(1) PEOPLE VS DEOPANTE GR NO 102772

G.R. No. 102772 October 30, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO DEOPANTE y CARILLO, accused-appellant.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p

In deciding this appeal, the Court finds occasion to reiterate some well-settled doctrines in
appreciating evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in the crime of murder, and
in evaluating claims of self-defense, voluntary surrender and physical defect.

This is an appeal from the decision1 dated September 6, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 164,2 in Criminal Case No.
85155, convicting accused Rogelio Deopante y Carillo of the crime of murder and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua.

On January 11, 1991, an Information3 was filed against the appellant charging him as
follows:

That on or about the 10th day of January, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a fan knife (balisong), with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab with a fan knife one Dante Deopante on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Arraigned on March 8, 1991, the accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to
the charge.4

The Facts

According to the Prosecution

The facts as summarized by the Solicitor General, who added the page references to the
transcript of stenographic notes, are as follows:5

At around nine o'clock in the evening (9:00 p.m.) of January 10, 1991 at Alkalde Jose
Street, Barrio Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila, Dante Deopante was having a
conversation with his friend Renato Molina when they saw appellant Rogelio
Deopante coming towards their direction. Renato noticed that as appellant was fast
approaching, the latter was drawing out an open fan knife (balisong) from his right
back pants pocket. Sensing danger, Renato immediately called out to Dante and told
 the latter to flee the place. As Dante took flight, so did Renato in another direction.
(pp. 3-4, 6, 8, t.s.n. June 3, 1991)

Appellant ran after Dante and overpowered the latter at a basketball court located in
a lot between Alkalde Jose and Pariancillo Streets. Appellant and victim grappled
with each other and both fell on the ground. Appellant was able to assume the
dominant position and as Dante lay flat on his back the former proceeded to stab the
latter twice with his fan knife. Immediately thereafter, appellant stood up and fled the
scene leaving Dante mortally wounded. Bystanders milling around Pariancillo Street
then rushed victim to the Rizal Medical Pariancillo Street then rushed victim to the
Rizal Medical Center. (pp. 3-5, t.s.n., April 25, 1991; pp. 8, 9, 11, t.s.n. June 3, 1991)

At about the same time on the aforesaid date, the Pasig Police Station received a
telephone call from the Rizal Medical Center informing them that a stabbing victim
has been brought to said hospital for treatment. Patrolman Crispin Pio proceeded to
the hospital and there received the information that appellant was the one who
stabbed Dante. Said policeman later obtained the sworn statement of Nestor
Deopante indicating that appellant stabbed the victim. Renato refused to give his
sworn statement to the police, but insisted that indeed it was appellant who stabbed
Dante. (pp. 5-7, t.s.n., May 15, 1991)

At around eleven o'clock (11:00 p.m.) of the same evening, Patrolman Crispin Pio
and two (2) other police officers went to the house of appellant located at No. 12
Alkalde Jose Street, Barrio Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila. After informing appellant
of the allegation against him, they invited the former to the police station for
investigation. Appellant went with the police officers and maintained his innocence
throughout the investigation. Patrolman Crispin Pio recovered a fan knife from
appellant measuring around ten (10") inches when opened. He sent the fan knife to
the P.N.P. Crime Laboratory Service for examination. (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., May 15, 1991)

The autopsy report shows a total of seven (7) wounds all over victim's body. Of these
wounds, two (2) were stab wounds (Wound Nos. 2 & 3) and the rest mere abrasions.
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, the medico-legal officer of the P.N.P. Crime Laboratory
Service who conducted the autopsy testified that the stab wounds were caused by a
sharp pointed object like a balisong or fan knife. He further declared that Wound No.
2, a stab wound located at the left side of the chest, lacerated the diaphragm, liver
(left lobe) and stomach of the victim causing the latter's instantaneous death.
Moreover, he concluded that the fan knife sent to him for examination could have
been used in stabbing a person since it showed minute traces of human blood. (pp.
7-8, t.s.n., April 19, 1991; p. 17. t.s.n., May 30, 1991)

The prosecution presented six witnesses. Aside from Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, who testified
on the results of the autopsy, the other witnesses included Manolo Angeles and Renato
Molina, who gave eyewitness accounts of the stabbing. Patrolman Crispin Pio of the Pasig
Police Station testified that he invited the accused for investigation after receiving a report on
the killing, and that upon frisking the accused, he found and recovered from him a 10-inch
fan knife which he submitted to the crime lab for examination. Alfonso Reyes, barangay
captain of Barangay Kapasigan, Pasig, Metro Manila, testified that on August 19, 1989,
Dante Deopante made a personal complaint to him as barangay captain, that Rogelio
Deopante had threatened to kill him (Dante). He testified that his office kept a logbook of all
the incidents that happened in the barangay and that the same contained a record of the
said complaint6 of Dante Deopante. However, on cross-examination, he admitted that he was
not the one who personally made the entry.

Version of the Defense

In contrast to the prosecution's theory that the victim was killed with evident premeditation,
the defense claimed that the fatal injuries inflicted by accused-appellant upon the victim were
done in self-defense.7 The defense presented three witnesses, viz.: the accused himself, his
longtime friend Benito Carrasco, and the son of the accused, Vladimir Deopante. Their
version of the event was as follows:

On January 10, 1991, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, in Alcalde Jose Street,
Pasig, Metro Manila, while the appellant was allegedly on his way home he was seen
by his nephew, the victim (Dante Deopante) and the witness for the prosecution,
Renato Molina, who at that time were allegedly both drunk. (TSN June 6, 1991, page
3). The victim (Dante Deopante) suddenly boxed him and the said appellant ran
away and (was) pursued by the victim and Renato Molina. The appellant was
overtaken by the victim by holding the back portion of his shirt. Both
of them fell. The victim pulled-out a knife which appellant allegedly wrested . . . away
from Dante Deopante. After he (appellant) wrested the knife from the victim, they
continued rolling over and over the ground and he does not know whether he stab
(sic) the victim or not. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 4). Said appellant sustained also
injuries on (the) little finger of his right hand and abrasion on his right leg, left knee
and left hand (sic). The said appellant was treated by one Dr. Leonides Pappa on
January 11, 1991, and issued medical certificate, marked as Exhibits "1, 1-A, 1-B
and 1-C" for the defense. (TSN June 6, 1991, pages 5-6); Appellant claimed that he
placed behind bars (incarcerated) the victim for being a drug addict when he was still
a policeman and member of the Police Department of Pasig. Renato Molina eluded
arrest by him, for being a drug addict too. (TSN June 6, 1991, page 6).8

On cross-examination, accused Rogelio Deopante testified that he was a former member of

the Pasig Police Department but was discharged for having been absent without leave, by
reason of a complaint filed against him by Manolo Angeles before the National Police
Commission, and in which case the victim, Dante Deopante, was presented as witness for
complainant Angeles. He further testified that his left hand was completely severed at the
wrist when it was hacked off by his brother Nestor Deopante.

The Trial Court's Ruling

On September 6, 1991, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the appellant of murder,
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds the accused Rogelio Deopante y Carillo GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged; and therefore hereby
imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no other generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance adduced; and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as well as to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The Issues
In his brief, the appellant charges that the trial court erred:

I. In considering the entry in the (barangay) peace and order chairman's blotter under
entry no. 0097, page 58 (logbook) as a basis in holding the commission of the
offense with evident premeditation.

II. In not affording the accused-appellant the mitigating circumstances of voluntary

surrender and his physical condition.

III. In not considering appellant's claim of self-defense.

IV. In not considering the flaws and inconsistencies of the testimonies of the
prosecution's witnesses and its biased character and wanting of credibility (sic).

V. In not considering the provision of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code in the
imposition of penalty.

The Court's Ruling

First Issue: Evident Premeditation

Very familiar by now to members of the legal profession are the elements which need to be
proven before evident premeditation can be appreciated. These are: (1) the time when the
accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused
had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between
the decision to commit the crime and the execution thereof, to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. Mere lapse of time is not enough, however, because
premeditation is not presumed from the mere lapse of time.9 It must be "evident" from his
overt act.

Considering the evidence on record, and the events leading up to the killing, we cannot
agree with appellant's contention that the lower court based its finding of evident
premeditation on the victim's report to the barangay captain that the accused-appellant had
threatened to kill him. We hold that the record contains sufficient basis for the finding of
evident premeditation. The first and third elements were proven by the testimony of the
barangay captain, Alfonso Reyes, as to the report made by the deceased about the threat on
his life, taken together with the record of the report in the barangay logbook,10 all of which
established the time when appellant decided to commit the crime. The period of time
between the said report and the killing (January 10, 1991) constituted a sufficient lapse of
time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution of the same, the
enable the accused to coolly consider and reflect upon his resolution to do away with the
victim. Finally, the second element was proven by the eyewitness testimony of Renato
Molina, friend of the victim since childhood, who was present from the inception to the
culmination of the assault launched by appellant against the victim. We quote with approval
the trial court's ratiocination, to wit:

That at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of January 10, 1991, he (Renato Molina)
and Dante Deopante were conversing at Alkalde Jose St., Pasig, Metro Manila when
the accused Rogelio Deopante arrived. He told Dante Deopante to run away. Both of
them ran but in different directions.
 That he told Dante Deopante to run away because the latter and the accused had a
previous (sic) misunderstanding and the accused always threatened Dante
Deopante after the latter testified against the accused for shooting a certain Maning
Angeles.

That he also told Dante Deopante to run away because he saw the accused carrying
a fan knife in his back pocket. He saw it because the place was lighted as there as a
lamp post.

xxx xxx xxx

This witness (Molina) testified that when he saw the accused more than six feet away
and was approaching them, he immediately warned his childhood friend and victim
Dante Deopante to run away which the latter did. At the time, the accused was seen
by this witness about to draw a knife from his back pant's pocket; and that he, too,
ran away but took the opposite direction. Having traversed a short distance, he
stopped and looked back and saw the accused chasing his victim and nephew until
the former caught up with the latter, took hold of him and they both fell to the ground.

The accused could have desisted from carrying his plan to kill into effect had he
stopped when his nephew took off and ran away from him. The latter did so because
he knew in his heart that his uncle was about to kill him and this was also felt by
eyewitness Molina because of the immediate warning given by him to his friend.

But then, although he saw his nephew sprinting away, he nevertheless did chase him
for a distance and all the while he could have stopped and go home to his residence
situated only a few meters away.

Again he could have let go the victim when he caught up and took hold of him. He
did not, but on the contrary, when they both fell and rolled on the ground, he
grappled with his victim and at the very first opportune moment, mercilessly stabbed
his nephew, not only once but twice, inflicting very serious blows, one of which was
most fatal and could have caused instantaneous death of his prey.

So it is that from this very actuation of the accused at the time, it is obviously clear
that he clung to this determination to kill Dante Deopante when he could have
stopped at anytime between the moment that his nephew ran away until the time that
he dealt the fatal blows that ultimately caused the death of Dante
Deopante.11 (emphasis ours)

The three elements having been duly proven, the presence of evident premeditation in the
case at bar is therefore conclusive.

Second Issue: Voluntary Surrender and Physical Defect

as Mitigating Circumstances?

Contrary to appellant's protestations, the trial court was correct in finding no voluntary
surrender in this case. In order to appreciate voluntary surrender by an accused, the same
must be shown to have been "spontaneous and made in such a manner that it shows the
intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture. In the absence of any of these reasons, and in the event
that the only reason for an accused's supposed surrender is to ensure his safety, his arrest
being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and, hence, not voluntary.12 It will be
observed in this case that there was no conscious effort on the part of the accused — who
was fetched from his house by police officers to go to police headquarters for investigation —
to voluntarily surrender and/or acknowledge his guilt. He went with them for the purpose of
clearing his name as he in fact tried to do during the investigation where he professed his
innocence. The fact alone that he did not resist but went peacefully with the lawmen does not
mean that he voluntarily surrendered.13 On this point, it is apt to quote the decision of this
Court in People vs. Flores14 where we stated that:

Neither can we accept accused-appellant's plea of voluntary surrender. He did not

surrender to the police. In fact, the evidence adduced shows that it was the police
authorities who came to the factory looking for him. It was there that accused-
appellant was pointed to them. With the police closing in, accused-appellant actually
had no choice but to go with them. Seeing that the police were already approaching
him, accused-appellant did not offer any resistance and peacefully went with them.
To be sure, no surrender was made by accused-appellant.

The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand, does not mean
that he should automatically be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained in
paragraph 8, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In order for this condition to be
appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect limited his means to act, defend
himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he did not have
complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in diminution of the element of
voluntariness.15 Such cannot be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical
condition clearly did not limit his means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his
free will. In fact, despite his handicap, appellant nevertheless managed to attack, overcome
and fatally stab his victim.

At this point, one might wonder how a one-handed attacker can open a fan knife and grapple
with and overcome his two-handed prey. This was answered by the testimony of Renato
Molina who revealed that at the time the accused closed in for the kill, his balisong was
already open and ready for use in his back pocket, and that he had already drawn the same
even during the chase. Molina's testimony16 is as follows:

Q You said that this Rogelio Deopante arrived while you were
conversing with Dante Deopante and you ask (asked) Dante
Deopante to run away, why did you ask Dante Deopante to run
away?

A Because, Sir I saw the open fan knife on his pocket, Sir at his back.

Q When you said that you have seen an open fan knife at his pocket,
to whom are you referring to?

A Rogelio Deopante's, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q How did you notice the fan knife which is placed at the back if (sic)
his pocket?
 A Because at the time, Sir he was drawing it out.

Hence, at the time the accused-appellant chased the victim, the former already had
the balisong in hand. Clearly, the fact that he had only one hand in no way limited his
freedom of action to commit the crime.

Third Issue: Self-defense

Equally well-known and well-understood by now are the requirements in order for self-
defense to be appreciated. The accused must prove that there was unlawful aggression by
the victim, that the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression were
reasonable, and that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part.17 And having
admitted that he killed his nephew Dante Deopante, "the burden of the evidence that he
acted in self-defense was shifted to the accused-appellant. It is hornbook doctrine that when
self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to show that the killing
was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the
latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing.18 Hence, he must prove the essential requisites of self-defense aforementioned.

In the case at bar, appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression by the victim, hence, his
claim of self-defense cannot be sustained. The self-serving and unsupported allegation of
appellant that he wrested the knife away from the victim while they were struggling and
rolling around on the ground (in the process sustaining only a minor scratch on his little finger
and abrasion on the right knee) does not inspire belief, when contrasted with the positive and
categorical eyewitness accounts of Renato Molina and Manolo Angeles that appellant ran
after and stabbed the victim. The latter's testimonies are corroborated by the number and
extent of the stab wounds sustained by the victim.

(Testimony of Manolo Angeles)

Q While you were urinating at a post in Pariancillo, can you

remember if there was an unusual incident that happened at that
time?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was that unusual incident?

A Nakita ko po si Rogelio Deopante na tikad-tikad ng saksak si Dante

Deopante (I saw Rogelio Deopante chasing Dante Deopante with
intention of stabbing).

COURT:

Q You mean by "tikad-tikad", habol?

A Yes, your Honor.

ATTY. VALERIO:
 Q How far were you when you were urinating from the place where
the victim was chased by the accused?

A More or less twenty (20) meters, sir.

Q What happened after that?

A He overtook him and stabbed him.

Q Can you remember how many stabs that the deceased received
from the accused?

A Two (2), Sir.

Q Did you see the position of the deceased while he was being
stabbed?

A At that time Dante Deopante was lying on his back and this Rogelio
Deopante stabbed him.19

(Testimony of Renato Molina)

Q If you know, what did Rogelio Deopante do with the knife that he
was then carrying?

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Witness may answer.

A He used (it) in stabbing Dante Deopante.

Q How did he (use) it?

A They were both lying on the ground when this Rogelio Deopante
used that Balisong or fan knife in stabbing the victim, only I did not
know how many stabs he made on the victim (but witness
demonstrating as if he is stabbing somebody from his right hand
going downward).20

Due to appellant's failure to prove unlawful aggression by the victim, and in view of the
prosecution's evidence conclusively showing that it was appellant who was the unlawful
aggressor, appellant's claims of self-defense must be completely discounted, since even
incomplete self-defense "by its very nature and essence, always would require the
attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the victim which must clearly be shown." 21 We
agree with the finding of the trial court that:

There is no gainsaying the fact that the accused herein was responsible for slaying
his nephew and victim Dante Deopante. Only, by way of avoidance, the accused
 stated that while he and his nephew were rolling and grappling on the ground, the
latter took a knife out of nowhere but he managed to wrest it away from his nephew
and he stabbed him (Dante Deopante) with it.

Such a posture adopted by the accused deserves scant consideration from the
Court.

For one, the victim would not have time to draw a knife from his person and then
opened it while at the same time grappling with his uncle while both were rolling on
the ground.

For another, such declaration was self-serving on the part of the accused and
remains unsupported by the evidence. Even the accused's own witness and friend
for a long time Benito Carrasco who professed that he was only about five to seven
meters away from the accused and who witnessed the latter grappling with the victim
on the ground, did not see Dante took out a knife and that the accused manage to
wrest it away or else the defense would certainly underscore such an event and
made much of it during his testimony in court. The fact that he did not state such a
circumstance gave the lie to such posture taken by the accused.22

Furthermore, based on the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, we are
convinced that the accused did not act in self-defense in killing the former. "It is an oft-
repeated rule that the presence of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim
negates self-defense; instead it indicates a determined effort to kill the victim.23 Accused,
after struggling with the victim, had the latter on his back and in an obviously helpless and
vulnerable position. Even assuming arguendo that it was the deceased who had initiated the
attack and accused was merely defending himself, clearly there could not have been any
need for him to stab the victim twice if the purpose was simply to disable the victim or make
him desist from his unlawful assault.

Forth Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

We see no reason to disturb the trial court's evaluation and assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, the same not being tainted by any arbitrariness or palpable error. "Jurisprudence
teaches us that the findings of the trial court judge who tried the case and heard the
witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and
circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if properly considered, might affect
the result of the case. The trial judge's evaluation of the witness' credibility deserves utmost
respect in the absence of arbitrariness.24 Furthermore, "conclusions and findings of the trial
court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong
and valid reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine the demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying on the case.25

We reviewed the entire record of the case, and found that the trial court correctly gave
credence to the testimonies of Manolo Angeles and Renato Molina. As aptly stated by it:

So it is that the Court gave full credence to the eyewitnesses accounts of prosecution
witnesses Manolo Angeles and Renato Molina.

Both are disinterested eyewitnesses.

 Manolo Angeles would not testify falsely against accused because the latter is the
uncle of the full blood of his wife, being the daughter of the sister of the accused. He
would not dare incur the wrath of his wife and her family, specially of the accused
whose temperament he well knew.

The same is true with Renato Molina. He resides nearby and in the same locality as
the accused and the victim, the latter being his childhood friend.

Knowing the accused very well and his reputation, he dare not trifle with the truth and
testify falsely against him. In fact, he was very reluctant to testify and it look coercive
process of the Court to bring him to the witness stand.

Besides his presence at the scene of the stabbing incident was even acknowledged
by the accused himself during the trial so that this witness' testimony is well worth
considering.26

Furthermore, we note and concur in the court a quo's assessment of the testimony of the son
of the accused, which definitely tends to negate the theory of self-defense.

Again, another defense witness presented was Vladimir Deopante, son of the
accused who mentioned in passing during the course of his testimony that when
informed of an on-going quarrel involving his father, he immediately proceeded to the
place where the incident was going on and there and then saw his father grappling
on the ground with his cousin Dante and the latter was holding a weapon with his left
hand so much so that he went back home and informed his mother about the matter
and he was instructed to go back and pacify the protagonists.

