An Army at The Crossroads

An Army at
the Crossroads
S t r a t e g y f o r t h e L o n g h a u L
By Andrew F. Krepinevich
II cSBA > Strategy for the Long Haul
about CSba
About the Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)
is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute es-
tablished to promote innovative thinking and debate about
national security strategy and investment options. CSBAs
goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on
matters of strategy, security policy and resource allocation.
CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses
to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative
branches, as well as to the media and the broader national
security community. CSBA encourages thoughtful partici-
pation in the development of national security strategy and
policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital re-
sources. CSBAs analysis and outreach focus on key ques-
tions related to existing and emerging threats to US national
security. Meeting these challenges will require transform-
ing the national security establishment, and we are devoted
to helping achieve this end.
About the Author
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., President, is an expert on US
military strategy, policy and operations, military revolu-
tions, and counterinsurgency. He gained extensive strategic
planning experience on the personal staff of three secretar-
ies of defense, in the Department of Defenses Offce of Net
Assessment, and as a member of the National Defense Panel,
the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimen-
tation, and the Joint Forces Commands Transformation
Advisory Board. He is the author of numerous CSBA reports
on such topics as the Quadrennial Defense Review, alliances,
the war in Iraq, and transformation of the US military. He
has provided expert testimony before congressional com-
mittees, as well as academic and other professional groups.
His work has been published in The New York Times, The
Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post, and profes-
sional and public policy journals, including Foreign Affairs
and Issues in Science and Technology. He received the 1987
Furniss Award for his book, The Army and Vietnam. He is
the author of the forthcoming book, 7 Deadly Scenarios. A
graduate of West Point, he retired from the US Army in 1993.
Dr. Krepinevich holds a Master of Public Affairs and Ph.D.
from Harvard University.
S t r at e g y f o r t h e L o n g h a u L
AN APMY A1 1R CP055P0A5
By andrew f. Krepinevich
2008
aBout the 51PA16Y F0P 1R L0N6 RAUL SerieS
This report is one in a series comprising CSBAs Strategy for the Long Haul intended
to inform and shape the next administrations defense strategy review.
the ChaLLengeS to uS nationaL SeCurity. Translates the principal challenges
to US security into a representative set of contingencies in order to determine what
resources will be required, and how they should be apportioned among forces and
capabilities.
uS MiLitary Power and ConCePtS of oPeration. Provides the connective tis-
sue between the threats to US security and the capabilities and force elements needed
to address the new challenges confronting the nation.
the defenSe Budget. Overviews the budget environment and explores a range of
options to make the Services plans more affordable.
the defenSe induStriaL BaSe. Addresses the US defense industrys role as a
strategic asset, and how it can best serve in that role.
ManPower. Examines recruitment and retention of quality people in suffcient
numbers at an acceptable cost.
training, oPerationaL art, and StrategiC CoMPetenCe. Assesses the need
for an overhaul of training and education of Americas service personnel and the im-
portance of strategic thinking in senior leaders.
reStruCturing the uS aLLianCe PortfoLio. Considers the nature and type of
alliances the United States needs in order to meet existing and emerging security
challenges.
ground forCeS. Explores how the US Army and Marine Corps might best be
organized, structured, modernized, and postured to meet existing and emerging
challenges to US security.
SPeCiaL oPerationS forCeS. Addresses the expansion and growing role of US
Special Operations Forces.
MaritiMe forCeS. Addresses how US maritime forces might best be organized,
structured, modernized, and postured to meet existing and emerging challenges to
US Security.
air and SPaCe forCeS. Explores how Air and Space Forces might best be organized,
structured, modernized, and postured to meet existing and emerging challenges to
US Security.
StrategiC forCeS. Examines the circumstances under which nuclear strategy and
force posture decisions must be made today.
Modernization StrategieS. Explores potential modernization strategies that can
best support the US defense posture in an era of great geopolitical uncertainty and
rapid technological change.
organizing for nationaL SeCurity. Assesses how the United States Government
can best organize itself to ensure effective strategic planning and execution of
strategy.
a grand Strategy for the united StateS. Synthesizes the fndings and insights
of the study series.
2008 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved.
ContentS
vii Preface
xi executive Summary
1 introduction
7 Chapter 1. what Kind of army do we have?
27 Chapter 2. what Kind of army do we need?
61 Chapter 3. Summary and recommendations
71 Conclusion
73 glossary
figureS
15 figure 1. Modular organizational designs for Brigade Combat teams
16 figure 2. Selected Shifts in army active and reserve Component
Capability areas
38 figure 3. the fCS System of Systems
taBLeS
50 table 1. the Modular force Brigade Combat teams (fy 2013)
66 table 2. the full-Spectrum force and dual-Surge force
ChaPter no. > CRAP1P 1I1L
CRALLN65 10 U5 NA1I0NAL 5CUPI1Y
The United States faces three primary existing and emerging strategic challenges that
are most likely to preoccupy senior decision-makers in the coming years:
> Defeating both the Sunni Salif-Takfri and Shia Khomeinist brands of violent
Islamist radicalism;
> Hedging against the rise of a hostile or more openly confrontational China and the
potential challenge posed by authoritarian capitalist states; and
> Preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.
Addressing these specifc challenges should be at the forefront of the incoming
administrations strategic calculations, particularly during the 2009 Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR), which will help shape US defense strategy, planning, and
force structure over the next twenty years.
Although none of these strategic challenges, individually, rivals the danger posed
by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, they are certainly graver than the types of
threats that prevailed immediately after the Cold War, during the period referred to
by some as the unipolar moment, when the power of the United States was at its peak
and its dominance had not yet been put to the test. They are also quite different from
the threats the United States confronted throughout the twentieth century (Imperial
Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union), all of which pos-
sessed militaries that, by and large, were very similar to the US military both in terms
For an overview of these strategic challenges, see Andrew Krepinevich, Robert Martinage, and Robert
Work, The Challenges to US National Security, the frst monograph of the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments series that presents a Strategy for the Long Haul.
PPFAC
v||| CSBa > 5trategy fer the Leng Rau|
of their structure and their modi operandi. For example, both the German and Soviet
armies focused primarily on conducting combined arms mechanized land operations,
as did the US Army. That is not the case with respect to todays threats and potential
rivals, who instead focus their principal efforts on exploiting asymmetries to gain an
advantage.
Radical Islamist movements, for example, use terror and subversion, engage in
modern forms of irregular and insurgency warfare, and pursue weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD) to infict catastrophic damage on the United States and its allies.
China, who, of the three challenges, presents the military forces most similar to the
US military, is emphasizing conventionally armed ballistic missiles, information war-
fare capabilities, anti-satellite weaponry, submarines, high-speed cruise missiles and
other capabilities that could threaten the United States access to the global com-
mons of space, cyberspace, the air, the seas and the undersea, and possibly to US
ally and partner nations in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Hostile and potentially
unstable countries like North Korea and Iran have developed or may soon develop
nuclear arsenals with which they could intimidate Americas allies and challenge the
US militarys ability to protect vital national interests. Moreover, if these countries
succeed in developing nuclear arsenals, they could spur others to follow suit.
1R KY P0L 0F MILI1APY P0WP
Military power is central to the United States ability to meet these strategic challeng-
es successfully, whether in support of diplomatic and other elements of US security
policy, or used in actual confict. It follows, therefore, that the military means must be
compatible and commensurate with the nations security ends.
Given the long expected service life of most of its major assets, the US military
force structure, which underlies the concepts of operation that drive the US way of
war, is still based primarily on the premises and experience of the Cold War and its
immediate aftermath. Arguably, much of the current Program of Record (the forces
the Department of Defense seeks to acquire in coming years) remains similarly refec-
tive of that period. Yet the looming strategic challenges look to be signifcantly differ-
ent. Thus there is a danger that many of the forces that the Defense Department plans
to acquire may prove to be unsuitable for dealing with future threats.
This monograph, and several others in the series comprising the Strategy for the
Long Haul project, examines the readiness of the four Services, the Special Operations
Forces, and the strategic forces to do their parts in meeting the emerging security
challenges. Each monograph:
> Describes the current state of a Service or force;
> Discusses what that Service or force must be able to do to help meet the emerging
strategic challenges successfully; and
An Army at the Cressreads |x
> Assesses problematic areas and issues in the Services or forces Program of Record
and recommends measures to address them.
While these monographs address particular Services or forces, it must be kept in
mind that the US military fghts as a joint force. Accordingly, each Service or force
must ensure that the forces it acquires and the operational concepts it employs are in-
teroperable with those of the others, and, equally important, that there is not a major
mismatch between the support one Service assumes that it can expect from another,
and what is actually the case. These concerns have historically been problematic for
the US military, and thus merit particularly close attention.
a short intro paragraph of about 125 words can go
here. this is optional
XCU1IV 5UMMAPY
1I1L > Subtitle
Throughout the twentieth century, the United States Army was oriented primar-
ily on waging conventional warfare against a similarly armed great power, frst the
German Army during the World Wars and later the Soviet Army during the Cold War.
Likewise, the pre-9/11 Army was designed to fght short, conventional wars against
regional powers along the lines of what it experienced during Operation Desert Storm
in 99. Today, however, nearly a half million American soldiers are serving overseas
in some eighty countries around the world. Over 2,200 soldiers have been killed in
combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and over 7,000 wounded. The garrison
Army that fred nary a shot in Central Europe for half a century during the Cold War
has, in the frst decade of the new century, become a battle-hardened, expeditionary
force conducting protracted ground campaigns on two main fronts. Yet for all the
change the Army has experienced, more is on the way.
The United States currently faces three major strategic challenges that will domi-
nate its defense policy over the next decade or longer: defeating Islamist terrorist
groups, hedging against the rise of a hostile and more openly confrontational China,
and preparing for a world in which there are more nuclear-armed regional powers.
These existing or prospective adversaries present very different military challenges
from those the Army prepared for during the previous century. Terrorist and insur-
gent groups employ a modern form of irregular warfare that has, over the past four
decades, presented a formidable challenge to the worlds best conventional armies in
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. Unlike previous great power com-
petitors, Chinas military modernization efforts appear to be centered on the aero-
space and maritime domains. Meanwhile, second- and third-tier military powers
such as Iran and North Korea have concentrated on developing and felding weapons
of mass destruction, Special Operations Forces, and, in the case of Iran, a substan-
tial irregular warfare capability, rather than building up conventional ground forces.
How should the Army prepare to confront these threats?
x|| CSBa > 5trategy fer the Leng Rau|
To date, the Army has made or is in the process of making a number of changes de-
signed to help it address these challenges: reorganizing from a division-based Army
to a modular, brigade-based force; rebalancing the force by placing an increased em-
phasis on military police, military intelligence, civil affairs and other capability areas
while decreasing its emphasis on artillery, air defense, and armor units; increasing the
size of its Special Operations Forces; updating its doctrine for counterinsurgency and
stability operations; and modifying its training facilities to better prepare soldiers for
the types of operations they have been tasked to conduct in Iraq and Afghanistan.
While these initiatives are certainly valuable, more must be done to prepare the
Army for the types of threats it will likely face in the near future. Specifcally, the
Army fnds itself in an era of persistent irregular warfare, in which the United States
seeks, wherever possible, to pursue an indirect approach to dealing with its enemies
by building up the forces of threatened states as a frst line of defense, emphasizing
preventive steady-state Phase 0 operations whenever possible. Should this approach
fail, the Army must also retain the ability to surge forces and to take the lead in
carrying out large-scale stability operations when necessary. At the same time, the
Army must remain capable of conducting traditional power-projection operations, to
include regime change operations against minor nuclear-armed states such as North
Korea and Iran (prospectively), and securing nuclear weapons no longer under the ef-
fective control of a failing or failed state. An Army that can successfully conduct these
missions will likely possess the forces and skill sets relevant for accomplishing other
missions along the confict spectrum.
