17 Lagman v. Pimentel

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 235935. February 6, 2018.]
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN,

EDGAR R. ERICE, TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., GARY C.
ALEJANO, AND EMMANUEL A. BILLONES , petitioners, vs. SENATE
PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER PANTALEON D.
ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA,
DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, BUDGET SECRETARY
BENJAMIN E. DIOKNO AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL REY LEONARDO GUERRERO , respondents.
[G.R. No. 236061. February 6, 2018.]
EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, NOLI VILLANUEVA, RIUS VALLE,

ATTY. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, DR. MARIA CAROLINA P.
ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., CRISTINA E. PALABAY, BAYAN
MUNA PARTYLIST REPRESENTATIVE CARLOS ISAGANI T. ZARATE,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY REPRESENTATIVES EMERENCIANA A.
DE JESUS AND ARLENE D. BROSAS, ANAKPAWIS REPRESENTATIVE
ARIEL B. CASILAO, ACT TEACHERS' REPRESENTATIVES ANTONIO L.
TINIO, AND FRANCISCA L. CASTRO, AND KABATAAN PARTYLIST
REPRESENTATIVE SARAH JANE I. ELAGO , petitioners, vs. PRESIDENT
RODRIGO DUTERTE, SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III,
HOUSE SPEAKER PANTALEON ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF-OF-STAFF GEN. REY
LEONARDO GUERRERO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-
GENERAL RONALDO DELA ROSA , respondents.
[G.R. No. 236145. February 6, 2018.]
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES , petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R.

DUTERTE, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR SECRETARY DELFIN
N. LORENZANA, MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTER GENERAL REY L.
GUERRERO, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR
GENERAL RONALDO M. DELA ROSA, AND THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CONSISTING OF THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL III,
AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HOUSE
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ , respondents.
[G.R. No. 236155. February 6, 2018.]
CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, DINAGAT ISLANDS REPRESENTATIVE

ARLENE J. BAG-AO, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO, NOLASCO RITZ LEE
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
B. SANTOS III, MARIE HAZEL E. LAVITORIA, NICOLENE S. ARCAINA,
AND JOSE RYAN S. PELONGCO , petitioners, vs. SENATE PRESIDENT
AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE (DND) SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG)
SECRETARY (OFFICER-IN-CHARGE) EDUARDO M. AÑO, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL REY
LEONARDO GUERRERO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)
CHIEF DIRECTOR GENERAL RONALD M. DELA ROSA, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISER HERMOGENES C. ESPERON, JR. , respondents.
DECISION
TIJAM , J : p
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of

national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give
way to its dictates. — Alexander Hamilton aDSIHc
There is an ongoing rebellion in the Philippines. NPA rebels, Maute rebels, ASG
rebels, BIFF rebels, Islamic fundamentalists and other armed groups are on the loose.
They are engaged in armed con ict with government forces; they seek to topple the
government; and they sow terror and panic in the community. To ignore this reality
and to claim that these are non-existent is to court consequences that
endanger public safety.
A state of martial law is not the normative state. Neither does it take a perpetual
form. It is an extraordinary power premised on necessity meant to protect the Republic
from its enemies. Territorial and temporal limitations germane to the Constitutional
prerequisites of the existence or persistence of actual rebellion or invasion and the
needs of public safety severely restrict the declaration of martial law, or its extensions.
The government can lift the state of martial law once actual rebellion no longer persists
and that public safety is amply ensured. Should the government, through its elected
President and the Congress, fail in their positive duties prescribed by the Constitution
or transgress any of its safeguards, any citizen is empowered to question such acts
before the Court. When its jurisdiction is invoked, the Court is not acting as an
institution superior to that of the Executive or the Congress, but as the champion of the
Constitution ordained by the sovereign Filipino people. For, after all, a state of martial
law, awesome as it is perceived to be, does not suspend the operations of the
Constitution which defines and limits the powers of the government and guarantees the
bill of rights to every person.
The Case
These are consolidated petitions, 1 led under the third paragraph, Section 18 of
Article VII of the Constitution, assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 alternatively, but not mandatorily, invoke the Court's
expanded jurisdiction under Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061 and 236155 pray for a temporary restraining order (TRO)
and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from implementing the one-
year extension.
The Antecedents
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, 2
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days, to address
the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives
his written Report, citing the events and reasons that impelled him to issue
Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 3 while
the House of Representatives issued House Resolution No. 1050, 4 both expressing full
support to the Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.
Three separate petitions 5 were subsequently led before the Court, challenging
the su ciency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. In a Decision rendered on
July 4, 2017, the Court found su cient factual bases for the Proclamation and declared
it constitutional.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity
of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress
adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 6 extending Proclamation No. 216 until
December 31, 2017.
In a letter 7 to the President, through Defense Secretary Del n N. Lorenzana
(Secretary Lorenzana), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff, General
Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended the further extension of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 "for compelling reasons based on
current security assessment." On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary
Lorenzana wrote a similar recommendation to the President "primarily to ensure total
eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-
minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs),
and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and nanciers, and
to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the
attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in
Mindanao." 8 ETHIDa
Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter 9 dated December 8,

2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further extend the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. Urging the Congress to grant
the extension based on the "essential facts" he cited, the President wrote:
A further extension of the implementation of Martial Law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will help the AFP, the
Philippine National Police (PNP), and all other law enforcement agencies to
quell completely and put an end to the on-going rebellion in Mindanao and
prevent the same from escalating to other parts of the country. Public safety
indubitably requires such further extension, not only for the sake of security and
public order, but more importantly to enable the government and the people of
Mindanao to pursue the bigger task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a
stable socio-economic growth and development. 1 0
Attached to the President's written request were the letters of Secretary
Lorenzana 1 1 and General Guerrero 1 2 recommending the one-year extension.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a joint
session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 1 3 further extending the period of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. In granting the
President's request, the Congress stated:
WHEREAS, the President informed the Congress of the Philippines of the
remarkable progress made during the period of Martial Law, but nevertheless
reported the following essential facts, which as Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines, he has personal knowledge of: First, despite the
death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their groups have
continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and training of
new members and ghters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the Turai e Group
has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct bombings, notably
targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least fteen (15) violent
incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato;
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-tawi, and
Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the New
People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensi ed their decades-
long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against
innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerrilla warfare against the
security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely to seize
political power through violent means and supplant the country's democratic
form of government with Communist rule.
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution authorizes the
Congress of the Philippines to extend, at the initiative of the President, such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress of
the Philippines, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it;
WHEREAS, on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and
extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session by two
hundred forty (240) a rmative votes comprising the majority of all its
Members, has determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety
indubitably requires the further extension of the Proclamation of Martial Law
and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole
of Mindanao; Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives in a Joint
Session Assembled, To further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017,
entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a period of one (1) year
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. 1 4

The Parties' Arguments
A. Petitioners' case
Based on their respective petitions and memoranda and their oral arguments
before this Court on January 16, 2018 and January 17, 2018, petitioners' arguments are
summarized as follows:
(a) The petitioners' failure to attach the Congress' Joint Resolution approving
the extension is not fatal to the consolidated petitions. Such failure is justi ed by the
non-availability of the Resolution at the time the petition was led. In any case, the Rules
on Evidence allow the Court to take judicial notice of the Resolution as an o cial act of
the legislative. 1 5
(b) The doctrine of presidential immunity does not apply in a sui generis
proceeding under Section 18, Article VII as such immunity pertains only to civil and
criminal liability. 1 6 In this proceeding, the President is not being held personally liable
for damages, or threatened with any punishment. If at all, he is being held to account for
non-compliance with a constitutional requirement. 1 7
(c) The principle of conclusiveness of judgment is not a bar to raising the
issue of the su ciency of the factual basis of the extension, being different from the
factual and legal issues raised in the earlier case of Lagman v. Medialdea. 1 8 At any rate,
the Court's decision in Lagman is transitory considering the volatile factual
circumstances. 1 9 Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas (Fr. Bernas) emphasized during the
deliberations on the 1987 Constitution that the evaluation of the Supreme Court in a
petition which assails such factual situation would be "transitory if proven wrong by
subsequent changes in the factual situation." 2 0
(d) As to the scope and standards of judicial review, petitioners in G.R. No.
236145 assert that the standard for scrutiny for the present petitions is su ciency of
factual basis, not grave abuse of discretion. The former is, by constitutional design, a
stricter scrutiny as opposed to the latter. Moreover, the Court is allowed to look into
facts presented before it during the pendency of the litigation. This includes, for
example, admissions made by the Solicitor General and the military during oral
arguments, as they attempted to show compliance with the constitutional
requirements. 2 1 cSEDTC
In contrast, petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 argue that the standard to be used in
determining the su ciency of the factual basis for the extension is limited to the
su ciency of the facts and information contained in the President's letter dated
December 8, 2017 requesting for the extension and its annexes. 2 2
(e) As to the quantum of proof, petitioners in G.R. No. 236061 insist that
clear and convincing evidence is necessary to establish su cient factual basis for the
extension of martial law instead of the "probable cause" standard set in Lagman. In
comparison to the initial exercise of the extraordinary powers of proclamation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, their
extension must have had the bene t of su cient time to gather additional information
not only on the factual situation of an actual rebellion, but also the initial exercise of the
Executive during its initial implementation. 2 3 Petitioners further argue that given its
critical role in the system of checks and balance, the Court should review not only the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the re-extension but also its accuracy. 2 4
(f) As to the onus of showing su ciency of the factual bases for extending
martial law, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935 and 236145 contend that the President
bears the same. Petitioners in G.R. No. 236155, however, argues that both the
President and the Congress bear the burden of proof.
(g) In relation to the Court's power to review the su ciency of the factual
basis for the proclamation of martial law or any extension thereof, the military cannot
withhold information from the Court on the basis of national security especially since it
is the military itself that classi es what is "secret" and what is not. The Court's power to
review in this case is a speci c and extraordinary mandate of the Constitution that
cannot be defeated and limited by merely invoking that the information sought is
"classified." 2 5
(h) The Congress committed grave abuse of discretion for precipitately and
perfunctorily approving the extension of martial law despite the absence of su cient
factual basis. 2 6 In G.R. No. 235935, petitioners impute grave abuse of discretion
speci cally against the "leadership and supermajority" of both Chambers of Congress,
arguing that the extension was approved with inordinate haste as the Congress'
deliberation was unduly constricted to an indecent 3 hours and 35 minutes. The three-
minute period of interpellation (excluding the answer) under the Rules of the Joint
Session of Congress was inordinately short compared to the consideration of ordinary
legislation on second reading. Further, a member of Congress was only allowed a
minute to explain his/her vote, and although a member who did not want to explain
could yield his/her allotted time, the explanation could not exceed three minutes. 2 7
Petitioners in G.R. No. 236061 highlighted the limited time given to the legislators to
interpellate the AFP Chief, the Defense Secretary and other resource persons and
criticized the Congress' Joint Resolution for not specifying its ndings and
justifications for the re-extension. 2 8
(i) The Constitution allows only a one-time extension of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, not a series of extensions
amounting to perpetuity. As regards the Congress' discretion to determine the period
of the extension, the intent of the Constitution is for such to be of short duration given
that the original declaration of martial law was limited to only sixty (60) days. 2 9 In
addition, the period of extension of martial law should satisfy the standards of
necessity and reasonableness. Congress must exercise its discretion in a stringent
manner considering that martial law is an extraordinary power of last resort. 3 0
(j) The one-year extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus lacked su cient factual basis because
there is no actual rebellion in Mindanao. The Marawi siege and the other grounds under
Proclamation No. 216 that were used as the alleged bases to justify the extension have
already been resolved and no longer persist. 3 1 In his letter of request for further
extension, the President admits that the Maute rebellion has already been quelled and
the extension is to prevent the scattered rebels from gathering and consolidating their
strength. 3 2 Moreover, the President himself had announced the liberation of Marawi
and the cessation of armed combat. 3 3
(k) The President and his advisers' justi cations, which were principally
based on "threats of violence and terrorism," "security concerns" and "imminent danger
to public safety," do not amount to actual invasion or rebellion as to justify the
extension of martial law. They merely constitute "imminent danger." Since the framers
of the 1987 Constitution removed the phrase "imminent danger" as one of the grounds
for declaring martial law, the President can no longer declare or extend martial law on
the basis of mere threats of an impending rebellion. 3 4
(l) The extension should not be allowed on the basis of alleged NPA attacks
because this reason was not cited in the President's original declaration. 3 5
(m) The alleged rebellion in Mindanao does not endanger public safety. The
threat to public safety contemplated under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is
one where the government cannot su ciently or effectively govern, as when the courts
or government offices cannot operate or perform their functions. 3 6
(n) Martial law should be operative only in a "theater of war" as intended by
the drafters of the Constitution. For a "theater of war" to exist, there must be an area
where actual armed con ict occurs which necessitate military authorities to take over
the functions of government due to the breakdown, inability or di culty of the latter to
function. The insurrection must have assumed the status of a public and territorial war,
and the conditions must show that government agencies within the local territory can
no longer function. 3 7 Without any of the four objectives that comprise the second
element of rebellion, 3 8 the acts of "regrouping," "consolidation of forces," "recruitment"
and "planning" stages, or the continuing commission of the crimes of terrorism,
robbery, murder, extortion, as cited by the President in his December 8, 2017 letter,
cannot be said to be the "theater of war" referred to by the framers of the Constitution.
39 SDAaTC
(o) There is no need to extend martial law to suppress or defeat remnants of

vanquished terrorist groups, as these may be quelled and addressed using lesser
extraordinary powers (i.e., calling out powers) of the President. Moreover, respondent
General Guerrero failed to state during the oral arguments what additional powers are
granted to the military by virtue of the proclamation and suspension and instead limited
himself to the "effects" of martial law. Respondents simply failed to demonstrate how
martial law powers were used. In short, there is no necessity for martial law. 4 0
In their Memorandum, petitioners in G.R. No. 236145 propounded two tests (i.e.,
proportionality and suitability) in determining whether the declaration or extension of
martial law is required ornecessitated by public safety. The Proportionality Test
requires that the situation is of such gravity or scale as to demand resort to the most
extreme measures. Petitioners cited AFP's own admission that there are only 537 out
of 8,813 barangays or 6.09% that are currently being controlled by rebel groups in
Mindanao. On the other hand, the Suitability Test requires that the situation is such that
the declaration of martial law is the correct tool to address the public safety problem.
Considering that the AFP Chief of Staff could not cite what martial law powers they
used in the past, and what martial law powers they intend to use moving forward, the
present circumstances fail both tests. 4 1
(p) Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 allege that martial law and the suspension
of the writ trigger the commission of human rights violations and suppression of civil
liberties. In fact, the implementation of the same resulted to intensi ed human rights
violations in Mindanao. 4 2 In support of the same allegations, petitioners in G.R. No.
236061 attached a letter-report from Salinlahi on human rights violations committed as
a consequence of martial law in Mindanao. They emphasize that martial law is a scare
tactic, one that is not intended for the armed groups mentioned but actually against the
dissenters of the government's policies. 4 3
(q) Finally, in support of their prayer for a TRO or a writ of preliminary
injunction, petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 allege that they are Representatives to
Congress, sworn to defend the Constitution, with the right to challenge the
constitutionality of the subject re-extension. They claim that petitioner Villarin, who is a
resident of Davao City, is personally affected and gravely prejudiced by the re-extension
as it would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like him, a steadfast critic
of the Duterte administration. They also assert that the injunctive relief will foreclose
further commission of human rights violations and the derogation of the rule of law in
Mindanao. 4 4 Petitioners in G.R. No. 236061 likewise prays for a TRO or writ of
preliminary injunction in order to protect their substantive rights and interests while the
case is pending before this Court. 4 5
B. Respondents' case
Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that:

a) Petitioners' failure to submit the written Joint Resolution extending the
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is fatal since it
is indispensable to the Court's exercise of its review power. 4 6
b) The Cullamat and Rosales Petitions were led against the President in
violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit. 4 7
c) The Court already ruled in Lagman that there is actual rebellion in
Mindanao. Thus, the principle of conclusiveness of judgment pursuant to Section 47 (c),
4 8 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court bars the petitioners from re-litigating the same issue. 4 9
d) Given that the Court had already declared in Lagman that there is rebellion
in Mindanao, the onus lies on the petitioners to show that the rebellion has been
completely quelled. 5 0
e) The invocation of this Court's expanded jurisdiction under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution is misplaced. As held in Lagman, 5 1 the "appropriate
proceeding" in Section 18, Article VII does not refer to a petition for certiorari led
under Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII, as it is not the proper tool to review the su ciency
of the factual basis of the proclamation or extension. 5 2
f) Petitioners failed to allege that rebellion in Mindanao no longer exists,
which is a condition precedent for the ling of the instant petition. They only pointed
out the President's announcement regarding the liberation of Marawi from "terrorist
in uence." They did not mention the rebellion being waged by DAESH-inspired
Da'awatul Islamahiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign
Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), remnants of the groups
of Hapilon and Maute, the Turai e Group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
(BIFF), the ASG, and the New People's Army (NPA), as cited in the President's
December 8, 2017 letter to Congress. 5 3
g) The determination of the su ciency of the factual basis to justify the
extension of martial law became the duty of Congress after the President's request
was transmitted. The question raised had assumed a political nature that can only be
resolved by Congress. 5 4
h) The manner in which Congress approved the extension is a political
question, outside the Court's judicial authority to review. Congress has full discretion on
how to go about the debates and the voting. The Constitution itself allows the
Congress to determine the rules of its proceedings. The Court does not concern itself
with parliamentary rules, which may be waived or disregarded by the legislature. 5 5
i) Proclamation No. 216 and the subsequent extensions granted by Congress
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality, which petitioners failed to overcome by
proving that the extension is without basis. The presumption cannot be ignored,
especially since the Court held in Lagman, that it considers only the information and
data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration and will not
undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. 5 6 acEHCD
j) Even if the Court were to entertain the allegation of grave abuse of

discretion on the part of Congress in approving the one-year extension, the same is
without merit. Both houses of Congress gave due consideration to the facts relayed by
the President which showed that rebellion persists in Mindanao and that public safety
requires the extension. The extension was approved because of the stepped-up
terrorist attacks against innocent civilians and private entities. 5 7
k) The period for deliberation on the President's request for further extension
was not unduly constricted. The extension or revocation of martial law cannot be
equated with the process of ordinary legislation. Given the time-sensitive nature of
martial law or its extension, the time cap was necessary in the interest of expediency.
Furthermore, an explanation of one's vote in the deliberation process is not a
constitutional requirement. 5 8
l) The Constitution does not limit the period for which Congress can extend
the proclamation and the suspension, nor does it prohibit Congress from granting
further extension. The 60-day period imposed on the President's initial proclamation of
martial law does not similarly apply to the period of extension. The clause "in the same
manner" must be understood as referring to the manner by which Congress may revoke
the proclamation or suspension, i.e., Congress must also observe the same manner of
voting: "voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session." Furthermore, in the absence of any express or implied prohibition in
the Constitution, the Court cannot prevent Congress from granting further extensions.
59
m) The burden to show su ciency of the factual basis for the extension of
martial law is not with the President. Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution states
that the extension of martial law falls within the prerogative of Congress. 6 0
n) Even assuming that the burden of proof is on the President or Congress,
such burden has been overcome. Although the leadership of the Mautes was
decimated in Marawi, the rebellion in Mindanao persists as the surviving members of
the militant group have not laid down their arms. The remnants remain a formidable
force to be reckoned with, especially since they have established linkage with other
rebel groups. With the persistence of rebellion in the region, the extension of martial law
is, therefore, not just for preventive reasons. The extension is premised on the existence
of an ongoing rebellion. That the rebellion is ongoing is beyond doubt. 6 1
o) In the context of the Revised Penal Code, even those who are merely
participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion, as coddlers,
supporters and financiers, are guilty of the crime of rebellion. 6 2
p) As a crime without predetermined boundaries, the rebellion in various
parts of Mindanao justi ed the extension of martial law, as well as the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 6 3
q) Under the Constitution, the extension of martial law and the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus are justi ed as long as there is rebellion and
public safety requires it. The provision does not require that the group that started the
rebellion should be the same group that should continue the uprising. Thus, the violence
committed by other groups, such as the BIFF, AKP, ASG, DI Maguid, and DI Toraype
(Turai e) should be taken into consideration in determining whether the rebellion has
been completely quelled, as they are part of the rebellion. 6 4
r) The President has the sole prerogative to choose which of the
extraordinary commander-in-chief powers to use against the rebellion plaguing
Mindanao. Thus, petitioners cannot insist that the Court impose upon the President the
proper measure to defeat a rebellion. In light of the wide array of information in the
hands of the President, as well as the extensive coordination between him and the
armed forces regarding the situation in Mindanao, it would be an overreach for the
Court to encroach on the President's discretion. 6 5
s) Among the differences between the calling out power of the President and
the imposition of martial law is that, during the latter, the President may ask the armed
forces to assist in the execution of civilian functions, exercise police power through the
issuance of General or Special Orders, and facilitate the mobilization of the reserve
force, among others. 6 6
t) While the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) has powers that can be used to
fight terrorism, the ATC, however, becomes relevant only in cases of terrorism. Thus, for
the purpose of involving itself during a state of martial law, the ATC must rst
associate an act of rebellion with terrorism, as rebellion is only one of the means to
commit terrorism. 6 7 SDHTEC
u) The phrase "theater of war" in relation to martial law should be understood

in a traditional Groatian sense, which connotes that "war" is "an idea of multitude" and
not limited to the concept between two nations in armed disagreement. 6 8
Nevertheless, the Constitution does not require the existence of a "theater of war" for a
valid proclamation or extension of martial law. 6 9
v) There is no need to show the magnitude of rebellion, as placing the
requirement of public safety on a scale will prevent the application of laws and
undermine the Constitution. 7 0
w) The alleged human rights violations are irrelevant in the determination of
whether Congress had su cient factual basis to further extend martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. As ruled in Lagman, petitioners'
claim of alleged human rights violations should be resolved in a separate proceeding
and should not be taken cognizance of by the Court. 7 1 Moreover, the alleged human
rights violations are unsubstantiated and contradicted by facts. According to the AFP
Human Rights O ce, no formal complaints were led in their o ce against any
member or personnel of the AFP for human rights violations during the implementation
of martial law in Mindanao. The online news articles cited in the Cullamat Petition have
no probative value, as settled in Lagman.
x) Martial law does not automatically equate to curtailment and suppression
of civil liberties and individual freedom. A state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights. The Constitution lays down
safeguards to protect human rights during martial law. Civil courts are not supplanted.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus applies only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent or directly connected with the invasion. Any person
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days. Various statutes also
exist to protect human rights during martial law, such as, but not limited to, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 7438 n on persons under custodial investigation, R.A. No. 9372 on
persons detained for the crime of terrorism, and R.A. No. 9745 on the non-employment
of physical or mental torture on an arrested individual. 7 2

y) A temporary restraining order (TRO) or a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the implementation or the extension of martial law is not provided in the
Constitution. Although there are remedies anchored on equity, a TRO and an injunctive
relief cannot override, prevent, or diminish an express power granted to the President
by no less than the Constitution. If a TRO or injunctive writ were to be issued, it would
constitute an amendment of the Charter tantamount to judicial legislation, as it would
fashion a shortcut remedy other than the power of review established in the
Constitution. 7 3
z) Petitioners' allegations do not meet the standard proof required for the
issuance of injunctive relief. Neither can the application for injunctive relief be
supported by the claim that an injunction will foreclose further violations of human
rights, as injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Petitioners
also failed to show that the alleged human rights violations are directly attributable to
the President's imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. 7 4
Ruling of the Court
Procedural Issues:
Failure to attach Resolution of

Both Houses No. 4
is not fatal to the petitions.
Section 1, 7 5 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that a court can take judicial
notice of the o cial acts of the legislative department without the introduction of
evidence.
"Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take
and act on without proof because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty
of the court to assume something as matters of fact without need of further evidentiary
support." 7 6
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 is an o cial act of Congress, thus, this Court
can take judicial notice thereof. The Court also notes that respondents annexed a copy
of the Resolution to their Consolidated Comment. 7 7 Hence, We see no reason to
consider petitioners' failure to submit a certi ed copy of the Resolution as a fatal
defect that forecloses this Court's review of the petitions.
The President should be dropped as
party respondent
Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-settled doctrine in our

jurisprudence. The President may not be sued during his tenure or actual incumbency,
and there is no need to expressly grant such privilege in the Constitution or law. 7 8 This
privilege stems from the recognition of the President's vast and signi cant functions
which can be disrupted by court litigations. As the Court explained in Rubrico v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al.: 7 9 AScHCD
It will degrade the dignity of the high o ce of the President, the Head of
State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his
o cial duties and functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one
constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in
the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the
Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. 8 0
Accordingly, in David, the Court ruled that it was improper to implead former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the petitions assailing the constitutionality of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017, where she declared a state of national emergency,
and General Order No. 5, where she called upon the AFP and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
country.
It is, thus, clear that petitioners in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145 committed a
procedural misstep in including the President as a respondent in their petitions.
The Congress is an indispensable
party to the consolidated petitions.
Of the four petitions before the Court, only G.R. No. 236145 impleaded the
Congress as party-respondent.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that "parties in interest without
whom no nal determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or
defendants." In Marmo, et al. v. Anacay, 8 1 the Court explained that:
[A] party is indispensable, not only if he has an interest in the subject
matter of the controversy, but also if his interest is such that a nal decree
cannot be made without affecting this interest or without placing the
controversy in a situation where the nal determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. He is a person whose absence
disallows the court from making an effective, complete, or equitable
determination of the controversy between or among the contending parties. 8 2
(Citation omitted)
In these consolidated petitions, petitioners are questioning the constitutionality
of a congressional act, speci cally the approval of the President's request to extend
martial law in Mindanao. Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935 and 236155 have also put in
issue the manner in which the Congress deliberated upon the President's request for
extension. Clearly, therefore, it is the Congress as a body, and not just its leadership,
which has interest in the subject matter of these cases. Consequently, it was
procedurally incorrect for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061 and 236155 to
implead only the Senate President and the House Speaker among the respondents.
Arguably, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III and House Speaker Pantaleon Alvarez can
be said to have an interest in these cases, as representatives of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively. However, considering that one of their main
contentions is that the "supermajority" of the Congress gravely abused their discretion
when they allegedly railroaded the adoption of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, it
stands to reason and the requirements of due process that petitioners in G.R. Nos.
235935 and 236061 should have impleaded the Congress as a whole. 8 3 Needless to
say, the entire body of Congress, and not merely the respective leaders of its two
Houses, will be directly affected should We strike down the extension of martial law.
Thus, We hold that in cases impugning the extension of martial law for lack of su cient
factual basis, the entire body of the Congress, composed of the Senate and the House
of Representatives, must be impleaded, being an indispensable party thereto.
It is true that a party's failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a
ground for the dismissal of the action, as said party may be added, by order of the
court on motion of the party or motu propio, at any stage of the action or at such times
as are just. However, it remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that an indispensable
party be impleaded before judgment is rendered by the court, as the absence of such
indispensable party renders all subsequent acts of the court null and void for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. 8 4
Joining indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of due
process. In their absence, the judgment cannot attain real finality. 8 5AcICHD
We are, thus, unprepared to trivialize the necessity to implead the entire

Congress as party-respondent in this proceeding, especially considering that the
factual scenario and the concomitant issues raised herein are novel and
unprecedented.
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Congress was impleaded as a respondent in G.R.
No. 236145 and the OSG has entered its appearance and argued for all the
respondents named in the four consolidated petitions, the Court nds that the
"essential" and "jurisdictional" requirement of impleading an indispensable party has
been substantially complied with.
The Court is not barred by the
doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment from examining the
persistence of rebellion in Mindanao
Citing the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, respondents contend that

petitioners could no longer raise the issue of the existence of rebellion in Mindanao, in
light of this Court's ruling in Lagman 8 6 and Padilla v. Congress. 8 7
Reliance on the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is misplaced.
Conclusiveness of judgment, a species of the principle of res judicata, bars the
re-litigation of any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment
is rendered on the merits. 8 8 In order to successfully apply in a succeeding litigation the
doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, mere identities of parties and issues is
required.
In this case, despite the addition of new petitioners, We nd that there is
substantial identity of parties between the present petitions and the earlier Lagman
case given their privity or shared interest in either protesting or supporting martial law
in Mindanao. It is settled that for purposes of res judicata, only substantial identity of
parties is required and not absolute identity. There is substantial identity of parties
when there is community of interest between a party in the rst case and a party in the
second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 8 9
As to the second requirement, We do not nd that there is identity of issues
between the Lagman 9 0 and Padilla 9 1 cases, on one hand, and the case at bar.
I n Padilla, petitioners sought to require the Congress to convene in a joint
session to deliberate whether to a rm or revoke Presidential Proclamation No. 216,
and to vote thereon. After consideration of the arguments of the parties, We ruled that
under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Congress is only required to
vote jointly to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. We clari ed that there is no constitutional
requirement that Congress must conduct a joint session for the purpose of concurring
with the President's declaration of martial law.
In Lagman, the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216 was the primary issue
raised before Us. We held that the Proclamation was constitutional as the President
had su cient factual basis in declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao. We found that based on the facts known to the
President and the events that transpired before and at the time he issued the
Proclamation, he had probable cause to believe that a rebellion was or is being
committed, and reasonable basis to conclude that public safety was endangered by the
widespread atrocities perpetrated by the rebel groups.
In contrast, the consolidated petitions at hand essentially assail the Congress'
act of approving the President's December 8, 2017 request and extending the
declaration of martial law in Mindanao from January 1 to December 31, 2018. In
support of their case, petitioners argue that rebellion no longer persists in Mindanao
and that public safety is not endangered by the existence of mere "remnants" of the
Maute group, ASG, DAESH-inspired DIWM members.
Although there are similarities in the arguments of petitioners in the earlier
Lagman case and the petitions at bar, We do not nd that petitioners are seeking to re-
litigate a matter already settled in the Lagman case with respect to the existence of
rebellion. A reading of the consolidated petitions reveals that petitioners do not contest
the existence of violence committed by various armed groups in Mindanao, to wit: TAIaHE
LAGMAN PETITION (G.R. No. 235935)

43. It is very unfortunate that in their contrived efforts to
justify the extension of martial law in Mindanao, President Duterte
and his military and police advisers with the support of partisans
in the Congress have molded the so-called remnants or residue,
miniscule as they are, into apparent menacing ogres.
xxx xxx xxx
53. A litany of alleged "skirmishes" does not necessarily
constitute armed public uprising against the government.
54. They may only indicate banditry, lawless violence and
terroristic acts of remnants or residue of vanquished combatants.
CULLAMAT PETITION (G.R. No. 236061)
58. The question now therefore is, the instant case, does the
actual rebellion being perpetrated by the armed groups
enumerated in the 08 December 2017 letter of President Duterte to
the House of Representatives and the Senate, compromise public
safety that would warrant the imposition of martial law?
ROSALES PETITION (G.R. No. 236145)
67. In short, the bases (for the extension of martial law in
Mindanao) were: rst, the supposed continuous rebuilding of the
remaining members of the Daesh-inspired DIWM, who are "in all
probability, . . . presently regrouping and consolidating their
forces" or are, at the very least, continuing their efforts and
activities 'geared towards the conduct of intensi ed atrocities and
armed public uprisings"; second, the supposed "plan" by members
of the Turai e group to conduct bombings; third, the supposed
continuing acts of violence of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters; fourth, the continuous commission of acts of terrorism
by members of the Abu Sayaff Group; and fifth, the intensi cation
of the "decades-long rebellion" by the New People's Army (NPA).
68. With all due respect, and without diminishing the threat
posed by any of the foregoing, none of these constitute actual
rebellion or actual invasion. Moreover, it mistakes the distinction
between the need for military force which is effected through the
use of the calling out powers of the President, on one hand, and
the need for imposing martial law on the civilian population, on
the other.
69. Since the ve (5) identi ed groups were/are in the
"regrouping," "[consolidation] of forces," "recruitment," "planning"
stages, or are continuing the commission of crimes (terrorism,
robbery, murder, extortion) without any of the four (4) objectives
that comprise the second element of rebellion, there cannot be
said to be a "theatre of war" already contemplated by the framers
of the Constitution as would cripple the normal operation of
civilian law.'
MONSOD PETITION (G.R. No. 236155)
72. There is no indication that "public safety requires" the
further imposition of martial law. The instances cited as
justi cation for the extension requested do not demonstrate
gravity such that ordinary powers and resources of the
government cannot address these. What Marawi needs at this
point is effective and responsive rehabilitation in an atmosphere
of freedom and cooperation. It does not need martial law to rise
from the ashes of war and turmoil.
73. At most, these incidents show several protracted incidents
of violence and lawlessness that is well within the powers and
authority of the government armed forces and police force to
suppress without resort to extraordinary powers, which the
government has been continuously doing for decades as well.
Martial law is neither a commensurate measure to address these
incidents, nor preventive measure to thwart the spread of lawless
violence in the country. The mere invocation, therefore, of rebellion
or invasion, will not be the su cient factual basis for the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus if it cannot be factually demonstrated that it
is actually happening and necessitated by the requirements of
public safety in a theater of war.cDHAES
From the foregoing, it appears that petitioners merely question the gravity and
extent of these occurrences as to necessitate the continued implementation of martial
law in Mindanao. In other words, the issue put forth by petitioners in the earlier Lagman
case, which this Court already settled, refers to the existence of a state of rebellion
which would trigger the President's initial declaration of martial law, whereas the
factual issue in the case at bar refers to the persistence of the same rebellion in
Mindanao which would justify the extension of martial law.
That petitioners are not barred from questioning the alleged persistence of the
rebellion in these consolidated petitions is also supported by the transitory nature of
the Court's judgment on the su ciency of the factual basis for a declaration of martial
law. The following exchange during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission is instructive:
MR. BENGZON.
I would like to ask for clari cation from the Committee, and I would like to
address this to Commissioner Bernas.
Suppose there is a variance of decision between the Supreme Court and
Congress, whose decision shall prevail?
FR. BERNAS.
The Supreme Court's decision prevails.
MR. BENGZON.
If Congress, decides to recall before the Supreme Court issues its decision,
does the case become moot?
FR. BERNAS.
Yes, Madam President.
MR. BENGZON.
And if the Supreme Court promulgates its decision ahead of Congress,
Congress is foreclosed because the Supreme Court has 30 days within
which to look into the factual basis. If the Supreme Court comes out with
the decision one way or the other without Congress having acted on the
matter, is Congress foreclosed?
FR. BERNAS.
The decision of the Supreme Court will be based on its
assessment of the factual situation. Necessarily, therefore, the
judgment of the Supreme Court on that is a transitory judgment
because the factual situation can change. So, while the decision of
the Supreme Court may be valid at that certain point of time, the situation
may change so that Congress should be authorized to do something about
it.
MR. BENGZON.
Does the Gentleman mean the decision of the Supreme Court then would
just be something transitory?
FR. BERNAS.
Precisely.
MR. BENGZON.
It does not mean that if the Supreme Court revokes or decides against the
declaration of martial law, the Congress can no longer say, "no, we
want martial law to continue" because the circumstances can
change.
FR. BERNAS.
The Congress can still come in because the factual situation can change.
Verily, the Court's review in martial law cases is largely dependent on the existing
factual scenario used as basis for its imposition or extension. The gravity and scope of
rebellion or invasion, as the case may be, should necessarily be re-examined, in order to
make a justiciable determination on whether rebellion persists in Mindanao as to justify
an extension of a state of martial law.
The Court's power to review the
extension of martial law is limited
solely to the determination of the
sufficiency of the factual basis
thereof.
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution pertains to the Court's judicial power to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. The rst part is to be known as the traditional concept of judicial
power while the latter part, an innovation of the 1987 Constitution, became known as
the court's expanded jurisdiction. Under its expanded jurisdiction, courts can now delve
into acts of any branch or instrumentality of the Government traditionally considered as
political if such act was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. ASEcHI
In seeking the Court's review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216 on the
strength of the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, petitioners
in G.R. No. 235935 alternately invoke the Court's expanded (certiorari) jurisdiction
under Section 1, Article VIII.
I n Lagman, 9 2 We emphasized that this Court's jurisdiction under the third
paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is special and speci c, different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 9 3 and 5 9 4 of Article VIII. It was further stressed therein that
the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has
committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the performance of his or her functions, whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court
is tasked to review the su ciency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of
emergency powers. Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to
Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the su ciency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. We held that to apply the standard of review in a petition for
certiorari will emasculate the Court's constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII,
which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible martial
law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
With regard to the extension of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ, the same special and speci c jurisdiction is vested in the
Court to review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the su ciency of the
factual basis thereof. Necessarily, and by parity of reasoning, a certiorari petition
invoking the Court's expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the
su ciency of the factual basis of the Congress' extension of the proclamation of
martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Furthermore, as in the case of the Court's review of the President's proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Court's judicial review of the
Congress' extension of such proclamation or suspension is limited only to a
determination of the su ciency of the factual basis thereof. By its plain language, the
Constitution provides such scope of review in the exercise of the Court's sui generis
authority under Section 18, Article VII, which is principally aimed at balancing (or
curtailing) the power vested by the Constitution in the Congress to determine whether
to extend such proclamation or suspension.
Substantive Issues
Congressional check on the exercise

of martial law and suspension
powers
Under the 1935 9 5 and 1973 9 6 Constitutions, the Congress had no power to
review or limit the Executive's exercise of the authority to declare martial law or to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Borne of the country's martial law
experience under the Marcos regime, such power was subsequently established in the
1987 Constitution as part of a system of checks and balance designed to forestall any
potential abuse of an extraordinary power lodged in the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the country's armed forces.
The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, in pertinent part, states:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may
call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report
in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special
session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative
of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
need of a call. (Emphasis ours) ITAaHc
Congressional check on the President's martial law and suspension powers thus
consists of:
First . The power to review the President's proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke such
proclamation or suspension. The review is "automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension
is made." 9 7 The Congress' decision to revoke the proclamation or suspension
cannot be set aside by the President.
Second . The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or
suspension, upon the President's initiative, for such period as it may determine,
if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act
When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or

suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, becomes a
"joint executive and legislative act" or a "collective judgment" between the President and
the Congress:
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.
MR. AZCUNA.
Thank you, Madam President.
I would like to offer an amendment to Section 15, line 7 of page 7. After
the word "or," insert a comma (,) and add the phrase: AT THE INSTANCE
OF THE PRESIDENT, so that the amended portion will read: "may revoke
such proclamation or suspension which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President, or AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT extend the
same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
May we know the reaction of the Committee? The reason for this Madam
President, is that the extension should not merely be an act of Congress
but should be requested by the President. Any extension of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should have the
concurrence of both the President and Congress. Does the Committee
accept my amendment?
MR. REGALADO.
The Committee accepts that amendment because it will, at the same time
solve the concern of Commissioner Suarez, aside from the fact that this
will now be a joint executive and legislative act .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE.
May I just pose a question to the Committee in connection with the Suarez
amendment? Earlier Commissioner Regalado said that that [sic] point was
going to be a collective judgment between the President and the
Congress. Are we departing from that now in favor of giving Congress the
plenipotentiary power to determine the period?
FR. BERNAS.
Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing this in
consultation with the President, and the President would be outvoted by
about 300 Members.
MR. OPLE.
Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective
judgment of that point upon the expiration of the 60 days when, upon his
own initiative, the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
FR. BERNAS.
Yes, the participation of the President is there but by giving the nal
decision to Congress, we are also preserving the idea that the President
may not revoke what Congress has decided upon. 9 8 (Emphasis ours)
At the core of the instant petitions is a challenge to the "joint executive and
legislative act," embodied in the President's December 8, 2017 initiative and in the
latter's Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, which further extended the implementation of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year, from January 1 to December 31, 2018. Petitioners assail not
only the su ciency of the factual basis of this extension, but also the manner in which it
was approved. CHTAIc
The manner in which Congress

deliberated on the President's
request for extension is not subject
to judicial review
Petitioners question the manner that the Congress approved the extension of
martial law in Mindanao and characterized the same as done with undue haste.
Petitioners premised their argument on the fact that the Joint Rules adopted by both
Houses, in regard to the President's request for further extension, provided for an
inordinately short period for interpellation of resource persons and for explanation by
each Member after the voting is concluded.
The assailed provisions refer to Section 7 of Rule V and Section 14 of Rule VIII of
the Rules of the Joint Session of Congress on the Call of the President to Further
Extend the Period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, which provide:
Rule V (CONSIDERATION OF THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT
DATED DECEMBER 9, 2017 CALLING UPON THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO "FURTHER EXTEND THE PROCLAMATION OF
MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO FOR A
PERIOD OF ONE YEAR, FROM 01 JANUARY 2018 TO 31 DECEMBER
2018, OR FOR SUCH OTHER PERIOD OF TIME AS THE CONGRESS MAY
DETERMINE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION)
Section 7. Any Member of the Congress may
interpellate the resource persons for not more than three minutes
excluding the time of the answer of the resource persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule VIII (VOTING ON THE MOTION TO FURTHER EXTEND THE
PERIOD OF THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE
SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS )
Section 14. After the conclusion of voting, the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House shall forthwith announce
the results of the voting. Thereafter, any Member of the Congress
who wishes to explain his/her vote may consume a maximum of
one (1) minute: Provided, that a Member who does not want to
explain may yield his/her allotted time to another Member of the
same House: Provided, further, that any Member of the Congress
shall be allowed a maximum of three (3) minutes.
No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress
the right to promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings, to wit:
Section 16. (3 ) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings , punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A
penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. (Emphasis
ours)
In Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole , 9 9 this constitutionally-
vested authority is recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to each House of
Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference,
except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will
constitute a denial of due process.
This freedom from judicial interference was explained in the 1997 case of Arroyo
v. De Venecia, 1 0 0 wherein the Court declared that:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. 1 0 1
In other words, the Court cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the
absence of any constitutional violation. Petitioners have not shown that the above-
quoted rules of the Joint Session violated any provision or right under the Constitution.
Construing the full discretionary power granted to the Congress in promulgating
its rules, the Court, in the case of Spouses Dela Paz (Ret.) v. Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, et al. 1 0 2 explained that the limitation of this unrestricted power deals
only with the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication. It should be added that
there must be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. 1 0 3 EATCcI
The rules in question do not pertain to quorum, voting or publication.

Furthermore, deliberations on extending martial law certainly cannot be equated to the
consideration of regular or ordinary legislation. The Congress may consider such
matter as urgent as to necessitate swift action, or it may take its time investigating the
factual situation. This Court cannot engage in undue speculation that members of
Congress did not review and study the President's request based on a bare allegation
that the time allotted for deliberation was too short. 1 0 4
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence
and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they may be revoked, modi ed or
waived at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Being merely matters of procedure,
their observance are of no concern to the courts. 1 0 5 Absent a showing of "violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals," the Court will not intrude
into this legislative realm. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the Congress. 1 0 6
Furthermore, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the rules that
governed the Joint Session were in fact adopted, without objection, by both Houses of
Congress on December 13, 2017. 1 0 7 So also, the Transcript of the Plenary
Proceedings of the Joint Session showed that Members of Congress were, upon
request, granted extension of their time to interpellate.
Congress has the power to extend
and determine the period of martial
law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of
at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to
be determined by the Congress , if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any
citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released. (Emphasis ours)
The provision is indisputably silent as to how many times the Congress, upon the
initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. Such silence, however, should not be
construed as a vacuum, aw or de ciency in the provision. While it does not specify the
number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, Section 18, Article VII is
clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend
such proclamation or suspension are that the extension should be upon the President's
initiative; that it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and
the demands of public safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the
sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, but
only for application. 1 0 8 Thus, whenever there is a determination that the invasion or
rebellion persists and public safety requires the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ, the Congress may exercise its authority to grant
such extension as may be requested by the President, even if it be subsequent to the
initial extension. DHITCc
Section 18, Article VII did not also x the period of the extension of the
proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to
decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be "for a
period to be determined by the Congress." If it were the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to limit the extension to sixty (60) days, as petitioners in G.R. No.
235935 theorize, they would not have expressly vested in the Congress the power to x
its duration.
The Court cannot accept said petitioners' argument that the 60-day limit can be
deduced from the following clause in Section 18, Article VII: "the Congress may, in the
same manner , extend such proclamation or suspension." The word "manner" means a
way a thing is done 1 0 9 or a mode of procedure; 1 1 0 it does not refer to a period or
length of time. Thus, the clause should be understood to mean that the Congress must
observe the same manner of voting required for the revocation of the initial
proclamation or suspension, as mentioned in the sentence preceding it, i.e., "voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session."
This is clear from the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
MR. REGALADO. x x x
So I will repeat from line 26: "The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, CONGRESS MAY
extend SUCH PROCLAMATION for a period to be determined by Congress .
. ."
MR. AZCUNA.
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT.
Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.
MR. AZCUNA.
May I suggest the insertion of the words CONGRESS MAY IN THE SAME
MANNER , so as to emphasize that will also be Congress voting
jointly and there would also be a need of at least majority vote of
all its Members for extension.
THE PRESIDENT.
Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO.
Yes, the amendment is accepted it makes the provision clearer. 111
(Emphasis ours)

United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in his book entitled "Reading
the Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts," 1 1 2 succinctly explained the dangers of
construction that departs from the text of a statute, particularly as to the allocation of
powers among the branches of government. He stated:
Some judges, however, refuse to yield the ancient judicial prerogative of
making the law, improvising on the text to produce what they deem socially
desirable results-usually at the behest of an advocate for one party to a dispute.
The judges are also prodded by interpretative theorists who avow that courts are
"better able to discern and articulate basic national ideals than are the people's
politically responsible representatives." On this view, judges are to improvise
"basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the
content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written
Constitution."
To the extent that people give this view any credence, the notion that
judges may (even should) improvise on constitutional and statutory text
enfeebles the democratic polity. As Justice John Marshall Harlan warned in the
1960s, an invitation to judicial lawmaking results inevitably in "a lessening, on
the one hand, of judicial independence and, on the other, of legislative
responsibility, thus polluting the bloodstream of our system of
government ." Why these alarming outcomes? First, when judges fashion law
rather than fairly derive it from governing texts, they subject themselves to
intensi ed political pressures — in the appointment process, in their retention,
and in the arguments made to them. Second, every time a court
constitutionalizes a new sliver of law — as by nding a "new constitutional
right" to do this, that, or the other — that sliver becomes thenceforth untouchable
by the political branches. In the American system, a legislature has no power to
abridge a right that has been authoritatively held to be part of the Constitution —
even if that newfound right does not appear in the text. Over the past 50 years
especially, we have seen the judiciary incrementally take control of larger and
larger swaths of territory that ought to be settled legislatively. cEaSHC
It used to be said that judges do not "make" law — they simply apply it. In
the 20th century, the legal realists convinced everyone that judges do indeed
make law. To the extent that this was true, it was knowledge that the wise
already possessed and the foolish could not be trusted with. It was true, that is,
that judges did not really " nd" the common law but invented it over time. Yet
this notion has been stretched into a belief that judges "make" law through
judicial interpretation of democratically enacted statutes. Consider the following
statement by John P. Dawson, intended to apply to statutory law:
It seems to us inescapable that judges should have a part in
creating law — creating it as they apply it. In deciding the
multifarious disputes that are brought before them, we believe that
judges in any legal system invariably adapt legal doctrines to new
situations and thus give them new content.
Now it is true that in a system such as ours, in which judicial decisions
have a stare decisis effect, a court's application of a statute to a "new situation"
can be said to establish the law applicable to that situation — that is, to
pronounce de nitively whether and how the statute applies to that situation. But
establishing this retail application of the statute is probably not what Dawson
meant by "creating law," "adapting legal doctrines," and "giving them new
content." Yet beyond that retail application, good judges dealing with statutes
do not make law. They do not "give new content" to the statute, but merely apply
the content that has been there all along, awaiting application to myriad factual
scenarios. To say that they "make law" without this necessary quali cation is to
invite the taffy-like stretching of words — or the ignoring of words altogether."
(Emphasis ours)
Even on the assumption that there is a gap in our Constitution anent the
frequency and period of the Congress' extension, and there is a need for this Court to
exercise its power to interpret the law, We undertake the same in such a way as to
re ect the will of the drafters of the Constitution. "While We may not read into the law a
purpose that is not there, We nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
its enactment." 1 1 3 We refer thus to the Constitutional Commission's deliberations on
the matter, viz.:
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you, Madam President. I concur with the proposal of Commissioner
Azcuna but may I suggest that we x a period for the duration of
the extension , because it could very well happen that the initial period
may be shorter than the extended period and it could extend inde nitely.
So if Commissioner Azcuna could put a certain limit to the
extended period , I would certainly appreciate that, Madam President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ.
Thank you Madam President. May we suggest that on line 7,
between the words "same" and "if," we insert the phrase FOR A
PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN SIXTY DAYS, which would equal the
initial period for the first declaration just so it will keep going.
THE PRESIDENT.
What does the Committee say?
MR. REGALADO.
May we request a clari cation from Commissioner Suarez on this
proposed amendment? This extension is already a joint act upon the
initiative of the President and with the concurrence of the Congress. It is
assumed that they have already agreed not only on the fact of extension
but on the period of extension. If we put it at 60 days only, then
thereafter, they have to meet again to agree jointly on a further
extension.
MR. SUAREZ.
That is precisely intended to safeguard the interests and protect the lives
of citizens.
MR. REGALADO.
In the rst situation where the President declares martial law, there had to
be a prescribed period because there was no initial concurrence
requirement. And if there was no concurrence, the martial law period ends
at 60 days. Thereafter, if they intend to extend the same suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the proclamation of martial law, it is upon the
initiative of the President this time, and with the prior concurrence of
Congress. So, the period of extension has already been taken into
account by both the Executive and the Legislative, unlike the rst
situation where the President acted alone without prior
concurrence. The reason for the limitation in the rst does not
apply to the extension.
MR. SUAREZ.
We are afraid of a situation that may develop where the extended period
would be even longer than the initial period, Madam President. It is only
reasonable to suggest that we have to put a restriction on the matter of the
exercise of this right within a reasonable period. CTIEac
MR. REGALADO.
Madam President, following that is the clause "extend the same if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it." That by
itself suggests a period within which the suspension shall be extended, if
the invasion is still going on. But there is already the cut-off 60-day period.
Do they have to meet all over again and agree to extend the same?
MR. SUAREZ.
That is correct. I think the two of them must have to agree on the period;
but it is theoretically possible that when the President writes a note to the
Congress, because it would be at the instance of the President that the
extension would have to be granted by Congress, it is possible that the
period for the extension may be there. It is also possible that it may not be
there. That is the reason why we want to make it clear that there must by a
reasonable period for the extension. So, if my suggestion is not acceptable
to the Committee, may I request that a voting be held on it Madam
President.
FR. BERNAS.
Madam President, may I just propose something because I see the
problem. Suppose we were to say: "or extend the same FOR A PERIOD
TO BE DETERMINED BY CONGRESS" — that gives Congress a little
flexibility on just how long the extension should be.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDENT.
Is that accepted by Commissioner Suarez?
MR. SUAREZ.
Yes, Madam President.
MR. OPLE.
amendment? Earlier Commissioner Regalado said that that point was
going to be a collective judgment between the President and the Congress.
Are we departing from that now in favor of giving Congress the
FR. BERNAS.
Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing this in
consultation with the President, and the President would be outvoted by
300 Members.
MR. OPLE.
Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective judgment of
that point upon the expiration of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative,
the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ.
FR. BERNAS.
Yes, the participation of the President, is that when we put all of these
encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief during an actual
invasion and rebellion, given an intractable Congress that may be
dominated by opposition parties, we may be actually impelling the
President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the Gordian knot by just
declaring a revolutionary government that sets him free to deal with the
invasion or the insurrection. That is the reason I am in favor of the present
formulation. However, if Commissioner Suarez insists on his amendment, I
do not think I will stand in the way.
MR. SUAREZ.
We will accept the committee suggestion, subject to style later on.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA.
According to Commissioner Concepcion, our former Chief Justice, the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is essentially an executive act. If that be so, and especially
under the following clause: "if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it," I do not see why the period must be determined
by the Congress. We are turning a purely executive act to a legislative act.
SaCIDT
FR. BERNAS.
I would believe what the former Chief Justice said about the initiation
being essentially an executive act, but what follows after the initiation is
something that is participated in by Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION.
If I may add a word. The one who will do the ghting is the executive but,
of course, it is expected that if the Congress wants to extend, it will extend
for the duration of the ghting. If the ghting goes on, I do not think it is
fair to assume that the Congress will refuse to extend the period, especially
since in this matter the Congress must act at the instance of the executive.
He is the one who is supposed to know how long it will take him to ght.
Congress may reduce it, but that is without prejudice to his
asking for another extension, if necessary. 1 1 4 (Emphasis ours)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez's proposal to limit the extension to 60 days was
not adopted by the majority of the Commission's members. The framers evidently gave
enough exibility on the part of the Congress to determine the duration of the
extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article VII and the records of the
deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the view that as regards the
frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as "the
invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires" such extension.
The President and the Congress had
sufficient factual basis to extend
Proclamation No. 216
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases for the
extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion persists; and (b) public safety
requires the extension.
A. Rebellion persists
Rebellion, as applied to the exercise of the President's martial law and

suspension powers, is as defined under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, 1 1 5 viz.:
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of
rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against
the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,
of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
Rebellion thus exists when "(1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms
against the Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a)
to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives." 1 1 6
The President issued Proclamation No. 216 in response to the series of attacks
launched by the Maute Group and other rebel groups in Marawi City. The President
reported to the Congress that these groups had publicly taken up arms for the purpose
of removing Mindanao from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and
establishing a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or province in Mindanao.
In Lagman, 1 1 7 the Court sustained the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216,
holding that the President had probable cause to believe that actual rebellion exists and
public safety required the Proclamation. The Court held:
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that
the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had su cient factual bases
tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's conclusion, that
there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its
territory and the deprivation of the President from performing his powers and
prerogatives, was reached after a tactical consideration of the facts. In ne, the
President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof.
After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of
probable cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x xcHECAS
On July 22, 2017, upon the President's initiative, Congress extended

Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
The ensuing question, therefore, is whether the rebellion persists as to satisfy the
rst condition for the extension of martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
The word "persist" means "to continue to exist," "to go on resolutely or stubbornly
in spite of opposition, importunity or warning," or to "carry on." 1 1 8 It is the opposite of
the words "cease," "discontinue," "end," "expire," "finish," "quit," "stop" and "terminate." 1 1 9
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate
that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist
and its "remnants" have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in
Mindanao, carrying on through the recruitment and training of new members, nancial
and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces and continued attacks. Thus, in his
December 8, 2017 letter to Congress, the President stated:
First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants
of their Groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the
recruitment and training of new members and ghters to carry on the rebellion.
You will please note that at least one hundred eighty- ve (185) persons listed in
the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at-large and, in all probability, are
presently regrouping and consolidating their forces.
More speci cally, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and
their allies, together with their protectors, supporters and sympathizers, have
been monitored in their continued efforts towards radicalization/recruitment,
nancial and logistical build-up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization
in Central Mindanao, particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao and North
Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan. These activities are geared towards
the conduct of intensi ed atrocities and armed public uprisings in
support of their objective of establishing the foundation of a global
Islamic caliphate and of a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also
in the whole of Southeast Asia.
xxx xxx xxx
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security concern.
Reports indicate that this year they have conducted at least forty-three (43) acts
of terrorism, including attacks using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),
harassments, and kidnappings which have resulted in the killing of eight (8)
civilians, three (3) of whom were mercilessly beheaded. 1 2 0 (Emphasis ours)
In recommending the one-year extension of Proclamation No. 216 to the
President, AFP General Guerrero cited, among others, the continued armed resistance
of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies, thus:
1. The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly
offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western and Eastern
Mindanao in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of
their forces in Marawi City; 1 2 1 (Emphasis ours)
The data presented by the AFP during the oral arguments bolstered the
President's cause for extension and clari ed what the government remains up against
in the aftermath of the Marawi crisis. According to the AFP:
The Dawlah Islamiyah is the Daesh-a liate organization in the
Philippines responsible for the Marawi Siege. It is comprised of several local
terrorist groups that pledged allegiance to Daesh leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi.
xxx xxx xxx
After the successful Marawi Operation, the Basilan-based ASG is left with
74 members; the Maute Group with 30 members; the Maguid Group has 11 ;
and the Turaifie Group has 22 members with a total of 166 firearms.
However, manpower increased by more or less 400 , with almost the
same strength that initially stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and
decentralized recruitment of the Daesh-inspired groups at their respective areas
of concentration.
ASG Basilan-based recruited more or less 43 new members in Basilan;
more or less 250 by the Maute Group in the Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid
Group in Sarangani and Sultan Kudarat, and more or less 70 by the Turai e
Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were motivated by
clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities; revenge for their
killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; nancial gain as new
recruits were given an amount ranging from PhP15,000.00 to 50,000.00 ; and,
as radicalized converts. AHDacC
These newly recruited members are undergoing trainings in tactics,

marksmanships and bombing operations at the different areas of Mount
Cararao Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high
potentials [sic] were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations.
Furthermore, the situation has become complicated with the in ux of
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), capitalizing on the porous maritime
boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and business men.
As of this period, 48 FTFs were monitored joining the Daesh-inspired groups,
particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and Turai e Group in Central Mindanao.
The closeness of these two groups is predominant with @Abu DAR who has
historically established link with Turaifie .
On Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents, these have increased to
100% for the 2nd Semester. 1 2 2 (Emphasis ours)
The AFP's data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now acting
as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah. 1 2 3
These accounts ineluctably show that the rebellion that spawned the Marawi
crisis persists, and that its remaining members have regrouped, substantially increased
in number, and are no less determined to turn Mindanao into a DAESH/ISIS territory.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 235935 argue that "remnants" or a residue of a rebel group
cannot possibly mount a rebellion. The argument, however, fails to take into account
the 185 persons identi ed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders who are still at large; the
400 new members whom said remnants were able to recruit; the in ux of 48 FTFs who
are training the new recruits in their ways of terrorism; and the nancial and logistical
build-up which the group is currently undertaking with their sympathizers and
protectors. It likewise fails to consider that the new Dawlah Islamiyah members
number nearly the same as the group that initially stormed Marawi City, and while the
government succeeded in vanquishing 1,010 rebels following the siege, 1 2 4 it took
several months to accomplish this even under martial law. Thus, it will be imprudent nay
reckless to downplay or dismiss the capacity of said remnants to relentlessly pursue
their objective of establishing a seat of DAESH/ISIS power in Mindanao.
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236155 have asserted that the rebellion no
longer persists as the President himself had announced the liberation of Marawi City,
and armed combat has ceased therein. Petitioners in G.R. No. 236061 added that Col.
Romeo Brawner, Deputy Commander of the Joint Task Force Ranao, was also quoted
as saying that the Maute-ISIS problem was about to be over. The statements, however,
were admittedly made on October 17, 2017, 1 2 5 nearly two months before the
President's request for extension in December 2017. Such declaration does not
preclude the occurrence of supervening events as the AFP discovered through their
monitoring 1 2 6 efforts. It is not inconceivable that remnants of the Dawlah Islamiyah
would indeed regroup, recruit new members and build up its arsenal during the
intervening period. The termination of a rebellion is a matter of fact. Rebellion does not
cease to exist by estoppel on account of the President's or the AFP's previous
pronouncements. Furthermore, it is settled that rebellion is in the nature of a continuing
crime. 1 2 7 Thus, members of the Dawlah Islamiyah who evaded capture did not cease
to be rebels.
So also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the
DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana, during the
Congress' Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that while the situation in
Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has not ceased but simply moved to
other places in Mindanao, thus:
Senator Drilon. Meaning, the question that we raised, Mr. President, are
the declarations of the President, His Excellency, and the secretary of national
defense changed since the time that the situation was described on October 23
of this year? Has the situation changed or is it the same situation today that the
Marawi City has been liberated from terrorists [sic] in uence that there has been
a termination of combat operations in Marawi City?
Hon. Lorenzana. May I answer that, Mr. President. Mr. President, the
situation in Marawi has substantially changed from the time that our troops
were ghting the ISIS-inspired Maute Group and that's the reason why there is
now this post-con ict need assessment as being conducted in Marawi.
However, as situations developed later on, the ISIS-inspired other groups in
Mindanao are also active like the BIFF in Central Mindanao and also in some
other parts of the BaSulTa islands.
Now, the reports now, Mr. President, is that they are actively recruiting
again , recruiting actively, recruiting some of the Muslim youths in the area and
that is what we are saying that the rebellion has not stopped. It just
moved to another place.
xxx xxx xxx
Representative Tinio. x x x
Mr. Speaker, hindi po ba sinabi ni Presidente sa kanyang sulat that the
AFP has achieved remarkable progress in putting the rebellion under control at
hindi po ba sinabi ni Executive Secretary na substantially neutralized na raw
and Maute-Daesh? Pwede po bang ipaliwanag ito ng mga resource persons?
The Speaker. The panel may respond.
Hon. Lorenzana. Mr. President, ang sagot po doon sa G. Congressman
ay ganito — ang sinasabi po naming substantially reduced na iyong strength or
clear na iyong Marawi of any terrorists ay Marawi lang po iyon . It does not
include the whole of, the other parts of Mindanao that are also subject
to the influence of these terroristic groups. Sabi nga ng Supreme Court ay,
ang nangyayari sa Marawi ay nag-spill over na rin sa ibang lugar doon sa
Mindanao kaya nga sinustain nila iyong declaration ng Martial Law. IDSEAH
xxx xxx xxx 1 2 8 (Emphasis ours)

I n Lagman, We recognized that "rebellion is not con ned within predetermined
bounds," and "for the crime of rebellion to be consummated, it is not required that all
armed participants should congregate in one place x x x and publicly rise in arms
against the government for the attainment of their culpable purpose." We held that the
grounds on which the armed public uprising actually took place should not be the
measure of the extent, scope or range of the actual rebellion when there are other
rebels positioned elsewhere, whose participation did not necessarily involve the
publicity aspect of rebellion, as they may also be considered as engaged in the crime of
rebellion.
In a similar vein, the termination of armed combat in Marawi does not
conclusively indicate that the rebellion has ceased to exist. It will be a tenuous
proposition to con ne rebellion simply to a resounding clash of arms with government
forces. As noted in Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile , 1 2 9 modern day rebellion has other facets than
just the taking up of arms, including nancing, recruitment and propaganda, that may
not necessarily be found or occurring in the place of the armed conflict, thus:
x x x The argument that while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in
Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated pockets in Luzon,
and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country,
ignores the sophisticated nature and rami cations of rebellion in a modern
setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and
identi able groups on elds of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the
most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is
no actual ghting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or
rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological
adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fth-column
activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion
which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. x x x. 1 3 0
Furthermore, as We explained in Lagman, "(t)he crime of rebellion consists of
many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots."
Thus:
Acts committed in furtherance of rebellion[,] though crimes in themselves[,] are
deemed absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. Rebellion absorbs "other acts
committed in its pursuance." Direct assault, murder, homicide, arson, robbery,
kidnapping just to name a few, are absorbed in the crime of rebellion if
committed in furtherance of rebellion; "[i]t cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge." Jurisprudence also teaches that not only common crimes may be
absorbed in rebellion but also "offenses under special laws [such as Presidential
Decree No. 1829] which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense."
"All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are
mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become
absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves." (Citations omitted)
In any case, Secretary Lorenzana has stressed that notwithstanding the
termination of armed combat in Marawi, clashes between the rebels and government
forces continue to take place in other parts of Mindanao. Thus, during an interpellation
at the December 13, 2017 Joint Session in Congress, he stated:
Senator Pangilinan. x x x
It would have been a very different situation altogether if the ghting was
still ongoing. If there is still that siege, then we can see that the situation is
extreme and therefore, we can proceed with an extension.
xxx xxx xxx
Hon. Lorenzana. Mr. President, may I reply to the good senator.
Sir, maybe your perception here is not as bad as what is
happening on the ground, but the troops report otherwise.
You know, wala na sigurong bakbakan diyan sa Marawi, but
there are still clashes almost everyday in other parts of Mindanao. The
clash with the BIFF in Central Mindanao continues almost everyday. Iyong mga
engkwentro din sa mga ibang lugar sa Eastern Mindanao with the CPP-NPA ay
nandoon pa rin. Basilan, Jolo ay ongoing pa rin iyan.
xxx xxx xxx 1 3 1 (Emphasis ours)
During the oral arguments, AFP General Guerrero also con rmed that there were
actually armed encounters with the remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired DIWM. 1 3 2
Accordingly, it would be error to conclude that the rebellion ceased to exist upon
the termination of hostilities in Marawi.
Other rebel groups
The extension has also been challenged on the ground that it did not refer to the
same rebellion under Proclamation No. 216.
It is true that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), the Turai e
Group and the New People's Army (NPA) were not expressly mentioned either in
Proclamation No. 216 or in the President's Report to Congress after he issued the
Proclamation. However, in Lagman, the government clearly identi ed the BIFF, based in
the Liguasan Marsh, Maguindanao, as one of the four ISIS-linked rebel groups that had
formed an alliance for the uni ed mission of establishing an ISIS territory in Mindanao,
led by ASG-Basilan leader, Isnilon Hapilon, who had been appointed emir of all ISIS
forces in the Philippines. The other three rebel groups were the ASG from Basilan,
Ansarul Khilafah Philippines (AKP), also known as the Maguid Group, from Sarangani
and Sultan Kudarat, and the Maute Group from Lanao del Sur. aCIHcD
Furthermore, while it named only the Maute Group and the ASG, the President's
Report made express reference to "lawless armed groups" as perpetrators of the
Marawi siege resolved to unseat the duly-constituted government and make Mindanao
a DAESH/ISIS province. The Report also indicated, as additional reasons for the
Proclamation, the "extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with foreign and
local armed groups" and the "network and alliance-building activities among terrorist
groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men" in Mindanao. 1 3 3 Thus, though not
speci cally identi ed in the Proclamation or the President's Report, the BIFF and the
Turaifie Group are deemed to have been similarly alluded to.
Indeed, absolute precision cannot be expected from the President who would
have to act quickly given the urgency of the situation. Under the circumstances, the
actual rebellion and attack, more than the exact identity of all its perpetrators, would be
his utmost concern. The following pronouncement in Lagman, thus, finds relevance:
Neither should the Court expect absolute correctness of the facts stated in the
proclamation and in the written Report as the President could not be expected to
verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts reported to him due to the urgency
of the situation. To require precision in the President's appreciation of facts
would unduly burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-
making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the President to be on
the ground to con rm the correctness of the reports submitted to him within a
period that only the circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate. Such a
scenario, of course, would not only place the President in peril but would also
defeat the very purpose of the grant of emergency powers upon him, that is, to
borrow the words of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in Fortun, to "immediately put an
end to the root cause of the emergency." Possibly, by the time the President is
satis ed with the correctness of the facts in his possession, it would be too late
in the day as the invasion or rebellion could have already escalated to a level
that is hard, if not impossible, to curtail.
In the same vein, to require the President to render a meticulous and
comprehensive account in his Proclamation or Report will be most tedious and will
unduly encumber his efforts to immediately quell the rebellion.
The efforts of the Turai e Group and its allies 1 3 4 in the ISIS-inspired 1 3 5 BIFF to
wrest control of Mindanao continued even as the government was able to put the
Marawi crisis under control.
In his December 8, 2017 letter to the Congress, the President stated:
Second, the Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to
conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area. Turai e is said to be
Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines and
the Southeast Asia. 1 3 6
Furthermore, as the AFP reported during the oral arguments, the BIFF "continues
to in ict violence and sow terror in central Mindanao," and as one of the AFP's primary
targets for disbandment, "the group will likely continue its hostile operations in a bid to
retaliate, fight for its relevance and demonstrate its resiliency." 1 3 7
The AFP has likewise con rmed that the Turai e Group is one of several terrorist
groups responsible for the Marawi siege, and that it has so far successfully recruited
70 new members in its unwavering pursuit of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat in Mindanao.
The Court, thus, nds that the government has su ciently established the
persistence of the DAESH/ISIS rebellion.
The inclusion of the rebellion of the New People's Army (NPA) as basis for the
further extension of martial law in Mindanao will not render it void. Undeniably, the NPA
aims to establish communist rule in the country while the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebels
intend to make Mindanao the seat of ISIS power in Southeast Asia. It is obvious,
however, that even as they differ in ideology, they have the shared purpose of
overthrowing the duly constituted government. The violence the NPA has continued to
commit in Mindanao, as revealed by the Executive, hardly distinguish its rebels from the
architects of the Marawi siege. Both have needlessly and violently caused the death of
military forces and civilians, and the destruction of public and private property alike.
Thus, in his request for the further extension of Proclamation No. 216, the President
informed the Congress that:
Last, but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied
with addressing the challenges posed by the DAESH-inspired DIWM and other
Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NPA) took advantage of
the situation and intensi ed their decades-long rebellion against the
government and stepped up terrorist attacks against innocent civilians and
private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public
government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through
violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of
government with Communist rule.
This year, the NPA has perpetrated a total of at least three hundred eight-
ve (385) atrocities (both terrorism and guerilla warfare) in Mindanao, which
resulted in forty-one (41) Killed-in-Action and sixty-two (62) Wounded-in-Action
(WIA) on the part of government forces. On the part of the civilians, these
atrocities resulted in the killing of twenty-three (23) and the wounding of six (6)
persons. The most recent was the ambush in Talakag, Bukidnon on 09
November 2017, resulting in the killing of one (1) PNP personnel and the
wounding of three (3) others, as well as the killing of a four (4)-month-old infant
and the wounding of two (2) civilians. cHaCAS
Apart from these, at least fty-nine (59) arson incidents have been
carried out by the NPA in Mindanao this year, targeting businesses and private
establishments and destroying an estimated P2.2 billion-worth of properties. Of
these, the most signi cant were the attack on Lapanday Food Corporation in
Davao City on 09 April 2017 and the burning of facilities and equipment of Mil-
Oro Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental on 06
May 2017, which resulted in the destruction of properties valued at P1.85 billion
and P109 million, respectively. 1 3 8 (Emphasis ours)
Given the scale of the attacks perpetrated by the communist rebels, it is far from
unreasonable for the President to include their rebellion in his request for the further
extension of martial law in Mindanao. The NPA's "intensi ed" insurgence clearly bears a
signi cant impact on the security of Mindanao and the safety of its people, which were
the very reasons for the martial law proclamation and its initial extension.
It will also be noted that when Proclamation No. 216 was issued, the Government
and the NPA were undergoing peace negotiations. Thus, the President could not have
included the NPA's rebellion in the Proclamation even granting he had cause to do so.
The O ce of the Solicitor General declared during the oral arguments that because of
the peace negotiations, the NPA was "not explicitly included" as a matter of comity. 1 3 9
The Executive's data showed that despite the peace talks, the NPA continued its
hostilities and intensi ed its tactical offensives, prompting the President to terminate
the peace negotiations on November 23, 2017. In his December 8, 2017 letter to
Congress, the President wrote:
As a direct result of these atrocities on the part of the NPA, I was
constrained to issue Proclamation No. 360 on 23 November 2017 declaring the
termination of peace negotiations with the National Democratic Front-
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (NDF-CPP-NPA)
effective immediately. I followed this up with Proclamation No. 374 on 05
December 2017, where I declared the CPP-NPA as a designated/identi ed
terrorist organization under the Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act of 2012, and the issuance of a directive to the Secretary of
Justice to le a petition in the appropriate court praying to proscribe the NDF-
CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization under the Human Security Act of 2007. 1 4 0
It is readily apparent that the inclusion of the NPA's rebellion in the President's
request for extension was precipitated by these turn of events, as well as the
magnitude of the atrocities attributed to the communist rebels. It would make no sense
to exclude or separate the communist rebellion from the continued operation of martial
law in Mindanao when it also persists in the same region. Thus, the Court nds that the
President's decision to add the NPA's "intensi ed" insurgence to the DAESH/ISIS
rebellion, as further basis to request for the extension, was not uncalled for.
In any event, seeking the concurrence of the Congress to use martial law to quell
the NPA's rebellion, instead of issuing a new martial law proclamation for the same
purpose, appears to be more in keeping with the Constitution's aim of preventing the
concentration of the martial law power in the President. The extension granted by the
Congress upon the President's request has become a joint action or a "collective
judgment" 1 4 1 between the Executive and the Legislature, thereby satisfying one of the
fundamental safeguards established under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
B. Public safety requires the extension
In Lagman, the Court defined "public safety" as follows:

Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of
martial law, "involves the prevention of and protection from events that could
endanger the safety of the general public from signi cant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters. " Public safety is an
abstract term; it does not take any physical form. Plainly, its range, extent or
scope could not be physically measured by metes and bounds. (Emphasis ours)
The question, therefore, is whether the acts, circumstances and events upon
which the extension was based posed a signi cant danger, injury or harm to the general
public. The Court answers in the affirmative.
The following events and circumstances, as disclosed by the President, the
Defense Secretary and the AFP, strongly indicate that the continued implementation of
martial law in Mindanao is necessary to protect public safety:
(a) No less than 185 persons in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained
at large. Remnants of the Hapilon and Maute groups have been monitored by the AFP
to be reorganizing and consolidating their forces in Central Mindanao, particularly in
Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and Basilan, and strengthening their nancial and
logistical capability. 1 4 2
(b) After the military operation in Marawi City, the Basilan-based ASG, the
Maute Group, the Maguid Group and the Turai e Group, comprising the DAESH-a liate
Dawlah Islamiyah that was responsible for the Marawi siege, was left with 137
members and a total of 166 rearms. These rebels, however, were able to recruit 400
new members, more or less, in Basilan, the Lanao Provinces, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat
and Maguindanao. 1 4 3
(c) The new recruits have since been trained in marksmanship, bombing and
tactics in different areas in Lanao del Sur. Recruits with great potential are trained in
producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and urban operations. These new
members are motivated by their clannish culture, being relatives of terrorists, by
revenge for relatives who perished in the Marawi operations, by money as they are paid
P15,000.00 to P50,000.00, and by radical ideology. 1 4 4
(d) 48 FTFs have joined said rebel groups and are acting as instructors to the
recruits. 1 4 5 Foreign terrorists from Southeast Asian countries, particularly from
Indonesia and Malaysia, will continue to take advantage of the porous borders of the
Philippines and enter the country illegally to join the remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-
inspired rebel groups. 1 4 6
(e) In November 2017, 15 Indonesian and Malaysian DAESH-inspired FTFs
entered Southern Philippines to augment the remnants of the Maguid group in
Sarangani province. In December 2017, 16 Indonesian DAESH-inspired FTFs entered
the Southern Philippines to augment the ASG-Basilan and Maute groups in the Lanao
province. In January 2018, an unidenti ed Egyptian DAESH gure was monitored in the
Philippines. 1 4 7
(f) At least 32 FTFs were killed in the Marawi operations. 1 4 8 Other FTFs
attempted to enter the main battle area in Marawi, but failed because of checkpoints
set up by government forces. 1 4 9DACcIH
(g) "The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and their allies continue to visibly
offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western and Eastern Mindanao in spite
of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in Marawi City."
1 5 0 There were actually armed encounters with the remnants of said groups. 1 5 1
(h) "Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the BIFF,
AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities
and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including the cities of
Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and Cotabato." 1 5 2
(i) The Turai e group conducts roadside bombings and attacks against
government forces, civilians and populated areas in Mindanao. 1 5 3 The group plans to
set off bombings in Cotabato. 1 5 4
(j) The Maute Group, along with foreign terrorists, were reported to be
planning to bomb the cities of Zamboanga, Iligan, Cagayan de Oro and Davao. 1 5 5
(k) The remaining members of the ASG-Basilan have initiated ve violent
attacks that killed two civilians. 1 5 6
(l) In 2017, the remnants of the ASG in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and
Zamboanga Peninsula, conducted 43 acts of violence, including IED attacks and
kidnapping which resulted in the killing of eight innocent civilians, three of whom were
mercilessly beheaded. 1 5 7 Nine kidnap victims are still held in captivity. 1 5 8
(m) Hapilon's death fast-tracked the uni cation of the Sulu and Basilan-
based ASG to achieve the common goal of establishing a DAESH-ISIS wilayat in
Mindanao. This likely merger may spawn retaliatory attacks such as IED bombings, in
urban areas, particularly in the cities of Zamboanga, Isabela and Lamitan. 1 5 9
(n) By AFP's assessment, the ISIS' regional leadership may remain in the
Southern Philippines and with the defeat of ISIS in many parts of Syria and Iraq, some
hardened ghters from the ASEAN may return to this region to continue their ght. The
AFP also identi ed four potential leaders who may replace Hapilon as emir or leader of
the ISIS forces in the Philippines. It warned that the Dawlah Islamiyah will attempt to
replicate the Marawi siege in other cities of Mindanao and may conduct terrorist
attacks in Metro Manila and Davao City as the seat of power of the Philippine
Government. With the spotlight on terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Southeast
Asia following the Marawi siege, the AFP likewise indicated that the in ux of FTFs in the
Southern Philippines will persist. The AFP further referred to possible lone-wolf attacks
and atrocities from other DAESH-inspired rebel groups in vulnerable cities like Cagayan
de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan and Zamboanga. 1 6 0
The rising number of these rebel groups, their training in and predilection to
terrorism, and their resoluteness in wresting control of Mindanao from the government,
pose a serious danger to Mindanao. The country had been witness to these groups'
capacity and resolve to engage in combat with the government forces, resulting in
severe casualties among both soldiers and civilians, the displacement of thousands of
Marawi residents, and considerable damage to their City. In a short period after the
Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have managed to increase their
number by 400, almost the same strength as the group that initially stormed Marawi.
Their current number is now more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which had taken
the AFP ve months to neutralize. To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these
rebel groups before We consider them a signi cant threat to public safety is neither
sound nor prudent.
(o) Furthermore, in 2017 alone, the BIFF initiated 116 hostile acts in North
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao, consisting of ambuscade, ring, arson, IED
attacks and grenade explosions. 66 of these violent incidents were committed during
the martial law period and by the AFP's assessment, the group will continue to in ict
violence and sow terror in central Mindanao. 1 6 1
(p) In 2017, the ASG, which is the predominant local terrorist group in the
Southern Philippines based in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga, with its 519
members, 503 rearms, 66 controlled barangays and 345 watch-listed personalities,
had perpetrated a total of 13 acts of kidnapping against 37 individuals, 11 of whom
(including 7 foreigners) remain in captivity. Their kidnap-for-ransom activities for last
year alone have amassed a total of P61.2 million. 1 6 2
(q) Mindanao remains the hotbed of communist rebellion considering that
47% of its manpower, 48% of its rearms, 51% of its controlled barangays and 45% of
its guerrilla fronts are in this region. 1 6 3 Of the 14 provinces with active communist
insurgency, 10 are in Mindanao. Furthermore, the communist rebels' Komisyon
Mindanao (KOMMID) is now capable of sending augmentation forces, particularly
"Party Cadres," in Northern Luzon. 1 6 4
(r) The hostilities initiated by the communist rebels have risen by 65% from
2016 to 2017 despite the peace talks. 1 6 5 In 2017 alone, they perpetrated 422
atrocities in Mindanao, including ambush, raids, attacks, kidnapping, robbery, bombing,
liquidation, landmine/IED attacks, arson and sabotage, that resulted in the death of 47
government forces and 31 civilians. 1 6 6 An ambush in Bukidnon in November 2017
killed one PNP personnel, two civilians and a four-month old baby. 59 incidents of arson
committed by the Communist rebels against business establishments in Mindanao last
year alone destroyed P2.378 billion worth of properties. Moreover, the amount they
extorted from private individuals and business establishments from 2015 to the rst
semester of 2017 has been estimated at P2.6 billion. 1 6 7HSCATc
(s) Among the most significant attacks by the communist rebels on business
establishments took place in April and May 2017 when they burned the facilities of
Lapanday Food Corporation in Davao City and those of Mil-Oro Mining and Frasec
Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental, which resulted in losses amounting
to P1.85 billion and P109 million, respectively. According to the AFP, business
establishments in the area may be forced to shut down due to persistent NPA attacks
just like in Surigao del Sur. 1 6 8
(t) By AFP's calculation, the aforesaid rebel groups (excluding the 400 newly
recruited members of the Dawlah Islamiyah) are nearly 2,781-men strong, equipped
with 3,211 firearms and control 537 barangays in Mindanao.
The magnitude of the atrocities already perpetrated by these rebel groups
reveals their capacity to continue in icting serious harm and injury, both to life and
property. The sinister plans of attack, as uncovered by the AFP, con rm this real and
imminent threat. The manpower and armaments these groups possess, the continued
radicalization and recruitment of new rebels, the nancial and logistical build-up cited
by the President, and more importantly, the groups' manifest determination to
overthrow the government through force, violence and terrorism, present a signi cant
danger to public safety.
In Lagman, the Court recognized that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, has
possession of intelligence reports, classi ed documents and other vital information
which he can rely on to properly assess the actual conditions on the ground, thus:
It is beyond cavil that the President can rely on intelligence reports and
classi ed documents. "It is for the President as [C]ommander-in-[C]hief of the
Armed Forces to appraise these [classi ed evidence or documents/]reports and
be satis ed that the public safety demands the suspension of the writ."
Signi cantly, respect to these so-called classi ed documents is accorded even
"when [the] authors of or witnesses to these documents may not be revealed."
In ne, not only does the President have a wide array of information
before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital,
relevant, and con dential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces.
As his December 8, 2017 letter to the Congress would show, the President's
request for further extension had been based on the security assessment of the AFP
and the PNP. Notably, the President also acknowledged that the grounds or "essential
facts" cited in his letter were of his "personal knowledge" as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces. The President's request to Congress also referred to the monitoring
activities that led to the Executive's ndings, which the AFP con rmed during the
January 17, 2018 oral argument.
According to Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, the President made his
request to the Congress after "a careful personal evaluation" of the reports from the
Martial Law Administrator, Martial Law Implementor, the PNP, the National Security
Adviser and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA), as well as
information gathered from local government officials and residents of Mindanao. 1 6 9
On December 12, 2017, the AFP separately gave the Senate and the House of
Representatives a brie ng on the Executive Department's basis for requesting the
further extension of Proclamation No. 216. 1 7 0
At the Joint Session, of the Congress held on December 13, 2017 Executive
Secretary Salvador Medialdea, Defense Secretary Del n Lorenzana, AFP General
Guerrero, PNP Chief Ronald Dela Rosa, the head of the NICA, the National Security
Adviser, as well as the Secretaries of the Department of Justice, the Department of
Public Works and Highways, Department of Labor and Employment, Transportation and
Communication, and the Chairman of the Task Force Bangon Marawi, were present and
sworn in as resource persons. 1 7 1 Secretary Medialdea highlighted to the Congress the
reasons cited by the President in his request, and during the course of the session, he,
Secretary Lorenzana, AFP General Guerrero and Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
Menardo Guevarra responded to interpellations from a number of Senators and
Representatives on the propriety and necessity of further extending martial law in
Mindanao.
The Joint Session also provided an occasion for the Representative from the
Second District of Lanao del Sur to con rm the recruitment activities of the "remnants"
of the Maute and Hapilon groups, thus:
Representative Papandayan . x x x
Kami po sa Lanao del Sur, ako ay umuwi last week, aking kinausap ang
aking mga barangay at mga barangay chairman sa aming distrito. Pinahanap
ko kung mayroon pang natitirang remnants o mga kasamahan ng Maute at
saka Hapilon. Ang mga barangay chairman po ay nag-report sa akin na
mayroon po at sila po ay nagre-recruit ngayon, na nag-aalok din sila ng pera sa
mga nare-recruit nila. 1 7 2
Following its deliberation on the request for further extension, the Congress, in
joint session, resolved to further extend Proclamation No. 216 for one year, with 240
members voting for, and 27 against, 1 7 3 the President's initiative. In approving the
extension, Congress agreed with the factual considerations of the Executive, as can be
gleamed from the 4th and 6th Whereas clauses of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
The information upon which the extension of martial law or of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based principally emanate from and
are in the possession of the Executive Department. Thus, "the Court will have to rely on
the fact- nding capabilities of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment; in turn, the Executive
Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court." 1 7 4 IDTSEH
The Executive Department did open its ndings to the Court when the AFP gave
its "brie ng" or "presentation" during the oral arguments, presenting data, which had
been vetted by the NICA, "based on intelligence reports gathered on the ground," from
personalities they were able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassi ed
o cial documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. 1 7 5 According to the AFP, the
same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. 1 7 6 As it stands, the
information thus presented has not been challenged or questioned as regards its
reliability.
The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply
establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is signi cantly
endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists su cient factual basis for the
further extension sought by the President and approved by the Congress in its
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
Necessarily, We do not see the merit to the petitioners' theory in the Cullamat
petition that the extent of threat to public safety as would justify the declaration or
extension of the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ must be of such level that the government cannot su ciently govern, nor assure
public safety or deliver government services. Petitioners posit that only in this scenario
may martial law be constitutionally permissible.
Restrained caution must be exercised in adopting petitioners' theory for several
reasons. To begin with, a hasty adoption of the suggested scale, level or extent of
threat to public safety is to supplant into the plain text of the Constitution. An
interpretation of the Constitution precedes from the fundamental postulate that the
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and
to which all persons, including the highest o cials of the land, must defer. 1 7 7 The
consequent duty of the judiciary then is to determine con icting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the
rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. 1 7 8 This must be so
considering that the Constitution is the mother of all laws, su cient and complete in
itself. For the Court to categorically pronounce which kind of threat to public safety
justi es the declaration or extension of martial law and which ones do not, is to
improvise on the text of the Constitution ideals even when these ideals are not
expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution. 1 7 9 Such judicial
improvisation finds no justification.
For another, if the Court were to be successful in disposing of its bounden duty
to allocate constitutional boundaries, the Constitutional doctrines the Court produces
must necessarily remain steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. 1 8 0 The
adoption of the extreme scenario as the measure of threat to public safety as
suggested by petitioners is to invite doubt as to whether the proclamation of martial
law would be at all effective in such case considering that enemies of the State raise
unconventional methods which change over time. It may happen that by the time
government loses all capability to dispose of its functions, the enemies of the
government might have already been successful in removing allegiance therefrom. Any
declaration then of martial law would be of no useful purpose and such could not be the
intent of the Constitution. Instead, the requirement of public safety as it presently
appears in the Constitution admits of exibility and discretion on the part of the
Congress.
So too, when the President and the Congress ascertain whether public safety
requires the declaration and extension of martial law, respectively, they do so by
calibrating not only the present state of public safety but the further repercussions of
the actual rebellion to public safety in the future as well. Thus, as persuasively
submitted by Fr. Bernas in his Amicus Curiae Brief 1 8 1 in Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo: 1 8 2
From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a
nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the
meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the
Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the
Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present
and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is
submitted, gives to the President a degree of exibility for determining whether
rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot
obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about
past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can
be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as de ned in the
Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to
safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the
purpose of the Constitution. (Emphasis ours) SICDAa
The requirement of the Constitution is therefore adequately met when there is

su cient factual basis to hold that the present and past acts constituting the actual
rebellion are of such character that endanger and will endanger public safety. This
permissive approach is sanctioned not only by an acknowledgment that the Congress
is and should be allowed exibility but also because the Court is without the luxury of
time to determine accuracy and precision.
No necessity to impose tests on the
choice and manner of the President's
exercise of military powers
We refuse to be tempted by petitioner Rosales' prodding that We set two tests in

reviewing the constitutionality of a declaration or extension of martial law. In her
memorandum, 1 8 3 she clarifies the two tests, as follows:
1. Proportionality Test requires that a situation is of such gravity or scale as
to demand resort to the most extreme of measures, i.e., a situation where the
ordinary police powers of the State are no longer su cient to restore, secure or
preserve public safety; and
2. Suitability Test requires that a situation is such that the declaration of
martial law is the correct tool to address safety problem.
It is su cient to state that this Court already addressed the same argument in
Our decision in Lagman. The determination of which among the Constitutionally given
military powers should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a
prerogative of the President. The Court's power of review, as provided under Section
18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor dictate its own judgment upon
the President, as to which and how these military powers should be exercised.
Safeguards against abuse
Martial law is a law of necessity. "Necessity creates the conditions for martial
law and at the same time limits the scope of martial law." 1 8 4 Thus, when the need for
which Proclamation No. 216 was further extended no longer exists, the President can
lift the martial law imposition even before the end of the one-year period. Under the
same circumstances, the Congress itself may pass a resolution pre-terminating the
extension. This power emanates from the Congress' authority, granted under the
Constitution, to approve the extension and to x its duration. The power to determine
the period of the extension necessarily includes the power to shorten it. Furthermore,
considering that this Court's judgment on the constitutionality of an extension is
"transitory," or "valid at that certain point of time," any citizen may petition the Court to
review the su ciency of the factual basis for its continued implementation should the
President and the Congress fail or refuse to lift the imposition of martial law. During the
deliberations on the 1987 Constitution, it was explained:
FR. BERNAS.
The decision of the Supreme Court will be based on its assessment of the
factual situation. Necessarily, therefore, the judgment of the Supreme
Court on that is a transitory judgment because the factual situation
can change . So, while the decision of the Supreme Court may be valid at
that certain point of time, the situation may change so that
Congress should be authorized to do something about it . 1 8 5
(Emphasis ours)
Petitioners fear that the one-year extension of martial law will only intensify the
human rights violations committed by government forces against civilians. To place a
territory under martial law is undeniably an immense power, and like all other powers, it
may be abused. 1 8 6 However, the possibility of abuse and even the country's martial law
experience under the Marcos regime did not prevent the framers of the 1987
Constitution from including it among the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President.
This is in recognition of the fact that during critical times when the security or survival
of the state is greatly imperiled, an equally vast and extraordinary measure should be
available for the President to protect and defend it.
Nevertheless, cognizant of such possibility of abuse, the framers of the 1987
Constitution endeavored to institute a system of checks and balances to limit the
President's exercise of the martial law and suspension powers, and to establish
safeguards to protect civil liberties. Thus, pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution:
(a) The President may declare martial law or suspend of the privilege
of the writ of the privilege of habeas corpus only when there is an invasion or
rebellion and public safety requires such declaration or suspension.
(b) The President's proclamation or suspension shall be for a period
not exceeding 60 days.
(c) Within 48 hours from the proclamation or suspension, the
President must submit a Report in person or in writing to Congress.
(d) The Congress, voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members, can revoke the proclamation or suspension. DHIcET
(e) The President cannot set aside the Congress' revocation of his
proclamation or suspension.
(f) The President cannot, by himself, extend his proclamation or
suspension. He should ask the Congress' approval.
(g) Upon such initiative or request from the President, the Congress,
voting jointly and by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members, can extend
the proclamation or suspension for such period as it may determine.
(i) The extension of the proclamation or suspension shall only be
approved when the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
(j) The Supreme Court may review the su ciency of the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension, or the extension thereof, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen.
(k) The Supreme Court must promulgate its decision within 30 days
from the filing of the appropriate proceeding.
(l) Martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the Bill of Rights 1 8 7 remains effective under a state of
martial law. Its implementers must adhere to the principle that civilian authority
is supreme over the military and the armed forces is the protector of the people.
1 8 8 They must also abide by the State's policy to value the dignity of every
human person and guarantee full respect for human rights. 1 8 9
(m) Martial law does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function.
(n) The suspension of the privilege of the writ applies only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion.
(o) Finally, during the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any
person thus arrested or detained should be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he should be released.
As Commissioner De Los Reyes explained during the deliberations on the 1987
Constitution:
MR. DE LOS REYES.
May I explain my vote, Madam President.
My vote is yes. The power of the President to impose martial law is
doubtless of a very high and delicate nature. A free people are naturally
jealous of the exercise of military power, and the power to impose martial
law is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But as presented
by the Committee, there are many safeguards: 1) it is limited to 60 days; 2)
Congress can revoke it; 3) the Supreme Court can still review as to the
su ciency of the actual basis; and 4) it does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution. To repeat what I have quoted when I interpellated
Commissioner Monsod, it is said that the power to impose martial
law is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All powers may
be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be di cult,
we think, to point out any other hands in which this power will be
more safe [sic] and at the same time equally effectual. When
citizens of the State are in arms against each other and the constituted
authorities are unable to execute the laws, the action of the President must
be prompt or it is of little value. I vote yes. 1 9 0 (Emphasis ours)
Human rights violations and abuses in the implementation of martial law and
suspension powers cannot by any measure be condoned. The Court lauds petitioners'
vigilance to make sure that the abuses of the past are not repeated and perceived
abuses of the present will not go unnoticed. However, as the Court settled in Lagman,
alleged human rights violations committed during the implementation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be resolved in a
separate proceeding. It, thus, bears noting some of the remedies, requirements and
penalties imposed under existing laws, meant to address abuses by arresting or
investigating public officers.
In Lacson v. Perez, 1 9 1 the Court had occasion to rule:
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G.R. Nos. 147780 (Lacson Petition) ,
147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition) , and 147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they
are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their
resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an
individual subject to warrantless arrest is not without adequate remedies in the
ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce
evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings to
determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly
be charged in court. x x x Should the detention be without legal ground, the
person arrested can charge the arresting o cer with arbitrary detention. All this
is without prejudice to his ling an action for damages against the arresting
o cer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of
other remedies which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer
for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time (Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65,
Rules of Court). 1 9 2 HcDSaT
R.A. No. 7438, 1 9 3 which defines the rights of persons arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, imposes the following penalties on errant arresting or
investigating officers:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. — (a) Any arresting public o cer or employee, or
any investigating o cer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained or
under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a ne of six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight
(8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The penalty of perpetual
absolute disquali cation shall also be imposed upon the investigating o cer
who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public o cer or employee,
or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating o cer or in his place, who
fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense if
the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any
member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister
chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his counsel,
from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating
him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in
urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a ne of four thousand
pesos (P4,000.00).
Under R.A. No. 9372 or the Human Security Act of 2007, rebellion may be
subsumed in the crime of terrorism; it is one of the means by which terrorism can be
committed. 1 9 4 R.A. No. 9372 imposes speci c penalties for failure of the law
enforcement personnel to deliver the suspect to the proper judicial authority within the
prescribed period, for violating the rights of the detainee, and for using torture in the
interrogation or investigation of a detainee, viz.:
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper
Judicial Authority within Three Days. — The penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police
or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and
taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected
person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three days.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. —
Any police or law enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other
law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a
person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of
a detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identi ed, the same penalty
shall be imposed on the police o cer or hear or leader of the law enforcement
unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or
Torture in the Investigation and Interrogation of a Detained Person. —
Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who in ict
physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which
shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation
and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person
occurs as a consequence of the use of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or
as a consequence of the in iction on him of such physical pain or torment, or
as a consequence of the in iction on him of such mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, the penalty shall be twelve (12) years and one day to
twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
R.A. No. 9372 also gave the Commission on Human Rights the following
authority and duty:
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. — The
Commission on Human Rights shall give the highest priority to the investigation
and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of persons in relation to
the implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall have
the concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute public o cials, law enforcers, and other
persons who may have violated the civil and political rights of persons
suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism. ASTcaE
R.A. No. 9745 or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009 provides that: "Torture and other
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment as criminal acts shall apply to
all circumstances. A state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability, or any
other public emergency, or a document or any determination comprising an 'order of
battle' shall not and can never be invoked as a justi cation for torture and other cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment." 1 9 5
The same law also expressly prohibits secret detention places, solitary
confinement, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention, where torture may be
carried out with impunity. For this purpose, it requires the Philippine National Police
(PNP), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and other law enforcement agencies
concerned to make an updated list of all detention centers and facilities under their
respective jurisdictions with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees
incarcerated or detained therein such as, among others, names, date of arrest and
incarceration, and the crime or offense committed. The list is to be made available to
the public at all times. 1 9 6
R.A. No. 9745 likewise de ned the following rights of a torture victim in the
institution of a criminal complaint for torture:
(a) To have a prompt and an impartial investigation by the CHR and
by agencies of government concerned such as the Department of Justice (DOJ),
the Public Attorney's O ce (PAO), the PNP, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the AFP. A prompt investigation shall mean a maximum period of
sixty (60) working days from the time a complaint for torture is led within
which an investigation report and/or resolution shall be completed and made
available. An appeal whenever available shall be resolved within the same
period prescribed herein,
(b) To have su cient government protection against all forms of
harassment; threat and/or intimidation as a consequence of the ling of said
complaint or the presentation of evidence therefor. In which case, the State
through its appropriate agencies shall afford security in order to ensure his/her
safety and all other persons involved in the investigation and prosecution such
as, but not limited to, his/her lawyer, witnesses and relatives; and
(c) To be accorded su cient protection in the manner by which
he/she testi es and presents evidence in any fora in order to avoid further
trauma.
It further imposes the following penalties on perpetrators of torture as de ned
therein:
Section 14. Penalties. — (a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon the perpetrators of the following acts:
(1) Torture resulting in the death of any person;
(2) Torture resulting in mutilation;
(3) Torture with rape;
(4) Torture with other forms of sexual abuse and, in consequence of
torture, the victim shall have become insane, imbecile, impotent, blind or
maimed for life; and
(5) Torture committed against children.
(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed on those who
commit any act of mental/psychological torture resulting in insanity, complete
or partial amnesia, fear of becoming insane or suicidal tendencies of the victim
due to guilt, worthlessness or shame.
(c) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed on those
who commit any act of torture resulting in psychological, mental and emotional
harm other than those described in paragraph (b) of this section.
(d) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have lost
the power of speech or the power to hear or to smell; or shall have lost an eye, a
hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or shall have lost the use of any such member; Or
shall have become permanently incapacitated for labor.
(e) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have become
deformed or shall have lost any part of his/her body other than those aforecited,
or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor
for a period of more than ninety (90) days. cDSAEI
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to

prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if, in consequence of
torture, the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for labor for mare than
thirty (30) days but not more than ninety (90) days.
(g) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
period shall be imposed if, in consequence of torture, the victim shall have been
ill or incapacitated for labor for thirty (30) days or less.
(h) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed for acts
constituting cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as de ned in
Section 5 of this Act.
(i) The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon those
who establish, operate and maintain secret detention places and/or effect or
cause to effect solitary con nement, incommunicado or other similar forms of
prohibited detention as provided in Section 7 of this Act where torture may be
carried out with impunity.
(j) The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon the
responsible o cers or personnel of the AFP, the PNP and other law
enforcement agencies for failure to perform his/her duty to maintain, submit or
make available to the public an updated list of detention centers and facilities
with the corresponding data on the prisoners or detainees incarcerated or
detained therein, pursuant to Section 7 of this Act.
This Court has likewise promulgated rules aimed at enforcing human rights. In
A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, 1 9 7 this Court made available the remedy of a writ of amparo to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public o cial or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. Similarly, in A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, 1 9 8 this Court also crafted the rule
on the writ of habeas data to provide a remedy for any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public o cial or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It also bears to note that the Philippines, is a signatory to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 1 9 9 which is embodied in the International Bill of
Human Rights. 2 0 0 As such, it recognizes that everyone has the right to liberty and
security of one's person. 2 0 1 That no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention; or that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in
accordance with such procedure as are established by law, are just among the thirty
(30) articles, mentioned in the UDHR setting forth the human rights and fundamental
freedoms to which all men and women, everywhere in the world, are entitled, without
any discrimination.
Signi cantly, during the Congress' December 13, 2017 Joint Session, the
Executive Department, through Secretary Lorenzana, made an express commitment to
submit a monthly report to the Congress regarding the extended implementation of
martial law in Mindanao. 2 0 2 Although not required under Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, the submission of such report is an ideal complement to the system
of checks and balance instituted therein. It will clearly assist the Congress in evaluating
the need to maintain or shorten the period of extension of martial law in Mindanao; it
will also serve as an additional measure to check on possible abuses or human rights
violations in the Executive's enforcement of martial law.
Petitioners failed to comply with the
requisites for the issuance of an
injunctive writ
The purpose of a preliminary injunction under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of

Court, 2 0 3 is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. 2 0 4 Its sole aim
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. 2 0 5 Status
quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which precedes a
controversy. 2 0 6 By jurisprudence, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioners have
the burden to establish the following requisites: (1) a right in esse or a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; (3) that there is an
urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage;
2 0 7 and (4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury. 2 0 8
EDCcaS
Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on

respondents' gross transgressions of the Constitution when they extended the martial
law in Mindanao for one year. The Lagman petition likewise alleges that petitioner
Villarin, a Davao City resident, is personally prejudiced by the extension or martial law in
Mindanao "which would spawn violations of civil liberties of Mindanaoans like petitioner
Villarin who is a steadfast critic of the Duterte administration and of the brutalities
committed by police and military forces."
These grounds, however, cannot carry the day for the petitioners. Basic is the rule
that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. 2 0 9 These
allegations cannot constitute a right in esse, as understood in jurisprudence. A right in
esse is a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, 2 1 0 one clearly founded on or
granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. 2 1 1 The existence of a right to be
protected, and the acts against which the writ is to be directed are violative of said right
must be established. 2 1 2
The alleged violations of the petitioners' civil liberties do not justify the grant of
injunctive relief. The petitioners failed to prove that the alleged violations are directly
attributable to the imposition of martial law. They likewise failed to establish the nexus
between the President's exercise of his martial law powers and their unfounded
apprehension that the imposition "will target civilians who have no participation at all in
any armed uprising or struggle." Incidentally, petitioners failed to state what the "civil
liberties" speci cally refer to, and how the extension of martial law in Mindanao would
threaten these "civil liberties" in derogation of the rule of law. Evidently, petitioners' right
is doubtful or disputed, and can hardly be considered a clear legal right, su cient for
the grant of an injunctive writ.
In Dynamic Builders & Construction Co. (PHIL.), Inc. v. Hon. Ricardo P. Presbitero,
Jr., et al. , 2 1 3 this Court held that no automatic issuance of an injunctive relief will result
by the mere allegation of a constitutionally protected right. We explained, thus:
Mere allegation or invocation that constitutionally protected rights were
violated will not automatically result in the issuance of injunctive relief. The
plaintiff or the petitioner should discharge the burden to show a clear and
compelling breach of a constitutional provision. Violations of constitutional
provisions are easily alleged, but trial courts should scrutinize diligently and
deliberately the evidence showing the existence of facts that should support the
conclusion that a constitutional provision is clearly and convincingly breached.
In case of doubt, no injunctive relief should issue. In the proper cases, the
aggrieved party may then avail itself of special civil actions and elevate the
matter. 2 1 4
Indeed, this Court cannot rely on speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but
must depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best evidence obtainable
under the circumstances. 2 1 5 We emphasize that the grant or denial of an injunctive writ
cannot be properly resolved by suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with
no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be determined by the procedural rules
of admissibility and proof. In The Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals , 2 1 6 this Court
stressed the indispensability of establishing the requirements for injunctive writ:
To be entitled to a preliminary injunction to enjoin the enforcement of a
law assailed to be unconstitutional, the party must establish that it will suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and must demonstrate that it
is likely to succeed on the merits, or that there are su ciently serious questions
going to the merits and the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor. The
higher standard re ects judicial deference toward "legislation or regulations
developed through presumptively reasoned democratic processes." Moreover,
an injunction will alter, rather than maintain, the status quo, or will provide the
movant with substantially all the relief sought and that relief cannot be undone
even if the defendant prevails at a trial on the merits. Considering that injunction
is an exercise of equitable relief and authority, in assessing whether to issue a
preliminary injunction, the courts must sensitively assess all the equities of the
situation, including the public interest. In litigations between governmental and
private parties, courts go much further both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved. Before the plaintiff may be entitled to injunction against
future enforcement, he is burdened to show some substantial hardship. 2 1 7
(Citations omitted and italics in the original)
Incidentally, there is nothing in the Constitution, nor in any law which supports
petitioners' theory. Such purported human right violations cannot be utilized as ground
either to enjoin the President from exercising the power to declare martial law, or the
Congress in extending the same. To sanction petitioners' plea would result into judicial
activism, thereby going against the principle of separation of powers. ISHaCD
As discussed above, petitioners are not left without any recourse. Such
trangressions can be addressed in a separate and independent court action. 2 1 8 Recall
that the imposition of martial law does not result in suspending the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function. Hence, petitioners can lodge a complaint-a davit before
the prosecutor's o ce or le a direct complaint before the appropriate courts against
erring parties.
A Final Word
The imperative necessity of Martial Law as a tool of the government for self-
preservation is enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. It earned a bad
reputation during the Marcos era and apprehensions still linger in the minds of doubtful
and suspicious individuals. Mindful of its importance and necessity, the Constitution
has provided for safeguards against its abuses.
Martial law is a constitutional weapon against enemies of the State. Thus, Martial
law is not designed to oppress or abuse law abiding citizens of this country.
Unfortunately, the enemies of the State have employed devious, cunning and
calculating means to destabilize the government. They are engaged in an
unconventional, clandestine and protracted war to topple the government. The enemies
of the State are not always quanti able, not always identi able and not visible at all
times. They have mingled with ordinary citizens in the community and have unwittingly
utilized them in the recruitment, surveillance and attack against government forces.
Inevitably, government forces have arrested, injured and even killed these ordinary
citizens complicit with the enemies.
Admittedly, innocent civilians have also been victimized in the cross re as
unintended casualties of this continuing war.
These incidents, however, should not weaken our resolve to defeat the enemies
of the State. In these exigencies, We cannot afford to emasculate, dilute or diminish the
powers of government if in the end it would lead to the destruction of the State and
place the safety of our citizens in peril and their interest in harm's way.
WHEREFORE , the Court FINDS su cient factual bases for the issuance of
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL .
Accordingly, the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED .
SO ORDERED.

Peralta and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J. and Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
Velasco, Jr. and Del Castillo, JJ., please see concurring opinion.
Leonardo-de Castro and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., please see separate concurring
opinion.
Bersamin, J., please see separate opinion.
Leonen, Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., I dissent, see separate opinion.
Martires, J., I certify that J. Martires left his separate opinion voting to "dismiss
all petitions." — Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno
Gesmundo, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
SERENO , C.J., dissenting :
The Court is still adrift, unable in the Majority Decision, to nd its mooring either
on a well-reasoned interpretation of the text of the Constitution, or to present a logical
continuum of this Court's jurisprudence. Instead, it has taken an extreme view, ceding
all substantive points to respondents and allowing thereby no signi cant quarters to
petitioners. In demonstrating its serious lack of balance, it has made itself even more
vulnerable to political forces, rendering itself inert in exercising the power of judicial
review. TEHIaD
With all due respect, I refer most especially to the ponencia's inability to establish
su cient parameters to determine whether the rst or the second requirement under
the Constitution is present to support a valid extension of the declaration of Martial
Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. These two
requirements are that actual rebellion persists, and that public safety requires the
imposition of Martial Law or the suspension of the writ.
The ponencia has additionally defaulted by providing no limits to the length or the
number of extensions that Congress may allow for Martial Law to take hold. The
limitations on the power of extension are so insubstantial as to be invisible. It holds
that "Section 18, Article VII is clear that the only limitation[s] to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are that the
extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it should be grounded on the
persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and that it is
subject to the Court's review of the su ciency of its factual basis upon the petition of
any citizen." 1
The ponencia then proceeds to cite the factual allegations of both the Executive
and Congress and without any further test, yields to the spirit of deference and justi es
its conclusion in this wise:
The information upon which the extension of martial law or of the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be based
principally emanate from and are in the possession of the Executive
Department. Thus, "the Court will have to rely on the fact- nding n capabilities
of the [E]xecutive [D]epartment; in turn, the Executive Department will have to
open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court."
xxx xxx xxx
The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress
amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is
signi cantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists su cient
factual basis for the further extension sought by the President and approved by
the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
Necessarily, we do not see the merit in petitioner's theory in the Cullamat
petition that the extent of threat to public safety as would justify the declaration
or extension of the proclamation of martial [law] and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ must be of such level that the government cannot
su ciently govern, cannot assure public safety and cannot deliver government
services. Petitioners posit that only in this scenario may martial law be
constitutionally permissible.
Restrained caution must be exercised in adopting petitioners' theory for
several reasons. To begin with, a hasty adoption of the suggested scale, level, or
extent of threat to public safety is to supplant into the plain text of the
Constitution. An interpretation of the Constitution precedes from the
fundamental postulate that the Constitution is the basic and paramount law to
which all other laws must conform to and to which all persons, including the
highest o cials of the land, must defer. The consequent duty of the judiciary is
to determine con icting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This must be so considering that
the Constitution is the mother of all laws, su cient and complete in itself. For
the court to categorically pronounce which kind of threat to public safety
justi es the declaration or extension of martial law and which ones do not, is to
improvise on the text of the Constitution ideals even when these ideals are not
expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution. Such judicial
improvisation finds no justification.
For another, if the Court were to be successful in disposing of its
bounden duty to allocate constitutional boundaries, the Constitutional doctrines
the Court produces must necessarily remain steadfast no matter what may be
the tides of time. The adoption of the extreme scenario as the measure of threat
to public safety as suggested by petitioners is to invite doubt as to whether the
proclamation of martial law would at all be effective in such case considering
that enemies of the State raise unconventional methods which change over
time. It may happen that by the time government loses all capability to dispose
of all its functions, the enemies of the government might have already been
successful in removing allegiance therefrom. Any declaration then of martial
law would be of no useful purpose and such could not be the intent of the
Constitution. Instead, the requirement of public safety as it presently appears in
the Constitution admits of flexibility and discretion on the part of the Congress.
So too, when the President and the Congress ascertain whether public
safety requires the declaration and extension of martial law, respectively, they
do so by calibrating not only the present state of public safety but the further
repercussions of the actual rebellion to public safety in the future as well. x x x.
2 DETACa
It is di cult to see how the ponencia can consider as inevitable its conclusion
disagreeing with the Cullamat proposal that the danger posed to public safety must
necessitate the imposition of Martial Law, and that only then can Martial Law be
justi able. Neither the di culty posed by the process of examining necessity nor the
need to adapt to different approaches in the future is su cient reason for the Court to
refuse to review the question of necessity. The automatic conclusion that as
Government has established the existence and persistence of rebellion, therefore
Martial Law is justi able by its self-evident claims, is, sadly, gratuitous. It is not wrong
to suspect that this halfhearted conclusion is rooted in the refusal to take seriously the
doctrine of necessity.
The Doctrine of Necessity
To put texture into this discussion, it would help to recall the conversations in
Lagman v. Medialdea, 3 where the Solicitor General called the declaration of Martial Law
a "Gulpi de Gulat," 4 an "exclamation point," and as the "calling out powers on steroids." 5
Note that the struggle to nd a de nition of Martial Law under the 1987 Constitution is,
in turn, due to the need for Government to justify why it needs that kind of Martial Law.
This is because, in essence, Government cannot escape facing the question of
necessity.
An examination of the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission
shows that our framers drew the Philippine concept of Martial Law from American law,
with certain differences. As explained by Father Joaquin Bernas:
Since the Philippine Constitution is traceable to American origins and was
formulated by jurists reared in the tradition of American constitutional law, it is
legitimate to start the quest for a de nition of martial law in the Constitution by
looking back to the difference nuances which the term carries in American law.
6
American cases on the concept of Martial Law show the doctrine of necessity at
its very heart. The United States (US) Supreme Court's rst look at Martial Law was in
1848 in Luther v. Borden . 7 The controversy centered on the state militia's warrantless
forced entry into the home of Martin Luther 8 during a state of Martial Law in Rhode
Island. 9 The case was dismissed for being a political question. Chief Justice Taney
wrote that the decision whether or not to impose Martial Law to combat a crisis is left
to the State. 1 0 Nevertheless, Luther touched on the substantive issue regarding the
state's authority to invoke Martial Law and thereby laid the early foundations of Martial
Law in the US. In describing this power, Luther went on to explain:
And, unquestionably, a State may use its military power to put down an armed
insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is
essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of
order and free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to
any other government. The State itself must determine what degree of force the
crisis demands. And if the government of Rhode Island deemed the armed
opposition so formidable and so rami ed throughout the State, as to require the
use of its military force and the declaration of martial law, we see no ground
upon which this court can question its authority. 1 1
A conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing dictum is that the state can
determine when an internal unrest necessitates the declaration of Martial Law, a
determination that then becomes conclusive upon the courts. Nevertheless, Luther
went on to explain that the power to make that determination is limited by the
necessity of the situation involved, viz.:
And in that state of things, the o cers engaged in its military service might
lawfully arrest anyone who, from the information before them, they had
reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in the insurrection, and might order
a house to be forcibly entered and searched when there were reasonable
grounds for supposing he might be there concealed. Without the power to do
this, martial law and the military array of the government would be mere parade,
and rather encourage attack than repel it. No more force, however, can be used
than is necessary to accomplish the object. And if the power is exercised for the
purposes of oppression, or any injury wilfully done to person or property, the
party by whom, or by whose order, it is committed would undoubtedly be
answerable. 1 2
Subsequently, it was in Ex Parte Milligan 1 3 where the US Supreme Court was
able to substantively explore Martial Law. The case stemmed from the arrest of Lamdin
Milligan while the state was under Martial Law. Milligan was later on tried by a military
commission, whose ruling was struck down by the Court. In that case, the imposition of
Martial Law in Indiana was analyzed, to wit:
It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are
occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or
civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer
criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute
for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and
society, and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial
rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it
limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are
reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where
the courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war. 1 4
TaDCEc
Justice Davis, speaking for the majority, clari ed that there could be no
Martial Law unless there is an actual need for it :
Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be
actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and
deposes the civil administration. 1 5
Luther and Ex Parte Milligan were decided within the context of war emergencies.
1 6 However, there were questions that remained unanswered. After the Civil War,
several cases that subsequently arose allowed the US Supreme Court to further de ne
Martial Law, this time within the context of turmoil rooted in economic crisis. 1 7 Still, the
doctrine of necessity persisted.
In Moyer v. Peabody , 1 8 the Court reviewed the Colorado governor's declaration
of Martial Law to address a labor dispute in the state. It also looked into the exercise of
Martial Law powers, such as the arrest of Charles Moyer. The opinion of the Court
penned by Justice Holmes mirrored Chief Justice Taney's dictum in Luther. It ruled that
the governor had the power to declare Martial Law sans a signi cant judicial review, as
long as the declaration was done in good faith. Nevertheless, necessity was still
deemed the primary consideration , to wit:
When it comes to a decision by the head of the state upon a matter involving its
life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the
necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive
process for judicial process. 1 9
Twenty-three years later, Sterling v. Constantin 2 0 allowed the US Supreme Court
to again review a governor's authority to declare Martial Law. This time, the governor of
Texas had proclaimed Martial Law over several oil-producing counties of the state,
declaring that insurrection and riot beyond civil control existed there due to the
wasteful production of oil. The military force shut down the oil wells thereafter, an act
the Court found to be excessive. It a rmed Luther and Moyer in that the governor's
decision to declare Martial Law was conclusive upon the courts. 2 1 However, Sterling
went one step further and quali ed the governor's power with the so-called
"proportionality test" 2 2 — that the means employed by the governor in his
exercise of Martial Law powers must bear a direct relation to the disturbance
being faced. 2 3 Finding the state's actions in Luther and Moyer to be in line with the
proportionality test, the Court likewise concluded that the doctrine of necessity was
still at the core of its considerations. In effect, Sterling a rmed its authority to review
the executive's declaration of Martial Law. 2 4
Duncan v. Kahanamoku 2 5 again provided the Court an opportunity to deal with
the imposition of Martial Law during wartime. Set during the bombing of Pearl Harbor,
the issue centered on Duncan's arrest and subsequent trial and conviction by the
military commission. While the Court, through Justice Black, struck down the military
tribunal's authority to try and convict Duncan, it still upheld the declaration of Martial
Law in Hawaii. Nevertheless, it tested the extent of authority of the military commission
against the doctrine of necessity enunciated in Ex Parte Milligan, 2 6 again con rming
the centrality of that doctrine in US Martial Law jurisprudence.
All of the above pronouncements, taken together, lead to the understanding
that Martial Law is "the law of necessity in national emergency." 2 7
This doctrine of necessity was translated into the Philippine concept of Martial
Law through the second requisite for its proclamation as speci ed by the text of the
1987 Constitution: "public safety requires it."
In other words, during a state of invasion or rebellion, the necessity posed by
public safety serves as the gauge for the proclamation of Martial Law, as well as its
scope and duration. As explained by Fr. Bernas:
Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and at the same time
limits the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a state
of invasion would be different from those created by rebellion. Necessarily,
therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous executive action needed to meet the
varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all
condition. 2 8 (Emphasis supplied)
Calibration Exercise and the

Proportionality Test
Unlike the US concept of Martial Law, which did not de ne the speci c
circumstance of unrest that would trigger Martial Law, the Philippine Constitution
specifies actual invasion or rebellion as the requisite factual antecedents, without which
Martial Law cannot be proclaimed. cDEHIC
It is in the context of invasion or rebellion that the doctrine of necessity is

considered. More aptly called the "necessity of public safety test," a calibration exercise
must be undertaken to determine whether the crisis at hand poses such a danger to
public safety and good order that Martial Law becomes necessary. If so, this exercise
further requires a determination of the degree of Martial Law powers necessary to
address the threat to public safety. This task entails a determination of the scope,
coverage, and duration of Martial Law.
The proportionality test that the US Supreme Court instituted in Sterling can
serve as a guide in undertaking a calibration exercise. The Court in Sterling , after
reviewing the factual bases of the governor's declaration of Martial Law, found that the
overproduction of oil was not serious enough to warrant the declaration of Martial Law
and the exercise of Martial Law powers. 2 9 In analyzing the proportionality between the
internal unrest and the government powers invoked to address the unrest, the Court
therein examined the factual findings of the district court, as follows:
It was conceded that at no time has there been any actual uprising in the
territory. At no time has any military force been exerted to put riots or mobs
down. At no time, except in the refusal of defendant Wolters to observe the
injunction in this case, have the civil authorities or courts been interfered with, or
their processes made impotent. Though it was testi ed to by defendants that,
from reports which came to them, they believed that, if plaintiffs' wells were not
shut in, there would be dynamiting of property in the oil elds, and efforts to
close them and any others which opened by violence, and that, if that occurred,
there would be general trouble in the eld, no evidence of any dynamite having
been used, or show of violence practiced or actually attempted, or even
threatened against any speci c property in the eld, was offered. We nd,
therefore, that not only was there never any actual riot, tumult, or insurrection
which would create a state of war existing in the eld, but that, if all of the
conditions had come to pass, they would have resulted merely in breaches of
the peace, to be suppressed by the militia as a civil force, and not at all in a
condition constituting, or even remotely resembling, a state of war. 3 0
In was then found that the above circumstances did not amount to an "exigency
which justi ed the Governor in attempting to enforce by executive or military order the
restriction." 3 1 The US Court reasoned:
By virtue of his duty to "cause the laws to be faithfully executed," the
Executive is appropriately vested with the discretion to determine whether an
exigency requiring military aid for that purpose has arisen. x x x The nature of
the power also necessarily implies that there is a permitted range of honest
judgment as to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in
suppressing violence and restoring order, for, without such liberty to make
immediate decisions, the power itself would be useless. Such measures,
conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency, and directly related to the
quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the
discretion of the executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.
xxx xxx xxx
It does not follow from the fact that the executive has this range of
discretion, deemed to be a necessary incident of his power to suppress disorder,
that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how unjusti ed by
the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts,
otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive at. The
contrary is well established. What are the allowable limits of military discretion,
and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial
questions. Thus, in the theater of actual war, there are occasions in which
private property may be taken or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the
hands of the enemy or may be impressed into the public service, and the o cer
may show the necessity in defending an action for trespass. "But we are clearly
of opinion," said the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taney,
"that, in all of these cases, the danger must be immediate and
impending; or the necessity urgent for the public service, such as
will not admit of delay, and where the action of the civil authority
would be too late in providing the means which the occasion calls
for. . . . Every case must depend on its own circumstances. It is the
emergency that gives the right, and the emergency must be shown
to exist before the taking can be justi ed." Mitchell v. Harmony , 13
How. 115, 134. See also United States v. Russell , 13 Wall. 623,
628. ISCDEA
There is no ground for the conclusion that military orders in the case of
insurrection have any higher sanction or confer any greater immunity. 3 2
The Sterling Court examined the previous case, Moyer, which also upheld the
temporary detention of one believed to be a participant in the insurrection launched
during Martial Law. The Sterling Court applied the proportionality test and agreed that
the action of the governor in Moyer had a direct relation to the crushing of the
insurrection. 3 3 Applying that model to the Texas governor's actions, the Court
ultimately found that the declaration of Martial Law was not a proportional response to
the crisis caused by the overproduction of oil.
Necessity of Public Safety as a
Required Precursor of Martial Law
There is no dire lack of guidance or parameters in determining what sort of

public safety necessity calls for a proclamation of Martial Law. It is Sterling that gives a
clearer insight into what kind of necessity entails a Martial Law declaration. As deduced
from the quoted portions above, there must be a semblance of a "state of war."
Moreover, there must be a perceived inability of the civilian authority to address the
crisis brought about by the "state of war." The logical consequence is the existence of a
serious threat to public safety.
This nding was reiterated in Duncan, which ruled that Martial Law was "intended
to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil
government and for the defense of the island against actual or threatened rebellion or
invasion." 3 4 This pronouncement essentially maintained the concept of Martial Law as
de ned in Ex Parte Milligan — that Martial Law is proper during war when civil
institutions are paralyzed to a certain extent and military operations are necessary to
preserve public safety and order.
War. Military operations. Crippled civilian functions. It was along these lines that
the US Supreme Court has determined the propriety of Martial Law. It is apparent from
the deliberations of the 1986 Constitution Commission that the framers somehow
intended to de ne and characterize Philippine Martial Law along the same lines. Fr.
Bernas himself used the term "theater of war" to define Martial Law:
FR. BERNAS:
This phrase was precisely put here because we have clari ed the meaning
of martial law; meaning, limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the
jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of
war. In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function . If in the
actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the
military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to
military courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But
in the general area where the civil courts are opened then in no case can
the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to
a theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function. 3 5
(Emphasis supplied)
It would therefore be helpful for the Court to undertake its calibration exercise in
weighing necessity vis-a-vis public safety along similar lines as well. To my mind, the
intensity of an invasion or a rebellion that endangers public safety must be
discerned within the context of a state of signi cant armed con ict. In other
words, the circumstances on the ground must be so severe that they entail
the invocation of an extreme measure.
A balancing act is called for, speci cally between the gravity of the
situation and the extraordinary measure meant to address it, which is Martial
Law. It is the established intent of the framers of our Constitution for Martial Law to be
a measure that would be utilized only in extremely urgent circumstances as the
following deliberation shows:
FR. BERNAS:
Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion. Even if we will
suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an actual
rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ because the Constitution further
says: "when the public safety requires it." So, even if there is a rebellion
but the rebellion can be handled and public safety can be
protected without imposing martial law or suspending the
privilege of the writ, the President need not. Therefore, even if we
consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was something which did not call for
imposition of martial law. 3 6 (Emphasis supplied) EDCTIa
This intent leads to the general understanding that Martial Law is an

extraordinary power to be wielded only in extraordinary circumstances. 3 7 That is the
fundamental principle that must guide the Court in the conduct of its review powers.
The Court's Power of Review
While the President and Congress are expected to engage in a calibration

exercise in the process of deciding whether or not to declare or extend Martial Law, this
exercise is of utmost importance to this Court, which exercises the power of review
over the sufficiency of the factual bases of the proclamation or its extension.
As emphasized in my dissent in Lagman v. Medialdea , it is the duty of the Court
to inquire into the necessity of declaring Martial Law to protect public safety. I pointed
out:
The duty of the Court to inquire into the necessity of declaring martial
law to protect public safety logically and inevitably requires the
determination of proportionality of the powers sought to be exercised
by the President. As pointed out by the ponencia, the exercise of the powers
of the President under Section 18, Article VII "can be resorted to only under
speci ed conditions." This means that greater powers are needed only when
other less intrusive measures appear to be ineffective. When it is deemed that
the power exercised is disproportional to what is required by the exigencies of
the situation, any excess therefore is deemed not required to protect public
safety, and should be invalidated. 3 8 (Emphasis supplied)
To perform this duty is to engage in the same kind of calibration exercise that the
Sterling Court undertook. Hence, the Court herein is required not only to determine the
existence of an actual invasion or rebellion, but also, to analyze and determine whether
the nature and intensity of the invasion or rebellion endanger public safety in a way that
makes Martial Law necessary.
The calibration would necessitate a determination not just of the propriety of a
Martial Law declaration, but likewise its territorial coverage. In the case of an extension
of Martial Law, the Court is called upon to take one step further and likewise calibrate
whether the danger posed is commensurate with the period of extension xed by
Congress. In so doing, this Court needs to apply a trial judge's reasonable mind and
common sense as honed by relevant experiences and legal proficiency.
It must be emphasized that this kind of exercise is no longer new to this Court, as
it has in fact undertaken a similar calibration in Lansang v. Garcia . 3 9 In that case, the
Court upheld the nationwide suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
but only after a careful examination and calibration of the danger posed by the
nationwide acts of rebellion.
To refrain from undertaking a similar calibration exercise this time around would
amount to an abdication of this Court's obligation under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. To reiterate my dissent in Lagman v. Medialdea:
The Court cannot be defending vigorously its review power at the beginning,
with respect to the su ciency-of-factual basis question, then be in default when
required to address the questions of necessity, proportionality, and
coverage . Such luxury is not allowed this Court by express directive of the
Constitution. 4 0 (Emphasis supplied)
Help to Government
In the exchange between the undersigned and General Guerrero, an effort was
made to elicit the operational necessity for Martial Law. Below is the exchange:
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:
Can you answer for us General, can you just answer for us what particular
power do you want under a martial law system? You have already
concluded that it was effective, immediate but what speci c aspect is
important for you?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
For now, Your Honor, what martial law [has] given us is the power for us to
be able to effect immediate arrest of rebels because of the suspension of
the privilege of habeas corpus.
But there are jurisprudence already that authorize you to do that?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor. ADCIca

Yes. Are these jurisprudence not enough for you?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
I cannot say for now, Your Honor, exactly what other powers could be
avail[ed] to apply to in the Armed Forces for us to be able to perform our
mission effectively, Your Honor.

Because that's precisely the question we need to answer and we spend a
lot of time yesterday afternoon saying what particular aspect of martial
law do you need that you cannot use already under your present, under the
ordinary powers of the President and the military because you see, you can
already conduct surveillance on terrorists, all terrorists. You only need
actually the declaration, the arrest, you only need, the arrest rather, you only
need the declaration of the Anti-Terrorism Council, is that not correct? x x x
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Your Honor . . .
Why are you not using that? [The] Anti-Terrorism Council[,] has it
convene[d] since President Duterte became president?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
I cannot answer for the Anti-Terrorism Council, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Okay. So, only martial law can bring [everybody on board]? Why? Can you
explain to us that ideological theory or operational justification?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Your Honor, let me just cite my experience as System Mindanao
Commander being the implement[e]r of martial law in my area of
responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
Before the implementation of martial law, I had to request, to invite other
heads of agencies for them to participate in our security engagements.
xxx xxx xxx
It was a difficult task at that time.
But the President can just give a directive through the Executive Secretary,
All calls from General Guerrero must be immediately obeyed.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It's not as easy as that, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
So, we have to understand that compliance needs to be improved.
xxx xxx xxx
Okay. So, what makes it easier, is it psychological? That's why I've been
asking since yesterday, is it psychological, the calling out powers on
steroids?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
So, it's psychological?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It's partly psychological, Your Honor. ACTIHa

Okay, partly psychological. What do you think makes people more
cooperative in a martial law setting?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It's that fact that [a] strong authority is in charge.
xxx xxx xxx
A picture, an image of a strong . . .
It's an image?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes.
So, the President issuing an order to civilians without anyone being a
martial law administrator or implement[e]r is a weak message. But if you
are the martial law implement[e]r, that's a strong message to comply?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Your Honor, the President is the Commander-in-Chief.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x This is what martial law does. Because even in my dissenting
opinion, x x x I said, Until now nobody has really answered the question of
what martial law is for? So, nally we have this chance, can you tell us,
candidly, why do we need martial law? Because I'm open to any idea, at
this point. Why?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
As I have said, the problem in Mindanao as in the other parts of the
country is multi-dimensional, the armed con ict, Ma'am, is just a
manifestation of a deeper problem in society.
So, there is a deeper problem in society. So, the SOLGEN is a, there is
paranoia, or I'm sorry, one of the theories propounded is there is paranoia
on the part of the petitioners. But you are now presenting to us that there is
a deep problem that must be addressed and we need martial law as a
psychological mooring because, rst, we have observed greater
compliance on the part of all government entities. What else? Can you
enumerate for us? Because you only concluded that it was very good but
you never in your presentation and J2 never presented why it was
effective? So, that's rst, there is more, there's easier compliance . The
second reason?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It enhances climate of safety; safety and security, Your Honor.
It enhances how?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The people, especially in the affected areas of rebellion, (inaudible) and I
was able to talk to the (inaudible), that they appreciate the implementation
of martial law in their respective localities.
xxx xxx xxx
Yeah, I know, and how do they describe it?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
For instance, I was just there the other day in Basilan and I was able to talk
to some of the residents there.
Yes.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
And they said that they prefer the presence of the soldiers in the area and
that they would not want the soldiers to pull out. And in fact they are
supporting the implementation of martial law. HCSAIa

So, martial law enhances the presence of the military , that's your second
reason. And because it enhances the presence of the military there is
greater safety on the part of the civilian population?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
Okay. What else?
xxx xxx xxx
Because you know, if we are able to de ne really why you need martial
law, we would have a breakthrough in this case. So, help me here. Third
reason?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
To be honest with you, Your Honor, we have not really fully exploited the
possibilities, but we can gain from the declaration of martial law, the
present martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
So, there is still an ephemeral, unde nable element to martial law which
you think is very effective but to some it is being characterized as
paranoia, but there is fear. So, in other words, is it not the yin and yang
concept here, there is the fear element, the fear enhances or the fear
paralyzes and makes it possible that the civilian population will believe
that their democratic rights are being endangered. Is that two sides of the
same face, is it a janus situation here?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor, and that is something that we, in the military, [are] also
trying to balance in terms of perception and in terms of our actuations.
So, fear can be used positively and fear is being said as [imposing] the
cause of martial law in a negative way. So, is it not just an information
campaign that needs to be done if you are going to be strong adheren[ts]
to human rights that there is an information gap between the two
interpretations? You agree?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It could be, Your Honor. But I could not say for a fact because as I have
said, if it would be an informational campaign then de nitely it is not
purely a military effort, Your Honor.
Okay. So, what I see so far, what you have said is that there is a
psychological impact on civilian authorities, there is a psychological
impact on the civilian authorities in the areas where rebellion or terrorism
abounds. So, [those are] the things that you have enumerated to the Court
so far. So, we need these because it creates a favorable mindset for us to
address the security problem in Mindanao, is that what you're saying?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
So, you are actually asking this Court to say that there is factual basis
su cient to justify the extension of martial law because you have noted
effectivity in your operations because of the martial law and you have
noticed that its effectivity is brought about by the psychological impact it
has on the authorities in the areas as well in the civilian population. That's
a good summation?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Partly, Your Honor. But as I have said, it's not only psychological, Your
Honor. We have to look at the added dimensions as well. CaSAcH

Logistical, is there a logistical efficiency?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor. Financial.
Why? Logistical and financial, why?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Again, with the martial law authority, with the authority, enhanced
authority given to us by martial law we are able to enjoin other agencies to
cooperate with us and help us in addressing . . .
So, without martial law, they wouldn't be fast in helping provide you with
necessary transportation, fuel, etc.?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Not necessarily fuel and transportation, Your Honor.
But like what?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Information, Your Honor.
Information. Information is one. They are able to relay information faster
because of martial law?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
Evacuation is helped?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Mobilization, Your Honor.
Mobilization. Financial, you said nancial, what nancial e ciencies are
being effected because of martial law?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The rebels are able to channel in us report to conduits to the various
channels in the localities.
xxx xxx xxx
But you just happened to be of the impression that things are made easier
for you?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It's not the impression, Your Honor. We have been actually able to apply
this, Your Honor, in my area when I was Eastern Mindanao Commander. 4 1
Nowhere in the exchange or the pleadings is there any indication of the factual or
legal basis for claiming that Martial Law makes addressing public safety in the midst of
rebellion easier, other than an undocumented experiential claim. But against this
experiential claim of ease in military operations are the apparently documented claims
of enhanced abuses under the existing Martial Law regime in Mindanao. 4 2 These
claims bring this Court to a point of transcendental importance, one that goes into its
very reason for existence — when petitioners make out a case of probable excess in the
exercise of power that leads to the violation of constitutional rights, and when
Government is unable to categorically put its nger on why it needs Martial Law, then
this Court must de ne the parameters according to the tests of necessity; otherwise, it
ceases to genuinely exist as a bastion of democracy. IaHDcT
Determination of the Period of Extension
Distinction must be made between the examination by this Court of the basis for
the extension of Martial Law per se on the one hand, and the period of extension on the
other hand. This distinction is clear in the following constitutional deliberations:
MR. SUAREZ:
Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT:
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ:
I concur with the proposal of Commissioner Azcuna but may I suggest that
we x a period for the duration of the extension, because it could very well
happen that the initial period may be shorter than the extended period and
it could extend inde nitely. So if Commissioner Azcuna could put a certain
limit to the extended period, I would certainly appreciate that, Madam
President.
THE PRESIDENT:
What does Commissioner Azcuna say?
MR. AZCUNA:
Madam President, I believe that that is a different concept and
should be voted on separately so as not to confuse the issue on
the limitation of the period with the extension. My amendment
would merely require that any extension should have the
concurrence of both the President and the Congress.
Commissioner Suarez may propose an amendment to limit the
period of the extension. 4 3 (Emphasis supplied)
The extension per se of Martial Law involves a two-step process. First, there
must be an initiative from the President addressed to Congress requesting the
extension of his prior proclamation of Martial Law. Second, Congress determines as a
joint body whether or not the extension is proper. If it approves of the extension, it then
likewise determines the period thereof.
The wording of the Constitution leaves an initial impression that the
determination of the extension period is an exclusive congressional prerogative.
However, a look into the constitutional deliberations seems to show that the
determination of the period was intended to remain a joint executive-legislative act.
This conclusion may be drawn from the following deliberations, which came about as a
solution to Commissioner Suarez's proposal to fix a 60-day period of extension:
FR. BERNAS:
Madam President, may I just propose something because I see
the problem. Suppose we were to say: "or extend the same FOR A
PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY CONGRESS" — that gives
Congress a little exibility on just how long the extension should
be.