This portion of the testimony of Vladimir Deopante sounded incredulous and

unbelievable.

Confronted with a like situation, a son, seeing that his father being (beleaguered) and
in immediate danger of being stabbed and possibly killed, would instinctively and
intuitively rush in, come (to) succor and render immediate assistance to his
endangered parent and would not turn his back on his father and go back home to
await instructions on what to do under the premises.

It may be that this witness was actually at the scene when he saw his father and
cousin were grappling on the ground and seeing that his father had a knife in his
hand and had the upper hand as well as in control of the situation, he did not
interfere but turned back and went home and informed his mother. This would be
more in keeping with the natural course of events.27

Fifth Issue: Incomplete Self-defense

Appellant argues that the trial court should have applied Art. 69 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides for imposition of a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed
by law where the killing "is not wholly excusable", as in the case at bar, given the absence of
some of the requisites to justify the killing. Appellant is in error. Said provision of law applies
only where a majority of the conditions required to justify a criminal act or exempt from
liability are present. Such is not the situation in the case at bar. Unlawful aggression is
indispensable in self-defense, complete or otherwise. When unlawful aggression (by the
victim) alone is proved, such incomplete self-defense is to be appreciated as an ordinary
 mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. When it is
combined with another element of self-defense, such incomplete self-defense becomes a
privileged mitigating circumstance under Article 69 of the same Code.28 But in the instant
case, as already mentioned above, it was conclusively shown that appellant was the
aggressor.

WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellant Rogelio Deopante y

Carillo of the crime of murder and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
payment to the victim's heirs of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

(2) PEOPLE VS GALAS GR NO 114007

G.R. No. 114007 September 24, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GONZALO GALAS, JOSUE GALAS, NOE GALAS, DIMAS ACMA alias "DIMAY," and MAXIMO
DELGADO, accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Federico Gamayon, a farmer and resident of Apoaporawan, Palawan, died on 23 December 1985 in
Tinagong Dagat, Narra, Palawan, due to six hack wounds and two stab wounds inflicted on various
parts of his body. Held to account for his death the accused herein.

The prosecution was commenced by the filing of a criminal complaint for murder in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Narra, Palawan. The complaint was then amended to charge the accused with
the lesser offense of homicide.1They were released by the said court upon the approval of their bail
bonds and the record of the case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan. In
his resolution of 7 April 1986,2 then Provincial Fiscal Aurelio Trampe recommended the filing of an
information for murder due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength.

On 8 April 1986, an Information3 was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan by
Provincial Fiscal Trampe charging the accused with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of December, 1985 at Barangay Tinagong Dagat Municipality
of Narra, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping
one another with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery and by the use of
superior strength, did then and there deadly weapons one Federico Gamayon hitting him in
different vital parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him several injuries which was the
direct and immediate cause of his instantaneous death.
 Contrary to law and committed with aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
use of superior strength.

No bond was recommended for the temporary liberty of the accused.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6233 and initially assigned to Branch 48 of the said
court.

On 10 February 1988, the court, per Judge Singuat Guerra, granted the motion of 9 February 1987
filed by Third Assistant Fiscal Reynaldo R. Guayco with the approval of Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio
Z. Gacott, Jr., for the cancellation of the bail bonds of the accused and the issuance of a warrant for
their arrest in view of the filing of the information for murder which recommended no bond for them.4

On 30 October 1987, Judge Guerra ordered the case archived and directed the issuance of
an alias warrant of arrest since no return was made of the warrant of arrest issued on 10 February
1987. Two more alias warrants of arrest were subsequently issued, but no returns were likewise
made. Thus, on 12 July 1988, Judge Guerra directed the Station Commander of Narra, Palawan, to
show cause and explain why he should not be held for indirect contempt.5

On 15 December 1988, accused Gonzalo Galas was turned over the court.6 Whether he voluntarily
surrendered or was arrested is unclear from the record. Since the other accused remained outside
the jurisdiction of the court and the warrants for their arrest had not been returned, Judge Guerra, on
12 July 1988, again directed the Station Commander of Narra, Palawan, to explain why he should
not be held for indirect contempt.7

On 9 May 1989, with Judge Angel Miclat as the new presiding Judge of Branch 48, accused
Gonzalo Galas was finally arraigned. As he entered a plea of not guilty, the court scheduled the pre-
trial and initial trial of the case, as against, him, on 5 and 6 July 1989. The court further issued
another alias warrant of arrest for the other accused.8

On 4 October 1989, with another judge, Judge Amor A. Reyes, presiding over Branch 48, the trial
court ordered the forfeiture of the bail bonds of Gonzalo Galas' co-accused and granted counsel for
the accused five days to file his announced petition for reinvestigation and the prosecution to resolve
it within twenty days from receipt.9 The petition10 was filed with the trial court on 6 October 1989 and
the latter referred it to the Provincial Prosecutor for resolution within twenty days.11

After the reinvestigation, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sesinio B. Belen, with the approval of
Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito Demaala, filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information which
now charges the accused with Homicide. As ground for the downgrading of the offense charged,
Prosecutor Belen alleged that the reinvestigation disclosed no evidence of evident premeditation nor
treachery, and the victim even had the opportunity to wound accused Gonzalo Galas.12

On 29 January 1990, Criminal Case No. 6233 was transferred to Branch 47 of the RTC of Palawan,
which was then presided by Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., former Provincial Fiscal of Palawan.

On 22 March 1990, accused Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado filed a
motion to lift the order of arrest and of the forfeiture of their bail bonds.13

On 23 March 1990, Branch 47 of the RTC, per Judge Gacott, denied for lack of merit the
prosecution's motion to admit the Amended Information,14 and arraigned accused Josue Galas, Noe
Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado on the basis of the information for murder. Each entered
a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits ensued, commencing on 14 May 1990 and ending on 13
July 1993.15

The prosecution established the following facts:

On 23 December 1995, at around 9:00 p.m., Fedrico Gamayon and his 15-year old son Crisanto,
who was riding on a carabao, and 6-year old nephew Joemar,16 who was riding on the sled, were on
their way home to Tinagong Dagat from Sandoval, Narra, Palawan, where they had sold copra to
certain Gabileo. When they were the house of accused Gonzalo Galas, Federico was called by
Gonzalo. When Federico approached Gonzalo, the latter suddenly hacked Federico with a
bolo.17 Federico fell to the ground,18 then accused Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas Acma, and
Maximo Delgado "ganged up" on Federico, according to Crisanto;19 or "helped each other mauling"
Federico, according to Joemar.20 Josue Galas hacked Federico with a bolo, while Noe Galas, Dimas
Acma, and Maximo Delgado were armed with pieces of wood.21

Federico was unable to fight back; he could not even unsheath his bolo from its scabbard.22

Crisanto Gamayon could not do anything to help his father because he was afraid; moreover, the
accused ran after him.23 Crisanto ran to his uncle for help, but the latter was not in his
house.24 Crisanto did not return to the crime scene until the next day25 and after the incident was
reported to the police authorities.

Federico lay there until the next day when the police and Dr. Dominador Hubo, the municipal health
officer, arrived to transport and examine Federico's cadaver. Dr. Hubo conducted the autopsy and
his findings are quoted
verbatim:26

The cadaver in the state of rigor mortiz [sic] wearing red jacket and red short pants. The
cadaver is covered with a twig and leaves of cacawate tree and a small plastic canvass in a
right side double up position. Several blood scattered the water where he is laying and a dry
place. The cadaver is located approximately 200 yards from the house of Mr. Galas.

Autopsy findings:

1. Hack wound 8 inches in length, 3 inches deep running from

the left side to the back of the neck, severing the 8th cervical.

2. Hack wound 6 inches in length, 3 inches in deep [sic] one

inch above the first wound, severing the 4th cervical
vertebrae.

3. Hack wound 6 inches in length, 2 inches in deep [sic], 2

inches above the second wound, severing the 2nd cervical
vertebrae.

4. Hack wound 5 inches in length, 2 inches in deep [sic]

severing the left parietal bone.

5. Stab wound 2 inches in length left infra mammary area,

perching the left thoraxic cavity and lung.
 6. Hack wound 4 inches in length 2 inches in deep [sic], right
arm.

7. Stab wound, one inch in length right and left inguinal area,
perching the abdominal cavity.

8. Hack wound, 3 inches in length, 2 inches in deep [sic],

anteromedial right leg.

Dr. Hubo opined that the cause of death of Federico was:

Cardio respiratory arrest secondary to —

1. Multiple hack and stab wound [sic].

2. Internal and external hemorrhage27

Dr. Hubo declared that he did not find any contusions nor abrasions on Federico's body as it was
covered with mud caused by occasional showers.28

As to the accused's motive, Crisanto intimated that Gonzalo was angry because Federico demanded
payment from Gonzalo for hiring his carabao29 for one year,30 with the payment supposed to be in
kind: ten sacks of palay.31

Each of the accused had a different version of what transpired.

Accused Gonzalo Galas claimed that on 23 December 1985 at around 9:00 p.m., he was twenty
meters away from his house in Sandoval, Narra, Palawan, helping a baby carabao nurse from its
mother. He was then called and challenged to a fight by Federico Gamayon, and when he
approached Federico, the latter stabbed him with a bolo. He grabbed his bolo and used it to defend
himself. He treated; but Federico still hit him. They hacked each other. Federico fell; Gonzalo went
home to ask for help to get to the doctor. He was brought to the doctor by Maximo Delgado and Joel
Buncag. The medical certificate issued to him (Exhibit "1") by the doctor indicates that he was
wounded on the right arm and on the left part of his abdomen. According to Gonzalo, nobody
witnessed the fight and nobody helped him fight Federico. He asserted that he had no previous
quarrel with Federico and that the latter was drunk that night.32

On their part, accused Josue and Noe Galas declared that on the date and time Federico was killed,
they were in Tigsiapo, Apu-aporaoan, Aborlan, Palawan, which is five kilometers away from the
scene of the crime, where they were hauling palay for Sergio Gabileo. They came to know of the
incident only the day after it happened.33

Accused Maximo Delgado testified that on 23 December 1985 at 9:00 p.m., he was in his house in
Tinagong Dagat, Narra, Palawan,34 about half a kilometer away from Gonzalo's home. He was
summoned by Gonzalo's wife and one Joel Buncag to help bring Gonzalo to the hospital. He denied
having inflicted any injury upon Federico.35

Accused Dimas Akma testified that on 23 December 1985 at 9:00 p.m. he was at Sandoval, Narra,
Palawan, at the house of one Decena which is approximately three kilometers away from the scene
of the crime. At that time they had just finished threshing palay for Sergio Gabileo and were roasting
chicken for little get-together.36
The accused also presented corroborating witnesses, viz., (a) Joel Buncag, who said he saw
Federico hack Gonzalo; and that the two eyewitnesses, Crisanto Gamayon and Joemar Deocadiz,
as well as the four other accused were not at the scene of the crime when the killing occurred;
however, Maximo Delgado arrived to help bring Gonzalo to the hospital;37 (b) Policarpio Gabello, who
corroborated the testimony of Maximo Delgado who had said that his only participation was to help
bring Gonzalo to the hospital for treatment and that of Dimas Akma who had said that he was in the
house of one Decena at the time of the killing;38 and (c) Sergio Gabileo, who corroborated the
testimonies of accused Josue Galas and Noe Galas who earlier testified that they were on his farm
hauling palay on the day of the killing and that the two slept in his house that night.39

In its decision dated 23 August 1993,40 the trial court found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as charged, and rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby holds that the prosecution has
proven the guilt of the accused Gonzalo Galas, Noel Galas, Josue Galas, Maximo Delgado
and Dimas Akma beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for having mutually helped, connived and
conspired with each other in killing the victim, Federico Gamayon with treachery, evident
premeditation and the use of superior strength. They are, therefore, sentenced each to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sum of
P150,000.00 (or P30,000.00 each accused) as actual, moral and exemplary damages, with
costs.

With this conviction that makes the accused herein maximum security prisoners, they are
hereby ordered shipped immediately to the national penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
to serve their sentence there.

The accused seasonably file their notice of appeal and in their Appellants' Brief they impute upon the
trial court the commission of the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LOSS OF JURISDICTION IN RELYING ENTIRELY ON THE MANIFESTLY PERJURED
TESTIMONY OF THE TWO SUPPOSED EYEWITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION AND
IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO

LOSS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT ACCORDING ACCUSED THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT AND TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.41

In the first assigned error, the accused make it appear that the relationship between the deceased
and the two main witnesses diminishes the potency of their testimony. Such emphasis is misplaced.
This Court has held in a number of cases that relationship between the witnesses and the deceased
does not automatically impair the credibility of the former.42 We have likewise held that a witness'
relationship to a victim, far from rendering his testimony biased, would even render it more credible
as it would be unnatural for a relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody
other than the real culpit.43 They have a definite stake at seeing the guilty person brought before the
courts so that justice may be served.44 It is not to be lightly supposed that relatives of the victim
would callously violate their conscience to avenge the death of a dear one by blaming it on persons
who are in fact innocent of the crime.45

They also put in issue the age of one of the main witnesses, Joemar Deocadiz, who was five years
old when he allegedly witnessed the killing.

It must be stressed that Joemar's age does not disqualify him as a witness. Section 20, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known
their perception to others, may be witnesses. The exceptions thereto are found in the succeeding
Section 20 and, insofar as children are concerned, only those whose mental maturity is such so as
to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating
truthfully are disqualified. It is thus clear that any child, regardless of age, can be competent witness
if they meet the following criteria: (a) capacity of observation, (b) capacity of recollection, and (c)
capacity of communication.46 The accused urge us to give no weight to Joemar's testimony because
of its unreliability; they claim that he could not even remember the month and the year when the
incident happened. A close scrutiny of his testimony discloses, however, that Joemar was clear on
the facts he observed surrounding the death of Federico which, according to him took place on a
date "nearing Christmas."47Since the date of Federico's death was indubitably established to be 23
December 1985, which was, indeed, "nearing Christmas," Joemar's approximation was sufficient.

The accused also harp on Crisanto Gamayon's credibility on the ground that if he were really there,
he would have unquestionably helped his father instead of merely standing still and simply gaping at
the latter's killing by five men and returning to the scene only on the following day. Crisanto's
testimony that he was afraid48 sufficiently refutes this objection. Fear has been known to render
people immobile, if not useless, in some life-and-death situations. Crisanto and Joemar left
Federico's body overnight at the scene of the crime because darkness had fallen and fear gripped
them. Under the circumstances, the 16-year old Crisanto and the 5-year old Joemar could not be
expected to act like adults, in full possession of their mental, emotional, and psychological faculties.

In the second assigned error, the accused insist that Gonzalo Galas alone killed Federico Gamayon
in self-defense; and assuming arguendo that self-defense was not found to be satisfactorily
established, an impartial tribunal could not but rule that the crime committed was not murder, but
only homicide.

In its Appellee's Brief filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the People agree with the trial court
except as to its order directing each of the accused to pay P30,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as
indemnity, which, it submits, is not in accord with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code and
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. They should be held solidarily liable in the amount of
P50,000.00 pursuant to People vs. Macam.49

We have no doubt whatsoever that prosecution witnesses Crisanto Gamayon and Joemar Deocadiz
were with Federico Gamayon on that fateful evening of 23 December 1985. But, whether their
testimony given only after the lapse of five years presented an authentic picture of what actually
happened is an entirely different matter, especially as regards the accused Josue Galas, Noe Galas,
Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado whose alibis have, nevertheless, to be rejected in light of their
positive identification by Crisanto and Joemar. It is doctrinally settled that alibi cannot prevail over
and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.50

Our meticulous scrutiny of the evidence discloses that accused Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas
Acma, and Maximo Delgado were not with accused Gonzalo Galas when the latter and Federico
Gamayon met for the first time. They arrived at the scene of the incident after accused Gonzalo
Galas had hacked Federico with a bolo and the latter had fallen. Then and there they "ganged up"
(according to Crisanto) or "mauled" (according to Joemar) Federico. Thus, on direct examination,
Crisanto testified:

PROSECUTOR DELOVINO:

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said you were in that place, what happened in that place?

A Gonzalo Galas suddenly called my father, Ma'am.

Q What did your father do after he called my Gonzalo Galas?

A He went near Gonzalo Galas and suddenly he was hacked.

COURT:

Q Who hacked you father?

A Gonzalo Galas, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR DELOVINO:

Q When he was hacked by Gonzalo Galas, what happened next?

A He was ganged up by the companions of Gonzalo Galas.

xxx xxx xxx

Q You said that after your father was hacked he was ganged up by the
companions of Gonzalo Galas, who ganged up on him?

A Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Maximo Delgado and a certain alias Dimay.

xxx xxx xxx

COURT:

Q You said that these people ganged up on him, what do you mean by that?

A Gonzalo Galas used a bolo in hacking my father; also Josue Galas; Noe
Galas, Maximo Delgado and alias Dimay were bringing pieces of wood, each
of them.51

That Gonzalo Galas' co-accused participated only after Federico had already fallen or was already
lying on the ground was further elicited by the trial court from Crisanto, thus:

COURT:
 Q Did your father not shout for help?

A No, sir.

Q Who actually killed him?

A Gonzalo Galas, Your Honor.

Q So, when Gonzalo Galas hacked him, he was already dead?

A No, Sir, because he was also being clubbed by the other accused.

Q The other accused was already clubbing him when he was already lying
down?

A Yes, Your Honor.52

On additional cross-examination by the defense counsel, Crisanto even admitted that Gonzalo had
already hacked Federico three time before the latter fell to the ground and that it was after the fall
that he was attacked by Gonzalo's co-accused. Thus:

ATTY. RUELO:

Q How many seconds elapsed after the start of the incident before your
father fell to the ground?

A He fell down after three hacks, Sir.

Q I said seconds.

A He fell down immediately.

Q After he fell only the accused went near your father and nobody else?

A Yes, Sir.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And you said that the incident took so long and most of the time spent was
when your father was already lying down on the ground?

A Yes, Sir.53

This answer prompted the court to ask:

Q Was it possible that your father was already dead when he fell and he was
still being clubbed?

to which, Crisanto answered:

 A It was possible, Your Honor.54

Joemar Deocadiz corroborated Crisanto's testimony that it was only after Federico had fallen that
Gonzalo's co-accused attacked Federico. However, contrary to Crisanto's claim, Joemar asserted
that Federico fell after he was hacked twice by Gonzalo. Thus:

PROSECUTOR DELOVINO:

Q How many times was Federico Gamayon hacked by Gonzalo Galas?

A Twice, Ma'am.

Q Where was Federico Gamayon hit?

A On the right neck. (As demonstrated by the witness).

Q And where else was he hit?

A On the right side of the dead, Ma'am. (As demonstrated by the witness).

Q What happened to Federico Gamayon?

A He fell down, Ma'am.

Q After Federico Gamayon fell down, what happened next?

A They helped each other in mauling him.

Q Who mauled him?

A Dimay, Noe, and Ming.55

The "mauling" was explained by Joemar to mean "clubbing" with the use of wood. Thus:

PROSECUTOR DELOVINO:

Q You said that Federico Gamayon was ganged up or mauled by these

accused whom you have just identified. How did they gang up on Federico
Gamayon?

A They clubbed Federico Gamayon.

Q With what weapon?

A Wood, Ma'am.56

Whether Gonzalo had hacked Federico — thrice according to Crisanto or twice according to Joemar
— before Federico had fallen, the fact remains that it was after that fall when Gonzalo's co-accused
arrived to "maul" of "club" Federico.
Assuming that, indeed, Federico was "mauled" or "clubbed," did accused Josue Galas, Noe Galas,
Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado succeed in inflicting any injury on Federico Gamayon? If full
credit is to be given to Crisanto and Joemar, the answer would be in the affirmative.