Given these very different mission sets and inherent resource limitations, the Army
has decided to feld a full-spectrum force rather than developing units oriented pri-
marily on conducting either conventional war or irregular war operations. However,
while this may be desirable in theory, several factors cast doubt on whether it can be
achieved in practice. First, as the Armys own doctrine makes clear, the skill sets re-
quired of soldiers for conventional and irregular operations are very diverse and very
demanding, ranging from executing complex combined arms maneuver warfare to
operating effectively among alien cultures. Second, embedded in this approach is an
assumption that the Army can shift with suffcient speed to reorient itself to address
any threat along the confict spectrum. Yet the Armys track record in reorienting
conventional forces rapidly for irregular warfare is not encouraging. Third, the Army
may not be able to rely upon its partners in the Interagency to provide the capabilities
they are responsible for as part of the whole of government solution to the chal-
lenges posed by stability operations, thus increasing the number of unique tasks the
Army must be capable of performing on its own in these situations. Fourth, and per-
haps most important, the Army is attempting to create the full-spectrum force, with
the unprecedented demands it places on soldiers, at the very time it is experiencing a
serious and steady erosion in the quality of the force, in both the offcer and non-com-
missioned offcer corps, and in recruiting standards.
An Army at the Cressreads x|||
For a variety of reasons, including the diffculty of preparing for both irregular
and conventional conficts, the Army has continued to place its institutional center of
gravity squarely in the area of conventional warfare. This is true both for the Armys
core modernization program, the Future Combat Systems (FCS), and its overall force
structure. While the FCS program is optimized for conventional operations, and
while the Army, in the interim, plans to feld an Active Component that arguably is
overly weighted toward conventional operations, the Service has also decided against
felding brigades oriented on irregular warfare missions such as stability operations,
counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense. The Army does anticipate desig-
nating some of its Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) as Security Cooperation
Brigade Combat Teams (SC BCTs) for Phase 0 stability operations, but these units will
be tasked with this mission only on a temporary basis, and are thus likely to lose any
profciency they gain.
What, then, should the Army do differently? How can it best prepare for irregu-
lar conficts while still maintaining a dominant capability for high-end conventional
warfare? The answer lies in developing and felding a force fully capable of conducting
and, if need be, surging for irregular warfare operations, in addition to its capability
to conduct and surge for large-scale conventional operations. Should either form of
confict prove protracted, the other wing of the force could, over the course of the
initial 2-5 month surge, undergo training and the appropriate force structure modi-
fcations to enable it to swing in behind the surge force to sustain operations.
What would this dual surge force look like? First, ffteen Army IBCTs and ffteen
Army National Guard IBCTs would be converted to SC BCTs. With a 3: rotation
base, this would allow for seven and a half SC BCTs to be felded on a sustained basis,
serving as the Armys phase 0 forward presence forces. It would also provide a pool
of thirty brigades to draw upon should major stability operations contingency require
a surge of forces. Second, because the best strategy when addressing the threat of ir-
regular warfare is to build partner capacity and engage in other preventive measures
before a friendly country is at risk, the Army should also develop and maintain a sig-
nifcant training and advisory capability that can be deployed on short notice when
necessary. Third, since the Army may need to fll any gaps in the US interagency effort
to restore governance and enable economic reconstruction, it should strongly consid-
er maintaining the ability to feld Civil Operations, Reconstruction and Development
Support (CORDS) groups capable of providing advice, mentoring, and support to the
host nations non-security institutions (including its civil administration and its legal,
economic, and healthcare sectors). Finally, for high-end conventional operations, the
Armys primarily capability should consist of twelve Heavy BCTs (perhaps eventu-
ally becoming FCS BCTs), an armored cavalry regiment, and nine National Guard
Heavy BCTs. This would give the Army a surge force of up to twenty-oneHeavy BCTs,
in addition to the six Stryker BCTs in the Active Component, one Stryker BCT in the
Reserve Component, and four brigades of the 0
st
Airborne Division (Air Assault)a
total of thirty-two heavy or middle-weight brigades, far in excess of what is likely to
x|v CSBa > 5trategy fer the Leng Rau|
be required for a conventional major combat operation. Because of the relatively high
density of offcers and NCOs involved in training, advising and support of Interagency
operations, the erosion in the offcer and NCO corps, and Army budget limitations,
the Army should forego its plans to increase its end strength by 65,000 soldiers.
The Armys centerpiece modernization program, the Future Combat System, is re-
ally a cluster of fourteen systems of various types. These systems will rely heavily
on being linked to an overarching battle network that also ties them together with
individual soldiers and the US militarys joint battle network. While revolutionary
in its concept, given the many technical challenges confronting it, the FCS program
may not be executable at an acceptable cost. Furthermore, it may not be technically
possible to create the battle network, as currently envisioned by the Army, or to create
it within the time frame projected. Finally, as the FCS is optimized for conventional
warfare, it is not clear it represents the best use of resources in this era of protracted
irregular warfare confronting the Army. If this proves to be the case, the Army needs
to have a plan to harvest as many FCS capabilities as possible. Thus far the Army is
moving FCS components into the current force as they become available. However, to
date these capabilities are relatively modest compared to the programs stated goals
and the level of resources being invested. A thorough program review by the incoming
administration is warranted before the Army commits to seeing the program through
in its current form. At the same time, the Army should strongly consider establishing
war reserve stocks of equipment to support irregular warfare operations, both to en-
able the rapid buildup of indigenous forces as necessary, and to replace the equipment
of Army BCTs damaged or destroyed in the course of conducting irregular warfare
operations.
Ultimately, the end result of the recommendations presented in this report would
be a more balanced forceone that is not only balanced between the demands of
irregular and conventional operations, but also one that is more evenly weighted be-
tween the Active and Reserve Components.
The soldier . . . is required to practice the greatest act of religious train-
ing sacrifce. . . . However horrible the incidents of war may be, the sol-
dier who is called upon to offer and to give his life for his country is the
noblest development of mankind.
2
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, May 962
Nearly a half million American soldiers are serving overseas in some eighty coun-
tries around the world.
3
Over 2,200 soldiers have been killed in combat operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and over 7,000 wounded.
The garrison Army that fred

nary a shot in Central Europe for half a century during the Cold War has, in the frst
decade of the new century, become a battle-hardened, expeditionary force conducting
protracted ground campaigns on two main fronts. Yet for all the change the Army has
experienced, more is on the way.
The United States is currently in a situation comparable to the one it confronted in
the early days of the Cold War, when US civilian and military leaders were faced with
a new and daunting challenge in the form of the Soviet Union. To address this chal-
lenge, a long-term national strategy to preserve American security was developed.
In the aftermath of the Soviet Unions collapse, the United States entered a period of
relative calm a unipolar moment in which its power was unrivaled and emerging
threats to its security had not yet come into focus. Unfortunately, just as the Cold War
2
Cited from the speech delivered by General MacArthur upon receiving the Sylvanus Thayer Award
at West Point, New York, May 2, 962. Accessed at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
douglasmacarthurthayeraward.html. Accessed on August , 2008.
3
Department of the Army, 2007 Army Modernization Program (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, March 5, 2007), p. 2.
Department of the Army, Defense Manpower Data Center, Data, Analysis and Program Division Global
War on Terrorism Casualties by Military Service Component Active, Guard and Reserve, October
7, 200 through August 9, 2008. Accessed at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/
castop.htm. Accessed on August , 2008.
IN1P0UC1I0N
2 CSBa > 5trategy fer the Leng Rau|
succeeded the brief peace following World War II, Americas unipolar moment has
been succeeded by a more dangerous era, as the United States now confronts three
formidable challenges that may grow even more threatening in the years to come.
This report provides an assessment of how the United States Army (hereafter the
Army) might best organize itself to address the three strategic challenges described
above the Long War with Islamist terrorist groups, a more proliferated world,
and a rising China which are most likely to dominate senior US national security
decision-makers attention over the next decade or two.
Because in many ways these challenges are different from those of the Cold War,
and even the immediate post-Cold War period, the Army fnds itself at a crossroad.
While it is generally accepted that the United States requires an army, the question,
What kind of army? is ever present. During the twentieth century the answer to
this question came easily. Over the frst half of that century, the Army oriented it-
self primarily some would say almost exclusively on waging conventional warfare
against its most formidable potential adversary: the German Army in the two world
wars. During the second half of the century, the Army retained its conventional war-
fare focus as it directed the vast majority of its energies toward confronting the Soviet
armies that threatened to overrun Western Europe. Given the magnitude of the threat
posed to US security by these enemies, it is diffcult to fault the Army for adopting this
orientation. By comparison, the dangers posed by brushfre wars in places like the
Philippines, Latin America and Southeast Asia were of minor consequence.
Now, however, the answer to this most fundamental question is far from obvious.
The German Army today has been part of a US-led alliance for over half a century.
Moreover, it is a pale shadow of the force that twice came terrifyingly close to defeat-
ing the worlds leading democracies. The Soviet Army ceased to exist with the Soviet
Unions collapse in 99 and, like its German counterpart, has diminished to the point
where it has diffculty maintaining internal order within Russia, let alone projecting
signifcant power abroad.
With the passing of the German and Russian threats, no new military has suc-
ceeded them to challenge the Armys dominance in traditional, or conventional, land
warfare. In the run-up to the First Gulf War there were fears that the Iraqi Army, one
of the worlds largest and based on its decade-long war with Iran one of its most
experienced, would exact a fearful toll on the US-led coalition. Yet in February 99
the Iraqi Army collapsed in less than a week after the onset of Coalition ground op-
erations. Twelve years later, during the Second Gulf War, Army and Marine ground
forces encountered greater resistance from Iraqi irregular forces on their sprint to
Baghdad than from Saddam Husseins regulars. Taking note of the Armys unsur-
passed profciency in waging combined-arms, mechanized air-land warfare, existing
and would-be rivals of the United States have, for the time being, essentially aban-
doned this form of military competition.
Today, while the United States does not lack enemies both existing and prospec-
tive none are taking the well-worn path of the Germans, Soviets and Iraqis. In the
An Army at the Cressreads 3
Middle East and Central Asia they are waging a form of modern irregular warfare
that has, over the past four decades, often presented a formidable challenge to the
worlds best conventional armies to include the American Army in Vietnam and,
more recently, Iraq and Afghanistan; the Soviet Army in Afghanistan; and the Israeli
Army in Lebanon. The challenges posed by modern irregular warfare are increasingly
formidable, and include the use of modern communications and other information
technologies, as well as extended-range rockets, missiles and unmanned aerial vehi-
cles (UAVs), and advanced armor-penetrating weaponry. The prospect that irregular
forces will acquire rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles (RAMM) with advanced
guidance capabilities (G-RAMM) seems increasingly plausible, even likely, over the
Defense Departments ten- to twenty-year planning horizon. As this occurs, it will
become progressively more diffcult to defend key fxed targets. This will likely be the
case in at least some protracted irregular wars. To avoid becoming engaged in such
conficts, the United States is well-advised to pursue preventive measures, in what are
referred to as Phase 0 operations.
5
Meanwhile, second- and third-tier military powers, such as Iran and North Korea,
focus comparatively minor attention on their conventional ground force capabilities
in favor of felding weapons of mass destruction, their own Special Forces and, in
Irans case, a substantial irregular warfare capability. Moreover, should Iran acquire
nuclear weapons, it would likely only embolden its use of proxy forces (e.g., Hezbollah,
Hamas, the Mahdi Army) to wage irregular warfare against US allies and interests
throughout the Middle East. The combination of G-RAMM and nuclear weapons,
linked with submarines, advanced anti-ship mines and other proliferating military
capabilities could enable even third-tier powers like Iran and North Korea to present
a formidable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) threat.
6
Perhaps the most challenging role for the Army, and the US military, would arise
in the event a rogue state employed nuclear weapons. This might necessitate power-
projection regime-change operations against a minor, nuclear-armed power, a chal-
lenge far more formidable than that confronted in either of the two Gulf Wars. As in
the case of regime change operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, following such a cam-
paign, the Army would likely be confronted with a prolonged period of occupation,
5
Phase 0 operations are associated primarily with security assistance, humanitarian relief, and disaster
response operations. See Oliver Fritz and Gregory A. Hermsmeyer, The US Air Force and Stability
Operations Transformation, Joint Forces Quarterly, Fourth Quarter 2007, p. 29.
6
Anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are those designed to delay the arrival of US forces,
to keep them beyond their effective range, and to defeat them if they try to penetrate the denial zone.
While many military forces and capabilities can contribute to the A2/AD mission, those most closely
associated with it include: ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike forward air bases and massed
troop concentrations; submarines; anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs); land-based anti-ship systems
(e.g., strike aircraft, ASCMs, and ballistic missiles that target carrier strike groups); and counter-
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (CISR)
capabilities, such as antisatellite weapons, cyberweapons, and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) generators
designed to fracture US battle networks.
conducting security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations and
possibly confronting enemy forces engaged in irregular warfare.