MR. REGALADO:
Is the Gentleman placing his amendment after "same" and before "if"?
FR. BERNAS:
Yes.
MR. SUAREZ:
Maybe that can be added after the nal word "it" so that the clause would
read: "if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it,
FOR A PERIOD AS MAY BE [DETERMINED] BY CONGRESS."
FR. BERNAS:
It is a question of style, Madam President. It seems to be very far from the
verb.
THE PRESIDENT:
Is that accepted by Commissioner Suarez?
MR. SUAREZ:
Yes, Madam President. DEIHAa
MR. OPLE:
amendment? Earlier, Commissioner Regalado said that that point was
FR. BERNAS:
Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing
this in consultation with the President, and the President would
be outvoted by about 300 Members.
MR. OPLE:
Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective
judgment of that point upon the expiration of the 60 days when,
upon his own initiative, the President seeks for an extension of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of the writ.
FR. BERNAS:
Yes, the participation of the President is there but by giving the
nal decision to Congress, we are also preserving the idea that
the President may not revoke what Congress has decided upon. 4 4
(Emphases supplied)
The principle of collective judgment, as stated by Commissioner Ople, is retained
through the following process: the President provides the facts showing the
persistence of invasion or rebellion and its perceived threat to public safety. In turn,
Congress evaluates the facts provided by the President and on the basis of those facts
determines the period of extension.
Parameters for the Determination of
the Period of Extension

Indeed, Congress has been granted nal authority in the determination of the
period of extension. But as any grant of discretion goes, it is not unbridled. There are
parameters that must be taken into consideration in the exercise of this discretion. It is
clear from the constitutional deliberations that there was no intention to completely
leave that exercise to Congress. Fr. Bernas himself said that the determination only
"gives Congress a little exibility on just how long the extension should be." 4 5 There
was no complete or unlimited exibility granted. Rather, Congress must be mindful of
the following parameters in fixing the period of extension.
First, the extension cannot be for an inde nite period of time — there must be a
de nite period xed by Congress. This interpretation is apparent from the provision in
Section 18, Article VII, which states that Congress may extend the proclamation of
Martial Law "for a period to be determined by congress." A period is de ned as "any
point, space, or division of time." 4 6 From Section 18 itself, it is clear that this period
must be "determined." That is, the start and end points must be "limited," " xed,"
"decided," or "settled" conclusively by Congress. 4 7 Otherwise, to effect the extension
for an inde nite period would amount to Congress' abdication of the foregoing positive
duty imposed upon it by the Constitution.
Further, the following discussion shows that prior to the approval of Fr. Bernas'
amendment, Commissioner Suarez suggested a xed period for the extension,
supposedly to protect the interest of the citizens:
MR. SUAREZ: x x x.
May we suggest that on line 7, between the words "same" and "if," we
insert the phrase FOR A PERIOD OF NOT MORE THAN SIXTY DAYS, which
would equal the initial period for the rst declaration just so it will keep on
going.
THE PRESIDENT:
What does the Committee say?
MR. REGALADO:
May we request a clari cation from Commissioner Suarez on this
proposed amendment? This extension is already a joint act upon the
initiative of the President and with the concurrence of Congress. It is
assumed that they have already agreed not only on the fact of extension
but on the period of extension. If we put it at 60 days only, then
thereafter, they have to meet again to agree jointly on a further
extension.
MR. SUAREZ:
That is precisely intended to safeguard the interests and protect
the lives of citizens.
MR. REGALADO:
initiative of the President this time, and with the prior concurrence of
Congress. So, the period of extension has already been taken into account
by both the Executive and the Legislative, unlike the rst situation where
the President acted alone without prior concurrence. The reason for the
limitation in the rst does not apply to the extension. 4 8 (Emphases
supplied)DcHSEa
The 60-day period, however, was not approved for its perceived impracticality.
Nevertheless, the commissioners did not disagree on the validity of the point made by
Commissioner Suarez — that there must be a xed period. This was apparently the
reason why Fr. Bernas did not negate the need for determining or xing the period when
he proposed his amendment, which was subsequently approved by the body. Only, the
amendment specified Congress as the entity that shall fix the period.
Second, the extension must be for a reasonable period. This is clear from the
following deliberations:
MR. REGALADO:
Madam President, following that is the clause "extend the same if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires
it." That by itself suggests a period within which the suspension
shall be extended, if the invasion is still going on. But there is
already the cutoff of 60-day period. Do they have to meet all over again
and agree to extend the same?
MR. SUAREZ:
That is correct. I think the two of them must have to agree on the
period; but it is theoretically possible that when the President writes a note
to the Congress, because it would be at the instance of the President that
the extension would have to be granted by Congress, it is possible that the
period for the extension may be there. It is also possible that it may not be
there. That is the reason why we want to make it clear that there
must be a reasonable period for the extension. So, if my suggestion
is not acceptable to the Committee, may I request that a voting be held on
it, Madam President. 4 9 (Emphases supplied)
The question now is what would make the period of extension reasonable? The
term "reasonable" is de ned as "fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the
circumstances." 5 0 It is also to be understood as "rational; governed by reason." 5 1 As
can be gathered from the deliberations quoted above, and in light of the de nitions
provided, the question of reasonableness is closely related to the existence of the two
requisites for the exercise of the authority to extend — that the invasion or rebellion
persists, and public safety requires it. That is, there must be a rational match between
the existence of the two requisites and the period of extension.
Therefore, to come up with a reasonable period, Congress has to conduct an
independent investigation and evaluation of the persistence of invasion or rebellion and
the requirement of public safety. Admittedly, there must be due consideration of what
is happening on the ground, which is possible only if Congress is in close coordination
with the President. It is in this manner that the determination of the period of extension
remains a joint judgment of the President and Congress. It was acknowledged during
the deliberations that the President has the most accurate idea of how long it would
take to quell the persisting invasion or rebellion and secure the public. For Congress to
conduct its own investigation of the matter would necessitate consulting the Chief
Executive.
Nevertheless, a close coordination with the President does not amount to a blind
submission to him — rather, Congress has to independently determine the length of
extension, so that it can even reduce or increase the period proposed by the President.
The following deliberations are enlightening:
MR. DAVIDE:
I would like to propose that instead of "AT THE INSTANCE OF," we use
UPON THE PETITION OF. It will be upon the petition of the President to
con rm the fact that any extension is just a matter of his request, not his
prerogative.
THE PRESIDENT:
Not on his own initiative?
MR. DAVIDE:
No, not on his own initiative, Madam President.
MR. AZCUNA:
I believe the word "petition" is more proper for the courts, Madam
President. Maybe with the intention put on the record that this is
not mandatory upon Congress to grant an extension simply
because the President is requesting it , I am willing to change it to
INITIATIVE instead of "INSTANCE" but not "PETITION" because "petition"
has more relevance to courts. So it will be "UPON THE INITIATIVE of the
President." 5 2
CTHaSD
xxx xxx xxx

MR. OPLE:
amendment? Earlier, Commissioner Regalado said that that point was
FR. BERNAS:
Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing
this in consultation with the President, and the President would
be outvoted by about 300 Members.
MR. OPLE:
FR. BERNAS:
Yes, the participation of the President is there but by giving the
nal decision to Congress, we are also preserving the idea that
the President may not revoke what Congress has decided upon. 5 3
xxx xxx xxx
MR. PADILLA:
According to Commissioner Concepcion, our former Chief Justice, the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is essentially an executive act. If that be so, and especially
under the following clause: "if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it," I do not see why the period must be determined
by the Congress. We are turning a purely executive act to a legislative act.
FR. BERNAS:
I would believe what the former Chief Justice said about the initiation
being essentially an executive act, but what follows after the initiation is
something that is participated in by Congress.
MR. CONCEPCION:
If I may add a word. The one who will do the ghting is the
executive but, of course, it is expected that if the Congress wants
to extend, it will extend for the duration of the ghting. If the
ghting goes on, I do not think it is fair to assume that the
Congress will refuse to extend the period, especially since in this
matter the Congress must act at the instance of the executive. He
is the one who is supposed to know how long it will take him to
ght. Congress may reduce it, but that is without prejudice to his
asking for another extension, if necessary. 5 4 (Emphases supplied)
Ultimately, Congress must be able to clearly demonstrate the reasonableness of
the period in its resolution approving the extension and fixing the period thereof.
Judicial Power of Review of Martial
Law Extension and the Period
Thereof
The third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, provides that
the su ciency of the factual basis for the extension of Martial Law may be reviewed by
the Court:
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof , and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its ling. (Emphasis
supplied)
As can be gleaned from the discussions above, the extension of a proclamation
of Martial Law necessarily entails a determination of the period of its extension.
Therefore, the Court's exercise of its review power is not limited to a resolution of the
factual su ciency of the extension per se. That power likewise includes a review of the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the period of extension. TacSAE
While the question that faces the Court is whether or not such period is
reasonable, this question can be answered through an examination of the factual basis
of the extension per se.
Speci cally, the Court has to look into the public safety element — whether the
period xed is commensurate with the necessity of public safety. This determination
essentially involves a calibration exercise as previously discussed. Therefore, in the
same way that this duty inevitably requires a delineation of the areas to be validly
covered by Martial Law, 5 5 the Court also has the duty to determine the length of period
necessary to quell the existing threat to public safety. There must be a calibration
based on the proportionality of the danger at hand to the period of extension. As a
result, the Court may do one of three things: a rm the period xed by Congress, extend
it, or shorten it.
Burden of Proof
Lagman v. Medialdea established that the President carried the burden of proof
to show that there was su cient factual basis for the proclamation of Martial Law. 5 6
The Court ruled that "the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of proof. After
all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a
valid declaration of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus." 5 7
As discussed above, the extension of the period of effectivity of the declaration
of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a joint
executive-legislative act. The Constitution has vested both the President and Congress
with the power of extending the Martial Law period, with the President initiating it and
Congress actually extending or not extending the period. The President provides
Congress with the necessary factual basis to justify his request for the extension of the
Martial Law period. Congress must then assess the su ciency of the factual basis.
Both the executive and the legislative branches of Government bear the burden of
proving the sufficiency of the factual basis.
In response to petitioners' claim that the President bears the burden of proving
the su ciency of the factual basis for the Martial Law extension, respondents argue
that petitioners are the ones who must prove that rebellion has already been
completely quelled. According to respondents, the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea has
already ruled that rebellion exists in Mindanao and, following the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, the resolution of the instant case must be con ned to the
issue of whether or not the rebellion has been completely quelled.
In effect, respondents argue that instead of them proving that rebellion persists,
the burden of proof has already shifted to petitioners to show that rebellion no longer
exists.
That contention is erroneous.
To justify the extension of the period of Martial Law, the Constitution provides
two requisites: (1) invasion or rebellion persists, and (2) public safety requires it. The
persistence of rebellion is a factual issue that must be proven. The initial proclamation
of Martial Law is distinct from its extension, and respondents cannot base their claim
of the existence of rebellion merely on Lagman v. Medialdea . Certainly, Lagman was
decided based on the circumstances surrounding the time of the initial proclamation of
Martial Law. That actual rebellion was found to have existed then does not
automatically lead to a conclusion that rebellion still persisted at the time the period
was extended.
Furthermore, respondents cannot shift the burden of proof to petitioners. As held
by Justice Caguioa in his Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea:
[C]onsidering that the declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ can only be validly made upon the concurrence of the requirements
of the Constitution, the very act of declaration of martial law or suspension of
the privilege of the writ already constitutes a positive assertion by the
Executive that the constitutional requirements have been met — one
which it is in the best position to substantiate. To require the citizen
to prove a lack or insu ciency of factual basis is an undue shifting
of the burden of proof that is clearly not the intendment of the
framers. (Emphasis supplied)
In ne, it can be concluded that the burden of proof remains with the
Government. For purposes of ful lling the constitutional requirements of a valid
declaration of Martial Law and its extension, the burden of proof never shifts to
petitioners. It is the constitutional duty of the Government to show that the
requirements of the Constitution have been met. SDHacT
Abandonment of the Permissive Approach
In my Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , I espoused a permissive

approach in weighing the evidence or drawing from interpretative sources. I adopted
that approach considering that this was the rst post-Marcos examination of Martial
Law undertaken by the Court under the 1987 Constitution. No rule or jurisprudence
existed then that su ciently guided the President in crafting the Martial Law
proclamation under the present Constitution.
Pursuant to this permissive approach, I examined the available evidence more
closely in order to understand what the correct description of the realities in Mindanao
should have been — beyond what was described in Proclamation No. 216, the
President's Report to Congress, and the Comment of the O ce of the Solicitor General
filed before this Court.
After adopting the permissive approach, I concluded that Martial Law was valid
not only in Marawi City, but in the entire province of Lanao del Sur, as well as in the
provinces of Maguindanao and Sulu.
It is important, however, to emphasize that the application of the permissive
approach was pro hac vice in view of the paucity of rules and jurisprudence to guide an
evidentiary determination of the su ciency of the factual basis for the declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Considering the views expressed in Lagman v. Medialdea , a permissive approach in
considering the evidence in this sui generis proceeding cannot remain to be the rule.
Allow me to point out that contrary to the majority's position in Lagman v.
Medialdea that they are unable to rule on the appropriate coverage of Martial Law, I was
able to demonstrate in my dissent that it was possible for this Court to undertake an
independent factual review of the coverage of Martial Law . While I agree that
the Court could recognize the unique fact- nding capabilities of the executive
department, it did not follow that the conclusions derived by the President from these
facts were to be adopted blindly by this Court. Rather, the Court should have been able
to arrive at an independent conclusion after a careful review of the facts provided.
In the Resolution dated 5 December 2017 in Lagman v. Medialdea , the majority
dabbled in surmises and conjectures by saying that "there is always a possibility that
the rebellion and other accompanying hostilities will spill over." 5 8 Behind a sweeping
generalization that "martial law is a exible concept," 5 9 the majority opinion posited
that the precise extent or range of the rebellion and the public safety requirement could
not be measured by exact metes and bounds.
However, this is not really the case. The elements of actual rebellion and public
safety are in exible requirements for the declaration of Martial Law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They also provide a su cient guide for
this Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis for that declaration.
Worse than the Court's act of effectively abdicating its duty to fully review the
President's action under Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, is its failure to lay
down parameters for the future review of the President's same or similar actions.
Weak, sweeping statements today can encourage their misuse as precedents in future
cases.
Factual Basis for the Extension of Martial
Law in Mindanao
In Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 4 dated 13 December 2017, 6 0 the

Congress of the Philippines determined that rebellion persists, and that public safety
indubitably requires the further extension of Proclamation No. 216 6 1 declaring a state
of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao. In a joint session that yielded 240 a rmative votes, Congress
approved the extension for a period of one year from 1 January to 31 December 2018.
Congress took note of the following essential facts:
1. Despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their
groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the
recruitment and training of new members and ghters to carry on the
rebellion.
ACETID
2. The Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct

bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area.
3. The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continues to defy the
Government by perpetrating at least 15 violent incidents during the Martial
Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato.
4. The remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi,
and the Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern.
5. The New People's Army (NPA) took advantage of the situation and
intensi ed their decades-long rebellion against the Government and
stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as
well as guerrilla warfare against the security sector and public and
violent means and to supplant the country's democratic form of
RBH No. 4 was issued by Congress in connection with the President's letter
dated 8 December 2017 requesting the further extension of Proclamation No. 216 for a
period of one year or for such other period of time as Congress may determine. The
report of the President in his letter gave the following particulars of the foregoing
essential facts narrated in RBH No. 4:
1. At least 185 persons listed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained
at large and, in all probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating
their forces.
2. The remnants, together with their protectors, supporters, and
sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards
radicalization/recruitment, nancial and logistical buildup, as well as in
their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly in the
provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also Sulu and Basilan.
Their activities are geared towards the conduct of intensi ed atrocities
and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of establishing the
foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and a Wilayat not only in the
Philippines, but also in the whole of Southeast Asia.
3. Turai e is said to be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH
Wilayat in the Philippines and Southeast Asia.
4. In 2017, the BIFF initiated at least 89 violent incidents consisting mostly of
harassments and roadside bombings directed at government troops.
5. In 2017, the ASG conducted at least 43 acts of terrorism including attacks
using improvised explosive devices, harassments, and kidnappings. These
acts resulted in the killing of 8 civilians, 3 of whom were beheaded.
6. In 2017, the NPA perpetrated at least 385 atrocities in Mindanao, which
resulted in 41 killed and 62 wounded in action on the part of the
government forces. These incidents also resulted in the killing of 23 and
the wounding of 6 other civilians. The most recent incident was the
ambush on 9 November 2017 that resulted in the killing of 1 and wounding
of 3 Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, as well as in the killing of a
four-month-old infant and the wounding of 2 other civilians.
7. Apart from perpetrating these atrocities, the NPA also committed at least
59 arson incidents in Mindanao targeting businesses and private
establishments and destroying an estimated P2.2 billion worth of
properties. The most signi cant attacks were launched against the
Lapanday Food Corporation in Davao City on 9 April 2017 and the Mil-Oro
Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental, on 6
May 2017, resulting in the destruction of properties valued at P1.85 billion
and P109 million, respectively.
8. These activities of the NPA constrained the President to issue
Proclamation No. 360 6 2 on 23 November 2017 declaring the termination
of peace negotiations with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People's Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF).
9. On 5 December 2017, the President issued Proclamation No. 374 6 3
declaring the CPP-NPA-NDF a designated/identi ed terrorist organization
under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention
and Suppression Act of 2012). The presidential proclamation was coupled
with a directive to the Secretary of Justice to le a petition in the
appropriate court praying that the CPP-NPA-NDF be proscribed for being a
terrorist organization under R.A. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007). SDHCac
The request of the President to the Congress was prompted by the letter dated 4
December 2017 from Secretary of National Defense Del n N. Lorenzana. The latter
recommended "the extension of Martial Law for another 12 months or 1 year beginning
January 1, 2018 until December 31, 2018 covering the whole island of Mindanao
primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul
Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed
Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers,
supporters and nanciers, and to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and
reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability,
economic development and prosperity in Mindanao."
Secretary Lorenzana indicated that the armed struggle in Mindanao was still
relatively strong. He emphasized that the proposed extension would signi cantly help
not only the AFP but also other stakeholders in quelling the ongoing DAESH-inspired
DIWM groups. He also said that the extension would help put an end to the rebellion
being staged by communist terrorists, as well as in restoring public order, safety and
stability in Mindanao.
Secretary Lorenzana attached the letter of General Guerrero, who was also
recommending the extension for compelling reasons based on "current" security
assessment. The latter added the following information in support of his request for
the extension of the declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus:
1. The remnants of the groups of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, with the
help of their sympathizers and supporters, are still capable or
strengthening their organization in preparation for the conduct of more
hostilities in the Lanao provinces and other vulnerable areas in Mindanao.
2. The Turai e Group is undertaking propaganda to show that it is still a
capable force to be reckoned with.
3. The BIFF is still equipped with 388 manpower and 328 firearms.
4. Mindanao, particularly Eastern Mindanao, continues to be the hotbed of
communist insurgency and accounts for 47% of the total manpower, 48%
of rearms, 51% of the affected barangays and 45% of guerrilla fronts
nationwide.
5. Of the 14 active provinces in terms of communist insurgency, 10 are in
Mindanao.
6. The Komisyon Mindanao (KOMMID) of the Communists Terrorists is now
capable of sending augmentation forces, particularly party cadres, to
Northern Luzon.
7. The in ltration, recruitment, indoctrination and political mobilization of
indigenous peoples (IP) remain unabated with the support of party
organizers from the urban areas.
8. The ASG is currently holding nine kidnap victims in captivity.
In all, General Guerrero offered the following as justi cation for the
recommended extension:
1. The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly
offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western and Eastern Mindanao
in spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces
in Marawi City;
2. Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the
BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging
similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao,
including the cities of Davao, Cagayan De Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and
Cotabato;
3. The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political
mobilization (army, party and mass-base building; rallies, pickets, and
demonstrations; nancial and logistical build-up), terrorism against innocent
civilians and private entities, and guerrilla warfare against the security sector,
and public and government infrastructures;
4. The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary
in order to defeat their strategy, stop their extortion, defeat their armed
component, and to stop their recruitment activities;
5. The threats being posed by the CTs, the ASG, and the presence of
remnants, protectors, supporters and sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a
clear and imminent danger to public safety and hinders the speedy
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the
Mindanao; SETAcC
6. The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled

with the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao will signi cantly help not only the AFP, but also the other
stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH-inspired
DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and
stability in Mindanao; and
7. In seeking another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to
perform anew its mandated task in the same manner that it had dutifully done
so for the whole duration of Martial Law to date, without any reported human
rights violation and/or incidents of abuse of authority. 6 4
Analysis of the Factual Claims of the

Government
In Lagman v. Medialdea , the majority observed there was no question that there
was an armed public uprising in Marawi City. The only contention of the petitioners
therein was that the armed hostilities did not constitute rebellion in the absence of the
element of a culpable political purpose. 6 5 Their argument was found to be
unmeritorious in view of the conclusion of the Court that the President had su cient
factual basis tending to show that actual rebellion existed. 6 6
Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, an extension of the declaration
of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
made by Congress, upon the initiative of the President, for a period to be determined by
it if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Thus, the question posed to this Court in the instant cases is whether or not
rebellion persists and public safety requires the extension.
Considering the facts alluded to by the President, Secretary of Defense
Lorenzana, General Guerrero, and ultimately Congress, the answer is no. Their
pronouncements in fact show that there is no armed public uprising that justi es the
conclusion that rebellion persists.
With respect to RBH No. 4, the fact that the rebel groups have "continued to
rebuild their organization through recruitment and training of new members and
ghters to carry on the rebellion," 6 7 or that the Turai e Group was "monitored to be
planning to conduct bombings," 6 8 or that the remnants of the ASG "remain a serious
security concern" 6 9 shows that there is no armed public uprising or taking up of arms
against the Government. At most, what the facts show is that there is danger of an
armed public uprising that may turn out to be imminent.
The President can always call on the armed forces to suppress an imminent
danger of rebellion. The deliberation of the Constitutional Commission is clear in this
regard:
FR. BERNAS:
Let me just say that when the Committee decided to remove that, it was for
the reason that the phrase "OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" could cover
a multitude of sins and could be a source of a tremendous amount of
irresistible temptation. And so, to better protect the liberties of the people,
we preferred to eliminate that. So, we submit it to the body for a vote.
MR. PADILLA:
I would just like to state that the term OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF
appears in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and it has not even resulted in
a multitude of sins, temptations nor confusion.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon):
Will Commissioner de Castro speak in favor of the amendment?
MR. DE CASTRO:
I am in favor of the amendment.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO:
Section 15 speaks of actual rebellion and actual invasion, if we eliminate
"OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF." When there is already actual invasion
or rebellion, the President no longer suspends the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus because we already have actual shooting. There is nothing
more to be remedied by the Chief Executive. But when we put the words
"OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF," perhaps they are still assembling; they
are still preparing for their departure or their provisions for immediate
rebellion. The Chief Executive then has the power to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus, but with the situation I mentioned there is nothing more to
suspend. ITCcAD
MR. REGALADO:
Mr. Presiding Officer.
Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. RAMA:
Mr. Presiding Officer.
The Floor Leader is recognized.
MR. REGALADO:
I yield to the Floor Leader.
MR. RAMA:
I ask that Commissioner Concepcion be recognized.
Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION:
The elimination of the phrase "IN CASE OF IMMINENT DANGER
THEREOF" is due to the fact that the President may call the
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress invasion, rebellion or
insurrection. That dispenses with the need of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus . References have been made to
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The 1935 Constitution was based on the
provisions of the Jones Law of 1916 and the Philippine Bill of 1902 which
granted the American Governor General, as representative of the
government of the United States, the right to avail of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law in
the event of imminent danger. And President Quezon, when the 1935
Constitution was in the process of being drafted, claimed that he should
not be denied a right given to the American Governor General as if he were
less than the American Governor General. But he overlooked the fact that
under the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill of 1902, we were colonies of
the United States, so the Governor General was given an authority, on
behalf of the sovereign, over the territory under the sovereignty of the
United States. Now, there is no more reason for the inclusion of the phrase
"OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" in connection with the writ of habeas
corpus. As a matter of fact, the very Constitution of the United States does
not mention "imminent danger." In lieu of that, there is a provision on the
authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief to call the Armed Forces
to prevent or suppress rebellion or invasion and, therefore, "imminent
danger" is already included there. 7 0 (Emphasis supplied)
The 15 violent incidents allegedly committed by the BIFF during the Martial Law
period have not been described with su cient particularity as to enable this Court to
conclude that an armed public uprising with a culpable political purpose has been
mounted by the BIFF against government forces. More important, these alleged violent
incidents during the Martial Law period do not by themselves justify the extension.
Neither does the letter of the President dated 8 December 2017 point to the fact
that an armed public uprising is still underway. He reported that at least 185 persons
who had been sought to be arrested during Martial Law remained at large and, "in all
probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating their forces." 7 1 He also stated
that "Turai e is said to be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in
the Philippines and Southeast Asia." 7 2 There is enough speculation in these statements
to conclude that the Government is not even sure about the gravity of the threats that
these "remnants" might pose. An impression of a foreboding rebellion is also given by
the statement that "[t]heir activities are geared towards the conduct of intensi ed
atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of establishing the
foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but
also in the whole of Southeast Asia." 7 3
The President has alluded to 89 violent incidents initiated by the BIFF and 43 acts
of terrorism committed by the ASG last year. Aside from the fact that these violent
incidents and acts of terrorism have not been described with su cient particularity,
there is a clear possibility that most of them have already been cited as justi cation for
the President's original proclamation of Martial Law and suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and likewise for Congress' approval of the first extension.
That rebellion is potentially imminent is also shown by the letter of General
Guerrero. He states that the remnants of the groups of Hapilon and the Maute brothers
are "still capable of strengthening their organization with the help of their sympathizers
and supporters in preparing for the conduct of more hostilities in the Lanao provinces
and other vulnerable areas in Mindanao." 7 4 Notably, the Turai e Group is not even
mounting an armed uprising, as it is merely undertaking "propaganda to show that it is
still a capable force to be reckoned with." 7 5 aHECST
That the BIFF is still equipped with 388 manpower and 328 rearms or that the
ASG currently has nine kidnap victims held in captivity, while absolutely deplorable,
cannot justify the extension of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. While the BIFF may be armed, the statement fails to show that
the rearms are being used for the conduct of a public uprising coupled with a culpable
political purpose. It is also di cult to see the culpable political purpose behind the
kidnap of nine innocent civilians.
The Inclusion of the CPP-NPA-NDF
It is clear from the letter of the President that the "decades-long rebellion" of the
NPA had very little to do with the uprising of the DAESH-inspired DIWM, and whatever
connection there was consisted mainly of their similarity in geographical location.
The Solicitor General believes otherwise. He posits that the CPP-NPA rebellion
was already included as a ground for the declaration of Martial Law and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Proclamation No. 216, as well as in the
request to Congress for the first extension:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Thank you. Counsel, let['s] settle it. Just one more point. In the original
declaration of martial law, only the Maute rebellion was mentioned
specifically, correct?
SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:
There were others, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And other rebels? But not, no other speci c rebellions? Maute or Maute
group [DAESH] is ISIS inspired, but no and other rebels?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, so no specific mention of CPP-NPA rebellion. It's just other rebels.
Yes, but it is subsume[d] under that term, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, okay. Now, in the rst extension. There was also no also [sic] mention
of CPP-NPA specifically it was not mentioned. Correct?
Actually, Your Honor, the [P]resident mentioned it, Your Honor. And may I
read for the record.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
First extension?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
As the government security forces intensi ed efforts during the
implementation of martial law, one hundred eleven members of the New
People's Army (NPA) had been encountered and neutralized while eighty-
five forearms have been recovered from them.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
But what was [sic] the rst extension merely extended the initial
declaration. Correct?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So what governs is the initial declaration? Because you were just
extending it.
Yes, Your Honor. But I mentioned the term. EHACcT
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes.
And other rebel groups includes the NPA, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yeah, but the rst proclamation of the President in the rst declaration
mentions other rebels.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Without specifying what these other rebels are, other rebels aside from the
Maute Group, there were other rebels.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, in this second extension, it says now, CPP-NPA?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, my question is, when the Constitution says that if the rebellion
persists, then Congress may extend. When you use the word persist and
extend, you [are] referring to the original ground for declaration of martial
law. Correct?
Yes, Your Honor. But as I've said, it covers the NPA because the Court can
take judicial notice the oldest rebel group in the Philippines is the NPA.
They have been fighting the government way back in 1960s, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
You are saying that when the Congress approved or approved the
extension, the rst extension, they were also referring to the CPP-NPA
rebellion? Is that what you are saying?
That's what I assumed, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, and also this Court, also when the Court approved.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
When the Court said that it's constitutional, the Court understood that the
rebellion that the ground for the declaration of martial law included the
rebellion of the CPP-NPA?
Yes. 7 6
The Solicitor General is, of course, mistaken. Proclamation No. 216 was issued
on the basis of the rebellion of the ISIS-inspired Maute Group. In Lagman v. Medialdea ,
the Court focused on the facts that had convinced the President that "there is probable
cause or evidence showing that more likely than not, a rebellion was committed or
being committed." 7 7 The facts cited at the time are as follows:
a) Facts, events and
information upon which the
President anchored his decision to
declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Since the President supposedly signed Proclamation No. 216 on May 23,
2017 at 10:00 PM, the Court will consider only those facts and/or events which
were known to or have transpired on or before that time, consistent with the
scope of judicial review. Thus, the following facts and/or events were deemed
to have been considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as
plucked from and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself: EacHCD
1. Proclamation No. 55 issued on September 4, 2016,

declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless
violence in Mindanao;
2. Series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist
group including:
a) Attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur
in February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers;
b) Mass jailbreak in Marawi City in August 2016 of the
arrested comrades of the Maute Group and other detainees;
3. On May 23, 2017:
a) Takeover of a hospital in Marawi;
b) Establishment of several checkpoints within Marawi;
c) Burning of certain government and private facilities;
d) Mounting casualties on the part of the government;
e) Hoisting the flag of ISIS in several areas; and
f) Capability of the Maute Group and other rebel groups
to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not
only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao;
and the Report submitted to Congress:
1. Zamboanga siege;
2. Davao bombing;
3. Mamasapano carnage;
4. Cotabato bombings;
5. Sultan Kudarat bombings;
6. Sulu bombings;
7. Basilan bombings;
8. Attempt to capture Hapilon was confronted with armed
resistance by combined forces of ASG and the Maute Group;
9. Escalation of armed hostility against government troops;
10. Acts of violence directed not only against government
authorities and establishments but civilians as well;
11. Takeover of major social, economic and political
foundations which paralyzed Marawi City;
12. The object of the armed hostilities was to lay the
groundwork for the establishment of a DAESH/ISIS wilayat or
province;
13. Maute Group has 263 active members, armed and
combat-ready;
14. Extensive networks or linkages of the Maute Group with
foreign and local armed groups;
15. Adherence of the Maute Group to the ideals espoused by
ISIS;
16. Publication of a video showing Maute Group's declaration
of allegiance to ISIS;
17. Foreign-based terrorist groups provide nancial and
logistical support to the Maute Group;
18. Events on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City, particularly;
a) at 2:00 PM, members and sympathizers of the
Maute Group and ASG attacked various government and
privately-owned facilities;
b) at 4:00 PM, around fty (50) armed criminals
forcibly entered the Marawi City Jail; facilitated the escape
of inmates; killed a member of PDEA; assaulted and
disarmed on-duty personnel and/or locked them inside the
cells' con scated cellphones, personnel-issued rearms,
and vehicles;cIECaS
c) by 4:30 PM, interruption of power supply; sporadic

gunfights; city-wide power outage by evening;
d) from 6:00 PM to 7:00 PM, Maute Group ambushed
and burned the Marawi Police Station, commandeered a
police car;
e) BJMP personnel evacuated the Marawi City Jail and
other affected areas;
f) control over three bridges in Lanao del Sur, namely
Lilod, Bangulo, and Sauiaran, was taken by the rebels;
g) road blockades and checkpoints set up by lawless
armed groups at the Iligan-Marawi junction;
h) burning of Dansalan College Foundation, Cathedral
of Maria Auxiliadora, the nuns' quarters in the church, and
the Shia Masjid Moncado Colony;
i) taking of hostages from the church;
j) killing of ve faculty members of Dansalan College
Foundation;
k) burning of Senator Ninoy Aquino College Foundation
and Marawi Central Elementary Pilot School;
l) overrunning of Amai Pakpak Hospital;
m) hoisting the ISIS flag in several areas;
n) attacking and burning of the Filipino-Libyan
Friendship Hospital;
o) ransacking of a branch of Landbank of the
Philippines and commandeering an armoured vehicle;
p) reports regarding Maute Groups' plan to execute
Christians;
q) preventing Maranaos from leaving their homes;
r) forcing young Muslims to join their group; and
s) intelligence reports regarding the existence of
strategic mass action of lawless armed groups in Marawi
City, seizing public and private facilities, perpetrating
killings of government personnel, and committing armed
uprising against and open defiance of the Government. 7 8
During the Oral Arguments for the instant petitions, the Solicitor General argued
that the atrocities committed by the NPA were in fact already included in Proclamation
No. 216 as shown by the use of the phrase "other rebel groups" in the sixth WHEREAS
Clause. According to him, the NPA was not categorically identi ed in view of the then
ongoing peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF:
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Considering that the government made mentioned [sic] of the NPA rebels
as one of the reasons for asking for the extension of martial law, this does
not seem to fall within the ambit of the word persist since the original
declaration was made on the basis of the rebellion committed by the
Maute in Mindanao and no mentioned [sic] whatsoever was made of the
NPA?
Actually, there's a phrase there, Your Honor, that will include the NPA in the
proclamation of the President, Proclamation No. 216, there's a phrase there
which says, 'of other rebels.' And because there [were] peace negotiations
during that time as a matter of comity and to the other party, the NPA was
not explicitly included there but if you read the entire contents of the letter
of the President and the proclamation of the President, Your Honor, it is
very clear that all rebels including NPA which has waged the longest time
of rebellion in the Philippines they are included there. In fact, Your Honor, in
the recommendation of the Chief of Staff the NPA was explicitly
mentioned in that recommendation. 7 9 SAHITC
Even if we were to accept the argument that the atrocities of the NPA were
already included among the grounds justifying the issuance of Proclamation No. 216,
the reality is that when the Court upheld the su ciency of the factual basis for the
declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Lagman v. Medialdea, no facts involving the NPA were examined by this Court
for the determination of probable cause or of evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a rebellion had been committed or was being committed.
Clearly, for the purposes of the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea , Proclamation No.
216 did not include the "decades-long rebellion" of the NPA as factual basis.
Thus, for the Court now to determine that rebellion "persists," it can only do so by
answering the question of whether or not the rebellion of the ISIS-inspired Maute Group
or of the DAESH-inspired DIWM persists. The addition of a new actor as factual basis
for arguing that a rebellion persists is self-contradictory and cannot be accepted.
Whether "defanged" or not, the present extension of the period of effectivity of
the declaration of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has not been shown to be necessary for public safety. Petitioners are more than
justified in reminding this Court and respondents of the lessons of Martial Law past.
Accordingly , I vote to declare that there is no sufficient factual basis for the
extension of the period of effectivity of the declaration of Martial Law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao, and
that Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated 13 December 2017 should be struck down
as unconstitutional .
CARPIO , J., dissenting :
The Case
These are consolidated petitions led under the Court's power to review the
su ciency of the factual basis of the extension of the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (writ) under paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The consolidated petitions challenge the
constitutionality of Joint Resolution No. 4 dated 13 December 2017 (Joint Resolution
No. 4) 1 issued by the Senate and the House of Representatives, further 2 extending the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ in the whole
Mindanao group of islands until 31 December 2018. HTcADC
The Antecedent Facts
On 13 December 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, voting

jointly, adopted Joint Resolution No. 4. The assailed issuance reads:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, on May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law
and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao," to address the rebellion launched by the Maute Group and elements
of the Abu Sayyaf Group and elements of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Marawi City,
and to restore peace and order in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a Special
Joint Session held on July 22, 2017, extended the Proclamation of Martial Law
Mindanao until December 31, 2017;
WHEREAS, in a communication addressed to the Senate and the House
of Representatives, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte requested the Congress of the
Philippines "to further extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, from 01 January 2018 to 31 December
2018, or for such other period of time as the Congress may determine, in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution";
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and
innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the
form of government with Communist rule;
requires it;
WHEREAS on December 13, 2017, after thorough discussion and
extensive debate, the Congress of the Philippines in a Joint Session, by two
and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus on the Whole
Mindanao; Now, therefore, be it
Session Assembled, [t]o further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017,
Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. 3
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145, and 236155 impugn the
constitutionality of Joint Resolution No. 4.
Discussion
I vote to grant the consolidated petitions for three reasons. First , the Maute
rebellion, which was the basis of Proclamation No. 216, already ceased. Second ,
threats to security posed by remnants of the defeated rebel groups do not constitute
an actual rebellion. Third , neither can the NPA rebellion justify the extension of
Proclamation No. 216, considering that the NPA rebellion was not the same rebellion
that led to the initial martial law declaration and suspension of the privilege of the writ
under Proclamation No. 216. Thus, Joint Resolution No. 4 lacks su cient factual basis,
thereby making it unconstitutional.
Preliminarily, I shall address petitioners' invocation of Ex Parte Milligan 4 as basis
to de ne martial law as "the assumption of jurisdiction by the military over the civilian
population x x x." 5 Petitioners view martial law "in the context of a theater of war,
wherein the government civilian functions such as the civil courts and other civil
services cannot function x x x." 6 aScITE
I disagree.
Decided by the United States (US) Supreme Court in 1866, Ex Parte Milligan
involved Lambden P. Milligan who was charged with acts of disloyalty and faced trial
before a military commission in Indiana during the civil war. He was found guilty on all
charges and sentenced to death by hanging. He then sought release through habeas
corpus from a federal court. While trials of civilians by presidentially created military
commissions were invalidated, the US Supreme Court recognized martial law as a
necessary substitute for the civil authority in the theater of active military operations,
thus:
It follows from what has been said on this subject that there are
occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or
civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer
criminal justice according to law, then, on the theat[er] of active military
operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a
substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the
safety of the army and society, and as no power is left but the
military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have
their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration, for, if
this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross
usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to
the locality of actual war. 7 (Emphasis supplied)
This pronouncement of the US Supreme Court has no application in this
jurisdiction because Ex Parte Milligan con icts with the Philippine Constitution.
Paragraph 4, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reads:
Sec. 18. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
privilege of the writ. (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution. Contrary to the theory of petitioners, the clause "nor supplant the
functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies" already precludes the
"existence of a vacuum in civilian authority in a theater of war." 8 Not even the phrase
"conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function" can serve as basis for the military to immediately acquire
jurisdiction. Under Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution, "Congress shall have the
power to de ne, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts." Applied to
military courts, this means that Congress needs to enact a law vesting military courts
with jurisdiction. In other words, a state of martial law does not ipso facto confer
jurisdiction on military courts over civilians. Rather, the conferment comes from
Congress through a separate law.
During the oral arguments, I made the same clari cation on the inapplicability of
Ex Parte Milligan, thus:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. x x x Ex Parte Milligan x x x. The US Constitution (does) not have
that provision that in case of martial law the Bill of Rights (is) not
suspended x x x.
ATTY. HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
It was the old concept of necessity.
ATTY. HILBAY:
Correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. So, I think, you agree with me that when (this) Court adopted the Ex
Parte Milligan de nition of martial law, it did not jibe with the present
Constitution, correct?
ATTY. HILBAY:
Well, in fact, Your Honor, Milligan is seen in the United States as a civil
liberties case decided by the United States Supreme Court against the
military. HEITAD

JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x the de nition x x x that martial law is the assumption of jurisdiction
by the military cannot apply here because our Constitution says, martial
law shall not supplant legislative assemblies. So, there is no instance
where the military can exercise supervision and control over legislative
assemblies, correct?
ATTY. HILBAY:
Your Honor, I think the cover of phrase is where civil courts are able to
function.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, x x x. "Shall not nor supplant the functioning of civil courts or the
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts over civilians where civil courts are able to function." x x x
that provision "nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts," you're talking of conferment of jurisdiction, which is conferred by
what?
ATTY. HILBAY:
By martial law, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
No. Jurisdiction is conferred by Congress, correct?
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Because it says here, it does not confer jurisdiction on military courts. The
act of declaration of martial law — can (that) confer jurisdiction on (the)
military? x x x there has to be a separate law. So that this de nition, 1866
definition, is not appropriate today, correct?
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CARPIO:
It's only appropriate in that it says you can declare martial law in a theater
of war . . .
ATTY. HILBAY:
Okay, Your Honor, I agree. 9
To be clear, all of the provisions of the Constitution, including the Bill of Rights,
remain operative during the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ. The Constitution clearly prohibits the automatic
assumption of jurisdiction by military courts during a state of martial law or
when the privilege of the writ is likewise suspended.
With the liberation of Marawi City and the end of
the Maute rebellion, the initial declaration of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ under Proclamation No. 216 can no longer
be extended.
Paragraph 1, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution reads:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x x x. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may , in the same manner, extend
such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it. [Emphasis supplied]
The Constitution provides that Congress, voting jointly, may extend the period of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ "if the x x x rebellion shall
persist." Literally and without need of constitutional construction, the word "persist"
means the continued existence of the same invasion or rebellion when martial law was
initially proclaimed or the privilege of the writ was initially suspended. In the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the framers understood that the
extension could be justi ed "if the invasion (or rebellion) is still going on ." 1 0 The
authority of Congress to extend martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ is, therefore, limited to the same rebellion persisting at
the time of the extension. In other words, the rebellion used by Congress as
justi cation to extend martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ must
be the same rebellion identified in the initial proclamation of the President. ATICcS
Proclamation No. 216, signed by President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President

Duterte) and attested by Executive Secretary Salvador C. Medialdea on 23 May 2017,
clearly identi es the "Maute group" as the rebel group who committed the crime of
rebellion by "rising (publicly) and taking arms against the [g]overnment for the purpose
of removing from the allegiance to said [g]overnment." The pertinent paragraphs of
Proclamation No. 216 read:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution provides that "x x x In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the
President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law x x x";
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 6968, provides that "the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by
rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives";
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation
No. 55 was the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist
group such as the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in
February 2016, killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in
Marawi City in August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other
detainees;
WHEREAS, today, 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has
taken over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established
several checkpoints within the City, burned down certain government
and private facilities and in icted casualties on the part of
Government forces , and started ying the ag of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting to remove from the
allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of Mindanao and deprive the
Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws of the land
and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, constituting the crime of
rebellion; and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute
group and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to
property not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. 1 1
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, on 25 May 2017, when President Duterte submitted his Report to
Congress, he identi ed the Maute group as the perpetrator of the crime of rebellion in
Marawi City, to wit:
Based on veri ed intelligence reports, the Maute Group, as of the end
of 2016, consisted of around two hundred sixty-three (263) members,
fully armed and prepared to wage combat in furtherance of its aims.
The group chie y operates in the province of Lanao del Sur, but has extensive
networks and linkages with foreign and local armed groups such as the Jemaah
Islamiyah, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur and the ASG. It adheres to the ideals
being espoused by DAESH, as evidenced by, among others, its publication of a
video footage declaring its allegiance to the DAESH. Reports abound that
foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria) in particular, as well as illegal drug money, provide nancial
and logistical support to the Maute Group.
The events commencing on 23 May 2017 put on public display
the groups' clear intention to establish an Islamic State and their
capability to deprive the duly constituted authorities — the President,
foremost — of their powers and prerogatives.
xxx xxx xxx
These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a
clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for
their planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering
the entire Mindanao. 1 2 (Emphasis supplied)
On 17 October 2017, President Duterte declared the liberation of Marawi City, a
day after the death of Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute, the leaders of the Maute
rebellion. In his speech to the soldiers on 17 October 2017, the President said, "Ladies
and gentlemen, I hereby declare Marawi City liberated from the terrorist
influence that marks the beginning of rehabilitation [of the city]." 1 3 TIADCc
This statement was bolstered by National Defense Secretary Del n Lorenzana in

his speech at the ASEAN Defense Ministers meeting held last October 2017. He said,
"After 154 days of the siege of Marawi by the Daesh-inspired Maute-ISIS
group, or after a week since the Commander-in-Chief declared liberation of
Marawi, we now announce the termination of all combat operations in
Marawi." 1 4
Joint Task Force Ranao Deputy Commander Colonel Romeo Brawner clari ed
what "termination of combat operations" means. He said, "x x x [T]his means that we
are terminating the assault, the offensive attack on the position of the Maute-
ISIS ." 1 5
These three separate statements made by President Duterte, the National
Defense Secretary and the Joint Task Force Ranao Deputy Commander, respectively,
clearly con rm that actual rebellion no longer persisted in Marawi City beginning 17
October 2017.
Moreover, the government did not present any evidence of an on-going rebellion
by the Maute group in other places of Mindanao outside of Marawi City to justify the
extension of Proclamation No. 216. In various media appearances, representatives
from the government and the army confessed that Marawi City was already contained
and under control.
In one media interview, Major General Restituto Padilla, Jr., spokesperson for the
military, said that the remaining twenty (20) to thirty (30) terrorists left in Marawi City
had "no way to get out anymore" and "there is no way for anyone to get in x x x [s]o
choking them to death at this point will be very key for our troops to do since
the area is very much contained and very controlled ." 1 6
National Defense Secretary Lorenzana Del n told reporters that "there were no
more militants , known locally as coming from the Maute Group, providing
resistance following an intense nal battle x x x." He continued, "All terrorists, ghting
troops. All hostages have been recovered. x x x In crushing thus far the most
serious attempt to export violent extremism and radicalism in the Philippines
and in the region, we have contributed to preventing its spread in Asia and
gave our share to maintaining global peace, stability and security ." 1 7
Indeed, the authority of Congress to extend the proclamation of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ must be strictly con ned to the rebellion that
"persists," the same rebellion cited by President Duterte in Proclamation No. 216.
Hence, the end of the Maute rebellion marked the end of the validity of
Proclamation No. 216. Any extension pursuant thereto is unconstitutional
since the Maute rebellion already ceased, with the death of its leader Isnilon
Hapilon and the liberation of Marawi City. To uphold the extension of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ when the Maute rebellion no longer
persists, in Marawi City or anywhere else in Mindanao, would sanction a clear violation
of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
The capability of the remnants of the defeated
rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and
damage to property, does not constitute an actual
rebellion.
Congress also justi es the extension of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ by citing the capability of the remnants of the
defeated rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property.
I disagree.
Paragraph 1, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests in the President, as
the Commander-in-Chief, the power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of
the writ, provided an actual rebellion or invasion exists and public safety requires the
declaration or suspension. While Congress may extend the proclamation or suspension,
the Constitution expressly requires, "the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it." In other words, the twin requirements of actual rebellion or invasion,
and public safety imposed on the initial proclamation and suspension are continuing
requirements for any subsequent extension of the proclamation or suspension. As aptly
put by the petitioners, "what persists must be actual." 1 8
By issuing Joint Resolution No. 4, the House of Representatives and the Senate
adopted the justification of the President in extending Proclamation No. 216. The Letter
dated 8 December 2017 of President Duterte to Congress reads in pertinent part: AIDSTE
xxx
More speci cally, the remnants of the DAESH-inspired DIWM
members and their allies, together with their protectors, supporters and
sympathizers, have been monitored in their continued efforts towards
radicalization/recruitment, nancial and logistical build-up, as well as their
consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao. x x x
Second, the Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning
to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area. x x x
Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) continue to defy
the government by perpetrating at least fteen (15) violent incidents during the
Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. x x x
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security
concern. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
x x x Public safety indubitably requires such further extension, not only
for the sake of security and public order, but more importantly to enable the
government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the bigger task of
rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic growth and
development. 1 9 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents cannot rely on the capability of the remnants of the defeated
rebels to deprive duly constituted authorities of their powers as a justi cation for the
extension of the state of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. To
emphasize, capability to rebel, absent an actual rebellion or invasion , is not a
ground to extend the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ. To allow martial law on the basis of an imminent danger or threat would unlawfully
reinstate the ground of "imminent danger" of rebellion or invasion, a ground that was
intentionally removed from the 1987 Constitution. This is a gross violation of the clear
letter and intent of the Constitution, as gleaned from the following deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission:
Mr. de los Reyes. As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual
rebellion and no longer imminent rebellion . Does the Committee mean
that there should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or
Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary event — this
Manila Hotel incident; everybody knows what happened. Would the committee
consider that an actual act of rebellion?
Mr. Regalado. If we consider the de nition of rebellion under Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual
assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes
mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed in Article 135. x x
x. 2 0 (Emphasis supplied)
The NPA rebellion, with the concurrence of

public safety, requires a separate martial law
declaration for a period not exceeding 60 days; it
cannot justify the extension of Proclamation No.
216, the factual basis of which was solely the
Maute rebellion.
To repeat, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the extension of the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ requires the
concurrence of the following two elements: one, the invasion or rebellion persists ; and
two, public safety requires the extension. Strict compliance with Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution is imperative because the provision distinguishes the initial
proclamation or suspension from the subsequent extension. The former can only last
for a period not exceeding 60 days, while the duration of the latter is subject to the
discretion of Congress. By belatedly invoking the NPA rebellion as factual basis
for the extension of Proclamation No. 216, the government effectively
circumvented the temporal limitation set by the Constitution that the initial
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ can
only last for 60 days. Worse, the extension set a maximum period of one year.
When the Court reviewed in Lagman v. Medialdea 2 1 the su ciency of the factual
basis of Proclamation No. 216, the Court ruled in the a rmative on the sole basis of
the Maute rebellion, to wit: AaCTcI
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he

arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and
the Report:
1) T h e Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the
rebellion."
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed
public uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people
of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao — starting with the City of
Marawi, Lanao del Sur — from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and
depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws
of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great
damage, prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a
whole."
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear
intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly
constituted authorities — the President, foremost — of their powers and
prerogatives."
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a
clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their
planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire
Mindanao."
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the
recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their
force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the
decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen
display of DAESH flags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent
to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance
to the Government."
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting
to deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi
City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an
attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and
o ces in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully
executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments."
7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face
pronounced di culty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-
wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from
performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The
bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the
government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring
peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government
personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered."
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with
support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and
their blatant acts of de ance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they
have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao."
9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among
terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi
City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the
entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to
ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
integrity."
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there
was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove
from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to
deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion
was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
[Emphasis supplied]
Similarly, when the Court examined the impact of the rebellion on public safety,
the Court never attributed the acts of violence to the NPA as to warrant the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ in the whole of
Mindanao, thus: EcTCAD
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but
de nitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of
actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the
President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the
Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishments but likewise against civilians and their properties . In
addition and in relation to the armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road
blockades and checkpoints were set up; schools and churches were burned;
civilian hostages were taken and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were
targeted; young male Muslims were forced to join their group; medical services
and delivery of basic services were hampered; reinforcements of government
troops and civilian movement were hindered; and the security of the entire
Mindanao Island was compromised.
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the atrocities had
already escalated to a level that risked public safety and thus impelled him to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. In
the last paragraph of his Report, the President declared:
While the government is presently conducting legitimate
operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of
invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the
rebellion is completely quelled.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have
been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has su cient
factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that
public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. (Emphasis supplied)
Even the ponencia concedes that Proclamation No. 216 did not contemplate the
NPA rebellion as factual basis. For one, the NPA merely "took advantage of the situation
and intensi ed their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up
terrorist attacks x x x, as well as guerilla warfare," all of which suggests that the
perceived "intensi ed" insurgence happened after the issuance of Proclamation No.
216. For another, when Proclamation No. 216 was issued, the government and the NPA
were undergoing peace negotiations. Hence, to belatedly expand the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216 as to include the NPA rebellion will violate Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution.
T h e ponencia holds that the inclusion of the NPA rebellion as basis for the
martial law extension is justi ed because the NPA shares with the DAESH/ISIS-inspired
rebels the same purpose of overthrowing the government and in icts the same degree
of violence as in the Marawi siege.
I disagree.
Contrary to the holding of the ponencia, mere identity of purpose and capacity
for violence between the NPA and the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebels cannot justify the
inclusion of the NPA rebellion as factual basis for the extension of Proclamation No.
216. The Constitution limits the initial martial law declaration or suspension of the
privilege of the writ to a period of 60 days. Only when this period is not enough to quell
the rebellion can an extension be sought. By citing the NPA rebellion as factual basis for
the extension, the government bypassed the mandatory 60-day period prescribed by
the Constitution for the initial declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ. The government can cite the NPA rebellion as a ground for the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ, but the initial 60-day period
prescribed by the Constitution must rst be observed before the government can ask
for an extension of such emergency measures.
Neither can the concurrence of Congress with the President cure the
unconstitutionality of the extension. The concurrent power of the legislative and the
executive to extend the proclamation or suspension is circumscribed by the clause "if
the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it." To give effect to this
clause, paragraph 3, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution vests the Court with the
power to review the su ciency of the factual basis of the extension. In other words,
mere concurrence of the two political branches is not enough. The Court is the nal
arbiter of the constitutionality of the extension. HSAcaE
ACCORDINGLY , I vote to GRANT the petitions in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061,

236145, and 236155 and DECLARE Joint Resolution No. 4 dated 13 December 2017
of the Senate and the House of Representatives UNCONSTITUTIONAL for failure to
comply with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
VELASCO, JR. , J., concurring :
I adhere to the dismissal of the petitions and concur with the declaration of
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 as constitutional. I would, however, like to make some
additional observations in connection with my concurrence. AScHCD
At the threshold of this opinion, I do not nd it amiss to note that the Martial Law
in Mindanao was extended for the rst time up to December 31, 2017. And yet, not one
of the petitioners questioned the validity of that extension. This neglect now estops the
petitioners from questioning the basis for the presently assailed extension since it is
merely a continuation of the extended Martial Law covered by Proclamation No. 216.
But be that as it may, in Lagman v. Medialdea , 1 this Court found that rebellion
exists in Mindanao and that public safety requires the exercise of the Martial Law
powers. Thus, it concluded that Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in the
region, has sufficient factual basis. This Court held:
. . . [T]he following facts and/or events were deemed to have been
considered by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 216, as plucked from
and extant in Proclamation No. 216 itself:
xxx xxx xxx
After the assessment by the President of the aforementioned facts, he
arrived at the following conclusions, as mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and
the Report:
1) The Maute Group is "openly attempting to remove from the
rebellion."
2) "[L]awless armed groups have taken up arms and committed
public uprising against the duly constituted government and against the people
of Mindanao, for the purpose of removing Mindanao — starting with the City of
Marawi, Lanao del Sur — from its allegiance to the Government and its laws and
depriving the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to enforce the laws
of the land and to maintain public order and safety in Mindanao, to the great
damage, prejudice, and detriment of the people therein and the nation as a
whole."
3) The May 23, 2017 events "put on public display the groups' clear
intention to establish an Islamic State and their capability to deprive the duly
constituted authorities — the President, foremost — of their powers and
prerogatives."
4) "These activities constitute not simply a display of force, but a
clear attempt to establish the groups' seat of power in Marawi City for their
planned establishment of a DAESH wilayat or province covering the entire
Mindanao."
5) "The cutting of vital lines for transportation and power; the
recruitment of young Muslims to further expand their ranks and strengthen their
force; the armed consolidation of their members throughout Marawi City; the
decimation of a segment of the city population who resist; and the brazen
display of DAESH ags constitute a clear, pronounced, and unmistakable intent
to remove Marawi City, and eventually the rest of Mindanao, from its allegiance
to the Government."
6) "There exists no doubt that lawless armed groups are attempting
to deprive the President of his power, authority, and prerogatives within Marawi
City as a precedent to spreading their control over the entire Mindanao, in an
attempt to undermine his control over executive departments, bureaus, and
o ces in said area; defeat his mandate to ensure that all laws are faithfully
executed; and remove his supervisory powers over local governments."
7) "Law enforcement and other government agencies now face
pronounced di culty sending their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-
wide power outages. Personnel from the BJMP have been prevented from
performing their functions. Through the attack and occupation of several
hospitals, medical services in Marawi City have been adversely affected. The
bridge and road blockades set up by the groups effectively deprive the
government of its ability to deliver basic services to its citizens. Troop
reinforcements have been hampered, preventing the government from restoring
peace and order in the area. Movement by both civilians and government
personnel to and from the city is likewise hindered." AcICHD
8) "The taking up of arms by lawless armed groups in the area, with

support being provided by foreign-based terrorists and illegal drug money, and
their blatant acts of de ance which embolden other armed groups in Mindanao,
have resulted in the deterioration of public order and safety in Marawi City; they
have likewise compromised the security of the entire Island of Mindanao."
9) "Considering the network and alliance-building activities among
terrorist groups, local criminals, and lawless armed men, the siege of Marawi
City is a vital cog in attaining their long-standing goal: absolute control over the
entirety of Mindanao. These circumstances demand swift and decisive action to
ensure the safety and security of the Filipino people and preserve our national
integrity."
Thus, the President deduced from the facts available to him that there
was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to remove
from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and to
deprive the Chief Executive of any of his powers and prerogatives, leading the
President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion
was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to
conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had
su cient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists .
The President's conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the
culpable purpose of which was the removal from the allegiance of the
Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation of the
President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In ne, the President satisfactorily
discharged his burden of proof. 2
Even petitioners at bar, as properly observed in the ponencia, concede the
existence of rebellion that led to the declaration of Martial Law under Proclamation No.
216. 3 The core of petitioners' contention is con ned merely to the propriety of the
further extension of the Martial Law in Mindanao. In substantiating their argument,
however, petitioners neglect that rebellion is a continuing crime , the ultimate goal
of which is to overthrow the government. The nature of rebellion as a continuing crime
has often been repeated by this Court. In Parong v. Enrile , 4 this Court characterized
rebellion as a continuing offense, viz.:
The last argument of petitioner, namely that the detainees were not
caught in flagrante delicto and therefore the arrest was illegal was refuted in the
Comment thus: "Again petitioner simply misses the point. As this Court correctly
observed, the crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses .
Besides this point involves an issue of fact."
A similar ruling was made in Umil v. Ramos 5 where this Court observed that:
. . . [H]e (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested, because Dural
was arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership is penalized, and for subversion which, like
rebellion is , under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense ,
thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion , subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes
and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses , aside from their essentially involving a
massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude . . .
x x x Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e., adultery, murder,
arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and
rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the
repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the
overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is
attained. 6
Further, while rebellion is the crime of the masses or multitudes, it is not
perpetrated in one crowd action or in a single battle. And while the crime of rebellion
consists of many acts, involving a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots, 7 these acts are not usually committed in a single instance. Rather,
rebellion is pursued and committed in sporadic crimes — murders, kidnappings, arsons,
sabotages, raids, hit-and-run tactics, and small skirmishes with the military — mostly by
a small group of combatants by what is termed as guerilla warfare. TAIaHE

Rarely is rebellion now committed by a large group of identi ed men engaging
the government in an all-out conventional war in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions. It would then be simply naive to dismiss, as the petitioners have, the
remaining armed groups in Mindanao as but "phantom remnants" of the defeated
terrorists and rebels. The fact that they do exist and still continue ghting is by itself
proof of the subsistence of the condition that compelled the administration to proclaim
Martial Law in Mindanao.
More importantly, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has su ciently
shown that the remaining members of the Maute group, which commenced the
rebellion, has not dwindled. Far from it, they have regrouped, increased in number, have
been augmented by foreign terrorist ghters and have established linkages with other
terrorists and rebel groups. During the oral arguments, the AFP stated thus:
74 members; the Maute Group with 30 members; the Maguid Group has 11; and
the Turaifie Group has 22 members with a total of 166 firearms.
However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the
of concentration.
more or less 250 members by the Maute Group in the Lanao provinces; 37 by
the Maguid Group in Sarangani and Sultan Kudarat, and more or less 70 by the
Turai e Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were
motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities;
revenge for their killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; nancial
gain as new recruits were given an amount ranging from PhP15,000.00 to
50,000.00; and, as radicalized converts.
markmanships and bombing operations at the different areas of Mount Cararao
Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high potentials
were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations.
boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and businessmen.
historically established links with Turaifie.
100% for the 2nd Semester. 8
Consequently, the burden is upon the petitioners to prove that the rebellion has
been quelled by the government forces and has ceased to exist. Petitioners, however,
failed to discharge this burden. Instead, petitioners have presented nary a competent
and adequate evidence that could refute the facts presented by the AFP and relied upon
by the President in requesting the extension of Martial Law. Bare allegations and
unfounded conclusions, without more, cannot debunk the nding of both the executive
and legislative branches of the government that rebellion continues to pose a danger to
the public safety in Mindanao and requires the imposition of Martial Law.