Unfortunately, there is no convincing evidence that proves that the wounds sustained by Federico
Gamayon were inflicted by two persons with the use of two different weapons to justify a conclusion
that anyone of Gonzales' co-accused also stabbed Federico with the use of another weapon. Dr.
Hubo was uncertain as to the first. He merely stated that they could have been caused by one or two
persons. Thus:

FISCAL DELOVINO:

Q Doctor, with all these injuries, could you tell us how many persons inflicted
those injuries?

xxx xxx xxx

A By the manner of the wounds and the size of the wounds, they were
caused by one or two persons.57

As to the second, Dr. Hubo admitted on cross-examination the possibility that only one weapon was
used. Thus:

ATTY. AUSTRIA:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Is there a possibility that there is only one instrument that was used by the
assailant in inflicting this kind of injuries to the victim?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, if that bladed instrument particularly say for example a bolo, Doctor,
which was used by the assailant in hacking the victim was used also by him
in stabbing the victim, could the victim also sustain stabbed [sic] wounds,
similar stabbed [sic] wounds as appearing in this autopsy report?

A If that bolo is so thin and the size of the bolo is 2 inches, that is possible.

Q So, Doctor, [y]ou will agree with me that it is possible that only one bladed
instrument or bolo was used in inflicting all these injuries by the assailant to
the victim?

A It is possible if the bladed instrument is pointed and the size of 2 inches.

Q That is also your basis in stating that those injuries could have been
caused by only one or two persons, isn't it?

A Yes, sir.58
And on cross-examination by another defense lawyer, Dr. Hubo emphatically declared that only one
weapon was used in inflicting the wounds on Federico. Thus:

ATTY. DE LOS REYES:

I will repeat for emphasis, your Honor.

Q Do you agree that only one weapon could have been used in inflicting all
the wounds?

A Yes, sir.59

There is, as well, no evidence that the "mauling" or "clubbing" by Gonzalo Galas' co-accused had
produced any injury on any part of Federico's body. Dr. Hubo explained that he failed to detect any
contusions nor abrasions because the cadaver was covered with mud due to occasional
showers.60 The People suggest, however, that the failure of Dr. Hubo to detect the contusions or
abrasions does not mean that Federico did not sustain any injury from the mauling or clubbing.61 This
is plain speculation which finds no support in the rule on evidence in criminal cases.

Furthermore, there is no evidence on record that Gonzalo Galas was with his co-accused when he
called Federico Gamayon, or that all the accused arrived simultaneously at the place where
Federico was hacked by Gonzalo. While Gonzalo's co-accused were seen at the scene of the crime
by Crisanto and Joemar, no clear and convincing evidence can support a conclusion that the said
co-accused were able to inflict any injury — either a stab or hack wound with the use of a bolo, or
contusion, abrasion, or hematoma with the use of pieces of wood — on Federico. There is, as well,
absolutely no evidence of conspiracy among Gonzalo and his co-accused as to make each of the
latter equally liable for all the acts of Gonzalo under the doctrine that once conspiracy is established
the act of one is the act of all.62 Crisanto and Joemar may have thus miscomprehended or
misappreciated the sequence of events after the arrival of Gonzalo's co-accused.

We cannot fully agree with the trial courts' unqualified reliance on the testimonies of Crisanto and
Joemar, nor cast our imprimatur on its assessment of the said witnesses' credibility pursuant to the
rule that the issue of credibility is addressed to the trial court since it heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner or testifying during the trial.63 For one, the trial court
overlooked the foregoing facts, viz.; infliction of the wounds by one person with the use of one
weapon, and the absence of any injury caused by the mauling or clubbing. Excepted from the rule
on the binding character of the trial court's assessment of credibility of witnesses are instances when
trial courts have overlooked, misapplied, and misinterpreted facts and circumstances of great weight
and value which would affect the result of the case.64

For another, Judge Gacott, who tried the case, heard the witnesses, and rendered the decision,
cannot be said to have possessed the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. As noted early on in
this ponencia, he approved, in his capacity as the Provincial Fiscal, the motion of Third Assistant
Provincial Fiscal Reynaldo R. Guayco to cancel the bail bonds of the accused and to issue the
warrant of their arrest65 in view of the filing of the information for murder which recommended no
bond for the accused.66 As such, Judge Gacott, as the then Provincial Fiscal, was deemed to have
concurred with the view of Fiscal Guayco that the evidence of guilt of the accused in this case was
strong. In light of the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty,67 he must have
read the supporting evidence, such as the sworn statements of Crisanto Gamayon and Joemar
Deocadiz. Finally, after the case was transferred from Branch 48 to his branch — Branch 47 —
Judge Gacott denied the prosecution's motion to admit an amended information charging the
accused with the lesser offense of homicide.68 Such acts merely evinced his belief in the
trustworthiness of the testimony of Crisanto and Joemar and an impression of prejudgment is thus
unavoidable.

Under these circumstances, it was discretionary upon Judge Gacott to voluntarily inhibit himself
pursuant to Section 1(2), Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,69 and returned the case of Branch 48 where
it originated. However, while Judge Gacott's voluntary inhibition would have been preferable, it
cannot be said that his failure caused substantial prejudice to the accused. Initially, let it be clear that
Judge Gacott's previous participation in the case as Provincial Fiscal was not raised either before us
nor the court a quo. On this score, it has been held:

[T]he disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act
such as to render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the part of a party, to
timely interpose such an objection of disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be
a fatal obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. In Government of the Philippines vs.
Abella [49 Phil. 374-378], we held: . . . The attorneys for the appellants should have been
familiar with the pleadings in the cause, as well as other documents in the record. Reference
to these would at once have revealed the fact that Judge Carballo had participated
administratively to the extent above stated. A litigant, having these facts before him, cannot
be permitted to speculate upon the action of a court and raise an objection to this sort after
[the] decision has been rendered. The grounds for disqualification specified in section 8 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (now Rule 137) supply matter for preliminary exception, and
timely objection should be submitted in writing as is required in said section. The inadvertent
failure of the court to disqualify himself in the case there mentioned does not supply a ground
for reversing the judgment; but of course if this court were of the opinion that the litigant had
not had a fair trial, a new trial could be granted. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that should be timely raised in the
first instance, so that it may properly be raised and considered on appeal. At the same time .
. . if this Court were of the opinion upon a review of the case that the litigant had not had a
fair trial, it would grant a new trial, although the judge may not have been disqualified under
Rule 137, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but in the best interest of justice. . . .70

Further, given that the guarantee of an impartial judge concerns itself with procedural due
process,71 any defect therein may be waived as implied above and is subject to the curative effect of
filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal.

That Crisanto and Joemar could have misapprehended or misappreciated the events, especially as
to the participation of Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas Acma, and Maximo Delgado, could easily be
deduced from the fact that the incident occurred at nighttime; Crisanto was "a little bit far" 72 from his
father, and he ran away. Joemar, who was only six years old, was sitting on a sled.73 He did not
testify as to his distance to Federico when the latter was attacked.

We have then serious doubts as to the culpability of accused Josue Galas, Noe Galas, Dimas Acma,
and Maximo Delgado. Their acquittal is inevitable for failure of the prosecution to overcome the
presumption of innocence which is guaranteed in Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.

The fate of accused Gonzalo Galas is entirely different. He admitted that he killed Federico
Gamayon; however, he interposed self-defense to justify his act. The rule is unbending that where
the accused admits the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself, i.e., the burden is
shifted to him to prove that the killing was justified and he incurred no criminal liability therefor. For
that purpose, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence for, even if the latter were weak, it would not be disbelieved after his open
admission of responsibility for the killing.74

The three requisites of self-defense which accused Gonzalo Galas has to satisfy by clear and
convincing evidence are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, Federico Gamayon, (2)
the reasonable necessity of the means he (Gonzalo) employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on his (Gonzalo's) part.75

The prosecution and Gonzalo Galas have contrariant versions as to how the incident started. The
former claimed that when Federico was near Gonzalo's house, Gonzalo called the former who then
approached the latter. The latter then suddenly hacked Federico with a bolo. Upon the other hand,
Gonzalo contended that while he was helping a baby carabao nurse from its mother at a place about
twenty meters from his house, Federico called and challenged him to a fight and when he
approached Federico, the latter stabbed him with a bolo. He then grabbed his own bolo to defend
himself and retreated; but since Federico still hit him, they hacked each other.

Assuming Gonzalo's version to be true and accurate, he, therefore, accepted a challenge to fight.
Both had bolos with them. By accepting the challenge and immediately approaching Federico,
Gonzalo placed himself in an unlawful status. Settled is the rule that when parties mutually agree to
fight, it is immaterial who attacks or receives the wound first, for the first act of force is an incident of
the fight itself and in nowise is it unwarranted and unexpected aggression which alone can legalize
self-defense. A personal fight freely and voluntarily accepted creates an illegal state of affairs which
comes within the sanction of criminal law, during which no application can be made to either party of
the circumstances modifying criminal liability, arising from facts or accidents, physical or otherwise,
of the fight itself.76

Consequently, Gonzalo's claim of self-defense claim hardly merits even a semblance of sympathy.

That both had a fight was confirmed by Joemar in his answers during cross-examination. Thus:

ATTY. DE LOS REYES:

Q So that you saw the fight between your uncle, Federico Gamayon and
accused Gonzalo Galas?

A Yes, sir.

Q And it was very near the house of the accused Gonzalo Galas?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And inspite of the fact that it was already 9:00 o'clock that night you saw
actually the fighting?

A Yes, Sir.77

Crisanto Gamayon likewise admitted that Gonzalo Galas sustained wounds. Thus:

ATTY. RUELO:
 xxx xxx xxx

Q And you knew that Gonzalo Galas also suffered wounds?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you are trying to tell the Honorable Court it was the other accused
who inflicted his wound?

A I don't know, Sir.78

The claim of the prosecution that it was not possible that Federico inflicted the injuries on Gonzalo
because the former was unable to pull out his bolo from its scabbard does not inspire belief. There is
no evidence that Gonzalo's wounds were self-inflicted and the speculation of the prosecution that
they would have been inflicted by his co-accused remains speculative. The best evidence that
Federico was unable to use of his bolo was his bolo and its scabbard; yet, they were not presented.

The challenge hurled by Federico was not unmotivated. Crisanto provided the motive: Gonzalo did
not pay Federico the rental for one year for the former's carabao which the latter leased.

The foregoing considered, we rule that accused Gonzalo Galas is liable only for the crime of
homicide as defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Since no mitigating or
aggravating circumstances have been proven, the medium period of the penalty of reclusion
temporal prescribed in Article 249 may be imposed upon him. He is also entitled to the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and as such, may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is partly granted and the judgment appealed from is modified. As
modified, (1) accused JOSUE GALAS, NOE GALAS, DIMAS ACMA alias "Dimay," and MAXIMO
DELGADO are hereby detention unless some other lawful cause warrants their further detention;
and (2) accused GONZALO GALAS is CONVICTED of the crime of homicide, as defined and
penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, his guilt therefor having been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law after having determined the
absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
SEVENTEEN (17) years and FOUR (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, with all
the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of Federico Gamayon in the sum of
P50,000.00, and to pay the costs in the trial court and in his instance.

SO ORDERED.

(3) PEOPLE VS GENEBLAZO 361 SCRA 573

G.R. No. 133580 July 20, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
MAXIMO GENEBLAZO, accused-appellant.
BUENA, J.:

Accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Calauag, Quezon, Branch 63 in Criminal Case No. 2151-C, entitled "The People of the Philippines
versus Maximino Geneblazo", convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.

On October 16, 1992, an information was filed against Maximino Geneblazo charging him of murder
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of January 1988, at Barangay Pinagtalyeran, Municipality of
Calauag, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill, and with
treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the said weapon one Domingo Opalsa, thereby inflicting upon the latter wounds on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his death."That the accused attacked and
stabbed said Domingo Opalsa suddenly and unexpectedly without giving the latter any
opportunity to defend himself or to escape.

"Contrary to law."[1]

Upon arraignment on December 3, 1992, accused Maximino Geneblazo, assisted by counsel,

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The Regional Trial Court thereafter proceeded with the trial.

Culled from the records are the following:

Alex Obien, the first witness for the prosecution, testified that on January 15, 1988, at around 12:00
midnight he and Domingo Opalsa were walking along Quezon Street, Calauag, Quezon, bound for
home when Maximino Geneblazo and around six unknown companions stoned them. Obien and
Opalsa retaliated by also throwing stones at Geneblazo and company. However, upon seeing that
Geneblazo was about to draw his knife, they ran away.

Maximino Geneblazo caught up with Domingo Opalsa and stabbed the latter twice – the first stab
landed on the left side of the body in the area of the armpit, while the second landed on the left side
of the face.

SPO1 Emmanuel Quiogue of the Philippine National Police, at Calauag, Quezon was at home on
the night in question. He heard a commotion outside. Peeping out the window he saw some men
throwing stones at each other. He got his gun and went outside. Noticing the chase which ensued,
he went after the men.

At the scene of the incident, SPO1 Quiogue saw two men almost locked in an embrace. He fired his
gun but the two did not draw apart so he stood between them so as to separate them. One of the
men fell to the ground while the person who was left standing stabbed him. Only his finger was hit.
He recognized the person who stabbed him as Maximino Geneblazo.

Thereafter SPO1 Quiogue, Obien and Barangay Captain Torres of Pinagtalyeran brought Opalsa to
St. Peter’s Hospital where the latter was pronounced dead on arrival.

Maximino Geneblazo, who was the lone witness for the defense, testified that he was standing in
front of the market at about 12:00 midnight on January 15, 1988, when two men who were drunk
passed by. They challenged him to a fight. He recognized these two men as Adie Obien and Momoy
(Domingo Opalsa). When he refused to fight them, the latter threw stones and flowerpots at him.
Thereafter, Geneblazo chased them for he wanted to know why he was being stoned and because
he wanted to get even.

Geneblazo caught up with Momoy. When he was about to box the latter, Momoy drew out a knife.
Momoy struck the bridge of the nose and finger of Geneblazo with the knife. When Geneblazo fell
down he heard a gunshot. Momoy was about to stab Geneblazo again but when he heard the shot
he was startled so the latter was able to wrest the weapon from Momoy.

Geneblazo then stabbed Momoy in the abdomen. He was about to stab Momoy again when SPO1
Quiogue arrived on the scene. While SPO1 Quiogue was pacifying them, Geneblazo hit Momoy in
the neck. As he did not recognize SPO1 Quiogue he accidentally hit the latter’s left hand with the
knife but when recognition dawned on him who SPO1 Quiogue was, he ran away and hid until his
surrender to a police officer Baloloy.

Salvacion Opalsa y Conohan, the mother of the victim, testified for the prosecution declaring that her
family incurred expenses in the total amount of P45,000.00 for the burial and wake of the victim. The
P45,000.00 is broken down as follows: P5,000.00 for funeral expense, P16,000.00 was spent during
the wake, P6,000.00 was expenses for the cemetery, P8,000.00 was spent to look for the accused,
an additional P5,000.00 for funeral services and P5,000.00 spent during the nine-day prayers for the
deceased after the interment. A certification from the Sutarez Funeral Homes stating that it rendered
funeral services to the late Domingo Opalsa in the amount of P5,000.00[2] and a handwritten list of
the expenses[3] were presented as evidence.

On February 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused the decretal position
of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
the Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and an additional P45,000.00 as
actual damages to the heirs of Domingo Opalsa and to pay the costs.

"SO ORDERED."[4]

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following errors allegedly committed by the
trial court:

"I

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME OF
MURDER, HAVING APPRECIATED THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.

"II

"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT."

The appeal is meritorious in the sense that the penalty should be lowered.

Accused-appellant Maximino Geneblazo alleges that he killed the victim Domingo Opalsa in self-
defense.
Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self-defense, the offender admits authorship of the killing.
The onus probandi is thus shifted to him to prove the elements of self-defense and that the killing
was justified; otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable. Concomitantly, he
must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful aggression
by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was reasonable; and
(3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[5]

It was sufficiently established by the prosecution that the victim Domingo Opalsa and his companion
Alex Obien were merely walking on the road when they were pelted with stones by Maximino
Geneblazo and his companions; that Opalsa and Obien retaliated; that they ran away when they
saw that Geneblazo was about to draw his knife; that Geneblazo pursued them; that Geneblazo
stabbed Opalsa when he caught up with the latter.

It is quite apparent that it was not the victim who committed the unlawful aggression but the
accused-appellant himself.

Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude -- there has to exist a real danger to the
life or personal safety of the person claiming self-defense.[6]

Assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant’s version of the events of the night in question is the
truth and that the unlawful aggression emanated from the victim and his companion who were drunk
at the time, the aggression ceased to exist when the victim and his companion ran away. There was
no longer any real danger to the life or personal safety of the accused. An act of aggression, when
its author does not persist in his purpose, or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the
object of his attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense.[7]

When accused-appellant Geneblazo pursued the two men, it was then that he became the
aggressor.

Finally, belying accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense is his testimony that as soon as he

grabbed the knife from the victim he stabbed the latter in the abdomen. Still he didn’t stop there. He
again stabbed the victim in the neck even in the presence of SPO1 Quiogue who arrived to pacify
them.

Having divested the victim of his knife, the accused-appellant was placed at an advantage as he
already had control of the bladed weapon. The victim was therefore left unarmed and accused-
appellant Geneblazo did not testify nor is there anything on record to show that the vicitm tried to
grapple with him for possession of the knife. A third person (a police officer, at that) was present to
pacify them. There was really no need for the accused-appellant to stab the victim. And his doing so
revealed his murderous intent.

However, the matter of whether or not the deceased was the aggressor is factual. It is a settled rule
that the trial court is in a better position to ascertain the facts under the circumstances. In the
absence of any justifiable reason, this Court is bound to uphold the findings of the trial court.

The accused-appellant admitted that he recognized SPO1 Quiogue after he had stabbed the victim
for the second time. His taking flight and going into hiding instead of surrendering to SPO1 Quiogue
on the spot was highly evidentiary of guilt, and incompatible with his claim of self-defense. Flight
negates self-defense and indicates guilt.[8]
The prosecution failed to prove that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in this
case. Treachery must be proven as clearly and as cogently as the crime itself.[9]

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to himself.[10]

When Opalsa and Obien were pelted with stones, they had the option of retaliating or running away.
They did both. First they threw stones at their attackers, and when they saw that the accused-
appellant was about to draw his knife they ran away. While the stoning incident was sudden, the
attack upon the victim was not. The victim, aware that the accused-appellant was armed with a
weapon, knew that the latter was of a mind to use the weapon and that the only thing he could do to
avoid being wounded was to outrun the accused-appellant. Unfortunately the accused-appellant
caught up with Opalsa and inflicted a fatal stab on him which led to his demise. We do not agree
with the trial court that the killing was attended by treachery that would make the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of murder. We find the accused-appellant guilty of homicide only.

The trial court ordered the accused-appellant to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and an
additional P45,000.00 as actual damages to the heirs of Domingo Opalsa and to pay the costs.

The award of actual damages amounting to P45,000.00 to the heirs of the victim cannot be
sustained. Said amount was allegedly incurred in the interment of the deceased. Except for the
amount of P5,000.00 that was supported by a certification/receipt, the sum of P40,000.00 was not
substantiated by competent evidence. The award of actual damages cannot rest on the bare
allegation of the heirs of the offended party.[11]

In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 should be
awarded to the heirs of the victim.