China, a rising great power that increasingly seeks to compete militarily with the
United States, is focusing on an array of capabilities that bear little resemblance to
a combined-arms, mechanized land-oriented military force. To be sure, the Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) is working to streamline, professionalize and modernize it-
self, to include developing and felding new tanks and infantry fghting vehicles. It is
also working to improve its marine infantry and amphibious assault capabilities.
However, to the extent the PLA is developing the capability to project power far
from its shores, its principal missions have little to do with traditional land warfare.
7

Of greatest concern is Taiwan, a country that Beijing considers a wayward prov-
ince. The ability to coerce Taiwan, or to invade and occupy it, is the most demanding
power-projection mission for Chinas land forces. Given Chinas already impressive
A2/AD capabilities, which are almost certain to become more imposing in the com-
ing years, it is highly unlikely that a rapid, large-scale US ground reinforcement of
Taiwan would be possible in the event of war. Positioning a major US ground combat
force in Taiwan in peacetime seems equally implausible, as it would likely provoke a
confict rather than avert one.
Rather, the Chinese military is emphasizing aerospace and maritime capa-
bilities that will enable it to challenge the United States for control of the global
commons air and space, cyberspace, the seas and the undersea and to extend
its military reach out to the second island chain in the Pacifc. Despite General
MacArthurs injunction against the United States becoming involved in a land war on
the Asian continent,
8
some might posit the need to feld ground forces able to deploy
on the Chinese mainland. However, Chinas sheer size brings to mind the response
German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck gave when asked what Germany would do if
the British suddenly landed an expeditionary force on its North Sea coast: Why, we
would have to send out the police and have them arrested!
9
In short, despite the United States enormous wealth, it is beyond even its means
to contemplate a major conventional land campaign in China. It is not, however, far-
fetched to believe that China, which seeks to develop strong ties to Third World coun-
7
For a discussion of the security challenge posed by the Peoples Republic of China to US security inter-
ests, see CSBAs Long Haul Strategy monograph by Andrew Krepinevich, Robert Martinage and Robert
Work, The Challenges to US National Security (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2008), pp. 232.
8
President Lyndon Johnson stated that, when he visited General Douglas MacArthur at Walter Reed
Hospital for the last time, the two began discussing the Far East. Said MacArthur: Son, dont ever
get yourself bogged down in a land war in Asia. A Look Down that Long Road, Time, February 9,
965. Accessed at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,97,9096-9,00.html. Accessed on
August , 2008. The statement is also attributed to Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery (Viscount
Alamein) in a speech in the House of Lords on May 30, 962: Rule , on page of the book of war is: Do
not march on Moscow . . . . Rule 2 is: Do not go fghting with your land armies in China. Accessed at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093779/trivia. Accessed on August , 2008.
9
The anecdote, which has various forms, can be found at http://www.anecdotage.com/index.php?
aid=58. Accessed on August , 2008.
tries hostile to the United States, like Iran, Sudan and Venezuela, might pursue proxy
irregular warfare against US interests, somewhat similar to what the Soviet Union
did during the Cold War through its sponsorship of wars of national liberation.
Given the discussion above it might be said that, no matter which of the three dif-
ferent challenges the Army confronts, each is likely, if not certain, to involve the pros-
pect of irregular warfare of some kind. If the familiar (one might also say comfort-
able) answer given by the Army for nearly a century that America needs an army
to defeat the conventional forces of the United States principal rivals is no longer
relevant, what should animate the Armys efforts? This brings us back to the ques-
tions: What kind of army does the United States have? and What kind of army does
the United States need? This report focuses on these two questions.
ChaPter no. > CRAP1P 1I1L U5 FN5 BU61 > options and Choices for the Long haul
As you know, you have to go to war with the Army you have, not the
Army you want.
0
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, December 200
1R C0L WAP BA11L 1RA1 IN1 C0M
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld incurred strong criticism for the statement cited
above; however, it raises an important issue: Will the country be satisfed with the
Army that emerges from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq? Will that Army be well-
prepared for the challenges ahead? Tomorrows Army promises to look quite different
from the Army that went to war in the period following the terrorist attacks on New
York and Washington on September , 200, as indeed it should.
Refecting both the guidance of senior civilian and military leaders, as well as its
institutional predilections, the pre-9/ Army was oriented on waging short, conven-
tional wars along the lines of what it had prepared for during the Cold War, and what
it had experienced in the First Gulf War That Cold War battle that didnt come in
the words of then-Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, General Colin Powell.

As two eminent military strategists observed, that Army was designed primarily
to defeat a numerically superior mechanized threat backed by strong air and naval
forces, on the territory of an ally, and from a forward-deployed posture in which es-
sential ground support and sustainment infrastructure already was in place.
2
The
First Gulf War presented the US Army with
0
CNN.Com, Troops Put Thorny Questions to Rumsfeld, December 8, 200. Accessed at http://www.
cnn.com/200/WORLD/meast/2/08/rumsfeld.troops/. Accessed on August , 2008.
Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Defense Budget
Project, 99), p. 22.
2
Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, Conceptual Foundations of a Transformed US Army
(Washington, DC: Institute for Land Warfare, March 2002), p. 9.
ChaPter 1 > WRA1 KIN 0F APMY 0 W RAV7
. . . circumstances uniquely favorable for the style of warfare in which it had trained for
more than a decade, and against an enemy far less capable than those it was organized
and equipped to confront. Required to deploy into an undeveloped theater, Army forces
were able for nearly four months to assemble and prepare for combat unhampered by
enemy interference. That same leisure, together with the open topography of the battle
area and virtually continuous overhead surveillance, enabled the Army to conduct an in-
telligence preparation of the battlefeld far more extensive than most attackers have ever
enjoyed. Once committed to battle, it confronted and attrited operationally static enemy
formations in largely open ground in conditions of unchallenged air supremacy and with
overwhelming advantage in information, mobility, frepower and protection.
3
This orientation was reinforced by the two-war posture that informed military
requirements for much of the 990s. Whether going by the name of major regional
conficts (MRCs) or major theater wars (MTWs), this force planning construct en-
couraged the armed forces to prepare for wars very similar to the First Gulf War.
The planning construct proved at odds with the more complex security environ-
ment that was emerging in the immediate post-Cold War era. While preparing for
potential major combat operations (or MCOs, the latest iteration of the MRC/MTW
term) may have deterred countries like Iran, Iraq, and North Korea from engaging in
overt acts of aggression, it did not prevent low-level conficts from starting in other
parts of the world. The 990s saw the Army conducting major contingency opera-
tions in the Balkans, Haiti, Panama, Rwanda and Somalia. The Pentagon scrambled
to catch up with the demands posed by these operations and by mid-decade the term
small-scale contingencies (SSCs) entered the planning lexicon. However, the intro-
duction of SSCs had no signifcant infuence on US military force structure or mod-
ernization efforts.
APMY 1PAN5F0PMA1I0N: 1AK 1
For the Army, all this changed with the 999 Balkan War (Operation Allied Force).
5
During the war, NATO military operations against Slobodan Milosevics Serbian-
dominated Yugoslav government were almost exclusively centered on aerial bom-
bardment. Not long after the campaigns onset, on March 2, General Wesley Clark,
the NATO commander, directed that Army Apache attack helicopters be deployed to
3
Ibid., p. 3.
The baseline for US force requirements can be found in Christopher Bowie, et al, The New Calculus
(Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 993). The reports logic and recommendations were adopted, with minor
revisions, by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in the Defense Departments Bottom-Up Review. See
Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment (Washington, DC: Defense Budget
Project, 99).
5
The war centered on NATO efforts to stop the government of Yugoslavia from engaging in forms of
ethnic cleansing against the Kosovar population in Kosovo. The objective was to have Serbian military
forces depart, to be replaced by an international peacekeeping force that would enable Kosovar refu-
gees to return to their homes.
While preparing for
potential major
combat operations
may have deterred
countries like Iran,
Iraq, and North
Korea from engaging
in overt acts of
aggression, it did
not prevent low-
level conficts from
starting in other parts
of the world.
Albania to support US Air Force operations whose purpose was to destroy or disperse
the Serbian units stationed in Kosovo. The Apaches would be supported by Army mul-
tiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and other force elements. Dubbed Task Force
Hawk, the unit experienced diffculty deploying quickly into Albania. In the eyes of
some senior Defense Department civilian leaders, the Army was in danger of becom-
ing strategically irrelevant. Seeing how challenged the Army was to deploy forces
quickly to the Persian Gulf following Iraqs invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, as well
as to Albania in 999, the new Army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, declared
Our heavy forces are too heavy and our light forces lack staying power. Heavy forces
must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint,
and light forces must be more lethal, survivable, and tactically mobile. Achieving this
paradigm will require innovative thinking about structure, modernization efforts, and
spending.
6
Shinseki moved quickly to restructure the Army into a more expeditionary force.
7

By the time of the attacks of 9/ and the onset of operations in Afghanistan, the Army
was engaged in a transformation effort of its own, from its Cold War era garrison
force to an expeditionary force. The central focus of this effort was to enable the Army
to deploy more rapidly against adversaries with anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) ca-
pabilities. The Armys transformation vision saw future conficts as ones in which:
> Operations will shift from linear to nonlinear
8
;
> Forces will operate much more dispersed;
6
Benjamen S. Lambeth, Task Force Hawk, AIR FORCE, February 2002, p. 83.
7
General James Dubik, who played a key role in standing up the Armys Stryker Brigades and also served
as head of Joint Forces Commands J9 staff element charged with identifying future challenges and op-
portunities for the military, stated that
Task Force Hawk was one of the infuences . . . [along with other] operations that we conducted since
the end of the Cold War Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo each one has some very similar
characteristics. One, theyre underdeveloped infrastructures. Two, there was a variety of threats.
Three, those threats are both conventional combat and asymmetrical. And four, theyre very hard
to get to due to the long logistics line.
So what we want to do, as an Army, is look at those as examples of future conficts . . . . And what the
next war needs is a force that can go into anywhere very quickly, doesnt need a big logistics tail,
doesnt need a main airport. They can plunk themselves down and be combat ready upon arrival.
Interview, Major General James Dubik, The Future of War, Frontline. Accessed at http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/future/. Accessed on August , 2008.
8
Nonlinear operations, as the term suggests, are operations in which there are no well-defned front
lines or rear areas. Examples of linear warfare would include the Western Front in World War I, and
the Russo-German Front in World War II. Examples of nonlinear operations include most insurgen-
cies (e.g., the Vietnam War; the Philippine Insurrection) as well as the American Civil War and certain
points during the Korean War (e.g., following the US assault at Inchon in September 1950).
By the time of the
attacks of 9/11
and the onset
of operations in
Afghanistan, the
Army was engaged
in a transformation
effort of its own,
from its Cold War era
garrison force to an
expeditionary force.
> Operations will be conducted at a much higher tempo, leading to greater reliance
on speed in mobilizing, deploying, and conducting combat operations;
> Advanced information technologies will allow ground forces to form networks, en-
abling them to violate the principle of mass to better protect themselves by disper-
sion, while losing little of their ability to coordinate or mass combat capability;
> Although close combat will remain a key element in land warfare, advanced infor-
mation capabilities and munitions will enable ground forces to conduct decisive
engagements at far greater ranges than has historically been the case;
> Adversaries who cannot compete effectively in open battle will gravitate toward
combat in complex terrain (urban areas in particular);
> Operations will be much more dependent on maritime and air forces for their suc-
cess than has been the case in short, land warfare will become even more of a
joint endeavor than it is today; and
> The spectrum of land warfare will become blurred, with various forms of warfare
merging, requiring unprecedented levels of fexibility from land forces.
9
The Armys vision looked to exploit opportunities made possible by rapidly ad-
vancing technologies, with particular emphasis on information-related technologies.
The Armys vision of the transformed force that it would See frst, understand frst,
act frst and fnish decisively is truly transformational in that it would eclipse the
combined arms, mechanized, heavy forces that dominated land warfare since the ad-
vent of blitzkrieg, in favor of far more dispersed, yet highly networked, forces that
fght the decisive battle not at close range but at extended distances. The Army leader-
ship also saw, quite perceptively as it turned out, that this kind of dominance in open
warfare would lead its enemies to seek alternative ways of fghting, such as urban
terrain combat.