If this Court is to accord due regard to the principle of comity that should exist
among the three branches of the Government, it must observe utmost restraint. 9 It
must not modify, much less annul, the action of the other two branches of government
as embodied in the assailed Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, unless there is hard and
strong evidence that the extension has no factual basis. As no such evidence was
presented by the petitioners, there is nothing to offset the "presumption of
constitutionality" 1 0 of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
Surely, as an act of both the executive and the legislative branches, Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, 1 1 which was
explained by this Court as follows:
. . . This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers
which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a
becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the
joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful
scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This
Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a
petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words, the grounds for
nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. 1 2
cDHAES
The burden of proving the invalidity of this joint exercise of discretion that is the
extension of Martial Law rests on those who challenge it. 1 3 In this case, petitioners
failed to present any proof, much less clear and convincing evidence, that will convince
this Court beyond reasonable doubt of the nullity of the assailed Resolution. 1 4 Hence,
in the absence of the required proof of the unequivocal infraction of the Constitution
committed by the President and both houses of Congress, this Court will indulge the
presumption of constitutionality of the assailed Resolution of Both Houses No. 4. The
validity of the extension of Martial Law embodied therein must perforce prevail.
Past experiences under Martial Law may have led the petitioners to doubt its
necessity, e cacy, and the good that it may serve. However, the stark realities of the
moment should temper our wariness of the Martial Law powers. We need not fear
employing them when necessary for the promotion of public safety and the promotion
of public welfare. After all, it is not a power that can be employed without
corresponding responsibility . 1 5 In the vein of my opinion in Lagman, Martial Law
is by no means an arbitrary license conferred on the President and the armed
forces. As it is borne out of necessity, so it is limited by necessity.
To assuage the fears stoked by the implementation of Martial Law, I deem it
proper to restate my opinion in Lagman discussing some of the safeguards and
constraints that bind the hands of the President and the military that employ the Martial
Law powers:
. . . the source from which the power to proclaim Martial Law springs
must be considered. Hence, if there is no Constitutional provision or
statute expressly allowing an intrusion or limitation of a civil liberty,
then it is not and will not be allowed .
Public defense can and should be attained without a total
abrogation of all individual rights. Otherwise, "it could be well said that a
country, preserved at the sacri ce of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not
worth the cost of preservation." Thus, while this Court recognized in David that
"arrests and seizures without judicial warrants" can be made during Martial Law,
the circumstances justifying such warrantless arrests and seizures under the
Rules of Court and jurisprudence must still obtain. Pertinently, Section 5, Rule
113 reads:
SECTION 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A
peace o cer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving nal judgment or is temporarily con ned while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
As the basis for the declaration of Martial Law — rebellion — is a
continuing crime , the authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of persons
suspected of rebellion under the foregoing provision of the Rules of Court. It
must, however, be emphasized that the suspicion of rebellion upon which a
warrantless arrest is made must be based on a probable cause , i.e., the
ground of suspicion is supported by personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances su ciently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person sought to be arrested has "committed or is actually
committing" the crime of rebellion. Thus, parenthetically, the general arrest
orders must be issued by the Armed Forces on the basis of probable cause.
Alternatively, it must be shown that the person to be arrested was caught in
agrante delicto or has committed or is actually committing an overt act of
rebellion or any other offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
In sustaining an arrest without a judicial warrant, Justice Holmes, in
Moyer v. Peabody, ratiocinated that the "public danger warrants the substitution
of executive process for judicial process." However, I subscribe to the position
that even during Martial Law, the jurisdiction of and inquiry by the courts
are merely postponed, not ousted or superseded . Hence, the same tests
that would be applied by the civil courts in an inquiry into the validity of a
government action must be applied by the military during a Martial Law. ASEcHI
In line with this, searches and seizures without judicial warrants can only
be had in the following cases: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in plain
view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (7) exigent and
emergency circumstance; and (8) search of vessels and aircraft, where, again,
probable cause exists that an offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In the restriction of the freedom of speech and of the press, the military
must still be guided by the clear and present danger test — that words are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the military
has a right to prevent. Thus, the military can prohibit the dissemination of vital
information that can be used by the enemy, e.g., they can ban posts on social
media if there is a clear and present danger that such posts will disclose their
location. The same test, the presence of clear and present danger, governs the
power of the military to disperse peaceable assemblies during Martial Law. As
this Court held, tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Otherwise
stated, in the absence of clear and present danger, the military is bound by the
rules of maximum tolerance under Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 880, otherwise
known as the "The Public Assembly Act of 1985."
As to the "take-over of news media" mentioned in David, Section 17,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: "In times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest." Prescinding therefrom, this Court, in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. , held that police power justi es a
temporary "take over [of] the operation of any business affected with public
interest" by the State in times of national emergency:
xxx xxx xxx
This Court, however, has held that it is the legislature, not the executive,
which is the constitutional repository of police power, the existence of a national
emergency, such as a rebellion or invasion, notwithstanding. Accordingly, the
power to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest can only
be done whenever there is a law passed by Congress authorizing the
same . This Court, in David, explained as much:
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, the military must still be guided by law and jurisprudence
and motivated by good faith in the exercise of the supreme force of
the State even during a Martial law . Thus, in its endeavor to restore peace
and preserve the state, the military must still make proper adjustments to the
safeguards of constitutional liberty under the following legislations intended to
protect human rights:
1. Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act De ning Certain Rights of Person
Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the
Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating O cers and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof)
2. Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997)
3. Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness
Week Act of 2002)
4. Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003)
5. Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004)
6. Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)
7. Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007)
8. Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women)
9. Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009)
10. Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity)
11. Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act of 2010)
12. Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act of 2012) ITAaHc
13. Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary

Disappearance Act of 2012)
14. Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Tra cking in Persons Act
of 2012)
15. Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013)
16. Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems Act of
2013)
The continuous effectivity of the 1987 Constitution further provides a
blueprint by which the military shall act with respect to the civilians and how it
shall conduct its operations and actions during the effectivity of Martial Law.
Under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the "generally
accepted principles of international law [remains to be] part of the law of the
land." Hence, conventions and treatises applicable to non-international armed
con icts including the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols
continue to impose the limits on the power and discretion of the armed forces.
Notably, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions enumerates acts
that remain prohibited despite the hostilities. It states:
In the case of armed con ict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, each Party to the con ict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race,
colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar
criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with
respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular
murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying
out of executions without previous judgment pronounced
by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared
for.
Furthermore, the Fundamental Guarantees under Article 4 of the "Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions x x x relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)" remain binding:
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have
ceased to take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has
been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and
convictions and religious practices. They shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction. It is prohibited to order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing,
the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph
1 are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any
place whatsoever:
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental
well-being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel
treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal
punishment; CHTAIc
(b) collective punishments;

(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution
and any form of indecent assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
3. Children shall be provided with the care and aid they
require, and in particular:
(a) they shall receive an education, including religious
and moral education, in keeping with the wishes of their parents,
or in the absence of parents, of those responsible for their care;
(b) all appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the
reunion of families temporarily separated;
(c) children who have not attained the age of fteen
years shall neither be recruited in the armed forces or groups nor
allowed to take part in hostilities;
(d) the special protection provided by this Article to
children who have not attained the age of fteen years shall
remain applicable to them if they take a direct part in hostilities
despite the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) and are captured;
(e) measures shall be taken, if necessary, and
whenever possible with the consent of their parents or persons
who by law or custom are primarily responsible for their care, to
remove children temporarily from the area in which hostilities are
taking place to a safer area within the country and ensure that
they are accompanied by persons responsible for their safety and
well-being.
These international commitments are incorporated into our laws not only
by virtue of Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, but also by the
domestic legislations previously enumerated.
Without a doubt, state agents — the members of the armed forces — who
abuse their power and discretion under the proclaimed Martial Law and thereby
violate their duty as the "protector of the people and the State" are criminally
and civilly liable. And here lies the ultimate safeguard against the possible
abuses of this emergency power — the ultimate responsibility of the o cers
for acts done in the implementation of Martial Law. To whom much is given,
much will be required.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the petitions.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO , J., concurring :
I concur with the Decision penned by the Honorable Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam
dismissing the consolidated petitions which assail the constitutionality of Resolution
No. 4 adopted on December 13, 2017 by the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint session, resolving "To further extend Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017,
entitled Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year from January 1,
2018 to December 31, 2018."
However, for the same reason that I adduced in my Separate Concurring Opinion
in the case of Lagman v. Medialdea , 1 I wish to restate here that a special civil action
such as a petition for certiorari is one of the appropriate proceedings to question the
factual basis of a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension of such declaration and/or suspension. In the said Separate
Concurring Opinion I stated:
As for concerns that a petition for certiorari, prohibition or habeas corpus
imposes procedural constraints that may hinder the Court's factual review of the
su ciency of the basis for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of habeas corpus, these may all be addressed with little di culty. In
the hierarchy of legal authorities binding on this Court, constitutional provisions
must take precedence over rules of procedure. It is Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution which authorizes the Court to review factual issues in order to
determine the su ciency of the factual basis of a martial law declaration or a
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, as discussed
above, the Court may employ the most suitable procedure in order to carry out
its jurisdiction over the issue as mandated by the Constitution. Time and again,
the Court has stressed that it has the inherent power to suspend its own rules
when the interest of justice so requires.
The Court should be cautious that it does not take a position in these
consolidated cases that needlessly restricts our people's judicial remedies nor
carelessly clips our own authority to take cognizance of the issue of
constitutional su ciency under Section 18, Article VII in any appropriate action
that may be led with the Court. Such would be antagonistic to the clear intent
of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to empower our citizens and the
Judiciary as a vital protection against potential abuse of the executive power to
declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
(Citation omitted.)
Joint Resolution No. 4 of both Houses of Congress, implements the provision of
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which vests upon the Congress the power to
extend the presidential proclamation of martial law as follows:
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within
forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in
person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall
persist and public safety requires it.
need of a call.
the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof , and must
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he
shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above-quoted provision of Section 18, Article VII unequivocally empowers
Congress, upon the initiative of the President, to extend the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the following conditions: (1) the
invasion or rebellion shall persist or continue; (2) the public safety requires it; and (3)
the extension is decided, by a joint majority vote of Congress in a regular or special
session.
Regarding the rst two requirements to justify the extension of said
proclamation or suspension, it is appropriate to reiterate my disquisition in my
Separate Concurring Opinion in Lagman, to wit:
The concept of rebellion in our penal law was explained in the leading
case of People v. Hernandez , where the Court ruled that the word "rebellion"
evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted authorities, but, also, civil war,
on a bigger or lesser scale, with all the evils that go with it; and that all other
crimes, which are committed either singly or collectively and as a necessary
means to attain the purpose of rebellion, or in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof, constitute only the simple, not complex, crime of rebellion.
The Court also underscored that political crimes are those directly aimed
against the political order and that the decisive factor in determining whether a
crime has been committed to achieve a political purpose is the intent or
motive in its commission.
While rebellion is considered as an act of terrorism under the law, the
latter can be used to achieve a political end, such as removing from allegiance
to the State any part of the national territory or overthrowing the duly
constituted authorities. Even so, such lawless elements engaged in terrorism will
never acquire any status recognized under International Humanitarian Law. Yet,
acts of terrorism may be taken into account in the context of determining the
necessity for a declaration of martial law within our constitutional framework.
Plainly then, rebellion can be committed through an offense or a violation
of any special law so long as it is done as necessary means to attain, or in
furtherance of, the purpose of rebellion. In Ponce Enrile v. Amin , the Court held
that the offense of harboring or concealing a fugitive , or a violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829, if committed in furtherance of the purpose
of rebellion, should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion
instead of being punished separately. The Court explained:
All crimes, whether punishable under a special law or general law,
which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and
cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in themselves.
Thus:
"This does not detract, however, from the rule that
the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x" (Citing People v.
Hernandez)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes
as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer
to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping,
etc. as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant
circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule
that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not con ne
itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws
which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
In his dissenting opinion in Fortun, Justice Velasco states that the
Constitution does not require precision in establishing the fact of rebellion. In
support of this, he cites an excerpt from the Brief of Amicus Curiae Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., as follows:
From all these it is submitted that the focus on public
safety adds a nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the
Constitution which is not found in the meaning of the same word
in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the Penal Code,
after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the
Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the
present and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such
nuance, it is submitted, gives to the President a degree of flexibility
for determining whether rebellion constitutionally exists as basis
for martial law even if facts cannot obviously satisfy the
requirements of the Penal Code whose concern is about past acts.
To require that the President must rst convince herself that there
can be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
rebellion as de ned in the Penal Code and jurisprudence can
severely restrict the President's capacity to safeguard public
safety for the present and the future and can defeat the purpose
of the Constitution.
What all these point to are that the twin
requirements of "actual rebellion or invasion" and the
demand of public safety are inseparably entwined. But
whether there exists a need to take action in favour of
public safety is a factual issue different in nature from
trying to determine whether rebellion exists. The need of
public safety is an issue whose existence, unlike the existence of
rebellion, is not veri able through the visual or tactile sense. Its
existence can only be determined through the application of
prudential estimation of what the consequences might be of
existing armed movements. Thus, in deciding whether the
President acted rightly or wrongly in nding that public safety
called for the imposition of martial law, the Court cannot avoid
asking whether the President acted wisely and prudently and not
in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such decision involves the veri cation of factors not
as easily measurable as the demands of Article 134 of the Penal
Code and can lead to a prudential judgment in favour of the
necessity of imposing martial law to ensure public safety even in
the face of uncertainty whether the Penal Code has been violated.
This is the reason why courts in earlier jurisprudence were
reluctant to override the executive's judgment.
In sum, since the President should not be bound to search
for proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion
and since deciding whether public safety demands action is a
prudential matter , the function of the President is far from
different from the function of a judge trying to decide whether to
convict a person for rebellion or not. Put differently, looking for
rebellion under the Penal Code is different from looking
for rebellion under the Constitution . x x x. 2 (Emphasis
supplied; citation omitted.)
I also cited the case of Aquino v. Ponce Enrile , 3 where the Court expounded on
the sophisticated and widespread nature of a modern rebellion, which has now even
exacerbated with the advancement of technology. Aquino relevantly discussed:
It [rebellion] does not consist simply of armed clashes between organized and
identi able groups on elds of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the
most subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is
no actual ghting. Underground propaganda, through printed news sheets or
rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and ideological
adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and materiel, fth-column
activities including sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion
which by their nature are usually conducted far from the battle fronts. They
cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that
context.
Rebellion in contemporary times has acquired a graver complexion. In Section 3
(b) of Republic Act No. 9372, the "Human Security Act of 2007," rebellion is considered
as an act of terrorism. Acts of terrorism can be directed towards the attainment of
political objectives just as in the case of rebellion namely, to remove the allegiance to
the State of any part of the national territory or to overthrow the duly constituted
authorities. It is within the context of the ever increasingly ominous global threat posed
by terrorism to national sovereignty and public safety that the su ciency of the factual
grounds invoked by the President and sustained by Congress must be evaluated by the
Court. Particularly, the factual basis is encapsulated in the preambulatory clause of
Joint Resolution No. 4 of Congress quoted below:
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and
Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and last, the new
form of government with Communist rule[.]
There is evident constitutional basis to sustain the declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as well as their extension
outside of the existence of or the absence of a "theater of war" where civilian authorities
are unable to function. This is found in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution which
pertinently provides that "a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of civil courts, or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction and military courts and agencies over civilians
where civil courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ."
Furthermore, it should be stressed that Congress is empowered by the
aforecited Section 18, Article VII to determine the period of extension of the martial law
proclamation or suspension of the privilege of the writ, in like manner that it can
exercise its power to revoke such proclamation or suspension. Thus, both the aforesaid
revocation and extension shall be done by the "Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at
least a majority or all its Members in regular or special session."
The underlying reason articulated in the course of the deliberation of the 1986
Constitutional Commission of the manner of voting is to avoid the possibility of
deadlock and to facilitate the process of revocation. 4 Presumably, the Constitutional
Commission adopted the same manner of voting for the extension of the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for the
same reason, that the Congress may with facility and without the possibility of a
stalemate decide on the said extension.
The ponencia of the Honorable Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam has detailed the
su cient factual bases undeniably demonstrating that rebellion persists and that
public safety requires the extension of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a
period of one (1) year from 1 January 2018 to 31 December 2018.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives decisively resolved to extend
Presidential Proclamation No. 216 by two hundred forty (240) a rmative votes. The
collective decision of the Executive and the Legislative Branches of the Government to
extend for one (1) year the said proclamation, which was arrived at through a
constitutionally mandated process can be the long awaited strong political will that will
restore the elusive peace and promote prosperity in the whole of Mindanao.
Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petitions in G.R. Nos. 235935, 236061,
236145 and 236155.
BERSAMIN , J., concurring :
I CONCUR .
The Majority opinion ably written for the Court by Justice Tijam re ects my
personal persuasion that su cient facts existed to justify the extension for a period of
one year of the proclamation of martial law over Mindanao made by the Congress. The
continuing existence of actual rebellion has justified the extension. EATCcI
I write this Separate Opinion to express my views on the nature and coverage of
the term appropriate proceedings used in the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution, as well as on certain procedural matters dealt with in the
Majority opinion that I believe need to be clarified.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
x x x The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined
by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
led by any citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.
the invasion.
shall be released. [Emphasis Supplied]
In explaining the nature and scope of this power of the Court to review the factual
su ciency of the Presidential declaration of martial law and the Congressional
concurrence to any extension thereto, the Court said in Lagman v. Medialdea (Lagman
I): 1
All three petitions beseech the cognizance of this Court based on the
third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding led by any citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
During the oral argument, the petitioners theorized that the jurisdiction of
this Court under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a
special and speci c jurisdiction of the Supreme Court different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII.
The Court agrees. DHITCc
a) Jurisdiction must be
specifically conferred by the
Constitution or by law.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or by the law. Unless jurisdiction has been specifically
conferred by the Constitution or by some legislative act, no body or tribunal has
the power to act or pass upon a matter brought before it for resolution. it is
likewise settled that in the absence of a clear legislative intent, jurisdiction
cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution or a statute. It must
appear clearly from the law or it will not be held to exist.
A plain reading of the afore-quoted Section 18, Article VII reveals that it
speci cally grants authority to the Court to determine the su ciency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus.
b) "In an appropriate
proceeding" does not refer to a
petition for certiorari filed under
Section 1 or 5 of Article VIII.
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution
that the phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for
Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of
review in a petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the
performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the
su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be
emphasized that under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the
su ciency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency
powers. Put differently, if this Court applies the standard of review used in a
petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under
Section 18, Article VII.
In my Separate Opinion in Lagman I, I agreed with the proposition that the
appropriate proceeding mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution is different and distinct from the proceeding relating to the
Court's exercise of the power of judicial review, whether traditional or expanded. I
explicitly indicated then:
The third paragraph of Section 18 su ces to confer on the Court the
exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine the su ciency of the factual
bases of the proclamation of martial law. To equate the appropriate proceeding
to the certiorari action authorized under Section 5 (1), in relation to the second
paragraph of Section 1, is erroneous. As earlier pointed out, the third paragraph
of Section 18 de nes the legal duty to review the su ciency of the factual
basis for the proclamation of martial law upon the ling of the petition for the
purpose by any citizen. The Court has then to discharge the duty.
The silence of Section 5 (1) on what the appropriate proceeding is should
be of no consequence because Section 5 is not the sole repository of the cases
or situations coming under the Court's jurisdiction.
xxx xxx xxx
The check-and-balance constitutional design set down in Section 18 of
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution establishes a structure of collaboration
among the three great branches of the Government in the matter of the
proclamation of martial law. Although the power of proclaiming martial law
over the country or any part of it is exclusively lodged in the President, he or she
is nonetheless required to report to Congress on the proclamation, and Congress
shall then decide whether to revoke or extend the state of martial law. The Court,
being a passive institution, may be called upon to review and determine the
su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation, and whether the public
safety requires it, only upon the petition for the purpose by any citizen.
The invocation of the third paragraph of Section 18 by the petitioning
citizen su ces to initiate this Court's power to review the su ciency of the
factual bases of the declaration of martial law. This initiation, which triggers the
inquiry or review by the Court, albeit unique, conforms to the constitutional
design. cEaSHC

The appropriate proceeding, once commenced, should not focus on
whether the President gravely abused his or her discretion or not in determining
the necessity for proclaiming martial law. Instead, the 1987 Constitution
mandates the Court to examine and sift through the factual basis relied upon by
the President to justify his proclamation of martial law and to determine
whether the factual basis is su cient or not. To rule that a nding of grave
abuse of discretion is essential is to con ne the discharge of the duty by the
Court within limits not considered at the time of the rati cation of the 1987
Constitution. Doing so may also produce impractical results. Consider this
hypothetical scenario. Supposing that the President cites 10 factual bases for
his proclamation of martial law, and the Court, upon its assiduous review of the
factual bases, considers nine of the 10 as manufactured or fabricated or
inadequate, leaving but one as true or authentic. Under the thesis of the OSG,
the Court would necessarily nullify the proclamation simply because the
President was found to have gravely abused his or her discretion. The Court
would thereby act indifferently towards the one true or authentic justi cation on
the ground that the grave abuse of discretion as to the nine tainted the
proclamation.
Moreover, the determination of su ciency or insu ciency of the factual
bases for the proclamation of martial law is usually a matter of validating the
good judgment of the President of the facts or information known to or made
available to him or her. This goes without saying that such facts must have
occurred prior to or about the time the determination by the President is made.
Whether or not such facts are later shown by subsequent events to be
fabricated or false or inadequate is not a decisive factor unless the President is
credibly shown to have known of the fabrication or falsity or inadequacy of the
factual bases at the time he or she issued the proclamation of martial law. In
that situation, the main consideration is de nitely not whether or not grave
abuse of discretion intervened.
My reading of the third paragraph of Section 18 tells me that the term
appropriate proceeding is different from the proceedings or actions that the
Court may take cognizance of under Section 5(1) or Section 1. My foremost
reason for so holding is that the third paragraph of Section 18 textually
mandates the Court to be a trier of facts, an o ce and function that the Court is
not generally called upon to discharge under either Section 5(1) or Section 1. It
is true that the Court is not always precluded from reviewing facts. There are
occasions when it assumes the role of a trier of facts, like, to name some, in
criminal appeals; in appeals from rulings of the Court of Appeals in proceedings
for the writ of amparo; or when it sits as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
In ne, I deem it to be plainly erroneous to subsume the appropriate
proceeding allowed in the third paragraph of Section 18 to the certiorari
jurisdiction vested by Section 5(1) in relation to the expanded jurisdiction
defined in second paragraph of Section 1.
The Majority opinion adopts several procedural steps that, to me, are not relevant
or controlling in this kind of proceedings.
The Majority opinion takes issue with the fact that all petitions except that in G.R.
No. 2236145 (Rosales petition) did not implead the Congress despite its being an
indispensable party. The Majority opinion states that impleading an indispensable party
is jurisdictional, and insists that any proceeding undertaken without an indispensable
party is null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the unimpleaded party
but even as to the party impleaded; and that impleading an indispensable party is not a
trivial matter.
I do not share the view stated in the Majority opinion.
In my humble view, the requirement of the Rules of Court for the joinder of the
indispensable party is not applicable in this kind of proceeding wherein the Court is
called upon by the 1987 Constitution to exercise a special and exclusive jurisdiction
that is different from the exercise of the Court's judicial power vested under either
Section 1, Article VIII or Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
The requirement of impleading an indispensable party, which is found in Section
7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, demands that a party in interest without whom no nal
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as a plaintiff or a defendant.
Hence, the joinder of the indispensable party is mandatory. Without the presence of the
indispensable party, no judgment of a court exercising judicial power can attain real
nality because the controversy is not at all thereby resolved, or because the relief
proper for the case is not granted. The absence of the indispensable party renders all
subsequent acts of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.
Yet, the requirement of impleading the indispensable party can be true only in
proceedings in which the courts exercise judicial power under either Section 1, Article
VIII or Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, not to the present
proceedings under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The distinction arises from the fact that the former are proceedings
instituted to resolve actual controversies between litigants holding or asserting
adverse rights and interests in property or other matters, while the latter are
proceedings that focus only on the determination of the su ciency of the factual basis
for the extension of the declaration of martial law made by the Congress and do not
involve any actual controversy or dispute about rights and interests of parties in
interest. In short, the present proceedings are not concerned with rights and interests,
thereby removing the need for the mandatory impleading of any person or entity. CTIEac
NONETHELESS , I vote to DISMISS the petitions.

DEL CASTILLO , J., concurring :
I concur with the ndings and conclusions of the ponencia upholding the
constitutionality of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, which extended the proclamation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the
whole of Mindanao from January 1 to December 31, 2018. DcHSEa
In the earlier case of Lagman v. Medialdea , 1 the Court upheld the

constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao. The
Court, in that case, found that "the parameters for the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, i.e., 1) actual rebellion or
invasion; and 2) public safety requirement] have been properly and fully complied with."
2 Hence, the Court ruled that, "Proclamation No. 216 has su cient factual basis, there
being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists, and that public safety requires the
martial law declaration and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus." 3
Using the same parameters as in Lagman, the Court is now tasked to review the
su ciency of the factual bases of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, further extending
the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao from January 1 to December 31, 2018, to wit:
First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their
groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and
training of new members and fighters to carry on the rebellion;
conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area;
Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters continue to defy the
government by perpetrating at least fteen (15) violent incidents during the
Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato;
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and
Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern;
and last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensi ed
their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist
acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerrilla warfare
against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely
to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's
democratic form of government with Communist rule. 4
Existence of Actual Rebellion
I n Lagman, the Court found that actual rebellion existed in the whole of
Mindanao. In this case, the question is whether the same rebellion still exists.
I am convinced that it does as the "liberation of Marawi" did not end the rebellion.
Marawi, as found by the Court in Lagman, was only the staging point of the rebellion as
the target was the whole of Mindanao. 5 The fact that the surviving members of the
Maute group have not surrendered and are even recruiting new members despite the
death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers clearly proves that the rebellion persists. The
violent incidents perpetrated by the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in
Mindanao likewise negate petitioners' position that the rebellion has been quelled by
the "liberation of Marawi." Thus, I believe that while the government may have won the
battle in Marawi, the war against the rebellion is still ongoing.
Moreover, I agree with the ponencia that the inclusion of the New Peoples Army
(NPA) as basis for the further extension will not render void Resolution of Both Houses
No. 4. Although the NPA group was not expressly included in Proclamation No. 216 as
one of the "other rebel groups," their attacks may nevertheless be used as factual bases
for the extension considering that these contributed to the violence and even
aggravated the situation in Mindanao.
To put things in perspective, let us say Country A invades Mindanao and
immediately thereafter, the President issues a proclamation declaring martial law in the
entire Mindanao. After two weeks, Country B then decides to join the war in the hope of
taking over a portion of Mindanao. Under the circumstances, is the President still
required to make another proclamation for the invasion by Country B? Obviously not —
as it would be super uous and impractical considering the President already declared
martial law to stop the invasion of Mindanao. So, instead of promulgating a separate
declaration of martial law, the President may just ask Congress for an extension based
on the original invasion, which continues to exist, with the invasion by Country B as an
additional factual basis for the extension. SCaITA

In this case, the attacks carried out by the NPA are but additional factual bases
which may be used to support the ndings of the President and the Congress that the
rebellion persists in the whole of Mindanao. In fact, whether or not the NPA group was
used as a basis for the extension does not change the fact that the rebellion started by
Hapilon and the Maute brothers continues to exist in Mindanao.
Theater of War
Citing portions of the deliberations of the framers of the 1987 Constitution,

petitioners Rosales, et al. and Monsod, et al. advance the theory that for martial law to
be valid, it must be in the context of an actual "theater of war" due to a rebellion or
invasion. 6 Under this theory, martial law can only be declared in an area where there is
actual armed conflict. 7
There is, however, nothing in the deliberations to support their theory. Quoted
below are the pertinent portions of the deliberations;
SR. TAN:
Yes. Thank you.
The other question is also on the same section. Would martial law
automatically give the President the power of legislation through decrees?
MR. SUMULONG:
We will ask Commissioner Concepcion to answer.
MR. CONCEPCION:
It is stated in Section 15:
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts . . .
The Commissioner's question is whether martial law decreases or
increases the power of the President?
SR. TAN:
Decreases?
MR. CONCEPCION:
Not necessarily.
SR. TAN:
So, what speci c power is necessary before the President can proclaim
martial law?
MR. CONCEPCION:
In general, in case of invasion, the President would have all the powers of
a general in the army.
MR. SUMULONG:
We ask Commissioner Bernas to answer.
FR. BERNAS:
That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee:
What precisely does martial law add to the power of the President to call
on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state:
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies . . .
The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme
Court. I think it is the case Aquino vs. COMELEC where the Supreme Court
said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has
legislative power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law
does not suspend the operation of the Constitution; therefore, it does not
suspend the principle of separation of powers.
The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees?
The answer we gave to that question in the Committee was: During martial
law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a
theatre of war . In actual war when there is ghting in an area, the
President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders
which have the effect of law but strictly in a theatre of war , not in the
situation we had during the period of martial law. In other words, there is
an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was
developed especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has
reference to the theatre of war . aTHCSE
SR. TAN:
Thank you. 8
xxx xxx xxx
MR. FOZ:
May I go to the next question? This is about the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on page 7,
on the second to the last paragraph of Section 15. Is it possible to delete
the clause "where civil courts are able to function"? In the earlier portion of
the same sentence, it says, "nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
x x x" I was just thinking that if this provision states the effects of the
declaration of martial law — one of which is that it does not supplant the
functioning of the civil courts — I cannot see how civil courts would be
unable to function even in a state of martial law.
MR. SUMULONG:
May we refer that interpellation to Commissioner Bernas?
FR. BERNAS:
jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war . In
a theater of war , civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual
theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function, then the military
commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military
courts precisely because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the
general area where the civil courts are opened then in no case can the
military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a
theater of war where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
MR. FOZ:
It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that
specified critical area.
FR. BERNAS:
That is correct.
MR. FOZ:
And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the
Commander-in-Chief.
FR. BERNAS:
It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The
understanding here is that the phrase "nor authorize the conferment of
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians" has reference to
the practice under the Marcos regime where military courts were given
jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will never allow that except
in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes
necessary for some kind of court to function.
MR. FOZ:
Thank you, Madam President. 9
It appears that Father Bernas mentioned the concept of the "theater of war" twice
during the deliberations.
First was in answer to the question of "[whether] martial law automatically give[s]
the President the power of legislation through decrees," 1 0 to which Father Bernas
answered in the negative. He explained that, "the President may have the powers of a
commanding general in a theatre of war. In actual war when there is ghting in an area,
the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue orders which have
the effect of law but strictly in a theatre of war, not in the situation we had during the
period of [Marcos] martial law." 1 1 Simply put, Father Bernas mentioned the "theater of
war" only to make it clear that under the 1987 Constitution, a declaration of martial law
does not automatically grant the President the power to legislate, as the 1987
Constitution expressly provides that "a state of martial law does not suspend the
operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts
and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically
suspend the privilege of the writ." 1 2 cAaDHT
Second was in response to the suggestion of deleting the phrase "where civil
courts are able to function." Father Bernas rejected this suggestion as the phrase
delimits the effects of martial law so that the "practice under the Marcos regime where
military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians" 1 3 would not happen again. He
explained that during martial law, the Commander-in-Chief has no power to confer
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians, except in a "theater of war" or
in the area where there is actual war because of which the civil courts are unable to
function.
Considering that the framers of the 1987 Constitution only mentioned the term
"theater of war" in the context of describing and de ning the powers of the President
during martial law, it is highly specious for petitioners to use the same to support its
theory. In fact, the Court in Lagman quoted the same portions of the deliberations only
to describe what happens during a state of martial law. Thus, contrary to the view of
petitioners, there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution that limits the scope of martial law
to the actual "theater of war." As the Court has declared in Lagman, the discretion to
determine the territorial coverage of martial law lies with the President, 1 4 subject of
course to the safeguards laid down in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Public Safety Requirement
As to the second requirement, petitioners assert that the public safety

contemplated in Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution "entails a breakdown of
civilian government" 1 5 or "a vacuum in civilian authorities." 1 6 Such assertion has no
legal basis as there is nothing in the 1987 Constitution and in the records of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission to indicate that such was the intended
de nition of the framers. Besides, unless technical terms are employed, words used in
the Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning and as much as possible its
language should be understood in its common usage. 1 7 Thus, in Lagman, the Court
de ned public safety simply as one that "involves the prevention of and protection from
events that could endanger the safety of the general public from signi cant danger,
injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or disasters." 1 8
With this de nition and in light of the factual circumstances indicated in the letter
of the President and the Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, I believe that public safety
requires the extension of martial law. Undeniably, the acts of violence committed, and
being committed, by the rebels in various areas in Mindanao continue to endanger the
lives of the people in Mindanao.
Period of Extension
Finally, as to the period of extension, Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution states that, "upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
determined by the Congress , if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
safety requires it." The provision is clear: the determination of the period of the
extension, as well as the number of extensions, lies with the Congress.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to DISMISS the Petitions and AFFIRM the
constitutionality of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
PERLAS-BERNABE , J., concurring :
I concur.
Before the Court are consolidated petitions 1 which assail the su ciency of the
factual basis of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 2 dated December 13, 2017, 3 that
further extended the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216, 4 entitled "Declaring a State of
Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao," 5 from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Pertinent portions of this
Resolution read: HTcADC

xxx xxx xxx
of Mindanao: Now, therefore, be it
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
I. Parameters of Review.
At the onset, it should be pointed out that the Court's parameter of review over
this case remains the same as its parameter of review over President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte's (the President) initial proclamation of martial law, as was undertaken by this
Court in the consolidated cases of Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, et al. v. Hon.
Salvador C. Medialdea, Executive Secretary, et al. , G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and
231774 (Lagman v. Medialdea) . 6 Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
(Section 18, Article VII) vests unto this Court special jurisdiction to review, in an
appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, not only the su ciency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law, but also "the extension thereof," viz.:
Section 18. x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by
any citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof , and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
filing. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , I have explained that the term
"su cient factual basis" under Section 18, Article VII is a conceptually novel and
distinct parameter of review, which should not be equated to the gauge of arbitrariness
(as in the standard of grave abuse of discretion in certiorari cases) but should, instead,
be construed in its generic sense — that is, adequate proof of compliance with the
constitutional requisites. Thus, insofar as reviewing the President's proclamation of
martial law, the parameter and its underlying considerations were summed up as
follows: aScITE
[T]he parameter "su cient factual basis" under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution simply means that there is adequate proof to show that the
President had complied with the two requisites to impose martial law. These
requisites are: (1) that there exists an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) that
the public safety so requires the same.
There is adequate poof that the President complied with the first requisite
if the elements of rebellion as de ned in Article 134 of the RPC concur; this
means that the rebellion is not merely imminent but has been actually
consummated.
On the other hand, there is adequate proof that the President complied
with the second requisite if it is shown that the public safety demands the
imposition of martial law under a particular territorial extent; since public safety
is a malleable concept, the Court should then gauge whether or not there is a
reasonable need to impose martial law in light of the exigencies of the situation
and concomitantly, whether its territorial extent is rationally commensurate to
the said exigencies. 7
Although the parameter of review remains the same, the object of review in this
case is different. Here, the object of review is not the President's initial proclamation of
martial law — as in Proclamation No. 216 decided in Lagman v. Medialdea — but rather,
the Congress' extension of the President's martial law proclamation, as embodied in
Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017. As such, there is no reason
to apply the principle of conclusiveness of judgment as respondents would suppose. 8
Notably, while Congress had, in fact, earlier extended Proclamation No. 216 9
through Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 1 0 dated July 22, 2017, 1 1 the Constitution
does not proscribe any limitation on either (a) the number of times an extension may be
made, or (b) the duration of time for which a particular extension may be made. Thus,
contrary to petitioners' postulation, 1 2 Congress is not precluded from either extending
martial law for a second time or extending martial law for a period of more than sixty
(60) days.
Pursuant to Section 18, Article VII, the power to extend martial law belongs to
Congress; however, the exercise of this power is "[u]pon the initiative of the President":
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
persist and public safety requires it .
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Being a power speci cally conferred unto Congress, it is not bound by the
recommendation of the President regarding any proposed extension; thus, it may
engage in its own independent examination on the matter, and consequently, may arrive
at its own reasons in deciding on whether or not to extend martial law. In this sense,
Congress — being composed of the duly-elected representatives of the people — acts
as a legislative body in deciding whether or not to extend martial law in our country, and
necessarily, if an extension is so decided, sets the extension's terms as it deems fit.
However, as observed during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution,
Congress' decision-making process would necessarily be in consultation with the
President. 1 3 This is because it is the President who not only seeks the proclamation's
extension but also ultimately possesses the information and expertise to deal with a
persisting invasion or rebellion. As pointed out in Lagman v. Medialdea:
"It is for the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to appraise
these [classi ed evidence or documents/]reports and be satis ed that the public
safety demands the suspension of the writ." Signi cantly, respect to these so-
called classi ed documents is accorded even "when the authors of or witnesses
to these documents may not be revealed." HEITAD
In ne, not only does the President have a wide array of information
before him, he also has the right, prerogative, and the means to access vital,
relevant, and con dential data, concomitant with his position as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces. 1 4
While Congress makes the nal decision, this necessary interaction between the
political branches of government shows that the entire process of extending the
proclamation of martial law is — as described by the Framers — a "joint executive and
legislative act," 1 5 animated by the "principle of collective judgment." 1 6
Meanwhile, same as reviewing the President's power to proclaim martial law, the
Court acts as a check to the Congress' power to extend martial law. In the latter
respect, the Court's task, upon the institution of the appropriate proceeding by any
citizen, is to determine if there is su cient factual basis to show that: (a) the invasion
or rebellion still persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension. Pursuant to
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, these two (2) requirements ought to be
satisfied by Congress before it may properly decree a martial law extension.
II. Persistence of Rebellion.
In my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , I have discussed the unique

nature of rebellion and in such light, broached how the concept of "actual rebellion"
should be understood under the Constitution's martial law provision:
[I]n light of the nature of rebellion (1) as a movement, (2) as a complex net of
intrigues and plots, (3) as a continuing crime, and (4) as a political offense, it is
my view that this Court cannot con ne the concept of rebellion to the actual
exchange of re between the accused rebels and the forces of the government.
As above-intimated, the taking up of arms against the government is only what
consummates the crime of rebellion in order to prosecute those accused thereof
under the RPC. However, up until that movement stops (for instance,
when the rebels surrender or are caught by government operatives), it
is my opinion that the rebellion continues to survive in legal existence .
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he crime of rebellion de es our ordinary impression that a crime's occurrence
can be pinpointed to a de nite territory, much less its existence bounded to a
particular moment in time. Because of its nature, rebellion is hardly compatible
with the norms of spatial and temporal limitability, as usually applied in our
criminal law. It is in this speci c light that we should understand the concept of
an actual rebellion under the Constitution's martial law provision. 1 7
As above-highlighted, it has been my position that a rebellion, because of its
peculiar conceptual features, survives in legal existence up until the rebellious
movement stops, such as when the rebels have already surrendered or that they are
caught by government operatives. As it may, however, be impractical, if not impossible,
to accurately ascertain if all the members of a rebel movement have surrendered or
have been killed or captured at a certain point in time, then a satisfactory showing of
the rebel movement's substantial inactivity or loss of capability to mount a public
uprising would reasonably suffice.
In this case, however, there is no evidence to show that the rebel movement in
Mindanao, comprised of the Maute-Hapilon Group and other rebel groups under the
DAESH/ISIS 1 8 front, has been substantially inactive or has lost the capability to mount
a public uprising. On the contrary, respondents have competently proven that these
rebels have, in fact, regrouped, thereby demonstrating that the rebellion still persists.
Records show that respondents' determination was arrived at based on eld
reports and technical data coming from no less than the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The information gathered by
our troops on the ground was then conveyed by the President in his December 8, 2017
letter to Congress:
On 04 December 2017[,] I received a letter from Secretary of National
Defense Del n N. Lorenzana, as Martial Law Administrator, stating that "based
on current security assessment made by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the undersigned recommends the extension of Martial Law for
another twelve (12) months or one (1) year beginning January 1, 2018 until
December 31, 2018 covering the whole island of Mindanao primarily to ensure
total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq
(DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed
Lawless (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers,
supporters, and nanciers x x x." A copy of Secretary Lorenzana's letter
(together with a copy of the letter of AFP Chief Guerrero) is attached for your
convenient reference. 1 9
In the same letter, the President summed up the security assessment of the AFP,
as supported by the PNP, into ve (5) integral points. These points constitute the
reasons which impelled the President to seek a further extension of martial law from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018: ATICcS
The security assessment submitted by the AFP, supported by a similar

assessment by the Philippine National Police (PNP), highlights certain essential
facts that I, as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, have
personal knowledge of.
First , despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants
the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at-large and, in all probability, are
their allies, together with their protectors, supporters and sympathizers, have
been monitored in their continued efforts towards radicalization/recruitment,
nancial and logistical build-up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization
Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan. These activities are geared towards the
conduct of intensi ed atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their
objective of establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a
Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in the whole of Southeast Asia.
Second , the Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning
to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area. Turai e is said to be
Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH [ Wilayat] in the Philippines and
Southeast Asia.
Third , the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) [continues] to
defy the government by perpetrating at least fteen (15) violent incidents during
the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. For this year, the
BIFF has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassments
and roadside bombings against government troops.
Fourth , the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security concern.
civilians, three (3) of whom were mercilessly beheaded.
Last , but certainly not the least, while the government was preoccupied
government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private
entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security sector and public and
government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent
means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with
Communist rule.
xxx xxx xxx 2 0 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Notably, Congress adopted these same considerations as evinced from the text
of Resolution of Both Houses No. 4:
targeting, the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
[continues] to defy the government by perpetrating at least fteen (15) violent
form of government with Communist rule[.]
As correctly observed by the ponencia, "[t]he reasons cited by the President in his
request for further extension [of martial law] indicate that the rebellion, which caused
him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its 'remnants' have been
resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the
recruitment and training of new members, nancial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces[,] and continued attacks." 2 1 These "remnants," as explained by
the respondents, "are capable of launching retaliatory attacks against the Government
and sowing acts of terrorism against the civilian population to wrest control of
Mindanao and continue their bid to establish a wilayah in the region. In addition, they
have established linkages with other rebel groups such as the BIFF, AKP, ASG, DI
Maguid, DI Turai e who are capable of perpetrating strategic and well-coordinated
mass casualty attacks to overthrow the present government." 2 2 TIADCc
As further elaborated upon by the AFP during the oral arguments of this case, the
manpower of the Dawlah Islamiyah, which is the DAESH-a liate organization in the
Philippines responsible for the Marawi Siege and is composed of several local terrorist
groups, "increased by more or less 400, with almost the same strength that initially
stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and decentralized recruitment of the
[DAESH]-inspired groups at their respective areas of concentration." 2 3 "These newly
recruited personalities were motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of
terrorist personalities; revenge for their killed relatives and parents during the Marawi
operations; nancial gain as new recruits were given an amount ranging from
Php15,000.00 to Php50,000.00; [and] as radicalized converts." 2 4 Furthermore, the AFP
has expressed concerns that "the situation has [in fact] become [more] complicated
with the in ux of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), capitalizing on the porous maritime
boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and business men. As of this
period, 48 [FTFs] were monitored joining the [DAESH]-inspired groups, particularly the
Maute Group in Lanao and Turai e Group in Central Mindanao. The closeness of these
two groups is predominant with Abu DAR who has historically established link with
Turaifie." 2 5
Based on this information, it is thus highly apparent that the rebellion subject of
Proclamation No. 216 still persists. Petitioners did not only fail to refute the data
presented to this Court by the government, but more so, have mistakenly equated the
end of the rebellion with the so-called liberation of Marawi City. While it is true that the
President had himself declared the liberation of Marawi City on October 17, 2017, 2 6
this declaration only signi es the fact that the actual re ghting between the rebels
and government forces in the said city had been halted. However, as stated in my
Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , the rebellion survives in legal existence up
until the rebellious movement stops. 2 7 The cessation of the actual exchange of re
between the rebels and government forces is not enough to declare an end to the
rebellion as these rebels may as well regroup and shore up their strength, as in fact,
what happened in this case. Besides, as aptly noted by the ponencia, the announced
liberation of Marawi City (on October 17, 2017) was made "nearly two months before
the President's request for extension in December 2017. Such declaration does not
preclude the occurrence of supervening events as the AFP discovered through its
monitoring efforts." 2 8 As held in Lagman v. Medialdea , "Congress may take into
consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration." 2 9
To clarify, these supervening events should not only pertain to the regrouping
efforts of the aforestated rebel "remnants" but also the inclusion of other rebel groups,
such as the BIFF, the Turai e Group and the NPA, whose rebellious activities during the
supervening period may have ampli ed — if not, complicated — the situation. As the
Constitution reads, the persistence of an invasion or rebellion (together with the public
requirement) is su cient for an extension to be decreed. Nowhere has it been required
that the extension should solely relate to the supervening activities of the same rebel
group covered by the initial proclamation. If such were the case, then (a) the
Constitution would have so stated or the Framers would have so discussed this
requirement; or (b) the President would have to impractically issue a separate martial
law proclamation just to cover the supervening activities of other rebel groups when, in
reality, the government has to deal with the entire impact of a state of rebellion.
Besides, while not speci cally identi ed in Proclamation No. 216, the President
mentioned of "other rebel groups" therein and had, in fact, considered the siege of
Marawi City as a demonstration of the capability of the Maute Group, as well as of
these "other rebel groups" "to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not
only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao." 3 0 As such, it can be
reasonably inferred that the identi cation of the Maute Group in Proclamation No. 216
was not meant to be exclusive. In this relation, the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea, had, in
fact, recognized "the widespread atrocities in Mindanao and the linkages established
among rebel groups," concluding that "the armed uprising that was initially staged in
Marawi cannot be justi ed as con ned only to Marawi." 3 1 Thus, the President and the
Congress' consideration of these other rebel groups, while not speci cally named in
Proclamation No. 216, should be deemed as reasonable. Finally, while the NPA has
been recognized to be a "decades-long rebellion," the ponencia correctly states that its
"'intensi ed' insurgence clearly bears a signi cant impact on the security of Mindanao
and the safety of its people, which were the very reasons for the martial law
proclamation and its initial extension." 3 2 Thus, the NPA's inclusion should not render
the subject extension void.
III. Public Safety Requires the Extension of Martial Law.
The Constitution not only requires the persistence of rebellion but also, that
public safety still requires its extension. As earlier stated, not only does Congress have
the power to decide whether or not to extend a proclamation of martial law, it also has
the power to dictate the terms of extension, which includes, of course, the extension's
length. AIDSTE
In my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , I have discussed that "the

second requirement [on public safety] is a more malleable concept of discretion,
whereby deference to the prudential judgment of the President, as Commander-in-
Chief, to meet the exigencies of the situation should be properly accorded." 3 3 However,
I have quali ed that "our deference x x x must be circumscribed within the bounds of
truth and reason[:]" 3 4 truth relates to the Court's duty to ascertain the veracity of the
facts presented by the government, whereas reasonableness may be determined
through an overall appreciation of the surrounding circumstances. With respect to the
latter, the Court may consider "the reported armed capabilities, resources, in uence,
and connections of the rebels"; "the historical background of the rebel movement"; and
further, "the President's estimation of the rebels' future plan of action. If the estimation,
when taken together with all the foregoing factors, does not seem implausible or
farfetched, then this Court should defer to the President's military strategy." 3 5
In this case, the President requested Congress to extend martial law over the
entire Mindanao from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 based on his prudential
estimation that it would take such period of time to quell the rebellion:
A further extension of the implementation of Martial Law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will help the AFP, the
[PNP], and all other law enforcement agencies to quell completely and put an
end to the on-going rebellion in Mindanao and prevent the same from escalating
to other parts of the country. Public safety indubitably requires such further
extension, not only for the sake of security and public order, but more
importantly to enable the government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the
bigger task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic
growth and development.
For all these reasons, I ask the Congress of the Philippines to further
extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year,
from 01 January 2018 to 31 December 2018, or for such other period of time as
the Congress may determine, in accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution. 3 6
After due deliberation, Congress had overwhelmingly acceded to this request,
thereby showing its deference to the President as this country's chief military
strategist:
of Mindanao: Now, therefore, be it
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. 3 7
As explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F Leonen in his Dissenting Opinion
i n Lagman v. Medialdea , "Congress deals primarily with the wisdom behind the
proclamation x x x" and "[m]uch deference is x x x accorded to [it] x x x when it
comes to determining the wisdom behind the imposition or continued
imposition of martial law or the suspension of the writ ." 3 8
The ponencia nds that "[t]he facts as provided by the Executive and considered
by Congress amply establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is
signi cantly endangered by it." 3 9 As detailed in the ponencia, the following
circumstances and events demonstrate the public necessity to extend martial law over
the entire Mindanao:
(a) No less than 185 persons in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have
remained at large. Remnants of the Hapilon and Maute groups have been
monitored by the AFP to be reorganizing and consolidating their forces in
Central Mindanao, particularly in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu and
Basilan, and strengthening their financial and logistical capability.
(b) After the military operation in Marawi City, the Basilan-based
ASG, the Maute Group, the Maguid Group and the Turai e Group, comprising
the DAESH-a liate Dawlah Islamiyah that was responsible for the Marawi
siege, was left with 137 members and a total of 166 rearms. These rebels,
however, were able to recruit 400 new members, more or less, in Basilan, the
Lanao Provinces, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao. AaCTcI
(c) The new recruits have since been trained in marksmanship,

bombing and tactics in different areas in Lanao del Sur. Recruits with great
potential are trained in producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
urban operations. These new members are motivated by their clannish culture,
being relatives of terrorists, by revenge for relatives who perished in the Marawi
operations, by money as they are paid P15,000.00 to P50,000.00, and by radical
ideology.
(d) 48 FTFs have joined said rebel groups and are acting as
instructors to the recruits. Foreign terrorists, from Southeast Asian countries,
particularly from Indonesia and Malaysia, will continue to take advantage of the
porous borders of the Philippines and enter the country illegally to join the
remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebel groups.
(e) In November 2017, 15 Indonesian and Malaysian DAESH-inspired
FTFs entered Southern Philippines to augment the remnants of the Maguid
group in Sarangani province. In December 2017, 16 Indonesian DAESH-inspired
FTFs entered the Southern Philippines to augment the ASG-Basilan and Maute
groups in the Lanao province. In January 2018, an unidenti ed Egyptian DAESH
figure was monitored in the Philippines.
(f) At least 32 FTFs were killed in the Marawi operations. Other FTFs
attempted to enter the main battle area in Marawi, but failed because of
checkpoints set up by government forces.
(g) "The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and their allies continue to
visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western and Eastern
their forces in Marawi City." There were actually armed encounters with the
remnants of said groups.
(h) "Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the
BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype [Turai e], and the ASG remain capable of
staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in
Mindanao, including the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos,
Zamboanga, and Cotabato."
(i) The Turai e [G]roup conducts roadside bombings and attacks
against government forces, civilians and populated areas in Mindanao. The
group plans to set off bombings in Cotabato.
planning to bomb the cities of Zamboanga, Iligan, Cagayan de Oro and Davao.
(k) The remaining members of the ASG-Basilan have initiated ve
violent attacks that killed two civilians.
Zamboanga Peninsula, conducted 43 acts of violence, including IED attacks
and kidnapping which resulted in the killing of eight innocent civilians, three of
whom were mercilessly beheaded. Nine kidnap victims are still held in captivity.
(m) Hapilon's death fast-tracked the uni cation of the Sulu and
Basilan-based ASG to achieve the common goal of establishing a DAESH-ISIS
wilayat in Mindanao. This likely merger may spawn retaliatory attacks such as
IED bombings, in urban areas, particularly in the cities of Zamboanga, Isabela
and Lamitan.
(n) By AFP's assessment, the ISIS' regional leadership may remain in
the Southern Philippines and with the defeat of ISIS in many parts of Syria and
Iraq, some hardened ghters from the ASEAN may return to this region to
continue their ght. The AFP also identi ed four potential leaders who may
replace Hapilon as emir or leader of the ISIS forces in the Philippines. It warned
that the Dawlah Islamiyah will attempt to replicate the Marawi siege in other
cities of Mindanao and may conduct terrorist attacks in Metro Manila and
Davao City as the seat of power of the Philippine Government. With the
spotlight on terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Southeast Asia following
the Marawi siege, the AFP likewise indicated that the in ux of FTFs in the
Southern Philippines will persist. The AFP further referred to possible lone-wolf
attacks and atrocities from other DAESH-inspired rebel groups in vulnerable
cities like Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan and
Zamboanga. 4 0
Petitioners, for their part, have failed to disprove the occurrence of the foregoing
circumstances and events. They instead, harp on the allegation that due to the
liberation of Marawi City, martial law is not anymore necessary to preserve the public's
safety. 4 1 Clearly, such narrow reasoning cannot prevail over the President and the
Congress' holistic appreciation of the case. With intelligence reports showing that the
Maute Group has, in fact, regrouped and that other rebel groups have either linked with
the DAESH/ISIS front or have taken advantage of the situation and intensi ed their
operations, the threat to public safety undoubtedly remains present. As to whether or
not the objective of resolving such threat can be achieved in one (1) year — to my mind
— this Court is hardly competent to provide a precise estimation. The Court's task is to
determine the su ciency of the extension's factual basis and in so doing, (a) vet if the
facts presented are true, and (b) assess if the decreed extension is reasonable. As
earlier intimated, if the President's estimation does not appear to be implausible or
farfetched, then this Court should defer to his plan of action, especially so since
Congress has further given its assent. Notably, AFP Chief of Staff General Rey Leonardo
Guerrero asked this Court during the oral arguments of this case to trust their years of
experience on the ground, their expertise in military strategy, and their capacity to make
split-second decisions which may spell the difference between life and death. 4 2 In this
case, no cogent cause has been shown for this Court to deny this trust to its co-equal
branches of government. EcTCAD
Thus, considering that there exists su cient factual basis to show that the
rebellion still persists and that public safety requires the extension of martial law under
the terms stated in Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017, I vote
to DISMISS the consolidated petitions.
LEONEN , J., dissenting :
The best propaganda is that which,

as it were, works invisibly,
penetrates the whole of life
without the public having any knowledge
of its propagandistic initiative. 1
— Joseph Goebbels
Nazi Politician and Propaganda Minister
We live in a fantasy world,
a world of illusion,
the great task in life is to find reality. 2
— Iris Murdoch
Author and Philosopher
The extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the principal means to address the long war
against terrorism given the facts in this case is a short-sighted populist fallacy that is
not supported by the Constitution. It is a solution that denies the complexity of a
generational problem. It assures an environment conducive to the emergence of an
authoritarian. HTcADC
At issue in this case is whether a longer second extension of martial law should
be constitutionally allowed considering declarations of victory in Marawi as well as
progress in the interdiction of terrorists.
There are no facts that support the length of the extension. There are no facts
that support why martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus should be applied throughout the entirety of Mindanao. The declaration of
martial law does not specify the additional powers that will be granted to the
Commander-in-Chief and the military.
The President inserts a new reason for the longer second extension of martial
law which was not present in Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017: the Maoist Marxist
Leninist rebellion of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New Peoples' Army-
National Democratic Front. Yet, even assuming that this was constitutionally
permissible, the facts as alleged by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) show
that this fty-year protracted insurgency is declining, the result of their successes even
without martial law.
The government failed to show why the normal legal framework and the
professional work of the military, police and local government units are insu cient to
meet the threats that they describe. The facts they present are not su cient to support
the use of the extraordinary powers of the Commander in Chief to declare martial law
and the suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The majority surrenders the Constitutional mandate of both Congress and this
Court to do a reasonable, conscientious, and sober check on the use of the most
awesome powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief. More than any
constitutional organ, this Court should be the last to succumb to fear stoked by a
pastiche of incidents without context. More than ever, this Court is called upon to
practice its studied independence. It should show that it is an institution that can look
beyond political pressure. It should be the constitutional body that does a sober and
conscientious review amid the hysteria of the moment. This Court should be the last to
succumb to false and simplified dichotomies.
The presentations of the government are simply allegations of reality whose
basis in fact remain illegible and invisible, hidden under the cloak of the military's
concept of con dentiality. Even if true, the numbers they present do not match the
constitutional exigencies required.
The deliberation in Congress was hobbled by the belated request for extension
from the President and the imposition of a rule by its "supermajority" clearly designed
to produce no other result than accession to the wishes of the President without
serious deliberation. Each representative of the House of Representatives and each
Senator were to reveal the preferences of their constituents in just three (3) minutes.
Three (3) minutes were all that each of them had to raise questions, clarify, and express
dissent, if any. The Congress' leadership's resolute persistence to keep to such time
limits sacri ced democratic parliamentary deliberation. This was grave abuse of
discretion.
The Constitution requires that on a matter as important as martial law, this Court
should not defer even as Congress renders itself unable to meet the expectations of
democratic deliberation. The revisions introduced in 1987 guard against grave abuse of
discretion as well as the failure of legislative inquiry into the su ciency of the factual
basis for invoking the Commander-in-Chief powers to declare a state of martial law and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Constitution does not allow us to blind ourselves with any version of the
political question doctrine. The majority opinion, in its proposal for a type of deferential
factual review, is nothing but a reincarnation of the political question doctrine similar to
that in Aquino v. Enrile and Morales v. Enrile during the darker days of martial law
declared by Ferdinand E. Marcos.
We do not know the extraordinary powers that will be wielded under the rubric of
martial law. The majority glosses over the executive and the legislature's silence as to
the extra powers that will be exercised under a state of martial law. We are asked to
defer to the invisible.
This is not what we have learned from history. It is not what the Constitution
allows. aScITE
Respectfully and in conscience, I cannot agree.

The proposal of the President to extend the state of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus as well as Congress' Resolution No. 4 of Both
Houses issued on December 13, 2017 should be declared unconstitutional. They are
anathema to our republican and democratic state with the people as sovereign, as
mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
Part I of this dissent narrates the facts and the proceedings that precede the
second and longer extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ in Mindanao. Part II summarizes the reasons for this conclusion in Part I of this
dissent. The succeeding parts elaborate on the reasons. This dissent should be read in
relation to my separate opinion also in G.R. No. 231658, Lagman, et al. v. Medialdea 3 or
the 2017 Martial Law cases, questioning the rst extension of the declaration of martial
law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The events leading to these consolidated cases are as follows:

On May 23, 2017, a state of martial law was declared in Mindanao for a period
not exceeding sixty (60) days, through President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216, which read:
WHEREAS, Proclamation No. 55, series of 2016, was issued on 04
September 2016 declaring a state of national emergency on account of lawless
violence in Mindanao;
WHEREAS, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that 'x x x In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he (the
President) may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law x x x';
WHEREAS, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
No. 6968, provides that 'the crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by
rising and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing
from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic
of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed
forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives';
WHEREAS, part of the reasons for the issuance of Proclamation No. 55
was the series of violent acts committed by the Maute terrorist group such as
the attack on the military outpost in Butig, Lanao del Sur in February 2016,
killing and wounding several soldiers, and the mass jailbreak in Marawi City in
August 2016, freeing their arrested comrades and other detainees;
WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken
over a hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints
within the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and
in icted casualties on the part of Government forces, and started ying the ag
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly
attempting to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part
of Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in
Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group
and other rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property
not only in Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE, President of the Republic
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and
by law, do hereby proclaim as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby declared a state of martial law in the
Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days, effective as of
the date hereof.
SECTION 2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall likewise
be suspended in the aforesaid area for the duration of the state of martial law.
DONE in the Russian Federation, this 23rd day of May in the year of our
Lord, Two Thousand and Seventeen.
Thereafter, the President submitted his Report on the declaration of martial law.
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives issued resolutions nding no reason
to revoke the declaration. 4 HEITAD
Petitions were then led before this Court assailing the declaration of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ as unconstitutional as there was no
su cient factual basis for these acts. Finding that Proclamation No. 216 was
supported by su cient factual basis, this Court dismissed these petitions in a Decision
dated July 4, 2017.
In a Letter 5 dated July 18, 2017, the President explained to Congress that the
rebellion would not be quelled completely by the expiry of the sixty (60) day period for
the effectivity of martial law provided under the Constitution. Thus, he requested that
the proclamation of martial law be extended until December 31, 2017.
Congress acted on the President's Letter in a Special Joint Session and adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, 6 extending the effectivity of Proclamation No. 216
until December 31, 2017. This was the first extension.
On October 17, 2017, Marawi City was freed from the terrorist groups' in uence.
7
From October 17, 2017 until December 2017, there was no indication that there
was any need to further extend martial law.
Despite the liberation of Marawi City, Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana wrote a Letter
8 dated December 4, 2017, forwarding an undated letter written by AFP General Rey
Leonardo B. Guerrero, recommending that President Duterte extend martial law and
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao for twelve (12) months,
until December 31, 2018. Secretary Lorenzana said:
Due to compelling reasons and based on current security assessment
made by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the undersigned
recommends the extension of Martial Law for another 12 months or 1 year
beginning January 1, 2018 until December 31, 2018 covering the whole island
of Mindanao primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul
Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist
Groups (L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist
terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters and nanciers, and to ensure
speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the
Mindanao.
The previous Martial Law declaration which is still in effect until end of
December 2017 has resulted in remarkable achievements, such as the death of
Hapilon and the Maute brothers. However, the remnants of their groups were
monitored to be continuously rebuilding their organization through the
recruitment and training of new members/ ghters. Likewise, there are also other
terrorist groups, such as the TURAIFIE, monitored to be planning to conduct
terrorist activities in some parts of Mindanao, and there are data that indicate
that armed struggle in Mindanao is still relatively strong.
This proposed second extension of implementation of Martial Law in
Mindanao coupled with continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus will signi cantly help not only the AFP, but also other
DIWM groups and communist terrorists-staged rebellion, and in restoring public
order, safety, and stability in Mindanao.
In his undated Letter 9 to the President, General Guerrero cited the following
justifications for the extension of martial law:
The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer
armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western, and Eastern Mindanao in
spite of the neutralization of their key leaders and destruction of their forces in
Marawi City;
Other DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer
Marawi City;
Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as BIFF, AKP,
DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar atrocities
and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including the cities
of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and Cotabato;
The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political mobilization
(army, party and mass base building, rallies, pickets and demonstrations,
nancial and logistical build up), terrorism against innocent civilians and
private entities, and guerrilla warfare against the security sector, and public
government infrastructures;
The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order
to defeat their strategy, stop their extortion, defeat their armed component, and
to stop their recruitment activities;
The threats being posed by the CTs, the ASG, and the presence of
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the
Mindanao;
The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with
the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Mindanao will signi cantly help not only the AFP, but also other stakeholders in
quelling and putting an end to the on-going DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and
CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and stability in
Mindanao; and ATICcS
In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to
so for the whole duration of Martial Law to date, without any reported human
rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority.
Thus, in a Letter 1 0 dated December 8, 2017, the President asked Congress for a
second extension of the proclamation of martial law and the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in Mindanao, for a period of one (1) year, to last until December 31,
2018. The only attachments to the President's Letter were the letters of Secretary
Lorenzana and General Guerrero.
Acting on the President's Letter, the House of Representatives and Senate
promulgated Rules of the Joint Session of Congress on the Call of the President to
Further Extend the Period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, 1 1 to govern the
joint session during which Congress would perform its constitutional duty to determine
whether rebellion persists, and whether public safety requires the extension of martial
law. 1 2 During this joint session, resource persons from the Executive Department
would report "on the factual basis of the letter of the President calling upon Congress
to further extend the period" of martial law in Mindanao. 1 3 These rules limited a
member's period to interpellate resource persons to only three (3) minutes. 1 4
During the joint session on December 13, 2017, the only materials provided to
the members of Congress were the three (3) letters written by the President, General
Guerrero, and Secretary Lorenzana. 1 5 Nonetheless, Congress passed Resolution of
Both Houses No. 4, Further Extending Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a Period of One (1) Year from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018. It read:
WHEREAS, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a Special
Joint Session held on July 22, 2017, extended the Proclamation of Martial Law
of Mindanao until December 31, 2017;
new members and ghters to carry on the rebellion. Second, the Turai e Group
innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerrilla warfare against the
requires it;
of Mindanao; Now, therefore, be it
from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018.
Thus, four (4) petitions 1 6 were led before this Court, assailing Congress' act of
extending martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as the
President's act of recommending it. Respondents, through the O ce of the Solicitor
General, led their comments to the petitions, and this Court set the case for oral
arguments.
During the Oral Arguments, on January 17, 2018, Major General Fernando
Trinidad, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Chief of the AFP made a Power Point
presentation on the Extension of Martial Law in Mindanao, to update this Court as to
how martial law has been implemented, and to explain the necessity of extending
martial law. 1 7 Through various manifestations led before us, the respondents
represented by the O ce of the Solicitor General refused to make public any portion of
the Operational Directives from the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces on the Conduct
of Martial Law or their Program to Counter Violent Extremism. The Court thus decided
that the contents of these documents will not be taken into consideration. TIADCc
The parties filed their respective memoranda on January 24, 2018.
II
With the filing of any appropriate action under Article VII, Section 18, 1 8 this Court
is required to conduct greater judicial and judicious scrutiny of both the Proclamation
of Martial Law and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus by the
President and the decision of Congress to allow any extension of these Commander-in-
Chief powers.
The heightened scrutiny can be discerned from (1) the text and context of the
provision; (2) the textual evolution of the provision from past constitutions and their
various interpretations in jurisprudence; and (3) a reasonable informed contemporary
interpretation based upon an analysis of the text, context, and textual history as well as
history in general.
Martial law is a state which suggests a derogation of the fundamental republican
and democratic concept of a state where sovereignty resides in the people. It is a
derogation of the elaborate balance of civil governance and limited government laid out
in the Constitution. Martial law is a label or rubric for a set of extraordinary powers to
be exercised by the President in a situation of extreme exigency. Regardless of the
incumbent, the possible scope of the powers that can be exercised intrinsically calls for
an examination of how it affects the fundamental individual and collective rights
embedded in our constitutional order.
Martial law generally allows more powers to the AFP. The clear intent of the
Constitution is for the sovereign through both its elected representatives as well as the
Supreme Court to do an exacting review of a declaration of martial law.
The heightened scrutiny in Article VII, Section 18 already includes the power to
review whether the President in his proclamation or request for extension, or the
Congress in its decision to extend, has gravely abused its discretion. The Supreme
Court does not lose its powers under Article VIII, Section 1 1 9 simply with an invocation
of Article VII, Section 18. The result would be the absurd situation of hobbling judicial
review when the Constitution requires the Court to exercise its full powers.
Besides, both powers were properly invoked in the consolidated petitions.
There can be no rational review if the powers that the President wishes to
exercise are not clearly de ned. There can be no rational review if all that we are
presented with is a declaration of the state of martial law — a description, label, or
rubric — not the actual powers that the Commander-in-Chief, through the military, is
willing to exercise in derogation of the regular powers already granted by the
Constitution and statutes. A declaration of a state of martial law is super uous when
ambiguous or when it simply reiterates powers which can be exercised by the Chief
Executive.
This is the situation we have in this case. We have an ambiguous declaration of
martial law with no unique powers over an area that is too broad, where the fear of
skirmishes in which imminence has not also been proven to exist. There are no actual
debilitating confrontations deserving of martial law powers. There are no
confrontations that could not be solved by the calling out powers of the President or
the surgical application of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
There is no rebellion that endangers public safety as required by the Constitution
as basis for the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Article VII, Section 18, when properly invoked, raises issues with respect to (a)
the reasonability of the extension of the declaration of the state of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (b) the su ciency of the
factual basis for the declaration of the state of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. These two relate to each other. Both must pass
both congressional and judicial inquiry.
On one hand, the reasonability of the extension of the state of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus will depend on the following inquiries:
(a) whether the powers originally granted were properly exercised and it was
not the inability to effectively and efficiently wield them that caused the extension;
(b) whether the past application of de ned powers, under the declaration of
a state of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, was conducted
in a manner which did not unduly interfere with fundamental rights. In other words, the
Court needs to be convinced that the powers requested under martial law were and will
be exercised in a manner least restrictive of fundamental rights;
(c) whether the proposed extension has clear, reasonable, and attainable
targets, and therefore, whether the period requested is supported by these aims;
(d) whether there are credible and workable rules of engagement for the
exercise of the powers properly disseminated through the ranks of the military that will
implement martial law; and
(e) whether there is basis for the scope of the area requested for the
extension of the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. AIDSTE
On the other hand, the su ciency of the factual basis for the declaration or the
suspension consists of two (2) elements. Both elements must prove rebellion and the
necessity of the extraordinary powers for public safety purposes.
The rst element of this part of the inquiry is the concept of "factual basis." It
must not only depend on factual assertions made by the military. The basis for the
factual assertions must be presented in a reasonable manner. That is, that this Court
must distinguish and evaluate the relationship between factum probandum and factum
probans — between the ultimate facts alleged and the evidentiary facts used, and the
reasonability of the inferences to arrive at the allegations.
The second element of this inquiry is the concept of the "su ciency" of the
factual basis. This means that it should relate to the powers necessary for the evil it
seeks to prevent.
The "evil" sought to be addressed by clearly de ned powers under a state of
martial law is the presence of actual — not imminent — rebellion, and "public safety" is a
necessity for the exercise of such powers. "Public safety" cannot be the damage or
injury inherent in acts of rebellion. If that is so, then there would have been no necessity
to make it a textual requirement in Article VII, Section 18. Rather, it should mean more.
In examining the history of martial law in general, and the clear expressed desire to
avoid the kind of martial law imposed through Proclamation 1081 in 1972, we see that
martial law is imposed in a situation where civil and/or judicial authority could not
exercise its usual powers. The history of martial law in this country also implies that
such exigency should require a measured and definitive timetable, target, and strategy.
In both general inquiries, the extraordinary powers — as well as their scope and
limitations — should be clear. Apart from making them clear to those that will review,
they should be made public and transparent. They cannot be confidential.
Both Congressional and judicial reviews include these two (2) basic inquiries:
whether there are clear, transparent, and necessary powers articulated under martial
law, and whether the declaration of such kind of martial law is supported by su cient
factual basis.
Unlike the Court, Congress may provide for oversight in the exercise of powers
by the President as Commander-in-Chief. Such oversight may be to ensure that the
fundamental rights of citizens are guaranteed even under a state of martial law or with
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The possible abuse of
discretion in the lack of oversight exercised by Congress is not in issue in this case but,
in my view, should likewise be justiciable due to the extraordinary nature of these
Commander-in-Chief prerogatives.
Both the President and Congress also gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to make public the powers that are to be exercised by the military, the remedies,
and the strategy. Public participation in quelling the rebellion, assuming that it exists,
should always be encouraged. There should no longer be any secret decrees.
Congress gravely abused its discretion in that it extended the proclamation of a
state of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus (a)
without a proper presentation of all the facts in their proper context; (b) without
examining the basis of the conclusions inherent in the allegations of facts by the
military; (c) without knowing the powers that will be exercised that are unique to the
declaration of a state of martial law; and (d) without ascertaining why there needed to
be a longer extension in the same area even with the declaration of continued victories
by the military.
All these were unexamined because of the existence of the fth ground that
rendered the extension unconstitutional. There was (e) a lack of deliberation. The
deliberation was hobbled by the late request submitted by the President to extend the
declaration and the rules of Congress which unconstitutionally restricted discussion.
Each representative of each district and each nationally elected Senator were given only
three minutes to interpellate, clarify, and express their dissent, if any.
The facts presented were generalized and meant to justify extraordinary powers
on the basis of general fears of what might happen. They listed a litany of violent
confrontations, past and present, with no coherent timeline.
Terrorism and rebellion are vastly different. Even the aims of each group
categorized as terrorists and enumerated in the presentations of the government are
different. Some of the groups are separated in terms of ideology and methods. Many of
these groups are continuously driven by internal and violent divisions. It is illogical and
deceiving to present them as a coordinated enemy, and therefore, accumulate their
collective strengths to stoke fear of potential catastrophe. This is fear mongering at its
best and this Court should provide the sobriety called for by the Constitution. AaCTcI
More importantly, the government has not highlighted its victories. It has not
presented how its normal law enforcement abilities have been able to disrupt and
interdict past attempts to sow chaos and discord. It has not shown why its ordinary
capabilities remain short to address all the law-and-order problems it enumerates.
III
Judicial review, properly invoked, is not a privilege of this Court. It is its sworn
duty.
The textual evolution of Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution and the context
in which it was formulated reveals a mandate for this Court not to give full deference to
the Executive when the Commander-in-Chief powers are exercised. The present text
entails "a heightened and stricter mode of review." 2 0
Under the Malolos Constitution, the President of the Republic was granted very
broad Commander-in-Chief powers. The President had "the army and the navy" at his or
her disposal. 2 1 The Malolos Constitution did not provide for any particular safeguard
when the president exercises the commander-in-chief powers other than the provision
imposing liability of the President for high treason. 2 2 Judicial power, which was vested
in the Supreme Court and in other courts created by law, 2 3 was simply de ned as the
"power to apply the laws, in the name of the Nation, in all civil and criminal trials." 2 4
The Philippine Bill of 1902 further developed the Commander-in-Chief Powers of
the President. Section 5, Paragraph 7 allowed the President or the Governor to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under certain conditions. The privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus could only be suspended with the approval of the Philippine
Commission in cases of "rebellion, insurrection, or invasion" and when the "public safety
may require it." 2 5
The question of whether the judiciary may review the exercise of the
Commander-in-Chief powers under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was raised in Barcelon v.
Baker. In resolving the case, this Court deferred to the judgment of the Governor
General and the Philippine Commission and ruled that the factual basis relied upon for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was purely political, and
thus, beyond the scope of judicial review. In refusing to take judicial cognizance of the
issue, this Court relied on the principle of separation of powers and on the presumption
that each branch of the government properly dispensed its functions. 2 6
The Philippine Autonomy Act, or the Jones Law of 1916, expressly recognized
the executive as the "commander in chief of all locally created armed forces and militia."
2 7 Section 21 of the Philippine Autonomy Act stated:
He shall be responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the

