Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

States of Mind Author(s): W. V. Quine Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 5-8 Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026508 . Accessed: 21/07/2013 23:15
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+ 4

THE

JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPHY
1985

VOLUME LXXXII, NO. 1, JANUARY

argue that a dualism of mind and body is an idle redundancy. Correspondingto everymental state,howeverfleeting or howeverremotely intellectual,thedualist is bound to admit theexistenceof a bodily statethatobtains when and only when the mental one obtains. The bodily state is triviallyspecifiablein the dualist's own terms,simply as the state of accompanying a mind thatis in thatmental state.Instead of ascribing theone stateto the mind, then,we may equivalentlyascribe theotherto thebody.The mind goes by the board, and will not be missed. Not that we would continue to referto the bodily state as the state of accompanying a mind in the mental state.That formulation was forthe dualist's benefit, to show him thatthe bodily state was undeniable fromhis own point of view and specifiablein his own terms.For our part,we just appropriatethe mentalisticterms themselves and construethemas referring to thosebodilystates.We even continue to speak of the statesas mental. The only change is that we reckon mental statesas states of the body ratherthan as statesof anothersubstance,the mind. If this effortless physicalismsmacks of trickery, we may do well to reflect on how we learn the mentalistictermsin the first place. All talk about one's mental life presupposes externalreference. Introspect our mental statesas we will, how do we know what to call them? How did we learn to call our anxieties anxieties, our dull aches dull aches, our joys joys and our awarenessawareness?Why do we suppose thatwhat we call joys and anxieties are what other people call by those names? How do we know what we are talking about? Clearly the answer is that such termsare applied in the
*This is an outgrowthof my piece in a colloquium of the AmericanPhilosophical Association, Detroit, 1980. Burton Dreben lately suggestedsome changes and urgedpublication. The keyidea of the first half was briefly noted meanwhile in my Theories and Things (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard, 1981), p. 18. 0022-362X/85/8201/0005$00.50

STATES OF MIND*

NLESS a case is to be madefor disembodied spirits, we can

?) 1985 The Journalof Philosophy, Inc.

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OF PHILOSOPHY THE JOURNAL

of bodily symptoms strictly light of publicly observablesymptoms: bodily states,and themind is as may be. Someone observesmyjoyor ful or anxious expression, or perhaps observes my gratifying or hears me tell about it. She thenapsituation itself, threatening anothersuch lesson or two I plies the word 'joy' or 'anxiety'. After applying thesewords to some of my subsequent states find myself in cases where no outward signs are to be observedbeyond my report itself.Without the outward signs to begin with, mentalistic termscould not be learned at all. To apply thesetermsto the state of the body is just to put themback where theybelonged to begin with. I am not applying the termsto behavior. A mental state is not it is a stateof in behavior. Physicallyconstrued, always manifested one from tell and it is, however, nerves. We can say which state We mechanism. specifyit the neural another, without knowing on the in was learned which turn the mentalistic term, with help of the if we shortcut the net result, Thus signs. of behavioral strength sporadic and incomplete provides behavior the is that mental bit, symptomswherebyto identifyand distinguish various complex states of nerveswhereofthe neural detail may still be a matterof conjecture;and it is thesestatesthat the mental termsmay be seen as denoting. Mental states,construedas states of nerves,are like diseases. A disease may be diagnosed in the light of observablesigns though diagnosis theguiltygermbe still unknown to science. Incidentally, depends heavily on symptomsreportedby the patient;and such is with the detectionof mental states. the way, overwhelmingly, the betweenidentifying What now can we make of thedifference mental stateswith the statesof nerves,as I just did, and repudiatIn ing them ratherin favorof statesof nerves?I see no difference. either case the states of nervesare retained,mental states in any are thereuponapothersense are repudiated,and the mental terms propriatedto statesof nerves.So I may as well persistin calling my of mental proposed reduction of mind to body an identificaiton stateswith bodily ones, neural ones; a construingof the mental as neural. There is no presumption that the mentalisticidioms would in general be translatableinto the anatomical and biochemical terminology of neurology,even if all details of the neurological mechanisms were understood.Thus take belief.Assessedon its objective belief is a verymixed bag. Lip serviceis our most manifestations, nor a sufficient convenientclue to belief,but is neithera necessary sign, and the accepted condition. Acceptanceof wagers is a firmer