The Armys vision, while revolutionary, was focused primarily on what might be
termed conventional, or open battles engagements between regular, or conven-
tional, forces in relatively unrestricted terrain, with particular emphasis on the ability
9
These observations are drawn from US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-3-90/O&O, The United States Army Objective Force Operational and Organizational
Plan for Maneuver Unit of Action (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, July 22, 2002); US Army Training and
Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The United States Army Objective Force Operational
and Organizational Concept (Draft) (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, December 8, 200); James M.
Dubik, The Armys Twofer: The Dual Role of the Interim Force (Washington, DC: Institute of Land
Warfare, October 200); Huba Wass de Czege and Richard Hart Sinnreich, Conceptual Foundations of
a Transformed US Army (Washington, DC: Institute for Land Warfare, March 2002; and United States
Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force (Washington, DC.: US Army, November 200).
The Armys vision
looked to exploit
opportunities
made possible by
rapidly advancing
technologies, with
particular emphasis
on information-
related technologies.
to deploy expeditionary forces very rapidly, in an A2/AD threat environment.
20
This is
a desirable capability, especially in regime change operations against a minor nuclear-
armed power. By demonstrating that it is not only dominant in open battle against
conventional forces in this era, but that it intends to maintain this dominance in the
post-transformation era, the Army may dissuade enemies from creating ground forc-
es to challenge the US military directly. By seeking to feld a dominant ground force
that can deploy and operate in an A2/AD environment, the Army appears to be trying
to ensure that the current US dominance in power-projection operations is sustained,
even against a minor power armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Indeed,
the Army, because of its potential ability to disperse its combat capability more widely
than any of its sister Services, is potentially the force most capable of operating under-
neath an enemys A2/AD threat umbrella but only if a substantial ground force can
be deployed and sustained in such an environment at an acceptable cost.
There were risks associated with the Armys vision, as with any large-scale orga-
nizational change. In particular, the Army did not suffciently take into account the
need to prepare for other signifcant missions that were emerging as a consequence of
the US militarys overwhelming dominance in traditional, or conventional, warfare.
This dominance has led adversaries to pursue asymmetrical approaches to warfare,
including nontraditional threats to the homeland and modern forms of irregular war-
fare, which are often protracted. Army transformation would, therefore, need to en-
compass more than conventional (or open) battle.
APMY 1PAN5F0PMA1I0N: 1AK 2
These gaps in the Army vision were made manifest in the wars that followed the 9/
attacks on the United States. Using a sports analogy, the Army was prepared to run
a conventional war sprint while its enemies in Afghanistan and Iraq were planning
to run an irregular warfare marathon. In addition to transforming from a forward-
based garrison Army to an expeditionary Army, the Service now confronted the chal-
lenge of adapting to this new reality.
As we have seen, the Army that went to war in Afghanistan and Iraq was designed
almost exclusively with an eye toward waging conventional warfare. This orienta-
tion was not novel. Indeed, it was consistent with the Armys focus during most of
the twentieth century on being prepared for conventional warfare in Europe. The
Army had enjoyed great success in this form of warfare and, from an institutional
perspective, was very comfortable with it. This institutional preference was further
reinforced by the United States traumatic experience in the Vietnam War, in which
the Army played the central role and suffered more than its sister Services, in both
20
While this has been the Armys vision, it has never come to grips with how to solve deploying and sus-
taining a sizeable land force in an A2/AD environment. See Andrew Krepinevich, Transforming the
Legions (Washington, DC: CSBA, 200), pp. 355, 6782.
The Army, because
of its potential
ability to disperse
its combat
capability more
widely than any of
its sister Services,
is potentially the
force most capable
of operating
underneath an
enemys A2/AD
threat umbrella.
a human and institutional sense. Thus in addition to a cultural preference for con-
ventional war, the Army became positively neuralgic over the thought of waging a
protracted war against irregular forces.
2
In its desire to avoid such conficts, the Army found willing partners in the form
of the American people and their political leaders. No More Vietnams became a
slogan, not just for Americans, but for the US military and especially the Army.
Thus the 980s saw the introduction of the Weinberger Doctrine, and its stepchild,
the Powell Doctrine, which sought to avoid future Vietnams by carefully choosing
Americas battlefelds, applying overwhelming force when troops were committed,
and looking for an early way out of the confict. When it looked like US forces might
be tied down in an irregular confict, or incur substantial casualties, as occurred, for
example, in Lebanon in the fall of 983, US forces were withdrawn before the mission
could be accomplished.
This theme continued in the 990s, under the rubric of Exit Strategies. Before de-
ploying US forces to places like Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda, their withdrawal date was
debated as much as how the military planned to accomplish the mission. When US
forces dipped their toe in the waters of stability operations, as in Somalia, they were
withdrawn quickly when casualties ensued. In 2000, then-candidate for president
George W. Bush criticized the Clinton Administrations use of US forces in peace-
keeping and peace enforcement operations, suggesting that under his leadership such
operations would decline. Not surprisingly, in Army circles, phrases like We dont
do windows, jungles, cities or guerrillas were heard, refecting not only the Services
institutional preference, but clearly those of the American people as well.
This all changed with the attacks of 9/. Following the successful major combat
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States realized that it could not depart
at a time of its own choosing, lest it run the risk that the unstable conditions in these
states might produce regimes every bit as hostile to the United States as those that
were displaced.
In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army was the Service principally confronted
with the mission of providing stability until a new government could be elected and
indigenous security forces could be trained. This would have been demanding under
conditions of relative tranquility. It has proven to be far more diffcult in both coun-
tries, as insurgent forces work to foment instability and frustrate the democratic pro-
cess and reconstruction. For the frst time since the Vietnam War the Army was faced
with the challenge of maintaining a large deployed force in the feld for a protracted
period of time: the world-class sprinter had to become a world-class marathoner, and
accomplish this while the race was being run.
The challenge for the Army is manifold: it needs to reorient itself to sustain a pro-
tracted rotation of units into two war zones, leaving suffcient time for units to rest
2
For an assessment on the Armys Vietnam War experience, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army
and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 986).
Following the
successful major
combat operations
in Afghanistan and
Iraq, the United
States realized that
it could not depart
at a time of its own
choosing, lest it run
the risk that the
unstable conditions
in these states
might produce
regimes every bit as
hostile to the United
States as those that
were displaced.
and reft between deployments; it has to develop doctrine to cope with modern in-
surgency warfare; it has to organize, train and equip its forces to execute the new
doctrine; it has to modernize the force, which is operating primarily with Cold War
era equipment; fnally, the Army needs to attract and retain suffcient numbers of
soldiers, and of suffcient quality, to sustain the force.
The results of the Armys efforts to overcome these challenges over the past fve
years, while remarkable in many respects, have been mixed.
1he Medu|ar Ferce
As it became increasingly evident that the Army would need to deploy large numbers
of soldiers over a protracted period of time to Afghanistan and, especially, Iraq, the
Service found itself transforming in the wake of events, rather than in anticipation
of them. The Army has responded by restructuring from a division- to a brigade-
based force, the so-called modular force, and by establishing a brigade rotational base
through its Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process (hereafter referred to sim-
ply as force generation).
Whereas in previous conficts one spoke of forward-deployed Army divisions, the
focus in Afghanistan and Iraq is on deployed brigades. A principal goal of this effort is
to enable brigades to deploy independently of their division, in order to enhance fex-
ibility.
22
To this end, modular force brigades have major combat support and service
capabilities organic to their structure.
The case for moving to a brigade-centered Army began over a decade ago; one of its
earliest advocates was Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. In 997 MacGregor advo-
cated reorganizing the Army into mobile combat groups [4,0005,000 soldiers],
arguing that formations smaller than the contemporary Army division will have to
operate independently for long periods of time.
23

The Armys modularity initiative envisions increasing the number of brigade com-
bat teams (BCTs) from thirty-three to forty-eight, and creating twenty-eight National
Guard BCTs, for a grand total of seventy-six BCTs.
2
These brigade combat teams
22
Army Field Manual (FM) , The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army (DA), June 2005), p.
7.
23
Douglas A. Macgregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 997), pp. , 227. See also Colonel (Ret.) John A. Bonin, U.S. Army,
and Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Crisco, Jr., The Modular Army, Military Review, MarchApril
200.
2
Army Field Manual (FM) , The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army (DA), June 2005),
p. 47; and Thomas M. Jordan, The Modular Force, Briefng, January 31, 2008. During the course of
transitioning from a division-based to a brigade-based Army, part of the restructuring process fnds
the number of brigades per division increasing from three to four, while the number of maneuver bat-
talions per brigade decreases from three to two. Thus each division actually suffers a net reduction in
combat maneuver battalions, from nine to eight. Finally, prior to the authorized 65,000 increase in
Army end strength the Service had planned to feld forty-two active BCTs. The increase has enabled the
Army to plan for a force of forty-eight.
Whereas in previous
conficts one spoke
of forward-deployed
Army divisions, the
focus in Afghanistan
and Iraq is on
deployed brigades.
supplant the division
25
as the Armys largest fxed maneuver force. The BCTs comprise
three basic types: heavy (HBCTs), infantry (IBCTs), and Stryker
26
(SBCTs).
Through its Modular Force initiative, the Army anticipates achieving a 30 percent
or greater increase in the combat power of the Active Component of the force.
27
There
are concerns, however, over the Modular Forces ability to achieve this. These con-
cerns are especially acute with regard to irregular warfare. The Army plans to incor-
porate only two maneuver battalions into its Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs)
and Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs), a reduction from the three maneuver
battalions in the old brigade system. Thus the pre-Modular Force, known as the Total
Army (Active, National Guard, and Reserve), had 233 combat battalions with 699
maneuver companies at the end of fscal year (FY) 2004. By the end of 2011, Army
plans call for 6 maneuver battalions with 5 maneuver companies roughly a 30
percent drop in the number of battalions and a 22 percent reduction in the number of
companies.
28
The loss of ground maneuver capability boots on the ground seems
at odds with the Services ongoing irregular warfare operations, which are often
manpower-intensive.
In its defense, the Army points out that the benefts of combat multipliers, such as
the modular force BCTs Armored Reconnaissance Squadron and its Reconnaissance,
Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadrons, offset the loss of the ma-
neuver company. Moreover, the Service believes that soldiers in company weapons
sections, such as snipers, dismounted scouts, sappers (specially trained combat en-
gineers), military police, and assault weapons squads all but eliminate the gap in the
number of boots on the ground.
29
The validity of the Armys structure is being tested
as modular force brigades deploy into the combat zones of Afghanistan and Iraq.
25
The modular force divisions primary task is to command and control assigned brigade-size forma-
tions in the conduct of full-spectrum operations. Brigade combat teams and all fve types of multifunc-
tional support brigades are normally required for the division to conduct major combat operations. See
Lieutenant Colonel Telford E. Crisco, Jr., The Modular Force: Division Operations, Military Review,
JanuaryFebruary 2006, pp. 95, 99.
26
The Stryker is the Armys name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will constitute most
of the brigades combat and combat support vehicles. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) con-
cept originated in the 990s under Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki as a rapidly deployable,
medium-weight combat force that could operate throughout the full spectrum of confict.
27
Department of the Army, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2005 (Washington, DC: Department of
the Army, January. 5, 2005), p. 9.
28
The non-modular, division-based brigades (e.g., the 82nd Airborne Division; 0st Airborne Division
(Air Assault) and the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) will retain three maneuver battalions.
Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) Working Paper, Army QDR Issue: Can the Overall Combat Output
Potential of the Army Be Increased by Applying Existing Army Organizational Principles in a Different
Way? September 2005, p. 6. Cited in Andrew Feickert, CRS, U.S. Armys Modular Redesign: Issues for
Congress, May 5, 2006, p. 3. The Armys decision to use part of the authorized 65,000 troop increase to
feld an additional six BCTs will also serve to close the gap in maneuver company levels.
29
US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center, Task Force Modularity: The
Role of Analysis in the Creation of the Modular Force, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, July 1, 2005, p. 31. See
Andrew Feickert, CRS, U.S. Armys Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, May 5, 2006, p. .
In addition to the BCTs, the modular force includes fve types of multifunctional
support brigades. They are the aviation, battlefeld surveillance, maneuver enhance-
ment, fres, and sustainment brigades. Plans are for the Army to feld ninety-seven
such brigades.