Philippine Islands and of the United States operative within the Philippine
Islands, and whenever it becomes necessary he may call upon the commanders
of the military and naval forces of the United States in the Islands, or summon
the posse comitatus, or call out the militia or other locally created armed forces,
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion; and
he may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the
public safety requires it, suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or
place the Islands, or any part thereof under martial law: Provided, That whenever
the Governor General shall exercise this authority, he shall at once notify the
President of the United States thereof, together with the attending facts and
circumstances, and the President shall have power modify or vacate the action
of the Governor-General. He shall annually and at such other times as he may
be required make such o cial report of the transactions of the Government of
the Philippine Islands to an executive department of the United States to be
designated by the President, and his said annual report shall be transmitted to
the Congress of the United States; and he shall perform such additional duties
and functions as may in pursuance of law be delegated or assigned to him by
the President. 2 8 (Emphasis supplied) acEHCD
The Philippine Autonomy Act recognized the executive's calling out powers "to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion."
This is also the rst time that "martial law" appeared in the organic act of the
Philippines. The Governor General was given the power to "suspend the privileges of
the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Islands, or any part thereof under martial law"
but only "in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof." In the exercise of
these powers, legislative concurrence was not necessary. The Governor General,
however, was required to notify the President of the United States of such declaration.
Only the President may vacate the action of the Governor General.
The 1935 Constitution also gave the President the power to call out the armed
forces, and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus or to place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law:
Section 10
xxx xxx xxx
(2) The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines, and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under Martial
Law. 2 9
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus could only be suspended and martial
law could only be declared in case of "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion or imminent
danger thereof, when the public safety requires it."
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended under the 1935
Constitution. This was challenged in Montenegro v. Castañeda. 3 0 Similar to Barcelon, a
policy of non-interference was adopted in Montenegro. This Court deferred to the
executive's discretion and ruled that "the authority to decide whenever the exigency has
arisen requiring the suspension belongs to the President and "his decision is nal and
conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons." 3 1
Later, the pronouncements in Barcelon and Montenegro were unanimously
reversed in Lansang v. Garcia . This Court recognized the power of the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ but quali ed that the same was "limited and
conditional." Courts may, therefore, inquire whether the power was exercised in
accordance with the Constitution: 3 2
Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor
unquali ed. The authority conferred by the Constitution, both under the Bill of
Rights and under the Executive Department, is limited and conditional. The
precept in the Bill of Rights establishes a general rule, as well as an exception
thereto. What is more, it postulates the former in the negative, evidently to stress
its importance, by providing that "(t)he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended . . ." It is only by way of exception that it permits the
suspension of the privilege "in cases of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" — or,
under Art. VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" — "when the public
safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever
during such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist." Far from
being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, con ned and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the
conditions essential to its existence, but, also, as regards the time when and the
place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting
or conditions mark, establish and de ne the extent, the con nes and the limits
of said power, beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and
restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department,
adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be
inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional
provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our
Constitution could not have intended to engage in such a wasteful exercise in
futility. 3 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Despite these pronouncements, this Court upheld the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus ruling that the existence of a rebellion and that public
safety required such suspension. 3 4
In In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Aquino, et al. v. Ponce Enrile ,
35 this Court, once again, was faced with the propriety of the exercise of the President
of his Commander-in-Chief powers. The majority of this Court in Aquino held that the
declaration of martial law was purely political in nature and therefore, may not be
inquired into by this Court. SDHTEC
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the President's Commander-in-Chief powers

under the 1935 Constitution. Article VII, Section 11 provides:
Section 11. The President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces
of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
This Court in In the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus for Parong, et al. v.
Enrile, 3 6 expressly reverted to the doctrine in Barcelon and Montenegro regarding
deference to the President upon the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus:
In times of war or national emergency, the legislature may surrender a
part of its power of legislation to the President. Would it not be as proper and
wholly acceptable to lay down the principle that during such crises, the judiciary
should be less jealous of its power and more trusting of the Executive in the
exercise of its emergency powers in recognition of the same necessity? Verily,
the existence of the emergencies should be left to President's sole and
unfettered determination. His exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus on the occasion thereof, should also be beyond
judicial review. Arbitrariness, as a ground for judicial inquiry of presidential acts
and decisions, sounds good in theory but impractical and unrealistic,
considering how well-nigh impossible it is for the courts to contradict the finding
of the President on the existence of the emergency that gives occasion for the
exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ. For the Court to insist
on reviewing Presidential action on the ground of arbitrariness may only result
in a violent collision of two jealous powers with tragic consequences, by all
means to be avoided, in favor of adhering to the more desirable and long-tested
doctrine of "political question" in reference to the power of judicial review.
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution, as earlier cited, affords
further reason for the reexamination of the Lansang doctrine and reversion to
that of Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castañeda. 3 7 (Citations
omitted)
Shortly after the promulgation of Parong , this Court ruled upon In the Matter of
the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Morales, Jr. v. Enrile which reiterated the doctrine in
Lansang.
The passage of the 1987 Constitution nally put an end to the pliability of past
Courts under martial law as declared by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. That
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus may judicially be inquired into is now rmly established in the present text of the
Constitution, particularly Article VII, Section 18: 3 8
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
requires it.
any need of a call.
the invasion.
shall be released.
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution, in stark contrast with its
predecessors, provides for a more heightened and stricter scrutiny when the President
exercises his Commander-in-Chief powers.
Compared with the provisions in the earlier Constitutions, more stringent
conditions are needed before the President can declare martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
First, the conditions of "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof" found in past Constitutions are narrowed down and limited to actual "invasion
or rebellion."
Second, there is an added requirement that "public safety requires" the
declaration or suspension.
Third, a time element is also introduced. The President may, "for a period not
exceeding sixty days," suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Apart from these stringent conditions, the 1987 Constitution grants a more
active role to the other branches of government as a check on the possible excesses of
the executive.
Article VII, Section 18 speci cally delineates the roles of Congress and the
Judiciary when the President exercises his Commander-in-Chief powers. The President
and the Congress, as held in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo , 3 9 must "act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus." 4 0
Congress is given "a much wider latitude in its power to revoke the proclamation
or suspension." The President is left powerless to set aside or contest the revocation
of Congress. 4 1
This Court, on the other hand, is directed to review "the su ciency of the factual
basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or
the extension thereof." The propriety of the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ is therefore "justiciable and within the ambit of
judicial review." 4 2 This Court is further mandated to promulgate its decision within a
period of 30 days from the filing of an "appropriate proceeding" by "any citizen." 4 3 AScHCD
The active roles of the two (2) branches of government were further
differentiated in my dissenting opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea:
The framers also intended for the Congress to have a considerably
broader review power than the Judiciary and to play an active role following the
President's proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ
o f habeas corpus. Unlike the Court which can only act upon an appropriate
proceeding led by any citizen, Congress may, by voting jointly and upon a
majority vote, revoke such proclamation or suspension. The decision to revoke
is not premised on how factually correct the President's invocation of his
Commander-in-Chief powers are, rather, Congress is permitted a wider latitude in
how it chooses to respond to the President's proclamation or suspension. While
the Court is limited to reviewing the su ciency of the factual basis behind the
President's proclamation or suspension, Congress does not operate under such
constraints and can strike down the President's exercise of his Commander-in-
Chief powers as it pleases without running afoul of the Constitution.
With its veto power and power to extend the duration of martial law upon
the President's initiative and as a representative of its constituents, Congress is
also expected to continuously monitor and review the situation on the areas
affected by martial law. Unlike the Court which is mandated to promulgate its
decision within thirty (30) days from the time a petition questioning the
proclamation is led, Congress is not saddled with a similar duty. While the
Court is mandated to look into the su ciency of the factual basis and whether
or not the proclamation was attended with grave abuse of discretion, Congress
deals primarily with the wisdom behind the proclamation or suspension. Much
deference is thus accorded to Congress and is treated as the President's co-
equal when it comes to determining the wisdom behind the imposition or
continued imposition of martial law or suspension of the writ. 4 4
The 1987 Constitution also makes it easier to question the propriety of the
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in that it allows "any citizen" to le an appropriate proceeding. The provision, in
effect, relaxes the rules on locus standi. 4 5
The heightened level of judicial scrutiny will be further discussed in this opinion.
IV
Public respondents failed to address the requirement that public safety requires
for the extension of martial law.
The rst paragraph of Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution mentions the
phrase "public safety requires it" twice. The rst reference in the constitutional text
refers to the original proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. The second reference to the requirement of public safety
refers to the extension of any proclamation, thus:

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it , he may,
for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
requires it . (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution requires that martial law may be imposed not only if there is
rebellion or invasion. It also requires that it is indispensable to public safety . The
resulting damage or injuries cannot simply be the usual consequences of rebellion or
invasion. It must be of such nature that the powers to be exercised under the rubric of
martial law or with the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus are indispensable to
address the scope of the con agration. The mere allegation of the existence of
rebellion is not enough.
A review of the history of the concept of martial law in general and as applied to
our jurisdiction is necessary in order to understand what the present provision requires.
AcICHD
The beginnings of the concept of martial law in England from 1300 to 1638 are
discussed in The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to
the Petition of Right: 4 6
The term martial law refers to a summary form of criminal justice,
exercised under direct or delegated royal authority by the military or police
forces of the Crown, which is independent of the established processes of the
common law courts, the ecclesiastical courts, and the courts which
administered the civil law in England. Martial law is not a body of substantive
law, but rather summary powers employed when the ordinary rule of law is
suspended. "It is not law," wrote Sir Matthew Hale, "but something rather
indulged than allowed as a law . . . and that only in cases of necessity."
xxx xxx xxx
From the beginnings of summary procedure against rebels in the reign of
Edward I until the mid-sixteenth century, martial law was regarded in both its
forms as the extraordinary usages of war, to be employed only in time of war or
open rebellion in the realm, and never as an adjunct of the regular criminal law.
Beginning in the mid-1550s, however, the Crown began to claim the authority to
expand the hitherto carefully circumscribed jurisdiction of martial law beyond
situations of war or open rebellion and into territory which had been the
exclusive domain of the criminal law . . .
Comparatively, in Duncan v. Kahanamoku , 4 7 a case of American origin, martial
law was de ned as the "exercise of the military power which resides in the Executive
Branch of Government to preserve order, and insure the public safety in domestic
territory in time of emergency, when other branches of the government are unable to
function or their functioning would itself threaten the public safety." 4 8 Justice Davis in
Ex Parte Milligan, 4 9 noted that "martial rule can never exist where the courts are open
and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." 5 0
As traditionally conceived, martial law is an extraordinary situation that
arises in exigent circumstances. It is required when the civilian government in
an area is unable to maintain peace and order requiring the military to step in
to address the con agration, govern temporarily until the area can again be
governed normally and democratically under a civilian government. Martial
law was never conceived as a substitute for democratic and representative
civilian government.
Prior to the 1987 Constitution, martial law had been declared three (3) times in
the Philippines.
In 1896, the provinces of Manila, Laguna, Cavite, Batangas, Pampanga, Bulacan,
Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija were declared to be in a state of war and under martial law
because of the open revolution of the Katipunan against Spain. 5 1 The proclamation
declaring martial law stated:
The acts of rebellion of which armed bodies of the people have been guilty
during the last few days at different points of the territory of this province,
seriously disturbing public tranquility, make it imperative that the most severe
and exemplary measures be taken to suppress at its inception an attempt as
criminal as futile. 5 2
The rst article declared a state of war against the eight (8) provinces, and the
following nine (9) articles described rebels, their acts, and how they would be treated.
5 3 Clearly, from the point of view of the colonial civilian government, there were areas
which were not fit for civilian government because of the extent of the insurgency.
The Philippines was again placed under martial law during the Second Republic
by virtue of Proclamation No. 29 signed by President Jose P. Laurel on September 21,
1944. It cited the danger of invasion being imminent and the public safety so requiring
it as the justi cation for the imposition of the same. 5 4 The proclamation further
declared that:
1. The respective Ministers of State shall, subject to the authority of the
President, exercise direct supervision and control over all district, provincial,
and other local governmental agencies in the Philippines when performing
functions or discharging duties affecting matters within the jurisdiction of
his Ministry and may, subject to revocation by the President, issue such
orders as may be necessary therefor.
2. The Philippines shall be divided into nine Military Districts, seven to
correspond to the seven Administrative Districts created under Ordinance
No. 31, dated August 26, 1944; the eight, to compromise the City of Manila;
and the ninth, the City of Cavite and the provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, Cavite,
and Palawan.
3. The Commissioners for each of said Administrative Districts shall have
command, respectively, of the rst seven military districts herein created,
and shall bear the title of Military Governor; and the Mayors and Provincial
Governors of the cities and provinces compromised therein shall be their
principal deputies, with the title of deputy city or provincial military
governor, as the case may be. The Mayor of the City of Manila shall be
Military Governor for the eight Military District; and the Vice-Minister of
Home Affairs, in addition to his other duties, shall be the Military Governor
for the ninth Military District. TAIaHE
4. All existing laws shall continue in force and effect until amended or
repealed by the president, and all the existing civil agencies of an executive
character shall continue exercising their agencies of an executive character
shall continue exercising their powers and performing their functions and
duties, unless they are inconsistent with the terms of this Proclamation or
incompatible with the expeditions and effective enforcement of the martial
law herein declared.
5. It shall be the duty of the Military Governors to suppress treason, sedition,
disorder and violence; and to cause to be punished all disturbances of
public peace and all offenders against the criminal laws; and also to
protect persons in their legitimate rights. To this end and until otherwise
decreed, the existing courts of justice shall assume jurisdiction and try
offenders without unnecessary delay and in a summary manner, in
accordance with such procedural rules as may be prescribed by the
Minister of Justice. The decisions of courts of justice of the different
categories in criminal cases within their original jurisdiction shall be nal
and unappealable. Provided, however, That no sentence of death shall be
carried into effect without the approval of the President.
6. The existing courts of justice shall continue to be invested with, and shall
exercise, the same jurisdiction in civil actions and special proceedings as
are now provided in existing laws, unless otherwise directed by the
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
7. The several agencies of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
are hereby authorized to call upon the armed forces of the Republic to give
such aid, protection, and assistance as may be necessary to enable them
safely and e ciently to exercise their powers and discharge their duties;
and all such forces of the Republic are required promptly to obey such call.
8. The proclamation of martial law being an emergency measure demanded
by imperative necessity, it shall continue as long as the need for it exists
and shall terminate upon proclamation of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines. 5 5
The next day, Proclamation No. 30 5 6 was issued, which declared the existence of
a state of war in the Philippines. The Proclamation cited the attack by the United States
and Great Britain in certain parts of the Philippines in violation of the territorial integrity
of the Republic, causing death or injury to its citizens and destruction or damage to
their property. The Proclamation also stated that the Republic entered into a Pact of
Alliance 5 7 with Japan, based on mutual respect of sovereignty and territories, to
safeguard the territorial integrity and independence of the Philippines. 5 8 Again the
situation was dire in that invasion was imminent.
The third declaration of martial law was an abuse of the concept and was
deployed for other purposes. President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1081 on September 21, 1972 putting the entire Philippines under martial law. The
proclamation in part reads:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of
the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as de ned in Article I,
Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their
commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.
In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all
others who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the
occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes
against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order,
crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names,
uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public o cers, and for such other
crimes as will be enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as
well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or
regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction
shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by my
duly designated representative. 5 9 (Emphases supplied) cDHAES
Subsequent events revealed the draconian control that the President allegedly
had as Commander-in-Chief. As narrated in my separate opinion in the rst Lagman v.
Medialdea: 6 0
The next day, on September 22, 1972, President Marcos promulgated
General Order Nos. 1 to 6, detailing the powers he would be exercising under
martial law.
General Order No. 1 gave President Marcos the power to "govern the
nation and direct the operation of the entire Government, including all its
agencies and instrumentalities, in [his] capacity and . . . exercise all the powers
and prerogatives appurtenant and incident to [his] position as such
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines."
General Order No. 2 ordered the arrest of several individuals. The same
was followed by General Order No. 3, which stated that "all executive
departments, bureaus, o ces, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National
Government, government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as
governments of all the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barrios throughout
the land shall continue to function under their present o cers and employees
and in accordance with existing laws." However, General Order No. 3 removed
from the jurisdiction of the judiciary the following cases:
1. Those involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, or of any decree, order or acts issued,
promulgated or [performed] by me or by my duly designated representative
pursuant thereto. (As amended by General Order No. 3-A, dated September 24,
1972).
2. Those involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any rules,
orders or acts issued, promulgated or performed by public servants pursuant to
decrees, orders, rules and regulations issued and promulgated by me or by my
duly designated representative pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated Sept.
21, 1972.
3. Those involving crimes against national security and the law of nations.
4. Those involving crimes against the fundamental laws of the State.
5. Those involving crimes against public order.
6. Those crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title, and improper
use of names, uniforms, and insignia.
7. Those involving crimes committed by public officers.
General Order No. 4 imposed the curfew between the hours of 12
midnight and 4 o'clock in the morning wherein no person in the Philippines was
allowed to move about outside his or her residence unless he or she is
authorized in writing to do so by the military commander-in-charge of his or her
area of residence. General Order No. 4 further stated that any violation of the
same would lead to the arrest and detention of the person in the nearest military
camp and the person would be released not later than 12 o'clock noon the
following day.
General Order No. 5 ordered that:
all rallies, demonstrations, and other forms of group actions by persons
within the geographical limits of the Philippines, including strikes and picketing
in vital industries such as companies engaged in manufacture or processing as
well as in the distribution of fuel, gas, gasoline, and fuel or lubricating oil, in
companies engaged in the production or processing of essential commodities
or products for exports, and in companies engaged in banking of any kind, as
well as in hospitals and in schools and colleges, are strictly prohibited and any
person violating this order shall forthwith be arrested and taken into custody
and held for the duration of the national emergency or until he or she is
otherwise ordered released by me or by my designated representative.
General Order No. 6 imposed that "no person shall keep, possess, or carry
outside of his residence any rearm unless such person is duly authorized to
keep, possess, or carry such rearm and any person violating this order shall
forthwith be arrested and taken into custody . . ."
Martial law arises from necessity, when the civil government cannot
maintain peace and order, and the powers to be exercised respond to that
necessity. However, under his version of martial law, President Marcos placed
all his actions beyond judicial review and vested in himself the power to
"legally," by virtue of his General Orders, do anything, without limitation. It was
clearly not necessary to make President Marcos a dictator to enable civil
government to maintain peace and order. President Marcos also prohibited the
expression of dissent, prohibiting "rallies, demonstrations, and other forms of
group actions" in the premises not only of public utilities, but schools, colleges,
and even companies engaged in the production of products of exports. Clearly,
these powers were not necessary to enable the civil government to execute its
functions and maintain peace and order, but rather, to enable him to continue as
self-made dictator.
President Marcos' implementation of martial law was a total abuse and
bastardization of the concept of martial law. A reading of the powers which
President Marcos intended to exercise makes it abundantly clear that there was
no public necessity that demanded that the President be given those powers.
Martial law was a stratagem. It was an arti ce to hide the weaknesses of his
leadership as people rose up to challenge him. It was ruse to perpetuate himself
in power despite the term limitations in the 1973 Constitution. 6 1
It is in this context that the 1987 Constitution imposed further safeguards. It was
in response to the authoritarian tendencies that a commander-in-chief may display. It
was part of a constitution rati ed by the sovereign Filipino people that lived through
these abuses. Among others, it required not simply the allegation of facts
showing rebellion, but a showing of the necessity to exercise speci c
extraordinary powers to ensure public safety.
The 1987 Constitution returned to the original concept of martial law: a
set of extraordinary powers arising only from a clear necessity, declared
because civil governance is no longer possible. The authority to place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law is not a de nition of a
power, but a declaration of a status — that there exists a situation wherein
there is no capability for civilian government to continue. It is a declaration
of a condition on the ground, that there is a vacuum of government authority,
and by virtue of such vacuum, military rule becomes necessary. Further, it is a
temporary state, for military rule to be exercised until civil government may
be restored.
This Court cannot dictate the parameters of what powers the President may
exercise under a state of martial law to address a rebellion or invasion. For this Court to
tell the President exactly how to govern under a state of martial law would be undue
interference with the President's powers. There may be many different permutations of
governance under a martial law regime. It takes different forms, as may be necessary.
ASEcHI
However, while this Court cannot state the parameters for the
President's martial law, this Court's constitutional role is to require that the
President provide the parameters himself, upon declaring martial law. The
Constitution, in my reading, requires Congress to examine the powers to be
wielded in relation to the facts provided. The proclamation and any extension
must contain the powers he intends to wield. The powers under the rubric of
martial law must reasonably relate to the exigency.
In these consolidated cases, both the President, in requesting for the extension
of the "state of martial law" and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as
Congress, in granting the extension, committed grave abuse of discretion.
Proclamation No. 216 s. 217, the President's request for extension and the Resolution
of Both Houses No. 4 does not de ne the powers to be wielded. It is a carte blanche
grant of extraordinary power to the President, which the Constitution does not
sanction.
The absence of the public safety necessity for a declaration of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ is clear from the documents presented.
Marawi City has been liberated and is undergoing rehabilitation. 6 2 Moreover, by
President's own admission, the AFP "has achieved remarkable progress in putting the
rebellion under control." 6 3
Strangely, the President sought the extension of martial law not just for public
safety but for other objectives as well. In his Letter to Congress, he stated that "
[p]ublic safety indubitably requires such further extension, not only for the
sake of security and public order, but more importantly to enable the
government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the bigger task of
rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic growth and
development." 6 4 Certainly, these objectives could be achieved through the ordinary
efforts of the local government units concerned. These are not bases for the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or the declaration of martial law.
These statements are a grave cause for concern as they imply sinister
motives to use martial law to undermine the legal order.
General Trinidad, the Intelligence Chief or J-2 of the AFP, during the presentation
before this Court, claimed that an extension of martial law in Mindanao is warranted
given that "the magnitude of scope, as well as the presence of rebel groups in
Mindanao" endangers public safety and the security of the entire Mindanao. 6 5 Mere
presence of rebel groups, however, does not justify the extension of martial law. There
must be a showing that these groups are committing rebellion and that the rebellion
has become of such magnitude that public safety requires the imposition of martial
law.
This Court can only assess whether the public safety requires the imposition of
martial law or its extension if it sees the reasonability of the speci c remedy sought, in
relation to the facts established. Thus, the government, in alleging that martial law is
necessary, should cite speci c, measurable, attainable, reasonable, and time bound
objectives.
This is especially true when the second extension is for a longer period.
Not only did the government fail to articulate the powers it wanted under the
extension of martial law, it also failed to de ne the targets it has for martial law. The
powers to be exercised and its su ciency for the targets of the extension, therefore,
could not be assessed. There are no judicial standards available to assess what does
not exist.
During the oral arguments, General Guerrero only managed to provide a general
target, "to quell the rebellion":
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Just very quickly, in one year's time, what is the objective?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The objective is to quell the rebellion.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Zero, no combatant. What do you mean "quell the rebellion," General? I
think you are in the . . .
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Ideally, Sir, it is, we should say there should be no remnants but ah. . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So if there are remnants there will be an extension of Martial Law.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
As I have said, ideally, but we are just realistic. We cannot reduce them to
zero. What is more important is for us to be able to reduce them to a
significant level where they can no longer be considered as a threat. ITAaHc
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I think some of us have encountered "engagements with the armed forces."
And we know for a fact that you conduct roadmaps in order to set your
targets for particular periods.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, may we know what the target is under Martial Law, what exactly, how
much degradation of forces are you looking at?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
You have to understand, Your Honor, that Martial Law is just a snapshot of
the entire campaign plan.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, so within one year . . .
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Martial Law came as a necessity because of the developments in the
security situation.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I understand but . . .
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The original campaign plan stated for a duration of 2017 to 2022 but we
have broken down our activities by months, by years, by quarters . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so the original plan was 2017 to 2022 did not envision Martial Law,
is that not correct?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And now with Martial Law, it is going to be speeded up, is that not correct?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
That is our hope, Your Honor, for us to be able to fast track the
accomplishment of our mission.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, what is the target in 2018?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The target for 2018 is for us to reduce, to nish the remaining ISIS rebels
here in Mindanao, and there are others . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You realize, of course, that we are the only country in the world that has
that for a target, for a realistic target . . .
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Pardon me, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
We are the only country in the world, all countries will want to remove all
ISIS inspired. But even the United States, and I will show you later, has said
that it is close to improbable unless you actually dig human rights
violation in order to remove all of it but, for course, it will increase the
rebellion in case you want to do so. But if you really want a realistic target,
it cannot be zero . . .
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Clearly, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
. . . unless you're saying, General, that after 2018, if there is a single
communist existing, a single Daesh person existing, or the rag tag team of
the BIFF existing, that there will still be an extension of Martial Law.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Your Honor, the problem is not only military. Talking about reducing the
number of the armed elements to zero is impossible for as long as we do
not address the root cause of the problem.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. So, under Martial Law you will have control of social welfare.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Not control, Your Honor. Clearly we have not vested with that authority and
we do not intend to arrogate such function upon ourselves.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Good. So, nice to hear that from you but then isn't that the actual situation
without Martial Law? CHTAIc
GENERAL GUERRERO:
I do not know, I cannot speak for the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, so what did Martial Law add?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
As I have said, it has given us enhanced authority, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, but the enhanced authority is not clear but perhaps I should ask that
of the Solicitor General to be fair to you because you are in . . .
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Let me just explain, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
What today is multi-dimensional. What you see in Marawi is only one
dimension of the war that is tactical.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Beneath the tactical warfare that is very obvious and very apparent are
underlying elements . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Elements that involve politics . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
. . . legal, informational, cyber, political, diplomatic, economical and
technological.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. So, the group in Basilan is severely degraded, is that not correct?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
I beg your pardon, Your Honor?
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The group in Basilan is severely degraded, the Basilan ASG, because this
was the Hapilon group. And most of them transferred to Marawi, is that not
correct?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
You have to understand, Your Honor, that the gures I have presented are
gures based on intelligence reports that we have gathered on the ground.
They are not accurate. In fact, they have only accounted for regulars,
armed regulars, but we have not accounted for sympathizers, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The intelligence reports are not accurate.
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And we are relying on the accuracy of the presentation of the Army to
declare Martial Law or for the sufficiency of facts. What do you mean "they
are not accurate"?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It is not accurate in a sense that we cannot guarantee the one hundred
percent exactness of the figures that they are presenting.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. So, the army presented gures, of course, not one hundred percent
with con dence, and now these conclusions of fact have been presented
to the Court. So, are we not relying on facts which have no su ciency in
basis?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Your Honor, the intelligence process is a tedious process. It is not guess
work, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
But part of it is. 6 6
Also, in response to the interpellation of the Chief Justice, the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces could only zero in on the "psychological advantage" of the
announcement of martial law. Thus:
So, the martial law administrator is the Secretary?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
Okay. Because you are the implementor you can immediately just say to
the agencies, We need this, evacuate, they will immediately follow because
you are the martial law implementor, is that correct?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
My implementation of martial law, Your Honor, is dependent on the powers
that are, or authorities that are vested in me by the President.
Okay. So, what makes it easier, is it psychological? That's why I've been
asking since yesterday, is it psychological, the calling out powers on
steroids? EATCcI
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes, Your Honor.
So, it's psychological?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It's partly psychological, Your Honor.
Okay, partly psychological. What do you think makes people more
cooperative in a martial law setting?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
It's the fact that a, a strong authority is in charge.
A what?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
A strong authority is in charge. 6 7
VI
Reviewing the su ciency of the factual basis means examining both the
allegations and the reasonability of the inferences arising from the actual facts used as
basis for such allegations. In other words, we should not content ourselves with the
factum probandum or what is alleged. We should also review the factum probans as
well. A proper review of the "su ciency of the factual basis" requires that this Court
examine the evidentiary facts that would tend to prove the ultimate facts and the
premises of the inferences used to arrive at the conclusions made by the government.
The government, through the AFP, regaled this Court with its allegations of fact.
This was accepted by the majority in Congress and the majority in this Court. There was
no effort to reveal the general sources of this intelligence information, the nuances in
the analysis of the various groups, and the premises used to make the inferences from
the sources which they gathered.
In other words, the majority accepts only the allegations of fact of the Armed
Forces and the President. Certainly, this cannot meet the Constitutional requirement
that this Court review the "su ciency of the factual basis" of the declaration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
This Court often discusses the difference between ultimate and evidentiary facts
in relation to pleadings, and what must be alleged to establish a cause of action.
Ultimate facts are the facts that constitute a cause of action. Thus, a pleading must
contain allegations of ultimate facts, so that a court may ascertain whether, assuming
the allegations to be true, a pleading states a cause of action. 6 8 Of course, the veracity
of the ultimate facts will be established during trial, generally through the presentation
of evidence that will prove evidentiary facts. In Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic , 6 9 this Court
explained:
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the rst, the
"ultimate facts," and the second, the "evidentiary facts." In Remitere vs. Vda. de
Yulo, the term "ultimate facts" was defined and explained as follows:
"The term 'ultimate facts' as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without
leaving the statement of the cause of action insu cient. . . ."
(Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1963 ed., p. 213).
"Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either
directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant.
The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or
particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be
established. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts,
upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests."
while the term "evidentiary fact" has been defined in the following tenor:
"Those facts which are necessary for determination of the
ultimate facts; they are the premises upon which conclusions of
ultimate facts are based. Womack v. Industrial Comm. , 168 Colo.
364, 451 P.2d 761, 764. Facts which furnish evidence of existence
of some other fact." 7 0
Another basic rule that this Court must not lose sight of in its undertaking is that
a bare allegation is not evidence. 7 1 Surmise is not evidence, 7 2 conjecture is not
evidence, 7 3 suspicion is not evidence, 7 4 and probability is not evidence. 7 5
Worth noting is the emphasis on the importance of credible evidence. This is
contained in a catena of cases already decided by this Court.

In Castillo v. Republic: 7 6
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Based on the
records, this Court nds that there exists insu cient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Felipe's sexual in delity and irresponsibility can be equated with
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was no
other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present
other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's in delity
notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw him with other
women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
evidentiary value.
Thus, although a psychologist testi ed as to the link between the husband's
infidelity and psychological incapacity in Castillo, this Court reiterated that the courts, in
all the cases they try, must base judgments on the totality of evidence adduced during
their proceedings:
It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the
parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings. 7 7
Likewise in Dela Llana v. Biong , 7 8
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of
evidence: (1) the pictures of her damaged car, (2) the medical certi cate dated
November 20, 2000, and (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these
pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular accident and
the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not
adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the
factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established , as fully
discussed below. DHITCc
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that
the massive impact of the collision caused her whiplash injury. We are not
persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these pictures show the
causation grossly belies common logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the
impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the
whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
Also, in Gomez v. Gomez: 7 9
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that the factum probandum
petitioner is trying to establish here is still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds
of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of Consuelo.
The factum probans this time around is the alleged payment of the Donors Tax
after the death of Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of the factum
probans , even if successfully proven, to prove in turn the factum
probandum . As intimated by respondents, payment of the Donors Tax after the
death of Consuelo does not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the
Deeds of Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of
Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum probandum .
Ariston, Jr. never testi ed that Consuelo herself physically and personally
delivered PCIB Check No. A144-73211 to the BIR. He instead testi ed that the
check was prepared and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he,
Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the same to the BIR. On the
query, however, as to whether it was delivered to the BIR before or after the
death of Consuelo, petitioner and respondents presented all the con icting
evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving it.
Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures based on the
evidence he presented, and did not bother to present Nestor Espenilla
to explain the consecutive numbers of the RTRs or what he meant
with the words on even date in his certi cation. Neither did petitioner
present any evidence that the records of the BIR Commissioner were
falsi ed or antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public
official had regularly performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to
respondents direct evidence attesting to the payment of said tax
during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to respondents evidence,
all that petitioner could offer in rebuttal is another speculation totally
unsupported by evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.
In Vda. de Viray v. Spouses Usi, 8 0 this Court explained:
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
Petitioners contend rst off that the CA erred in its holding that the
partitions of Lot 733 and later of the divided unit Lot 733-C following the Galang
Plan were actually the partitions of the pro-indiviso shares of its co-owners
effectively conveying to them their respective specific shares in the property.
We agree with petitioners.
First, the CA's holding aforestated is neither supported by, nor
deducible from, the evidentiary facts on record. He who alleges must
prove it. Respondents have the burden to substantiate the factum
probandum of their complaint or the ultimate fact which is their
claimed ownership over the lots in question. They were, however,
unsuccessful in adducing the factum probans or the evidentiary facts
by which the factum probandum or ultimate fact can be established.
Finally, in People v. Agustin: 8 1
Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the
prosecution as secondary evidence are not allowable in court, still the absence
thereof does not warrant the acquittal of appellant. In People vs. Comia, where
this particular issue was involved, the Court held that the complainants' failure
to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the accused therein, as well as their
consequent failure to present receipts before the trial court as proof of the said
payments, is not fatal to their case. The complainants duly proved by their
respective testimonies that said accused was involved in the entire recruitment
process. Their testimonies in this regard, being clear and positive, were declared
sufficient to establish that factum probandum.
Indeed, the trial court was justi ed and correct in accepting the version of
the prosecution witnesses, their statements being positive and a rmative in
nature. This is more worthy of credit than the mere uncorroborated and self-
serving denials of appellant. The lame defense consisting of such bare denials
by appellant cannot overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution
proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
To establish that the factual basis for the extension of martial law is su cient,
the government has to show evidence for its factual allegations as well as the context
for its inference. An enumeration of violent incidents containing nothing but the area of
the incident, the type of violent incident, and the date of the incident, without its sources
and the basis for its inference, does not meet the su ciency of the factual basis to
show persisting rebellion and the level of threat to public safety that will support a
declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
There are two (2) facta probanda, or ultimate facts, necessary to establish that
martial law was properly extended, namely: (1) the persistence of an actual rebellion;
and (2) that public safety requires the extension of martial law.
Of course, no single piece of evidence can establish these ultimate facts. There
must be an attempt to establish them through evidentiary facts, which must, in turn, be
proved by evidence — not bare allegations, not suspicion, not conjecture.
Letters stating that rebellion persists and that public safety requires the
extension of martial law do not prove the facta probanda. The letters only prove that
the writers thereof wrote that rebellion persists and public safety requires the
extension of martial law. Lists of violent incidents do not prove the facta probanda; they
only tend to prove the factum probans that there were, in fact, violent incidents that
occurred. But, assuming the evidence is credible to prove the factum probans that
violent incidents have occurred, this factum probans, without context, is insu cient to
show that rebellion persists.
We do not con ate the factum probandum with the factum probans. Muddling
the two undermines the review required by the Constitution. It will lead this Court to
simply accept the allegations of the government without any modicum of review. cEaSHC
VII
Put differently, the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law and its
extension must not only be those that are alleged, but also that the allegation must be
su cient or credible. The facts can only be judicially deemed su cient if their basis is
transparent and legible. The basis relied upon for the proclamation of martial law or its
extension must be shown, to a certain degree of con dence, to be factually true based
upon the credibility of its intelligence sources and the viability of its inferences.
Su cient validation must be shown in terms of the suggestions made by intelligence
sources, as well as checking on the reliability of the process of reaching a conclusion.
The conclusion must be factually su cient as of the time of the review both by
Congress and then by this Court.
The President cannot be expected to personally gather intelligence information
from the ground. He or she would have to rely on intelligence reports given by those
under his or her command. 8 2 That it is based on intelligence information does not
mean that Congress and the Court cannot inquire further because of its con dentiality.
Otherwise, there will be no sense in the review of the factual su ciency for the exercise
of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
Intelligence information is gathered through ve (5) intelligence information
disciplines namely: (1) signals intelligence; (2) human intelligence; (3) open-source
intelligence; (4) geospatial intelligence; and (5) measurement and signatures
intelligence. I described these intelligence information disciplines in my dissenting
opinion in Lagman:
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) refers to the interception of communications
between individuals and "electronic transmissions that can be collected by
ships, planes, ground sites, or satellites."
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) refers to information collected from human
sources either through witness interviews or clandestine operations.
By the term itself, Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) refers to readily-accessible
information within the public domain. Open-Source Intelligence sources include
"traditional media, Internet forums and media, government publications, and
professional or academic papers."
Newspapers and radio and television broadcasts are more speci c examples of
Open-Source Intelligence sources from which intelligence analysts may collect
data.
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) pertains to imagery of activities on earth. An
example of geospatial intelligence is a "satellite photo of a foreign military base
with topography[.]"
Lastly, Measures and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) refers to "scienti c and
highly technical intelligence obtained by identifying and analyzing
environmental byproducts of developments of interests, such as weapons
tests." Measures and Signatures Intelligence has been helpful in "identify[ing]
chemical weapons and pinpoint[ing] the speci c features of unknown weapons
systems." 8 3 (Citations omitted)
Intelligence reports must be shown to have at least undergone a rigorous
analytical process for them to be considered truthful and worthy of belief. It is not
enough that facts are gathered through the ve (5) intelligence collection disciplines.
Good intelligence requires good analysis. The information gathered must be analyzed
through the application of specialized skills and the use of analytical tools. For instance,
levels of con dence may be ascribed to determine the quality and reliability of the
information. Information, assumptions, and judgments may also have to be
differentiated so as not to muddle established facts with mere assumptions. All these
processes require the use of sound logic. 8 4
In this case, there is no su cient factual basis that would support Congress' act
of extending the proclamation of martial law in Mindanao.
No intelligence information — other than possibly a power point presentation —
was given to each member of the House of Representatives and the Senate from which
they could assess if an extension of martial law in Mindanao was warranted. During the
oral arguments, petitioner Lagman explained that the members of Congress were not
informed of the context of the intelligence information backing the President's initiative
to extend the proclamation of martial law in Mindanao. Congress was not even
informed of the processes done to vet the information they were provided:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Were you introduced to the different factions inside the BIFF?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Were you introduced to the different factions of the Abu Sayyaf Group?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In other words, in the entirety of the deliberations in the extension of
Martial Law, the Congress did not have the opportunity to act, look at the
context of the intelligence information given to you.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
The time given to us was too short that we could not exhaust all the
possible questions we have to ask. CTIEac
xxx xxx xxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You are not aware that the Abu Sayyaf Group, not its entirety, not all of
them are affiliated with ISIS or ISIS-inspired groups.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
There was no detail of this, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
No information about that?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
No information.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
You are not aware of the strength of the AKP as of December of last year?
That in the reports of the intelligence, they say that there are about 7, 8 or 9
individuals only under the AKP, based on intelligence reports that were
given to the Supreme Court.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
That was not part of the brie ng and that was not deliberated upon during
joint session.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And you are not aware of what the 185 skirmishes were and whether the
army was walloped, or it was the enemy that was walloped, 180 plus
skirmishes with the Abu Sayyaf and the NPAs.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
There was a litany of skirmishes as said in this letter, as well as in the
briefings, but no details were given to us.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, you were not told that in most of these skirmishes, in fact almost all,
the army prevailed.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
No, Your Honor, we were not informed of that.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And you were told that because there were so many skirmishes, they
needed Martial Law.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
That's correct, Your Honor. 8 5
VIII
The facts even only as alleged by the government, assuming them to be true, do
not adequately show that there is the kind of rebellion that requires a declaration of
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
First, by the Executive's own admission, the neutralization of at least "920
DAESH-inspired ghters" as well as their leaders fast-tracked the clearing of Marawi
City, hastened its liberation, and paved the way for its rehabilitation. 8 6 The numbers of
the purported DAESH-inspired groups have gone down and as a result, "remnants" of
these groups are now only in the process of rebuilding through recruitment operations.
In other words, the government, in so far as the purpose for declaring martial law
through Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017 is concerned, already achieved its target.
However, in his Letter dated December 8, 2017 addressed to Congress,
President Duterte asserted that the continued recruitment operations of local terrorist
groups warranted the extension of martial law. He stated that "despite the death of
Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the remnants of their Groups have continued to rebuild
their organization through the recruitment and training of new members and ghters to
carry on the rebellion." 8 7 These recruitment operations, according to AFP Chief of Staff
General Guerrero, point to the conclusion that these groups are capable "of
strengthening their organization." 8 8 Thus:
[T]he remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members and their allies, together with
their protectors, supporters and sympathizers, have been monitored in their
continued efforts towards radicalization/recruitment, nancial and logistical
build-up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao,
particularly in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in
Sulu and Basilan. 8 9
The President's conclusions seem to be in reference to the conclusion of
Secretary of Defense Del n Lorenzana, who also emphasized the recruitment
operations of local terror groups as a justi cation to extend martial law in Mindanao. In
his Letter to President Duterte, Secretary Lorenzana wrote that "remnants of their
groups were monitored to be continuously rebuilding their organization through the
recruitment and training of new members/fighters." 9 0
Among the local terror groups surveyed are the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters (BIFF), the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Dawlah Islamiyah (DI), and communist
rebels. 9 1 Based allegedly on the military's consistent monitoring, the "MAUTE Group,
TURAIFIE Group, MAGUID Group, and Basilan-based ASG continuously conduct
recruitment and training activities" in Basilan, Lanao Provinces, Maguindanao, and
Sarangani. 9 2 SaCIDT
The Maute Group, in particular, is alleged to have intensi ed their recruitment

efforts in various areas in Mindanao, particularly in Marawi City, Lumbatan, Bayang,
Tubaran, and in Lanao del Sur. 9 3 Maguid remnants are allegedly also actively recruiting
in Sarangani and Sultan Kudarat 9 4 while the Turai e Group continues to recruit,
reorganize, and strengthen its capabilities. 9 5 They add that "local terrorist remnants
are continuously reorganizing, radicalizing communities, recruiting new members, and
sow terror," allegedly due to the support of foreign terrorist organizations. 9 6
The alleged recruitment operations undertaken by the remnants of local terror
groups do not clearly establish actual rebellion or even the imminence of one. The BIFF,
AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG's perceived capability of "staging similar
atrocities and violent attacks" 9 7 remains just that.
If at all, these groups' recruitment activities only tend to prove that their numbers
have gone down, prompting them to rebuild their weakened organizations. For example,
the AFP has con rmed that the manpower of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom
Fighters was reduced from 2016 to the first semester of 2017 by at least 4.33%. 9 8
More importantly, the AFP in their presentation admits to the total ghting
strength of the alleged terrorist taken together and the numbers of its new recruits. It
claims that there were 400 members out of the 537 total who are new recruits of the
Dawlah Islamiyah. 9 9
This allegation of fact by itself should be enough to cause serious reflection.
There are more than a hundred thousand men and women in the AFP. There will
be more if we consider the strength of the Philippine National Police. There are millions
of residents in various provinces and municipalities in the different islands that
comprise the Mindanao region, 537 seem so obviously de cient to hold any ground or
to challenge the authority of the entire machinery of the Republic of the Philippines.
The basis of the AFP to arrive at such exact number for the total personnel
complement of a terrorist group in hiding has not been presented. If we grant the exact
number to be accurate, then it would also be reasonable to conclude that law enforcers
know who they are and where they are already located, and therefore, could fashion
operations that would interdict or disrupt their activities. If it is true that the 400
members are new recruits, then the alleged hard-core members would only amount to
137. Again, this hardly is a decent gure that will support an extended declaration of
martial law and a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus throughout the entire
Mindanao region, and for a period of one year.

Furthermore, the Armed Forces also admits the motivations for the 400 to join
these groups. In its PowerPoint presentation, it cites clannish culture with the relatives
of terrorist personalities, revenge for killed relatives/parents during the Marawi
operations, nancial gains of new recruits, and radicalized converts as among the
reasons for the increase in DI recruits. 1 0 0
Again, the basis for the military's conclusions as to the motives of those who
joined the terrorist group was unclear and was never presented. Both Congress and
this Court were made to accept these conclusions without any basis other than their
assertion. This is hardly the kind of scrutiny that the Constitution requires when it
states that "sufficiency in the factual basis for the declaration of martial law."
Even if these were true, this Court should be hard pressed to nd any relation at
all to how a declaration of martial law or a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus will
address these motives. A military solution does not address clannish cultures,
motivations for revenge, nancial needs, or conversion into a new religion. Rather, it can
simply be further cause for radicalization.
Both the President and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Guerrero continue to
assert that the recruitment "pose a clear and imminent danger to public safety and
hinders the speedy rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City,
and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and prosperity in
Mindanao." 1 0 1 Again, apart from being simply allegations, early recovery is clearly not a
constitutional basis for the use of Commander-in-Chief powers. If it is, then logically the
labyrinth of our procurement law, misunderstanding among local government o cials,
and corruption can also be basis for a future declaration of martial law.
IX
Second, a closer look at the analysis of the facts, even only as alleged, as
presented to Congress and this Court, does not support the respondents' conclusion
as to the persistence of the kind of rebellion that warrants a declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. cHECAS
To instill fear in uninquisitive minds, the government presents a grand,

coordinated plan to overthrow it and attempts to portray the local groups as
coordinated and DAESH-a liated. To add some credibility to the claim of rebellion, the
government repeatedly alleges that the groups have a common goal to establish a
wilayat in Mindanao.
I n Lagman v. Medialdea , respondents failed to completely account for the
internal factions and ideological differences within the alleged ISIS-inspired groups.
This cast doubt on the accuracy of the claim that these groups were united in the goal
of establishing a wilayat. The reports essentially just enumerated the widespread
atrocities of the ISIS-inspired groups 1 0 2 and made it appear that these groups were
working together under a cohesive plan. 1 0 3

The Dawlah Islamiyah, a coalition of DAESH-inspired local terror groups
composed of the ASG Basilan, some members of the Abu Sayyaf Sulu Group, the Maute
Group, AKP, and the Turai e Group are alleged to have recruited 400 individuals in
addition to the present 137 members. 1 0 4 The Turai e Group, a relatively new group,
allegedly recruited 70 new members in addition to their present membership.
Yet there was no proof to show the coordination between the groups. The
possibility that they will have the motive or ability to wage the kind of rebellion
sufficient to excite the extraordinary power of martial law is lacking.
The numbers presented by AFP show that a majority of 52% (or 280 individuals
out of a total of 537) of the Dawlah Islamiyah is made up of the Maute Group. 1 0 5
However, as pointed out in my dissenting opinion in Lagman, the Maute Group began as
a private militia, known primarily for their extortion activities. It was founded by scions
of a political clan who regularly elded candidates for local elections. The Maute Group
is followed by the Basilan-based ASG faction in numbers, which comprises 21.8% (117
individuals) of the entire group. As mentioned in my dissenting opinion in Lagman, the
Basilan-based ASG faction, which was also engaged in kidnappings and extortion, was
bound by ethnicity, family ties, loyalty to leadership, and desire for revenge — not
ideology. 1 0 6
Furthermore, with the death of its key leaders in Marawi and the continued
arrests of its members, the government has not credibly presented the emergence of a
stronger leadership for this faction.AHDacC
In its assessment of the ASG, the AFP highlighted the group's activities. 1 0 7
There was no correlation made between these activities and the purported rebellion.
The AFP claims that the "death of Hapilon fast-tracked the uni cation of the Sulu- and
Basilan-based ASG to achieve their common goal with the Dawlah Isalmiyah in
establishing a wilayat in Mindanao." This, however, is a bare allegation. Again, the AFP
did not present anything to prove that the Abu Sayyaf Sulu group and Basilan group are
indeed coordinating with each other.
The AFP recognized the BIFF as a factionalized organization. During the oral
arguments, General Trinidad stated that "the leadership differences between Esmail
Abubakar alias "BUNGOS" and "KARIALAN" have divided the BIFF into factions."
Strangely however, the AFP claims that "both factions still reinforce each other" 1 0 8 and
that some BIFF elements "also coddle and provide support to their comrades and
relatives under the group of former Vice Chairman for Internal Affairs Abu Turai e." 1 0 9
Again, no evidence was presented to indicate coordination between the two (2)
factions or the coordination of some BFF elements with Turai e. As such, these claims
remain to be mere allegations. The reasons for the factionalism have not been
presented. The motive to move together in joint operations have not been presented.
Neither have cases been presented as to their ability to join forces in the past.
The AFP's assessment that "[o]ther DAESH-inspired and like-minded rebel
groups remain capable of staging similar atrocities and violent attacks against
vulnerable targets in Mindanao" 1 1 0 also does not appear to be supported by any
evidence. Assuming that this assertion is truthful and accurate, the capability to
commit atrocities does not conclusively or even remotely establish that rebellion exists,
that it is imminent, or that the requirement of public safety as required by the
constitution exists.
The AFP assessed that the Dawlah Islamiyah is attempting "to replicate the siege
of Marawi in other cities or areas in Mindanao to achieve their goal of establishing a
wilayat." 1 1 1 However, this assessment is only based on the alleged continuous
recruitment and training activities of these groups and on the alleged "support of
Foreign Terrorist Fighters." 1 1 2 These allegations were further not substantiated by the
AFP during their presentation.
The woeful numbers of terrorist personnel (537) and the belief in the possibility
of their coordination alone does not support this portrayal of being able to establishing
a wilayat. It is not based on credible evidence.
Worse, the portrayal is inaccurate, even beyond conjecture, as it is incompatible
with the known context here in the Philippines. Even a cursory look at the context of
Islam in the Philippines would reveal that the portrayal of the DAESH-inspired groups is
incongruous with the current understanding of ISIS, DAESH, the local terrorist groups,
or the ARMM and its populace.
As discussed in my dissenting opinion in Lagman, adherence to DAESH ideology
would naturally alienate the Muslim population throughout Mindanao. 1 1 3 The DAESH
brand of Islam is fundamentally nihilistic and apocalyptic, and unabashedly medieval.
1 1 4 DAESH has been described as following Sala -jihadis. They are of the position that
many Muslims are marked for death as apostates, having done acts such as wearing
Western clothes, shaving one's beard, voting in an election, or even being lax about
calling others apostates. 1 1 5
Third, there is also absolutely no basis for the extension of martial law in the area
requested, that is, the entire Mindanao region.
The on-going recruitment operations and reorganization efforts alleged to be
"geared towards the conduct of intensi ed atrocities and armed public uprisings" are
admittedly being carried out only in Central Mindanao, particularly "in the provinces of
Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and Basilan." 1 1 6 This is not yet the
area of operations but merely the recruitment areas.
The supposed target areas of the Turai e Group and the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters certainly do not comprise the entire region of Mindanao but only the
Cotabato area and Maguindanao. Furthermore, although the areas of Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, and the Zamboanga Peninsula were mentioned in relation to the Abu-Sayyaf
group, there is no evidence or allegation showing that these areas are indeed targets of
the Abu-Sayyaf group.
In his Letter to Congress, the President only identi ed these as key areas
because of the presence of ASG remnants: "[f]ourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG) in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious
security concern."
The presentation of the AFP mentioned that the BIFF continues to sow terror in
Central Mindanao. 1 1 7 The Abu-Sayyaf Group is still present in Zamboanga, Tawi-Tawi,
and Sulu. 1 1 8 Meanwhile, the Maute Group, the Turai e Group, and the AKP continue to
occupy areas in Central Mindanao. 1 1 9 Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga
Peninsula were also identi ed as key areas due to the concentration of the remnants of
the Abu-Sayyaf Group in those areas. 1 2 0
Then, there is the epistemological jump. The President asked and Congress
approved that the implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus cover the entire Mindanao area. It is true that law
enforcement will be required to disrupt any nefarious intention. Certainly, however,
justifying law enforcement is a world apart from justifying the factual su ciency for
martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. IDSEAH
XI
Fourth, the President and his advisers failed to explain why Congress should
"further extend the proclamation of Martial Law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year" or from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018. Likewise, there is no explanation why the
original period of 60 days was insu cient. There was likewise no explanation why the
first extension of a few months was also not enough.
At the very least, the recommendation of AFP Chief of Staff General Guerrero
should have enumerated targets or speci c objectives that the AFP intended to
accomplish during the extension. No success indicators were even mentioned in his
recommendation to the President. The request for a one (1)-year extension of martial
law, therefore, appears to be unreasonable and arbitrary as there is no correlation
between the objectives of the extension to the requested time frame.
The President, through the recommendation of AFP Chief of Staff General
Guerrero, stated that the extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao would help all law enforcement agencies to
"quell completely and put an end to the on-going rebellion in Mindanao and prevent the
same from escalating to other parts of the country," 1 2 1 without stating the powers he
would be requiring to accomplish these objectives. The ambiguous objective seems to
guarantee further extensions. The failure of the majority to see that the facts are not
sufficient to support an extension almost guarantees those extensions.
Strangely, the AFP seeks the extension of martial law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao not to "gain any extra power . . . but to hasten the
accomplishment of the AFP's mandated task in securing the safety of our people in
Mindanao, in particular and the whole country, in general." 1 2 2 The AFP did not specify in
its presentation what powers they would use during the extension of martial law. This
goal of hastening AFP's accomplishment of its mandated task hardly justi es the
purpose or rationale behind the one (1)-year extension. The extension is purely arbitrary.
It is, thus, unconstitutional.
XII
Finally, the government's surreptitious insertion of incidents relating to the 50-

year protracted and diminishing Marxist Leninist Maoist insurrection communist
insurrection of the Communist Party of the Philippines through its New Peoples' Army
and National Democratic Front falls short of the constitutional requirements. It appears
to be an afterthought to bolster the factual milieu in view of the military successes in
relation to the alleged DAESH-related groups.
The insurrection by the related groups under the wing of the Communist Party of
the Philippines or the New Peoples' Army or the National Democratic Front was not in
the proclamation or used as basis for the rst extension of the declaration of the state
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 1 2 3
There is also no explanation why this ongoing insurrection should be the basis for
extending martial law or suspending the writ of habeas corpus only throughout
Mindanao considering that there are isolated incidents of violence attributed to this
group in other parts of the country. Nor was there any explanation why the exercise of
these Commander-in-Chief powers will be for one year considering that the
engagement with the army has been for more than fty years. It is not clear what is
sought to be achieved within this one-year period in relation to this group.
The initial declaration of martial law was based on the acts of the Maute group
on May 23, 2017. Proclamation No. 216 reads, in part:

WHEREAS, today 23 May 2017, the same Maute terrorist group has taken over a
hospital in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, established several checkpoints within
the City, burned down certain government and private facilities and in icted
casualties on the part of Government forces, and started ying the ag of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby openly attempting
to remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government this part of
Mindanao and deprive the Chief Executive of his powers and prerogatives to
enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety in
Mindanao, constituting the crime of rebellion; and
WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other
rebel groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in
Lanao del Sur but also in other parts of Mindanao. 1 2 4
A perusal of Proclamation No. 216 reveals that the true intent of the initial
declaration of martial law was to quell the rebellion allegedly carried out by the Maute
group and other DAESH-inspired groups. It was premised solely on the alleged plan of
the DAESH-inspired groups to establish a wilayah in Mindanao. 1 2 5 Proclamation No.
216 referred to and highlighted the atrocities that the DAESH-inspired groups
committed but nowhere did it mention the communist insurgency led by the NPA or
acts attributable to the NPA.
That Proclamation No. 216 was limited in its scope to the DAESH-inspired
groups is even more magni ed by the Solicitor General's admission in this case that the
focus of the initial proclamation of martial law "was the Marawi S[ie]ge . . . and the
Daesh inspired rebellious groups" 1 2 6 as well as evidence presented by the government
i n Lagman v. Medialdea . There was absolutely no reference to the NPA or atrocities
attributable to the NPA. aCIHcD
As if to give credence to the extension of martial law in the entire region of

Mindanao for a year, the NPA's communist insurgency was included as a justi cation
for the first extension.
In a Letter 1 2 7 dated July 18, 2017, the President reported on the successful
operations in Marawi City:
From 23 May 2017 to 10 July 2017, the AFP's operations had neutralized
three hundred seventy-nine (379) out of the estimated six hundred (600) DIWM
rebels, and had recovered three hundred twenty-nine (329) rearms. Around one
thousand seven hundred twenty-two (1,722) residents of Marawi City had been
rescued and a total of sixteen (16) barangays had been declared clear of DIWM
presence. During clearing operations conducted by the AFP, approximately
Seventy-Five Million Pesos (P75,000,000.00) in cash and cheques were
recovered from a house in Marawi City.
Operations against other rebel groups likewise yielded positive results.
Against the BIFF, eighteen (18) members had been neutralized and two (2) had
been arrested. Against the ASG, twenty-three (23) had been neutralized, ve (5)
apprehended, forty-one (41) surrendered to government forces, and forty-seven
(47) firearms had been recovered. 1 2 8
Without explaining the connection to the alleged actual rebellion, the President
added:
As the government's security forces intensi ed efforts during the
implementation of Martial Law, one hundred eleven (111) members of the New
People's Army (NPA) had been encountered and neutralized, while eighty- ve
(85) firearms had been recovered from them. 1 2 9
Also, in his Letter dated December 8, 2017, the President said:
carried out by the NPA in Mindanao this year, targeting businesses and private
establishments and destroying an estimated P2.2 billion-worth of properties. Of
these, the most signi cant were the attack on Lapanday Food Corporation in
Davao City on 09 April 2017 and the burning of facilities and equipment of Mil-
Oro Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental on 06
May 2017, which resulted in the destruction of properties valued at P1.85 billion
and P109 million, respectively.
As a direct result of these atrocities on the part of the NPA, I was
constrained to issue Proclamation No. 360 on 23 November 2017 declaring the
termination of peace negotiations with the National Democratic Front-
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (NDF-CPP-NPA)
effective immediately. I followed this up with Proclamation No. 374 on 05
December 2017, where I declared the CPP-NPA as a designated/identi ed
terrorist organization under the Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act of 2012, and the issuance of a directive to the Secretary of
Justice to le a petition in the appropriate court praying to proscribe the NDF-
CPP-NPA as a terrorist organization under the Human Security Act of 2007. 1 3 0
During oral arguments, several Justices pressed for an explanation from
respondents, having noticed the discrepancy in using the NPA as basis for the
extension of martial law:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Thank you. Counsel, let['s] settle it. Just one more point. In the original
declaration of martial law, only the Maute rebellion was mentioned
specifically, correct?
There were others, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
And other rebels? But not, no other speci c rebellions? Maute or Maute
group DAES is ISIS inspired, but no other rebels?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, so no specific mention of CPP-NPA rebellion. It's just other rebels.
Yes, but it is subsume[d] under that term, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, okay. Now, in the rst extension. There was also no mention of CPP-
NPA specifically it was not mentioned. Correct?
Actually, Your Honor, the president mentioned it, Your Honor. And may I
read for the record.

JUSTICE CARPIO:
First extension?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
As the government security forces intensi ed efforts during the
implementation of martial law, one hundred eleven members of the New
People's Army (NPA) had been encountered and neutralized while eighty-
five firearms have been recovered from them.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
But what was the rst extension merely extended the initial declaration.
Correct?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
So what governs is the initial declaration? Because you were just
extending it.
Yes, Your Honor. But I mentioned the term. cHaCAS
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes.
And other rebel groups includes the NPA, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yeah, but the rst proclamation of the President in the rst declaration
mentions other rebels.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Without specifying what these other rebels are, other rebels aside from the
Maute Group, there were other rebels.
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, in this second extension, it says now, CPP-NPA?
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Now, my question is, when the Constitution says that if the rebellion
persists, then Congress may extend. When you use the word persist and
extend, you referring to the original ground for declaration of martial law.
Correct?
Yes, Your Honor. But as I've said, it covers the NPA because the Court can
take judicial notice the oldest rebel group in the Philippines is the NPA.
They have been fighting the government way back in 1960s, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
You are saying that when the Congress approved or approved the
extension, the rst extension, they were also referring to the CPP-NPA
rebellion? Is that what you are saying?
That is what I assumed, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay, and also this Court, also when the Court approved.
Yes, Your Honor. 1 3 1
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I'll move on to a different point and just a point of fact. During the
con dential hearings on the rst Martial Law Petition, Lagman v.
Medialdea, you were present, correct?
I was, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, that is not con dential. Will you con rm that there was no
presentation during the confidential briefing on the CPP-NPA?
Well, at that time, Your Honor, because of the on-going peace negotiations,
we did not want to, you know . . . when we are in a negotiating mode, Your
Honor, you want to be in the . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I understand but my question is a bit factual that to convince the Court
that there was a necessity for the proclamation of Martial Law in Lagman
v. Medialdea, one, that was last year, there was no presentation of the CPP
NPA's strength and "atrocities."
I think the focus there was the Marawi S[ie]ge, Your Honor, and the Daesh
inspired rebellious groups, Muslim groups, Your Honor. 1 3 2
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Extension of Martial Law. By the way, was the NPA or the existence of the
NPA, the basis for the initial proclamation of Martial Law?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
It was stated as an initial, in the initial proclamation, your Honor. It only
stated, in fact, the entire proclamation it only stated the events in Marawi
and the Maute, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Because my reading might have been mistaken of the proclamation, there
might have been several paragraphs which were not there, but are you sure
that in Proclamation 216, there is no mention of the NPA at all?
ATTY. COLMENARES:
Yes, there was no mention, Your Honor, I think it was only three pages. In
fact, the proclamation merely alleged that there is rebellion as shown by
the examples of Maute activities in Marawi. And in fact, the proclamation,
Your Honor, in fact even failed to allege that public safety requires the
imposition of Martial Law, Your Honor. 1 3 3
To understand the motive and dangers of the intercalation, a distinction must be
made between terrorism and rebellion. Terrorist acts are largely intended to instill fear
or to intimidate governments or societies. 1 3 4 Though a terrorist act may be in pursuit
of a political or ideological goal, the immediate purpose of a terrorist act is to draw
attention to the terrorist's cause. Re ecting this, terrorist attacks are planned to
generate the most publicity, and primarily target civil society.
I pointed out in my separate opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea that the Marawi
incident was not rebellion, but a con agration caused by a retreating armed force. To
quell the conflagration, there was no need to declare martial law. DACcIH
Acts of rebellion, on the other hand, are acts of armed resistance to an

established government or leader as challenges to established state authority. Acts of
rebellion target the state.
There may exist individuals or organizations which ultimately wish to challenge
the established state authority, and who utilize acts of terrorism to draw attention to
their cause, as part of their recruitment. Challenging state authority, even with violence,
does not automatically constitute all of its acts of violence as acts of rebellion.
Generally, for purposes of declaring a state of martial law and suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, rebellion, as contemplated by the Constitution,
cannot be de ned strictly by the Revised Penal Code. The statutory de nition of
rebellion is merely persuasive. To require that this Court be restricted by the statutory
de nition of rebellion is tantamount to giving Congress the power to amend the
Constitution through legislation. The Constitution does not state that martial law may
be declared "in case of invasion or rebellion, which may be de ned by law," or anything
of similar import.
Even if we assume that Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code de nes the
rebellion that is constitutionally required, the facts as presented by respondent
government are not enough to prove that rebellion persists to the extent required to
support a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The President claims in his Letter to Congress that the New People's Army
"intensi ed their decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up
terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare
against the security sector and public and government infrastructure . . . to seize
political power . . . and supplant the country's democratic form of government with
Communist rule." 1 3 5 Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Guerrero details this in his
Letter to the President:
This year, the CTs perpetrated a total of 385 atrocities (both terrorism
and guerrilla warfare) in Mindanao, which resulted in 41 KIA and 62 WIA on the
part of government forces. On the part of the civilians, these atrocities resulted
in the killing of 23 and the wounding of 6. The most recent was the November 9,
2017 ambush in Talakag, Bukidnon, resulting in the killing of 1 PNP personnel
and wounding of 3 others as well as the killing of a four-month old infant and
the wounding of 2 civilians.
Apart from these, 59 arson incidents were carried out by the NPA in
Mindanao for this year, targeting businesses and private establishments that
destroyed an estimated Php2.2B-worth of properties. Of these, the most
signi cant were the April 9, 2017 attack on Lapanday Food Corporation in
Davao City and the May 6, 2017 burning of facilities and equipment of Mil-Oro
Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental which
resulted in PhP1.85B and PhP109M-worth of properties destroyed. 1 3 6
The AFP grouped the NPA with local terrorist groups and added the "intensi ed"
communist insurgency as a justi cation for the extension of martial law. To dramatize
its point, the AFP cited one incident: the November 2017 ambush in Talakag Bukidnon,
which left three (3) individuals wounded and claimed the lives of an infant and a PNP
personnel. 1 3 7 The AFP also cited the attacks of the NPA against private individuals,
business establishments, and mining companies 1 3 8 as well as the NPA's extortion
activities.
The factual basis of the AFP, however, establishes neither an intensi ed
communist insurgency nor the existence of rebellion su cient to support a declaration
of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. If at all, it proves that the
communist insurgency has diminished and has refocused its efforts against extortion
activities. Even with extortion activities, the numbers show a marked decline.
The NPA, on the basis of isolated criminal acts, was made to appear as a
formidable organization capable of seizing power from the government. However, the
assertions regarding the strength of the NPA glaringly contradict the NPA's current
capabilities. The NPA was estimated to have a total of 26,000 soldiers back in
the 1980s. Their numbers have signi cantly decreased to 4,000 in 2017. 1 3 9
Current data furnished by no less than the AFP shows that as of the rst
semester of 2017, the numbers of the NPA in Mindanao have gone down to
1,748. 1 4 0
The attacks mentioned by the AFP in its presentation were directed against
private entities, not against the government. The properties the NPA burned belonged
to private corporations such as Lapanday Food Corporation, 1 4 1 mining companies, 1 4 2
and DOLE, 1 4 3 among others. It does not belong to government entities. HSCATc
The extortion activities of the NPA, assuming they are related to an on-going
rebellion, do not seem to have intensi ed. The NPA is claimed to have amassed P1.05
billion in 2016 from private individuals and entities but their extortion activities
appeared to have declined. The AFP, however, reports that as of the rst semester of
2017, the NPA has taken roughly only P91 million from private entities. This is a marked
decline. It does not show the intensi ed efforts of the insurgents as alleged by the
respondents.

