or rebellion. And, it is mainly for the
reason that the Court has opted to allow the Court of First Instance of Rizal to proceed with the determination of the
existence of probable cause, although ordinarily the Court would have merely determined the existence of the
substantial evidence of petitioners' connection with the crime of rebellion. Besides, the latter alternative would
require the reception of evidence by this Court and thus duplicate the proceedings now taking place in the court of
first instance. What is more, since the evidence involved in the same proceedings would be substantially the same
and the presentation of such evidence cannot be made simultaneously, each proceeding would tend to delay the
other.
Mr. Justice Fernando is of the opinion in line with the view of Mr. Justice Tuason, in Nava v. Gatmaitan, 28 to the
effect that "... if and when formal complaint is presented, the court steps in and the executive steps out. The detention ceases
to be an executive and becomes a judicial concern ..." that the filing of the above-mentioned complaint against the six (6)
detained petitioners herein, has the effect of the Executive giving up his authority to continue holding them pursuant to
Proclamation No. 889, as amended, even if he did not so intend, and to place them fully under the authority of courts of
justice, just like any other person, who, as such, cannot be deprived of his liberty without lawful warrant, which has not, as
yet, been issued against anyone of them, and that, accordingly, We should order their immediate release. Despite the
humanitarian and libertarian spirit with which this view had been espoused, the other Members of the Court are unable to
accept it because:

(a) If the proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is valid and We so hold it to be
and the detainee is covered by the proclamation, the filing of a complaint or information against him does not affect
the suspension of said privilege, and, consequently, his release may not be ordered by Us;
(b) Inasmuch as the filing of a formal complaint or information does not detract from the validity and efficacy of the
suspension of the privilege, it would be more reasonable to construe the filing of said formal charges with the court
of first instance as an expression of the President's belief that there are sufficient evidence to convict the petitioners
so charged and that hey should not be released, therefore, unless and until said court after conducting the
corresponding preliminary examination and/or investigation shall find that the prosecution has not established the
existence of a probable cause. Otherwise, the Executive would have released said accused, as were the other
petitioners herein;

(c) From a long-range viewpoint, this interpretation of the act of the President in having said formal charges filed
is, We believe, more beneficial to the detainees than that favored by Mr. Justice Fernando. His view
particularly the theory that the detainees should be released immediately, without bail, even before the completion of
said preliminary examination and/or investigation would tend to induce the Executive to refrain from filing formal
charges as long as it may be possible. Manifestly, We should encourage the early filing of said charges, so that
courts of justice could assume jurisdiction over the detainees and extend to them effective protection.
Although some of the petitioners in these cases pray that the Court decide whether the constitutional right to bail is
affected by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, We do not deem it proper to pass upon
such question, the same not having been sufficiently discussed by the parties herein. Besides, there is no point in
settling said question with respect to petitioners herein who have been released. Neither is necessary to express our
view thereon, as regards those still detained, inasmuch as their release without bail might still be decreed by the
court of first instance, should it hold that there is no probable cause against them. At any rate, should an actual
issue on the right to bail arise later, the same may be brought up in appropriate proceedings.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring that the President did not act arbitrarily in issuing Proclamation No. 889, as amended, and that,
accordingly, the same is not unconstitutional;
2. Dismissing the petitions in L-33964, L-33965, L-33982, L-34004, L-34013, L-34039 and L-34265, insofar as
petitioners Teodosio Lansang, Bayani Alcala, Rogelio Arienda, Vicentellao, Juan Carandang, Nemesio E. Prudente,
Gerardo Tomas, Reynaldo Rimando, Filomeno M. de Castro, Barcelisa C. de Castro and Antolin Oreta, Jr. are
concerned;
3. The Court of First Instance of Rizal is hereby directed to act with utmost dispatch in conducting the preliminary
examination and/or investigation of the charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act filed against herein
petitioners Luzvimindo David, Victor Felipe, Gary Olivar, Angelo de los Reyes, Rodolfo del Rosario and Teresito
Sison, and to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or,
otherwise, to order their release; and
4. Should there be undue delay, for any reason whatsoever, either in the completion of the aforementioned
preliminary examination and/or investigation, or in the issuance of the proper orders or resolution in connection
therewith, the parties may by motion seek in these proceedings the proper relief.
5. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CASTRO and BARREDO, JJ., concurring:

While concurring fully in the opinion of the Court, we nevertheless write separately to answer, from our own
perspective, a point which Mr. Justice Fernando makes in his dissent. His view, as we understand it, is that while an
individual may be detained beyond the maximum detention period fixed by law when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended, such individual is nevertheless entitled to be released from the very moment a formal
complaint is filed in court against him. The theory seems to be that from the time the charge is filed, the court
acquires, because the executive officials abdicate, jurisdiction.
This view is based on the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason in Nava vs. Gatmaitan. 1 Justice Tuason, in
part, said:

All persons detained for investigation by the executive department are under executive control. It is
here where the Constitution tells the court to keep their hands off unless the cause of the detention
be for an offense other than rebellion or insurrection, which is another matter.