30
The Army also plans to feld 130 functional support brigades, for a
total of 227 support brigades of all types.
3
Each support brigade accomplishes a broad
function, such as RSTA or intelligence operations.
32
30
Army Field Manual (FM) , The Army (Washington, DC: Department of the Army (DA), June 2005), p.
47; and Thomas M. Jordan, The Modular Force, Briefng, January 31, 2008. The Army plans to have
thirty-nine of these brigades in the Active Component, forty-six in the National Guard, and twelve in
the Reserves.
3
Thomas M. Jordan, The Modular Force, Briefng, January 31, 2008. Among the functional support
brigades are those structured for air defense, chemical, engineer, military intelligence, military police,
civil affairs, and signal operations and support.
32
The Army Modular Force, Briefng, n.d., Slide 19.
fi gure 1. M0ULAP 0P6ANI ZA1I 0NAL 5I 6N5 F0P BPI 6A C0MBA1 1AM5
Source: Army Transformation: Report to the Congress of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
February 2007), p. 15.
X
X
HBCT
X
SBCT
IBCT
BSTB BSB
Brigade Special
Troops Battalion
BSTB
Brigade Special
Troops Battalion
BSTB
Brigade Special
Troops Battalion
Reconnaissance
Squadron
Reconnaissance
Squadron
Reconnaissance
Squadron
Combined Arms
Battalion
Infantry
Battalion
Infantry
Battalion, SBCT
Anti-Armor
Company
Engineer
Company
Signal
Company
Military Intelligence
Company
Fires Battalion Brigade Support
Battalion
BSB
Brigade Support
Battalion
BSB MI
Brigade Support
Battalion
Fires Battalion
Fires Battalion
E
Peba|anc|ng
In recognition of the altered strategic environment, the Army is also engaged in re-
balancing both its Active and Reserve components. This involves altering the mix
of capabilities within the Army to better refect the kinds of demands it anticipates
having to satisfy. Over 0,000 positions will be rebalanced as part of this initiative,
which began in FY 2003 and is projected to extend to FY 203. Figure 2 provides an
overview of those capability areas that are slated for reduced emphasis, and those
programmed for an increase.
The Armys growing experience in irregular warfare is clearly refected in its re-
balancing efforts. Emphasis on heavy forces, in the form of armor and artillery, is
reduced by one sixth or more. At the same time, force types most associated with the
kinds of wars being waged in Afghanistan and Iraq receive signifcant boosts, albeit
many from very low initial levels.
The growing G-RAMM threat among irregular forces may argue for retaining a
robust air defense capability. However, it is likely that the Army will have to move be-
yond its current approach to missile defense, which centers on kinetic intercept of the
threat, toward increased emphasis on directed energy intercepts. Directed energy air
and missile defense research and development has made remarkable strides in recent
years, especially in the area of solid-state laser technology. Of great importance, the
cost per round of a laser shot is only a small fraction of the cost of a kinetic kill round,
such as a Patriot-3 interceptor missile. As more cost-effective air and missile defense
capabilities come on line, the Army will likely need to recalibrate the size and mix
(between directed energy and kinetic energy intercepts) of its air defense capabilities.
fi gure 2. 5LC1 5RI F15 I N APMY AC1I V
AN P5PV C0MP0NN1 CAPABI LI 1Y APA5
ecrease Percentage ec||ne Increase Percentage 6rewth
air defense 16% aviation 43%
armor 18% Civil affairs 16%
field artillery 16% engineer 19%
infantry 14%
Military intelligence 40%
Military Police 53%
Psychological
operations
129%
Special operations
forces
25%
Source: The Modular Force, Briefng, Mr. Thomas M. Jordan, Director, CAC-FMD, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January
31, 2008.
An Army at the Cressreads 1?
5ec|a| Ferces
The large increase in irregular warfare operations following the terrorist attacks
of September , 200, have greatly taxed the nations Special Operations Forces
(SOF), most of whom are drawn from the Army.
33
The Armys Special Operations
Command comprises the Ranger Regiment, Green Beret Special Forces Groups, the
60
th
Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne),
th
Psychological Operations
Group (Airborne), and 95
th
Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne). All have been engaged in
extensive operations over the last seven years in what the Bush Administration calls
the Global War on Terrorism. Consequently, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) called for a one-third expansion in the number of active-duty Army Special
Forces battalions.
3
The Army is building toward a force of twenty Special Operations
Forces battalions, four active Civil Affairs battalions and six active Psychological
Operations battalions.
1he Petat|en Base
The Army recognizes that continual deployments in support of the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT) have caused the Army to become out of balance with the demand
for forces exceeding the sustainable supply.
35
Correcting this imbalance is essential
if the Army is to maintain unit readiness and effectiveness. The principal concerns
associated with too-frequent deployments center on the wear-and-tear on soldiers
and their equipment. Soldiers subjected to repeated deployments without having suf-
fcient time for rest and recuperation risk a loss of effectiveness on future deploy-
ments. They may also be more prone to leave the Army when their enlistments are up.
Finally, as the Army is comprised entirely of volunteers, the prospect of tightly spaced
combat tours may discourage prospective recruits.
While there are concerns regarding what effect repeated, frequent deployments
will have on equipment wear-and-tear, the principal worries center on the impact
they will have on soldiers, which the Army sees as the foundation upon which unit
effectiveness rests. Todays volunteer Army is superior in many ways to the draft-era
force that existed during the Services last large-scale protracted deployment during
the Vietnam War. For the purposes of protracted periods of deployment, it is also dif-
ferent. For example, in extended conficts such as the ones now confronting the Army
in Afghanistan and Iraq, draftees might serve once in the combat theater before de-
parting the military. Long-term volunteers, however, might serve a number of tours,
33
For a detailed treatment of US Special Operations Forces, see CSBAs Long Haul Strategy study by
Robert C. Martinage, Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2008).
3
Donald Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
February 6, 2006), p. 5.
35
LTG Stephen M. Speakes, 2008 Army Modernization Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, July 25, 2008), p. 7.
The principal
concerns associated
with too-frequent
deployments center
on the wear-and-tear
on soldiers and their
equipment.
as is currently the case. It seems reasonable to assume that a soldier serving his or
her second or third tour would be more effective than a soldier experiencing the con-
fict for the frst time, although there is evidence that soldiers deployed too frequent-
ly and for protracted periods are at risk of suffering from combat fatigue and/or
post-traumatic stress disorder.
As this occurs, the Army risks having many of its soldiers decide that a military
career is too arduous or too risky an occupation for them (and their families) to pur-
sue. This leads to the question: How often can a soldier be put in harms way and still
desire to remain in the Army?
36
The answer is different for every soldier, but a sus-
tainable deployment ratio range seems to be somewhere in between 3: and 5:. That
is, for every brigade that is forward deployed in combat operations or in a hardship
tour, there must exist between three and fve brigades to sustain the rotation. Thus a
3:1 rotation base would fnd soldiers deployed on such missions one third of the time;
a 5:1 rotation would see them deployed one ffth of their service time. For the purpos-
es of this assessment, a 3: deployment ratio is assumed.
37
Thus a soldier under these
circumstances could expect to be on deployment one out of every three years.
Not surprisingly, the deployment ratio for Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades
in the Reserve Component (RC) of the Army is not as favorable. The simple reason
is that National Guard soldiers are civilians who have joined the Reserves in the ex-
pectation that their civilian livelihood and lifestyle will not be subjected to numerous
interruptions. Moreover, because National Guard units do not train anywhere near as
frequently as units in the Armys Active Component, once they are called up to active
service they require a period of intensive training, typically several months long, be-
fore they are ready for deployment. According to senior Army offcials, a more reason-
able deployment ratio for National Guard brigades, then, would be 6:.
38
But owing to
36
Other factors in addition to the rotation base come into play as well. For example, if soldiers perceive
that they are being poorly led, or engaged in executing a failed strategy, their willingness to persevere
may decline, perhaps dramatically. During the Vietnam War, once it became clear the United States was
looking for a way out of the confict rather than attempting to win it, there was a heightened degree of
cynicism, and a corresponding decline in the willingness of soldiers to sacrifce in order to accomplish
the mission. The phrase Why die for a tie? popular at the time, is emblematic of this attitude.
37
This assumption is based on the authors discussions with senior Army leaders. It is, however, less
than the rotation base ratio espoused by the Marine Corps. John Hendren, Rumsfeld Asks Army to
Consider Shorter Rotations, Los Angeles Times, June 25, 200, p. 0. A study by the Congressional
Budget Offce concluded that rotation ratios of between 3.2:1 and 4:1 span the range expected to be
feasible over the long term for active-component units. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Congressional Budget
Offce, The Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq, Testimony, Committee on
Armed Services, US House of Representatives, November 5, 2003, p. . Recent Army statements in-
dicate the Service hopes to assume a : deployment ratio for Active brigades, with a 3: ratio under
surge conditions. The corresponding deployment ratios for the Reserve Component brigades are 6:
and 5:, respectively. Army Transformation: Report to the Congress of the United States (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, February 2007), p. 37.
38
As with the Armys Active Component, this ratio is based on the authors discussions with senior Army
leaders. This also conforms to the conclusion reached by the CBO. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The
Ability of the U.S. Military to Sustain an Occupation in Iraq, Congressional Budget Offce, Testimony,
Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, November 5, 2003, p. .
How often can a
soldier be put in
harms way and still
desire to remain
in the Army? The
answer is different
for every soldier,
but a sustainable
deployment ratio
range seems to
be somewhere in
between 3:1 and 5:1.
the need for pre-deployment training, the true ratio of deployed brigades to existing
brigades is probably closer to 8:.
39
To help redress this imbalance, the Army, through its Modular Force initiative and
the planned expansion in the number of BCTs stemming from its increased end strength,
looks to increase the rotational pool of ready BCTs by at least 50 percent. In so doing,
and by structuring the BCTs so that they are capable of deploying independently, the
Army can generate a greater number of brigades, and a more predictable rotation. This
will also provide units with more time between rotations, increasing their opportuni-
ties to obtain adequate rest, and to train and reft prior to another deployment.
Under the Armys force generation scheme, units progressively increase in readi-
ness as they progress through three readiness pools:
> A Reset pool for units either redeploying from long operations or who did not de-
ploy when available to do so;
> A Ready pool that includes units assessed as ready to conduct mission prepara-
tion and training; and
> An Available pool that includes units prepared to deploy.
0
In reality, however, this pool does not yet exist. Save for those units that are either
deployed or on the brink of deployment, few if any are ready to prepare or train as
units in the traditional sense. Units are being provided with essential manpower and
equipment right up to, during, and even after their major pre-deployment training
exercises. This degrades the value of the training experience signifcantly.
Employing this process, a modular BCT force comprising forty-eight Active

Component BCTs and twenty-eight National Guard BCTs should, according to the
deployment metrics outlined above, sustain a force of roughly twenty BCTs in the
feld indefnitely.
2
While this rotation base would be suffcient to meet current de-
mands for BCTs in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as other hardship tours (e.g., South
Korea), it would be insuffcient to meet the demands of a larger contingency, such
39
It is important to note that while there exist some data with respect to Active Component deployment
patterns, the data regarding acceptable Reserve Component rotation rates is sketchy, making it more
diffcult to determine what RC rotation rates are sustainable.
0
Army, July 25, 2008), p. 5.
I am indebted to Major General Eric Olson (USA, Ret) for this insight. His observation was confrmed
by the Armys chief of staff, General George Casey, who notes that Unfortunately, were not going to
be able to implement that until the end of 2011, when we fnish our growth and have all the new units
on board. See Gina Cavallero, Gen George Casey, US Army Chief of Staff, Defense News, October 6,
2008, accessed at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3757325&c=FEA&s=INT, on October 7,
2008.
2
The calculation is as follows: 8 AC BCTs deployed one-third of the time yields 6 brigades constantly
deployed forward. Additionally, 28 National Guard BCTs deployed one-eighth of the time yields 3
brigades deployed forward on a continuing basis. The total of the two is 9 BCTs.
Units are being
provided with
essential manpower
and equipment
right up to, during,
and even after
their major pre-
deployment
training exercises.
