G.R. No.

88324


SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 88324, July 06, 1990 ]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANGELO ARCEO Y MALI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N
REGALADO, J.:
This appeal seeks to overturn the judgment of conviction rendered in Criminal Case No. 86-45584 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on February 17,1989,
[1]
with the following dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the two (2) accused, ANGELO ARCEO Y MALI and RAMIL CECILIO Y
MARIANO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide; and hereby
sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided for by
law, less preventive period of their imprisonment; and adjudging them to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of the deceased, Delfin Manalese, the amount of P30,000.00 for his death, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and with costs against them.
SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellant Angelo Arceo, together with his co-accused Ramil Cecilio, were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, with the crime of robbery with homicide, in an information
which reads as follows:
"That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation to
wit: by suddenly grabbing and forcibly snatching from the wrist of one Delfin Manalese y Astor, take,
steal and carry away one (1) wrist watch valued at P1,500.00 belonging to said Delfin Manalesey Astor
against his will, to the damage and prejudice of said owner in the aforesaid sum of P1,500.00, Philippine
Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the commission of the said crime of robbery, the said
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of said Delfin Manalese y Astor, by then and there stabbing him
on the chest with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
[2]

Upon arraignment, both accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered the aforesaid judgment finding both
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. Only accused
Angelo Arceo appealed from the judgment of conviction.
The trial court synthesized the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:
"1. ROLANDO CALADIAO, testified that he was a market porter and a resident of 346
P. Rada Street, Tondo, Manila; that on May 22, 1986, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening he was on his
way to the market in order to report for work at the corner of Padre Rada and Camba Extension, Manila;
while he was at the corner of Padre Rada Street and Camba Extension, he saw Delfin Manalese standing
as if he is resting, two (2) persons approached Delfin. After approaching, the smaller one placed his arm
on the shoulder of Delfin, who turned out to be Angelo Arceo. Thereafter, the two (2) persons forced
(sic) to get the watch of Delfin. Delfin tried to free himself from the hold of the two persons in order to
run away. Angelo at that time had a companion who turned out to be Ramil Cecilio. Angelo
stabbed Delfin with a balisong' while Ramil was holding him (t.s.n., pp. 3, 4, 6, 7, & 8, hearing, October
23, 1986). Continuing, he declared that Angelo was able to get the watch of Delfin when Angelo
stabbed Delfin (t.s.n., pp. 8-9, hearing, Oct. 23,1986). At the time the accused approached the victim, he
was then three (3)armlenght (sic). He brought the lifeless victim to Mary Johnston Hospital.
"Likewise, he asseverated that he recognized both accused Angelo and Ramil as he used to see them
loitering at Maria Payo Street whenever he visited his friend Rodrigo Capwa who lived at P. Herrera
Street. At the time of the incident he observed that Ramil and Angelo were under the influence of drugs
as they were loitering in their place and that they were pasuray-suray' from side to side (t.s.n., p. 10,
hearing, Nov. 26, 1986);
2. MARCIAL CENIDO, testified that he was a medico-legal-officer of Western Police District; that he
examined the cadaver of Delfin and the cause of his death. He recounted that on May 23, 1986 he
autopsied the body of Delfin and conducted postmortem examination, his findings of which are
reflected in Exh. 'E';
3. PFC. AMADOR REGALADO of the Homicide Section of WPD declared that on May 22, 1986, a
stabbing incident was reported to their office. Upon receiving that report, he inquired as to the
identities of the alleged suspects and was told of the aliases of the two (2) suspects. Thereafter, he
went to the house of the alleged suspects and invited them to the police headquarters to shed light on
the reported stabbing incident. Likewise, persons who allegedly witnessed the incident were also
invited for investigation.
"He testified that he was present at the time both the accused gave their statements before
Pat. Trinidad;
4. REYNALDO LIMPIN testified that in the evening of May 22, 1986, at around 8:00 o'clock he heard
people shouting magnanakaw'. At this juncture, he moved towards the direction where the shouting
came from and noticed two persons running in a hurry, one of them was holding a bladed weapon with
traces of blood. He confronted them and asked them 'Ano iyong sumisigaw na magnanakaw?' and to
which they answered 'Hindi sila' (t.s.n. p. 9, hearing of April 9,1987).
"Testifying further, he identified his sworn statement (Exh. 'C') as part of his testimony. In addition, he
asseverated that he was five (5) armlenght (sic) away from the victim. After the testimonies of the
aforementioned witnesses, the prosecution offered Exhibits 'A' to 'E-1' and rested its case.
[3]