Based on our findings that homicide, not murder, was committed, the penalty imposed upon
accused-appellant should correspondingly be lowered to reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is
anywhere within the range of prision mayor, or from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years, and the
maximum within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from 14 years, 8 months
and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Calauag, Quezon Br. 63, finding
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder, is MODIFIED. Instead, this Court finds accused-
appellant Maximino Geneblazo guilty of the crime of Homicide, and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporalmedium, as maximum.
The accused is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
actual damages of P5,000.00, moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

(4) PEPLE VS JAURIGUE 76 PHIL 174

C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA JAURIGUE, defendants.
AVELINA JAURIGUE, appellant.

Jose Ma. Recto for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Enriquez and Solicitor Palma for appellee..

DE JOYA, J.:

Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for
the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was
found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four
months and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months and eleven days of reclusion
temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased,
Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay one-half of the costs. She was also credited with
one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her.

From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for
Southern Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —

(1) That the lower court erred in not holding that said appellant had acted in the legitimate
defense of her honor and that she should be completely absolved of all criminal
responsibility;

(2) That the lower court erred in not finding in her favor the additional mitigating
circumstances that (a) she did not have the intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
actually committed, and that (b) she voluntarily surrendered to the agents of the authorities;
and

(3) That the trial court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged offense was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in a sacred place.

The evidence adduced by the parties, at the trial in the court below, has sufficiently established the
following facts:

That both the defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue and the deceased Amado Capina lived in
the barrio of Sta. Isabel, City of San Pablo, Province of Laguna; that for sometime prior to the
stabbing of the deceased by defendant and appellant, in the evening of September 20, 1942, the
former had been courting the latter in vain, and that on one occasion, about one month before that
fatal night, Amado Capina snatched a handkerchief belonging to her, bearing her nickname
"Aveling," while it was being washed by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.

On September 13, 1942, while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado approached her
and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced and
kissed her and touched her breasts, on account of which Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered girl,
slapped Amado, gave him fist blows and kicked him. She kept the matter to herself, until the
following morning when she informed her mother about it. Since then, she armed herself with a long
fan knife, whenever she went out, evidently for self-protection.
On September 15, 1942, about midnight, Amado climbed up the house of defendant and appellant,
and surreptitiously entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead, evidently with
the intention of abusing her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and
brought them to her side. Amado came out from where he had hidden under a bed in Avelina's room
and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking for forgiveness; and when Avelina's
mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her husband prevented her from doing so, stating that
Amado probably did not realize what he was doing. Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant,
Casimiro Lozada, and for Amado's parents, the following morning. Amado's parents came to the
house of Nicolas Jaurigue and apologized for the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue
was then angry, he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to control himself.

In the morning of September 20, 1942, Avelina received information that Amado had been falsely
boasting in the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person and that she had even asked
him to elope with her and that if he should not marry her, she would take poison; and that Avelina
again received information of Amado's bragging at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the
chapel of the Seventh Day Adventists of which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, just across the
provincial road from his house, to attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the
altar with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada. Inside the
chapel it was quite bright as there were electric lights.

Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the arrival of her father,
also for the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest
the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence
of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her
right side, and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on
the upper part of her right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado
Capina, Avelina Jaurigue, conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand
the fan knife marked Exhibit B, which she had in a pocket of her dress, with the intention of
punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the
knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting
upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who
was seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and
upon seeing his daughter still holding the bloody knife, he approached her and asked: "Why did you
do that," and answering him Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore." Amado Capina died
from the wound a few minutes later. Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada, who was also in the same
chapel, approached Avelina and asked her why she did that, and Avelina surrendered herself,
saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa aquin," meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more
correctly, "I place myself at your disposal." Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio
lieutenant Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue and herein defendant and appellant to go home
immediately, to close their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house, unless
accompanied by him. That father and daughter went home and locked themselves up, following
instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the arrival of the municipal authorities; and when
three policemen arrived in their house, at about 10 o'clock that night, and questioned them about the
incident, defendant and appellant immediately surrendered the knife marked as Exhibit B, and
informed said policemen briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the previous acts
and conduct of the deceased, as already stated above, and went with said policemen to the police
headquarters, where her written statements were taken, and which were presented as a part of the
evidence for the prosecution.

The high conception of womanhood that our people possess, however humble they may be, is
universal. It has been entertained and has existed in all civilized communities.
A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman
represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the
reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make
use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances. Criminologists
and courts of justice have entertained and upheld this view.

On the other hand, it is the duty of every man to protect and show loyalty to womanhood, as in the
days of chivalry. There is a country where women freely go out unescorted and, like the beautiful
roses in their public gardens, they always receive the protection of all. That country is Switzerland.

In the language of Viada, aside from the right to life on which rests the legitimate defense of our own
person, we have the right to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least
prized of our patrimony (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., pp. 172, 173).

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of
legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if
not more, than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay
kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be
considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from
so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62
Phil., 504). .

As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the
defense of her honor. Thus, where the deceased grabbed the defendant in a dark night at about 9
o'clock, in an isolated barrio trail, holding her firmly from behind, without warning and without
revealing his identity, and, in the struggle that followed, touched her private parts, and that she was
unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, she was considered justified in making use of
a pocket knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, and which ended in his
death, since she had no other means of defending herself, and consequently exempt from all
criminal liability (People vs. De la Cruz, 16 Phil., 344).

And a woman, in defense of her honor, was perfectly justified in inflicting wounds on her assailant
with a bolo which she happened to be carrying at the time, even though her cry for assistance might
have been heard by people nearby, when the deceased tried to assault her in a dark and isolated
place, while she was going from her house to a certain tienda, for the purpose of making purchases
(United States vs. Santa Ana and Ramos, 22 Phil., 249).

In the case, however, in which a sleeping woman was awakened at night by someone touching her
arm, and, believing that some person was attempting to abuse her, she asked who the intruder was
and receiving no reply, attacked and killed the said person with a pocket knife, it was held that,
notwithstanding the woman's belief in the supposed attempt, it was not sufficient provocation or
aggression to justify her completely in using deadly weapon. Although she actually believed it to be
the beginning of an attempt against her, she was not completely warranted in making such a deadly
assault, as the injured person, who turned out to be her own brother-in-law returning home with his
wife, did not do any other act which could be considered as an attempt against her honor (United
States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391)..

In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina, when the latter climbed up
her house late at night on September 15, 1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom,
undoubtedly for the purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct, instead of
merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him, as shown by the
authorities cited above..
According to the facts established by the evidence and found by the learned trial court in this case,
when the deceased sat by the side of defendant and appellant on the same bench, near the door of
the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her right thigh, without her consent,
the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of
them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of
the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped. And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at the base of the left side of his neck,
inflicting upon him a mortal wound 4 1/2 inches deep, causing his death a few moments later, the
means employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and under the facts
and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal
liability..

But the fact that defendant and appellant immediately and voluntarily and unconditionally
surrendered to the barrio lieutenant in said chapel, admitting having stabbed the deceased,
immediately after the incident, and agreed to go to her house shortly thereafter and to remain there
subject to the order of the said barrio lieutenant, an agent of the authorities (United States vs.
Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472); and the further fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as to
produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should be
considered as mitigating circumstances in her favor (People vs. Parana, 64 Phil., 331; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil., 27; United States vs. Arribas, 1 Phil., 86).

Defendant and appellant further claims that she had not intended to kill the deceased but merely
wanted to punish his offending hand with her knife, as shown by the fact that she inflicted upon him
only one single wound. And this is another mitigating circumstance which should be considered in
her favor (United States vs. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; United States vs. Diaz, 15 Phil., 123).

The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was committed by
the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place
dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the
defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night.
Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a
God-fearing young woman, typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious
hope in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting
away they know not where.

The questions raised in the second and third assignments of error appear, therefore, to be well
taken; and so is the first assignment of error to a certain degree.

In the mind of the court, there is not the least doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado
Capina, in the manner and form and under the circumstances above indicated, the defendant and
appellant committed the crime of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with
at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in her favor; and, in
accordance with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, she is entitled to a reduction
by one or two degrees in the penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the circumstances of
the instant case, the defendant and appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration
possible under the law (United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil., 391; United States vs. Rivera, 41 Phil.,
472; People vs. Mercado, 43 Phil., 950)..

The law prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for the crime of homicide; and if it should be
reduced by two degrees, the penalty to be imposed in the instant case is that of prision correccional;
and pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 4103 of the Philippine Legislature, known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, herein defendant and appellant should be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from arresto mayor in its medium degree, to prision correccional in its
medium degree. Consequently, with the modification of judgment appealed from, defendant and
appellant Avelina Jaurigue is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two
months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months, and one day
of prision correccional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Amado Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs. Defendant and appellant should also be given the benefit of 1/2 of her preventive
imprisonment, and the knife marked Exhibit B ordered confiscated. So ordered..

Ozaeta, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

HILADO, J., concurring:

In past dissenting and concurring opinions my view regarding the validity or nullity of judicial
proceedings in the Japanese-sponsored courts which functioned in the Philippines during the
Japanese occupation has been consistent. I am not abandoning it. But in deference to the majority
who sustain the opposite view, and because no party litigant herein has raised the question, I have
taken part in the consideration of this case on the merits. And, voting on the merits, I concur in the
foregoing decision penned by Justice De Joya.

(5)PEOPLE VS RABANAL 387 SCRA 685

G.R. No. 146687 August 22, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BONNIE R. RABANAL, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In the early dawn of August 11, 1996, a drunken and armed Roberto Pascua was fatally shot by the
security guard of a building in Dagupan City, Pangasinan. The prosecution asserts that Pascua was
treacherously shot while the defense contends that it was an act of self-preservation.

The security guard, Bonnie R. Rabanal, was charged with Murder committed as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of August 1996, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused BONNIE R. RABANAL, being then
armed with a gun, with treachery and with intent to kill one ROBERTO PASCUA, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and use personal violence upon the latter by
shooting him, hitting him several times on vital parts of his body with the said gun, thereby causing
his death shortly thereafter due to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest, Massive Intra-thoracic and Intra-
Abdominal Hemorrhage, Gunshot Wound[s]" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death, both
issued by Dr. Thomas G. Cornel, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased,
ROBERTO PASCUA, in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.1

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-01443-D of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 44. Accused-appellant entered a negative plea when arraigned.2 The case thereafter
proceeded to trial.

The prosecution’s version of the incident:

At 2:00 a.m. of August 11, 1996, Freddie Soriano, a security guard of the CSI building in Dagupan
City, saw accused-appellant Bonnie Rabanal, a security guard of the McDonald’s restaurant located
in the same building, repeatedly shoot at close range the victim Rudy Pascua, the security
coordinator of the building. After the victim fell down, accused-appellant fired another shot and then
took the victim’s gun and fled.3

The victim was rushed to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dagupan City, where he was declared
dead on arrival. The victim suffered four gunshot wounds on the chest, all of which were fatal.4

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the fatal shooting of Rudy Pascua was an act of
self-defense. He alleges that on August 11, 1996, at 2:00 a.m., Pascua, who was armed and reeking
of alcohol, approached him at his usual post in front of the McDonald’s restaurant and suddenly
kicked the podium, causing it to fall on him. When accused-appellant asked what was the matter,
Pascua uttered, "You’re hard-headed security guards, I told you to give me P100.00 per head
monthly but you refused to give, are you going to give me or not?" He then drew his firearm and
said, "If that’s the thing you want to happen, I better kill you."5

Accused-appellant pleaded for his life while Pascua demanded that he surrender his firearm. While
1âwphi 1

Pascua was reaching for accused-appellant’s holster, the latter pushed him and grabbed his gun.
Pascua lost his balance and staggered backwards. At that instant, accused-appellant drew his pistol
and pulled the trigger four times. Pascua fell to the ground. Accused-appellant then took the gun
from Pascua’s hand and brought it to the security agency as proof that somebody attempted to kill
him.6

That same day, accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered himself and Pascua’s firearm to Supt.
Enrique Galang at Camp Crame. He did not surrender at Dagupan because of Pascua’s influence as
bodyguard of Belen Fernandez. He was brought to the Lingayen Police Station the following day.7

On October 24, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant and imposing
on him the supreme penalty of death, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Bonnie R. Rabanal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of cruelty and not offset by any mitigating
circumstances, and pursuant to law, accused Bonnie R. Rabanal is sentenced to suffer the Death
Penalty and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased.
The accused is ordered to pay P100,000.00 representing expenses during the wake and P60,000.00
for the coffin and tomb; P5,440,800.00 as indemnity for loss of earnings; and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.

The Service Revolver (caliber .38 with Serial No. 54913 [Exhibit 9] ) and the firearm with Serial
Number FG66801, 9 mm pistol, Colt MK IV, Exhibit "10", all in the possession of the City Prosecutor,
are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government. The evidence custodian in the City
Prosecutor’s Office, Dagupan City, is ordered and directed to turn over the firearms immediately to
the Firearms and Explosives Division, Camp Crame, Quezon City.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.8

Before us on automatic review, accused-appellant argues that:

A. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF SELF-
DEFENSE WERE NOT OBTAINING BASED ON CONJECTURAL, PREPOSTEROUS, AND
ILLOGICAL REASONS.

B. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING TREACHERY. THERE WAS NO

TREACHERY IN A FACE TO FACE ENCOUNTER WITH DECEASED WHOSE FIREARM WAS
WITHIN EASY REACH. FURTHERMORE ACCUSED-APPELLANT NEVER EMPLOYED MEANS
TO ENSURE SUCCESS WITHOUT RISK TO HIMSELF.

C. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED FINDING CRUELTY BASED ON THE NUMBER OF
ALLEGED MORTAL WOUNDS SUSTAINED BY THE DECEASED. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT
CRUELTY REFERS TO THE MANNER OF EXECUTION AND NOT THE NUMBER OF MORTAL
WOUNDS INFLICTED IN SELF-DEFENSE.

D. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT SINCE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

SURRENDERED AT CAMP CRAME AND NOT AT DAGUPAN VOLUNTARY SURRENDER MUST
NOT BE APPRECIATED. NO OTHER SUBMISSION COULD BEST ADDRESS SUCH RULING
THAN THAT THE PROFFERED REASON IS UTTERLY WHIMSICAL, TWISTED, AND SHAMEFUL
IN A SOCIETY OF THINKING MEN.

E. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN COMMITTING HIGHWAY ROBBERY BY AWARDING

AN UNCONSCIONABLE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES.9

For self-defense to prosper, accused-appellant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.10 Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on
proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no
self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.11 In other words in self-
defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. It presupposes an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude – at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.12

In the case at bar, even if we sustain the version of accused-appellant that the initial act of
aggression came from the deceased, we cannot uphold his plea of self-defense. While indeed, the
drunken victim initially brandished his handgun and aimed it at accused-appellant, the evidence
shows that he laid it down on the nearby concrete porchshortly before he was shot several times by
accused-appellant.13

When the deceased laid down his gun, unlawful aggression had already ceased and it was no longer
necessary for accused-appellant to have fired successively the way he did at the
victim.14 Furthermore, we note that accused-appellant had shoved the intoxicated victim who
staggered backwards. Hence, it was accused-appellant who became the aggressor when he,
despite such prevailing conditions, not to mention the inebriated physical state of the deceased,
proceeded to fire several shots at the victim. His act can no longer be interpreted as an act of self-
preservation but a perverse desire to kill.15

Accused-appellant, however, insists that the unlawful aggression of the victim was a "continuing one
whether or not he momentarily tripped, lost his balance or did similar acts of temporary
character."16 Thus, he argues that even if the deceased lowered his guard at some point, he was still
the aggressor. He also cites the fact that the victim was "predisposed to using violence and
intimidation while accused-appellant was simply a security guard doing his job;" and that the victim
was armed with the more powerful and sophisticated .9mm Colt MK IV series 80, while accused-
appellant merely had an inferior .38 caliber pistol.17

These arguments fail to persuade.

There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either actual or imminent.
Actual peril to one’s life means that the danger must be present, that is, actually in existence, or
imminent in that the danger is on the point of happening.18 This cannot be said in this case because
the victim was unarmed when he was shot by accused-appellant.19 Indeed, the danger had already
ceased when the victim laid his gun down on the pavement, thus enabling accused-appellant to
push him away.

Furthermore, even assuming that the victim was a gun club member armed with a more powerful
handgun than that of accused-appellant, it must be pointed out that the deceased was at the time of
the incident a middle-aged and drunken 46 year-old,20 with impaired and slowed physical reflexes on
account of his intoxication. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, was a youthful and sober 27 year-
old security guard, in full possession of his physical faculties.21Accused-appellant stands 5’5"22 while
the victim’s height was only 5’2".23 Suffice it to state that under such conditions, it would have been
easy for the bigger, sober accused-appellant to subdue the intoxicated and already unarmed victim.

It must be remembered that the means employed by the person making a defense must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.24 What the law requires is a rational
equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent
danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or
impels the defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but
upon the imminent danger of such injury.25

In other words, whether or not the means employed is reasonable will depend upon
the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition, character,
size and other circumstances and those of the person defending himself as well as
the place and occasion of the assault.26

In the case at bar, assuming arguendo that the aggression was continuing, the means employed by
accused-appellant in repelling the assault of the unarmed victim was not reasonable. It must be
noted that the deceased sustained four (4) gunshot wounds fired at close range, all of them
concentrated on the chest area and each of them fatal.27 It bears repeating in this regard that the
nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered
as important indicia which disprove the plea for self-defense because they demonstrate a
determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself.28

All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the court a quo insofar as accused-
appellant’s culpability is concerned.

This brings us to the second issue, concerning the propriety of the imposition by the trial court of the
death penalty on the ground that the killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by cruelty.

It must be borne in mind that qualifying and aggravating circumstances which are taken into
consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty imposed must be proven with
equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense.29

Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.30 Treachery or alevosia, which is alleged in the information, is
one such qualifying circumstance.

We do not agree with the trial court that the killing of Rudy Pascua was attended by alevosia. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.31 In this case,
the two elements of treachery are not present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was
not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him.32 The essence of treachery is the swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.33

For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of
the attack.34Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with
treachery cannot merely be supposed.35 In the case at bar, there was neither a description of how the
attack was commenced – whether it was sudden, unexpected and whether the victim was caught
totally unaware – nor has there been a showing that the method of execution in the commission of
the crime was consciously or deliberately adopted by the malefactor.

To reiterate, the existence of alevosia must be based on positive or conclusive proof, not mere
suppositions or speculations,36 and must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the killing
itself.37 Any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.38

Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty cannot be appreciated in this case. There is
1âwphi1

cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing
him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act.39 In other words, for cruelty to
be appreciated, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the
victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The
crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing the suffering of the victim, the offender
denotes sadism and, consequently, a marked degree of malice and perversity.40

The test for determining the presence of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the victim’s suffering.41 Consequently, there must be proof that that the victim was made
to agonize before he was killed.42 In this case, the wounds sustained by the victim came from four (4)
gunshots fired in quick succession. Furthermore, other than the number and location of the wounds,
there is absolutely no evidence that would show accused-appellant’s cruelty and sadism. The mere
fact of inflicting several wounds successively upon a person to cause his death, with no appreciable
time intervening between the infliction of said injuries to show that the malefactor wanted to prolong
the suffering of the victim, is not sufficient to prove the existence of this aggravating circumstance.43

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated given the factual milieu of
this case. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur:
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.44 For the circumstances of voluntary surrender, it is
sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to
surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities
the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.45

In the case at bar, accused-appellant fled after the commission of the crime, taking with him the
victim’s gun, although the Dagupan City Police Station was just a few meters away from the locus
criminis. His supposed fear for the victim’s influence in the community has no basis, and, if at all,
even betrays his feelings of guilt at what transpired. As has been aptly ruled in People v. Herrera:46

Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. Indeed, flight
1âwphi1

is an implied admission of guilt and accused-appellant’s act of fleeing to Batangas after shooting the
victims cannot but betray his guilt and his desire to evade responsibility therefor. Certainly, a
righteous individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest
possible opportunity if he were morally justified in doing so. If the accused-appellant honestly
believed that his acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of the victim, he
should have reported the incident to the police instead of escaping and avoiding the
authorities. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

The circumstances that accused-appellant neither resisted arrest nor did he struggle to free himself
when he was taken into custody by the authorities do not amount to voluntary surrender.47 Indeed, it
was only later that he decided to turn himself in. Needless to state, his surrender can hardly be
deemed spontaneous.

