Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD
DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada
alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she
is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are
the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are
many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a
democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the
President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million
Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both
petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October
4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went
on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from
jueteng lords.1
The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery
privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also
charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on
cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President
Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel)
and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano) for joint
investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security,
then headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the exposẻ of Governor
Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime
Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the
Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the
moral authority to govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference
of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on
October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the
"supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus.
Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Department of
Social Welfare and Services6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner
strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council
of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former
Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.8 On
November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and
Industry.9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel
Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng
Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13,
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment11 signed by 115
representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the
Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was
replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by
Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment
trial started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal
profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte
and Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Tañada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar
Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio
Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel
were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice
Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of
the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day
to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating.
Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The
dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice
president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner
Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million
investment agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of
Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the
prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of
Finance took the witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources
Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider trading.16 Then came the
fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner
held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned
as Senate President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the
EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven
(11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering
their collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance
with the impeachment tribunal.19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have
resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the
motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-
kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino
Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their
classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the
EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the
petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to
the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not
diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and
General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22
In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of
cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the
130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.24 Some Cabinet
secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from
their posts.25 Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the
country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree
to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26 There was no turning back the
tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations
for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the
Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel
Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner.
Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside
the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters
which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to
respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as
President of the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left
Malacañang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our
country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of
unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service
of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23
Another copy was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was
received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged
the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following
Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC — In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her
Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice — Acting
on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the
Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the
court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the
Court then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.1âwphi1.nêt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed
by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly
followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacañang, led by the Dean of
the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats
recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the
respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37 The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of
the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the
support of the House of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's
goals under the Constitution."39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few
days later, she also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices
Act.41
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice
President.42 The next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr.43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile,
and John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending
challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's presidency before the Supreme Court.
Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of
Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45
Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is
functus officio and has been terminated.47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the
record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the
Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the
question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating
jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey
conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the
Filipinos nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The
survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60%
in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating
increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the
ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the E's or very
poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters.
Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against
Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption,
bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government
Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation,
Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury,
serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on
November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28,
2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA
7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4,
2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to
investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan,
Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22,
the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits
of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned
complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR
No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in
Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over
and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No.
146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6,
required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12
February 2001." On February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15
and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the
hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused
themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They
debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by
indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but nonetheless inhibited
themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their
memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and
press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in
G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001
declaring the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press
statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of
being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the
merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news
reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against
petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001,
which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed
submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question,
and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its
embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They
stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has
already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the
powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They
submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot
enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to
lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds.
Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the
principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in
the mills of constitutional law.55 In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962
case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-
judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of
which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a
firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question.57 Our leading case
is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a
great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.59
Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed
against the exercise of its jurisdiction.60 With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.
In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming
the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which
empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis
that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo,
ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show
that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former
President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a
peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of
a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for
that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at
the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically
swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is
discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear.
EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of
the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and
the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President
as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II
involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of
EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights
was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal,
raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included
it as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of
the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be
deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through
the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of
human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the right to send petitions
to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when
the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is specifically provided
"that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of
the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The
guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the
Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368
Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now
self-evident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as
a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-
making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable
and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus."69 In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly
provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary to the progress of a society can take
place without destroying the society."70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71
this function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of
Rights Committee of the American Bar Association which emphasized that "the basis of the
right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than
force; and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v.
Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that "… it should be clear even to those with
intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of
grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are
deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues
for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution,
notably section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of
governmental powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in vocation of the
doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a
political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable
from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of
the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution
which provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case
of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and
Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall
have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered
resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not government by any
formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation
before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-
taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the
totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important
to follow the succession of events after the exposẻ of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged
misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of
Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near cipher
chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115
representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful
political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare.
Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow.
Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade
and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation
intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the
impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms
of outrage. Before the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with
people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind
of the petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the
diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara
Diary reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about
the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to
handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his
small office at the presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si
Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m.,
the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a
candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a
candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that
time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the
resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from
the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support
left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel
to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did
not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m.,
Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified
exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go
abroad with enough funds to support him and his family.83 Significantly, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would
never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie
(Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace."85 This is proof that
petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already
concerned with the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary
Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to
ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request.
Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already
about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20
a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1)
the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the
safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to
vindicate the name of the petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was
not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in
the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately
stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the
second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako
sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of this – it's too
painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear
when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the
following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. – Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona.
For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will
be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the
Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new
administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various
positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination
with the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under
the Vice President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security
of the President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice
President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the
alleged savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the
rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake
as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their
person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his
families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the
private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through
the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities – Vice President
(Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will
authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the
subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the
'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from
the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function
Vice President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all
the necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and
observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor
provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement."89
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will
be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation
of the petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax
it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition.
However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking.
The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. – Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points
to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he
is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation
shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the
presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20
January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government
positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety
and security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved
by the national military and police authority – Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as
national military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings
account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex
"B" heretofore attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. – I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by
our side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What
about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'