This degrades
the value of the
training experience
signifcantly.
as one involving Iran, Nigeria or Pakistan. Given the limits on the size of the army
the American people are willing to sustain, the Service simply cannot address the
multitude of prospective contingencies across the entire spectrum of confict, from
various forms of irregular warfare to full-scale conventional war, to include nuclear
confict. This has led the Army to conclude that its Modular Force must also be a full-
spectrum force, a subject that will be addressed presently.
In addressing this challenge the Army is, to a great extent, putting its force struc-
ture eggs in one BCT basket. The increase in BCTs is coming at the expense of
placing greater weight on Army units that can dramatically increase force structure
indirectly, such as those capable of rapidly training, equipping and advising the mili-
taries of indigenous host-nation (HN) forces, as well as those of allies and partners.
This is important, since if the Army lacks the size to address key contingencies, it will
have to rely on creating partner capacity to make up the difference. The ability to
generate partner capacity, and to do so expeditiously, also recognizes that, in many
irregular warfare contingencies, a partner states indigenous forces must ultimately
take responsibility for their countrys security.
ectr|ne
As befts a Service in the midst of large-scale change, the Army has revised its doc-
trine to address changes in the challenges it confronts, and those it anticipates it
will confront. The Services recently revised cornerstone doctrine document, Field
Manual 3-0, Operations, attempts to reorient the Army toward full-spectrum oper-
ations involving a mix of offensive, defensive, stability, and civil support operations.
3

Importantly, the feld manual introduces stability operations as a major requirement
for the Army.
This edition of FM 3-0, the frst update since September 11, 2001, is a revolutionary
departure from past doctrine. It describes an operational concept where commanders
employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as
part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting
prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. Just as the 976 edition
of FM 100-5 began to take the Army from the rice paddies of Vietnam to the battlefeld of
Western Europe, this edition will take us into the 21st century urban battlefelds among
the people without losing our capabilities to dominate the higher conventional end of the
spectrum of confict.
Field Manual 3-o confrms the Armys reorientation from the Cold War era for-
ward-based garrison force to an expeditionary force.
3
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
February 2008), pp. 33, 37.
Ibid., np.
Field Manual 3-0,
Operations, attempts
to reorient the
Army toward full-
spectrum operations
involving a mix of
offensive, defensive,
stability, and civil
support operations.
Expeditionary capability is the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces
worldwide into any operational environment and operate effectively upon arrival.
Expeditionary operations require the ability to deploy quickly with little notice, shape
conditions in the operational area, and operate immediately on arrival. . . .
Expeditionary capabilities assure friends, allies, and foes that the Nation is able and
willing to deploy the right combination of Army forces to the right place at the right
time. . . .
Rapidly deployed expeditionary force packages provide immediate options for seizing
or retaining the operational initiative. With their modular capabilities, these forces can
be swiftly deployed, employed, and sustained for extended operations without an un-
wieldy footprint. These forces are tailored for the initial phase of operations, easily task-
organized, and highly self-suffcient.
5
The Army, notes the manual, must also be capable of conducting stability opera-
tions for the indefnite future.
America is at war and should expect to remain fully engaged for the next several decades
in a persistent confict against an enemy dedicated to U.S. defeat as a nation and eradica-
tion as a society. This confict will be waged in an environment that is complex, multidi-
mensional, and rooted in the human dimension. This confict cannot be won by military
forces alone; it requires close cooperation and coordination of diplomatic, informational,
military, and economic efforts. Due to the human nature of the confict, however, land-
power will remain important to the military effort and essential to victory.
6
Reinforcing the newfound importance of stability operations, the Armys new feld
manual on counterinsurgency operations, FM 3-24, is the frst major Service state-
ment on this form of confict since the Vietnam War era.
7
The effort was directed by
then-Lieutenant General David Petraeus who, as commander of US forces in Iraq, has
been credited with putting the doctrine into practice to effect a dramatic turnaround
in that country during the last year and a half.
8
Building upon the efforts of FM 3-2, the Army recently published FM 3-07,
Stability Operations. As one would expect, FM 3-07 is consistent both with the US
national security strategy and its supporting documents, and overall Army doctrine. It
embraces the indirect approach to stability operations, declaring that the Army aims
to shift the responsibility for providing security and stability from the international
5
Ibid., p. 6.
6
Ibid., p. viii.
7
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-2, Counterinsurgency (Department of the Army, December
2006).
8
Michael Gordon, A New Commander, In Step with the White House on Iraq, New York Times, January
5, 2007, p. A; and Jim Michaels, Petraeus Strategy Takes Aim at Post-Vietnam Mind-set, USA Today,
March 7, 2007, p. 9A.
Reinforcing
the newfound
importance of
stability operations,
the Armys new
feld manual on
counterinsurgency
operations, FM 3-24,
is the frst major
Service statement
on this form of
confict since the
Vietnam War era.
community to this host nation, with a sustainable level of continuing support from
external actors.
9

Yet there are concerns that the Army, for so long oriented on conventional warfare,
may not embrace the new doctrine, which declares that Army doctrine now equally
weights tasks dealing with the population stability or civil support with those re-
lated to offensive or defensive operations.
50
Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell
IV, commander of the Armys Combined Arms Center, candidly warns that There is
going to be some resistance. There will be people who will hear and understand what
we are saying, but it is going to take some time to inculcate that into our culture.
5
In fact, this seems to be a matter of serious concern, as will be discussed
presently.
1ra|n|ng
In addition to restructuring the force, the Army is moving to adopt its training to pre-
pare soldiers and their units for irregular warfare operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
A remarkable transformation has occurred at the Armys National Training Center
(NTC) at Fort Irwin, California. Not long ago the NTC was optimized for training
Army brigades in combined arms, mechanized warfare. Over the past few years the
NTC has remade itself. The training area, which is the size of Rhode Island, has be-
come chock-a-block with small Army bases, towns and civilian communities. A dozen
Iraqi villages dot the landscape. Today there is even a web of tunnels under some
larger villages to simulate sewer systems. Efforts are underway at the NTC to con-
struct a town complex of some four hundred structures.
52
Here Army units must convoy their supplies over distances approaching one hun-
dred miles, while being harassed by insurgent forces. To accomplish their mission,
American soldiers must recruit men from this civilian population for the Iraqi se-
curity forces, negotiate with local leaders, all while defending themselves and the
local inhabitants against an array of roadside bombs, car bombs, suicide bombers,
and mortar attacks.
53
This requires operating in the midst of hundreds of Iraqis or
9
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, October 6, 2008), p. 8.
50
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
February 2008), p. vii.
5
Michael R. Gordon, After Hard-Won Lessons, Army Doctrine Revised, New York Times, February 8,
2008.
52
Denis Steele, NTC: Between Heaven and Hell, Army, July 2008, p. 28. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) recently completed construction on a multi-block urban area using
construction materials prevalent in Iraq.
53
Stephen J. Hedges, Mock Village Helps GIs See Iraq Reality, Chicago Tribune, December , 200, p.
; and Richard Whittle, In the Armys Sandbox, No Playing Nice, Dallas Morning News, October 9,
2005.
In addition to
restructuring the
force, the Army is
moving to adopt its
training to prepare
soldiers and their
units for irregular
warfare operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Afghans civilians with native language speaking skills who have been recruited to
ensure the training is as realistic as possible.
5
This level of training is essential, even for soldiers who have been deployed to com-
bat zones in Afghanistan and Iraq. There they confront enemies whose best troops
have survived years of off-and-on fghting with American and Coalition forces. These
enemy survivors have been at their version of the NTC, day-in and day-out, for years,
not a week.
55
At some point, a BCT rotates back to Afghanistan or Iraq. If it is sent
back into the area where it was previously deployed, and if it retains suffcient num-
bers of their soldiers from the previous deployment, this training gap may be miti-
gated. However, this rarely occurs. If, in this protracted confict, the US military is not
able to deploy units that contain a signifcant number of veteran soldiers and marines,
the training gap between them and their adversary may widen.
56
During the Vietnam
War, when US forces had a high percentage of draftees in their ranks who were dis-
charged after a few years service, including one year in Vietnam, it was said that the
United States military had one years worth of experience in Vietnam ten times over,
whereas many of the communist guerrillas they confronted had a decade or more of
experience. A similar phenomenon could occur in todays volunteer military if reten-
tion rates decline. If this happens, there will be greater stress on the Armys training
infrastructure to make up the difference, as the Service will have to prepare a higher
percentage of green troops for counterinsurgency warfare. The implications for US
military effectiveness could be striking.
There is also the matter of soft training. To be sure, soldiers must be profcient in
tasks such as detecting and handling improvised explosive devices, conducting con-
voy operations, clearing urban structures, and manning checkpoints. But counter-
insurgency training is even more challenging. Soldiers must also be trained in other
tasks that are not central to the fre and maneuver or move, shoot and communi-
cate skill sets that form the core of conventional combat operations. Among these
tasks are those that focus on:
> Possessing an appreciation of cultural norms;
> Maintaining fre power restraint;
5
Denis Steele, NTC: Between Heaven and Hell, Army, July 2008, p. 30.
55
Those units that go to the NTC for training spend three weeks on site. However, the frst week replicates
the period when the unit is deploying to its new area of operations, while the second week is focused on
live-fre exercises, command post exercises and situation training exercises. Only in the fnal week does
the BCT assume control over its area of operations and engage in free-play training in the simulated
Afghanistan/Iraq training environment.
56
One reason this might not happen is if enemy insurgent forces are suffering severe casualties, or ex-
periencing substantial defections. This could increase substantially the percentage of inexperienced
insurgents in their ranks.
To be sure, soldiers
must be profcient
in tasks such as
detecting and
handling improvised
explosive devices,
conducting convoy
operations, clearing
urban structures,
and manning
checkpoints. But
counterinsurgency
training is even
more challenging.
> Undertaking civic action programs with local government and civic leaders
57
;
> Operating (and perhaps integrating) with local security forces;
> Serving as advisors;
> Providing security and other forms of support to reconstruction efforts; and
> Possessing suffcient language skills to enable these actions to succeed.
It is not clear how well individual soldiers and marines, or small units, can be
trained up for these tasks prior to their deployment to the combat theater. Training
in some skills may be relatively easy. There are, for example, ongoing programs to pro-
vide US forces with an appreciation of Afghan and Iraqi customs and cultural norms.
Here in America, police training emphasizes restraint in the use of force. These tech-
niques may be applied to train US troops in the form of frepower restraint.
Yet other than personal experience, and relying on well-crafted lessons learned
reports, it would seem diffcult to conduct training in these types of tasks beyond
basic military skills (e.g., patrolling). Similarly, building the necessary confdence
among local leaders and the population in general, so as to promote civic action, en-
hance security, and thus win their hearts and minds is likely to be, at least in part,
a function of US troops people skills. Yet even for those possessing the necessary
cultural awareness, building up a level of confdence and trust with local Iraqi reli-
gious and civic leaders can only occur over time. This cannot be pre-loaded within
the span of a few weeks at the NTC.
58
57
The leadership skills required for this task are especially demanding, given that responsibility for stim-
ulating economic development, establishing governance, and instilling the rule of law rests with civilian
agencies, such as the State Department and the US Agency for International Development (USAID).
58
For a discussion of trends in training, and the erosion of the US militarys advantage in training on tac-
tics, see CSBAs Strategy for the Long Haul study by Barry D. Watts, US Combat Training, Operational
Art, and Strategic Competence (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2008).
Even for those
possessing
the necessary
cultural
awareness,
building up
a level of
confdence and
trust with local
Iraqi religious
and civic leaders
can only occur
over time.
There will be people who naturally will say, If I can do high-end offense
and defense, I can do any lesser kind of operations. What we have found
through seven years [of war] is that is not the case.
LTG William B. Caldwell IV, Commander,
US Army Combined Arms Center
0VPVIW
To address the challenges described above, the Army must be capable of executing
two general types of missions, each very different from the other. The Army must be
able to conduct:
> Persistent irregular warfare
59
operations, with emphasis on steady-state Phase
0 operations, to include building partner capacity among threatened states and
conducting stability operations. The Army must, however, retain the ability to
surge forces and to take the lead in carrying out large-scale stability operations
when necessary. This mission also involves steady-state operations, principally by
Special Operations Forces, to destroy radical Islamist terrorist networks through,
among other things, persistent manhunting operations for the purpose of cap-
turing or killing senior terrorist leaders.