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STATES OF MIND

of thebelief;but this test a measureof thestrength odds even afford is available only if thereis a prospect of subsequentlyfindingthe answer,acceptably to both parties,and settlingthe bet. Other becan havior, such as searching or fleeing or standing expectantly, as manifestationsof one or another belief, but serve tentatively with the and unsystematically varydrastically thesemanifestations contentof the beliefto be ascribed. Other groundsforascribingbeby probing the subject's past liefs may be sought unsystematically forprobable causes of his presentstate of mind, or by seeing how he will defendhis purportedbeliefwhen challenged. The empirical contentof ascriptionsof beliefis thus heterogeneand thephysiological mechanismsinvolvedare ous in theextreme, is cloaked under a linguistic uniforno less so. The heterogeneity mity:the connective'believes that' followed by a subordinatesentence.The otheridioms of propositionalattitudehave thesame disas the beliefidiom, and it cloaks much arminglyuniformstructure of empirical evidenceand neural in respect the same heterogeneity mechanism. Hence the insistence,fromBrentano onward, on the need for an independent science of intension.' Even those of us who do not acquiesce in a metaphysicaldualism of mind and body must take the best of what Davidson has called anomalous
monism.2

The stubborn idioms of propositional attitude are as deeply physicalisticones. One of themis almost coerootedas the overtly val, it would seem, with observationsentences.Thus take the observationsentence'It's raining'. Tom is learningit fromMartha by ostension. Martha's business is to encourage Tom in utteringthe sentence,or in assentingto it, when she sees thathe is noticingappropriate phenomena, and to discourage him otherwise. Thus Tom's mastery of the physicalisticsentence'It's raining' hinges on virtual if not literal,of the mentalisticsentence Martha's mastery, 'Tom perceivesthatit's raining'. are where our comObservation sentences,learned ostensively, mand of language begins, and our learning them fromour elders depends heavilyon theabilityof our eldersto guess thatwe are getting theappropriateperception.The handing down of language is thus implementedby a continuing command, tacitat least, of the idiom 'x perceivesthatp' where'p' rangesoverobservationsentenof one idiom of propositional ces. This degreeof implicit mastery attitudewould seem therefore to be nearlyas old as language. The
2Donald Davidson, Action and Events (New York: Oxford,1980),pp. 214-225.

'See RoderickChisholm, Perceiving(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell, 1957),chapter 11.

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

of this idiom, moreover-its embeddingof a subordinate structure sentence-would have been clearlydictatedby its primitiveuse in assessing children'sacquisition of observationsentences.Analogical extension of the idiom to other than observation sentences would follow inevitably,and the developmentof parallel idioms for other propositional attitudeswould then come naturally too, notwithstanding their opacity from a logical point of view. one, another; familiarity Naturalness is one thing, transparency clarityanother.
W. V. QtJINE

Harvard University

of our senO the phenomenological or qualitative features aspito thereductive a permanentbarrier sations constitute neuroscience?I here argue that rationsof any materialistic theydo not. Specifically,I wish to address the recentanti-reducand tionist argumentsposed by Thomas Nagel,' Frank Jackson,2 Howard Robinson.3 And I wish to explore the possibility of human subjectiveconsciousness within a conceptual environment by a maturedand successfulneuroscience. constituted If we are to deal sensiblywith the issues here at stake,we must reductionalready of scientific approach themwitha general theory motivatedby and adequate to the manyinstances in hand, a theory and varietiesof interconceptualreduction displayed elsewherein based account of the With an independently history. our scientific reduction,we can approach nature and grounds of intertheoretic
forAdvanced *Researchforthispaper was supportedby a grantfromtheInstitute of Manitoba, and by SSHRC leave fromthe University Study,by a research/study on Methods An earlierdraftwas presentedto the Conference grantno. 451-83-3050. in Philosophy and the Sciences, convened in honor of Ernest Nagel, at the New School of Social Research in April, 1983. My thanks to that audience for theirinsightfulcriticismsand helpful suggestions.Thanks also to Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson,Daniel Dennett,Philip Hanson, Charles Marks,and Brian Loar forcritical discussions of thatearlierdraft. ' "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?", Philosophical Review, ILXXXIII, 4 (October, 1974): to Nagel are to this paper. 435-450; page references Qualia," Philosophical Quarterly, xxxii, 127 (April 1982): 2"Epiphenomenal 127-136. 3Matterand Sense (New York: Cambridge,1982), p.,4. 0022-362X/85/8201/0008$02.00
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REDUCTION, QUALIA, AND THE DIRECT OF BRAIN STATES* INTROSPECTION

1985 The Journalof Philosophy, Inc.

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