I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'

And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is
already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the
documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and
General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of
the other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will
administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon – Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. – The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and
Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola.
Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already
withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. – The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's
personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement
before leaving Malacañang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent
the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave
the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people. I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service
of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by
his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the
presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to
the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past
opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk
from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which
he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The
press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the
part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated
January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella
is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby
transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office.
By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.91 The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led
to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite
its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure,
there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was
all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily
unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for
the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the
resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands
scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a
changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his
reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal
significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this
Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he
could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this
Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill,
when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the
law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the
author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the inclusion of a
provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or
corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or
retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted as section
15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending
an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any
offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution
under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency."93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the
second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend
after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter
passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this
particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the
reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition
against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal and
administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious.
It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a
protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case against
him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under
the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that
would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A public official has the right not to serve if
he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public
official is facing administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or
retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against
him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar,
the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against
him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-
1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman
refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as
the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot
be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of
RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose
investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the
immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,
under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of
an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned
because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against
the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were
postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner
when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to
perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As
aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on
the same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the
inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in
section 11 of article VII."95 This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is
a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume
the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the
Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session, within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of
both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:

Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House;


Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20,
2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;


Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House
Resolution No. 175;96

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697
which states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND
EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT
OF THE NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001
before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended
their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of
the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of
national healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and
development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is
divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an
institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the
people, the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing
government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify
the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an
instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the
various segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the
foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the
administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive
partner in nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into
office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a
partner in the attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898
which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of
such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority
Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and
patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true
statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities, among others, as
Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive
Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Senator of the Philippines – qualities which merit his
nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of
Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of
the Senate signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful
change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs
unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in
unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of
such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority
Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and
patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship,
having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary,
Secretary of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position
of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which
states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is
functus officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15,
Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope"
be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in
accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only
upon written approval of the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of
vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to
be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the
unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo
as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition
from any sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability
to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly
rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing
respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco,102 we hold
that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government."
Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot
pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency.
The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is
a political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of
separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed
by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the
respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the
impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit,
whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will
be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a
case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent
Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret
Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him
to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no
authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do
what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny,
under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of
person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not
mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the
law has n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the
governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not
be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the
performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is
properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-
General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has
been deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person,
however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been
invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is
mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his
official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine
Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally
sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it
clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the
liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-
General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and
authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not
he had the right to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for
damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority,
provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in
determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the
question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of
his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might
honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such
men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-
General but as a private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted
immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and
substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the
person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to
unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive
immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever
shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his
tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article
XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and
All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages,"106
petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin,
brightened the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on
executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and
fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only
form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope
so that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third,
we broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be
they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It
can be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity
defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of
executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of
Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency
immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public
trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the anachronism "the king can do no
wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the
People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not
reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation
was given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee
did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on
immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not
agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from
suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he
might be spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now
facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the
Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus
officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then
convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against
his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a
better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates in
the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his
resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the
criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner
Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the
Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different
factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting
President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State
and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any
trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial
disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or
impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,115 US President Richard
Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents
relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's
associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's
Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was named an
unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first
be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the
ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In
the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court further held that the
immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US
Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117
where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of
their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public
office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or
inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting
president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting
the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on
his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file
the criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the
rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The
British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial
suffers a threat.126 The American approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical
approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair
trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial;
probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the
trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128
later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the
doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we
rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a
responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by
itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial
and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our
communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right
to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life.
For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected
from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law
and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to
litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally
infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to
the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino,
et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there
must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that
they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that
the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case
does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity,
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the
burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation
considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily
diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
the principal actors in the case – the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their
threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press
and public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx

The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal
trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that
the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the
misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the
significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime
occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the
open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99
L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process.
From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in
centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United
States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038. 

The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment,
share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to
the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech and press,
the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as
give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information
and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing
alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been
open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of
assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as
a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the
draftsmen deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally
and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place. 

Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.
The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without
the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries, important
aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino,
et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of
petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot
just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for
these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed
of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in
criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded
by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia
of bias for it does not appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence
properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite
its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions
of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the
disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the
office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by
bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has
yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its
recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with
bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by
the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed
at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent
Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the
prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of
the news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this
Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged
prejudice and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty
to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e.,
that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their
own findings and recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors.134 They can
be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In
other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines.
Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and
the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still
has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a
different dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman.
Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the
gnashing of teeth of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the
respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty and the right
of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most
fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice
and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what
Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not
decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights
necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the
majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved
to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to
convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however
offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us not
throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.