> Traditional power-projection operations, to include regime change operations
against minor nuclear-armed states, such as North Korea, Iran (prospectively), and
to secure nuclear weapons no longer under the effective control of a failing or failed
59
Irregular warfare is defned as A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and
infuence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches,
though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversarys
power, infuence, and will. Thus irregular warfare includes such forms of confict at stability operations
and counterinsurgency. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS) Publication -02, Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, April 2, 200, as amended through May 30, 2008, p. 28.
ChaPter 2 > WRA1 KIN 0F APMY 0 W N7
nuclear-armed state. This mission is residual of the major theater war (MTW),
major regional confict (MRC) force-planning metric employed in the 1990s, and
their successor, the major combat operation (MCO). However, with the prospect
of confict against a nuclear-armed state, this mission is also substantially more
challenging. For example, unlike during the two Gulf Wars, the Army would likely
be confronted with projecting ground forces absent access to large forward bases
(owing to the threat of nuclear attack), defeating an enemy ground force operating
more along the lines of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War, and perhaps
conducting large-scale humanitarian relief operations in a country that may itself
be recovering from the effects of a WMD attack.
An Army that can successfully conduct these two missions will likely possess the
forces and skill sets relevant for accomplishing other missions along the confict spec-
trum, such as homeland defense
60
(e.g., consequence management operations), and
defense against irregular warfare rivals employing relatively advanced weaponry,
to include G-RAMM and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and disruption (e.g.,
dirty bombs).
6
Thus it might be argued that America needs not one Army, but two. This raises the
central question of whether the Army will be primarily a general purpose or a full-
spectrum force a jack of all trades, or orient itself on mastering several trades
on a lesser scale.
P50UPC5
Budget
Absent some catastrophic event like 9/ that triggers a new surge in defense spend-
ing, the budgets the Army will have to work with over the short-to-mid-term future
are likely to experience more modest growth than has been the case so far this decade.
The Bush Administration has requested $611 billion for national defense in fscal year
2009, including $5 billion for the base defense budget, with some $58 billion go-
ing to the Department of Defense. The 2009 request also includes $66 billion in emer-
gency supplemental appropriations for defense, as a partial down-payment on 2009
60
This report, as with others in CSBAs Strategy for the Long Haul series, assumes that the Armys ability
to conduct the range of operations described above provides it with the basis for conducting operations
in the defense of the US homeland, to include border security, stability and consequence management
operations.
6
A dirty bomb, or radiological dispersal device (RDD), combines radioactive material with conventional
explosives to disperse radioactive material. While such a weapon is unlikely to cause massive destruc-
tion, either in terms of human life or property, its use could have a signifcant psychological terror ef-
fect on the targeted population. See http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-
bombs.html. Accessed on August 25, 2008.
The budgets the
Army will have to
work with over the
short-to-mid-term
future are likely to
experience more
modest growth than
has been the case
so far this decade.
war-related costs. Eventually, tens of billions of dollars in additional 2009 funding
will have to be provided to cover war-related costs for the full year. This brings the
current level of defense spending to its highest level since World War II. Additional
large increases in the coming years seem unlikely, given the Bush Administrations
latest Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) projections, historical defense spending
trends and patterns, and the formidable long-term fscal challenges confronting the
United States, especially those related to rising health care costs, the onset of retire-
ment for the baby boomer generation, and the large federal budget defcits that have
been accumulated in recent years.
62
Compounding the problem, the Congressional Budget Offce estimates that, exclu-
sive of war costs, implementing DoDs current long-term plan would require increas-
ing the departments base budget from the requested 2009 level of about $58 billion
to an average of some $535575 billion annually over the next two decades. The low-
end ($535 billion) estimate assumes that DoD would be able to hold down cost growth
in both operations and support (O&S) activities and weapons acquisition programs
far more successfully than it has been able to in the past. Conversely, the high-end
($575 billion) estimate assumes that costs would increase in line with historical ex-
perience. If anything, historical cost and spending trends suggest that implementing
DoDs existing long-term plan might be even more costly than projected by CBO in
its high-end estimate. Given these trends and factors, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the Defense Department is likely looking at a plans-funding mismatch on the
order of $50 billion or so per year over twenty years, for a total of $ trillion.
The strain on equipment is even greater now that the Reserve Component is no
longer considered a part of the Armys strategic reserve, but serves as an operational
reserve. National Guard and Reserve units have been deployed on a regular basis
since 9/. Given that they are called to active service far more frequently than had
previously been the case during the Cold War and immediate post-Cold War peri-
od, there are signifcant implications for how they need to be equipped, and for the
Armys budget. For example, pre-war ARNG equipment levels stood at 70 percent that
of the Active Army, and much of this equipment was old or outdated. The shift of the
Reserve Component from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve that deploys
on a regular basis requires a substantial upgrade in equipment and training, in order
for soldiers in these units to deploy to war zones ready for combat.
63
Between January
2008 and the end of 2009, the Army plans to provide over 00,000 pieces of equip-
ment at a cost of $7.5 billion to the ARNG, and nearly 20,000 equipment items
costing $5 billion to the Army Reserve (USAR). The Army is also providing dual-use
62
For a detailed treatment of the US defense budget, see CSBAs Long Haul Strategy study by Steve Kosiak,
US Defense Budget: Options and Choices for the Long Haul (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2008).
63
Army, July 25, 2008), p. 20.
Historical cost
and spending
trends suggest
that implementing
DoDs existing long-
term plan might be
even more costly
than projected by
CBO in its high-end
estimate.
equipment to the Reserve Components that can be used both to support overseas
contingencies and those relating to homeland defense.
6
As will be discussed presently, the Armys major modernization effort, the Future
Combat Systems, is incurring substantial problems with controlling costs, which are
now at $60 billion and rising. At the same time, the Services manpower costs have
also been climbing steeply as it attempts to maintain troop quality while increasing
end strength by 65,000, during wartime within the constraints of a volunteer force.
Total compensation for the average active-duty Service member currently (FY 2009)
amounts to some $20,000 a year. Overall compensation per active-duty Service
member (exclusive of veterans benefts) grew by about $24,000 (fscal year 2009 dol-
lars), or 33 percent in real terms, between 999 and 2005.
65
Particularly discourag-
ing for the Army, these increases, and those that have followed since then, have not
stemmed the decline in Service member quality that has emerged since the onset of
the Second Gulf War in 2003. If the Army follows through on its plans to add 65,000
troops to its ranks, personnel costs will increase substantially.
66
The troop increases
would require nearly $80 billion over the 2007203 period. Once the buildup is
complete in 20, the annual steady-state cost to sustain the additional force would
run about $ billion per year.
67
In summary, the Army, like the Defense Department (and, indeed, the nation),
confronts a tough fscal environment that makes increasing the defense budget along
the lines of what we have seen in recent years a diffcult proposition. This is occur-
ring at a time when the Service is in the middle of what promises to be by far the most
expensive modernization program in its history, and with troop costs at an all-time
high. Given the growing mismatch between the Defense program and the budgets es-
timated to be available to sustain it, the Armys program is far more likely to confront
calls for economies than expansion.
6
Among the dual-use equipment being provided are those in ten essential capabilities areas: aviation,
engineering, civil support, security, medical, transportation, maintenance, logistics, joint force head-
quarters, and communications. This capabilities set is, not surprisingly, also highly relevant for stabil-
ity, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. LTG Stephen M. Speakes, 2008 Army
Modernization Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 25, 2008), p. 22.
65
Steven M. Kosiak, Analysis of the FY 2009 Defense Budget Request (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2008), p.
6.
66
Implementing the Army personnel increase, along with an increase in the Marine Corps end strength
of 27,000, will cost some $100 billion over the next fve years. Ibid., p. 4.
67
Congressional Budget Offce, Estimated Cost of the Administrations Proposal to Increase the Armys
and the Marine Corpss Personnel Levels, April 6, 2007, p. 6.
The Army, like the
Defense Department
(and, indeed, the
nation), confronts
a tough fscal
environment that
makes increasing
the defense budget
along the lines of
what we have seen
in recent years a
diffcult proposition.
Manewer
More than any other Service, the Armys success centers on manpower rather than
materiel.
68
The skill and courage of the individual soldier is the bedrock of the Armys
overall effectiveness. Ongoing operations fnd soldiers in short supply, given the de-
mand signals received for BCTs from the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs). The
challenge to respond to these demands, while preparing to support the Armys goal
of felding a full-spectrum force promises to stress the Service and its soldiers still
further.
The Army will be asking more of its soldiers, not less. As Lieutenant General
Caldwell has observed, Years ago you heard about the strategic corporal. Well, I think
weve all come to understand now its the strategic private . . . .
69
Moreover, soldiers
must be prepared to conduct stability operations on short notice. Field Manual 3-07
notes that stability operations rely on military forces quickly seizing the initiative.
70

While yesterdays strategic corporal will be tomorrows strategic private at the low
end of the confict spectrum, it does not end there. That same soldier is also expected
to be able to transition, on short notice, to function effectively as part of a fast-paced
highly networked ground force engaged in high-intensity warfare.
As the Armys new doctrine states, operating effectively as part of a full-spectrum
force will challenge soldiers as well as their leaders the offcer and noncommis-
sioned offcer (NCO) corps. Here the need for soldiers of exceptional quality risks
bumping up against the limits of what the Army can reasonably expect to recruit
under current conditions. Despite the Armys heroic efforts to recruit and retain suf-
fcient numbers of soldiers, and of suffcient quality, to feld a full-spectrum capable
force, the trends are not encouraging. Not surprisingly, recruiting volunteers who
face the prospect of repeated deployments to combat zones is more challenging than
recruiting for a peacetime force. Consequently, rather than sustaining (let alone in-
creasing) the quality of its full-spectrum capable force, the Army fnds the quality of
the force is declining.
7

Take the Armys recruits. To fll its recruitment quotas in numbers suffcient to
sustain (and expand) its end strength, the Army fnds itself recruiting personnel who
fail to meet the Services weight and body-fat standards. The Army has also lowered
other standards. In FY 2007, the Army fell well short of its goal for recruiting high
school graduates, with only 79 percent holding a diploma. The high school graduation
68
Of course, the Army is the Service most dependent upon its sister Services, especially the Air Force and
Navy, the two most capital-intensive of the US military Services.
69
Department of Defense, Bloggers Roundtable, LTG William Caldwell, Teleconference Subject: US
Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, February 26, 2008.
70
7
For a thorough treatment of the challenges confronting the Army with regard to manpower, see CSBAs
Long Haul Strategy report by Steven Kosiak, Military Manpower for the Long Haul (Washington, DC:
CSBA, 2008).
While yesterdays
strategic corporal
will be tomorrows
strategic private
at the low end
of the confict
spectrum, it does
not end there. That
same soldier is
also expected to be
able to transition,
on short notice, to
function effectively
as part of a fast-
paced highly
networked ground
force engaged
in high-intensity
warfare.
rate for recruits had been as high as 98 percent in 992, during the post-Cold War
drawdown, and was as high as 86 percent as recently as 200.
72
The percentage of
recruits requiring a moral waiver to join the Army has more than doubled since 200.
The percentage reached percent in FY2007, rising from .6 percent three years
earlier.
73
The Army also fnds itself accepting recruits who cannot meet its weight and
body-fat standards.
7
This decline in recruit quality has persisted despite the Services increasingly ag-
gressive use of fnancial incentives to improve recruiting. The Army is also struggling
to recruit new soldiers in suffcient numbers. In order to meet its quota in 2007, the
Army began offering enlistees up to $20,000 as a QS (for Quick Ship) bonus in
exchange for promising to ship out to basic training within thirty days of signing up.
Recruits who are willing to sign up for four years and report quickly can get as much
as $0,000 over the course of their enlistment.
75
As the Army struggles to keep suffcient numbers of troops in the feld to meet the
demand, its sister Services have pitched in to help. Of the 25,53 airmen assigned to
combat zones in 2007, 6,293 were deployed on in lieu of missions those assigned
to airmen in lieu of soldiers. The Navy is also doing its part: over 8,000 sailors have
been engaged in individual augmentee assignments in combat zones to replace sol-
diers and marines.
76
The US Government also has sought to make up for the shortage of soldiers by rely-
ing increasingly on private security contractors. Some 30,000 are currently deployed
performing duties once performed by soldiers. (Nearly 200,000 private contractors
in all were supporting the war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007.) It is far from
clear that this approach has merit. Retired Army General David M. Maddox, who
reviewed the impact of contractors as part of an Army review commission, cautions
that the Army has not fully recognized the impact of a large number of contractors
in a war zone, or their potential impact to mission success.