In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide and not
Murder.48 The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is Reclusion
Temporal, to be imposed in its medium period considering that there is no modifying circumstance to
aggravate or to mitigate criminal liability.49 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-
appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, Prision Mayor. Thus, accused-appellant shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum.

Coming now to the matter of damages, we affirm the award of civil indemnity in the amount of
P50,000.00, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.50 Such award requires no proof other than the
death of the victim.51 Likewise, the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is
consistent with controlling case law taking into consideration the pain and anguish of the victim’s
family brought about by his death.52

However, the award of P26,000.00 for the Eternal Garden plot, P60,000.00 for the coffin of the victim
and P100,000.00 for the wake and other expenses incurred in connection with the death of the
deceased, amounting to a total of P186,000.00, should be modified. The trial court did not present
any computation to justify such an amount. In fact, other than the bare allegations of the victim’s
widow to this effect, the records are totally bereft of any receipt or voucher to justify the trial court’s
award for burial and other expenses. The rule is that every pecuniary loss must be established by
credible evidence before it may be awarded.53 Credence can be given only to claims which are duly
supported by receipts or other credible evidence.54 Thus, the amount of actual damages should
accordingly be reduced to P66,000.00, which is borne out by the evidence.55

In the same vein, loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded to the victim’s heirs in the absence of
competent proof thereof. While the widow in this case testified on the victim’s income,56 the same can
no longer serve as basis for lost earnings, in the light of our recent ruling in People v.
Panabang,57 and reiterated in People v. Cuenca.58 There we held that indemnification for loss of
earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven; and a self-
serving statement, being unreliable, is not enough. For lost income to be recovered, there must be
an unbiased proof of the deceased’s average, not just gross, income.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 96-01443-D is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Bonnie R. Rabanal is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. He is ORDERED to pay the
heirs of the victim, Roberto Pascua, the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P66,000.00 as burial and other expenses. The award of damages for lost
income is DELETED. The decision under review is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

(6)PEOPLE VS GOMEZ OCTOBER 2013

G.R. No. 202847 October 23, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ANTERO GAMEZ y BALTAZAR, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

For review1 is the Decision2 dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00671 which affirmed the Judgment3 dated May 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of
Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 convicting and sentencing accused-appellant Antero Gamez y Baltazar
accused-appellant) to reclusion perpetua for the crime of parricide.

The Facts

Accused-appellant was accused of killing his own father, Apolinario Gamez (Apolinario) through an
Information articulating the following criminal charges, viz:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill and with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack
and wound one APOLINARIO GAMEZ y AMORILLO, his father, with the use of a long bladed
weapon (sundang) and sickle (sarad) which the accused provided himself for the purpose, thereby
hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y Amorillo multiple hacking and incised wounds on the
different parts of his body which were the direct and approximate cause of his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired to amend his plea to "Guilty"
during the pre-trial conference held on September 26, 2005 but the RTC denied the said plea
bargaining. In view however of the accused-appellant’s invocation of self-defense, an inverted trial
scheme ensued.5

Through the testimonies of the accused-appellant himself, Dr. Irene Astilla Dacut, his attending
physician, and eyewitness Bienvenido Buhalog, the defense narrated the events that culminated into
the encounter that claimed Apolinario’s life.6

The accused-appellant and 69-year old Apolinario had a less than ideal father and son relationship
with the former claiming that the latter did not treat him well when he was a child. Their relationship
got more strained when Apolinario meddled with the accused-appellant’s personal relationship with
his wife. Apolinario apparently told the accused-appellant that his wife was being unfaithful. The
unsolicited information irked the accused-appellant.

On August 21, 2004, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree in his house at Barangay Gamay,
Burauen, Leyte, with his two brothers, Nicolas and Cornelio from 12 noon until 3:00 p.m. As he was
about to go out of the kitchen door, the accused-appellant saw Apolinario standing at the doorway
with a long bolo. Apolinario appeared to be drunk.

To prevent any commotion, Nicolas held Apolinario but he was able to free himself from his son’s
grip. The accused-appellant then spoke to Apolinario: " I think that you are looking for me and I
believe it is since last night ." An argument ensued between them. In order not to prolong the spat,
the accused-appellant and his brothers took their father to his nipa hut about 500 meters away. But
before the accused-appellant could leave, he got into another argument with Apolinario.

The accused-appellant then set out to the place where he gathered tuba while his brothers went
back to his house. After gathering tuba and tethering his carabao, the accused-appellant proceeded
home. He met Apolinario along a pathway. With no one to pacify them, they decided to resume their
quarrel.

The accused-appellant first remarked: "Father, what are the words that you uttered?" to which
Apolinario responded, "It is better if one of us will perish." Apolinario then instantaneously hacked the
accused-appellant with a long bolo hitting him twice on the head for which he sustained a 5-
centimeter long and scalp-deep incised wound with fracture of the underlying bone and another 5-
cm long incised wound on the frontal right portion of his head.

The accused-appellant fell to his knees as Apolinario delivered another blow which the former was
able to parry by raising his left arm. The accused-appellant was wounded on the left 3rd interdigital
space posterior to his palm.

The accused-appellant then held Apolinario’s hands, grabbed the bolo and used the same to hack
the latter several times, the count of which escaped the accused-appellant’s consciousness as he
was already dizzy. The accused-appellant thereafter left the scene and went home. His brother
brought him to the hospital upon seeing that his head was teeming with blood. He was hospitalized
for six (6) days before he was taken to the municipal hall by the police officers.
The rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, on the other hand, principally consisted of the testimony of
Maura Anadia (Maura), Apolinario’s daughter and the accused-appellant’s sister. According to
Maura, at around 4:30 p.m. of August 21, 2004, she was with her father at their house located at
Barangay Gamay, Burauen, Leyte when his elder brother, the accused-appellant, arrived. He was
carrying a long bolo and a scythe was tucked on his waist.

He approached her and said: "Will you join the killing spree today including your child that you are
carrying? "before turning to Apolinario with this query: "What are the stories that you were talking?"

Frightened, Maura ran away and hid at a grassy portion near the house. She then saw her father
flee but the accused-appellant gave him a chase. Apolinario was able to run for about 20 m before
the accused-appellant was able to catch up.

The accused-appellant then hacked the unarmed Apolinario on the right side of his head using the
bolo. Apolinario fell down and the accused-appellant finished him off by slashing his neck with the
scythe. Maura thereafter left to report the incident to the police.

The autopsy conducted on Apolinario’s cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores, MD,7 showed that he
sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which almost decapitated his head while the other hit the
parietal aspect thereof exposing the skin and connective tissue. Apolinario also obtained two (2)
incised wounds on his neck and left forearm and two (2) lacerations on his fingers. He perished at
the crime scene.8

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment9 dated May 9, 2006, the RTC found that both the prosecution and the defense
deliberately withheld vital details of the incident. The prosecution did not reveal that the initial
unlawful aggression was committed by Apolinario who, based on medical records, hacked the
accused-appellant in the parietal area of his head. The defense, on the other hand, concealed that
accused-appellant pursued the victim after the latter fled. These findings completed the sequence of
the incident and revealed that the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense is unmeritorious.

The RTC held that when accused-appellant hacked and killed Apolinario, the unlawful aggression
which the latter initially perpetrated has already ceased because he has already ran away for 20 m.
Hence, accused-appellant’s act was not self-defense but rather one of retaliation which, in turn,
props up the conclusion that he intentionally killed his father. The decretal portion of the RTC
decision thus reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ANTERO GAMEZ y Baltazar
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Parricide penalized under Art. 246 of the
Revised Penal Code and considering the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance without any
aggravating to offset it, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
to pay the Heirs of Apolinario Gamez Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and to pay the
costs of this suit.

The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since August 21, 2004 shall be credited with
the full time during which he was deprived of his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide
by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he will be entitled to
only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.10

Ruling of the CA
The CA adopted the RTC’s findings and similarly concluded that the accused-appellant put up
retaliation and not self-defense because the aggression proffered by the victim has already ended
when the accused-appellant attacked him. From the time Apolinario ran away and was disarmed by
the accused-appellant, the aggression originally heaved by the former has ceased. Hence, when the
accused-appellant chased and hacked Apolinario several times, self-defense can no longer be
invoked. The CA affirmed the conviction and sentence rendered by the RTC as well as the award of
civil indemnity but an additional award of moral damages was granted for Apolinario’s heirs. The CA
Decision11 dated May 25, 2011 disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed May 9, 2006 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15, in CRIM. CASE NO. Bn-05-03-4125, is hereby AFFIRMED
with modification. Aside from the civil indemnity already awarded, the accused is also hereby
directed to pay the heirs of Apolinario Gamez the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages in
accordance with the recent jurisprudence.

No pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.12

The accused-appellant manifested before the Court that in the present review, he is adopting the
arguments contained in his Brief filed before the CA whereby he argued that his guilt for the crime of
parricide was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in ruling that he
failed to prove self-defense.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court affirms the accused-appellant’s conviction.

The arguments proffered by the accused-appellant essentially attack the evaluation by the trial court
of the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Maura, and its ruling that the same
satisfactorily repudiate his claim of self-defense.

This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on
the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia
available but not reflected on the record. Hence, the corollary principle that absent any showing that
the trial court overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the final disposition of
the case, appellate courts are bound to give due deference and respect to its evaluation of the
credibility of an eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the rest of the
other evidence on record.13

We see no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets especially in view of the accused-
appellant’s failure to identify significant details, which if considered, will alter the outcome of the trial
court’s judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA. At any rate, an examination of the
records at hand shows that the factual basis of accused-appellant’s plea of self-defense cannot
relieve him from criminal liability.

Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the admission by the accused that
he committed the criminal act.14 Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused that he was in fact innocent.
However, if the accused admits killing the victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is
shifted to him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on his part.15

In order to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the concurrence of the following requisites under the second paragraph of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.16

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.
Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.17 "There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or
imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual
physical force or actual use of a weapon."18 It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not constitute aggression
warranting self-defense.19

Here, the accused-appellant, miserably failed to discharge his burden of proving that unlawful
aggression justifying self-defense was present when he killed Apolinario.

The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of the continuous kind as it was no longer
present when the accused-appellant injured Apolinario. As testified by the accused-appellant
himself, he was able to grab the bolo from Apolinario. From that point on, the aggression initially
staged by Apolinario ceased to exist and the perceived threat to the accused-appellant’s life was no
longer attendant.

Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting in self-defense, when he, despite having already
disarmed Apolinario, ran after the latter for about 20 m and then stabbed him. The accused-
appellant’s claim of self-defense is further negated by the fatal incision on Apolinario’s neck that
almost decapitated his head, a physical evidence which corroborates Maura’s testimony that after
stabbing Apolinario with the bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out the scythe on his waist and used
the same to slash Apolinario’s neck. The use of a weapon different from that seized from the victim
and the nature of the injury inflicted show the accused-appellant’s determined resolve to kill
Apolinario.

When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any justification to kill or wound the
original aggressor. The assailant is no longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the
original aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was
begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the
aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.20

The CA was thus correct in upholding the findings and conclusions of the RTC, thus:

Although, it is supported by the medical report, that the accused-appellant was indeed initially
attacked by the victim, the act of the accused-appellant of going after the victim, who was already
running away from the accused-appellant after the latter has gained possession of the weapon, is
anathema to the self-defense theory invoked by the accused appellant.

xxxx

In the instant case, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness that the
victim tried to run away from the accused-appellant but the accused-appellant ran after him. When
the accused-appellant was able to overtake the victim, the latter was hacked on the right side of his
head. To finish him off, the accused-appellant slashed the victim’s neck with the use of a scythe until
the victim (his own father) died. Thus, assuming arguendo that the father was indeed the first
aggressor, the aggression ceased the moment the accused-appellant disarmed him and the victim
tried to run away from the accused-appellant. When the accused-appellant then continued to chase
his 69 year-old father and hacked several times the already disarmed victim, self-defense can no
longer be invoked.21

In fine, there is no justifiable cause exempting the accused-appellant from criminal liability and the
courts a quo were correct in convicting him for parricide.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3)
the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.22 Here, it is an undisputed
fact that Apolinario was the accused-appellant’s father.

Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, the crime of parricide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. It must be noted that the declaration of the RTC in its Judgment dated May 9, 2006 on the
1âwphi1

presence of a mitigating circumstance is not supported by any allegation or evidence on record.

Nonetheless, in view of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 934623 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty,
the courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua.24

It must be emphasized, however, that the accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole pursuant
to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua , or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua , by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended."25

The award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Apolinario is proper and in line with
current jurisprudence.26 Civil indemnity is mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and
the culpability of the accused for such death.27 The award of ₱50,000.0028 as moral damages is
likewise correct. Even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering, it
has been recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death brings emotional pain and
anguish.29

The Court finds that an award of exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.0030 is in order
considering that the qualifying circumstance of relationship is present in the crime of parricide.31

Lastly, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages an
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.32

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 finding the accused-appellant, Antero Gamez y Baltazar, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Antero
Gamez y Baltazar is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole
and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Apolinario Gamez, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of
damages shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6) per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 (7)PEOPLE VS SUBINGSUBING 31 PHIL 376

G.R. No. L-10736 August 31, 1915

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN SUBINGSUBING, defendant-appellant.

Celestino Rodriguez for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellees.

TORRES, J.:

The present case was instituted upon presentation by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu of an information dated December 17, 1914, charging Pablo Montealto and Juan
Subingsubing with the crime of homicide. Judgment therein was rendered, on March 4 of the present
year, holding Montealto not guilty of said crime, freely acquitting him, with one-half of the costs de
oficio, and ordering that he be set at liberty forthwith; and holding guilty thereof the other defendant,
Juan Subingsubing who was sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision
correccional, a penalty two degrees lower than that fixed by the law, on account of the occurrence in
his favor of three very pronounced mitigating circumstances with no aggravating ones, and to one-
half of the costs. From this judgment the defendant Subingsubing has appealed.

In the evening of October, 25, 1914, Pablo Montealto's wife was walking along one of the streets of
the municipality of San Remigio, Islands of Cebu, and when near the cockpit she was accosted by a
Japanese called Mariano who made to her unchaste and indecent proposals, which she at once
rejected. Thereupon said Japanese violently seized one of her hands and refused to turn her loose
in spite of the suggestion of Juan Subingsubing who approached the place where they were and told
the Japanese to let the woman go because she was married. At that instant her husband, Pablo
Montealto, came up to take part in the struggle that had been begun, whereupon the Japanese, after
having insulted the woman with a slanderous phrase, let her go and immediately turning upon her
husband Pablo Montealto, and old man of 78 years, suddenly hit him in the face, shoved him down
to the ground, then got on top of him and with one hand choke while beating him with his fist.

In this situation, Juan Subingsubing, fearing that the person assaulted would come to grief,
according to his declaration on the stand, approached the combatants and said to Montealto, "Don't
move," for he was going to pull the assailant off; whereupon he heard Montealto say that he
(Montealto) had stabbed the Japanese with a gaff such as is used on gamecocks. When Montealto
was asked why he had wounded his assailant, he replied that it was because the latter had
attempted to abuse his wife and had attacked him. But it appears in the case that the eyewitnesses
of the fight, Alipio Sinining, 12 years of age, testified that in the midst of the fight, when Montealto
was stretched out on the ground, with the Japanese on top of him choking him, Juan Subingsubing
went up close and handed him something, but the witness did not clearly see the object so secured
by Montealto. (Folios 76, 80, and 91.)

The investigation made by the justice of the peace at the place where the Japanese lay seriously
wounded shows that the latter had a wound in his abdomen toward the left side under the last rib, 3
centimeters in length and 2 in width. As a result of the seriousness of the wound the man died the
next morning.
From the facts related it appears that there actually was committed the crime of homicide, comprised
under article 404 of the Penal Code, for, as consequence of the assault made by the deceased
Japanese upon Pablo Montealto, at the time when said Japanese was on top of his victim, throttling
him and beating him with his fist, he was suddenly stabbed in the left side of the abdomen by said
Montealto. It does not appear that there concurred in the commission of the homicide any qualifying
circumstance to classify the crime as murder, but there did concur the circumstance of self-defense,
which affords complete exemption from responsibility and which was admitted by the trial court on
the ground that the defense Pablo Montealto, an old man of 78 years, had to offer against the rough
assault of which he was the victim on the part of the Japanese called Mariano, middle-aged man of
strong and robust physique, was attended by the three requisites explicitly set forth in No. 4 of article
8 of the Penal Code. On this ground the trial judge freely acquitted the defendant Pablo Montealto
for inflicting the mortal wound upon his assailant, the Japanese Mariano, but convicted Juan
Subingsubing for having furnished Montealto the weapon with which he mortally wounded his
assailant.

The case does not afford satisfactory and conclusive proof that the defendant Subingsubing gave a
gaff such as is used in cockfighting to Pablo Montealto at the moment when the latter supine on the
ground, beaten, crushed, and choked, and in peril of being strangled by his assailant, the Japanese
Mariano, for the only incriminating circumstance that appears in the case is the testimony of the
eyewitness, a boy 12 years old, who stated that Subingsubing handed something which said witness
could not see very well to Pablo Montealto while the latter was held down by his throat and supine
on the ground under his assailant. This testimony of the 12-year-old Sinining boy is contradicted by
the defendants Montealto and Subingsubing, the former of whom avers that he wounded his
assailant with a gaff such as is used on gamecocks, which he had in his shirt pocket and which he
seized to defend himself from the serious assault of the Japanese.

If this confession of Pablo Montealto be allowed to outweigh the testimony of the Alipio Sinining, it
follows that the defendant Juan Subingsubing, who on his part denies the action ascribed to him, is
wholly cleared of the charge and the law requires that he be acquitted in this case; but even should
we admit the finding of the trial judge that the fact was true and duly proven that Juan Subingsubing
furnished the weapon with which Montealto wounded his Japanese assailant, we must still
investigate whether even from this point of view the defendant Subingsubing has incurred criminal
responsibility.

This individual performed no physical act in defense of Pablo Montealto. He did not attack or even
lay hands on the person of the Japanese who had Pablo Montealto on the ground throttling him,
therefore the case does not fall under No. 6 of article 8 of the Penal Code, which reads: "Anyone
who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
circumstances mentioned in paragraph four are present, and the further circumstance that the
person defending be not actuated by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive."