XIII
Terrorism must not be ignored. It is a tragic and violent reality that we must
address head-on. However, military rule is not the solution that will extinguish all acts of
terrorism. This conclusion is replete in the relevant literature and expressed by the
most experienced experts.
In Fifteen Years On, Where are We in the "War on Terror"?, Brian Michael Jenkins, a
former Green Beret who has served on the White House Commission on Aviation Safety
and Security and as an advisor to the National Commission on Terrorism of the United
States of America, explores the complex issues that face those addressing terrorism.
An effective understanding of the implications of terrorist events is di cult to
achieve without delving deeper into the context behind the events. Numbers alone and
gut reactions should not replace scrutiny. Terrorists are opportunistic. They succeed
when they can manipulate and capitalize on gut reactions and imperfect knowledge.
Jenkins points out that the so-called "War on Terror" is complicated by issues
such as the ambiguity of the enemy's identity, con ated by the ever-changing political
environment adding to the list of enemies; society's fears of terrorism being driven and
increased by news coverage; and the constant ux of world events. To gain a more
accurate picture of what the acts of terrorism convey, Jenkins proposes a more global
and balanced appreciation of the situation:
A thorough appreciation of the current situation requires assessing
progress in different fields of action and different geographic theatres . . .
. . . In some areas, counterterrorism efforts have been successful; in others, less
so. And for every plus or minus entry, there is a "however." Moreover, as shown
in the preceding discussion, the situation has been and continues to be
dynamic.
On the plus side, our worst fears have not been realized. There have been
no more 9/11s, none of the worst cases that post-9/11 extrapolations
suggested. The 9/11 attacks now appear to be a statistical outlier, not a
forerunner of further escalation. Terrorists have not used weapons of mass
destruction, as many expected they would do. (At least they have not used them
yet, many would add.) While the Islamic State appears to have recruited some
chemical weapons specialists, the terrorist arsenal remains primitive, although
lethal within bounds.
Contrary to the in ated rhetoric of some in government, the operational
capabilities of al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State remain limited. Both enterprises
are bene ciaries of fortune (they would argue, of "God's will"). They are
successful opportunists. The Islamic State's military success in Syria and Iraq
re ects the collapse of the government's forces, not military prowess. With its
legions of foreign ghters and deep nancial pockets, the Islamic State
theoretically could launch a global terrorist offensive, but the surge would
probably be brief. This is not, as some have suggested, World War III.
Neither al-Qa'ida nor the Islamic State has become a mass movement,
although both organizations attract sympathy in Muslim countries. The vast
majority of Muslims polled over the years express negative views of jihadist
organizations, but a signi cant minority expresses favorable views of al-Qa'ida
and, more recently, of the Islamic State . . .
The constellation of jihadist groups is not as meaningful as it appears to
be. Competing for endorsements, al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State have attracted
declarations of loyalty from local groups across Africa, the Middle East, and
Asia and have established a host of a liates, provinces, and jihadist footholds.
This is growth by acquisition and branding. A lot of it is public relations. Many
of these groups are the products of long-standing local grievances and con icts
that would continue if there were no al-Qa'ida or Islamic State. Some are
organizational assertions that represent only a handful of militants. The
militants share a banner but are, for the most part, focused on local quarrels
rather than a global jihad. There is no central command. There are no joint
operations. The groups operate autonomously. Their connections in many
cases are tenuous, although, with time, they could evolve into something more
connected. The split between al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State has divided the
groups. A number of them are beset by further internal divisions. IDTSEH
Like all terrorists, jihadis can kill, destroy, disrupt, alarm, and oblige
governments to divert vast resources to secure against their attacks, but
terrorists cannot translate their attacks into permanent political gain. Yet this is
not the way they measure things. They tend to see their mission as continuing
operations to demonstrate their commitment and awaken others.
The Islamic State is losing territory and can be defeated. With coalition
air support and other external assistance, government forces in Iraq and U.S.-
backed Kurdish and Arab ghters in Syria have been able to retake territory held
by the Islamic State. Progress is slow, though faster than many analysts initially
anticipated. This is not just a military challenge; it is also an effort to put
something in place to govern recovered towns and cities.
Al-Qa'ida Central's command has been reduced to exhorting others to
fight. The Islamic State has made very effective use of social media to reach a
broader audience. Its advertisement of atrocity as evidence of its authenticity
appears to have been a magnet for marginal and psychologically disturbed
individuals. Jihadist ideology has become a conveyer of individual discontents.
1 4 4 (Emphasis in the original)
Jenkins makes a case for having a nuanced, information and analysis-based

understanding of and approach to counter terrorism. Thus, to effectively address
terrorism, a clear program for countering violent extremism (CVE) requires a multi-
faced approach.
No such program was presented before Congress or this Court. The context of
martial law to address public safety was inadequately provided by the government.
It is enlightening to compare this to how other countries are comprehensively
addressing terrorism. Unfortunately, respondents have manifested that they preferred
not to declassify and make public this government's program to counter violent
extremism.
One such program belongs to the United Kingdom (UK), which faces threats
from Al Qa'ida, as well as its a liates, associated groups, and "lone-wolf" terrorists,
while also facing the violence associated with Northern Ireland-related terrorism. The
UK has developed and improved upon its own Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST).
In CONTEST the Secretary of State for the Home Department details to parliament the
comprehensive strategy that the UK is adopting to counter terrorism. Through
CONTEST, the messaging is clear as to what the UK's goals are and what areas across
all fields must be worked on in order to keep Britain safe from terrorist attacks.
CONTEST was designed with the following principles in mind:
• Effective: we will regularly assess the progress we are making and the
outcomes of this strategy;
• Proportionate: we will ensure that the resources allocated to CONTEST, and
the powers that are used for counter-terrorism work are proportionate to the
risks we face and necessary to reduce those risks to a level we judge is
acceptable;
• Transparent: wherever possible and consistent with our security we will seek
to make more information available about the threats we face, the options
we have and the response we have decided on;
xxx xxx xxx
• Flexible: terrorists will seek new tactics to exploit vulnerabilities in our
protective security; we will regularly re-assess the risks we face and ensure
that risk assessment is the foundation of our work;
• Collaborative: countering terrorism requires a local, national and
international response. We will continue to work with foreign governments,
the private sector, non-governmental organisations and the public; and
• Value for money: to deliver a counter-terrorism that is sustainable over the
long term we will try to reduce costs while we maintain our core
capabilities. 1 4 5
Further, the UK's CONTEST is organized around four (4) areas of activity, namely,
"Pursue," "Prevent," "Protect," and "Prepare." 1 4 6
Pursue is concerned with stopping terrorist attacks within the UK and against UK
interests worldwide. This involves the early detection, investigation, and disruption of
terrorist activity before it poses a danger to the public. 1 4 7 Among the planned Pursue
activities are a continued assessment of counter-terrorism powers to ensure they are
both effective and proportionate; an improvement of the ability to prosecute and
deport people for terrorist-related offenses; an increase of capabilities to detect,
investigate, and disrupt terrorist threats; the improvement of the ability to handle
sensitive and secret materials during judicial proceedings to promote justice and
national security; and to enable the UK to better tackle threats at their source by
working with other countries as well as multilateral organizations. 1 4 8
Prevent aims to stop people from supporting terrorism, or becoming terrorists
themselves. 1 4 9 It is recognized as a key part of CONTEST. The primary objectives of
the UK in relation to Prevent are to:
• Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face
from those who promote it;
• Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are
given appropriate advice and support; and
• Work with a wide range of sectors (including education, criminal justice,
faith, charities, the internet and health) where there are risks of
radicalisation which we need to address. 1 5 0
Protect is intended to strengthen the UK's protection against a terrorist attack
within the country, or against its interests abroad. CONTEST recognizes that priorities
under Protect must be informed by an assessment of facts: what the terrorists are
trying to do, what their targets may be, and the vulnerabilities in said targets. 1 5 1 The
government's objectives in relation to Protect are to:
• Strengthen UK border security;
• Reduce the vulnerability of the transport network;
• Increase the resilience of the UK's infrastructure; and
• Improve protective security for crowded places. 1 5 2
Prepare is intended to mitigate the impact of terrorist attacks that cannot be
stopped. 1 5 3 Among the government's objectives here are to:
• Continue to build generic capabilities to respond to and recover from a wide
range of terrorist and other civil emergencies;
• Improve preparedness for the highest impact risks in the National Risk
Assessment;
• Improve the ability of the emergency services to work together during a
terrorist attack; and
• Enhance communications and information sharing for terrorist attacks. 1 5 4
TAacHE
The foregoing objectives re ect the UK government's recognition, that it is

essential to have a strategy that is both effective and proportionate, more focused and
more precise, "which uses powers selectively, carefully and in a way that is as sparing
as possible." 1 5 5
XIV
The government's presentation contained no sophistication in relation

to how martial law, as generally conceived, can contribute to addressing the
different types of violence it sought to address. They were not required by
Congress or by the majority of this Court. Representing the government, the Solicitor
General insisted trough manifestations to even keep the program to counter violent
extremism confidential and unavailable to the petitioners and the public.
We cannot remain so woefully uninformed that they will believe that a mere
declaration and its psychological advantage is enough.
Again, there is enough publicly available literature that can inform us on the
complexity of the problem.
For example, lessons on how individuals are recruited and radicalized may also
be taken from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Con ict (IPAC). IPAC was founded on
the premise that violent conflict cannot be prevented without accurate analysis.
Its report analyzing the custodial debrie ngs of seven (7) individuals arrested in
relation to the Davao bombing of September 2016 is instructive.
The report reveals the cell group responsible for the Davao bombing consisted
of a core group of friends who brought others into the fold, and that two (2) men were
instrumental in the cell's formation.
One of them, Fakhrudin Dilangalen, was an Islamic teacher who had already been
involved in pro-ISIS activities as early as 2014. The other was the cell's leader, T.J.
Macabalang, a businessman who had become fascinated by the establishment of a
caliphate in 2014. 1 5 6
Fakhrudin was a regular speaker after sunset prayers in a mosque in Sousa,
Cotabato, who organized the young male attendees of his discussions into a cell and
who sent small groups of these young men to train with AKP. Many of these young men
were university students. T.J. Macabalang, on the other hand, was a motorcycle shop-
owner with a drag racing club, who took up information technology at the University of
Visayas in Cebu. In 2014, having become fascinated by the establishment of a
caliphate, and having become committed to ISIS through his exploration of ISIS online,
he reached out to Fakhrudin. In January, 2015, Fakhrudin invited T.J. in his home in
Cotabato, and they proceeded with fteen (15) others to the AKP camp in Butril,
Palimbang, where most of them underwent a 40-day military training course. However,
in December, 2015, Fakhrudin told T.J. he was breaking with AKP and its commander
over a variance of views.
In January 2016, T.J. and Fakhrudin met Abdullah Maute in Butig, Lanao del Sur,
and subsequently, Fakhrudin moved to Butig to join the Maute group. With Fakhrudin
gone, T.J. replaced him as amir of the Cotabato cell.
Members of T.J.'s drag racing club joined, and they likewise brought others into
the group. At the time of the Davao bombing, the cell had around thirty (30) members,
despite the fact that T.J. did not have substantial religious knowledge. 1 5 7
Noting that the key to radicalization in this instance was not poverty, and noting
further that basic data-gathering from detainees has not yet been done by Philippine
authorities, this IPAC report proposes that the following steps be taken to provide a
basis for an effective counter-radicalization program:
• A mapping of university-based recruitment into extremist based both on
detainee data as well as research in tertiary institutions by researchers who
understand the distinctions among different streams of Islam.
• A compilation of the narratives used to draw recruits into pro-ISIS activity,
both in religious study discussions as well as during military training.
• A systematic focus on cities other than Cotabato where radical cells were
known to be active, using detainee information to try and draw a more
complete picture of how these cells worked. We know, for example, that the
organization initially known as Khilafah Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) was
founded in Cagayan de Oro by a man who became part of Maute's inner
circle in Marawi, Ustadz Humam Abdul Najid alias Owayda (also known as
Wai). Mapping the connections in Cagayan and understanding Owayda's
role there remain essential.
• A mapping of mosques known to have hosted discussions with pro-ISIS
preachers. The Salaf mosque in Cotabato is one example but there will
surely be many others. Local ulama councils may want to work out a
mechanism by which they can share information about known extremists
to try and prevent mosques and other institutions from being recruitment
centers.
• A detailed understanding of the role of women and why and through whom
women became involved as nanciers, propagandists and combatants.
158 HDICSa
In the context of these insights, a general declaration of martial law without

specifying the types of powers that will be exercised different from ordinary law
enforcement action appears simplistic. The factual basis, apart from being too
generalized, unsupported by evidence and incoherent, simply is not su cient to
support the nding that the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ is needed to address the kind of danger to public safety that is
existing in various parts of Mindanao.

XV
This was because the deliberations in Congress did not provide for any
reasonable space for democratic deliberation.
As a general rule, this Court will not interfere with the proceedings of Congress.
I n Baguilat, Jr. v. Alvarez , 1 5 9 this Court recognized Congress' sole authority to
promulgate rules to govern its proceedings. However, this is not equivalent to an
unfettered license to disregard its own rules. Further, the promulgated rules must not
violate fundamental rights.
As loathe as this Court is to examine the internal workings of a co-equal branch
of government, there are circumstances where this Court's constitutional duty needs
such examination.
I n Baguilat, I stressed the need for this Court to ful ll its duty to uphold the
Constitution even if it involves inquiring into the proceedings of a co-equal branch. I
pointed out the danger in refusing this duty, where the proceedings are designed to
stifle dissent:
Caution must be exercised in having a complete hands-off approach on
matters involving grave abuse of discretion of a co-equal branch. This Court has
come a long way from our pronouncements in Mabanag v. Vito.
I n Mabanag, the Congress voted on the "Resolution of Both Houses
Proposing an Amendment to the [1935] Constitution of the Philippines to be
Appended as an Ordinance Thereto." The Resolution proposed to amend the
1935 Constitution to give way for the American parity rights provision, which
granted United States citizens equal rights with Filipinos in the exploitation of
our country's natural resources and the operation of public utilities, contrary to
Articles XIII and XIV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution required the a rmative
votes of three-fourths (3/4) of all members of the Senate and the House, voting
separately, before a proposed constitutional amendment could be submitted to
the people for approval or disapproval. The Senate was then composed of 24
members while the House had 98 members. Two (2) House representatives later
resigned, leaving the House membership with only 96 representatives. Following
the Constitutional mandate, the required votes to pass the Resolution were 18
Senators and 72 Representatives.
The Senate suspended three (3) Senators from the Nacionalista Party,
namely, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, and Jose E. Romero, for alleged
irregularity in their elections. Meanwhile, the House also excluded eight (8)
representatives from taking their seats. Although these eight (8) representatives
were not formally suspended, the House nevertheless excluded them from
participating for the same reason. Due to the suspension of the Senators and
Representatives, only 16 out of the required 18 Senators and 68 out of the 72
Representatives voted in favor of the Resolution.
Mabanag recognized that had the excluded members of Congress been
allowed to vote, then the parity amendment that gave the Americans rights to
our natural resources, which this Court ruled impacted on our sovereignty, would
not have been enacted.
Nevertheless, the absence of the necessary votes of three-fourths (3/4) of
either branch of Congress, voting separately, did not prevent Congress from
passing the Resolution. Petitioners thus assailed the Resolution for being
unconstitutional. This Court, ruling under the 1935 Constitution upheld the
enactment despite the patent violation of Article XV, Section 1.
Mabanag ruled that Congress in joint session already certi ed that both
Houses adopted the Resolution, which was already an enrolled bill. Thus, this
Court had no more power to review as it was a political question:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we deem it unnecessary to
decide the question of whether the senators and representatives
who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote were members of Congress within the meaning of
Section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution. IDaEHC
Justice Perfecto's dissent, however, considered the matter a

constitutional question — that is to say, deciding whether respondents violated
the requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution was within this Court's
jurisdiction.
Subsequent rulings have since delimited and clari ed the political
question doctrine, especially under the 1987 Constitution. It bears stressing that
Article VIII, Section 1 explicitly grants this Court the power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
We cannot again shy away from this constitutional mandate.
The rule of law must still prevail in curbing any attempt to suppress the
minority and eliminate dissent.
In Estrada v. Desierto:
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach
of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of
judicial review of this [C]ourt not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the
judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new
provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to
determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing.
(Emphasis supplied)
Any attempt by the dominant to silence dissent and take over an entire
institution nds no room under the 1987 Constitution. Parliamentary practice
and the Rules of the House of Representatives cannot be overruled in favor of
personal agenda.
It is understandable for the majority in any deliberative body to push their
advantages to the consternation of the minority. However, in a representative
democracy marked with opportunities for deliberation, the complete annihilation
of any dissenting voice, no matter how reasonable, is a prelude to many forms
of authoritarianism. While politics speaks in numbers, many among our citizens
can only hope that those political numbers are the result of mature discernment.
Maturity in politics is marked by a courageous attitude to be open to the
genuine opposition, who will aggressively point out the weaknesses of the
administration, in an orderly fashion, within parliamentary forums. After all, if
the true interest of the public is in mind, even the administration will bene t by
criticism. 1 6 0
In this case, the rules of the Joint Session of Congress 1 6 1 appear to have been
designed to sti e discourse and genuine inquiry into the su ciency of factual basis for
the extension of martial law. They give a member of Congress no more than three (3)
minutes to interpellate resource persons during the Joint Session:
RULE V
CONSIDERATION OF THE LETTER OF THE PRESIDENT DATED DECEMBER 8,
2017 CALLING UPON THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES "TO FURTHER
EXTEND THE PROCLAMATION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF
MINDANAO FOR A PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR, FROM 01 JANUARY 2018 TO 31
DECEMBER 2018, OR FOR SUCH OTHER PERIOD OF TIME AS THE CONGRESS
MAY DETERMINE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII OF THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION"
SEC. 6. The relevant agencies of the Executive Department shall report to
the Joint Session on the factual basis of the letter of the President calling upon
Congress to further extend the period of Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017.
SEC. 7. Any member of Congress may interpellate the resource persons for
not more than three (3) minutes excluding the time of the answer of the
resource persons.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lagman provided some detail as to how
Congress performed its inquiry into the factual basis for the extension of martial law.
Not only were the members of Congress given an inadequate three (3) minutes to
interpellate resource persons during the Joint Session, but they were also only provided
with three (3) letters as basis for their vote. Although the three (3) letters contained
some factual allegations, no basis for the factual allegations was provided to the
members of Congress during their Joint Session: DTCSHA
JUSTICE LEONEN:
xxx xxx xxx
Congressman Lagman, I am sure that you were given the operational
orders or the OPORD while you were conducting the congressional
hearings that you were given the OPORD, the Operational Directive of the
Chief of Staff to the Service Command for the extension of Martial Law, is
that not correct?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
Well, we were given the letter of the President . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
I'm sorry Congressman Lagman. So, the only thing given to you as
Congressmen was the letter of the President.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
With the annexes of the recommendation both of the Secretary of National
Defense and the . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Let me get this right. So, the Congress decided on the basis of a letter of
the President, the annex was the letter of the Chief of Staff and the . . .
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
And also of the Secretary of National Defense.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
In other words, was there intelligence information given to each member of
the House and the Senate when they reviewed the factual basis of the
assertions in the letter?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
There was a brie ng before we had the joint session but de nitely no
confidential information was given to the members.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The briefing was in power point, correct?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
No, Your Honor . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, it was just . . .
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
That was before, wala. . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So, let me again go back. So, Congress relied on a brie ng but was not
given materials when it actually voted for the extension of Martial Law in
the entirety of Mindanao for one year. You were relying on the letter of the
President, the letter of the SND, the letter of the Chief of Staff, and the
words that were given only during the briefing, am I not correct?
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
Those were the only documents in the brie ng conducted but during the
joint session, we were allowed to make some interpellation and inquiries
on the Executive Panel but it was very limited. We were only given three
minutes.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Three minutes.
CONGRESSMAN LAGMAN:
Three minutes. 1 6 2
This account was described further by petitioners Lagman, et al. in their
Memorandum and unrefuted by the respondents: CScTED
11. Petitioner Lagman was present during the entire joint session of the
Congress on December 13, 2017 when the request of the President for a
yearlong extension of martial law and the suspension of the writ in Mindanao
was summarily granted by the Congress. He is absolutely certain there was no
PowerPoint presentation made by the resource persons from the military and
police establishments and executive department during the joint session.
12. He was also present during the all-Member caucus of the House of
Representatives held in the afternoon of December 12, 2017 when the military
and police establishments briefed the Members of the House of Representatives
on the security situation in Mindanao. There was a PowerPoint presentation
made principally by General Alex Monteagudo, the Chief of the National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA). But the caucus was not the body
charged with approving the extension.
13. The PowerPoint presentation, which included the
assessment/conclusions of the military-police establishment, was not
substantiated by independent hard data and validated accounts. It was bereft of
veri ed and veri able basis. It was not supported by documentary evidence.
Verily, the PowerPoint presentation lacks the disclosure of the factual data on
which it was based.
14. When sensitive questions were asked, the usual answer was that they
involved classi ed information which are con dential in nature and any
disclosure may endanger national security.
15. It was during his brie ng that General Monteagudo said that "Marawi is
only the tip of the iceberg," an understatement to justify alleged looming bigger
terrorist threats and attacks. This estimation was not backed up with facts.
xxx xxx xxx
19. It is false for the Solicitor General to claim that Petitioner Lagman was
absent in either or both the briefing and joint session. 1 6 3
The foregoing account exposes a failure on the part of Congress to look into the
factual basis for extending the proclamation of martial law. Not only that, but the
limitation of three (3) minutes to interpellate resource persons during the Joint Session
suggests an intention to suppress any inquiry into the factual premise for the extension
of martial law.
The discussion of Congress was crammed in one (1) day towards the end of a
Congressional session. This was due to the belated request for extension
communicated by the President. 1 6 4
By passing and enforcing the joint rules, Congress shirked its own
constitutionally mandated duty to determine, rst, whether the actual rebellion persists
and, second, whether public safety requires the extension of martial law on account of
the persisting actual rebellion. The rules provided by Congress ensured that those
members who wished to perform their roles and inquire as to the facts were prevented
from doing so. Time for deliberation and reconsideration by their colleagues were
clearly curtailed.
Congress' deliberations, or manifest lack thereof, should be enough to encourage
this Court to approach this case with more rigor and less deference. The Congress
could have been more critical and analytical in its review of the facts presented through
PowerPoint presentations.
XVI
The majority in this Court presents its decision in the context of a choice
between terrorism and rebellion on the one hand and martial law on the other. This is a
false dichotomy.
There are peace and order problems in Mindanao. Indeed, these are to be
addressed convincingly and decisively with law enforcement and with a strategic
program to counter violent extremism. Terrorism and isolated acts of rebellion require
comprehensive solutions that sincerely addresses the causes of the emergence of
radical ideologies hand in hand with military and police actions to disrupt and suppress
violence. Martial law is not the only option.
To label the law enforcement problems in Mindanao simplistically as rebellion in
order to grant a carte blanche authority for the President under the rubric of martial law
is dangerous sophistry.
Accepting the allegations of the government, without any effort to determine its
quality in terms of the evidence supporting it and to examine its logic in its entirety,
amounts to a failure to do our constitutional duty to examine not only grave abuse of
discretion but the factual su ciency of the exercise of extraordinary Commander-in-
Chief powers. To be blind to the kind of deliberation that was done in Congress is to fail
our covenant with the sovereign Filipino people. cDCEIA
In the 1970s, there was a Court which painfully morphed into a willing
accomplice to the demise of fundamental rights through tortured readings of their
clear constitutional mandate in order to accommodate a strongman. What followed
was one of the darkest episodes in our history. Slowly but surely, soldiers lost their
professionalism. Thousands lost their freedoms. Families suffered from involuntary
disappearances, torture, and summary killings. Among them are some of the
petitioners in this case.
Regardless of the motives of the justices then, it was a Court that was complicit
to the suffering or our people. It was a Court that degenerated into a willing pawn
diminished by its fear of the impatience of a dictator.
The majority's decision in this case aligns us towards the same dangerous path.
It erodes this Court's role as our society's legal conscience. It misleads our people that
the solution to the problems of Mindanao can be solved principally with the determined
use of force. It is a path to disempowerment.
Contrary to the text and spirit of the Constitution, the decision in this case
provides the environment that enables the rise of an emboldened authoritarian.
This is far from the oath to the Constitution that I have taken. I, therefore, dissent.
ACCORDINGLY , in view of the foregoing, I vote to grant the Petitions and
declare the President's request for extension of the period covered by Proclamation
No. 216 series of 2017 and Congress' Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 issued on
December 13, 2017 as unconstitutional.
JARDELEZA , J., dissenting :
In my Separate Opinion 1 in Lagman v. Medialdea , 2 I advanced the following

views: (1) that a case led under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution is sui
generis; (2) determination of the su ciency of the factual basis is distinct from
ascertaining whether there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) the standard of review for a
proceeding under Section 18, Article VII should be reasonableness; and (4) the
Government's presentation of evidence should, in the rst instance, be conducted
publicly and in open court. 3 After examining the evidence then presented before us, I
found "nothing incredulous or far-fetched" about the Government's claims which, I also
noted, were "not incompatible with local and foreign media reports and publicly
available legal research." Thus, I concluded that there was an actual rebellion and the
threat to public safety necessitated the President's declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
The Court's jurisdiction under Section 18, Article VII is again invoked, this time to
determine the su ciency of the factual basis for the extension of the President's
declaration. If upheld, martial law will continue to be implemented and the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus suspended in the whole of Mindanao until December 31,
2018. The ponencia finds that there is sufficient factual basis for the extension.
I dissent and write this Opinion to explain my conclusion.
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides:

In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he
may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation
shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President,
the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
led by any citizen, the su ciency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply
only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.
shall be released. (Emphasis supplied.)
The text of the Constitution is clear. Two conditions must concur before a
President can suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law: (1) actual rebellion or invasion; and (2)
when public safety requires it. Much has been said about the concept of rebellion within
the meaning of Section 18, Article VII. I myself have advanced views on this matter. 4
My present analysis is concerned not so much with the issue as to the existence of an
actual rebellion as used under Section 18. In fact, given the facts and my proposed
de nition of rebellion within the meaning of Section 18, 5 which is simply armed public
resistance to the government, I nd the Government's claim that actual rebellion is
continuously being waged in Mindanao to be not unreasonable.
I have very grave concerns, however, with the suggestion that the existence or
persistence of a rebellion per se necessarily endangers public safety for purposes of
Section 18, Article VII. According to the Government:
84. Since Cullamat, et al., admit the existence of rebellion in
Mindanao, they cannot begrudge the Congress from agreeing to the extension
of the proclamation and suspension in the interest of public safety. The danger
posed by rebellion on public safety cannot be discounted. The crime of rebellion
consists of many acts. It is a vast movement of men and a complex net of
intrigues and plots. x x x 6
Otherwise stated, the Government's proposition is that since a rebellion, by de nition, is

carried out by a "vast movement of men," any rebellion, regardless of scale , may call for
an exercise by the President of his extraordinary powers. I strongly disagree.
II
It is my view that the second requirement of "when public safety requires it"
introduced a level of scale as to qualify the rst requirement of the existence of an
actual rebellion or invasion. "Scale" is de ned as "the relative size or extent of
something." 7 It is synonymous with "scope, magnitude, dimensions, range, breadth,
compass, degree, reach, spread, sweep." 8 The public safety requirement under Section
18, Article VII operates to limit the exercise of the President's extraordinary powers
only to rebellions or invasions of a certain scale as to su ciently threaten public safety.
This conclusion, I nd, is supported by: (a) the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission; (b) our law and jurisprudence on the concept of public safety as used in
speci c relation to the exercise of government powers which result in an impairment of
civil rights; and (c) the experience of the Court both in this case and in Lagman v.
Medialdea where it upheld the President's original declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
Deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
A careful reading of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would

clearly show that there was no intention to interpret the public safety requirement
simply as a foregone consequence of the existence of the rst requirement, i.e., actual
rebellion or invasion. Rather, it seems that the intention was to qualify the rst
requirement such that not all cases of rebellion or invasion can be considered
su cient for purposes of the exercise of the President's extraordinary
powers :
MR. DELOS REYES:
As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer
imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual
shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example?
Let us take for example a contemporary event — this Manila Hotel incident
everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an
act of rebellion?
MR. REGALADO:
If we consider the de nition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an
armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the
means employed under Article 135. I am not trying to pose as an expert
about this rebellion that took place in the Manila Hotel, because what I
know about it is what I only read in the papers. I do not know whether we
can consider that there was really an armed public uprising. Frankly, I have
my doubts on that because we were not privy to the investigations
conducted there.
Commissioner Bernas would like to add something.
FR. BERNAS:
Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion . Even if we
will suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an
actual rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ because
the Constitution further says: "when the public safety requires it."
S o , even if there is a rebellion but the rebellion can be handled
and public safety can be protected without imposing martial law
or suspending the privilege of the writ , the President need not.
Therefore, even if we consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was
something which did not call for imposition of martial law. 9
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The following exchange between Commissioners Jose N. Nolledo and Crispino
M. De Castro further clari ed that while the President can call out the armed forces to
address actual rebellion or invasion, it is only when the situation has posed a severe
enough threat to public safety is he empowered to resort to his extraordinary powers
of declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus:
MR. NOLLEDO: x x x
Does Commissioner de Castro agree with me that the President need not
declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if
there is actual invasion [or] rebellion because he is authorized under
Section 15 of the committee report to call out such Armed Forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?
MR. DE CASTRO:
We are talking of the next sentence with the words "in case of invasion or
rebellion." This becomes a useless sentence. In fact, the questions of
Honorable Suarez and the statements of Honorable Ople do not fall on
these two situations.
MR. NOLLEDO:
No, the rst sentence is very material because if there is an invasion, the
President can immediately call upon the Armed Forces.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DE CASTRO:
That is why I said in case of actual invasion or actual rebellion. [T]he
President will have no more time to say "I declare martial law." He will just
order the Armed Forces to go there and repel the enemy.
MR. NOLLEDO:
Madam President, the argument of Commissioner de Castro seems to
indicate that the President is powerless without declaring martial law. The
rst sentence is very clear, that in case of lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, the President may immediately call the
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress the same. And it is only
when public safety requires it that the President may decide to
declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus . So, I would like to correct the impression that the President has no
power to meet the invasion or rebellion without declaration of martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GARCIA: x x x
I also would like to remind ourselves that very often the doctrine of
national security is given as a reason to impose extraordinary measures
which, once begun, leads to many other violations. I believe this is
something that we must guard against from the very beginning. 1 0
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Mere invocations of issues of national security and public safety, without more,
are not enough. The Constitution requires that there is su cient factual basis to show
not only that actual rebellion or invasion exists, but that the situation has reached such
scale as to threaten public safety.
Public safety in Philippine law and jurisprudence
There is no one concept of public safety in Philippine law and jurisprudence, but
attempts have been made to arrive at accepted meanings of the term. Public safety, for
example, has been interpreted to be "synonymous" with the concept of "national
security" and "security of the state," 1 1 but narrower than those matters falling under the
concept of "interest of the state." 1 2 On the other hand, dangers to public safety have
been held to include tra c congestion; 1 3 hazards of tra c in the evening; 1 4 business
establishments which give rise to con agrations and explosions; 1 5 open canals,
manholes, live wire and other similar hazards to life and property; 1 6 presence of
motorcycles in toll ways; 1 7 billboards and signages in times of typhoons; 1 8
unrestricted right to travel of court employees; 1 9 and the failure of railroad companies
to install, maintain and repair safety equipment and signages. 2 0
For purposes of my analysis of "when public safety requires" within the meaning
of Section 18, Article VII, however, I nd that the interpretation of "public safety" in
relation to the impairment of the liberty of travel 2 1 to be most proximate/appropriate
in that both involve the derogation of civil rights to give way to a "higher" state interest.
In interpreting whether then President Corazon C. Aquino could legally ban the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, the Court in Marcos v. Manglapus, 2 2 voting
eight to seven, upheld the restriction on the Marcoses' right to travel as part of the
President's residual power as "protector of the peace." 2 3 For me, however, the gripping
dissents made for a more compelling analysis on how public safety may, in a proper
case, be invoked by the Government to curtail fundamental rights. Justice Teodoro
Padilla, for example, opined that:
Mr. Marcos, I repeat, comes before the Court as a Filipino, invoking a
speci c constitutional right, i.e., the right to return to the country. Have the
respondents presented su cient evidence to offset or override the
exercise of this right invoked by Mr. Marcos? Stated differently, have the
respondents shown to the Court su cient factual bases and data which would
justify their reliance on national security and public safety in negating the right
to return invoked by Mr. Marcos?
I have given these questions a searching examination. I have carefully
weighed and assessed the "brie ng" given the Court by the highest military
authorities of the land last 28 July 1989. I have searched, but in vain, for
convincing evidence that would defeat and overcome the right of Mr. Marcos as
a Filipino to return to this country. It appears to me that the apprehensions
entertained and expressed by the respondents, including those
conveyed through the military, do not, with all due respect, escalate to
proportions of national security or public safety . They appear to be more
speculative than real, obsessive rather than factual. Moreover, such
apprehensions even if translated into realities, would be "under control," as
admitted to the Court by said military authorities, given the resources and
facilities at the command of government. But, above all, the Filipino people
themselves, in my opinion, will know how to handle any situation brought about
by a political recognition of Mr. Marcos' right to return, and his actual return, to
this country. The Court, in short, should not accept respondents' general
apprehensions, concerns and perceptions at face value, in the light of
a countervailing and even irresistible, speci c, clear, demandable, and
enforceable right asserted by a Filipino .
Deteriorating political, social, economic or exceptional conditions, if any,
are not to be used as a pretext to justify derogation of human rights. 2 4
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted, italics in the original.)
Similarly, in his Dissent, Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. stated that while there may be
disturbances which may be directly attributable to the Marcoses' return to the country,
they are "not of a magnitude as would compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of non-
justiciability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of Rights
guarantee:"
And except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious of which were
totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military was able to readily quell,
the respondents have not pointed to any grave exigency which permits the
use of untrammeled Governmental power in this case and the
indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.
xxx xxx xxx
Signi cantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban
Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or not the respondents acted with
grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of
the implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion.
In the rst place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President
that a clear and present danger to national security and public safety will arise if
Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only
after the present petition was led that the alleged danger to national security
and public safety conveniently surfaced in the respondents' pleadings.
Secondly, President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos
policy to — (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing
need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of recovery and stability.
x x x Neither ground satis es the criteria of national security and
public safety . The President has been quoted as stating that the vast majority
of Filipinos support her position. x x x We cannot validate her stance simply
because it is a popular one. Supreme Court decisions do not have to be popular
as long as they follow the Constitution and the law. The President's original
position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be allowed to
return at this time" has not changed. x x x On February 11, 1989, the President is
reported to have stated that "considerations of the highest national good dictate
that we preserve the substantial economic and political gains of the past three
years" in justifying her rm refusal to allow the return of Mr. Marcos despite his
failing health. x x x "Interest of the nation," "national good," and
"preserving economic and political gains," cannot be equated with
national security or public order. They are too generic and sweeping to
serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional right. The Bill of
Rights commands that the right to travel may not be impaired except on the
stated grounds of national security, public safety, or public health and with the
added requirement that such impairment must be "as provided by law." The
constitutional command cannot be negated by mere generalizations.
2 5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics in the original.)
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, for his part, found "mere conjectures of political and
economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up their
apprehensions" to be insu cient to overcome the Marcoses' right to travel. 2 6 Justice
Edgardo L. Paras, on the other hand, stated that while there may be some danger to
national safety and national security as claimed by the Government, "there is no
showing as to the extent " as to warrant the curtailment of the Marcoses' rights. 2 7
Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento, Sr. similarly objects, thus, "[i]t is his constitutional right, a
right that cannot be abridged by personal hatred, fear, founded or unfounded, and by
speculations of the man's 'capacity' 'to stir trouble.'" 2 8 These dissents, to me, clearly
present a powerful case to require of the Government a clear showing of danger to
national security or public safety of such scale su cient to defeat the right to travel
guaranteed by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
I submit that no less than this same requirement should be demanded of the
Government in this case.
For, the powers to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus implicate not only one's right to travel, but many other basic civil
liberties, including the most fundamental, namely, "individual freedom." 2 9 There was
thus a conscious effort on the part of our Framers to reserve their exercise only in the
direst of situations and under the strictest of conditions. The realization that a
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
impacts our most basic and fundamental rights was foremost on the minds of the
members of the Constitutional Commission:
FR. BERNAS:
I quite realize that that is the practice and, precisely, in proposing this, I am
consciously proposing this as an exception to this practice because of the
tremendous effect on the nation when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended and then martial law is imposed.
Since we have allowed the President to impose martial law and suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus unilaterally, we should make it a
little more easy for Congress to reverse such actions for the sake
of protecting the rights of the people .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO:
I thank Commissioner Monsod. May I join Commissioner Monsod and
Commissioner Guingona that the Congress, voting jointly, should have the
power to revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ
o f habeas corpus. In this way, we make it easy for the people's
representatives to cut short a power which is very potent that could be the
subject of abuse, and in the words of Commissioner Bennagen, could open
the way for the resurgence of tyranny and dictatorship. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BROCKA:
x x x We are talking about a possible situation, a declaration of
martial law, wherein the very basic and fundamental rights of the
citizens are involved, x x x. Whether martial law is declared for
one day or 60 days, the fact is, when martial law is declared the
very basic and fundamental human rights of the citizenry are
taken away from them. It does not matter whether it is one day,
one hour, or 60 days. So, I would like to express my agreement to
Commissioner Monsod's amendment because yesterday we already took
away the condition of prior concurrence of Congress; and now,
Commissioner Monsod agrees that we have to provide a better safeguard
by inserting this particular amendment of a joint decision of Congress. 3 0
(Emphasis supplied.)
It stands to reason that the President may exercise his extraordinary powers only
when the danger to public safety has reached such scale that some restriction of
fundamental rights becomes constitutionally permissible, under the circumstances.
Appreciation of scale is evident in the experience of

the Court in both martial law cases
First. The characterization by the Government of the evidence they presented to

justify the proclamation, and later, extension, of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus would show that it admits scale is an element of
the public safety requirement. In the presentation in this case made by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) before the Court, they described the manpower and
number of rearms of the rebels/terrorist groups to be of such "magnitude" as to
"endanger the public safety" in this wise:
The magnitude as well as the presence of rebel groups

endanger the public safety. 3 1
RE BE L/TE RRORIST CONTROLLE D

MANPOWE R FIRE ARMS
GROUPS BARANGAYS
Communist Rebels 1,748 2,123 426
Dawlah Islamiyah 137 162 -
BIFF 388 328 59
ASG 508 598 52
TOTAL 2,781 3,211 537
Thereafter, the Government attempted to pack the record with statistics to show that
the "magnitude of scope" 3 2 of the threat to public safety was such as to put the
security of Mindanao at stake. To support this conclusion about "magnitude" and
"magnitude of scope," they presented speci cs as to the number of violent incidents
initiated by the different rebel groups, 3 3 the number of victims, 3 4 the amounts
received as a result of kidnap-for-ransom activities, 3 5 intensi cation of recruitment
activities, 3 6 and presence of foreign-trained terrorist ghters. 3 7 These, to me, show a
clear admission on the part of the Government that the public safety requirement under
Section 18, Article VII involves a showing of scale.
Second, the Court, in Lagman v. Medialdea , de ned public safety as "involv[ing]

the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the safety of the
general public from significant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as crimes or
disasters." 3 8 Again, this clearly acknowledged scale by using the word "signi cant" 3 9
to qualify any existing danger, injury/harm or damage to public safety. While it would
continue to state that "public safety is an abstract term" whose "range, extent or scope
could not be physically measured by metes and bounds," 4 0 the Court, after an analysis
of all the evidence presented, nevertheless found that they have reached a level of
danger sufficient to risk public safety:
Invasion or rebellion alone may justify resort to the calling out power but
de nitely not the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be a concurrence of
actual rebellion or invasion and the public safety requirement. In his Report, the
President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the ASG and the Maute
Group were directed not only against government forces or establishments but
likewise against civilians and their properties. In addition and in relation to the
armed hostilities, bomb threats were issued; road blockades and checkpoints
were set up; schools and churches were burned; civilian hostages were taken
and killed; non-Muslims or Christians were targeted; young male Muslims were
forced to join their group; medical services and delivery of basic services were
hampered; reinforcements of government troops and civilian movement were
hindered; and the security of the entire Mindanao Island was compromised.
These particular scenarios convinced the President that the
atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public safety
and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus . In the last paragraph of his
Report, the President declared :
While the government is presently conducting legitimate
operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not the seeds of
invasion, public safety necessitates the continued implementation
of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the
rebellion is completely quelled.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parameters for the declaration
of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus have
been properly and fully complied with. Proclamation No. 216 has su cient
factual basis there being probable cause to believe that rebellion exists and that
public safety requires the martial law declaration and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 4 1 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied,
citations omitted.)
Signi cantly, it appears to me that all the other members of the Court, including
myself, who voted to sustain the President's proclamation of martial law and
suspended the privilege of the writ in Mindanao appreciated (whether instinctively or
deliberately) to a certain extent the scale to which public safety has been endangered
by the situation in Marawi City.
Justice Tijam, in his Separate Concurring Opinion for example, also considered
essentially the same circumstances to arrive at his conclusion that the President's
proclamation was rmly grounded on the requirements of public safety, that is: (1)
destruction of government and privately-owned properties; (2) signi cant number of
casualties; (3) government inability to deliver basic services; (3) government inability to
send troop reinforcements to restore peace in Marawi City; and (4) lack of easy access
for civilians and government personnel to and from the City. 4 2
III
Scale as a measure for determining the existence

of the public safety requirement; Proposed indicators of scale
T h e ponencia cites an Amicus Curae Brief submitted by esteemed

constitutionalist Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo , 4 3 to
justify a "permissive approach" to the President's assessment of the public safety
requirement under Section 18, Article VII. 4 4 The portion quoted reads:
From all these it is submitted that the focus on public safety adds a
nuance to the meaning of rebellion in the Constitution which is not found in the
meaning of the same word in Article 134 of the Penal Code. The concern of the
Penal Code, after all, is to punish acts of the past. But the concern of the
Constitution is to counter threat to public safety both in the present
and in the future arising from present and past acts. Such nuance, it is
submitted, gives to the President a degree of exibility of determining whether
rebellion constitutionally exists as basis for martial law even if facts cannot
obviously satisfy the requirements of the Penal Code, whose concern is about
past acts. To require that the President must first convince herself that there can
be proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of rebellion as de ned in the
Penal Code and jurisprudence can severely restrict the President's capacity to
safeguard public safety for the present and the future and can defeat the
purpose of the Constitution. 4 5
While I am in complete agreement with Father Bernas' statement, I disagree with
the conclusion reached by the ponencia on account thereof.
First, — I believe Father Bernas' statement was given in the context of a
discussion regarding the de nition of "rebellion" as it is used in the Constitution. The
conclusion of the statement was that while the Revised Penal Code de nition may be
considered, the President is not bound to assume "the function of a judge trying to
decide whether to convict a person for rebellion or not." 4 6 It was not meant to de ne
public safety requirements or otherwise proscribe the future provision of guidelines for
its determination.
Second. Father Bernas' statement that the determination of the requirements of
public safety "involves the veri cation of factors not as easily measurable" 4 7 is not
conceptually incompatible or irreconcilable with the identi cation of minimum
reasonable indicators, "veri able through the visual or tactile sense," 4 8 through which
to determine whether public safety requires the exercise of the President's
extraordinary powers. Indeed, when our Framers tasked the Court to determine the
su ciency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, it certainly did not mean for the Court to verify
only the factual bases for the alleged rebellion and "permissively" rely on the President's
assessment of the public safety requirement given the facts presented.
For the Court to take such an approach goes against the very reason why it was
given the speci c mandate under Section 18, Article VII in the rst place. Such an
approach defeats the deliberate intent of our Framers to "shift [the] focus of judicial
review to determinable facts, as opposed to the manner or wisdom of the exercise of
the power" and "[create] an objective test to determine whether the President has
complied with the constitutionally prescribed conditions." 4 9
In fact, I realize that I have previously articulated some views on public safety
which may seem opposed to the views I now embrace. I initially took the position that
since the requirements of public safety appear to be phrased in discretionary terms, it
would be di cult to set parameters in a vacuum as to what predicate facts should
exist. The facts and experience from this case, however, have opened my eyes to the
mischief that a "permissive" approach to the President's "prudential estimation" of the
public safety requirement can cause. Permissive deference can be used to justify the
imposition or extension of martial law by the simple expedient of alleging the existence
or persistence of "rebel" groups capable of opposing the Government. I fail to see the
difference between sustaining the extension of martial law based on the capability of
hostile "rebel" groups to sow discord against the Government and sustaining martial
law on the basis of an imminent danger of rebellion. That would be a movement back to
t h e Lansang formulation, and an abject abdication of this Court's "newly assumed
power" to review the declaration, or extension, of martial law based on su ciency of
factual basis. 5 0
Worse, it would open the country to the possibility of a permanent state of
martial law, as the Philippines has a long history of rebellions motivated by diverse
religious, ideological, regional, and other interests. That rebellion is a continuing crime
is a handle for the prosecution of rebels wherever they may be. This criminal law
doctrine, however, was never envisioned to be a justi cation to declare martial law
and/or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus whenever and wherever a
rebel may operate or be found. Our history and the evidence presented in this case and
i n Lagman v. Medialdea have shown that there are rebellions and rebellions. Each
rebellion is episodic and will have, as shown in the cases of the Maute Group, the Abu
Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) and the New
People's Army (NPA), their ebbs and flows.
I believe a proper and principled approach to deciding this and future cases
require this Court to identify some reasonable indicators which can be used as guides
to determine scale for purposes of the public safety requirement. Certainly, we will not
be able to catalogue all indicators with mathematical precision. Such an endeavor, while
di cult, is nevertheless doable using all aids available to us, including interpretative
aids and knowledge derived from past experience. 5 1 Surely, in deciding this and future
cases, the Court is not limited in determining the su ciency of the factual basis of the
requirements of public safety to the extremes of an "I know it when I see it" and "the
President knows better" analysis.
As I have endeavored to show above, there were incidents which were
considered by the ponencia in Lagman v. Medialdea as indicators of the scale of the
danger to public safety which may justify a declaration of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. These are: (1) "armed
hostilities" directed not only against government forces or establishments but likewise
against civilians and their properties; (2) bomb threats; (3) set up of road blockades
and checkpoints by the hostile groups; (4) burning of schools and churches; (5) taking
and killing of civilian hostages; (6) targeting of non-Muslims or Christians; (7) forced
recruitment of young male Muslims; (8) hampering of the delivery of medical and other
basic services; and (9) hindrance to movements of civilians and troop reinforcements.
52
Building on the indicators provided in Lagman v. Medialdea , there appears to be

two minimum indicators of scale as to reasonably meet the public safety requirement
necessary for a declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus. These are: (1) the presence of hostile groups engaged in actual and
sustained armed hostilities with government forces; 5 3 and (2) these groups have
actually taken over, and are holding , territory. 5 4 Following our experience in Marawi,
these indicators may further result in, or may be attended by, the interruption in the
sending of troop reinforcements or local authorities being prevented, or unable to,
perform their regular functions, 5 5 including law enforcement and the delivery of basic
services. Bomb threats, burning of schools or churches, kidnapping of civilian hostages,
and forced recruitment of young male Muslims only fall under the rubric of lawless
violence; they do not, by themselves, satisfy the requirements of public safety. When, as
in the Marawi crisis, however, these acts of lawless violence are being committed at or
about the same time, and within the same de ned territory, they may indicate a
signi cant enough breakdown of general peace and order as to reasonably meet the
public safety requirement under Section 18, Article VII.
T h e ponencia argues that "[t]he adoption of the extreme scenario as the
measure of threat to public safety as suggested by petitioners is to invite doubt as to
whether the proclamation of martial law would be at all effective in such case
considering that enemies of the State raise unconventional methods which change over
time." 5 6 It posits that to require parameters may result in a situation where the
declaration of martial law "would be of no useful purpose and such could not be the
intent of the Constitution." 5 7
Again, and with respect, I disagree. Our experience in Marawi has proven this to
not be the case. At the time, armed hostile groups opposed to the government have
already succeeded in overrunning a large part of the city. They engaged government
troops in sustained re ghts, forcing many of the city's residents to evacuate their
homes and ee to temporary shelters outside the city. 5 8 In the end, however, our
military forces were still able to restore peace and order and not without great
sacri ce. No "unconventional methods" were alleged to have been resorted to by these
hostile groups which were beyond the experience and capacity of our government
forces to meet. The mere possibility that hostile groups may, in the future, be able to
devise such unconventional methods is, however, not an acceptable reason to do away
with reasonable proof of scale for purposes of the public safety requirement under
Section 18, Article VII. The requisite scale of the danger to public safety must be
shown in every exercise of the President's extraordinary powers, regardless of the
unconventionality of their causing.
Finally, that there are laws in place which would rectify possible abuses after the
fact also does not justify this "permissive" approach. The best safeguard is still
vigilance on the part of the agencies tasked to check the exercise of the power in the
first place. Ensuring that the President has enough exibility and discretion on when to
impose martial law is not su cient justi cation for taking on a "permissive" approach.
If at all, the identi cation of reasonable indicators to determine whether the danger to
public safety has reached such scale as to warrant the exercise of the President's
extraordinary powers is recognition of the extreme nature of the extraordinary powers
and its tremendous effect on civilian lives.
IV
Conclusion: No sufficient factual basis to show that public safety requires

the continued implementation of martial law and suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao
The weight of concerns about the continued implementation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao seem to stem
from the absence of a categorical statement on the part of the Court on what martial
law means under our Constitution. It cannot mean the assumption by the military,
headed by the President, of either judicial or legislative power, at least not in the sense
that it was used and abused by the former President Marcos. The 1987 Constitution
textually prohibited such results. What then does martial law entail?
Quoting Willoughby, Father Bernas enumerates three types of "martial law:" (1)
Military Law Proper, that is, the body of administrative laws created by Congress for the
government of the army and navy as an organized force; (2) the principles governing
the conduct of military forces in time of war, and in the government of occupied
territory; and (3) Martial Law in sensu strictiore, or that law which has application when
the military arm does not supersede civil authority but is called upon to aid it in the
execution of its civil functions. 5 9
According to Father Bernas, martial law as it is understood in our jurisdiction
cannot refer to the rst meaning because it "refers to a body of administrative laws
which are operative all the time, whereas martial law in the Constitution can be
operative only 'in case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.'" 6 0
After differentiating between the second (military government) and third (martial rule)
types of martial law, he concludes that martial law under our Constitution is simply
martial rule, that is, the military "takes the place of certain governmental agencies which
for the time being are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which
remains subject to the sovereignty." 6 1 It is a "public exigency which may rise in time of
war or peace" and "ceases when the district is su ciently tranquil to permit the
ordinary agencies of government to cope with existing situations." 6 2
Otherwise stated, martial law as allowed under our Constitution, is simply
authority for the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an ordinary civil
government. It is brought about by necessity, 6 3 an exigency brought about by extreme
danger to public safety, that its object is simply the "preservation of the public safety
and good order." 6 4 Since necessity calls it forth and de nes its scope, it is imperative
that the Government su ciently establish the necessity. There must be proof of the
graveness of the exigency confronting the Government as to call for the imposition of
martial law. Without this, the Court is obliged, if not compelled, to strike down its
exercise.
I have examined the written submissions of the Government and listened closely
to the brie ng provided by representatives from the AFP on the factual bases behind
the continued implementation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ
o f habeas corpus in Mindanao. As earlier stated, the Government, through the AFP,
sought to prove the "magnitude of scope " 6 5 of the threat to public safety was such
as to put the security of Mindanao at stake. Aside from the data on manpower, arms,
and controlled barangays, the following 2017 statistics were also presented: (1) total
of 116 BIFF-initiated violent incidents; 6 6 (2) total of 44 ASG-initiated violent incidents;
6 7 (3) total of 53 Dawlah Islamiyah-initiated violent incidents; 6 8 and (4) total of 422
communist-initiated incidents of rebellion in Mindanao. 6 9 When tested, however,
against the minimum reasonable indicators above proposed, none of the evidence
presented were similar to, or at least somewhat approximating, the scale of the
situation which obtained in Marawi City during the initial Proclamation. 7 0 There is
nothing in the record to show that there are hostile groups engaged in actual and
sustained armed hostilities with government forces. Neither are there allegations, much
less, proof of hostile groups actually taking over and holding territory, or otherwise
causing a signi cant breakdown of the general peace and order situation as to prevent
local civilian authorities from going about their regular duties. Neither is there evidence
presented to support the claimed linkages with foreign terrorist groups. The Islamic
State, with its blitzkrieg campaign for the re-founding of an Islamic caliphate, has seen
a dramatic decline in its in uence in 2017, with its last stronghold, the city of Raqqa,
falling into the hands of US-led coalition of Syrian Kurdish and Arab ghters in October
of last year. 7 1 And while several Philippine factions of radical Islamic leanings may
have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, the AFP has not presented evidence that
the organization has reciprocated, or that the Islamic State has publicly acknowledged
an o cial wilayat or franchise in the country, or extended logistical, nancial,
manpower, or armament support to any, some or all of such factions. 7 2
Lest I be misunderstood, I am not discounting or belittling the damage to life,
limb, and property caused by the reported continued attacks of the hostile groups.
Granting all of the Government's allegations to be true, however, I do not nd these to
be su cient basis to warrant any continued restriction on or suspension of
fundamental civil liberties.
236145, and 236155, and DECLARE INVALID Joint Resolution No. 4 of the Senate and
the House of Representatives dated December 13, 2017, for failure to comply with
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
CAGUIOA , J., dissenting :
"At first all of it appeared to be idiotic

in its impudent assertiveness.
Later on it was looked upon as disturbing,
but finally it was believed. " 1
Shorn of its legal niceties, martial law is an emergency governance response
involving the imposition of military jurisdiction over civilian population, designed to
complement the emergency armed force response to an actual armed uprising. Force
is met with force. The might of the military is summoned and exed to prevent the
dismemberment of the Republic caused by an actual rebellion or invasion, with martial
law suspending certain civil liberties to facilitate the armed response. But, when the
rebellion is quelled, or the invasion is repelled, the normal state of affairs must return.
The declaration and extension of martial law in the absence of the exigencies
justifying the same reduces such extraordinary power to a mere tool of convenience
and expediency. Thus, the baseless imposition of martial law constitutes, in itself, a
violation of substantive and procedural due process, as it effectively bypasses, if not
renders totally nugatory, the conditions and limitations explicitly spelled out in the
Constitution for the protection of individual citizens. This violation merits
consideration in the resolution of this Petition, for it stands independent of
the acts of abuse that may be, or have been perpetrated in furtherance
thereof.
In these consolidated petitions, the Court reviews anew the su ciency of the
factual basis of the extension of martial law for one year in the entire Mindanao.
The power to extend is subject to
constitutional conditions.
Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution contains the standards with which all
three coordinate branches of government must comply in relation to the declaration or
extension of martial law, and its review. HTcADC
It enshrines the extraordinary powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) — (i) the power to call out the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; (ii) the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (iii) the power to proclaim martial law. In
Lagman v. Medialdea 2 (Lagman) the Court characterized these powers as graduated in
nature, such that each may only be resorted to under speci ed conditions. As for the
declaration of martial law, the relevant portion reads:
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. 3
The Court, in Lagman, stated that Section 18, Article VII sets the parameters for
determining the su ciency of the factual basis for the declaration of martial law and/or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, "namely (1) actual invasion
or rebellion, and (2) public safety requires the exercise of such power" 4 and thereupon
proceeded with the analysis consistent with those standards. Lagman also instructs
that the President is given the prerogative to determine which extraordinary power to
wield in a given set of circumstances, provided, however, that the conditions
required by the Constitution for the use of these extraordinary powers exist,
for while the exercise of the calling-out power is primarily left to the President's
discretion, 5 the power to suspend the privilege of the writ and declare martial law are
not.
As for the extension by the Congress of the declaration of martial law, the same
first paragraph of Section 18 provides:
Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
Staying faithful to the above text and consistent with Lagman, the parameters of
determining the su ciency of the factual basis of the extension requires the Court to
examine whether (1) the invasion or rebellion persists, and (2) public safety requires the
exercise of such power.
Several points become instantly clear from a plain reading of the above text: (1)
the invasion or rebellion furnishing the rst requirement for the extension indubitably
refers to the invasion or rebellion that triggered the declaration sought to be extended,
and (2) the requirement of public safety must require the extension. The mere fact of a
persisting rebellion or existence of rebels, standing alone, cannot be basis for the
extension.
The Court's power and duty to review under Section 18 contemplates the
determination of the existence of the conditions upon which the President's
extraordinary powers may be exercised. In the context of an extension of a prior
proclamation or suspension, the Court's duty thus equates to the determination of
whether the factual basis therefor, then "su cient, truthful, accurate, or at the very least,
credible," 6 persists.
The Executive and Legislative
Departments bear the burden of
proof to show sufficient factual
basis.
The question of burden of proof in the review of the declaration of martial law
has been settled in Lagman — the Executive bears the burden of proof. For the same
reasons I stated in my Dissent in that case, given the nature of a Section 18 proceeding
as a neutral fact-checking mechanism, the Executive and Legislative departments
continually bear the burden of proving sufficient factual basis for the extension.
The Court has recognized that martial law poses a severe threat to civil liberties;
7 ttingly, a review of its declaration or extension must require proof. Even the less
stringent review in Lansang v. Garcia 8 required that minimum.
Consequently — and I reiterate to the point of being tedious — the presumptions
of constitutionality or regularity do not apply to the Executive and Legislative
departments in a Section 18 proceeding. These presumptions cannot operate to
require the petitioners to prove a lack or insu ciency of factual basis or to produce
countervailing evidence because this amounts to an undue shifting of the burden of
proof absent in the language of the provision, and clearly was not the intendment of the
framers. As well, while the Executive and Legislative departments cannot be compelled
to produce evidence to prove the su ciency of factual basis, these presumptions
cannot operate to gain judicial approbation in the face of the refusal to adduce
evidence, or presentation of insufficient evidence. For otherwise, the ruling that fixes the
burden of proof upon the Executive and Legislative departments becomes illusory, and
logically inconsistent: the Court cannot rule on the one hand that respondents in a
Section 18 proceeding bear the burden of proof, and then on the other, rule that the
presumptions of constitutionality and regularity apply. In short, the Court cannot say
that the respondents must present evidence showing sufficient factual basis, but if they
do not or cannot, the Court will presume that su cient factual basis exists. To insist
otherwise is to argue the absurd.
Indeed, if the Court needs to rely upon presumptions during a Section 18 review,
then it only goes to show that the Executive and Legislative departments failed to show
su cient factual basis for the declaration or extension. Attempts at validation on this
ground is equivalent to the Court excusing the political departments from complying
with the positive requirement of Section 18. aScITE
The requirements for the extension

of Proclamation 216 have not been
met.
Again, the parameters for determining the su ciency of the factual basis are
now well-settled. As stated in Lagman, they are: (i) the existence of an actual rebellion
or invasion; and (ii) that public safety necessitates such declaration or suspension. I
nd that the extension fails the test of su ciency of factual basis, a s both these
requirements do not exist to justify the extension.
The existence of an actual rebellion
was not established with sufficient
evidence.
A valid declaration of martial law presupposes the existence of rebellion as a

matter of fact and law. As de ned in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), 9 the following
elements are necessary for the crime of rebellion to exist:
First, that there be (a) a public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
government; and
Second, that the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove
from the allegiance to said government or its laws (i) the territory of the Philippines or
any part thereof, or (ii) any body of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive
the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or
prerogatives.
Simpli ed, the elements of rebellion are reducible to (i) an overt act of armed
public uprising and (ii) a speci c purpose. Both elements must concur and be proved
independently of each other, as explained by the Court in People v. Lovedioro: 1 0
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the
overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential
components of the crimes. With either of these elements wanting, the crime of
rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained
of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the
killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or pro t, without
any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately
punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime
rebellion. 1 1
Based on the foregoing standards, the point of inquiry therefore is whether the
Congress had su cient factual basis to conclude that rebellion persists — that the
concurrence of the elements of rebellion obtaining during the time of the declaration
still exists — thus justifying the extension of the proclamation of martial law.
Necessarily, the relevant window of time to be considered is shortly before the
Congress' receipt of the President's Letter dated December 8, 2017.
i. The element of an armed public uprising no longer exists
My dissent is largely premised on a simple fact: there is no more armed public
uprising — thus, it cannot be said that the rebellion necessitating the declaration
persists. In this regard, a review of the key evidence is in order.
a. Letter dated December 8, 2017 (Subject Letter) and Resolution of Both
Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017 (Joint Resolution)
In the Subject Letter that eventually formed the basis of the Joint Resolution, the
narration of facts palpably demonstrates that the armed public uprising which
necessitated the issuance of Proclamation No. 216 had already been subdued by
government forces:
I am pleased to inform the Congress that during the Martial Law
period as extended in Mindanao, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) has achieved remarkable progress in putting the rebellion under
control. General Rey Leonardo Guerrero, AFP Chief of Staff and Martial Law
Implementor, has reported that a total of nine hundred twenty (920) DAESH-
inspired ghters, including their known leaders, have been neutralized. Clearing
of the main battle area in Marawi City was fast-tracked, with at least
one hundred thirty-nine (139) terrorists arrested, of which sixty-one (61) have
been criminally charged. All these hastened the liberation of Marawi City
on 17 October 2017, and paved the way for the initiation of efforts for
the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the city.
On 04 December 2017 I received a letter from Secretary of National
Defense Del n N. Lorenzana, as Martial Law Administrator, stating that "based
on current security assessment made by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the undersigned recommends the extension of Martial Law for
another twelve (12) months or one (1) year beginning January 1, 2018 until
December 31, 2018 covering the whole island of Mindanao primarily to ensure
total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul
Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups
(L/FTGs) and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist
terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers, supporters, and nanciers x x x." A
copy of Secretary Lorenzana's letter (together with a copy of the letter of AFP
Chief Guerrero) is attached for your convenient reference.
The security assessment submitted by the AFP, supported by a similar
assessment by the Philippine National Police (PNP), highlights certain essential
facts that I, as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, have
personal knowledge of.
First, despite the death of Hapilon and the Maute brothers, the
remnants of their Groups have continued to rebuild their organization
through the recruitment and training of new members and ghters to
carry on the rebellion. You will please note that at least one hundred eighty- ve
(185) persons listed in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at-large
and, in all probability, are presently regrouping and consolidating their
forces.
More speci cally, the remnants of DAESH-inspired DIWM members
and their allies, together with their protectors, supporters and sympathizers,
have been monitored in their continued efforts towards
radicalization/recruitment, nancial and logistical build-up, as well as
in their consolidation/reorganization in Central Mindanao, particularly
in the provinces of Maguindanao and North Cotabato and also in Sulu and
Basilan. These activities are geared towards the conduct of intensi ed
atrocities and armed public uprisings in support of their objective of
establishing the foundation of a global Islamic caliphate and of a Wilayat not
only in the Philippines but also in the whole of Southeast Asia.HEITAD
Second, the Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning

to conduct bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area. Turai e is said to
be Hapilon's potential successor as Amir of DAESH Wilayat in the Philippines
and Southeast Asia.
Martial Law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. For this year, the BIFF
has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassments and
roadside bombings against government troops.
government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power through violent
means and supplant the country's democratic form of government with
Communist rule. 1 2 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the contents of the Subject Letter, its plain import is that: (i) the
rebellion that spawned Proclamation No. 216 is already "under control" as over 1,000
DAESH-inspired ghters have either been killed in combat or arrested; (ii) Marawi has
been liberated; (iii) reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi is already underway; and
(iv) the rebel groups have not yet been "totally eradicated" as there are still "remnants"
remaining.
These claims are made in the face of statements made a month or two prior to
this request for extension by key military and government o cials in the media that
Marawi has been liberated; 1 3 that the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF)
attacks had no connection to the Marawi siege; 1 4 and that military operations have
ceased because there are no longer militants in Marawi, and the remaining stragglers
no longer affect the security in the area. 1 5 Interestingly, statements of military and
government o cials only took a turn and became consistent with the claims made in
the Subject Letter at the start of 2018, after the ling of the consolidated petitions for
review. Now there are warnings of a repeat of the siege, 1 6 and of a "continuing
rebellion". 1 7
Signi cantly, there is nothing in the Subject Letter that would show that the said
rebellion has maintained or intensi ed in strength. On the contrary, the phrases
"rebuild[ing] their organization," "presently regrouping and consolidating their forces,"
"radicalization/recruitment," " nancial and logistical build-up," all connote that the
armed public uprising had been quashed and that the rebel groups were recuperating
or, at most, reduced to engaging in preparatory acts toward some unspeci ed end. As
if removing all doubt, the Subject Letter is couched in the future tense as it states that
the activities of the DAESH-inspired ghters "are geared towards the conduct of x x x
armed public uprisings" and that the Turaifie Group is "planning to conduct bombings."
To state the obvious, to say that a rebel group is engaged in activities
geared towards the conduct of an armed public uprising is to say that no
armed public uprising is, as of yet, existing. As well, to claim, as the
respondents do, that the commission of acts preparatory to an armed public
uprising a priori constitutes an actual rebellion is an argument in a circle. It is
illogical and completely fails to persuade.
While it is true that rebellion is characterized as a "continuing offense," which
constitutes a series of repeated acts, 1 8 it is equally true that these overt acts must be
anchored on a common ideological base 1 9 and committed in furtherance thereof. In
the context of a martial law extension, this unity in purpose must be clearly
ascertainable from the acts in question. Stated differently, there must be a clear
showing that the acts cited as basis for the extension are in fact done in furtherance of
the rebellion subject of the initial proclamation. Again, I echo the warning of Justice
Feliciano in Lacson v. Perez 2 0 on this point:
My nal submission, is that, the doctrine of "continuing crimes," which has its
own legitimate function to serve in our criminal law jurisprudence, cannot be
invoked for weakening and dissolving the constitutional guarantee against
warrantless arrest. Where no overt acts comprising all or some of the
elements of the offense charged are shown to have been committed
by the person arrested without warrant, the "continuing crime" doctrine
should not be used to dress up the pretense that a crime, begun or
committed elsewhere, continued to be committed by the person
arrested in the presence of the arresting o cer. The capacity for
mischief of such a utilization of the "continuing crimes" doctrine, is
in nitely increased where the crime charged does not consist of
unambiguous criminal acts with a de nite beginning and end in time
and space (such as the killing or wounding of a person or kidnapping
and illegal detention or arson) but rather of such problematic
offenses as membership in or a liation with or becoming a member
of, a subversive association or organization. For in such cases, the overt
constitutive acts may be morally neutral in themselves, and the unlawfulness of
the acts a function of the aims or objectives of the organization involved. Note,
for instance, the following acts which constitute prima facie evidence of
"membership in any subversive association[.]" 2 1 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.) ATICcS
Justice Feliciano's observations nd particular relevance in this Petition, for

unlike in Lagman where an armed public uprising was shown to have taken place in
Marawi City, no such circumstance has been shown to persist in Marawi City or any
part of Mindanao. As I had stated in my Dissent in Lagman, the concept of rebellion as a
continuing crime does not thereby extend the existence of actual rebellion wherever
these offenders may be found, or automatically extend the public necessity for martial
law based only on their presence in a certain locality. 2 2 The requirement of actual
rebellion serves to localize the scope of martial law to cover only the areas of armed
public uprising. Necessarily, martial law is con ned to the place where there is actual
rebellion, meaning, concurrence of the normative act of armed public uprising and the
specific purpose.
Nevertheless, in the Joint Resolution, the Congress resolved to extend the
proclamation of martial law over the entire Mindanao for the second time, based
essentially on the same set of facts set forth in the Subject Letter. Thus:
continued to rebuild their organization through the recruitment and
training of new members and ghters to carry on the rebellion; Second, the
Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct
bombings, notably targeting the Cotabato area; Third, the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters continue to defy the government by perpetrating at least
fteen (15) violent incidents during the Martial Law period in Maguindanao and
North Cotabato; Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan, Sulu,
Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain a serious security concern; and
last, the New People's Army took advantage of the situation and intensi ed their
decades-long rebellion against the government and stepped up terrorist acts
against innocent civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare
against the security sector and public and government infrastructure, purposely
to seize political power through violent means and supplant the country's
democratic form of government with Communist rule;
xxx xxx xxx
of Mindanao; x x x 2 3 (Emphasis supplied)
It is not unusual — as it is, in fact, expected — that a defeated army will have its
own share of survivors. Our own colonial history bears witness to this fact. Hence, that
some enemy ghters remain alive does not mean that a battle has not been won. In this
case, to require rst the "total eradication" of rebel groups before a rebellion can be
considered quelled goes against plain logic and human experience. Meaning to say, the
rebels' survival and the concomitant perpetuation of their ideology do not ipso facto
mean that there is still an armed public uprising. And where there is no more armed
public uprising, there can be no rebellion persisting as contemplated in the
Constitution.
Respondents attempt to cover up this gaping hole by extending, through some
legal ction, the rebellion subject of Lagman to the present case. Using the Court's
declaration in Lagman that actual rebellion existed in Mindanao, respondents claim that
the issue of whether rebellion still exists should have already been "laid to rest." 2 4 In
effect, respondents are telling the Court that the armed public uprising then existing
during the first declaration of martial law on May 23, 2017 still persists, purportedly on
the basis of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment. This is egregious error.
As pointedly discussed in the ponencia, with which I fully agree, the issue in the
earlier Lagman case refers to the existence of a state of rebellion that would call for the
President's initial declaration of martial law, while in this case, the issue refers to the
persistence of the same rebellion that would justify the extension of martial law by the
Congress. Moreover, given the nature of an armed public uprising, it follows that the
Court's judgment on the su ciency of factual basis for the declaration of martial law is
transitory 2 5 and relevant only to the state of affairs during that specific period in time.
b. Presentation of Respondents during the Oral Arguments held on January
17, 2018TIADCc
Among the data presented by respondents are lists of violent incidents in

Mindanao. It must be stressed, however, that most of the data presented are
irrelevant for the simple reason that most of the attacks listed occurred during
periods irrelevant to the controversy at hand. Evidence, to be admissible, must be
relevant to the fact in issue, that is, it must have a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. 2 6
Again, the relevant window of time to be considered is shortly before the
Congress' receipt of the President's letter dated December 8, 2017. Thus, events that
took place: (i) prior to the declaration of martial law on May 23, 2017 being the set of
facts that the President considered when he issued Proclamation No. 216; and (ii) the
intervening period from May 23, 2017 to July 18, 2017, which is when the President
requested a rst extension from Congress and which in turn is the supposed set of
facts that Congress considered when it extended Proclamation No. 216 until December
31, 2017 are irrelevant for the purpose of showing that rebellion persists from the time
martial law was first declared and extended.
Synthesizing the data, therefore, from the time Marawi was declared liberated on
October 17, 2017, only seven (7) BIFF-initiated violent incidents were reported, all
occurring within the Province of Maguindanao. The same can be said of the "Abu Sayyaf
Rebel Group List of Violent Activities," which reported all incidents beginning January 6,
2017 until December 24, 2017. Only ve (5) ASG-related incidents were reported
between October 17, 2017 (when Marawi was liberated) until December 13, 2017.
To my mind, what stands out from the foregoing data is the apparent pattern of
violence in Mindanao even before the "Marawi Siege." This glaring fact, in effect,
dilutes respondents' claim that the incidents of violence following the
declaration of martial law was in pursuance of the actual rebellion in Lagman .
Hence, without more, respondents' evidence remains ambiguous, to say the least.
Meanwhile, without delving into speci cs, respondents also introduced a list of
pending criminal cases for rebellion. However, a cursory reading of the list would reveal
that the most recent development was the issuance of a Resolution dated July 27,
2017, or almost three (3) months before Marawi's liberation, nding probable cause to
indict several respondents for the crime of rebellion. Clearly, this specie of evidence is
irrelevant in the Congress' determination of whether there is su cient factual basis to
extend martial law from beyond its first extension of until December 31, 2017.
In the same vein, the list of "Arrested Personalities" provided by respondents is
likewise of no consequence. As clearly stated in its heading, the said list only covers
arrests "as of 23 October 2017," or a few days after Marawi's liberation, a date that is
too far removed from the Congress' deliberation leading to the Joint Resolution.
All things considered, I am fully convinced that respondents have failed to
establish the persistence of an actual rebellion as a constitutional requirement for the
extension of martial law. While they argue that the rebellion in Lagman was still
persisting at the time the Joint Resolution was issued, the evidence and their own
admissions say otherwise — that is — that the armed public uprising has already
ceased. Respondents can no longer resurrect what the law considers dead.
ii. The specific purpose
Following Lovedioro, 2 7 it must be proved that the armed public uprising was for
any of the purposes enumerated in Article 134 of the RPC. Speci c purpose is akin to
intent, the existence of which, being a state of the mind, is proven by overt acts of the
accused. 2 8
Proceeding from the above discussion, the data in the presentation of
respondents during the Oral Arguments held on January 17, 2018 failed to take into
account the purpose for such violent incidents. By merely listing attacks made by
certain armed groups, respondents cannot summarily conclude that the same are
geared towards the accomplishment of the purposes of rebellion under the RPC.
Absent any more data indicating purpose, the Court cannot, without violating the
standards of the Constitution, rely on surmises and hasty conclusions.
To illustrate, the incidents are described as "IED attack," "attack," "grenade
explosion," "kidnapping," "harassment," which are all highly generic terms, making it
impossible to determine intent. Even the targets of these attacks were not supplied. At
most, only the data with respect to the pending criminal cases are competent to prove
intent as there was already a nding of probable cause for the crime of rebellion.
However, as already discussed above, the said information is inconsequential and could
not have been used by Congress to determine the necessity of extending martial law.
Another point. The ponencia cites as basis for its conclusion that the rebellion
persists is the reported increase in manpower of the "remnants" of the rebel groups. I
submit, however, that respondents were unable to prove the component of speci c
purpose due to their own admissions to the contrary. As quoted at length in the
ponencia:
However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the
of concentration.
more or less 250 by the Maute Group in the Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid
Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were
motivated by clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist
personalities; revenge for their killed relatives/parents during the
Marawi operations; nancial gain as new recruits were given an
amount ranging from PhP15,000.00 to 50,000.00; and, as radicalized
converts.

marksmanships and bombing operations at the different areas of Mount
Cararao Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high
potentials [sic] were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations. AIDSTE

boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and business men.
historically established link with Turaifie.
100% for the 2nd Semester. 2 9 (Emphasis supplied)
As admitted by respondents themselves, the motivations of (i) clannish culture,
(ii) revenge for their killed relatives, and (iii) nancial gain, are not among the purposes
contemplated in the RPC, which are, to repeat: (a) to remove from the allegiance to said
government or its laws (i) the territory of the Philippines or any part thereof, or (ii) any
body of land, naval or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive the Chief Executive or
Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
I also submit that the reliance of the ponencia on the atrocities committed by the
New People's Army (NPA) in extending martial law stands on shaky ground. The
Subject Letter reads in part:
Local Terrorist Groups (LTGs), the New People's Army (NPA) took
advantage of the situation and intensi ed their decades-long rebellion
against the government and stepped up terrorist acts against innocent
civilians and private entities, as well as guerilla warfare against the security
sector and public government infrastructure, purposely to seize political power
through violent means and supplant the country's democratic form of
This year, the NPA has perpetrated a total of at least three hundred
eight- ve (385) atrocities (both terrorism and guerilla warfare) in
Mindanao, which resulted in forty-one (41) Killed-in-Action (KIA) and sixty-two
(62) Wounded-in-Action (WIA) on the part of government forces. On the part of
the civilians, these atrocities resulted in the killing of twenty-three (23) and the
wounding of six (6) persons. The most recent was the ambush in Talakag,
Bukidnon on 09 November 2017, resulting in the killing of one (1) PNP
personnel and the wounding of three (3) others, as well as the killing of a four
(4)-month-old infant and the wounding of two (2) civilians.
carried out by the NPA in Mindanao this year, targeting businesses and
private establishments and destroying an estimated P2.2 billion-worth of
properties. Of these, the most signi cant were the attack on Lapanday Food
Corporation in Davao City on 09 April 2017 and the burning of facilities and
equipment of Mil-Oro Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City,
Davao Oriental on 06 May 2017, which resulted in the destruction of properties
valued at P1.85 billion and P109 million, respectively. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution cannot be any clearer: the Congress may extend the President's
proclamation of martial law if the same rebellion necessitating such proclamation
shall persist . However, despite the express parameters of Section 18, the ponencia
nds no error in the inclusion of the NPA in the Subject Letter as basis for the
extension. Indeed, it is incredible how a "decades-long rebellion" can be used
as basis for extending Martial Law triggered by a rebellion that took place
only months ago, especially considering that both movements were mounted
by different groups inspired by distinct ideologies.
If there is indeed an actual rebellion by the NPA as contemplated in Section 18, it
must be covered by a new declaration.
In this scenario espoused by the ponencia, violent attacks by different armed
groups could easily form the basis of an endless chain of extensions, so long as there
are "overlaps" in the attacks. To this end, the ponencia is accommodating practical
concerns over the clear mandate of the country's fundamental law. This precedent
dangerously supports the theoretical possibility of perpetual martial law. This
precedent dangerously suggests a perpetual violation of people's Constitutional rights.
As well, to anchor the Court's review to the fallback position that the "government can
lift the state of martial law once actual rebellion no longer persists and that public
safety is amply secured" is to abdicate the duty of the Court to determine for itself the
sufficiency of factual basis for the extension.
Likewise, following the discussion above, the factual narration in the Subject
Letter presented is highly ambiguous, if not amorphous.
First, the timeline of the violent incidents is unclear as the information merely
re ects the total number of the atrocities for "this year," which is the entire 2017. Again,
these gures do not present an accurate picture because they include incidents already
relied upon for the initial declaration and the rst extension, and for that reason, are far-
removed from the question of persistence of rebellion when Congress was deliberating
on the second extension of martial law.
Second, some details in the Subject Letter strongly negate rebellion as the
attacks were described as "terrorist acts against innocent civilians and private entities,"
and "arson incidents x x x targeting businesses and private establishments." Needless
to state, terrorist acts and destruction of property, no matter how grave, are for entirely
different ends than that of rebellion under Article 134. In fact, these and analogous
factual bases have been relied upon by the Executive when it called out the armed
forces in Proclamation No. 55, s. 2016, 3 0 without any showing that there was an
escalation of violence that necessitated the extension. AaCTcI
Third, the claim of "intensi ed" rebellion of the NPA is vague in light of the
"decades-long rebellion" already existing. Considering the known fact of protracted
violence in different areas of Mindanao, the Subject Letter provides no standard by
which Congress, and consequently, this Court, could determine whether indeed there is
a considerable rise in violent incidents that make martial law a necessity. Without such
standard, Congress will be left to guesswork and blind adherence to the word of the
President.
All told, weighing the totality of evidence adduced by respondents, I nd that
there is insufficient factual basis to justify an extension of martial law.
iii. The evidence suggests a mere threat of rebellion
The foregoing discussion does not mean, however, that I am turning a blind eye
to the situation in Mindanao. The facts, as they stand, while falling short of establishing
an existing rebellion, indicate a threat thereof.
However, under the framework of our present Constitution, it is only in cases of
an actual rebellion or insurrection that the President may, when public safety requires
it, place the Philippines or any part thereof, under martial law. The threat of a rebellion,
no matter how imminent, cannot be a ground to declare martial law. 3 1
The intent of the framers of the Constitution to limit the President's otherwise
plenary power only to cases of actual rebellion is discernible from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986, as cited by the Court in Lagman v. Medialdea :
32
MR. NATIVIDAD.
First and foremost, we agree with the Commissioner's thesis that in the
rst imposition of martial law there is no need for concurrence of the
majority of the Members of Congress because the provision says "in case
of actual invasion or rebellion." If there is actual invasion and rebellion, as
Commissioner Crispino de Castro said, there is a need for immediate
response because there is an attack. Second, the fact of securing a
concurrence may be impractical because the roads might be blocked or
barricaded. x x x So the requirement of an initial concurrence of the
majority of all Members of the Congress in case of an invasion or rebellion
might be impractical as I can see it.
Second, Section 15 states that the Congress may revoke the declaration or
lift the suspension.
And third, the matter of declaring martial law is already a justiciable
question and no longer a political one in that it is subject to judicial review
at any point in time. So on that basis, I agree that there is no need for
concurrence as a prerequisite to declare martial law or to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 3 3
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
This situation arises in cases of invasion or rebellion. And in previous
interpellations regarding this phrase, even during the discussions on the
Bill of Rights, as I understand it, the interpretation is a situation of actual
invasion or rebellion. In these situations, the President has to act quickly.
Secondly, this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum
of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically terminates. Thirdly, the
right of the judiciary to inquire into the su ciency of the factual basis of
the proclamation always exists, even during those first 60 days. 3 4
xxx xxx xxx
MR. DE LOS REYES.
As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no longer
imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there should be actual
shooting or actual attack on the legislature or Malacañang, for example?
Let us take for example a contemporary event — this Manila Hotel incident,
everybody knows what happened. Would the Committee consider that an
actual act of rebellion?
MR. REGALADO.
If we consider the de nition of rebellion under Articles 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual assemblage of men in an
armed public uprising for the purposes mentioned in Article 134 and by the
means employed under Article 135. x x x 3 5
Meanwhile, in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora , 3 6 the Court cited the
following exchange:
FR. BERNAS.
It will not make any difference. I may add that there is a graduated power
of the President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can call out such Armed
Forces as may be necessary to suppress lawless violence; then he can
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can impose
martial law. This is a graduated sequence.
When he judges that it is necessary to impose martial law or suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, his judgment is subject to review. We
are making it subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to
concurrence by the National Assembly. But when he exercises this lesser
power of calling on the Armed Forces, when he says it is necessary, it is my
opinion that his judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS.
Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the matter can
be handled by the rst sentence: "The President . . . may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion." So we feel that that is su cient for handling imminent danger.
EcTCAD
MR. DE LOS REYES.