The evidence for the defense was summarized as follows:
"1. ANGELO ARCEO Y MALI testified in his behalf and declared that he was a resident of
21 Marikina Maypajo, Caloocan City and asseverated that on May 22,1986 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
evening he was at Maypajo, he was then with his friends, Chito, Joseph, Robert, Pogi and Aling Felisa,
singing. They started singing at9:00 p.m. and finished at 10:00 o'clock in the evening. He further added
that from 7:00 o'clock to 9:00 o'clock p.m. he was in Maypajo, conversing with his friend (t.s.n., p. 4,
Hearing of Oct. 13, 1987).
"On cross-examination, Angelo testified that it would take him ten (10) minutes if he rides a jeep to
reach Padre Rada, Manila, from Caloocan. He admitted that if he will take a taxi it will take the same
number of minutes from Padre Rada, Manila. If he walks from Padre Rada, Manila to Caloocan, it will
take him 1/2 hour to reachCaloocan (t.s.n., p. 5, hearing, Dec. 15, 1987).
2. FELISA HERRERA, testified that she is 64 years old and residing at
21 Marikina, Maypajo, Caloocan City; that Angelo is her neighbor for three (3) years. OnMay 22, 1986,
at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was in their house together with Angelo, Bong, Chito,
Joseph, Mando and Pogi, who were then singing.
3. FORTUNATO ARCEO, likewise testified that in the evening of May 22, 1986 between 11:00 to
12:00 midnight, Pat. Regalado and his co-policemen went to his house and inquired about the
whereabouts of Ramil as the latter was implicated in a killing incident. He told them that he has no son
by the name of Ramil.
"The following morning, the policemen arrived and arrested his son, Fortunato Arceo, Jr. He admitted
that he knew Ramil Cecilio who was living in the 6th house from their house.
4. RAMIL CECILIO testified likewise in his behalf and declared that he is 28 years old, jobless and a
resident of 415 Zabala Street, corner Balagtas, Tondo,Manila. He admitted that a certain policeman
picked him up in his wife's house located at Sandico, corner P. Soriano, Tondo, Manila, on May 22, 1986
at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening (t.s.n., pp. 3 & 4, hearing, January 14, 1988).
"On cross-examination he testified that Sandico Street is eight (8) meters away from Camba Extension
and to Padre Rada, if one is to walk from Sandico to Cambaand Padre Rada streets, it will take ten (10)
minutes to reach the place (t.s.n., p. 7, hearing, January 14, 1988).
5. ANGELINA BUENSUCESO, testified that at about 7:30 in the evening of May 22, 1986, Ramil went
to her house located at 1164 Asuncion Extension, Tondo,Manila, to attend to her mother's
birthday. She further admitted that Ramil slept in their house and left at 12:00 o'clock noon the
following day. After the testimony of Angelina Buensuceso, the defense rested its case without any
documentary evidence."
[4]

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Danilo Manalese, brother of the victim. He recounted that on
May 22, 1986, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening while he was in his house at
989 Camba Extension, Tondo, Manila, he heard the victim shout twice "Nay, sinaksak po ako." He
proceeded to the place where his brother was and the latter pointed to both accused as the ones
responsible for the stabbing. He recognized both accused as the place was well lighted.
[5]

The main thrust of the appeal is centered on credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution, appellant
faulting them as follows:
1. Caladiao allegedly neither helped the victim nor could he have identified the perpetrators since he
was in a state of shock; that because the place was crowded it was impossible to identify appellant as
one of the perpetrators; that Caladiao was a neighbor of the victim; and that Caladiao, instead of using
the fastest means of transportation, used a pushcart to bring the patient to the hospital.
2. Limpin supposedly contradicted Caladiao because the latter never testified that shouts of
"magnanakaw" were heard; that he could not have inquired from appellant on what was happening
since Limpin was not a person in authority or an agent thereof; and that Limpin was implicated in
another stabbing incident thereby casting doubt on his credibility.
3. Pfc. Regalado, appellant claims, was likewise inconsistent in his testimony that he investigated the
appellant in the morning and also in the afternoon.
4. Lastly, Delfin Manalese's testimony was allegedly inconsistent with that
of Caladiao. Delfin Manalese stated that he heard his brother cry "Nay, sinaksak po ako" twice,
whileCaladiao testified that he heard the victim cry the same words once. Appellant further argues
that Delfin could not have possibly heard his brother since his house was thirty meters away from the
corner of Padre Rada St.
[6]

It is an elementary rule that inconsistencies and contradictions referring to minor details do not destroy
the credibility of witnesses.
[7]
Inconsistencies in the principal eyewitness' testimony which are details
that do not impair the identification of the accused are not fatal. Witnesses who are in a state of
surprise and fright cannot be expected to recall with accuracy or uniformity matters connected with the
main overt act. Rather than discredit the testimony of the witnesses, such discrepancies or minor
details serve to add credence and veracity to their categorical, straightforward and spontaneous
testimony.
[8]

From an analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, it becomes readily apparent that
the supposed errors involve minor matters which have no material bearing on the commission of the
criminal act itself. Variances can be attributed to the fact that different persons have diverse
impressions and perceptions of a startling event. On the other hand, the testimonies of two or more
witnesses would be under a serious cloud of doubt if their declarations tallied in their minutest details,
for then, that would not be natural. That would indicate that the testimonies were rehearsed.
[9]

Furthermore, the trial court categorically observed that "(t)he testimony of subject witness is clear,
direct, spontaneous and therefore deserves credence. The witnesses testified in a straightforward
manner, sincere and candid in answering questions propounded during the direct examination as well as
in the cross-examination. They have no motive to testify falsely against the accused."
[10]