But even holding the fact of furnishing a small, short knife to the person assaulted, Montealto, when
the latter was in a critical position and plainly unable to defend himself, to be an act of assistance, it
is still unquestionable that there concurred the first and second penalties of No. 4 of article 8,
because Montealto, previously offended by the Japanese who was somewhat drunk with tuba when
he insulted Montealto's wife, was then unlawfully assaulted by the Japanese who placed him in a
situation from which it was difficult, if not impossible, to flee, or to avoid or repel the attack made
upon him; that he was finally able to free himself from the peril of certain strangulation was due to
the small weapon which in the midst of such danger and imminent risk of death Juan Subingsubing
furnished him, according to the finding in the judgment appealed from. Moreover it does not appear
that in furnishing his co-defendant Montealto the weapon with which to defend himself Juan
Subingsubing was actuated by revenge, resentment, or other illicit motive, the third requisite
established by the law; and since in holding the defense Montealto offered to the assault of the
Japanese to be lawful, and in declaring him exempt from all responsibility the trial judge had to hold
that Montealto was compelled by reasonable necessity to make use of a small knife to repel the
unlawful attack that seriously jeopardized his existence, it is just and logical to hold that in furnishing
said weapon to the person assaulted Juan Subingsubing employed rational means tending to aid
Montealto in legitimately defending himself and in repelling that unlawful attack.

As the use Montealto made of said knife in defending himself has been judicially held to be lawful
and right, so must the act performed by Subingsubing in furnishing it to sad Montealto in the perilous
situation n which the latter found himself; and since the latter, who used the weapon, was declared
to be exempt from responsibility in repelling the attack of which he was the victim and in wounding
his assailant therewith, the logical consequence of that declaration of exemption from responsibility
is that Subingsubing, who furnished the legitimate weapon used in his defense, be also acquitted
and declared exempt from any responsibility, because he did not incur it in any way by giving the
weapon to Montealto under the circumstances set forth.

The guilt of the accomplice who has furnished the weapon or any instrument for the crime is
embraced in that of the principal, who has by his responsibility for the crime incurred the penalty
fixed in the Code, even though he may have succeeded in getting away or fleeing or may have
afterwards died; but when the perpetrator of the homicide is present and has been tried and
acquitted on the ground of complete exemption from responsibility, this acquittal is inconsistent with
the conviction of the defendant who took no part in the deed and who did not defend the victim from
the assault of which he was the object, but merely furnished him the weapon with which he
reasonably and legitimately defended himself and repelled the said assault.

There are many cases of exemption from criminal responsibility on the ground of defense of a third
person, decided under the provisions of No. 6 of article 8 of the Penal Code, according to the
precedents established by the supreme court of Spain in applying the corresponding article and
paragraph of the penal code of that country, as may be seen in its decisions of November 11, 1905,
and December 4, 1906, and the principles followed by the courts of the North American Union are in
conformity with the doctrine established in these and other cases.

If one who defends a third person under the conditions and with the requisites the penal law lays
down for exempting him from responsibility should be acquitted of the charge in a case prosecuted
against him, then when a person who did nothing more than furnish a weapon to one whom he saw
in peril and in great need of defending himself and repelling a serious assault, as Juan Subingsubing
was doing and where the person assaulted made lawful and reasonable use of the weapon
furnished him and he has been declared exempt from responsibility, it is illogical and unjust to deny
to said assistant the same exemption from responsibility and the exoneration granted the slayer on
the grounds of self-defense, as was held in the same judgment to be lawful and right.

For all the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from should be reversed in the portion referring
to the defendant Juan Subingsubing and we must acquit him, as we hereby do, with the costs de
oficio. The bond filed for his release will be canceled. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions
TRENT, J., dissenting:

I dissent. I think the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.

(8)PEOPLE VS BELBES 334 SCRA 161

G.R. No. 124670 June 21, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PATROLMAN DOMINGO BELBES, accused-appellant.

QUISUMBING, J.

Before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 18, Patrolman Domingo Belbes stood
charge of Murder. The information against him reads:

The on or about the 16th of February, 1990 at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, more or less,
inside the campus of Pili National High School, at Barangay Pili, Municipality of Bacacay,
Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with treachery, taking advantage of nighttime, employing means to insure or
afford impunity, with the use of high powered firearm, and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, feloniously, suddenly unexpectedly and without any warning, attack, fire and
shoot successively with an armalite rifle (M-16) FERNANDO B. BATALLER while the latter
was intoxicated, thereby hitting and inflicting upon him multiple serious and mortal wounds
on his head, at the right lower face, the chest (front) at the left antero lateral approximately 5
cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, at the left lateral waistline, thereby lacerating the liver,
hitting the stomach portions of the large and small intestines and lower vertebrae, and the
chest (back) at the middle back and another at the left back, lateral level of the lower rib,
which caused Fernando B. Bataller's direct and instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.1âwphi1.nêt

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.1

When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.

The facts established during trial by the prosecution is summarized by the appellee in its brief, thus:

In the evening of February 16, 1990, appellant Pat. Domingo Belbes and Pat. Jose Pabon
were assigned by the Bacacay Station Commander to maintain peace and order at the
Junior and Senior Prom of Pili Barangay High School, Pili, Bacacay, Albay.

Around 9:00 p.m. while Teacher-In-Charge Mila Ulanca, appellant, Pat. Pabon and Elmo Bes
were watching the dance, two students, Riselle Banares and Juliana Basaysay, approached
Mrs. Ulanca and said "Mam, it seems that there is somebody making trouble." Appellant and
Pat. Pabon, armed with an armalite rifle and a .38 caliber revolver, respectively, responded
forthwith. Moments after the two police officers left, bursts of gunfire — "Rat-tat-tat-tat-tat"
filled the air. Fernando Bataller, a graduating student of Pili Barangay High School, was hit
on different parts of his body and died.
 Moments before the gruesome incident, Fernando Bataller, then drunk, was in the company
of Carlito Bataller and Rosalio Belista. While Fernando was vomiting and holding on to the
bamboo wall of the school's temporary building, the bamboo splits broke. At this instance,
appellant and Pat. Pabon appeared. Without warning, appellant fired his gun. Fernando
slumped on the ground, bathed with his own blood. Appellant and Pat. Pabon fled from the
crime scene.

Fernando was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. As shown in the autopsy report,
Fernando suffered the following gunshot wounds: (1) head, located at the right lower face,
skin, muscles, blood vessels, nerves, bone torn away; (2) chest (front, located at left, antero
lateral approximately 5 cm. below but lateral to the left nipple, another gunshot wound on the
same location with tattooing locates at left lateral waistline; (3) chest (back) located at the
middle back at the level of the lowest rib, skin and superficial muscles torn away, another
gunshot wound located at the left back, lateral level of the lowest rib, with tattooing.
(Citations omitted)2

In his defense, the accused-appellant presented his version, of the fatal incident, summed up by the
trial court as follows:

The accused, Domingo Belbes in his defense testified that he was at Pili Barangay High
School with P/Cpl. Jose Pabon because they were detailed by their Station Commander. . . .
At 9:00 p.m. two female students reported to them and Mrs. Ulanca that somebody was
making trouble at the back of the temporary building. They were requested by Mrs. Ulanca to
see what happened and they went to the place. There they came upon somebody who was
making trouble and destroying the wall of the temporary building. He came to know that it
was Fernando Bataller. Fernando Bataller had some companions, Carlito Bataller and
certain Belista. Fernando Bataller was more than 20 years old at that time and Carlito was
about Fernando's age. He saw Fernando destroying the wall of the temporary building which
was made of bamboo splits. Pabon was in front of him. The two companions were prevailing
upon Fernando. Fernando was drunk or a little bit tipsy. He was not vomiting but he smelled
of wine. They approached Fernando and identified themselves as policemen. Fernando did
not mind them. Fernando stabbed Pabon with a knife. Belbes knew because he saw the glint
of the blade when the thrust was made on Pabon. Pabon and Bataller were about one (1)
meter away from each other. Pabon was not hit, for he was able to move backward.
Fernando made two thrusts on Pabon. After Pabon retreated because of the knife thrust, he
(Belbes) was also stabbed by Fernando. He was hit on his lower left shoulder. He was able
to hold Fernando's hand because he wanted to get the knife from him. His firearm was slung
on his shoulder. Fernando was able to free himself. Fernando made another thrust and
Belbes moved to his left. Then he made a warning shot. After the warning shot, Fernando
suddenly grabbed his firearm. Belista was quite aggressive at that moment, while Carlito
wanted to kick him. Fernando was able to hold the barrel of the armalite. They struggled with
each other and the gun went off considering that his armalite was semi-automatic, with one
squeeze of the trigger one shot came out. During the process of grappling for the armalite he
could not recall how many shots came out. When his service armalite went off he was
Fernando fall to the ground. When Fernando fell, he took the knife from his hand. The people
gathered around them. They asked that Fernando be brought to the hospital. After one hour,
the police mobile car arrived. They proceeded to the Police Station. There they turned over
the knife to the Desk Officer. The knife is now with the Provincial Command.3

Defense witness Jose Pabon, also a policeman, who was present when the incident happened,
corroborated the testimony of the appellant. However, on cross-examination, Pabon belied the fact
that the appellant fired a warning shot. Pabon likewise failed to mentioned anything about
aggression on the part of the companions of the deceased, namely Carlito Bataller and Rosalio
Belista. He only recalled that said companions ganged up on Belbes after he shot the deceased.

Finding the defense weak, while the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently strong, the trial court
convicted the appellant of murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

In this appeal, counsel de oficio raised one issue:

WAS THE TRIAL [Court] CORRECT IN HOLDING ACCUSED- APPELLANT GUILTY OF

MURDER?4

We shall now consider this matter as well as the more basic issues of self-defense claimed by
appellant and the credibility of the witness for the prosecution. Appellant policeman admits firing the
fatal gunshots that hit the deceased student. But he claims that did so in self-defense. He contends
that he was only performing his official functions when he responded in the course of police duties to
the information that somebody was making trouble and disturbing the peace. Being in charge of
maintaining peace and order within the vicinity, he ascertained the veracity of the information given
by the students concerned. He asserts that in the absence of intent and voluntariness, he cannot be
faulted for the death of the deceased.

At the outset, we note that appellant questions the credibility of the sole eye-witness for the
prosecution, Carlito Bataller. He states that Carlito is the cousin and friend of the deceased. In his
view, Carlito had strong motive to falsely testify against him. Moreover, appellant says that Carlito
kindled some moral guilt because he contributed to the sudden death of his cousin. Appellant
alleges that if only Carlito had prevailed over Fernando (instead of tolerating the hostility of the
deceased), he could have prevented the shooting incident.

Regrettably, appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his claim of self-defense on
the face of mortal danger while on police duty. The cross-examination of Carlito Bataller did not bear
out his averments of fraternal bias and psychological guilt or moral taint in Carlito's testimony. The
testimony of the single witness, if positive and clear, is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction,
even in a charge for murder.5 Moreover, when the issue boils down to the credibility of witnesses, the
findings of the trial court deserve great respect since it is in a better position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in court, and to discern its dimensions, both verbal and
non-verbal.6 The relationship of a witness to the victim does not necessarily diminish the former's
credibility.7

It is a settled rule that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of a witness
deserve respect because it is in a better position to determine whether the witness was telling the
truth or not, having observed the demeanor of the witness while testifying on the witness stand.8 In
the case at bar, there appears to be no cogent reason why we should not adhere to this rule.

Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him.
He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense
of a relative or a stranger.9 To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing
evidence, that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on
his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense,
like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that once an
accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it was incumbent upon him,
in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the
strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be
disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing." 10

Appellant testified that upon responding to the report of two students, he and Patrolman Pabon, saw
Fernando Bataller destroying the bamboo wall of the school's temporary building. Fernando
appeared to be drunk and a little bit tipsy. They approached Fernando and identified themselves as
policemen but the former ignored them. Instead, Fernando lunged with a knife at Patrolman Pabon
but the latter avoided the thrust. Afterwards, Fernando also stabbed the appellant and hit his left
shoulder. As another thrust was coming, appellant claims he fired a warning shot. Fernando grabbed
the armalite and they struggled until the gun went off hitting Fernando, according to appellant.

We have serious questions on accused-appellant's claim of self-defense, on his part, against the
alleged aggressiveness of the deceased student. First, why was the knife allegedly used by the
deceased mishandled? It was not even subjected to fingerprinting. Second, why was the wound on
appellant's shoulder medically examined only after the lapse of more than twenty-one hours? Was it
possibly self-inflicted? According to the doctor who examined him, Dr. Evelyn Amador, it was a
possibility. 11 Lastly, as observed by the trial court, if it was true that they grappled face to face with
each other, why was the victim hit sideways, as testified to by Amador?

The time factor here appears significant. Mrs. Mila Ulanca testified that it only took about six
seconds from the time Patrolman Belbes left his seat until she heard the burst of gunshots. 12 This
testimony is not contradicted or rebutted.

Thus, appellant's claim of self-defense could not prosper. The evidence on record, however, reveals
an incomplete justifying circumstance defined in Article 11, paragraph number 5 of the Revised
Penal Code. 13 A person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office. But we must stress there are two requisites for this justifying
circumstance: (a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right: and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such right or office. 14 In the instant case, only the first
requisite is present; admittedly appellant acted in the performance of his duty. However, the second
requisite is lacking, for the killing need not be a necessary consequence of the performance of his
duty. His duty is to maintain peace and order during the Junior and Senior Prom. But he exceeded
such duty, in our view, when he fired his armalite without warning. No doubt, the concept of
mitigating circumstance is founded on leniency in favor of an accused who has shown less
perversity in the commission of an offense. 15 Though his protestation of innocence is unavailing, his
offense could only be characterized as homicide, not murder, as hereafter shown.

On one hand, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as to rule out murder. Treachery
cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing as conclusively as the killing itself.
For the same to be considered as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must concur: (a) the
employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the
malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the
latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) the means, method or manner of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. 16 There is no showing that the shooting was
premeditated or that appellant, in shooting the victim, employed means, methods or forms to ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended victim might make.
Likewise, mere suddenness of the attack does not necessarily imply treachery. 17

On the other hand, the offense is definitely not reckless imprudence resulting in homicide because
the shooting was intentional. 18 Illustrations of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide are: (1)
exhibiting a loaded revolver to a friend, who was killed by the accidental discharge brought about by
negligent handling; 19 or (2) discharging a firearm from the window of one's house and killing a
neighbor who just at the moment leaned over the balcony front; 20 or (3) where the defendant, to stop
a fist fight, fired his .45 caliber pistol twice in the air, and, as the bout continued, he fired another
shot at the ground, but the bullet ricocheted and hit a bystander who died soon thereafter. 21 In this
case, appellant intended to fire AT the victim, and in fact hit ONLY the victim.

We conclude that appellant is guilty only of homicide, mitigated by the incomplete justifying
circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being one
mitigating circumstance, the maximum of the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, which is 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months. Applying the indeterminate sentence
law, the minimum of said penalty should be taken fromprision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court convicting appellant Domingo Belbes of the crime of
murder is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P20,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the
costs. 1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

(9)PEOPLE VS ESTRADA 333 SCRA 699

G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. vs. ROBERTO ESTRADA -->

EN BANC

G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERTO ESTRADA, Accused-Appellant.

PUNO, J.:

This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in
Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition.

In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of murder for the killing
of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P.
MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his death
shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of
Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said
deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other
consequential damages.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2

(10)PEOPLE VS AMBAL 100 SCRA 860

G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.

AQUINO, J.:

Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicting
him of parricide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No.
155-C).

In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near
the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-
Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.

She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised
hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and
G).

On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor,
went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had
killed his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal
hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.

The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was
bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.

The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which
were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose
to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.

The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy
medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration.
Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay").
That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).

On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a
preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4,
1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted
by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.

After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the
defense of Ambal was insanity.

The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor
Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in
psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a
report on the latter's mental condition (p. 65, Record).

Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive,
emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).

Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to
November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental
defect and was normal (44-46 tsn November 3,1977).

Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied:
"Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but
during the commission of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration
tolerance" (45 tsn).

Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of
mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of
mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis,
a disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The
doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental
disorder.

Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the
incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was
allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was
charged with the capital offense of having killed his wife.

But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During
his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he
worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.

He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle
when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he
got wet while plowing. He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up,
he had chills. That was the commencement, his last illness.

The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not
insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.

Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity,

mental weakness or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State
should guard against sane murderers escaping punishment through a general plea of
insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *

According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane person is one who has an unsound mind or
suffers from a mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como escaso de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juico." An insane person may have
lucid intervals but "el embecil no puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una alteracion, sino una carencia del
juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)

Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the
brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).

The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary (Art. 800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34
Phil. 305, 308). The law always presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to
presume that acts were executed unconsciously (People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,
292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27 Phil. 547; People
vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).

When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he
performed the criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of
madness or of mental derangement, or that he was generally considered to be
insane — his habitual condition being, on the contrary, healthy — the legal
presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the burden is upon the
defendant to overcome this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)

Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few
moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he
was in a normal condition (U.S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).

A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was
committed (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)

What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)

In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs.
Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)

A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as
an imbecile (Formigones case).

Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his
acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not
insanity, especially considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after
he had killed his wife. (Cruz case.)
 There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked
himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in
what he does. Persons who get into a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally
during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman.
The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular
meaning of the word I "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non
compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88,
91.)

The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is
not insanity. (People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)

One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the impulse of
passion or revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment
control the will, cannot nevertheless be shielded from the consequences of the act by
the plea of insanity. Insanity will only excuse the commission of a criminal act, when
it is made affirmatively to appear that the person committing it was insane, and that
the offense was the direct consequence of his insanity (State vs. Strickly, 41 Iowa
232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)

The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-
year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and
shoulders, cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 155).

Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane (People vs. Martin, 120
Phil. 14, 20-21).

Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the
rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:

In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval times, insanity was never a
defense for crime. The insane killer, like the man who killed in self-defense, might
seek a pardon from the king, and would often get one. He had no defense at law.
Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits This was what was
become known as the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the limits of the defense
were expanded, but still slowly and narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of
the mind was such that he was incapable of appreciating the difference between right
and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and wrong of particular case, but right
and wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes said,
between good and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong generally would not charge with
responsibility if there was no capacity to understand the difference in relation to the
particular act, the subject of the crime.

The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer
made by the House of Lords to questions submitted by judges in the famous case of
McNaghten, who was tried for the murder of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir
Robert Peel.

In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: "To
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of
committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of
the mind, as not, to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong."

In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20,
1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was
the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was
Sir Robert. M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his
enemies and that the prime minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that
M'Naghten was affected by morbid delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own control,
leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of controlling his
conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.

As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted,
is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to
the act which is the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)

Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason
of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would
enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission
of the crime is excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a
result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White,
270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)

The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible
impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a
person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal
responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration;
a mental defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of
improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a physical or mental
disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)

As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."

And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible
impulse" test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that,
although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.

Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also
permits inability to distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even
though it refuses to limit the inquiry to that topic, it would appear that insanity which
meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American jurisdictions and that the only
controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-and-wrong test
is not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be
recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)

In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence.
The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or
discernment and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any
mental disease or defect.

The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was
going to be punished for it.

Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetua to death. The
lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the
absence of aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).

WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

(11)PEOPLE VS DUNGO 199 SCRA 860

G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:

This is an automatic review of the Decision* of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information
charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of
treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the
chest, stomach, throat and other parts of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds
which directly caused the death of said Belen Macalino Sigua.
 All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation
and the generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was
committed inside the field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior
strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)

On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.

The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the
hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the
place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga.
After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs.
Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's
office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46,
April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).

The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the
victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.

Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February,
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the
victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused
the procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it
my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he
spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of
his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).

The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the offense.

The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to
her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6)
months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder.
Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent
medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his
monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple,
instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16,
1987, she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was
not used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid;
chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the
fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach
ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain
therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no
longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned
home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard
from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed").
She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the
barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is
the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would
not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even
in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma
Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay
official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay
official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN,
pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)

Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that
the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17,
1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo
was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that
his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).

Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able
to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali
Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs.
Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was
already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)

Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the
accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr.
Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left
side weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified
that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988;
TSN, pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).

On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime
of murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:

1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;

2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage,
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act.
The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He
was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order
to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane
when he committed the crime.

It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-
appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime changed.

One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful
act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person
from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v.
Puno, 105 SCRA 151)

It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity
and insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion
is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible
under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion
test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would
believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he
has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency
being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)

So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of
the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or
conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by
disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.

Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such
as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.

Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in
issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the
act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:
thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine
whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)

In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused
was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and
impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The
accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.

Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and
did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
 Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals
unfortunately are not present, sir.

(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be
treated with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is
permanent, the manifestation of insanity is curable.

Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987,
thus:

Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has
been mentally ill?

A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to
scan my record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7)
months before his contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987,
the first manifestation is noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep
thought, pre-occupied self, complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of
appetite; and that was about January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)

The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of
1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of
medical and psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However,
We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission
of the offense.

The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane,
has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of
the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the
latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly
against the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:

Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino
Dungo?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.

Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the
accused at your residence?
 A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that
he wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was
requiring him to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR.
Furthermore, he wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land
Transfer of the landholding of his deceased father in his name.

xxx xxx xxx

Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late
Belen Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did
you tell him?

A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question
of me?"

Q What was his answer?

A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to
make a request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his
name.

Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the
accused?

A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the
transfer of the landholding in the name of my father and my name."

(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)

If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person
who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from
impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts.
This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid
intervals.

The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:

Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when
asked by the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in
Court and that he is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not
appear, he asked for the postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to
another date. With those facts, do you consider him insane?

A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

A Yes, sir.
 COURT

Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?

A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory

examination, in short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for
example praying for postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to
consider if the patient is really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the
accused, the nature of the illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can
reason out and at the next moment he burst out into violence regardless motivated or
unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have encountered in this case. When we
deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really deliberation with all the
members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for example he
shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was aware of what he
did, he knows the criminal case.

COURT

Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim
in this case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware
when he did the act?

A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2,
1983; emphasis supplied)

Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of
the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of
what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act
charged. As stated by the trial court:

The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane.
The evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an
envelope where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused
consciously adopted a pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the
killing as treacherous and therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of
the incident after he stabbed the victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in
Metro Manila, an indication that he took flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the
Court is another indicia that he was conscious and knew the consequences of his acts in
stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)

There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
(People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth
or not.

Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the
1âw phi 1

defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden
of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:

In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting
premise is that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S.
v. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and
 that it is improper to presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil.
288). . . . Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its
existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218) (People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)

The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an
accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of
overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.

Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea
of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby

AFFIRMED without costs.

SO ORDERED.

(12)PEOPLE VS NICOLAS GR NO 110116 FEB 1 1995

G.R. No. 110116 February 1, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NICK NICOLAS y AQUINO AND LYNDON ILAW y PEREZ, accused-appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

For illegally selling and distributing shabu, Nick Nicolas y Aquino and Lyndon Ilaw y Perez were
charged in an information filed before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City with violating Sec. 4,
Art. II, of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," as amended. Upon
their commission of the offense on 10 March 1990, both accused were immediately placed under
detention.

In its decision of 10 January 1992, the trial court1 found both accused guilty as charged not under
Sec. 4 of R.A. 6425 which punishes the sale and delivery of prohibited drugs but under Sec. 15 of
said law which penalizes the sale, delivery and distribution of regulated drugs, among which is
shabu. As a result, each accused was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
P20,000.00.2

Both accused appealed each filing a separate notice of appeal. However, only Nick Nicolas, through
the Public Attorney's Office, submitted his appellant's brief. The other accused, Lyndon Ilaw, in a
letter addressed to this Court, likewise sought the legal assistance of the PAO. But despite our
referral of his letter to the PAO, no appellant's brief was filed in his behalf. Notwithstanding such
failure however, considering that the instant appeal ultimately redounds to the benefit of Ilaw, and
pursuant to Sec. 11, par. (a), Rule 122 of the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Court will
consider the appeal of Nicolas applicable as well to Ilaw.3
The evidence of the prosecution, on which the trial court mainly based its decision, shows that at
about eleven in the morning of 10 March 1990, Sgt. Marcelino Gamboa of the 101st PC Company
with office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, operating within the entire province of Pangasinan including the
cities of Dagupan and San Carlos, was ordered by his superior officer, Capt. Herminio Calderon, to
conduct a buy-bust operation. The target area was Amado Street based on a CIS report, File No. 01-
03-90 dated 3 March 1990, prepared by a confidential agent bearing the approval of Capt. Calderon
stating that the "Ilaw" brothers and a certain "Nick" were selling shabu in that area. Attached to the
report was a sketch of the drug base prepared by another confidential agent.

Following standard procedure, four P100-bills which would be used in the operation were
photocopied. Sgt. Gamboa then placed his initials on the bills for marking and identification.

At around seven in the evening of that same day, Sgt. Gamboa, together with five (5) other members
of the buy-bust team and the three (3) informants, proceeded to Amado Street in Dagupan City.
Upon their arrival, one of the informants assigned to act as poseur-buyer approached accused
Nicolas. Lyndon Ilaw, the other accused, also arrived. Upon signal from the poseur-buyer, Sgt.
Gamboa approached Ilaw and gave the marked money to him who then passed the same to
Nicolas. After receiving the marked bills, Nicolas in turn gave Sgt. Gamboa two (2) decks of shabu
contained in a plastic bag. Immediately thereafter, Sgt. Gamboa introduced himself as a member of
the police force. The two accused scampered away but were later apprehended by the other
members of the buy-bust team. The marked bills used in the operation were recovered from Nicolas.

The accused were taken to the CIS Field Office in Lingayen, Pangasinan, where they were
investigated and detained. They were also photographed in the act of pointing to the marked money
used and recovered in the operation. Pat. de Asis of the CIS office prepared a spot report on the
apprehension of the accused which was transmitted through radio to the 152nd PC Company
Headquarters.

The two (2) decks of shabu were subjected to laboratory examination by Forensic Chemist Capt.
Luena E. Layador who certified in her report that the specimens were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.06 gram. 4

The defense has a different story. According to accused Nicolas, at seven in the evening of 10
March 1990 he was in his store at Amado Street arranging bottles of softdrinks. He exchanged the
empty bottles with filled ones in Esguerra Sari-Sari store about 200 meters away. While pushing a
cart filled with softdrinks back to his store, a Ford Fiera stopped in front of him from which armed
men alighted. They forced him to get inside the vehicle. When he asked one of the men, whom he
later discovered to be Sgt. Gamboa, as to why he was being treated that way, the latter just told him
to go with them. His brother, Ruben Nicolas, arrived and inquired as to the reason for his brother's
arrest. However, one of the armed men pointed his armalite rifle at Ruben Nicolas and then fired a
shot upwards.

The testimony of Nicolas was corroborated by another witness, Cresente Lopez, who allegedly saw
the incident.

Accused Lyndon Ilaw, in turn, testified that he was a tricycle driver and a friend of Nicolas. He said
that on 10 March 1990, at about seven in the evening, he was at home. Then his father sent him to
buy medicine at the Farmacia Balingit in front of the Public Plaza Market. Before proceeding, he
bought cigarettes at Epang's Store. Suddenly, five (5) CIS men arrested and mauled him. Nick
Nicolas who was standing in front of his house smoking was also apprehended by the CIS men. Ilaw
asked why he was being arrested and they told him that he and Nicolas were selling shabu. When
Ilaw denied the accusation, the CIS men mauled him again.
The two accused were initially brought to the CIS safehouse, then to Arellano-Boni near the
Alimango Restaurant, and back to the safehouse. They were later taken to the CIS office in
Lingayen, Pangasinan. Sgt. Gamboa forced Ilaw to pose for a photograph while pointing to the
shabu seized from them. Then they were brought to the police station in Dagupan City and
presented to Major de Guzman, after which they were brought back to Amado Street.

Ernesto Ilaw, father of appellant Lyndon Ilaw, corroborated his son's testimony. Ernesto testified that
he sent Lyndon to buy medicine for his allergy at the Farmacia Balingit but his son did not return. He
later learned from his daughter that Lyndon and Nick Nicolas were arrested by CIS agents. His wife
subsequently learned that their son was already in Lingayen.

We sustain the judgment of conviction. The basic question raised in this appeal is the credibility of
witnesses for the prosecution as against those for the defense. The rule is settled that the findings of
the trial court on credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight and respect unless some material
facts have been overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result.5 But this excepting circumstance
is not present in the instant case.

Appellants contend that the marked P100-bills were never presented in court for identification or
comparison with the xerox copies marked as evidence for the prosecution. They also argue that
there are glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa on the whereabouts of the marked
money; that when asked on direct examination, Sgt. Gamboa testified that the marked bills were in
the custody of a non-commissioned officer who was on vacation;6 but when asked on cross-
examination, Sgt. Gamboa testified that it was first deposited in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and was
supposed to be presented as evidence in the hearing of 17 July 1990 but an earthquake occurred in
the afternoon of the previous day.7 Thus appellants contend that the foregoing inconsistencies only
prove that there was in fact no marked money as no buy-bust operation was ever conducted in the
first place. The testimony of Sgt. Gamboa that he deposited the bills in the safehouse is a mere
fabrication to deceive the court into believing that a buy-bust operation was made.8 Finally,
appellants submit that the failure of the prosecution to present as a witness the informant who acted
as poseur-buyer is fatal to the case of the prosecution especially so that the drug seized from
appellants was merely planted by the police officers.

We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against appellants. There is no
compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa,
the lone witness for the prosecution, was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The
testimony of a sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court beyond reasonable doubt,
is sufficient to convict.9

The matter as to who to present as witnesses for the prosecution is addressed to the sound
discretion of the fiscal or prosecutor handling the case. And failure to present a witness does not
necessarily suggest that said witness will testify adversely against it. 10 Furthermore, the same
witness is just as available for the defense who may present him if appellants so desire.

It is a common defense of persons charged with the sale of prohibited and regulated drugs to
question the non-presentation of the informants in court. Police rarely, if ever, remove the cloak of
confidentiality with which they surround their poseur-buyers and informers since their usefulness will
be over the moment they are presented in court. Moreover, drug dealers do not look kindly upon
squealers and informants. It is understandable why, as much as permitted, their identities are kept
secret. The usual defense — that the non-presentation of informers and poseur-buyers amounts to
suppression of key evidence — is non-availing when it comes to buy-bust operations against illegal
sale of drugs. 11
Thus, in the instant case, the fact that the prosecution failed to produce the informant in court is of
no moment especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust
operation had indeed been conducted. Anyway, Sgt. Gamboa testified on the actual incident and
was able to positively identify appellants as the drug pushers selling their wares along Amado Street
in Dagupan City. In effect, Sgt. Gamboa has given the prosecution all the evidence it needed to pin
appellants on, drug charge and to build a case against them for drug pushing.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witness Sgt. Gamboa are neither
substantial nor of such nature as to cast a serious doubt on his credibility. The established rule of
evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with respect to minor
details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity or
the weight of their testimony.12

Appellants, as earlier noted, try to exploit the supposed inconsistencies regarding the marked bills. It
is obvious however that the apparently conflicting statements are mere unwitting lapses or
insignificant details and do not bear such weight as to impair the credibility of the witness and his
testimony. In fact, even the absence of the marked money will not create a hiatus in the
prosecution's evidence as long as the drugs subject of the illegal transaction were presented at the
trial court. 13

Appellants do not refute the fact that the recovered as a result of the transaction was shabu although
they claim that it was merely "planted" by Sgt. Gamboa and the other police authorities. However,
there is no evidence whatsoever to establish the foregoing allegation. What is certain is that in the
buy-bust operation, appellants were apprehended while selling shabu to the poseur-buyer, which
fact was witnessed by Sgt. Gamboa.

The usual defense of being framed up invoked by drug pushers, as in this case, does not impress
us. In order for that defense to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing. Like
alibi, the defense of frame-up is inherently weak as it is easy to concoct but difficult to prove. And
worse for those who invoke said defense, law enforcers are presumed to have performed their
duties regularly in the absence of proof negating the same. Appellants failed to show any ill motive
on the part of Sgt. Gamboa to falsely impute such a serious charge against them.

Considering the foregoing, we find that the arrest and conviction of appellants are in accordance with
law. There were the surveillance and police reports confirming appellants' drug-pushing activities at
Amado Street in Dagupan. Upon verification, buy-bust operation was conducted to entrap them.
They were arrested in flagrante delicto selling shabu to a poseur-buyer who paid them with four (4)
marked P100-bills. With the substance found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and the
recovery of the marked money from appellant Nicolas, the denial of appellants cannot be accorded
any evidentiary value.

With the passage of R.A. 7659, which amended certain sections of "The Dangerous Drugs Act," and
following our pronouncement in People v. Simon 14 making the amendatory provisions apply
retroactively when favorable to the accused, the penalties imposed by the trial court must be
accordingly modified.

Appellants were found guilty of violating Sec. 15 of R.A. 6425 which, as revised, carries the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and an increased fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 if the shabu
involved is 200 grams or more; otherwise, if the quantity be less, only the penalty ranging
from prision correccional to reclusion temporal shall be imposed.
In the instant case, the weight of the shabu sold by appellants was 0.06 gram, which is less than a
gram. Hence, the second paragraph of Sec. 20 as now amended applies, i.e., the reduced penalty
of prision correccional to reclusion temporal. With no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the proper imposable component penalty is prision correccional to be applied in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, maximum shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is arresto mayor the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding appellants Nick Nicolas and Lyndon Ilaw guilty of
violating Sec. 15, Art. III, of R.A. 6425 is AFFIRMED with the modification that appellants are each
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto
mayor maximum as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium
as maximum.

It appears from the records that accused-appellants were placed under immediate detention
following their arrest on 10 March 1990. Hence, since both have more than served the four (4) years
and two (2) months maximum term of imprisonment which we now impose upon each of them, their
immediate custody is ordered unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

(13)PEOPLE VS SEN. JUAN PONCE ENRILE 2015

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident
of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution's case,
albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is
subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul
the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third
Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several
others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his
Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.

Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in
the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of
appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and
June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6 praying,
among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. The
motions were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7

On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on
the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered
the arrest of Enrile.9

On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame,
Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital
following his medical examination.10

Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital ,11 and his Motion to Fix
Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support
of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had
not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he
was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.

On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to
Fix Bail, disposing thusly:

x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the Court shall have
made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he demand
bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.

To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed
an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly
premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.

Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while he is charged with
plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua." He anchors this claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the
allegation that he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered. "Accordingly, it
may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus
bailable."

The argument has no merit.

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into consideration.
These circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should
the accused be found guilty of the offense charged. x x x

Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail because he is not a flight risk
and his physical condition must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are among the factors
that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of
guilt against accused Enrile is not strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7,
2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s
motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014 resolution.15

Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari , namely:

A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right. Enrile

may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.

B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would
be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a
matter of right.

C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s
guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; th at
it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under
the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed
to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the
presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age of 90, his
medical condition, and his social standing.

In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is
charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be
conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to
due process and to be presumed innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait
until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional
crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated
to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in
assuring the accused’s presence at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a
matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court , as follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the time
of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be punished with death.25

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall
be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he
is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the
evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or
life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned
Citizens v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion
on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v. Belmonte, viz. :32

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled in People vs.
Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused who is
charged with a capital offense, in this wise:

The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the
motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it
turned out later, over its strong objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing. Whatever
the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime
was committed and pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the evidence
of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of
the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable
opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of the
crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from justice,
and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court)
It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex-parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should
primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. For this
purpose, a summary hearing means:

x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the weight of
evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into
any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused,
nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered or
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to
receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33

In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to comply with the
guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to wit:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless
of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
(Section 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.

3.
Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating
circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at
the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35

Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion
to Fix Bail has only argued that –

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be imposed upon Enrile is
only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that
the presence or absence of mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of
mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment on the presence of
the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being
punishable with reclusion perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.

Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in
the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person.
This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to
liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their
release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty.
These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.38

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.39

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We
also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he
was not seen as a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical
examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;
(Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);

(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the following :

 a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with carotid and vertebral artery
disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)

b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)

c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial calcifications. (Annex 1.6)

(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring ;
(Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1,
2.2)

(5) Ophthalmology:

a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p laser of the Retina, s/p

Lucentis intra-ocular injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)

b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)

(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:

a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;

b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;

c. Alpha thalassemia;

d. Gait/balance disorder;

e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in 2014;

f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented enlarged prostate on recent

ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or collectively, could pose
significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to
brain or heart complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to
fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary
calcifications associated with coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for
heart attack under stressful conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be
triggered by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which
could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required
special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own
instance,44 was not even recommended by the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that
medical facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their testimonies
ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:

The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
Philippine National Police Hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the
PNP Hospital ?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Why?

PSUPT. JOCSON:

Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator Enrile, are you happy or
have any fear in your heart of the present condition of the accused vis a vis the facilities of the
hospital?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?

DR. SERVILLANO:

Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if the condition of the
patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your Honor.45

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health
and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has already held in
Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the prisoner,

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes it a
consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail ;47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that the petitioner
"is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic,
granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into
advance stages when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into
consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the
ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied
purpose of the People’s Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the
petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his petition for
bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court has adopted and applied the well-
established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases
against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued confinement in
New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we
consequently hold that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re
lease the petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his
medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly , will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the
issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of
judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without
awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of
the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure
the appearance of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of
the fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as the ground for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ;
ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14 CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014;
ORDERS the PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 upon posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the
immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for
some other lawful cause.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

(14)PEOPLE VS MAGPANTAY CA 46 OG 1655

G.R. No. L-19133 November 27, 1964

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIX MAGPANTAY, and EUGENIO ALCARAZ, accused-appellants.

Pascual G. Mier as counsel de officio for accused-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, in its Criminal Case No. R-
1788, for multiple murder, sentencing the accused, Arnulfo Estabaya, to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and imposing on the other accused, Felix Magpantay and Eugenio Alcaraz, the death
penalty, ordering them to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of each of the ten deceased persons
named in the information the sum of P6,000.00, and to pay the proportionate costs. The dispositive
portion of the decision states, in addition to the foregoing, that "the penalties herein imposed are
subject to the provision of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in case of commutation of penalties",
and that the accused shall be credited with one-half of their respective preventive, imprisonment.

The indictment, under date of 19 January 1960, to which these three, accused pleaded guilty,
charges them as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1959, at 7:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, in
the barrio of Villapagasa, municipality of Bongabon, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Felix Magpantay, Arnulfo Estabaya, Eugenio Alcaraz and Catalino Fajardo, all provided with
unlicensed carbine rifles, caliber .30 conspiring and confederating together, mutually helping
one another and acting in common accord, with treachery and evident premeditation and the
decided purpose to kill, taking advantage of the darkness of the night and their superior
strength, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously waylaid, ambushed, attacked, assaulted and shot
Lope Cadacio, Emilio Claveria, Doroteo Malabanan, Albino Sarian, Rosendo Raes, Ignacio
Francisco, Hermogena Atilano, Catalino Gervacio, Filomeno Macalalad and Alejandro
Fernandez with their said carbine rifles, while the victims were riding in a passenger jeep
bearing Plate No. TPU-14016, and inflicting upon them several gunshot wounds in the
different parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.
 That in the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the generic
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, and taking advantage of their superior
strength, are present.

Contrary to law.