So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger of invasion
or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO.
That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to
judicial review. 3 7
xxx xxx xxx
MR. CONCEPCION.
The elimination of the phrase "IN CASE OF IMMINENT DANGER
THEREOF" is due to the fact that the President may call the
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress invasion, rebellion or
insurrection. That dispenses with the need of suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus . References have been made to
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. The 1935 Constitution was based on the
provisions of the Jones Law of 1916 and the Philippine Bill of 1902 which
granted the American Governor General, as representative of the
government of the United States, the right to avail of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law in
the event of imminent danger. And President Quezon, when the 1935
Constitution was in the process of being drafted, claimed that he should
not be denied a right given to the American Governor General as if he were
less than the American Governor General. But he overlooked the fact that
under the Jones Law and the Philippine Bill of 1902, we were colonies of
the United States, so the Governor General was given an authority, on
behalf of the sovereign, over the territory under the sovereignty of the
United States. Now, there is no more reason for the inclusion of the phrase
"OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF" in connection with the writ of habeas
corpus. As a matter of fact, the very Constitution of the United States does
not mention "imminent danger." In lieu of that, there is a provision on
the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief to call the
Armed Forces to prevent or suppress rebellion or invasion and,
therefore, "imminent danger" is already included there. 3 8
(Emphasis supplied)
The demonstrable capacity to launch a rebellion, absent an overt act in
pursuance thereof, is not actual rebellion. As well, it is only if the actual rebellion or
insurrection persists that the declaration of martial law may be extended. The evidence
presented by the respondents do not su ciently prove the existence or persistence of
an actual rebellion. It is in this light that I register my dissent to the nding of
sufficiency of factual basis as to the first requirement.
There is no evidence to show that
the requirements of public safety
necessitate the continued
implementation of Proclamation
No. 216 in any part of Mindanao.
Even assuming that the evidence presented by the respondents constitute

su cient proof of the existence of rebellion, I emphasize, as I did in my Dissent in
Lagman, 3 9 that the existence of actual rebellion does not, on its own, justify the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ if there is no
showing that it is necessary to ensure public safety. 4 0
To pretend that the analysis of the question before the Court turns only upon the
fact of the existence of the Maute group, the NPA, the BIFF, Islamic fundamentalists
and other armed groups that are on the loose, and their on-going plans to regroup and
perceived capacity to sow terror upon our people in the future, is to deceive.
As early as Lansang , the Court already recognized that the magnitude of the
rebellion has a bearing on the second condition essential to the validity of the
suspension of the privilege — in this case, in the extension of the declaration of martial
law — namely, that it be required by public safety. 4 1
On this score, I maintain that the President's exercise of extraordinary powers
must be measured against the scale of necessity and calibrated accordingly. The
Court's determination of insu ciency of factual basis carries with it the necessary
implication that the conditions for the use of such extraordinary power do not exist. In
making such a nding, the Court does not thereby assume to do the calibration in the
President's stead, but only checks the said calibration in hindsight, as Section 18
empowers and mandates the Court to do.
As correctly observed by petitioner Rosales, necessity, in the context of martial
law, is dictated not merely by the gravity of the rebellion sought to be quelled, but also
the necessity of martial law to address the exigencies of a given situation. 4 2
The Constitutional deliberations elucidate: HSAcaE
MR. DE LOS REYES.

But is not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
the imposition of martial law more of the preparatory steps before the
President should call the Armed Forces of the Philippines as Commander-
in-Chief? In other words, before calling the Armed Forces of the Philippines
should he not take the preparatory step of suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or imposing martial law?
MR. REGALADO.
As a matter of fact, the former President outlined the steps and we have
put them here as follows: (1) When it is only imminent danger, although, of
course, he did not use that term, he can already call out the Armed Forces
just to prevent or suppress violence; (2) if the situation has worsened and
there is a need for stronger measures, then aside from merely calling out
the Armed Forces he goes into the suspension of the privilege of the writ;
(3) but if both measures calling out the Armed Forces and the suspension
of the privilege of the writ still prove unavailing in the face of
developments and exacerbated situation, this time he goes to the ultimate
which would be martial law.
MR. DE LOS REYES.
As I see it now, the Committee envisions actual rebellion and no
longer imminent rebellion. Does the Committee mean that there
should be actual shooting or actual attack on the legislature or
Malacañang, for example? Let us take for example a contemporary
event — this Manila Hotel incident everybody knows what happened.
Would the Committee consider that an actual act of rebellion?
MR. REGALADO.
If we consider the de nition of rebellion under Articles 134 and
135 of the Revised Penal Code, that presupposes an actual
assemblage of men in an armed public uprising for the purposes
mentioned in Article 134 and by the means employed under
Article 135. x x x
Commissioner Bernas would like to add something.
FR. BERNAS.
Besides, it is not enough that there is actual rebellion. Even if we will
suppose for instance that the Manila Hotel incident was an actual
rebellion, that by itself would not justify the imposition of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ because the Constitution further
says: "when the public safety requires it." So, even if there is a rebellion
but the rebellion can be handled and public safety can be
protected without imposing martial law or suspending the
privilege of the writ, the President need not. Therefore, even if we
consider that a rebellion, clearly, it was something which did not
call for imposition of martial law. 4 3 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied.)
Lagman instructs that "necessity" should be understood as a standard that
proceeds from the traditional concept of martial law under American Jurisprudence,
that is, martial law in a theater of war. 4 4 In turn, the conditions existing in a theater
of war were clearly identified during the Constitutional deliberations, thus:
MR. FOZ: x x x
May I go to the next question? This is about the declaration of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on page 7,
on the second to the last paragraph of Section 15. Is it possible to delete
the clause "where civil courts are able to function"? In the earlier portion of
the same sentence, it says, "nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
. . ." I was just thinking that if this provision states the effects of the
declaration of martial law — one of which is that it does not supplant the
functioning of the civil courts — I cannot see how civil courts would be
unable to function even in a state of martial law.
xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS.
jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war. In
a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the
actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to function,
then the military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction
even over civilians to military courts precisely because the civil
courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil
courts are opened then in no case can the military courts be given
jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war
where the civil courts, in fact, are unable to function.
MR. FOZ.
It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the
situation in that specified critical area.
FR. BERNAS.
That is correct. 4 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the Oral Arguments, Commissioner Monsod further clari ed the concept
of necessity as a fixed standard, thus:
x x x Assuming there's rebellion or invasion done. The second part how do
we interpret when the public safety requires it? Requires it means public
safety requires the imposition of martial law, i.e., [martial law] is
necessary?
xxx xxx xxx
I'm just about the logical nexus.
xxx xxx xxx
CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO: HESIcT
Meaning it is not [that] rebellion always demands, always threatens public

safety. Because in the example given by Justice Carpio, if only two people
rebel how can public safety be endangered. So there can be rebellion
without [the] public [being] endangered. So the proper breeding of the
second requirement is not that rebellion, rebellion is not required to be
present (sic). It must always be present but (sic) that public safety requires
the imposition of martial law. In other words, you will still go back to
the idea of the need to calibrate the powers sought to be
exercised by the President.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x I was thinking that the proper interpretation is that rebellion is there,
and therefore, public safety requires the imposition of martial law, rather
the public safety requires the imposition of martial law in a situation where
in the rst place rebellion or invasion has been already established. You
get me? In other words, the calibration of the power is de ned by
the need to protect the public.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x May I request Commissioner Monsod please?
Chairman, can you tell me whether the better interpretation is that
public safety requires it, public safety requires the imposition of
martial law to address the rebellion or the invasion?
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes, Your Honor.
Is that the correct interpretation?
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes. It's part, there has to be [a] condition of public safety
requires it. Now, that includes, in other words, the citizens are
exposed to all the dangers to their health or safety or security. It
even includes the absence of social services. It includes the
police protection is no longer there, the military steps in. And
that's the situation that is contemplated. It is a lack of
government services whether protection of the police help (sic)
and so on of the citizens and criminality and all that. That's when
the military comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. MONSOD:
That's the standard.
[Whenever you] talk about necessity, you always must x x x must
always have a calibration exercise.
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes.
Because you are already talking of necessity, and of course, you
measure.
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
So, the quote in the doctrine, well in the part of the decision, quoting [E]x-
parte [M]illigan, "is the martial law where the military has jurisdiction in a
theater of war."
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes.
You still believe that still has a bit of relevance in the matter of necessity.
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes.
In other words, that [E]x-parte [M]illigan quotation was basically
a de nition of the necessity for the military presence and in fact,
jurisdiction.
ATTY. MONSOD:
Yes, still necessity. 46
The rationale behind the lofty standard of "necessity" is clear — the President is
already equipped with su cient powers to suppress acts of lawless violence, and even
actual rebellion or invasion in a theater of war, through calling out the AFP to prevent or
suppress such lawless violence. The necessity of martial law therefore requires a
showing that it is necessary for the military to perform civilian governmental functions
or acquire jurisdiction over civilians to ensure public safety.
This is consistent with my vote in Lagman wherein I found the existence of an
actual rebellion but found that the requirement of public safety only necessitated the
imposition of martial law over the areas of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, and Sulu, as
areas intimately or inextricably connected to the armed uprising then existing in Marawi
City.
Hence, I nd as completely unfounded the assertion that the lifting of
Proclamation No. 216 will render the Executive unable to meet the current situation in
Mindanao.
As confirmed by Commissioner Bernas:
FR. BERNAS.
Let me just add that when we only have imminent danger, the
matter can be handled by the rst sentence: "The President . . .
may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion." So we feel that that is su cient
for handling imminent danger.
MR. DE LOS REYES.
So actually, if a President feels that there is imminent danger of invasion
or rebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, he must necessarily have to call the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as their Commander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?
MR. REGALADO.
That does not require any concurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to
judicial review. 4 7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
T h e ponencia nds that the submissions of the respondents show that the
continued implementation of martial law in Mindanao is necessary to protect public
safety. As basis, the ponencia cites the following events and circumstances disclosed
by the President and AFP:
(a) No less than 185 persons in the Martial Law Arrest Orders have
remained at large. Remnants of the Hapilon and Maute groups have
been monitored by the AFP to be reorganizing and consolidating their
forces in Central Mindanao, particularly in Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sulu
and Basilan, and strengthening their financial and logistical capability.
(b) After the military operation in Marawi City, the Basilan-based
ASG, the Maute Group, the Maguid Group and the Turai e Group, comprising
the DAESH-a liate Dawlah Islamiyah that was responsible for the Marawi
siege, was left with 137 members and a total of 166 rearms. These rebels,
however, were able to recruit 400 new members, more or less, in Basilan, the
Lanao Provinces, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao. TAIaHE
(c) The new recruits have since been trained in marksmanship,

bombing and tactics in different areas in Lanao del Sur. Recruits with great
potential are trained in producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
urban operations. These new members are motivated by their clannish culture,
being relatives of terrorists, by revenge for relatives who perished in the Marawi
operations, by money as they are paid P15,000.00 to P50,000.00, and by radical
ideology.
(d) 48 FTFs have joined said rebel groups and are acting as
instructors to the recruits. Foreign terrorists from Southeast Asian countries,
particularly from Indonesia and Malaysia, will continue to take advantage of the
porous borders of the Philippines and enter the country illegally to join the
remnants of the DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebel groups.
(e) In November 2017, 15 Indonesian and Malaysian DAESH-inspired
FTFs entered Southern Philippines to augment the remnants of the Maguid
group in Sarangani province. In December 2017, 16 Indonesian DAESH-inspired
FTFs entered the Southern Philippines to augment the ASG-Basilan and Maute
groups in the Lanao province. In January 2018, an unidenti ed Egyptian DAESH
figure was monitored in the Philippines.
(f) At least 32 FTFs were killed in the Marawi operations. Other FTFs
attempted to enter the main battle area in Marawi, but failed because of
checkpoints set up by government forces.
(g) "The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and their allies continue to
visibly offer armed resistance in other parts of Central, Western and Eastern
their forces in Marawi City." There were actually armed encounters with the
remnants of said groups.
(h) "Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the
BIFF, AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging
similar atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao,
including the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and
Cotabato."
(i) The Turai e group conducts roadside bombings and attacks
against government forces, civilians and populated areas in Mindanao. The
group plans to set off bombings in Cotabato.
planning to bomb the cities of Zamboanga, Iligan, Cagayan de Oro and Davao.
(k) The remaining members of the ASG-Basilan have initiated ve
violent attacks that killed two civilians.
Zamboanga Peninsula, conducted 43 acts of violence, including IED attacks
and kidnapping which resulted in the killing of eight innocent civilians, three of
whom were mercilessly beheaded. Nine kidnap victims are still held in captivity.
(m) Hapilon's death fast-tracked the uni cation of the Sulu and
Basilan-based ASG to achieve their common goal of establishing a DAESH-ISIS
wilayat in Mindanao. This likely merger may spawn retaliatory attacks such
as IED bombings, in urban areas, particularly in the cities of Zamboanga,
Isabela and Lamitan.
(n) By AFP's assessment, the ISIS' regional leadership may remain
in the Southern Philippines and with the defeat of ISIS in many parts of Syria
and Iraq, some hardened ghters from the ASEAN may return to this region to
continue their ght. The AFP also identi ed four potential leaders who may
replace Hapilon as emir or leader of the ISIS forces in the Philippines. It warned
that the Dawlah Islamiyah will attempt to replicate the Marawi siege in other
cities of Mindanao and may conduct terrorist attacks in Metro Manila and
Davao City as the seat of power of the Philippine Government. With the
spotlight on terrorism shifting from the Middle East to Southeast Asia following
the Marawi siege, the AFP likewise indicated that the in ux of FTFs in the
Southern Philippines will persist. The AFP further referred to possible lone-
wolf attacks and atrocities from other DAESH-inspired rebel groups in
vulnerable cities like Cagayan de Oro, Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan
and Zamboanga.
The rising number of these rebel groups, their training in and predilection
to terrorism, and their resoluteness in wresting control of Mindanao from the
government, pose a serious danger to Mindanao. The country had been witness
to these groups' capacity and resolve to engage in combat with the government
forces, resulting in severe casualties among both soldiers and civilians, the
displacement of thousands of Marawi residents, and considerable damage to
their City. In a short period after the Marawi crisis was put under control, said
rebel groups have managed to increase their number by 400, almost the same
strength as the group that initially stormed Marawi. Their current number is now
more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which had taken the AFP ve months
to neutralize. To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these rebel groups
before We consider them a signi cant threat to public safety is neither sound
nor prudent.
(o) Furthermore, in 2017 alone, the BIFF initiated 116 hostile acts in
North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and Maguindanao, consisting of ambuscade,
ring, arson, IED attacks and grenade explosions. 66 of these violent incidents
were committed during the martial law period and by the AFP's assessment, the
group will continue to inflict violence and sow terror in central Mindanao.cDHAES
(p) In 2017, the ASG, which is the predominant local terrorist group in
the Southern Philippines based in Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga,
with its 519 members, 503 rearms, 66 controlled barangays and 345 watch-
listed personalities, had perpetrated a total of 13 acts of kidnapping against 37
individuals, 11 of whom (including 7 foreigners) remain in captivity. Their
kidnap-for-ransom activities for last year alone have amassed a total of P61.2
million.
(q) Mindanao remains the hotbed of communist rebellion
considering that 47% of its manpower, 48% of its rearms, 51% of its controlled
barangays and 45% of its guerilla fronts are in this region. Of the 14 provinces
with active communist insurgency, 10 are in Mindanao. Furthermore, the
communist rebels' Komisyon Mindanao (KOMMID) is now capable of sending
augmentation forces, particularly "Party Cadres," in Northern Luzon.
(r) The hostilities initiated by the communist rebels have risen by
65% from 2016 to 2017 despite the peace talks. In 2017 alone, they perpetrated
422 atrocities in Mindanao, including ambush, raids, attacks, kidnapping,
robbery, bombing, liquidation, landmine/IED attacks, arson and sabotage, that
resulted in the death of 47 government forces and 31 civilians. An ambush in
Bukidnon in November 2017 killed one PNP personnel, two civilians and a four-
month old baby. 59 incidents of arson committed by the Communist rebels
against business establishments in Mindanao last year alone destroyed P2.378
billion worth of properties. Moreover, the amount they extorted from private
individuals and business establishments from 2015 to the rst semester of
2017 has been estimated at P2.6 billion.
(s) Among the most signi cant attacks by the communist rebels on
business establishments took place in April and May 2017 when they burned
the facilities of Lapanday Food Corporation in Davao City and those of Mil-Oro
Mining and Frasec Ventures Corporation in Mati City, Davao Oriental, which
resulted in losses amounting to P1.85 billion and P109 million, respectively.
According to the AFP, business establishments in the area may be forced to
shut down due to persistent NPA attacks just like in Surigao del Sur.
(t) By AFP's calculation, the aforesaid rebel groups (excluding the
400 newly recruited members of the Dawlah Islamiyah) are nearly 2,781-men
strong, equipped with 3,211 rearms and control 537 barangays in Mindanao.
4 8 (Emphasis supplied.)
These events and circumstances, while worthy of severe condemnation, do not

show the existence of an actual rebellion in a theater of war. At most, as I stressed
earlier, these indicate the threat of imminent danger brought about by the
reorganization, consolidation, recruitment and reinforcement activities, as well as
isolated planned attacks undertaken by various armed groups.
Verily, in the absence of an armed public uprising which imperils the
operation of the civil government, a declaration of martial law or any
extension thereof necessarily fails the test of su ciency, as such absence
negates not only the existence of an actual rebellion, but also refutes the
respondents' assertion that said declaration or extension is necessitated by
the requirements of public safety . It is settled that the imminent danger of a
rebellion, assuming one exists, cannot serve as su cient basis for the proclamation of
martial law; perforce, the threatened rebirth of a rebellion which the law considers dead
cannot, with more reason, justify an extension thereof.
The continued implementation of
martial law without sufficient basis
constitutes a violation of due process.
There appears to be no right more fundamental in a modern democracy than the
right to due process. In White Light Corp. v. City of Manila 4 9 (White Light), the Court
explained how the concept of due process must be understood, thus:
Due process evades a precise de nition. The purpose of the guaranty is to
prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty
and property of individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and
partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their property is
concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing
two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process"
and "substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures
that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property. Procedural due process concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of
a hearing.
If due process were con ned solely to its procedural aspects, there would
arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper
formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the
protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether
the government has su cient justi cation for depriving a person of
life, liberty, or property.
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other elds
of law, has re ected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the
expanded acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally
awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis
before it can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has
not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve
a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to
the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired
potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to
determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. 5 0 (Emphasis
supplied) ASEcHI
In essence, the right to due process had been speci cally adopted by the
framers of the Constitution to protect individual citizens from the abuses of
government. The importance that the Constitution ascribes to the right to due process
is clear. As well, the need to afford primacy to due process in the resolution of this
Petition is evident, if not compelling.
To recall martial law operates to grant the AFP jurisdiction over civilians when
and where the civil government is unable to function as a consequence of an actual
rebellion or invasion. As exhaustively discussed, the imposition of martial law operates
as a matter of necessity. 5 1 The conditions necessary to authorize its imposition are
not only xed but also exacting, for the imposition of martial law constitutes an
encroachment on the life, liberty and property of private individuals.
To me, this is the signi cance of this case: as earlier stated, the imposition of
martial law in the absence of the exigencies justifying the same reduces such
extraordinary power to a mere tool of convenience and expediency. The baseless
imposition of martial law constitutes, in itself, a violation of substantive and procedural
due process, as it effectively bypasses and renders nugatory the explicit conditions and
limitations clearly spelled out in the Constitution for the protection of individual
citizens.
The Court must disabuse itself of the notion that martial law is required to quell
the rebellion, or to empower the military and the police to engage the lawless elements
in Mindanao. The Executive is fully empowered to deploy the armed forces as
necessary to suppress lawless violence, and even rebellion, whether actual or imminent,
without martial law. Martial law is an emergency governance response that is directed
against the civilian population — allowing the military to perform what are
otherwise civilian government functions and vesting military jurisdiction over civilians.
It is through this lens that the Court should view the pressing question
of whether or not there was sufficient basis to extend Martial Law.
To stress, the Court's function in a Section 18 review is to be an avenue for the
restoration of the normal workings of government and the enjoyment of individual
liberties should there be a showing of insu cient factual basis. 5 2 A ruling that
sanctions the extension of martial law as a matter of expediency defeats this function
and stands as a danger to public safety in itself, for it jeopardizes, for the sake of
convenience, the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights — that from
warrantless arrests and searches, without prior determination of probable cause. 5 3
To be sure, what fans the ames of rebellion, whether a lasting peace is
achievable in Mindanao, whether the military option is the way to address the violence
in Mindanao — these are questions that can be debated ad nauseum. Who the so-called
enemies of the Republic are and who and what their targets may be will certainly be the
subject of endless speculation. At present, there are the Mautes, BIFFs, ASGs, NPAs,
and other armed groups. There may be others which have not been identi ed by the
military.
Without doubt, the threats to the country's internal and external peace and
security are incessant and always present. Armed hostilities in all the islands of the
country exist and will continue to exist. There is as well the specter of terrorism
throughout the world.
And yet, in the face of all these, what should not be forgotten, overlooked or
considered trivial is that the present Constitution has excised "imminent danger" from
its martial law provision. What is required by the Constitution is actual rebellion or
invasion for martial law to be declared or to persist. The respondents have not
presented proof of actual rebellion, or any ongoing armed uprising between the
government's armed forces and any of the so-called rebel groups, in any part of
Mindanao. Even in Marawi City, the actual rebellion there no longer exists. To be sure,
the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Marawi is already underway. The respondents'
proof, consisting of the presence of "remnants" of the Maute group that are carrying on
recruitment and training of new forces, nancial and logistical build-up, consolidation of
forces, and isolated attacks, as well as the increase in the Basilan-based ASG's
manpower with its newly recruited members undergoing trainings in tactics,
marksmanships and bombing operations, may present an "imminent danger" situation
— but they do not rise to meet the Constitution's conditions.
In the end, as the country grapples with all these con icts, it cannot fall into the
slippery slope of expediency as the standard with which to attempt to solve these
problems. No matter how bene cial or preferable the psychic effects the state of
martial law may have upon government o cials and the population at large, it cannot
be wielded in the absence of the conditions required by the Constitution for its
imposition. In the end, the fundamental law that binds all citizens of this country is the
Constitution — one that demands public safety and necessity as basis for curtailing
fundamental Constitutional freedoms. That is what the Constitution mandates. That, in
turn, points the Court to where its duty lies — to ensure that the true state of facts is
made known, that is, that the rebellion has not persisted, and that public safety does
not require the extension anymore.
236145, and 236155, and DECLARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL Joint
Resolution No. 4 of the Senate and the House of Representatives dated December 13,
2017, for failure to comply with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
MARTIRES , J.:
I vote to dismiss all the petitions.

In his letter 1 addressed to President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte),
thru the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND), the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero (Gen. Guerrero)
recommended, for compelling reasons based on current security assessment, the
further extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus for twelve (12) months beginning 1 January until 31 December 2018 in
the whole island of Mindanao. The reasons cited by Gen. Guerrero in his letter to justify
his recommendation were as follows:
1. The DAESH-inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer
Marawi City;
2. Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as the BIFF,
AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Torai e, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar
atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including
the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga, and
Cotabato;
3. The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political mobilization
(army, party, and mass base building, rallies, pickets and demonstrations,
nancial and logistical buildup), terrorism against innocent civilians and private
entities, and guerilla warfare against the security sector and public government
infrastructures;
4. The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order
5. The threats being posed by the CTs, the ASG, and the presence of
rehabilitation, recovery, and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the
attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development, and prosperity in
Mindanao;
6. The second extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with
stakeholders in quelling and putting an end to the ongoing DAESH-inspired
DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety and
7. In seeking another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to
for the whole duration of Martial Law to date, without any reported human
rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority.
On 1 December 2017, DND Secretary Del n N. Lorenzana (Sec. Lorenzana) wrote
President Duterte recommending the further extension of martial law for a period of
one year beginning 1 January until 31 December 2018 "covering the whole island of
Mindanao primarily to ensure total eradication of DAESH-inspired Da'awatul Islamiyah
Waliyatul Masriq (DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs)
and Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), the communist terrorists (CTs) and their coddlers,
supporters, and nanciers, to ensure speedy rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction
efforts in Marawi, and the attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development,
and prosperity in Mindanao." 2
In his letter 3 dated 8 December 2017, President Duterte informed the Senate
and the House of Representatives about the letters he received from Sec. Lorenzana
and Gen. Guerrero. President Duterte stated in his letter that, as Commander in Chief, he
has personal knowledge of the security assessment submitted by the AFP and which
was supported by a similar assessment by the Philippine National Police (PNP), to wit:
of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the
the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large and, in all probability, are
their allies, together with their protectors, supporters, and sympathizers, have
been monitored in their continued efforts towards the radicalization/recruitment,
nancial and logistical build up, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization
Islamic caliphate and a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in
the whole of Southeast Asia .
Southeast Asia.
martial law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. For this year, the BIFF
has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassment and
government with Communist rule .
xxx xxx xxx
Corollary to the above assessments, President Duterte asked that the Congress
further extend martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, i.e., from 1 January to 31
December 2018, or for such other period of time as the Congress may determine in
accordance with Section (Sec.) 18, Article (Art.) VII of the 1987 Constitution. President
Duterte offered the following explanation:
A further extension of the implementation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao will help the AFP, the x
x x PNP, and all other law enforcement agencies to quell completely and put an
end to the ongoing rebellion in Mindanao and prevent the same from escalating
to other parts of the country. Public safety indubitably requires such further
extension, not only for the sake of security and public order, but more
importantly to enable the government and the people of Mindanao to pursue the
bigger task of rehabilitation and the promotion of a stable socio-economic
growth and development.
In the Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 4, 4 dated 13 December 2017, the
Senate and the House of Representatives approved President Duterte's request for
another extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus for the period 1 January to 31 December 2018.
Hence, the present petitions.
In G.R. No. 235935, petitioners anchored their petition on the following:
I.
The leadership and supermajority of both chambers of the Congress of the
Philippines baselessly and with brazen alacrity acceded to the President's
initiative of extending the duration of martial law in Mindanao for one full year
by relying on the mere say-so of the military and police authorities on the
purported "continuing rebellion" by remnants of terrorist groups in Mindanao.
II.
The leadership of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, as supported
by the supermajority, unduly constricted the period of deliberation and
interpellation on the President's request for extension of martial law to an
indecent three hours and 35 minutes for considering favorably an extension
which will endure for 8,760 hours in 2018 in the entire Mindanao.
III.

The threats of violence and terrorism alleged by the President, Philippine
National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from
remnants of the terrorist groups do not constitute a constitutional ground for the
re-extension of martial law in Mindanao.
IV.
The extension of one year from January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018 of the
period of martial law in Mindanao de es the Constitution's unmistakable
mandate of a limited duration of the declaration of martial law and its
extension.
V.
The leadership and supermajority of both Chambers of the Congress of the
Philippines wantonly violated and exceeded the congressional authority under
the Constitution for a one-time extension of the original proclamation
(Proclamation No. 216), and not to re-extend a previous extension or grant a
series of extensions amounting to "perpetuity."
VI.
Verily, the approval of the extension of martial law and the suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao utterly lacks su cient factual basis
because there is no actual rebellion in Mindanao and the re-extension is
extremely long even as the approval was made with undue haste and
unscrupulous imprudence.
VII.
The leadership and supermajority of both Chambers of the Congress of the
Philippines in extending martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus in Mindanao committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
VIII.
While martial law does not confer any signi cant additional powers to the
President as well as to the military and police establishments, its imposition and
extension emboldens government forces to indiscriminately attack and kill
perceived enemies of the State and conduct warrantless arrests, searches and
seizures even as the civilian courts are functioning.
IX.
Without extending martial law in Mindanao, the President has the constitutional
power as Commander in Chief to call out all the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion in Mindanao.
In G.R. No. 236061, petitioner raised this sole issue:
THE PRIMORDIAL ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE IS SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS
FOR THE ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF MARTIAL LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE ENTIRE MINDANAO.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 236145 tried to fortify their petition through the following
premises:
I.
THE INSTANT PETITION SATISFIES THE REQUISITES FOR THE EXERCISE OF
THE HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT MUST TEST THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
EXTENSION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 216 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MEANING AND PURPOSE OF MARTIAL LAW AS INTENDED BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, AND AS ARTICULATED BY THE HONORABLE
COURT IN LAGMAN V. MEDIALDEA.
III.
ABSENT AN ACTUAL INVASION OR REBELLION, THERE CAN BE NO SUFFICIENT
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE CONTINUED IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW IN
MINDANAO.
In G.R. No. 236155, the petitioners raised the following justi cations to grant
their petition, to wit:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT HAS THE POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE
TO INDEPENDENTLY DETERMINE THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FACTUAL BASES
FOR THE EXTENSION OF PROCLAMATION NO. 216 AND IF IT SO DETERMINES,
NULLIFY THE SAME.
B.
THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR, AND CONGRESS' SUBSEQUENT JOINT
RESOLUTION TO FURTHER EXTEND THE EFFECTIVITY OF PROCLAMATION
NO. 216 UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2018, LACK SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS, AND
ARE THEREFORE NULL AND VOID.
DISCUSSION
The President is
immune from suit
during his tenure.
We note that in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145, President Duterte was named as a
respondent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the presidential immunity from suit remains
preserved in the system of government of this country, even though not expressly
reserved in the 1987 Constitution. 5 Addressing a concern of his co-members in the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter,
Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that
the President may not be sued during his or her tenure. 6 The President is granted the
privilege of immunity from suit to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the position of Chief
Executive of the Government requires all of the o ce-holder's time and demands
undivided attention to his duties as Head of State. 7 This ruling was further ampli ed in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 8 viz.:
Incidentally, it is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of o ce or actual
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
o ce of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed
from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his o cial duties and functions. Unlike the
legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the
operation of the Government. However, this does not mean that the President is
not accountable to anyone. Like any other o cial, he remains accountable to
the people but he may be removed from o ce only in the mode provided by law
and that is by impeachment.
Considering the foregoing, President Duterte should be dropped as respondent
in G.R. Nos. 236061 and 236145.
The act of declaring
martial law differs from
the act of extending
martial law.
Sec. 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 18 . The President shall be the Commander in Chief of all armed
In case of invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it, he may, for a
requires it.
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need
of a call.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
The act pertaining to the declaration of martial law differs from the extension of
martial law. The act of declaring martial law is an executive act, i.e., the President as the
Commander in Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, whenever it becomes
necessary, may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. The act of declaring martial law is the sole prerogative of the
President.
The act of extending martial law on the one hand, is a joint executive-legislative
act brought into motion by the initiative of the President. The extension of martial law is
given life because the Congress voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, has determined that actual invasion or rebellion
persists, and that public safety requires it. This conforms to the constitutional
requirement that it should be "in the same manner" that the Congress undertook its
legislative review of the declaration of martial law that it should determine whether or
not to extend martial law. It must be stressed, however, that Congress cannot motu
proprio extend martial law as it must rst await the request of the President stating the
need for the extension, i.e., upon the initiative of the President.
On record is Proclamation No. 216 9 issued by President Duterte, on 23 May
2017, through Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, declaring the state of martial
law in the Mindanao group of islands for a period not exceeding sixty days. 1 0 On the
one hand, in view of the President's initiative, the Congress issued RBH Nos. 2 and 4 1 1
whereby the Senate and the House of Representatives resolved to further extend
Proclamation No. 216 until 31 December 2017, and from 1 January to 31 December
2018, respectively.
The act of declaring martial law is subject to an automatic review by Congress,
i.e., The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Hence, extant from the records are
Senate Resolution No. 49 1 2 and House Resolution No. 1050 1 3 which documented the
nal determination of both bodies, in the exercise of their automatic review power, not
to revoke Proclamation No. 2016.
Since the matter of extending martial law is an act of Congress, it would be
absurd that the same body would subject its determination to its own review. It is only
logical to deduce that the Congress, voting jointly, had already threshed out all the
issues and concerns before coming to a decision on whether or not to extend martial
law.
The duration of martial law as declared by the President should not exceed sixty
(60) days, while the life span of an extension of martial law would be subject to its
determination by Congress. But whether it is an executive or joint executive-legislative
act, martial law can only be justi ed by the existence of an actual invasion or rebellion
and that public safety should require it. It is in this stage that the wisdom of the Court is
summoned when it is asked to review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen,
the su ciency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the extension
thereof. Thus, whether it is an executive act of declaration of martial law or the
executive-legislative act for the extension thereof, the Court can always be called upon
to review the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation or extension of martial
law.
The requisites for the
extension of martial law

Considering that the term "rebellion" has not been de ned in the Constitution, the
Court has deferred to the definition in the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Art. 134. Rebellion or insurrection; How committed. — The crime of
rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against
the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said
Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof,
of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, depriving the Chief Executive
or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
In Lagman v. Medialdea , 1 4 the Court held that for rebellion to exist the following
must be present: (1) there is a (a) public uprising and (b) taking arms against the
Government; and (2) the purpose of the uprising or movement is either (a) to remove
from the allegiance to the Government or its laws (i) the territory of the Philippines or
any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or (b) to deprive
the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers and
prerogatives.
The Court has ruled that in "determining the existence of rebellion, the President
only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that
more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed. To require him
to satisfy a higher standard of proof would restrict the exercise of his emergency
powers." 1 5 It merely necessitates an "average man [to weigh] the facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he
has no technical knowledge. He [merely] relies on common sense [and] x x x needs only
to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed x x x
by the accused." 1 6 It is in view of this required standard that the Court established the
metes and bounds to determine the su ciency of the factual basis of martial law, viz.:
1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the rst two requirements
must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is
actual rebellion or invasion. 1 7
Having ascertained that it is upon the initiative of the President that Congress
undertake a determination on whether the extension of martial law is warranted, the
issue that comes to the fore is the resolution of the parameter that should be observed
by the august body in making such determination.
To restate, Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: "x x x Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner , extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it ." In observing
this provision, there is certainty that the same parameter used in determining the
su ciency of factual basis in the declaration of martial law equally applies to its
extension, i.e., 1) actual rebellion or invasion persists as required by the Constitution; 2)
public safety requires the extension, with the rst two requirements present; and 3)
there is probable cause for the President and the Congress to believe that actual
rebellion or invasion persists.
a. Actual rebellion persists.
Petitioners invariably claim that there is no actual rebellion to support the
extension of martial law.
It must be emphasized that in extending martial law, the President and the
legislators need only to convince themselves that there is probable cause or evidence
showing that more likely than not the rebellion persists.
In his letter dated 8 December 2017, President Duterte stated that the grounds
on which he anchored his request for the extension of martial law from 1 January to 31
December 2018 were based on the security assessment submitted by the AFP and the
PNP. He claims that he has personal knowledge of the circumstances constituting the
security assessment. He clearly acknowledged the persistence of rebellion when he
stated that the extension of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus will help the AFP, the PNP, and other law enforcement agencies to quell
completely the ongoing rebellion in Mindanao and prevent its escalation to other parts
of the country. Additionally, the recent developments involving the National Democratic
Front, the Communist Party of the Philippines, and the New People's Army (NDF-CPP-
NPA) portend intensi ed armed hostilities, which together with the other security
concerns continue to make Mindanao a hotbed for rebellion.
On the one hand, after four hours of discussion and extensive debate, the
Congress, in a joint session with two hundred forty a rmative votes comprising the
majority of all its members, determined that rebellion persists and that public safety
indubitably required the further extension of martial law. 1 8
At this point, there is a need to repeat the ruling in Lagman that "the purpose of
judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of the facts upon which
the President anchored his declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency of the factual basis as to convince
the President that there is probable cause that rebellion exists." That same purpose
applies to the present judicial review insofar as it would determine the su ciency of
the factual basis as to convince the President and the Congress that there is probable
cause that rebellion persists.
The records con rm that the President and the Congress have separately
determined and were convinced that rebellion persists in Mindanao. The Court cannot
supplant its own ndings with those made by the President and the Congress because
to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the well-safeguarded and
independent dominion of the executive and the legislature.
The contention of the petitioners that the President should have exercised his
extraordinary power of calling out the armed forces instead of requesting the extension
of martial law, has no basis. The Court cannot tread on this issue as it clearly
recognizes that its power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the
President's decision as to which extraordinary power to avail of given a set of facts or
conditions. To do so would be an incursion into the exclusive domain of the executive
and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President. 1 9
In the same vein, the issue as to the duration of the martial law extension is
better left to the decision of the Congress considering that the Constitution plainly
provides that the august body, in resolving whether or not to extend martial law, shall
likewise determine the period for the extension.
The contention that the congressional authority is for a one-time extension of the
original proclamation, is without basis. A reading of Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution evinces that there is nothing that would indicate such limitation. For sure,
even the contention that the series of extensions may amount to "perpetuity" is
specious considering that there are established parameters for Congress in extending
martial law, which extension may even be subject to the Court's judicial review.
b. Public safety requires the extension of martial law.
"Public safety, which is another component element for the declaration of martial
law, 'involves the prevention of and protection from events that could endanger the
safety of the general public from signi cant danger, injury/harm, or damage, such as
crimes or disasters.' Public safety is an abstract term; it does not take any physical
form. Plainly, its range, extent or scope could not be physically measured by metes and
bounds." 2 0
The letter of Pres. Duterte detailing the security assessment by the AFP and the
PNP satisfies the public safety requirement for the extension, viz.:
of their groups have continued to rebuild their organization through the
the Martial Law Arrest Orders have remained at large and, in all probability, are
their allies, together with their protectors, supporters, and sympathizers, have
been monitored in their continued efforts towards the radicalization/recruitment,
nancial and logistical buildup, as well as in their consolidation/reorganization
Islamic caliphate and a Wilayat not only in the Philippines but also in
the whole of Southeast Asia .
Southeast Asia.
martial law period in Maguindanao and North Cotabato. For this year, the BIFF
has initiated at least eighty-nine (89) violent incidents, mostly harassments and
Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula remain as a serious security concern .
the situation and intensi ed their decades long rebellion against the
government with Communist rule . (italics supplied)
Petitioners averred that even President Duterte, in his letter requesting for the
extension of martial law, referred to "remnants" of the terrorist groups purportedly
recruiting ghters to launch new attacks. Petitioners claimed that "(A)lmost comically,
martial law is extended in Mindanao to subdue residual phantoms."
True, the word "remnants" was used by President Duterte in his letter, but this
does not mean that the remaining forces of the terrorist groups were not as powerful,
or even more powerful as its founders and original ghters. It cannot even be validly
claimed that the resolve of the "remnants" to establish a global Islamic caliphate and a
Wilayat had lessened or was completely shattered when the DAESH-inspired ghters
and their leaders were neutralized. On the contrary, the death of their ghters and
leaders could even have wrongly enlightened the remnants of the alleged nobleness of
their cause and would have converted this belief into a stronger resolve to continue to
fight the government.
The remnants are not specters who do not deserve any attention from the
government. The immense havoc created by the DAESH-inspired DIWM, BIFF, and ASG
in Marawi is real. The huge number of dead civilians and military personnel, and the vast
amount of funds needed to rebuild Marawi cannot be denied. There is the lingering
plausibility that greater massive destruction would result after these groups would
have regrouped and consolidated their forces. There is even the possibility that the
NDF-CPP-NPA, which have successfully sown acts of terrorism in different parts of the
country, and the Turai e group, the potential successor of Hapilon as Amir of DAESH
Wilayat in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia, would join the remnants, albeit these
groups do not gravitate towards the same goal. And with the assistance of well-funded
and highly equipped foreign terrorist groups, it is undeniable that the "remnants" would
be a formidable force to reckon with.
Equally signi cant is the actual need of the government to forthwith contain
these terrorist groups in speci c areas rather than allow them all over the country. It
cannot be denied that it took the government ve months to neutralize the DAESH-
inspired ghters despite the fact that the terrorist attacks were mostly con ned in
Marawi. The number of dead civilians and military personnel as well as the huge amount
of funds needed to weed out the terrorist groups easily defused whatever victory the
government had claimed in neutralizing this terrorist group. Indeed, the ruins in Marawi
are painful reminders to the government that its success sadly mirrors the great
failures behind it.
The volatile situation in Mindanao right now spawns a good breeding ground for
terrorists and their coddlers, supporters, and nanciers. The government cannot sit idly
by and wait for these terrorist groups to make their move. The arduous task of crushing
the terrorist groups must start posthaste otherwise, another victory, though
bittersweet it may be, may not be possible at all for the government if these groups are
allowed to proliferate all over the country.
The Court has emphasized that time is paramount in situations necessitating the
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
2 1 Considering that an extension of martial law is ineludibly moored on the existence of
an actual rebellion that persists and that public safety requires it, there is a paramount
urgency for the President and Congress to act quickly to protect the country.
c. There is probable
cause for the
President and the
Congress to believe
that actual rebellion
persists.
Records will con rm that both the President and the Congress have separately
determined whether actual rebellion persists in Mindanao, and in the process are
convinced that there exists probable cause that actual rebellion persists. Worth noting,
the President has a wide range of information available to him, and that he has the right,
prerogative, and the means to access vital, relevant, and con dential data, concomitant
with his position as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. 2 2 The President has the
prerogative to share these information with Congress in fortifying his request for the
extension of martial law, which information the Court may not even be privy to.
Likewise, the Court does not have the same resources available to the President; thus, it
is restrained in the exercise of its judicial review power not to "undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings." 2 3
In stark contrast, petitioners have miserably failed to present evidence that
would controvert the records that have swayed the President and the Congress to
conclude that rebellion persists.
In fine, the President and the Congress have successfully discharged their burden
as to the su ciency of the factual basis that convinced them that there was probable
cause that rebellion persists.
Judicial review of the
declaration of martial
law and its extension is
pursuant to Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Jurisprudence 2 4 has settled that the "appropriate proceeding" referred to in Sec.

18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution does not refer to a petition for certiorari pursuant
to Sec. 1 or 5 of Art. VIII, viz.:
It could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the
phrase "in an appropriate proceeding" would refer to a Petition for Certiorari
pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The standard of review in a
petition for certiorari is whether the respondent has committed any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of
his or her functions. Thus, it is not the proper tool to review the su ciency of
the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that
under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the su ciency of the
factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if
this Court applies the standard of review used in a petition for certiorari, the
same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
Clearly, petitioners erred when they invoked Sections 1 or 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution in mooring their assertion that the Senate and the House of
Representatives committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the performance of their functions.
Congress is clothed by
the Constitution with the
authority to determine
its rules of proceedings.
Sec. 16 (3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all
its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
It was obviously pursuant to this constitutional provision that the Congress had
adopted the rules that governed the Joint Session when it resolved to extend martial
law from 1 January to 31 December 2018. Accordingly, the issues raised by the
petitioners insofar as they are speci cally anchored on the propriety of the rules, are
beyond the judicial review of this Court, viz.:
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of
proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full
discretionary authority to the House of Congress in the formulation,
adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of
this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and
interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due
process .
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the
Constitution, is to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. Further, pursuant to his constitutional
grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules, the Senate is
at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see t, subject only to
the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the
observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these
requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of
Congress to amend its own rules. 2 5 (emphasis supplied)
Petitioners can very well raise the issue on the propriety of the rules of Congress
or violation thereof by its members in a proper proceeding, but de nitely the present
petitions led pursuant to the Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution could not be the
proper vehicle.
It is for this reason that the Court necessarily has to defer to its above-quoted
ruling and decline to rule on whether Congress committed grave abuse of discretion in
extending martial law.
Finally, the query: Who is afraid of martial law?
The fear that the present martial rule in Mindanao may lead to a dictatorial
regime similar to what transpired when the late President Ferdinand Marcos declared
martial law in the entire Philippines in 1972 is speculative and unfounded. The factual
milieu and legal environment surrounding the present martial law in Mindanao are
totally different from those prevailing during martial rule in 1972.
The declaration of martial law in 1972 was premised on the alleged intensi ed
communist insurgency and perceived threat by the NPA as shown by the alleged series
of bombings and assassination attempts throughout the country. 2 6 This was
permitted by Article VII, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution which provided for
justi cations for declaration of martial law not present under the 1987 Constitution. In
particular, under the 1935 Constitution, the President of the Philippines, as Commander
in Chief of the armed forces, may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law when there is lawless
violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
On the other hand, the present martial law in Mindanao is based on the actual
threat presented by a local terrorist group aligned with a foreign terrorist organization
when they attacked government and other vital facilities, and took over Marawi City.
These facts led President Duterte to believe that there was an armed public uprising
with the purpose of removing a portion of the territory of the Republic of the Philippines
from its allegiance thereto. 2 7
Further, while Article VII, Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution gave the President
virtually unbridled powers under Martial Law, the same cannot be said under the
present Constitution.
Indeed, the unrestricted commander in chief powers under the 1935 Constitution
allowed then President Marcos to, among others, place the entire Philippines under
martial law for more than eight (8) years from 23 September 1972, until it was o cially
lifted on 17 January 1981, with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, series of 1981;
to arrogate unto himself the powers of the legislature; and to authorize military courts
to have jurisdiction over civilians. The opportunities for such abuses have been
curtailed by the present Constitution.
The 1987 Constitution has already established su cient safeguards and
parameters to prevent government abuse during martial law from happening again.
First, the 1987 Constitution mandates that any declaration of martial law shall be
valid only for sixty (60) days and any extension thereof shall require the concurrence of
Congress voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its members. 2 8 The
present martial law in Mindanao was extended twice following this rule.
Second, the President, even during the effectivity of martial law, cannot assume
the legislative powers of Congress, or give the military courts jurisdiction over civilians
because a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 2 9 And in such
instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such
suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses
connected with invasion. 3 0
The President, through the DND, recognized such limitation and even reminded
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, that "any arrest, search,
and seizure executed or implemented in the area or place where Martial Law is
effective, including the ling of charges, should comply with the Revised Rules of Court
and applicable jurisprudence." 3 1 This directive only indicates the disposition and
willingness of the present administration to follow the rule of law despite the
declaration of martial law, and there is no reason for the Court to believe otherwise,
unless convincing evidence to the contrary is shown.
In ne, the extraordinary powers enjoyed by President Marcos during the 1972
martial law are no longer available under the 1987 Constitution and therefore could not
be applied by President Duterte. Any submission that the present martial rule in
Mindanao may just be the means to start a dictatorial regime is speculative at best. ITAaHc
GESMUNDO , J., concurring :
I concur with the ponencia.

There is sufficient factual basis
for extending the period of
martial law
I submit that there is su cient factual basis to justify the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in the whole Mindanao for one (1) year.
Congress approved the extension of martial law pursuant to the letter dated
December 8, 2017, of President Rodrigo R. Duterte (President Duterte). The said letter,
in turn, was based on the letters of AFP General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero (General
Guerrero) and Secretary of National Defense Del n Lorenzana 1 (Secretary Lorenzana),
which state:
The AFP strongly believes that on the basis of the foregoing assessment,
the following are cited as justification for the recommended extension, to wit:
The DAESH-Inspired DIWM groups and allies continue to visibly offer
Marawi City;
Other DAESH-inspired and like-minded threat groups such as [the] BIFF,
AKP, DI-Maguid, DI-Toraype, and the ASG remain capable of staging similar
atrocities and violent attacks against vulnerable targets in Mindanao, including
the cities of Davao, Cagayan de Oro, General Santos, Zamboanga and Cotabato;
The CTs have been pursuing and intensifying their political mobilization
(army, party and mass base building, rallies, pickets and demonstrations,
nancial and logistical build up), terrorism against innocent civilians and
private entities, and guerilla warfare against [both] the security sector, and
public government infrastructures;
The need to intensify the campaign against the CTs is necessary in order
The threats being posed by the CTs, ASG, and the presence of remnants,
protectors, supporters and sympathizers of the DAESH/DIWM pose a clear and
imminent danger to public safety and hinders the speedy rehabilitation, recovery
and reconstruction efforts in Marawi City, and the attainment of lasting peace,
stability, economic development and prosperity in Mindanao;
The 2nd extension of the implementation of Martial Law coupled with
DIWM groups and CT-staged rebellion, and in restoring public order, safety, and
In seeking for another extension, the AFP is ready, willing and able to
so for the whole duration of Martial law to date, without any report of human
rights violation and/or incident of abuse of authority. 2
During the oral arguments, General Guerrero presented data which justi ed the
further extension of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao, to wit:
However, manpower increased by more or less 400, with almost the same
strength that initially stormed Marawi City, through clandestine and
decentralized recruitment of the Daesh-inspired groups at their respective area[s]
of concentration.
more or less 250 by the Maute Group in Lanao provinces; 37 by the Maguid
Group in Maguindanao. These newly recruited personalities were motivated by
clannish culture as they are relatives of terrorist personalities; revenge for their
killed relatives/parents during the Marawi operations; nancial gain[s] as new
recruits were given an amount ranging from Php15,000.00 to 50,000.00; and as
radicalized converts.
marksmanships and bombing operations at different area of Mount Cararao
Complex, Butig, and Piagapo all of Lanao Del Sur. Recruits with high potentials
[sic] were given instruction on IED-making and urban operations.
boundaries in Southern Philippines, in the guise as tourists and businessmen.
The closeness of these two groups is predominant with Abu Dar who was
historically established link[s] with Turaifie.
100% for the 2nd Semester. 3
As gleaned above, the approval of the extension of martial law in Mindanao is not
arbitrary but has su cient factual basis. It must be remembered that in Lagman v.
Medialdea 4 (Lagman), the Court held that there was su cient factual basis that actual
rebellion exists in Mindanao and that public safety requires martial law, particularly in
Marawi where there was intensive re ghting initiated by the Maute Group. Notably,
even after President Duterte declared the liberation of Marawi City on October 17,
2017, the Maute Group was still able to recruit new members and increase their
number to 250 as of December 2017. Other terrorist groups in Mindanao were able to
increase their memberships as well.
General Guerrero stated that the said increase in membership was due to several
factors, such as the clannish culture of the groups; revenge for their fallen relatives; and
nancial gain ranging from P15,000.00 to P50,000.00. He also pointed out that
foreigners have been joining these terrorists group in guise of businessmen or tourists,
particularly the Maute Group in Lanao and Turaifie Group in Central Mindanao.
Indeed, with these factual bases, the military needs to intensify their efforts
against these terrorist groups through the continued imposition of martial law. Lifting
martial law would remove the leverage of the military against these terror groups
during their on-going operations and would weaken the rigorous campaign against
them and allow them to continuously threaten the civilian population. These facts
establish a prima facie case in justifying the extension of the period of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao
because actual rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
The petitioners failed to impeach the factual basis and prima facie case
presented by the respondents. Notably, in this sui generis petition to determine the
su ciency of the factual basis for an extension of martial law or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the movants should focus on assailing the
factual basis to support such declaration. Regrettably, instead of citing speci c factual
allegations to counter the respondents' position, the petitioners resorted to raising
questions of law and even questions regarding the wisdom in extending martial law.
Such issues, however, should not be raised in this present sui generis proceeding.
Rebellion as a continuing offense
As stated in Umil v. Ramos 5 (Umil), a case decided under the 1987 Constitution,
the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith
constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, such as adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base, which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government is
attained. 6
It was also established in Umil that the arrest of persons involved in the rebellion
whether as its ghting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
con ict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in
court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure
in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is
no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance
of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the
exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted authorities . 7
The Court stressed in Umil that arrest of persons involved in the rebellion
whether as its ghting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion , is more an act of capturing them in the course of an
armed con ict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting
them in court for a statutory offense. 8 Consequently, even if the re ghting stopped
temporarily, offenders could still be arrested by State agents if they continue to
perform non-violent acts in furtherance of the rebellion, such as recruitment of
members, financing of rebellious groups, or planning the next unlawful attack.
In spite of the cessation of re ghting, the crime of rebellion is continuing
because the ideological base persists, which requires the repetition of the acts of
lawlessness and violence until the objective of overthrowing organized government is
realized. Thus, hostilities and acts of terrorism committed afterwards, pursuant to the
ideological purpose, continue to form part of the crime of rebellion.
In this case, while the re ghting in Marawi City have ceased, the goal of the
Maute Group to overthrow the government remains. Their continuing goal is evident in
the incessant recruitment of members in the Lanao area and the nancing of the rebel
group. While non-violent, these acts are still considered in the furtherance of rebellion.
Indeed, these acts are part and parcel of the crime of rebellion seeking to achieve their
illegitimate purpose. Thus, as of December 2017, General Guerrero reported to the
Court that the Maute Group has recruited a total of 250 members, a signi cant number
capable of committing other atrocities against the civilian population.
Aside from the Maute Group, the Turai e Group in the Cotabato Area; the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters in Maguindanao and North Cotabato; the Abu
Sayaff Group in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi; and the New People's Army are continuing
their rebellious goals through their rampant recruitment and clashes with the military.
Notably, the New People's Army engaged in armed con ict with the government even
though there were on-going peace negotiations. These continued re ghting threaten
the general populace in Mindanao, which affects public safety.
In the course of the oral arguments, General Guerrero stated that rebellion in
Mindanao is still on-going in spite of the culmination of the Marawi siege, viz.:
JUSTICE BERNABE:
Now, why is the second extension signi cantly longer than the rst when
in fact it was already publicly declared that Marawi City has been liberated
from the Maute?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
As I've said, Your Honor, Marawi is just a part of the whole problem. After
the liberation of Marawi, there are still other areas that we need to address.
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE BERNABE:
I mean, Marawi City had already been liberated so there is this escalating
con ict already, shouldn't this diminish the public safety needed to
continue with martial law over the entire Mindanao?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The con ict in Marawi is distinct and separate from what is
happening in the other parts of the area, in the Lanao,
particularly. Although, as I have said, the con ict in Marawi has
already been resolved but still there are some elements there that
continue to operate. As I have said, we had just addressed the
armed component and for as long as we have not addressed the
other factors that have brought this con ict into existence they
will still be able to continue to recruit other rebels and continue
with the atrocities, Your Honor .
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE BERNABE:
What is the objective behind this extension of martial law, the one-year
extension? Is it still to quell the Maute-Japilon led rebellion?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
Yes. . .
JUSTICE BERNABE:
Or is it generally put an end to all communist or terrorist activities in the
entire Mindanao?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
The rebellion has not been quelled, Your Honor. What we have done
is we have been able to resolve the Marawi con ict but the
rebellion continues to exist .
JUSTICE BERNABE:
So, the objectives are both, to still quell the Maute-Japilon led Rebellion and
as well as to put an end to all communist or terroristic activities?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
That is the objective, Your Honor, to address the other rebel groups. 9
Certainly, with these set of facts and with the concept of rebellion as a continuing
offense, there is su cient factual basis that actual rebellion in Mindanao persists and
public safety requires the extension of the period of martial law and the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period of one (1) year, as
reasonably authorized by Congress.
Current concept of rebellion
The petitioners argue that the US cases of Ex Parte Milligan 1 0 (Milligan) and
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, Sheriff 1 1 (Duncan), which required that there must be an actual
theater of war to justify the President's declaration of martial law, must be applied by
the Court.
I disagree.
In Milligan, martial law was declared because there was an on-going rebellion in
the Confederate states. The US Court held that martial law is the will of the
commanding o cer of an armed force or of a geographical military department,
expressed in time of war, within the limits of his military jurisdiction, as necessity
demands and prudence dictates, restrained or enlarged by the orders of his military or
supreme executive chief. It was also ruled therein that the military tribunals only have
jurisdiction where civil courts are not functioning. But where the civil courts are
functioning and there is no need for bayonets or military aid to execute its jurisdiction,
military tribunals cannot try civilians.
Similarly, in Duncan, martial law was declared because Hawaii was in an actual
theater of war arising from the Japanese armed invasion on December 7, 1941 and
there was, at all times, a danger of invasion in the nature of commando raids or
submarine attacks. The US Court ruled therein that since the civil courts were opened
later on February 24, 1944, the petitioners could not be tried by military courts under
martial law.
In the case at bench, the concept of actual invasion or rebellion is not the same
as that of Milligan, decided in 1866, and Duncan, decided in 1946. During those times,
the actual invasion or rebellion was appreciated in the traditional sense where the
enemies use bayonets, cannons, commando raids or submarine attacks and con icts
were concentrated within a speci c location or state. However, during the deliberations
of the present Constitution, the framers discussed the possibility of modern tactics in
rebellion or invasion, to wit:
MR. DE LOS REYES:
I ask that question because I think modern rebellion can be carried out
nowadays in a more sophisticated manner because of the
advance of technology, mass media and others . Let us consider this
for example: There is an obvious synchronized or orchestrated strike in all
industrial rms, then there is a strike of drivers so that employees and
students cannot attend school nor go to their places of work, practically
paralyzing the government. Then in some remote barrios, there are
ambushes by so-called subversives, so that the scene is that there is an
orchestrated attempt to destabilize the government and ultimately
supplant the constitutional government. Would the Committee call that an
actual rebellion, or is it an imminent rebellion?
MR. REGALADO:
At the early stages, where there was just an attempt to paralyze the
government or some sporadic incidents in other areas but without armed
public uprising, that would only amount to sedition under Article 138, or it
can only be considered as a tumultuous disturbance.
MR. DE LOS REYES:
The public uprising are not concentrated in one place, which use to be the
concept of rebellion before.
MR. REGALADO:
No.
MR. DE LOS REYES:
But the public uprisings consists of isolated attacks in several places — for
example in one camp here; another in the province of Quezon; then in
another camp in Laguna; no attack in Malacañang — but there is complete
paralysis of the industry of the whole country. If we place these things
together, the impression is clear — there is an attempt to destabilize the
government in order to supplant it with a new government.
MR. REGALADO:
It becomes a matter of factual appreciation and evaluation . The
magnitude is to be taken into account when we talk about tumultuous
disturbance, to sedition, then graduating to rebellion. All these things are
variances of magnitude and scope. So, the President determines,
based on the circumstances, if there is presence of rebellion . 1 2
(emphases supplied)
The Constitutional framers foresee the possibility that modern rebellion will
involve a more sophisticated manner of execution with the use of advanced technology
and even mass media. They discussed the possibility that rebels may conduct isolated
attacks in different places but would be orchestrated to paralyze the country and
destabilize the government. In such case, Justice Regalado suggested it would be a
matter of factual appreciation and evaluation of the President, based on the
circumstances, in determining if rebellion exists. Thus, the traditional concept of
rebellion where there must be actual use of weapons concentrated in a single place is
not the sole concept of actual rebellion envisioned under the 1987 Constitution.
Defanged Martial Law
Martial law, while it has no precise de nition, is employed to authorize the

military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the
defense of the State against actual rebellion or invasion. 1 3 In the Philippines, the power
to declare martial law rests in the hands of the President. History dictates that the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions allowed the President to exploit its power in declaring
martial law due to the following reasons:
1. That the proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus;
2. That the President as Commander-in-Chief can promulgate proclamations,
orders and decrees during the period of martial law essential to the security
and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the political and social
liberties of the people, and to the institution of reforms to prevent
resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as
well as to meet the impact of a world recession, in ation or economic
crisis;
3. That the President, as legislator during the period of martial law, can
legally create military commission or court martials to try not only
members of the armed forces but also civilian offenders for speci ed
offenses. 1 4
Thus, when the framers of the present Constitution discussed the power of the
President to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
they ensured that such abuses would not be repeated. Commissioner Monsod even
noted that the martial law of then President Marcos was an aberration in history and
that the grounds for the imposition of martial law and suspension of the privilege were
reduced, and that should a second Marcos arise, there would be enough
safeguards in the new Constitution to take care of such eventuality .
Accordingly, the following safeguards are now in place to limit the Chief Executive's
power to declare martial law:
1. The initial declaration of martial law has a time limit of sixty (60) days;
2. The President is required to submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress to substantiate his declaration of martial law;
3. There is a process for its review and possible revocation of Congress;
4. There is also a review and possible nulli cation by the Supreme Court
based on the sufficiency of factual basis;
5. The removal of the phrases "imminent danger thereof" and "insurrection"
as grounds for declaring martial law;
6. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution,
nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies,
nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and
agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function. Thus, during
the martial law, the President can neither promulgate proclamations, orders
and decrees when legislative assemblies are functioning nor create military
courts to try civilians when the civil courts are open.
7. The declaration of martial law does not automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
8. During the suspension of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
9. The extension of the declaration of martial law initiated by the President
shall only take effect when approved by Congress for a period reasonably
determined by it.
The numerous safety measures embodied under the present Constitution ensure
that the President cannot abuse its power anymore to the detriment of the citizens. The
said measures defanged martial law. As can be gleaned in Lagman, the safeguards and
processes were fully operational and the declaration of martial law by President
Rodrigo Duterte over the whole Mindanao was thoroughly scrutinized by Congress and
the Court. In said case, the Court concluded that the President, in issuing Proclamation
No. 216, had su cient factual bases to show that actual rebellion exists and that public
safety requires the declaration of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus.
During the oral arguments, it was con rmed by Commissioner Monsod, one of
the petitioners, that martial law under the Constitution has been restricted, to wit:
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Okay, I will agree for the moment with you. But the thing is, you have a
version of martial law that does not replicate the Marcos version, it is now
emasculated. Is that, will you agree with that?
CHAIRMAN MONSOD:
Yes.
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Emasculated.
CHAIRMAN MONSOD:
Not emasculated, there's a narrowed discretion of the President because. . .
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Narrowed, restricted to tie the hands of the President, if I may put it that way.
It cannot be anymore as pervasive as the martial law that was under the
1935 Constitution because we had no other experience in martial law since
that time, since that time.
CHAIRMAN MONSOD:
Yes, Your Honor. 1 5
It was also discussed that martial law under the present Constitution is unique
because it does not confer additional powers to the President, the Constitution is
continuously upheld, the agencies of the government and the courts continue to
function, and human rights and international humanitarian laws are still observed. 1 6
General Guerrero also shared his view that the only bene ts generated by the present
declaration of martial law are the immediate arrest of the rebels; 1 7 civilian authorities
are readily compliant with the requests of the AFP; 1 8 increased military presence; 1 9
and logistical benefit due to the increased information gathering and dissemination. 2 0
Flexibility in Extending Martial Law

