Chapter 2: Strategy: Part I: Attacking and Defending Through Operations (Not From The Textbook)
Chapter 2: Strategy: Part I: Attacking and Defending Through Operations (Not From The Textbook)
Chapter 2: Strategy: Part I: Attacking and Defending Through Operations (Not From The Textbook)
Competitive strategy is about being different to deliver more unique and better value to
the customer. Please read the example of Timbuk2 on page 50-51 of the textbook.
A strategy that is sustainable needs to create value for the firms shareholders (equity
owners) and stakeholders (individuals and organizations that are affected by the firms
actions). Thus, a firms strategy must not only focus on economic viability, but also the
environment and social impact of its actions.
The operations and supply-chain strategy coordinates operational goals with the higher
goals of the organization. Besides the basic competitive dimensions of cost, quality,
delivery speed (response time), and flexibility mentioned in Chapter 1, other competitive
dimensions are reliability, changes in volume, new product introduction speed, and other
product-specific criteria. Usually, there are trade-offs that need to me made among
these dimensions.
Operations and supply-chain strategies need to be evaluated relative to their riskiness.
Supply-chain disruptions are unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the normal
flow of goods and materials. Risks can be categorized along two dimensions: supplychain coordination risks and disruption risks.
One must identify the potential
interruptions, assess the potential impact of the risk, and develop plans to mitigate the
risk.
Part I: Attacking and Defending through Operations (not from the textbook)
Consider the following questions:
Why are small companies sometimes able to come out of nowhere and, without the
benefit of economies of scale and market power, successfully attack large,
entrenched competitors?
Why didnt those powerful competitors react more promptly and vigorously to such
attacks even after extended periods of time?
The answer lies in the surprising power of operations-based strategies: Such strategies
reinforce a companys chosen approach to differentiating itself from its competitors; they
are inherently difficult and time consuming for others to imitate and impossible to buy;
and they are less visible to outsiders, and therefore less likely to trigger immediate
Its strategy was low-cost, point-to-point service between midsize cities and secondary
airports in large cities.
Case 2: Australian Paper Manufacturers
Its domestic competitor, APPM, had a 75% SOM, a low cost position, owned two of
Australias three largest paper distributors. and was backed by a big conglomerate
1990: APM had taken a third of the domestic market, was operating its newly rebuilt
paper plant at capacity, and had announced plans to expand
1993: APPM capitulated--selling all its paper operations to APM and exiting the
business
Entered the forklift truck business in 1957 (total sales <$1 mill.), with a small, manual
model.
Thereafter, entered segment after segment, each time taking on larger competitors
and winning substantial market shares.
Each time it differentiated itself with superior design (aesthetics and ease of
operation), at a premium price.
Today is the third largest producer in the U.S. (even though it only produces electric
trucks).
Went public in 1972, when it had only 30 discount stores in rural Arkansas, Missouri
& Oklahoma.
Steadily expanded around that base, emphasizing low cost operations, egalitarian
workforce policies, and a tightly integrated supplier/logistics system.
By 1987 had 1200 stores (~ half as many as Kmart), and was approaching its
strongholds in major cities.
Why didnt they react faster when the threat became clear?
Why werent they able to learn from--or even copy--the innovative practices of the
upstart?
While the counter attacks, if any, were not successful in the cases described above, here
is a case of a successful counter-attack:
American Connector Co. (ACC, disguised name) learned that DJC, a Japanese
competitor, was planning to build a new factory in the U.S.
DJCs factory in Japan had, through a series of innovations, reduced the cost of
making comparable products by about 35 percent.
initiated a major cost reduction program in the U.S., using DJCs example as
a source of new approaches
sold its customization capabilities and problem-solving services to
customers
reduced prices of products directly competitive with the ones DJC had tooled
up to build, starving its new plant
Each business unit has its own strengths & weaknesses, and may choose to
compete in a different way
Seek competitive superiority through lower cost, better quality (performance), more
flexible/responsive, more dependable, and so forth
Structure
Capacity
Work scheduling
Facilities
Quality systems
Equip. Technology
Exploit (and sell) your own strengths, but not beyond the point of diminishing
returns.
React so quickly to a competitors attack, that it isnt able to get too far ahead of you
down the learning curve (e.g. Microsoft vs. Netscape).
Part II: Competitive Advantage and Operations Strategy (Some from the textbook
and some from outside)
Competitive Advantage is achieved by positioning yourself in a unique, defensible niche
in your market or industry, and/or developing capabilities along performance dimensions
that are both valued by customers and superior to those of competitors
The Strategy Hierarchy:
Functional strategy: what should our facilities and it networks look like?
Most
flexible:
broad
product
line,
customized
products
&
services,
fast
response/delivery times
Japanese car imports competed first at low end, then progressively emphasized
quality
Now after many years, the US and European auto companies can deliver roughly the
same degree of quality as their Japanese counterparts, but once everyone is at the
same level on an order winner, it becomes an order qualifier! So whats the next order
winner going to be? Features? Fuel efficiency? Safety? Electronics? None of these
are particularly difficult to imitate. Toyota can now custom produce a car in Japan,
through its plants, in 5 days versus 12 weeks in the U.S. and Europe. Could this be the
next across-the-industry order winner? It is very difficult to imitate, and delivers value to
the customer, because operations are difficult (difficult to imitate), they can be great
sources of sustained advantage.
III. More from the Textbook: Productivity
Productivity is a common measure on how well resources are being used. Since these
are relative measures, they are meaningful if they are compared to something else.
Often, the comparison is with other companies.
In the broadest sense, it can be defined as the following ratio:
Outputs
Inputs