The fourth accused Catalino Fajardo having pleaded not guilty, the decision under review was
rendered with respect only to those named heretofore. The judgment considered two aggravating
circumstances, those of evident premeditation and superior strength, as present in the commission
of the crime; Arnulfo Estabaya was, however, credited with two mitigating circumstances, those of
plea of guilty and voluntary surrender, while Magpantay and Alcaraz were credited with one
mitigating circumstance, that of having pleaded guilty.

In addition to their plea of guilty, each of the three accused, Magpantay, Alcaraz and Estabaya,
insists on the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Magpantay claims, in addition thereto,
lack of instruction. Estabaya adduced no evidence when the fiscal admitted that his surrender was
voluntary.

In support of their claim for additional mitigation, Magpantay and Alcaraz declared that, after
committing the crime, at about 7:30 in the evening of 2 June 1959 they went, for the purpose of
surrendering, to a certain Labo, a former barrio lieutenant of Villapagasa. They met him at about ten
o'clock that same night. Labo refused to accept their surrender because he was no longer the
incumbent official of the barrio; whereupon, Magpantay requested him to send word to the municipal
mayor, Angel Rodriguez.

The accused then proceeded to barrio Rosacara, but the barrio lieutenant there also refused to
accept their surrender on the ground that the crime was committed outside his territory. Magpantay
requested him to fetch the mayor. The trio then proceeded to barrio Sapang Dagat, and from there
Catalino Fajardo (this co-accused had been with Magpantay and Alcaraz) prepared a letter to PC
Sgt. Araman.

From Villapagasa to the poblacion of Bongabon is a distance of about 13 kilometers; Rosacara is

farther by some kilometers. The route taken by the accused from the scene of the crime was away
from the poblacion and towards the mountains. On the second day of the incident, the accused had
been informed that PC soldiers had been issued orders to kill at sight.

Mayor Rodriguez of Bongabon was informed of Magpantay's desire to surrender to him at about
seven o'clock in the morning of 10 June 1959. He reported the matter to the PC detachment in
Sumagui and to Colonel Ver. That same morning Magpantay, in tears and without a firearm,
surrendered to the mayor in a sitio of Villapagasa, about two kilometers inland from Liberty Sawmill.
Therefore, the mayor delivered custody of Magpantay to Colonel Ver at the sawmill where he had
waited, as pre-arranged with the mayor.

Sgt. Araman, P.C., received Fajardo's note of surrender on the 11th of June, referred it to the
provincial commander, contacted Fajardo and Alcaraz on the 12th, slept with them that same night,
and on the following morning, on their way to the poblacion, the sergeant delivered the accused to
his superiors. The accused then handed over their carbines.

Testifying in rebuttal for the prosecution, Sgt. Exequiel Martinez asserted that civilians had informed
the PC of the whereabouts of the accused and that the area was cordoned with 160 soldiers. Said
witness opined that this contingent provided no means of escape to the accused. When and how the
area was cordoned was not touched upon, nor did he explain how escape had become impossible.
Nor was it established that the accused knew of their alleged encirclement and that it prompted them
to surrender in earnest.

We agree with herein appellants Alcaraz and Magpantay that the court below should have
appreciated in their favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Not only was there
failure to prove that they felt that they had no other alternative course; but the fact that the PC
authorities had waited at a designated place for the mayor to bring Magpantay down shows that they
conformed to his offer of voluntary surrender — PC Colonel Ver waited at the sawmill to receive the
surrenderee and not to capture him. The same thing can be said of appellant Alcaraz, because the
PC had prior knowledge of his offer to surrender when, on receipt of Fajardo's letter, Sgt. Araman
referred it to the provincial commander; nor can it be contended that the PC officers and men
affected a capture when they met Sgt. Araman and accused Alcaraz and Fajardo, already peacefully
on their way to the poblacion.

The flight of the accused from the scene of their crime to the mountains cannot be taken as belying
their bona fideintention to surrender, because the evidence is unrebutted that they did earlier take
steps to surrender. After committing the crime, they defied no law or agent of authority, and when
they did surrender, they did so with meekness and repentance. Appellant Alcaraz, undisarmed, slept
with Sgt. Araman in an isolated place; had he been wanting in sincerity, Alcaraz, together with
Fajardo, could easily have overpowered the sergeant, but did not do so. On the following morning,
when the trio met the constabulary men on the way to the poblacion, Alcaraz surrendered himself
and his rifle without any trouble.

We find no particular reason, however, to disturb the trial court's rejection of Magpantay's alleged
lack of instruction as a mitigating circumstance. His answers to the questions propounded to him
show that he understood the significance of his acts, notwithstanding his illiteracy (People vs. Ripas,
et al., L-6246, May 26, 1954; Peo. vs. Sari, L-7169, May 30, 1956).

The narration of the commission of the crime in the information avers five (5) circumstances which
may qualify or aggravate the crime, namely, treachery, evident premeditation, superior strength,
nocturnity, and band. However, in the succeeding paragraph, it specifies only the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
superior strength, without alleging anew the other circumstances. In view thereof, the Solicitor
General believes that only evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength should be taken into
account in determining the penalty to be imposed, "since the view more favorable to the accused is
that they had in mind" these two aggravating circumstances, which were reiterated by the fiscal in
the paragraph following the narration of the commission of the crime "presumably for emphasis or
clarification". To this view we agree. This separate specification certainly could her misled the
accused and diverted their attention from the other aggravating circumstances included in the
detailing of the crime. Under the circumstances, appellants in all probability pleaded guilty upon the
estimation that the two aggravating circumstances stressed in the last portion of the information
could be, and were, neutralized by their voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. The doubt should be
resolved in favor of the accused, considering that they were in no way to blame for the ambiguous
terms in which the information is couched.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is affirmed, in so far as it finds the accused guilty often (10)
separate murders, and modified by declaring that the aggravating circumstances of premeditation
and superior Strength were balanced by the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty. Consequently the penalty should be that of life imprisonment (reclusion perpetua) for
each offense, to be successively served up to the maximum limit of forty (40) years' imprisonment
provided by Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
The solidary civil indemnity of P6,000.00 for each one of the ten persons slaughtered, payable to the
respective heirs, is also affirmed. Each appellant shall pay one fourth of the costs.

(15)NADYAHAN VS PEOPLE MARCH 2016

G.R. No. 193134, March 02, 2016

RAFAEL NADYAHAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PEREZ, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 17 December 2009 affirming the Judgment2dated 5
February 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 34 of Lagawe, Ifugao finding petitioner Rafael
Nadyahan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

In an Information3 filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor on 2 July 2004, petitioner was charged with
homicide, thus:
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That on or about the evening of May 26, 2004, at Banaue, Ifugao and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife and with intent to kill DID then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack and stab one Mark Anthony D. Pagaddut inflicting multiple stab
wounds on his body that caused his death thereafter.
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The defense manifested at pre-trial that while petitioner indeed stabbed the victim, he did so in self-defense.
For this reason, a reverse trial, upon agreement of the parties, was conducted with the defense presenting
its evidence first.

The defense presented petitioner himself as its principal witness and a certain Pedro Binwag who sought to
corroborate the latter's statement.

Their version goes:

In the evening of 26 May 2004, petitioner was driving his motorcycle on the way to Poblacion with Mark
Apilis at his back. As they reached the marker of the junction road going to Bontoc, they were flagged down
by Marcial Acangan (Acangan), who was then accompanied by Elias Nabejet (Nabejet), Moreno Binwag
(Binwag) and Mark Pagaddut (Pagaddut). Acangan asked petitioner for a ride home and the latter readily
obliged. Acangan further asked that they be treated to a drink. Petitioner refused and explained that he had
already spent his last money on drinks earlier in the day. This angered Acangan. He slapped petitioner on
the forehead and kicked his foot. Petitioner did not back down. Instead, he got off his motorcycle and
prepared to fight Acangan. At that instance, he saw Acangan's companions pick up pieces of wood.
Petitioner then ran towards Apilis and instructed the latter to start the engine of the motorcycle. Before
petitioner could leave, he was struck on the back with a piece of wood by Nabejet. Petitioner impulsively
took his knife from the windshield of the motorcycle and ran to the direction of his house. Acangan's group
followed him. Upon reaching the parking area of the KMS Line, petitioner was met by Binwag. Petitioner
even managed to ask Binwag why his group was ganging up on him when he was hit by Pagaddut with a
belt buckle. As petitioner was starting to lose consciousness, he thrust his knife and stabbed Pagaddut
before both of them fell down. Petitioner then got up, wiped his face and prepared to go home. Fie met
Apilis who was driving his motorcycle. Apilis refused to go with him so petitioner drove the motorcycle away
and proceeded towards the house of a congressman. Petitioner then spent four days in Barangay O-ong
before going to San Jose City in Nueva Ecija to have his wounds treated. Finally, he went back to Ifugao to
surrender.4

Pedro Binwag witnessed a commotion while he was waiting for a jeepney near the junction road. He saw one
person armed with a knife and running towards Bontoc while he was being chased by two men. The person
holding a knife was eventually cornered by three men and he was struck in the head by a club. While he was
about to fall down, he was bumped by another man holding a swinging object, causing the latter to fall.
Sensing danger, Pedro Binwag immediately left the area.5

Petitioner presented a medical certificate6 issued by the hospital in San Jose City to prove that he suffered a
lacerated wound on his forehead.

The prosecution presented Acangan and Nabejet whose version portrayed petitioner as the aggressor.
Acangan narrated that he and Pagaddut had just come from Viewer's Live Band located at the market where
they had a few drinks. Pagaddut went inside the cab of a tricycle with Acangan as driver. While Acangan was
about to start the engine, petitioner and Apilis, who were riding a motorcycle, approach them. After saying
that he has no problem with Pagaddut, petitioner suddenly wielded a knife. Acangan ran and petitioner
chased him around the tricycle. Pagaddut alighted from the tricycle cab and tried to start the motorcycle
engine. When petitioner saw Pagaddut, he kicked the latter in the chest. Petitioner turned his ire on
Pagaddut and stabbed his upper right buttock. Nabejet came and tried to hit petitioner with a piece of wood
but he missed. Petitioner, in turn chased Nabejet. Acangan followed them and upon reaching the station of
the KMS Line, he saw petitioner pull the knife from Pagaddut's body. Acangan brought Pagaddut to the
hospital. Pagaddut expired at the hospital.7

Nabejet recounted that he had just come from a wake and was near Viewer's Live Band when he saw
petitioner, who was armed with a knife, standing near Pagaddut. He took a piece of wood nearby and
approached Pagaddut. He then saw petitioner chase Pagaddut. He saw petitioner stab Pagaddut in the back
causing the latter to fall down. Petitioner continued stabbing Pagaddut but the latter was able to parry the
blows. Nabejet tried to hit petitioner with a piece of wood but he missed. Petitioner turned his attention to
Nabejet and chased him. Nabejet was able to escape.8

According to the Certificate of Death, Pagaddut sustained the following injuries:

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1. Multiple Stab Wounds, Penetrating, perforating

a. Right infraclavicular, 7 cm
b. Right anterior axillary fold, 5 cm
2. Stab wound, penetrating 3 cm. base of neck right

3. Stab wound, lateral aspect upper arm, 2 cm.9 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

Dr. Antonio Ligot testified that the victim had three stab wounds: 1) one was perforating and penetrating
wound on the anterior chest wall on the right side; 2) other is perforating and penetrating stab wound at the
base of the right side of the neck; and 3) one was a stab wound on the right upper arm.10

Finding an incomplete self-defense, the trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. The dispositive portion reads:
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WHEREFORE, there being an incomplete self-defense, ACCUSED, Rafael Nadyahan is

found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide. Pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Mark Anthony D.
Pagaddut, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as civil indemnity.11 ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary

The trial court lent credence to the version of the defense that petitioner is not the aggressor. However, the
trial court found that there is an incomplete self-defense on the part of petitioner. Particularly, the trial court
ruled that based on the wounds sustained by the victim, the means used by petitioner to prevent or repel
the attack was not reasonable. In the imposition of penalty, the trial court considered incomplete self-
defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance and voluntary surrender as an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.

On 17 December 2009, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming petitioner's conviction.

Petitioner maintains that the court a quo gravely erred: (1) in ruling that there is an incomplete self-
defense; and (2) in sustaining the penalty imposed by the trial court without considering the circumstances
favorable to accused.12

In its Comment,13 the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) defends the ruling of the appellate court that
there is incomplete self-defense. However, the OSG recommends the modification of the penalty to arresto
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional minimum.

Case law has established that in invoking self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, the onus
probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of the
justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.14

We agree with the trial court that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim and lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of petitioner. We quote the pertinent portion of the decision of the trial
court:
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After a thorough evaluation of the evidence and testimonies from both parties, the court gives more weight
to the account that the accused was not the aggressor. His narration that Marcial Acangan requested him to
take Marcial Acangan home was supported by the statement in the affidavit of Marcial where the accused
said "MUD PROBLEMA INE TE BARKADA HI MARCIAL' (THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH THAT BECAUSE
MARCIAL IS A FRIEND). The records do not disclose previous conversation in Marcial's affidavit to which
accused replied with such a statement but it jibes with the account of the accused that Marcial requested
him to take the latter home. It is illogical that after saying that, accused alighted from the motorcycle and
chased his friend with a knife without any provocation. There was also no mention in Marcial's affidavit that
accused kicked and stabbed the victim. He narrated it in his oral testimony because it was in the affidavit of
the other witnesses. We must bear in mind that Martial was the companion of the victim as early as when
they were inside Viewer's Live Band and was continuously in close proximity with the victim until the chase
started so it is improbable that he did not mention such incident to the police if it indeed happened. As to
the testimony of the other witness for the prosecution, Eleazar Nabejet, he was presented to prove lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the victim yet in his testimony he never mentioned any kicking incident.
It is most likely that he arrived late at the scene to have witnessed the beginning of the altercation and
without personal knowledge to judge who the aggressor was. He does not even have an accurate grasp of
the time of the incident relative to the time they left the house where the wake was, saying that they left
the house where the wake was, saying that they left about 9:00 o'clock and later saying that it was perhaps
at 9:55 so that if they reached the road it was 10:00 o'clock. Finally Dr. Ligot stated in his testimony that
there was no stab wound on the lower back portion of the victim, and that the injuries sustained by the
victim were frontal wounds. This will explain the fact why Martial Acangan, the first witness for the
prosecution offered to answer when asked why he did not mention in his affidavit the stabbing incident in
front of Viewer's Live Band. This testimony, supported with physical evidence impeaches the testimonies of
the two earlier witnesses for the prosecution. With the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses for
the prosecution, the court concludes that the oral testimony of Marcial Acangan is not credible and he
adapted it from the story narrated by the other witnesses. With the foregoing, the court gives full credence
to the testimony of the accused that he was not the aggressor.

Another factor which contributed to the failure of the cause of the prosecution is the fact that not one of the
prosecution witnesses had seen the exchange of blows between the accused and the victim. The prosecution
evidence failed to prove the details on how the stabbing took place that led to the death of the victim. In
fact the first witness for the prosecution who was supposed to have seen the accused stab the victim and
whose testimony will prove that the accused inflicted the fatal wounds on the victim admitted in his
testimony that he saw only the "last pull of the knife" and then accused went to his motorcycle. It appeared
that during the span of time that the accused and the victim were facing each other and exchanging blows,
the witnesses for the prosecution were not around to see what happened. Marcial stated that he noticed
Moreno Binwag at the site of the incident. Eleazar Nabejet said he was not around as he was running back to
where the wake was using the pathway near the Viewer's Live band. Moreno Binwag was not presented as
witness. The evidence of both parties however, are one in saying that there was a chasing incident, one
after the other, a few meters from each other. The court finds it strange that not one of the prosecution
witnesses had seen the exchange of blows between the accused and the victim when they were only a few
meters away from each other. Mr. Moreno Binwag who could have seen it all as he was the alleged
companion of the victim in attacking the accused near the KMS Lines was not presented[.] In effect, the
claim of the accused corroborated by his witness, Pedro Binwag, that the group of the victim were the
aggressors is undisputed.

xxxx

We go next to the other requirement of self-defense to qualify as justifying circumstance, lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending him. The same set of testimonies may be appreciated to
determine if the accused did not provide sufficient provocation. The court rules and so holds that there was
no sufficient provocation on the part of the accused to invite the attack from Martial Acangan and his
companions. In fact he acceeded (sic) to the request of Marcial to take him home. His subsequent refusal or
failure to buy drinks as requested definitely is not sufficient provocation for the attack by the group of the
victim.15 ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry

Petitioner defends the use of a knife against four (4) men who were armed with a belt buckle and a club.
Petitioner claims that since the aggressors were ganging up on him, he was put in a situation where he
could not control or calculate the blows, nor could he have had time to reflect whether to incapacitate the
victim or hit the less vital part of his body. Petitioner asserts that a penalty lower by two degrees under
Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code is proper, assuming without admitting, that the evidence warrants a
conviction.

The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the
means of attack and the defense.16

The following circumstances, as cited by the appellate court, negate the presence of a reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel it:
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First, there is intrinsic disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle. Although this disproportion is not
conclusive and may yield a contrary conclusion depending on the circumstances, we mention this
disproportionality because we do not believe that the circumstances of the case dictate a contrary
conclusion.

Second, physical evidence shows that the accused-appellant suffered only a lacerated wound on the
forehead. Contrary to what the accused-appellant wishes to imply, he could not have been a defender
reeling from successive blows inflicted by the victim and Binwag.

Third, the victim Pagaddut and his companions were already drunk before the fatal fight. This state of
intoxication, while not critically material to the stabbing that transpired, is still material for purposes of
defining its surrounding circumstances, particularly the fact that a belt buckle and a piece of wood might not
have been a potent weapon in the hands of a drunk wielder.

Fourth, and as the trial court aptly observed, the knife wounds were all aimed at vital parts of the body,
thus pointing a conclusion that the accused-appellant was simply warding off belt buckle thrusts and used
his knife as a means commensurate to the thrusts he avoided.

To be precise, the accused-appellant inflicted on the victim: two penetrating and perforating stab wounds,
one at the right infraclavicular, 7 cms. deep, and at the right anterior axillary fold, 5 cms. deep, anther was
at the base of the neck, 5 cms. deep, and a last one was in the lateral aspect upper arm, 2 cms. deep. The
depth of these wounds shows the force exerted in the accused-appellant's thrusts while the locations are
indicative that the thrusts were all meant to kill, not merely disable the victim, and thereby avoid his
drunken thrusts.17 ChanRoblesVi rt ualawlib ra ry

In sum, we do not find any error in the Court of Appeals' ruling with respect to incomplete-self defense to
warrant its reversal. However, we find the need to modify the penalty it imposed which is four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayorminimum,
as maximum.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes for the crime of homicide the penalty ofreclusion temporal,
the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Under Article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense reduces the penalty
by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. There being an incomplete self-defense, the penalty
should be one (1) degree lower or from reclusion temporal to prision mayor to be imposed in its minimum
period considering the presence of one ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender pursuant to
Article 64(2).

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the penalty shall be prision mayor minimum,
the proper period after considering the mitigating circumstance, which has a range of six (6) years and one
(1) day to eight (8) years. The minimum penalty is the penalty next lower in degree which is prision
correccional in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Thus, the trial court correctly sentenced petitioner to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum. chanroble slaw

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 31643 dated 17 December 2009 and 21 July 2010, respectively, are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

(16) PEOPLE VS BAUTISTA 38 SCRA 354

PEOPLE VS RIVERO 242 SCRA 354
(18) PEOPLE VS PARAMA 64 PHIL 331
PEOPLE VS PAJARES 210 SCRA 234
PEOPLE VS TIONGCO 236 SCRA 458