We, therefore, find no reason to depart from the cardinal principle that the findings of the trial court on
the matter of credibility should not be disturbed on appeal due to its superior advantage in observing
the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, unless some facts or circumstances may
have been overlooked that may affect the result of the case.
[11]
The findings of the trial court carry great
weight because they have the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses, and,
therefore, can discern if such witnesses are telling the truth or not.
[12]

Furthermore, we are convinced beyond reasonable doubt, on the basis alone of the testimony of
eyewitness Rolando Caladiao, that both accused actually committed the crime charged. Caladiao's lone
but credible testimony is, to our mind, sufficient to support a conviction. Hence, even in the absence of
corroborating testimony, the accused can validly be convicted on the basis of the positive identification
by Caladiao.
Appellant tries to impeach Limpin by adverting to the latter's being one of the respondents in a case for
frustrated murder in I.S. No. 85-13602 of the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. It should be noted,
however, that in order to affect the credibility of a witness by the mere fact that he was charged with an
offense, previous conviction by final judgment is required,
[13]
and the existence of a pending information
may not be shown to impeach the witness.
[14]
With more reason, therefore, should Limpin not be
discredited merely on the basis of a complaint filed with the city fiscal, there being no showing that an
information has been filed in court and that judgment has been rendered convicting him of the offense.
The defense of appellant hinges primarily on alibi which, as we have repeatedly declared, is one of the
weakest defenses that may be invoked by an accused. We rule once again that for this defense to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere when the crime was committed but
that he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the prosecution witnesses. It is an issue of
fact that hinges on the credibility of the witnesses who seek to establish it.
[15]
It has been held that no
physical impossibility exists where the distance between the scene of the crime and the place where the
accused allegedly was at that time would take only fifteen to twenty minutes to negotiate by jeep,
[16]
or
where it can be traversed by walking in one and a half hours,
[17]
or where the places involved are only
two hundred meters apart.
[18]

That it could not have been physically impossible for accused Arceo to be at the scene of the crime is
evident from his own testimony to the effect that it would take him ten minutes if he rides a jeep to
reach Padre Rada, Manila, from Caloocan; that it would take him the same number of minutes if he
takes a taxi; and that if he walks from PadreRada, it would take him half an hour to reach Caloocan.
Alibi, we have consistently held, cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Even if,
admittedly, the eyewitness had seen the malefactors for the first time at the time of the killing, it does
not necessarily follow that he could not have recognized their faces. Persons observing a startling
occurrence would strive to know the ones involved, especially in a case where the victim is known to the
eyewitness.
[19]
Perforce, there is no merit in the allegation of appellant that he could not have been
identified byCaladiao who, at that time, was supposedly in a state of shock.
There is no reason to doubt the testimony of Caladiao who has positively identified the perpetrators of
the crime, it appearing that the place of the incident was well lighted and the witness was at a distance
of about three arm's length. These facts are sufficient to exclude any doubt in the identification of the
accused. Furthermore, the witness actually saw appellant stab the victim on the chest. That the victim
sustained a stab wound on the chest was confirmed by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Marcial Cenido, who
conducted an autopsy on the body of the victim. It was also shown that this single stab wound was
fatal, thereby causing the immediate death of the victim.
The proven circumstances attendant to the crime indubitably establish that
accused Arceo and Cecilio conspired to commit the crime as shown by their coordinated acts directed to
ensure the accomplishment of their evil designs. The act of one accused in holding the victim from
behind when the latter was stabbed by his co-accused is a positive act towards the realization of a
common criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely
assumed that had not the first accused held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have
parried the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of the victim
from behind, and although there was no anterior conspiracy, the two accused showed unity of criminal
purpose and intent immediately before the actual stabbing.
[20]

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.


[1]
Per Judge Manuel E. Yuzon: Rollo, 29.
[2]
Rollo, 4.
[3]
Ibid., 21-22.
[4]
Ibid., 22-23.
[5]
TSN, January 28, 1988, 7-8.
[6]
Brief for the Appellee, 9-10.
[7]
People vs. De las Pinas, et al, 141 SCRA 379 (1986).
[8]
People vs. Espinosa, etc., 141 SCRA 110 (1986).
[9]
People vs. Ferrera, 151 SCRA 113 (1987).
[10]
Rollo, 27.
[11]
People vs. Yagong, G.R. No. 77088, January 29, 1990.
[12]
People vs. Ramilo, 147 SCRA 102 (1987).
[13]
Sec. 11, Rule 132, Rules of Court.
[14]
Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, 1973 Ed., 688.
[15]
People vs. Coronado, et al., 145 SCRA 250 (1986).
[16]
People vs. Temblor, etc., 161 SCRA 623 (1988).
[17]
People vs. Ausan, etc., 152 SCRA 52 (1987).
[18]
People vs. Reyes, 166 SCRA 483 (1988).
[19]
People vs. Encipido, et al., 146 SCRA 478 (1986).
[20]
People vs. Montealegre, 161 SCRA 700 (1988).