The petitions at bench also question the procedural validity of the extension of
martial law. Under the Constitution, the said extension is different from the initial
proclamation of martial law, to wit:
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may , in the
persist and public safety requires it . (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated above, in the initial declaration of martial law, it is the President as the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines that declares martial law for
a maximum period of sixty (60) days. Upon its declaration, it shall become immediately
effective. It is subject to a review by Congress within forty-eight (48) from its
declaration.
With respect to the extension of martial law, the last sentence of the rst
paragraph of Section 18 clearly states that Congress is empowered to extend the
duration of martial law. The President's only role in such an extension is that he is the
one who initiates it. Notably, even if the President initiates the said extension, it is not
immediately effective. It is only when Congress grants the extension, after determining
that invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it, that it becomes
operational. Evidently, the power of Congress is more potent than that of the President
when it comes to the extension of martial law. Stated differently, when there is an
extension of the duration of martial law, the Constitution confers on Congress the
authority to grant or deny it. If Congress does not nd any basis to grant the requested
extension, then it shall not exceed the sixty (60) day period of its initial declaration.
Congress' power to extend the proclamation of martial law is observed in the
following Constitutional deliberations:
MR. REGALADO
initiative of the President this time, with the prior concurrence of Congress.
So, the period of extension has already been taken into account by both
the Executive and the Legislative, unlike the rst situation where the
President acted alone without prior concurrence. The reason for the
limitation in the first does not apply to the extension. 2 1
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SUAREZ
That is correct. I think the two of them must have to agree on the period;
but it is theoretically possibly that when the President writes a note to the
Congress because it would be at the instance of the President that the
extension have to be granted by Congress, it is possible that the period for
the extension may be there. It is also possible that it may not be there. That
is the reason why we want to make it clear that there must be a
reasonable period for the extension . So, if my suggestion is not
acceptable to the Committee, may I request that a voting be held on it,
Madam President.
FR. BERNAS
Madam President, may I just propose something because I see the
problem. Suppose we were to say "or extend the same FOR A
PERIOD TO BE DETERMINED BY CONGRESS" — that gives
Congress a little exibility on just how long the extension should
be .
MR. OPLE
FR. BERNAS
Yes, participation of the President is there but by giving the nal
decision to Congress , we are also preserving the idea that the President
may not revoke what Congress has decided upon.
MR. OPLE
The reason for my concern, Madam President, is that when we put all of
these encumbrances on the President and Commander-in-Chief
during an actual invasion and rebellion , given an intractable
Congress that may be dominated by opposition parties, we may be
actually impelling the President to use the sword of Alexander to cut the
Gordian knot by just declaring a revolutionary government that sets him
free to deal with the invasion or the insurrection. That is the reason I am in
favor of the present formulation. However, if Commissioner Suarez insists
on his amendment, I do not think I will stand in the way. Thank you.
Madam President. 2 2
xxx xxx xxx
MR. CONCEPCION
If I may add a word. The one who will do the ghting is the executive but,
of course, it is expected that if the Congress wants to extend, it will extend
for the duration of the ghting. If the ghting goes on, I do not think it is
fair to assume that the Congress will refuse to extend the period, especially
since in this matter the Congress must act at the instance of the executive.
He is the one who is supposed to know how long it will take him
to ght. Congress may reduce it, but that is without prejudice to
his asking for another extension, if necessary . 2 3 (emphases
supplied)
The framers of the Constitution gave Congress exibility on the period of the
declaration of martial law. It was emphasized therein that the nal decision to extend
the said declaration rests with Congress. Whether the President states a speci c
period of extension or not, Congress ultimately decides on the said period. Until it
grants the extension, the sixty (60) day period of the initial declaration of martial law
prevails. In effect, by becoming the granting authority, Congress limits the President's
power to extend the period of martial law.
During the Constitution deliberations, it was recognized that there are many
limitations and encumbrances in the President's power to declare martial law.
Commissioner Ople even raised apprehension that the encumbrances of martial law
under the constitutional provision may compel the President to simply declare a
revolutionary government. However, such apprehension did not prevail because the
present wording of the Constitution grants Congress the ultimate authority to decide
whether the period of martial law should be extended. Manifestly, there is no speci c
period stated in the extension of the period of martial law because the Constitution
leaves it to Congress to decide the reasonable period for such an extension. In the
event that the President requires more time to quell a rebellion or invasion beyond the
granted period of extension, then his remedy is to ask for another extension from
Congress. Manifestly, as discussed by Commissioner Concepcion, the framers also
considered the possibility that there will be more than one (1) extension should the rst
extension be insufficient.
Thus, Congress has the prerogative to determine for itself the period of the
extension of martial law. In this case, it used the exibility granted to it by the
Constitution to determine that the reasonable period of extension of martial law over
Mindanao should be for one (1) year or until December 31, 2018. The petitioners cannot
deny the exibility of Congress in determining the extended period for martial law. They
should have focused on assailing the su ciency of the factual basis for extending the
period of martial law. However, as discussed supra, the petitioners failed to assail the
said factual basis. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, the
reasonable period of extension as determined by Congress must stand.
Extent of review of Congress
and the Supreme Court differs
The role of Congress in granting the extension of martial law is vital. Due to the
essential authority of Congress, it is proper to examine the review it can undertake to
determine the propriety of granting such extension initiated by the President. It was
thoroughly discussed in Lagman that the power of Congress to review a declaration of
martial law is independent from that of the Court. Congress has a greater scope of
review compared to the Court, to wit:
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding led by any citizen on the ground of lack of su cient factual basis.
On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
In reviewing the su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension, the Court considers only the information and data available to the
President prior to or at the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake
an independent investigation beyond the pleadings." On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but
likewise events supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court which does not
look into the absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed
below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy
of the facts presented before it.
In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only initiated by the ling of
a petition "in an appropriate proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand,
Congress' review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be activated
by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.
Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are
not only totally different but likewise independent from each other although
concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the nulli cation of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the Court to review can
be exercised independently from the power of revocation of Congress. 2 4
In this case, the President sent a letter dated December 8, 2017, to the Senate
President and House Speaker requesting further extension of the period of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao for an
additional year. The letter contained several grounds justifying the extension.
On December 12, 2017, the AFP o cials presented and explained the different
justi cations of the request for the extension of martial law before the Senate and the
House of Representatives. 2 5 On December 13, 2017, Congress held a joint session to
discuss whether the extension of martial law in Mindanao was warranted. Each
member of Congress was granted a maximum of three (3) minutes to explain his
allotted time pursuant to Section 7 of Rule IV of the Joint Session of Congress. 2 6 The
said three (3) minute rule excluded the time given to resource persons. After thorough
discussion and extensive debates, two hundred forty (240) members of Congress
a rmed that rebellion persists and that public safety requires the further extension of
martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus for one (1) year in
Mindanao.
I concur with the ponencia that Congress complied with its constitutional duty to
review the extension of martial law before granting the same. From the onset, the
Constitutional framers intended that the procedure of review by Congress under
Section 18 should be accelerated and simpli ed due to the pressing need of the
President and the people when there is actual invasion or rebellion and public safety
requires it, to wit:
FR. BERNAS
I quite realize that there is this recourse to the Supreme Court and there is a
time limit, but at the same time because of the extraordinary character of
this event when martial law is imposed, I would like to make it easier
for the representatives of the people to review this very
significant action taken by the President . 2 7 (emphasis supplied)
The three-minute rule provided for each member of Congress to speak before
the Joint Session is reasonable pursuant to the constitutional intent to accelerate the
proceedings for review under Section 18. The said congressional rule even excluded the
time allocated to resource speakers invited by Congress. To hold otherwise, where
each member of Congress is given an unlimited time to interpolate, will no longer serve
the purpose of expediently resolving the extension of martial law. Verily, as long as the
members of Congress are all given equal opportunity to voice their opinions, then they
can effectively review the significant action taken by the President.
Moreover, the procedure laid down by the Joint Session Rules of Congress is
pursuant to its power to determine its own rules of proceedings. 2 8 The rule-making
power of Congress is a grant of full discretionary authority in the formulation, adoption
and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally
exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. 2 9
Pursuant to this constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its
own rules, the Senate or the House of Representatives is at liberty to alter or modify
these rules at any time it may see t, subject only to the imperatives of quorum, voting
and publication. 3 0
Here, the petitioners failed to specify how Congress, in the joint session, violated
its own rules of procedure or how the said rules were violative of the right to due
process even though each member of Congress was given the opportunity to be heard.
Absent any evidence of arbitrariness, the proceedings during the joint session of
Congress on December 13, 2017 must be upheld. Pursuant thereto, Congress properly
issued the Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, 3 1 viz.:
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution[;]"
Fourth, the remnants of the Abu Sayaff Group in Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and
form of government with communist rule;
xxx xxx xxx
and the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole
Mindanao:
Now, therefore, be it Resolve by the Senate and the House of
Representatives in a Joint Session Assembled, To further extend Proclamation
No. 216, Series of 2017, entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas corpus in the Whole of
Mindanao" for a period of one (1) year from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018. 3 2
For failure of the petitioners to overcome the prima facie case establishing the
factual basis presented by the respondents in necessitating the extension of the period
of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole Mindanao
for one (1) year, I vote to DISMISS the consolidated petitions.
Footnotes
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 3-31; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 3-52; rollo (G.R. No. 236145),
pp. 9-41; rollo (G.R. No. 236155), pp. 3-46.
2. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 123-124.
3. Id. at 125-126.
4. Id. at 130-131.
5. G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 and 231774.
6. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 34-35.
7. Id. at 42-45.
8. Id. at 42.
9. Id. at 36-40.
10. Id. at 40.
11. Id. at 41.
12. Id. at 42-45.
13. Id. at 467-468.
14. Id. at 468.
15. Id. at 616-617; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 597-598; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 779-781.
16. Rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 593-594.
17. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 780-782.
18. G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 595-597.
19. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 624-625.
20. Rollo (G.R. No. 236155), pp. 26-27; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 812-813.
21. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 778-779.
22. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 631-636.
23. Rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 791-794.

24. Rollo (G.R. No. 236155), pp. 26-28.
25. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), p. 779; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 785-788.

27. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 19-20, 26-27; rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 552-556.
28. Rollo (G.R. No. 236155), pp. 33-34.
30. Rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 813-816.
31. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 12-17; rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 540-544; rollo (G.R. No.
236061), pp. 10-13; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 540-543.
32. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 31-37.
33. Rollo (G.R. No. 236155), pp. 32-35.
34. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 20-22; rollo (G.R. No. 236145), p. 38; rollo (G.R. No. 236155), pp.
32-35.
35. Rollo (G.R. No. 236061), p. 20; rollo (G.R. No. 236145), p. 39; rollo (G.R. No. 236145), p. 791;
rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 34-35.
236061), pp. 601-609; rollo (G.R. No. 236155), p. 33.
38. Either (a) to remove from the allegiance to the Government or its laws: (i) the territory of the
Philippines or any part thereof; or (ii) any body of land, naval, or other armed forces; or
(b) to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
and prerogatives.
39. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 24-26, 32-37; rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 784-787.
236145), pp. 39-40; rollo (G.R. No. 236155), p. 33; rollo (G.R. No. 236061), p. 808.
41. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 787-791.
44. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 29-30.
45. Rollo (G.R. No. 236061), pp. 32-33.
46. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 747-748.
47. Id. at 745-747.
48. Section 47. Effect of judgments or nal orders. — The effect of a judgment or nal order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or nal order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto.
49. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 772-774.
50. Id. at 753-755.
51. Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 18.
52. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 748-753.
53. Id. at 259-265.
54. Id. at 256.
55. Id. at 797-801.
56. Id. at 254-257.
57. Id. at 248-254.
58. Id. at 793-797.
59. Id. at 771-780.
60. Id. at 759.
61. Id. at 259-265.
62. Id. at 280.
63. Id. at 765.

64. Id. at 763-768.
65. Id. at 769-770.
66. Id. at 806-807.
67. Id. at 808-811.
68. Id. at 815.
69. Id. at 820-822.
70. Id. at 823-825.
71. Id. at 281-282.
72. Id. at 282-284.
73. Id. at 827, 831-832.
74. Id. at 825-830.
75. Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without
the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the o cial acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
76. CLT Realty Development Corp. v. Hi-grade Feeds Corp., et al., 768 Phil. 149, 163 (2015).
77. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 308-309.
78. Rubrico, et al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., 627 Phil. 37, 62 (2010).
79. 627 Phil. 37 (2010).
80. Id. at 62-63, citing Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 764 (2006).
81. 621 Phil. 212 (2009).
82. Id. at 221-222.
83. See Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole, 660 Phil. 202 (2011).
84. People v. Go, et al., 744 Phil. 194, 199 (2014).
85. Valdez-Tallorin v. Heirs of Juanito Tarona, 620 Phil. 268, 274 (2009).
87. G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
88. See Spouses Antonio v. Sayman Vda. De Monje, 646 Phil. 90 (2010).
89. See Sps. Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Devt., Inc., et al., 683 Phil. 72, 106 (2008).
91. Padilla v. Congress, supra note 87.

93. SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
94. SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or a rm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may
require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of
the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simpli ed and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all o cials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil
Service Law.
9 5 . Section 10, Article VII (Executive Department) of the 1935 Constitution states: "The
President shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, and,
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it,
he may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under Martial Law."
96. Section 12, Article IX (The Prime Minister and the Cabinet) of the 1973 Constitution reads:
"The Prime Minister shall be commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines,
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, or
rebellion, or imminent danger thereof when the public safety requires, it he may suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law."
98. Record of the Constitutional Commission (1986), Vol. II, pp. 508-509.
99. 660 Phil. 202 (2011).
100. 343 Phil. 42 (1997).
101. Id. at 61.
102. 598 Phil. 981 (2009).
103. See Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato Puno in Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers & Investigations, 586 Phil. 135, 286 (2008).
104. See Malonzo, et al. v. Hon. Zamora, et al., 380 Phil. 845 (2000).
105. Representative Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., et al. v. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez, et al. ,
G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017.
106. Id.

107. Transcript of the Plenary Proceedings of the Joint Session of the Congress of the
Philippines, December 13, 2017, pp. 13-14.
108. Bolos v. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, October 20, 2010.
109. <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com> (visited February 4, 2018).
110. <https://www.merriam-webster.com> (visited February 4, 2018).
111. Records of the Constitutional Commission (1986), Vol. II, p. 732.
112. Co-authored with Bryan Bryan A. Garner, pp. 4-6.
113. People v. Lacson, 459 Phil. 330, 348-349 (2003).
114. Record of the Constitutional Commission (1986), pp. 508-512.
115. See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 18.
117. Supra note 18.
118. <https://www.merriam-webster.com> (visited January 22, 2018).
119. Id.
120. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 37-38.
121. Id. at 44.
122. AFP's "Briefing" Narrative (January 17, 2017 Oral Arguments), pp. 6-7.
123. Id. at 8.
124. Id. at 3. Transcript of the Oral Argument, December 13, 2017, p. 54.
125. Rollo (G.R. No. 236061), p. 12; rollo (G.R. No. 236145), p. 13.
126. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), p. 38.
127. In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil v. Ramos , 265 Phil. 325,
336 (1990).
Philippines, December 13, 2017, pp. 26 and 43.
129. 158-A Phil. 1 (1974).
130. Id. at 48-49.
132. Transcript of the Oral Arguments, January 17, 2018, pp. 117-118.
133. Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 18, citing the President's Report to Congress.
134. Transcript of the Oral Argument, January 17, 2018, p. 56.
135. Transcript of the December 13, 2017 Plenary Proceedings of the Joint Session of the
Congress of the Philippines, p. 26.
136. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), p. 38.
138. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 38-39.
140. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 39-40.
141. Records of Constitutional Commission (1986), Vol. II, p. 509.
142. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 37-38, 43.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 60.
146. Id. at 62.
147. Id. at 60-61.
148. Id. at 54.
149. Id. at 60.
150. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), p. 44.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), pp. 38, 43.

156. Id.
157. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), p. 38; Transcript of the Oral Argument, January 17, 2018, p. 65.
158. Id. at 43.
160. Id. at 52, 61-63.
161. Transcript of the Oral Argument, January 17, 2018, pp. 55, 66.
162. Id. at 56-58.
163. Rollo (G.R. No. 235935), p. 43.
164. Id. at 43.
166. Id. at 66-67.
167. Id. at 67.
168. Id.
Philippines, December 13, 2017, p. 20.
172. Id. at 55.
173. Id. at 131.
174. See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 18.
175. Transcript of the Oral Argument, January 17, 2018, pp. 95, 97, 100, 102, 108-109 and 116.
176. Id. at 103.

177. Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; A
COMMENTARY, 1996 ed., p. XXXIV, citing Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the
United States 64 (1893); 1 Schwartz, The Powers of Government 1 (1963).
178. Angara v. The Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
179. Justice Scalia, READING THE LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS.
180. Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 2002 ed., p. 12.
181. See Justice Presbitero Velasco's Dissenting Opinion in Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo.
182. 684 Phil. 526 (2012).
183. Rollo (G.R. No. 236145), pp. 788-789.

184. Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES, A COMMENTARY, 2009 ed., p.
903.
185. Records of the Constitutional Commission (1986), Vol. II, p. 494.
186. See Republic v. Roque, 718 Phil. 294 (2013).
187. 1987 Constitution, Article III.

188. 1987 Constitution, Section 3, Article II.
189. 1987 Constitution, Section 11, Article II.
190. Id. at 485.
191. G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001, 357 SCRA 756.
192. Id. at 763-764.
193. AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSONS ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING
AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF.
195. Section 6.
196. Section 7.
197. THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF AMPARO.
198. THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA.
199. The United Nations General Assembly as adopted on December 10, 1948.
200. <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf> (visited
January 31, 2018.)
201. Barbieto v. CA, et al., 619 Phil. 819, 840 (2009).
Philippines, December 13, 2017, p. 67.
203. SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. — A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established: (a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually; (b) That the commission, continuance or
nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably
work injustice to the applicant; or (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or
acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the
action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
204. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Santiago, 548 Phil. 314, 329 (2007).
205. First Global Realty and Development Corporation v. San Agustin , 427 Phil. 593, 601
(2002).
206. Preysler, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 527 Phil. 129, 136 (2006).
207. Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, 485 Phil. 533 (2004).
208. St. James College of Parañaque v. Equitable PCI Bank, 641 Phil. 452 (2010).
209. ECE Realty and Development, Inc. v. Mandap, 742 Phil. 164, 171 (2014).
210. Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corporation v. Philippine National Bank, 574 Phil.
340, 346 (2008).
211. Tomawis v. Tabao-Caudang, 559 Phil. 498, 500 (2007).
212. Duvaz Corporation v. Export and Industry Bank, 551 Phil. 382, 391 (2007).
213. 757 Phil. 454 (2015).
214. Id. at 473.
215. Consolidated Industrial Gases, Inc. v. Alabang Medical Center, 721 Phil. 155, 180 (2013).
216. 473 Phil. 27 (2004).
217. Id. at 57-58.
SERENO, C.J., dissenting:
1. Decision, p. 34.
2. Id. at 57-59. The ponencia justifies this preemptive approach by using the language in the
amicus curiae brief of Fr. Joaquin Bernas in Fortun v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
3. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, 4 July 2017.
4. TSN, 14 June 2017, p. 122.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
x x x You earlier said that there is not much difference between the martial law powers
of the president and his calling out powers under the present Constitution. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
What is that difference?

It's like a sentence, instead of a period there's an exclamation point, Your Honor.4
xxx xxx xxx
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Psychological?
Psychological probably. It's an exclamation point.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
"Gulpi de gulat?"
Yes, Your Honor. So you better listen to me now because I'm imposing martial law. (TSN,
14 June 2017, 117-122).
5. Id. at 138.
I [am] very much enlightened by the new phrase that you have pronounced this
afternoon which was martial law. As we understand it is the calling out powers on
steroids.
Thank you, Your Honor.
6. Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary 898 (2009).
7. 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
8. No relation to the German religious leader Martin Luther (circa 1483).
9. Jason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36
Conn. L. Rev. 1397, 1403 (2004).
10. Luther, 48 U.S. at 45-47.
11. Id. at 45.
12. Id. at 45-46.
13. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
14. Id. at 127.

15. Id.
16. Weida, supra at 1412.
17. Id.
18. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
19. Id. at 85.
20. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
21. Id. at 399.
22. William Feldman, Theories of Emergency Powers: A Comparative Analysis of American
Martial Law and the French State of Siege, 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 1021, 1034 (2005).
23. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 399-400.
24. Feldman, supra at 1034.
25. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
26. Id. at 325-326.
27. J.W. Brabner Smith, Martial Law and the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 30 Geo. L.J. 697, 697
(1942).
28. Bernas, supra 903.
29. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 403-404.
30. Id. at 390-391.
31. Id. at 404.
32. Id. at 399-401.
33. Id. at 399.
34. Duncan, 327 U.S. at 324.
35. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 402 (29 July 1986).
36. Id. at 412.
37. Lagman v. Medialdea, supra.
38. Dissenting Opinion, CJ Sereno, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra at 7.
39. In re Lansang v. Garcia, 149 Phil. 547 (1971).
40. Dissenting Opinion, CJ Sereno, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra at 8.
41. TSN, 17 January 2018, pp. 136-153.
42. Violation of Civil and Political Rights in Mindanao under the Rodrigo Duterte Government,
May 23, 2017 to November 30, 2017, Based on reports gathered by Karapatan
(Document "b" attached to Compliance dated 17 January 2018 submitted by Petitioners
Cullamat, et al.).
During the oral arguments, General Guerrero admitted that there is at least one
documented case of looting committed by a military personnel:
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Were there cases of abuses committed by military personnel and PNP personnel, as far
as you know, whether it be a matter of torture, or killing, or looting, or destruction of
property not arising from the war in Marawi?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
There were reports about looting, Sir, and about maltreatment but all of these were
investigated and so far, Sir, there are records there is only one case of human rights
violation and that is of looting that was filed against one.
JUSTICE TIJAM:
Under existing rules and regulation governing the Martial Law in Maguindanao, are
these erring culpable military personnel exempt from liability?
GENERAL GUERRERO:
No, Sir, no, Your Honor. (TSN, 17 January 2018, pp. 75-76).
44. Id. at 509.
45. Id.
46. Black's Law Dictionary 1138 (6th Ed. 1990).

4 7 . Merriam-Webster.com, 2018 <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/determine>
(visited 26 January 2018).
48. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 508-509 (31 July 1986).
49. Id. at 509.

50. Black's Law Dictionary, supra at 1265.
51. Id.
53. Id. at 509.
54. Id. at 510.
55. Dissenting Opinion, CJ Sereno, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra.
57. Id. at 61.
58. Lagman v. Medialdea, supra at 7.
59. Id.
60. Resolution of Both Houses Further Extending Proclamation No. 216, Series of 2017, Entitled
"Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" for a Period of One (1) Year from January 1, 2018 to
December 31, 2018.
61. Entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Whole of Mindanao" dated 23 May 2017.
62. Entitled "Declaring the Termination of Peace Negotiations with the National Democratic
Front-Communist Party of the Philippines-The New People's Army."
63. Entitled "Declaring the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)-New People's Army (NPA)
as a Designated/Identified Terrorist Organization Under Republic Act No. 10168."
64. Letter of AFP General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero, pp. 3-4.
66. Id. at 61.
67. Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated 13 December 2017, p. 2.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 773-774 (18 July 1986).
71. Letter of President Duterte to the Senate of the Philippines and House of Representatives,
dated 8 December 2017, p. 3.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Letter of AFP General Rey Leonardo B. Guerrero to the President through the Secretary of
National Defense, p. 2.
75. Id.
76. TSN, 17 January 2018, pp. 190-193.
78. Id. at 54-58.

79. TSN, 17 January 2018, pp. 176-177.
CARPIO, J., dissenting:
1. Annex "D" of Monsod Petition; Annex "5" of OSG Consolidated Comment.
2. On 23 May 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017,
declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ in the whole of
Mindanao. During a Special Joint Session on 22 July 2017, Congress extended
Proclamation No. 216 until 31 December 2017.
3. Annex "D" of Monsod Petition; Annex "5" of OSG Consolidated Comment.
4. 711 U.S. 4 Wall. 2 (1866).
5. Memorandum of petitioner Rosales, pp. 15-16. See Memorandum of petitioners Monsod, et
al., p. 46.
6. Memorandum of petitioners Monsod, et al., pp. 46, 50-51.
7. Ex Parte Milligan, supra note 4, at 127.
8. Memorandum of petitioner Rosales, p. 16.
9. TSN, 16 January 2018, pp. 107-109.
10. The portion of the records read:
MR. REGALADO: Madam President, following that is the clause "extend the same if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it." That by itself suggests a
period within which the suspension shall be extended, if the invasion is still going
on . But there is already the cutoff of 60-day period. Do they have to meet all over again
and agree to extend the same? (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, 31
July 1986)
11. Annex "A" of Rosales Petition.
12. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
1 3 . Eimor P. Santos, Duterte declares liberation of Marawi
<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/17/Marawi-liberation-Duterte.html> [last
accessed 2 February 2018]. See also Claire Jiao and Lara Tan, Fighting in Marawi City is
over <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/23/Marawi-crisis.html> [last accessed
2 February 2018]; Trisha Macas and Raffy Tima, Duterte declares Marawi City is free
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/629820/duterte-declares-marawi-
city-is-free/story/> [last accessed 2 February 2018]; Allan Nawal, Jeoffrey Maitem, Richel
Umel and Divina Suson, Marawi 'liberated' from terrorists but battle drags on
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/938592/president-duterte-marawi-city-liberated-terrorists>
[last accessed 2 February 2018]; AFP, AP and Francis Wake eld, Battle of Marawi ends
<https://news.mb.com.ph/2017/10/24/battle-of-marawi-ends/> [last accessed 2
February 2018]; Catherine S. Valente, Marawi free <http://www.manilatimes.net/marawi-
free/357155/> [last accessed 2 February 2018]; Rosette Adel, Duterte declares Marawi
freed from terrorists <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/10/17/1749752/duterte-
declares-marawi-freed-terrorists> [last accessed 2 February 2018]; PTV News, President
Duterte declares liberation of Marawi City <https://ptvnews.ph/president-duterte-
declares-liberation-marawi-city/> [last accessed 2 February 2018].
1 4 . Claire Jiao and Lara Tan, Fighting in Marawi City is over

<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/23/Marawi-crisis.html> [last accessed 2
February 2018]. See also AFP, AP and Francis Wake eld, Battle of Marawi ends
February 2018].
1 5 . Claire Jiao and Lara Tan, Fighting in Marawi City is over
<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/23/Marawi-crisis.html> [last accessed 2
February 2018].
1 6 . Allan Nawal, Jeoffrey Maitem, Richel Umel and Divina Suson, Marawi liberated' from
terrorists but battle drags on <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/938592/president-duterte-
marawi-city-liberated-terrorists> [last accessed 2 February 2018].
1 7 . AFP, AP and Francis Wake eld, Battle of Marawi ends
February 2018].
18. Memorandum of Lagman Petition, p. 14.
19. Annex C of Lagman Petition.

20. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 412 (1987).
21. G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
VELASCO, JR., J., concurring:
1. G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017.
2. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
3. See pp. 29-31 of the ponencia.
4. 222 Phil. 170, 180 (1985).
5. 279 Phil. 266-344 (1991).
6. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
7. People v. Dasig, G.R. No. 100231, April 28, 1993.
8. AFP's briefing presented during the January 17, 2018 Oral Arguments, pp. 6-7.
9. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455 etc., August 25, 1994.
10. See Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila ,
128 Phil. 473-484 (1967).
11. Cawaling, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 420 Phil. 524-537 (2001).
12. Id. Emphasis supplied.
13. Spouses Lim v. People, 438 Phil. 749-756 (2002).
14. See also Board of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187-120 (1996).
15. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19 (25 U.S.); Vanderheyden v. Young, 11 Johns., N.Y., 150, cited in
Barcelona v. Baker, Jr., 5 Phil. 87-120 (1905).
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
1. G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
2. Id.
3. 158-A Phil. 1, 48-49 (1974).
4. Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017.
BERSAMIN, J., concurring:
1. G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017.
DEL CASTILLO, J., concurring:
1. Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Resolution of Both Houses No. 4, dated December 13, 2017.
5. Supra note 1.
6. Memorandum for Petitioners Rosales, et al., pp. 14-16 and Memorandum for Petitioners
Monsod, et al., pp. 50-54.
7. Id.
8. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 398 (July 29, 1986).
9. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 401-402 (July 29, 1986).
10. Supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Paragraph 4 of Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
13. Supra note 9 at 402.
14. Supra note 1.
15. Memorandum for Petitioners Monsod, et al., pp. 51-54.
16. Memorandum for Petitioners Rosales, et al., pp. 17-19.
17. Bayan v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 657 (2000).
18. Supra note 1.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J., concurring:
1. There are four (4) petitions led assailing the martial law extension. The Petition in G.R. No.
235935 was led on December 27, 2017, while the Petition in G.R. No. 236061 was led
on January 8, 2018. Petitions in G.R. No. 236145 and G.R. No. 236155 were both led on
January 12, 2018.
2. Entitled "RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES FURTHER EXTENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 216,
SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED "DECLARING A STATE OF MARTIAL LAW AND
SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THE WHOLE OF
MINDANAO" FOR A PERIOD OF ONE (1) YEAR FROM JANUARY l, 2018 TO DECEMBER
31, 2018."
3. See Annex "A" of Memorandum for the Petitioner in G.R. No. 236145 dated January 24, 2018.
4. Issued on May 23, 2017.
5. See Annex "1" of the Comment of respondents dated January 8, 2018.
6. See Decision in Lagman v. Medialdea , G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, and 231774, July 4, 2017.
The Resolution on the motion for reconsideration was promulgated on December 5,
2017.
7. See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, id., p. 22.
8. See Comment of respondents dated January 8, 2018; pp. 8-10; and Memorandum for the
Respondents dated January 24, 2018, pp. 38-40.
9. Proclamation No. 216 was to end on July 22, 2017, or the last day of the sixty (60)-day
period provided under Section 18, Article VII. Pursuant to Resolution of Both Houses No.
2 dated July 22, 2017, Proclamation No. 216 was originally extended until December 31,
2017.
10. Entitled "RESOLUTION OF BOTH HOUSES EXTENDING UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2017
PROCLAMATION NO. 216, SERIES OF 2017, ENTITLED "DECLARING A STATE OF
MARTIAL LAW AND SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
IN THE WHOLE OF MINDANAO."
11. See Annex "B" of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935.
12. See discussions in the Petitions: G.R. No. 235935, pp. 20-25; and G.R. No. 236061, pp. 28-
30.
13. THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Azcuna is recognized.
MR. AZCUNA. Thank you, Madam President.
I would like to offer an amendment to Section 15, line 7 of page 7. After the word "or,"
insert a comma (,) and add the phrase: AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENT, so that
the amended portion will read: "may revoke such proclamation or suspension which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President, or AT THE INSTANCE OF THE
PRESIDENT extend the same if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
May we know the reaction of the Committee? The reason for this, Madam President, is
that the extension should not merely be an act of Congress but should be requested by
the President. Any extension of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
o f habeas corpus should have the concurrence of both the President and Congress.
Does the Committee accept my amendment?
MR. REGALADO. The Committee accepts that amendment because it will, at the same
time, solve the concern of Commissioner Suarez, aside from the fact that this will now
be a joint executive and legislative act .
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. May I just pose a question to the Committee in connection with the Suarez
amendment? Earlier Commissioner Regalado said that that [sic] point was going to be a
collective judgment between the President and the Congress. Are we departing from that
now in favor of giving Congress the plenipotentiary power to determine the period?
FR. BERNAS. Not really, Madam President, because Congress would be doing this
in consultation with the President , and the President would be outvoted by about
300 Members.

MR. OPLE. Yes, but still the idea is to preserve the principle of collective
judgment of that point upon the expiration of the 60 days when, upon his own initiative,
the President seeks for an extension of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the participation of the President is there but by giving the
final decision to Congress , we are also preserving the idea that the President may not
revoke what Congress has decided upon. (II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION,
507-509 [July 31, 1986]; emphases and underscoring supplied)
14. See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 68.
15. II RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, 508 (July 31, 1986).
16. Id. at 509.
17. See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, pp. 16 and 18.
1 8 . Acronym of the group's full Arabic name, al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq wa al-Sham ,
translated as "Islamic State in Iraq and Syria." (See Letter to Congress of the President
dated July 18, 2017, Annex "D" of the Petition in G.R. No. 236145).
19. See Letter dated December 8, 2017 of the President; Annex "E" of the Petition in G.R. No.
236145, p. 2.
20. See id. at 2-3.
21. Ponencia, p. 40.
22. See Memorandum for the Respondents dated January 24, 2018, p. 30.
23. Statement of AFP Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Major General Fernando Trinidad
during a Power Point briefing in the Oral Arguments, TSN, January 17, 2018, pp. 58-59.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 60.
26. Petition (G.R. No. 235935), p. 4; Petition (G.R. No. 236061), p. 10; Petition (G.R. No. 236145),
p. 5; and Petition (G.R. No. 236155), p. 12.
27. See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 16.
30. WHEREAS, this recent attack shows the capability of the Maute group and other rebel
groups to sow terror, and cause death and damage to property not only in Lanao del Sur
but also in other parts of Mindanao. (See Proclamation No. 216.)
33. See my Separate Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 6, p. 12.
34. See id. at 20.
35. See id. at 21.
36. See Letter dated December 8, 2017 of the President, Annex "E" of the Petition in G.R. No.
236145, p. 5.
3 7 . See Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017, Annex "A" of the
Memorandum for the Petitioner in G.R. No. 236145.
38. See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea ,
supra note 6, p. 20; emphasis and underscoring supplied.
40. Id. at 50-53.
41. See Petition (G.R. No. 235935), p. 4; Petition (G.R. No. 236061), p. 10; Petition (G.R. No.
236145), p. 5; and Petition (G.R. No. 236155), p. 12.
42. General [Rey Leonardo] Guerrero:
Thank you, Your Honor. If I may be allowed to respond[.]
Yes, Your Honor, it has been a challenge[.] [I]t's been challenging to answer to [sic] your
questions propounded here before me because, clearly, Your Honor, what is expected of
me is to try to dissect de nitions of sections about how the military operates[,] [w]hen in
truth and in fact, Sir, the military operates in a manner that is hard to explain to legal
minds, [and] to people from the other professions. We based our decisions partly on
information that we gather[.] [I]n some instances, [they] are imperfect. We take risks [—]
calculated risks, and normally we also rely on our gut feel, which is for many people
probably would not understand. But our gut feel is based on our years of experience in
the eld, in combat[,] or we make decisions in a split of a second. Our decision could
necessarily result in the loss of lives, destruction of property. This afternoon, Your
Honors, we presented to you the reasons why we [are] recommending for the extension
of martial law. We provided you with the factual basis of the existence of rebellion in
Mindanao. And as to the powers that you are referring to, the powers that we need, it is
upon you, what powers you will give us. We are not asking for any powers, Your Honor.
But clearly[,] with the implementation of martial law, you have been abled us, you have
been able to provide us with the much needed support that we have been longing for, for
us to be successful in our campaign and we have done that in Marawi. And if you will
allow us, we will continue to do that and nish our job. We are not asking for any extra
powers, Your Honors.
xxx xxx xxx
What we are asking is for you to trust us[, t]he people in Marawi, the people in
Mindanao[, t]hat we have been able to talk to clearly understand the situation of the
military in so far as our performance of our mission is concerned. We hope that your will
also understand our situation. x x x. (TSN, Oral Arguments dated July 17, 2018, pp. 157-
158.)
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
1. As quoted in SUSAN L. CARRUTHERS, THE MEDIA AT WAR 82 (2nd ed., 2011).
2. As quoted in JOHN R. SULER, PSYCHOLOGY OF THE DIGITAL AGE: HUMANS BECOME
ELECTRIC 358 (2016).
3. G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
4. Respondent's Memorandum, p. 2.
5. Respondent's Memorandum, Annex D.
6. Lagman Petition, Annex B.
7. Lagman Petition, Annex C.
8. Lagman Petition, Annex C-1.
9. Lagman Petition, Annex C-2.

10. Lagman Petition, Annex C.
11. Representative Lagman's Memorandum, Annex G.
12. CONST., Art., VII, sec. 18.
13. Representative Lagman's Memorandum , Annex G. Rule V, Section 6, Rules of the Joint
Session of Congress on the Call of the President to Further Extend the Period of
Proclamation No. 216, Series of 217.
14. Representative Lagman's Memorandum , Annex G. Rule V, Section 7, Rules of the Joint
Session of Congress on the Call of the President to Further Extend the Period of
Proclamation No. 216, Series of 217.
15. TSN dated January 16, 2018, pp. 58-60.
16. Lagman v. Pimentel III , docketed as G.R. No. 235935; Cullamat v. Duterte , docketed as G.R.
No. 236061, Rosales v. Duterte, docketed as G.R. No. 236145; and Monsod v. Pimentel III,
docketed as G.R. No. 236155.
17. TSN, January 17, 2018, p. 51.
18. CONST., art. VII, sec. 18 provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a
vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress,
if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding led by any citizen, the
su ciency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant
the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment
of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
19. CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
20. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017,
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
21. MALOLOS CONST., Art. 65.
25. Phil. Bill of 1902, sec. 5.
27. Phil. Autonomy Act, sec. 21.
28. Phil. Autonomy Act, sec. 21.
29. 1935 CONST., sec. 10, par. 2.
30. 91 Phil. 882 (1952) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc].
31. Id. at 887.
32. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017, <
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july20l7/231658.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
33. Lansang v. Garcia, 149 Phil. 547, 586 (1971) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc].
35. 158-A Phil. 1 (1974) [Per C.J. Makalintal, En Banc].
36. 206 Phil. 392 (1983) [Per J. De Castro, En Banc].
37. Id. at 431-432.
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer. html?
39. 684 Phil. 526 (2012) [Per J. Abad, En Banc].
40. Id. at 557.

file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> 20 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658.pdf> 19 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
43. Id.
44. Id. at 20.
45. Id. at 11.
46. J.V. Capua, The Early History of Martial Law in England from the Fourteenth Century to the
Petition of Right, 36 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 152 (1977).
47. 327 U.S. 304 (1946) [Per J. Black].
48. C.J. Stone, Concurring Opinion in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 355 (1946) [Per. J.
Black] citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) [Per J. Taney].
49. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2-142 (1866) [Per J. Davis].
50. Id. at 127.
5 1 . PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY, Evolution of the Revolution,
<http://malacanang.gov.ph/7824-evolution-of-the-revolution/> (last accessed on June
22, 2017).
52. Ambeth Ocampo, Martial Law in 1896, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, December 18, 2009,
<https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/philippine-daily-
inquirer/20091218/283180079571432> (last accessed June 22, 2017).
53. Id.
54. Proc. No. 29 (1944).
55. Id.
56. Proc. No. 30 (1944).
57. PRESIDENTIAL MUSEUM AND LIBRARY, Dr. Jose P. Laurel as President of the Second
Philippine Republic, <http://malacanang.gov.ph/5237-dr-jose-p-laurel-as-president-of-
the-second-philippine-republic/#_edn7> (last accessed July 3, 2017).
58. Proc. No. 30 (1944).
59. Proc. No. 1081 (1972).
61. Id. at 32-35.
62. Lagman Petition, Annex C, p. 2.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 5.
65. TSN dated January 17, 2018, p. 68.
68. RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, sec. 1.
69. 281 Phil. 487-508 (1991) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
70. Id. at 495-496.
71. Lagasca v. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376-381 (1947) [Per J. Perfecto, First Division].
72. People v. Dunig y Rodriguez, 289 Phil. 949-956 (1992) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
73. Joaquin v. Navarro, 99 Phil. 367-373 (1956) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
74. People v. Mamalias, 385 Phil. 499-514 (2000) [Per J. Puno, First Division].
75. People v. Balanon, 304 Phil. 79-87 (1994) [Per J. Bellosillo, First Division].
7 6 . G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017 <sc.judiciary.gov.ph?pdf?web?viewer.html?
file=jurisprudence/2017/214064.pdf> [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
77. Id. at 7.
78. 722 Phil. 743-763 (2013) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].
79. 543 Phil. 436-483 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division].
80. 699 Phil. 205-235 (2012) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division].
81. 317 Phil. 897 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division].
82. Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea , G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017,
le=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658_leonen.pdf> 54-55 [Per J. Del Castillo, En
Banc].
83. Id.
84. Id. at 56.
86. Monsod Petition, p. 13.

87. Rosales Petition, Annex E, p. 2.
88. Lagman Petition, Annex C-2, p. 2.
89. Rosales Petition, Annex E, pp. 2-3.
91. Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slide 16.
102. See OSG Annex in Lagman v. Medialdea , Signi cant Atrocities in Mindanao Prior to the
Marawi City Incident.
103. See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea , G.R. No. 231648, July 4,
2017 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658_leonen.pdf> [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
104. Martial Law Extension Brie ng Powerpoint Presentation, slide 33. The slide shows a total
membership of 185 individuals as of December 2017. However, the membership of local
terror groups are only 137, the remaining 48 are accounted for as foreign terrorist
fighters.
le=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658_leonen.pdf> 75-76 [Per J. Del Castillo, En
Banc].
107. Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slides 26-28.
108. Martial Law Extension Brie ng Powerpoint Presentation, slide 21. The original states,
"both factions still reinforces each other."
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/231658_leonen.pdf> 76 [Per J. Del Castillo, En Banc].
114. Id. at 74.
115. Id. at 75.

123. Proc. No. 216 (2017).
124. Proc. No. 216 (2017).
125. See OSG Memorandum in Lagman v. Medialdea, pp. 5-8.
127. Rosales Petition, Annex D.
128. Id. at 2-3.
129. Id. at 3.
130. Rosales Petition, Annex E, pp. 4-5.
132. Id. at 225-226.
134. United States Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ,
238, June 2017 <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf> (last accessed
Feb. 6, 2018).
135. Lagman Petition, Annex C, p. 4.
139. Cullamat Petition, p. 19 citing National Security Policy, 2017-2022 National Security Policy
for Change and Well-Being of the Filipino People,
<http://www.nsc.gov.ph/attachments/article/NSP/NSP-2017-2022.pdf> (last visited
February 7, 2018)
142. Martial Law Extension Briefing Powerpoint Presentation, slides 66, 70-71.
144. Brian Michael Jenkins, Fifteen Years on, Where are We in the "War on Terror"? , 9 CTC
SENTINEL 7, 10-11 (September, 2016).
145. CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism, pp. 40-42.
146. Id. at 40.
147. Id. at 45.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 40.
150. Id. at 59-60.
151. Id. at 80.
152. Id. at 82.
153. Id. at 93.

154. Id. at 93-94.
155. Id. at 119.
156. 41 INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT, POST-MARAWI LESSONS FROM
DETAINED EXTREMISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES 3 (2017).
157. Id. at 4.
158. Id. at 10-11.
159. G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017, <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/227757.pdf> [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
160. Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Baguilat v. Alvarez , G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017
le=/jurisprudence/2017/july2017/227757_leonen.pdf> 36-39 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En
Banc].
161. Memorandum by Representative Lagman, Annex G.
163. Memorandum by Representative Lagman, pp. 5-6.
JARDELEZA, J., dissenting:
1. Hereinafter "Separate Opinion."
2. G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771, & 231774, July 4, 2017.
3. Separate Opinion, pp. 4-13, 18-23.

4. Separate Opinion, pp. 13-18.
5. Id.
6. Office of the Solicitor General Memorandum, p. 34.
7. English Oxford Living Dictionaries <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/de nition/scale> (last
accessed February 6, 2018).
8. Id.
9. RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 42 (July 29, 1986).
10. RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 43 (July 30, 1986).
11. In re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230, 237-238 (1948). The Court held reporter Parazo in contempt for
his refusal to reveal the sources for his article reporting leakage in the 1948 Bar
Examinations. Invoking Republic Act No. 53, which provides that reporters cannot be
compelled to reveal their con dential sources unless "such revelation is demanded by
the interest of the state," Parazo contended that the phrase "interest of the state" is
confined to cases involving the "security of the state" or "public safety ." Since concerns
regarding the alleged leakage do not qualify as national security matters, Parazo argued
that he cannot be compelled to reveal the source of his news information. The Court,
however, found that while "security of the state" and "public safety" to be
"synonymous phrases" which involve matters of "national security," the term "interest
of the state" referred to a much broader concept which includes "matters of national
importance in which the whole state and nation, x x x is interested or would be affected,
x x x" such as protection of the integrity of the bar examinations and maintenance of the
high standards for entry into the legal profession. (Emphasis supplied.)
12. Id. at 239-241.
13. Luque v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-22545, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 408, 423. Thus, the Court
there upheld the Public Service Commission's imposition of "measures calculated to
promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares" by
regulating the number of provincial buses and jeepneys allowed to enter Manila.
14. Edu v. Ericta , G.R. No. L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481, 489. The Court refused to
sustain a challenge to the Re ector Law which required, for registration purposes, the
installation of built-in reflectors and parking lights in vehicles. The Court therein held that
"to close one's eyes to the hazards of tra c in the evening x x x betrays lack of
concern for public safety. " (Emphasis supplied.)
See also Agustin v. Edu , G.R. No. L-49112, February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA 195, which dealt
with a challenge to a rule issued by the Land Transportation O ce requiring the
procurement and use of reflectorized triangular early warning devices.
15. In Uy Matia & Co. v. The City of Cebu , 93 Phil. 300, 304 (1953), the Court upheld the local
government's power to regulate and impose taxes and fees on copra warehouses on the
nding that it is an establishment likely to endanger the public safety and give rise to
con agrations or explosions: "[O]nce ignited, the re resulting therefrom, because of the
oil it contains, is di cult to put under control by water and to extinguish it the use of
chemicals would be necessary."
16. Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 121920, August 5,
2005, 466 SCRA 78, 87-89, citing Todd v. City of Troy , 61 N.Y. 506. The Court held a local
government unit liable for damages for its failure to "adopt measures to ensure public
safety against open canals, manholes, live wires and other similar hazards to life and
property" which resulted to injuries to a motorist. According to the Court, the
Municipality's obligation to constantly monitor road conditions to insure the safety of
motorists includes the duty "to see that they are kept in a reasonably safe condition for
public travel." (Emphasis supplied.)
17. Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways , G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490
SCRA 318, 349 & 343. The Court did not nd unreasonable the regulation which
prohibited motorcycles from traversing toll ways. The Government there argued that the
presence of motorcycles in the tollways "will compromise safety and tra c
considerations." The Court upheld the Government's position, stating that " [p]ublic
interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do
not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all
forms of transport could use it." (Emphasis supplied.)
18. Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corporation , G.R.
No. 182944, November 9, 2016, 808 SCRA 53, 57-58. The Court held that the DPWH's act
of removing and con scating billboards and signs which it determined to be "hazardous
and pose imminent danger to life, health, safety and property of the general public" serve
the overarching interest of public safety.
19. Leave Division, O ce of the Administrative Services-O ce of the Court Administrator v.
Heusdens, A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 126, 137. Here, the Court
justi ed the regulations of judicial employees' right to travel thus: "To permit such
unrestricted freedom can result in disorder, if not chaos, in the Judiciary and the society
as well. In a situation where there is a delay in the dispensation of justice, litigants can
get disappointed and disheartened. If their expectations are frustrated, they may take the
law into their own hands which results in public disorder undermining public safety .
In this limited sense, it can even be considered that the restriction or regulation of a court
personnel's right to travel is a concern for public safety, one of the exceptions to the non-
impairment of one's constitutional right to travel." (Emphasis supplied.)
20. Philippine National Railways Corporation v. Vizcara , G.R. No. 190022, February 15, 2012,
666 SCRA 363, 379-380, citing Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No.
157658, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 147 and Cusi v. Philippine National Railways , G.R.
No. L-29889, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 357. In nding negligence on the part of the
Philippine National Railways in an action for damages for the death and injury of several
civilians, the Court expounded on railroad companies' responsibility to secure public
safety, that is, to "avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings."
21. CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 6. This Section provides: "The liberty of abode and of changing
the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law."
22. G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668; October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 760.
23. Marcos v. Manglapus , G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989, 178 SCRA 760, 762. Here, the
Court resolved the issue of whether then President Corazon C. Aquino gravely abused her
discretion when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines posed
a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino sought to justify her
action "[i]n the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in
widely and passionately con icting ways, and for the tranquility of the state and order of
society x x x."
24. Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989, 177 SCRA 668, 719-720.
25. Id. at 703, 710-711.
26. Id. at 715.
27. Id. at 717. Emphasis supplied.
28. Id. at 729.
29. Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 53 SCRA 448, 471-476.
3 0 . RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 44 (July 31, 1986). Here, the Constitutional
Commission was debating whether to require a joint or separate vote by the two houses
of Congress for purposes of revoking the President's declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ. Members of the Constitutional Commission
considered the effect of such action on civil rights. After a lengthy debate, the
amendment to introduce joint voting by both houses of Congress was able to garner the
majority of votes (25 in favor, 4 against, and 1 abstention).
31. AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 75.
32. AFP Briefing Paper on the Extension of Martial Law in Mindanao, p. 15.
33. AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide Nos. 19, 26, and 52.
37. AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 39-43.
38. Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2 at 73.
39. The Oxford dictionary de nes "signi cant" as "Su ciently great or important to be worthy
of attention; noteworthy." <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/de nition/signi cant>
(last accessed February 6, 2018)
41. Id. at 65-66.
42. Separate Concurring Opinion, J. Tijam, Lagman v. Medialdea, p. 16.
43. G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012, 668 SCRA 504.
45. Id.
46. Dissenting Opinion, J. Velasco, Fortun v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra at 594-595.
47. Id. at 594.
48. Id.
49. Separate Opinion, p. 10.
50. Separate Opinion, p. 9, citing Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, 2009 Ed., p. 541.
51. The development of the standards for what constitutes obscenity comes to mind. In the
1957 case of Roth v. United States , 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the United States Supreme
Court was rst confronted with the issue of "whether obscenity is utterance within the
area of protected speech and press." While it acknowledged that the law on obscenity at
the time was not as developed as to clearly/textually show that it was beyond the
protection of the Fourth Amendment, the Court nevertheless found "su ciently
contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection
intended for speech and press." Over the course of several years, and several cases later,
the Court would continue to grapple with the "intractable obscenity problem," re ning,
testing and improving the Roth test until 1973, when it decided Miller v. California , 413
U.S. 15 (1973). This experience of the U.S. Supreme Court is, to me, testimony that it is
possible to arrive at principled parameters despite the seeming "novelty" of the issue at
hand, by utilizing relevant interpretative aids available.
52. Supra note 2 at 65.
53. In Marawi City, there was an actual shooting standoff between the military and the hostile
elements. There were also instances of the hostile groups attacking and occupying
public and private establishments, such as schools and hospitals adversely affecting the
delivery of their respective services. The city was overrun and local police were unable to
restore peace and order. See Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2 at 5-7.
54. Bridge and road blockades by hostile groups. Sustained occupation of government or
civilian properties. Id.
55. "Law enforcement and other government agencies x x x face pronounced di culty sending
their reports to the Chief Executive due to the city-wide power outages. x x x [B]ridge and
road blockades [were] set up by groups x x x. Movement by both civilians and
government personnel to and from the City is likewise hindered." Supra note 2 at 8, citing
the Proclamation No. 216 and the President's Report to Congress.
57. Id.
5 8 . Maxine Betterige-Moes, What happened in Marawi? October 30, 2017
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-
171029085314348.html> (last accessed February 1, 2018). Given the gravity of the
situation, no member of the Court appeared to question the scale of the danger to public
safety at the time. In fact, the debates mostly revolved around legal concepts: what is
the nature of the action led under Section 18, what is the scope of the Court's review,
what is the proper standard to assess the President's action, and how to define rebellion.
59. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary , 2009
Ed., p. 899.
60. Id.
61. Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary , 2009
Ed., p. 901.
62. Id.
63. Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Stone in Duncan v. Kahanamoku , 327 U.S. 304, 335
(1946), citing Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849); Mitchell v. Harmony , 54 U.S. 115 (1851);
United States v. Russell , 80 U.S. 623 (1871); Raymond v. Thomas , 91 U.S. 712 (1875);
and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932).

64. Id.
65. AFP Briefing Paper on the Extension of Martial law in Mindanao, p. 15.
6 6 . These incidents, broken down, are as follows: 3 ambuscades; 1 shelling/stra ng; 64

ring/attacks upon government troops; 2 shootings; 4 liquidation/sniping; 2 arsons; 32
landmining and attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs); and 8 grenade
throwing/explosions. See AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 19.
67. These incidents, broken down, are as follows: 13 kidnappings; 3 IED landmining/explosions;
17 attacks; 3 murders; 2 stra ng; 1 liquidation; 1 shooting; 1 ambuscade; 1 arson; 1
firefight; and 1 grenade throwing. See AFP Powerpoint Presentation, Slide No. 26.
70. It must be noted that reference to the Marawi Siege is especially relevant considering that
what is at issue here is the extension of a declaration of martial law brought about by
said incident.
7 1 . BBC News, Islamic State and the Crisis in Iraq and Syria in Maps, January 10, 2018
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034> (last accessed on February 6,
2018). The city was the de facto capital of the caliphate the group declared. An intensive
aerial bombardment by the US-led coalition helped secure victory in Raqqa for the Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF), which was formed in 2015 by the Kurdish Popular Protection
Units (YPG) militia and a number of smaller, Arab factions. Since early June, coalition
planes have carried out almost 4,000 air strikes on the city.
72. Patrick B. Johnston and Colin P. Clarke, Is the Philippines the Next Caliphate?, November
28, 2017 <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/11/is-the-philippines-the-next-
caliphate.html?> (last accessed February 6, 2018).
CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:
1. Hitler, A. & Murphy, J. V. (1981), Mein Kampf. Retrieved from
<http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt.>
2. G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017 [En Banc, Per J. Del Castillo].
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 51.
5. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora , 392 Phil. 618, 640 (2000) [En Banc, Per J.
Kapunan].
6. J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea (Resolution) , G.R. Nos. 231658,
231771 & 231774, December 5, 2017.
7. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 781 (2006) [En Banc, Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez].
8. 149 Phil. 547 (1971) [Per C.J. Concepcion].
9. Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection. — How committed. — The crime of rebellion or
insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for
the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory
of the Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other
armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of
any of their powers or prerogatives.
10. 320 Phil. 481 (1995).
11. Id. at 489.
12. Letter dated December 8, 2017, Annex "C" of the Lagman Petition.
13. On October 17, 2017, President Duterte already declared that Marawi is free from "terrorist
in uence," as military operations continue to ensure that all terrorists have been ushed
out. This declaration was made a day after Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute were killed.
The military clari ed that the war is not yet over but it will only take a "matter of days."
Article retrieved from CNN Philippines:
<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/17/Marawi-liberation-Duterte.html.>
14. In June 2017, both Malacañang and AFP claimed that the BIFF attack in Pigkawayan, North
Cotabato during that time had no connection to the rebellion in Marawi. Presidential
spokesman Ernesto Abella dismissed the attack as a mere attempt to recover from more
than two weeks of setbacks from ongoing military operations of the Army's 6th Infantry
Division. Captain Arvin Encinas, Public Affairs Chief of the 6th Infantry Division said that
they doubt the capability of the BIFF to proceed to areas far from central Mindanao to
sow terror. Article retrieved from Philstar:
<http://www.beta.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/23/1713103/biff-attack-not-
connected-marawi-siege-palace-military>.
15. On October 23, 2017, DND Secretary Lorenzana announced the termination of all combat
operations against Daesh-inspired Maute-ISIS group in Marawi after the military killed
the last remaining local and foreign terrorists in the city. He said that there are no more
militants in Marawi City. Article retrieved from CNN Philippines:
<http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/10/23/Marawi-crisis.html>.
On November 3, 2017, Major Gen. Restituto Padilla, AFP spokesperson, in a press
brie ng held in the Palace insisted that there was no premature declaration of Marawi
City's liberation from terrorists despite the presence of a small number of stragglers in
the war-torn city. He said that the declaration was made when the stragglers in Marawi
no longer have bearing to the security in the area, "they are leaderless, they have no
direction, they are merely ghting for survival." Article retrieved from Inquirer:
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/942686/afp-no-premature-declaration-of-liberation-in-
marawi-afp-marawi-padilla-stragglers>.
16. On January 8, 2018, Secretary of National Defense (SND) Lorenzana ordered the troops to
prepare for a repeat of the Marawi siege in "another city" in the Philippines. Article
retrieved from Rappler: <https://www.rappler.com/nation/ 193155-lorenzana-warning-
marawi-martial-law>.
SND Lorenzana said that rebellion remains in Mindanao and that martial law will be
necessary to quell it. He also said that the main purpose of the extension is to eradicate
the ISIS threat in the Philippines. Article retrieved from GMA:
<http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/638944/lorenzana-gov-t-verifying-
report-on-presence-of-foreign-terrorists-in-mindanao/story/>.
17. SND Lorenzana argued that there is a "continuing rebellion". He said that "[i]t is the belief of
the armed forces and the police that there is a continuing reorganization of rebellious
forces." Article retrieved from Rappler: <https://www.rappler.com/nation/193155-
lorenzana-warning-marawi-martial-law>.
18. Leonor D. Boado, NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE 422 (2012).
19. See Umil v. Ramos, 279 Phil. 266, 294-295 (1991) [En Banc, Per Curiam].
20. Lacson v. Perez, 410 Phil. 78 (2001) [En Banc, Per J. Melo].
21. J. Feliciano, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, Lacson v. Perez, id. at 109.
22. J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774,
July 4, 2017, pp. 20-21.
23. Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 dated December 13, 2017.
24. Memorandum for Respondents, p. 38.
25. Fr. Bernas, during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. II RECORD OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 494 (1986).
26. Herrera v. Alba, 499 Phil. 185, 202 (2005) [First Division, Per J. Carpio].
27. Supra note 10.
28. See Venturina v. Sandiganbayan, 271 Phil. 33, 39 (1991) [En Banc, Per J. Fernan].
29. Ponencia, pp. 41-42, citing AFP's "briefing" Narrative (January 17, 2017 Oral Arguments), pp.
6-7.
30. WHEREAS , Mindanao has had a long and complex history of lawless violence perpetrated
by private armies and local warlords, bandits and criminal syndicates, terrorist groups,
and religious extremists; WHEREAS , in recent months, there has been a spate of violent
and lawless acts across many parts of Mindanao, including abductions, hostage-takings
and murder of innocent civilians, bombing of power transmission facilities, highway
robberies and extortions, attacks on military outposts, assassinations of media people
and mass jailbreaks;
WHEREAS , the valiant efforts of our police and armed forced to quell this armed
lawlessness have been met with stiff resistance, resulting in several casualties on the
part of government forces, the most recent of which was the death of 15 soldiers in a
skirmish with the Abu Sayyaf Group in Patikul, Sulu on 29 August 2016;
WHEREAS , on the night of 2 September 2016, at least 14 people were killed and 67
others were seriously injured in a bombing incident in a night market in Davao City,
perpetrated by still unidentified lawless elements;
WHEREAS , the foregoing acts of violence exhibit the audacity and propensity of these
armed lawless groups to defy the rule of law, sow anarchy, and sabotage the
government's economic development and peace efforts;
WHEREAS , based on government intelligence reports, there exist credible threats of
further terror attacks and other similar acts of violence by lawless elements in other
parts of the country, including the metropolitan areas;
32. Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 2, at 36-37, 52.
33. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, p. 470
(1986).
34. Id. at 476-477.
35. Id. at 412.
36. Supra note 5, at 642-643.
37. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp.
409, 412 (1986).
38. I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp.
773-774 (1986).
39. J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 22.
40. Id. at 17.
41. Lansang v. Garcia, supra note 8, at 592.
42. Memorandum for Petitioner Rosales, p. 17.
(1986).
45. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, pp.
401-402 (1986).
46. TSN, January 16, 2018, pp. 149-153.
(1986).
48. Ponencia, pp. 50-54.
49. 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [En Banc, Per J. Tinga].
50. Id. at 461-462.
(1986).
52. J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea (Resolution) , supra note 6, at 8.
53. J. Caguioa, Dissenting Opinion, Lagman v. Medialdea, supra note 22, at 22.
MARTIRES, J.:
1. Annex "C-2" of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935.
2. Annex "C-1" of the Petition in G.R. No. 235935.
3. Annex "E" of the Petition in G.R. No. 236145.
4. Annex "5" to the Consolidated Comment of the O ce of the Solicitor General in G.R. Nos.
236061, 236145, and 236155.
5. Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, 29 November 2016.
6. Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 627 Phil. 37 (2010).
7. Aguinaldo v. Aquino, supra note 5.
8. 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
9. Entitled "Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the
whole of Mindanao."
10. Annex "I" to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General in G.R. No. 235935.
11. Entitled "Resolution of both Houses Further Extending Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017,
Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in
the whole of Mindanao' for a period of one year from January 1, 2018 to December 31,
2018."
12. Entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate not to revoke at this time
Proclamation No. 216, series of 2017 Entitled 'Declaring a State of Martial Law and
Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of Mindanao.'"
13. Entitled "Resolution expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to President
Rodrigo Duterte as it nds no reason to revoke Proclamation No. 216 Entitled 'Declaring
a state of Martial Law and suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.'"
14. G.R. No. 231658, 4 July 2017.
15. Id.
16. Id., citing the dissenting opinion of J. Carpio in Fortun v. President Macapagal-Arroyo , 684
Phil. 526 (2012).
17. Id.
18. RBH No. 4, supra note 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole, 660 Phil. 202 (2011).
26. Proclamation No. 1081, series of 1972.

28. 1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 18, par. 1.
29. Sec. 18, par. 4, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution.
31. Department of National Defense Memorandum, dated 24 May 2017.
GESMUNDO, J., concurring:
1. Memorandum of the OSG, pp. 4-5.
2. Id.
3. Oral Arguments-En Banc, January 17, 2018, pp. 59-60.
4. G.R. Nos. 231658, 231771 & 231774, July 4, 2017.
5. 265 Phil. 325 (1990).
6. Umil v. Ramos (Resolution), 279 Phil. 266, 295 (1991).
7. Supra note 5 at 336-337.
8. Id. at 336.
10. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
11. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
12. Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, pp. 412-413.
13. Duncan v. Sheriff Kahanamoku, supra note 10.
14. See Gumaua v. Espino , 185 Phil. 283 (1980); and Bernas, Constitutional Structure and
Powers of Government Part I, 2010 ed., p. 473.
15. Oral Arguments-En Banc, January 16, 2018, p. 115.
17. Id. at 136.
18. Id. at 148.
19. Id. at 150.
20. Id. at 151.
21. Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, p. 507.
22. Id. at 508-509.
23. Id. at 510.
24. Id.
25. Oral Arguments-En Banc, January 17, 2018, p. 99.
26. Petition in G.R. No. 235935, p. 17.
27. Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, Vol. II, p. 494.
28. SECTION 16. x x x
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.
29. Pimentel, Jr. v. Senate Committee on the Whole, 660 Phil. 202, 220 (2011).
30. Spouses Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 598 Phil. 981, 986 (2009).
31. Memorandum of the OSG, pp. 23-24.
32. Id.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7483" in the original document.
n Note from the Publisher: Written as "fat-finding" in the original document.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 235935. February 6, 2018.]

REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN,

[G.R. No. 236061. February 6, 2018.]

EUFEMIA CAMPOS CULLAMAT, NOLI VILLANUEVA, RIUS VALLE,

[G.R. No. 236145. February 6, 2018.]

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES , petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT RODRIGO R.

[G.R. No. 236155. February 6, 2018.]

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, DINAGAT ISLANDS REPRESENTATIVE

Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of

Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter 9 dated December 8,

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

(o) There is no need to extend martial law to suppress or defeat remnants of

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that:

j) Even if the Court were to entertain the allegation of grave abuse of

u) The phrase "theater of war" in relation to martial law should be understood

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Ruling of the Court

Failure to attach Resolution of

Presidential privilege of immunity from suit is a well-settled doctrine in our

We are, thus, unprepared to trivialize the necessity to implead the entire

Citing the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, respondents contend that

LAGMAN PETITION (G.R. No. 235935)

Congressional check on the exercise

Joint executive and legislative act

When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or

The manner in which Congress

The rules in question do not pertain to quorum, voting or publication.

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

Rebellion, as applied to the exercise of the President's martial law and

On July 22, 2017, upon the President's initiative, Congress extended

These newly recruited members are undergoing trainings in tactics,

xxx xxx xxx 1 2 8 (Emphasis ours)

In Lagman, the Court defined "public safety" as follows:

The requirement of the Constitution is therefore adequately met when there is

We refuse to be tempted by petitioner Rosales' prodding that We set two tests in

(f) The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to

The purpose of a preliminary injunction under Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of

Petitioners anchored their prayer for the issuance of an injunctive writ on

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Calibration Exercise and the

It is in the context of invasion or rebellion that the doctrine of necessity is

There is no dire lack of guidance or parameters in determining what sort of

This intent leads to the general understanding that Martial Law is an

While the President and Congress are expected to engage in a calibration

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

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CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

CHIEF JUSTICE SERENO:

Determination of the Period of Extension

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CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

xxx xxx xxx

Abandonment of the Permissive Approach

In my Dissenting Opinion in Lagman v. Medialdea , I espoused a permissive

In Resolution of Both Houses (RBH) No. 4 dated 13 December 2017, 6 0 the

2. The Turai e Group has likewise been monitored to be planning to conduct