77
Another Army general
offcer who observed private security contractors in Iraq was more direct:
These guys run loose in this country and do stupid stuff. Theres no authority over them,
so you cant come down on them hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and
someone else has to deal with the aftermath. It happens all over the place.
78
72
Military Offcers Say Their Recruiting Goals Are Being Met, National Journals Congress Daily PM,
January 3, 2008.
73
Jim Michaels, More Army Recruits Require Waivers, USA Today, April 7, 2008, p. .
7
Military Offcers Say Their Recruiting Goals Are Being Met, National Journals Congress Daily PM.
75
Karoun Demirjian, Army is Offering a Quick $20,000, Chicago Tribune, August , 2007, p. .
76
Otto Kreisher, The Ground Force Taskings Go On, AIR FORCE, March 2008, pp. 2, .
77
Walter Pincus, US Cannot Mange Contractors in Wars, Offcials Testify on Hill, Washington Post,
January 25, 2008, p. A5; and Blackwaters Impunity, New York Times, May 6, 2008.
78
Jonathan Finer, Security Contractors in Iraq Under Scrutiny After Shootings, Washington Post,
September 0, 2005, p. A.
This decline in
recruit quality has
persisted despite the
Services increasingly
aggressive use of
fnancial incentives
to improve recruiting.
The Army is also
struggling to recruit
new soldiers in
suffcient numbers.
Simply stated, it is far from clear that private security contractors are a good sub-
stitute for Army soldiers. They may not even constitute a net beneft when one realizes
that, by engaging private security frms, the US Government (i.e., the armed forces) is
bidding against itself for the services of young Americans.
There are some who argue service in the Army should be opened up to immigrants
who, in exchange for their commitment, would receive US citizenship. Yet this is al-
ready occurring to a signifcant degree. Over 20,000 noncitizens are on active duty
in the US military. Two years ago, nearly 70,000 members of the armed forces were
foreign-born.
79
There is also a more fundamental issue here regarding the willingness
of Americans to fght for their own security, and to accept the responsibilities that
come when those they elect to represent them decide to wage war. Unfortunately, this
issue lies beyond the scope of this report.
The decline in quality is also being increasingly felt in the Armys Non-Commissioned
Offcer (NCO) corps. NCOs mentor junior enlisted soldiers in soldier skills and leader-
ship, setting an example for them and providing an indispensable link between off-
cers and their troops. For this reason the NCOs are often referred to as the backbone
of the Army. The NCOs importance is clearly seen in the institutional crisis that con-
fronted the Army during the Vietnam War when the Service found itself compelled
to adopt accelerated promotions to fll shortages in the NCO ranks. The widespread
promotion of enlisted soldiers (sometimes referred to as shake-and-bake sergeants)
unprepared to handle NCO responsibilities played a major role in the breakdown in
order, discipline, and unit effectiveness during that war.
There are signs the same process may be at work today. In 2005 the Army began
automatically promoting enlisted personnel in the rank of E- to E-5 (sergeant), based
solely on the soldiers time in service, without requiring them to appear before a pro-
motion board. In April 2008 the policy was extended to include promotions from E-5
to E-6 (staff sergeant). Although a soldiers name can be removed from consideration
by his or her commander, each month the soldiers name is automatically placed back
on the promotion list.
80
The Army was short over ,500 sergeants when the policy
went into effect. Since then, the shortage has been reduced by over 70 percent, but
numbers do not reveal quality or lack thereof.
8
79
James Pinkerton, Thousands of Immigrants in US Military, Houston Chronicle, March 9, 2008, p. .
80
While a soldiers commanding offcer can remove his or her name from the promotion list, there are
pressures at work that discourage this. Failure to advance a soldier to NCO rank could make the soldier
less willing to re-enlist. It could also hurt unit morale if other units in the same organization (e.g., other
companies in a battalion) are promoting soldiers as they hit their time-in-service points, but one unit is
not. Failure to promote, which results not only in an increase in rank but in pay and status, can also be
seen by soldiers as a social issue, in terms of how a soldier is viewed in his or her community, and the
level of support they can provide to their family.
8
Bill Sasser, Strained by War, US Army Promotes Unqualifed Soldiers, July 30, 2008, accessed at
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/07/30/sergeants/index.html?source=rss&aim=/news/fea-
ture, on August 29, 2008.
The decline in
quality is also being
increasingly felt in
the Armys Non-
Commissioned
Offcer (NCO) corps.
The shortage also fnds the Army increasing the number of involuntary extensions
of duty the stop loss policy. The number of soldiers affected by the stop loss in-
creased by 3 percent between 2007 and 2008. Revealingly, nearly half of those af-
fected by the stop loss are NCOs. Army leaders believe the program will have to be
extended at least through 2009.
82
Moreover, as the Army suffers from a shortage of
junior offcers as well, many enlisted personnel with high potential are being diverted
into Offce Candidate School, further diluting leader quality. This situation will only
be exacerbated by the planned 65,000 increase in the Armys end strength.
Nor is the problem limited to junior NCOs. An Army study of soldiers mental
health found that 27 percent of NCOs on their third or fourth combat tour exhib-
ited post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, vice 8.5 percent of those who
had completed their second tour, and 12 percent among those who fnished their frst
tour. The Army study found that those NCOs who had served multiple deployments
reported low morale, more mental health problems and more stress-related work
problems.
83
The Armys problems extend to the offcer corps as well. In 2003, roughly 8 percent
of the Armys offcers with between four and nine years of experience left the Service.
Three years later, the attrition rate had jumped to 3 percent. Of the nearly ,000 ca-
dets from the West Point class of 2002, 58 percent are no longer on active duty.
8
An
effort in the Fall of 2007 to entice ,000 captains to extend their commissions fell
short by roughly ,300.
85
Making matters worse, the Army will need another 6,000
captains as it grows by 65,000 troops.
86
Colonel George Lockwood, the director of of-
fcer personnel management for the Armys Human Resources Command, informed
the Services leadership that [t]he Army is facing signifcant challenges in offcer
manning, now and in the immediate future. There is a projected shortfall of roughly
3,000 captains and majors until at least 203, with the Army counting only about half
the senior captains that it needs.
87

An increasing percentage of the Armys new offcers, however, are not being
commissioned from the traditional sources of West Point and ROTC programs,
which supply recruits fresh from college. Rather, the Army has been increasingly
compelled to pull soldiers, most of whom have not graduated college, from the ranks
and send them to Offcer Candidate School. The number of OCS graduates has grown
82
Tom Vanden Brook, More Forced to Stay in Army, USA Today, April 22, 2008, p. ; and Pauline
Jelinek, General: Army Will Need Stop-Loss Through 09, Houston Chronicle, April 22, 2008.
83
Thom Shanker, Army Worried By Rising Stress of Return Tours to Iraq, New York Times, April 6,
2008, p. A.
8
Andrew Tilghman, The Armys Other Crisis, Washington Monthly, accessed at http://www2.
washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/072.tilghman.html, on September 8, 2008.
85
Tom Vanden Brook, Deployments Strain Army Recruiting, Retention, USA Today, p. 6.
86
Bryan Bender, Military Scrambles to Retain Troops, Boston Globe, March 7, 2008.
87
The Armys
problems extend
to the offcer corps
as well. There is a
projected shortfall
of roughly 3,000
captains and
majors until at
least 2013, with
the Army counting
only about half the
senior captains
that it needs.
dramatically since the late 990s, rising from roughly 00 a year to over ,500 a year,
or more than the graduating class at West Point.
88
Again, as with the NCO corps, as
offcer quality has declined, promotion rates have increased. Instead of the traditional
promotion rates of 70 to 80 percent of eligible offcers to major, today over 98 percent
of eligible captains are promoted to major.
89
These trends are worrisome, especially for an Army that intends to place greater
demands on its soldiers and their leaders.
M0PNIZA1I0N
1he Future Cembat 5ystems
The need for high-quality manpower is evident when one examines the Armys mod-
ernization plans. The Future Combat Systems Brigade Combat Team (FCS BCT) is the
cornerstone of the Armys modernization efforts. In fact, it is barely an exaggeration
to say that the FCS program is the Armys modernization program.
90
The FCS, the foundation of the Armys Future Force, has the goal of being strategi-
cally responsive and dominant at every point on the confict spectrum, from full-scale
confict to irregular warfare. However, it is principally designed for offensive opera-
tions in a conventional warfare environment.
9
The FCS is designed to place the soldier
in a battle network comprising a range of manned and unmanned combat systems, as
well as the network itself. The Army envisions the FCS incorporating and exploiting
information employed within the network, enabling the force to develop a common,
relevant operating picture, thereby achieving a major advantage in situational aware-
ness. In so doing, the FCS has the potential to provide soldiers with vastly increased
survivability and lethality, enabling them to take the fght to the enemy before the
enemy has time to react: hence the FCS vision to See frst, understand frst, act frst,
and fnish decisively.
The FCS BCT is designed for expeditionary operations, and its major weapon sys-
tems are projected to be considerably and in some cases, radically lighter than
88
89
Ibid.
90
The Army is procuring a number of systems as a means of bridging the gap between the current force
and the Future Combat Systems. Among the systems in current production are the AH-6 Apache at-
tack helicopter, the UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopter; the CH-7F helicopter; and the Stryker family
of combat vehicles. The Stryker is intended to provide a relatively light and easily deployable combat
vehicle to bridge the gap between todays lethal, but relatively heavy forces, and the more capable and
deployable systems being developed under the FCS program.
9
Although optimized for offensive operations, the FCS BCT will be capable of executing full-spec-
trum operations. [Authors emphasis] LTG Stephen M. Speakes, 2008 Army Modernization Strategy
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 25, 2008), p. 69.
The Future Combat
Systems Brigade
Combat Team
(FCS BCT) is the
cornerstone of the
Armys modernization
efforts. In fact, it is
barely an exaggeration
to say that the FCS
program is the
Armys modernization
program.
their predecessor systems.
92
This is refected in the programs performance metrics.
Like the SBCTs Stryker vehicle, FCSs are intended to be transportable in a C-30-
type aircraft. However, the FCS has failed to meet this goal, since its original vehicle
target weight has grown from twenty tons or less to between twenty-seven and thirty
tons. Thus it will need to be air transported by larger, C-7 aircraft, and will not be
able to deploy substantially faster than other Army brigades.
93
Unlike the Stryker family of combat vehicles, the FCS is designed to be as surviv-
able and as lethal as the Armys seventy-ton MA2 Abrams main battle tank.
9
The
FCS design has stimulated a major shift in Army thinking with respect to the conduct
of operations, particularly the armor community it most directly affects. Mandating
a 70 percent reduction in weight from the Abrams tank and a 50 percent reduction
in internal volume (to under twenty tons and between 300 and 00 cubic feet, re-
spectively) to accommodate C-30 cargo capacity limitations runs directly counter
to the historical trends of ever-increasing size, weight, and volume in ground combat
vehicles. Consequently, few seasoned observers have been surprised by the growth in
the systems weight, as described above.
Given these trends, the FCS may not only represent a marginal improvement in
terms of deployability, it may also be far less survivable than more heavily armored
systems, like the Abrams tank. Absent a revolution in armor technology, the lightly
armored FCS must rely on situational awareness and mobility to be as survivable as
the Abrams; the only way to do this is to avoid getting hit. While this may be pos-
sible against a combined arms mechanized enemy force in open battle, it is far less
plausible in urban warfare and against an enemy waging irregular warfare. In these
situations, armored vehicles would be more exposed to mines, improvised explosive
devices (IEDs), and ambushes employing these weapons as well as man-portable
anti-tank guided munitions. While FCS combat vehicles are designed to incorporate
active defenses, they can, of course, be outftted on the M1. In fact, this has already
been taking place.
95
The FCS comprises eight manned ground vehicles (MGVs), four unmanned ground
vehicles (UGVs), and two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), for a total of fourteen
major systems. This represents a reduction from the original FCS design, which in-
cluded eighteen systems. It also includes unattended ground sensors (UGS), a Non-
Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS), and advanced tactical and urban sensors,
92
An early design criteria called for all FCS systems to be transportable on C-30 cargo aircraft. While it
appears some FCS systems will exceed the weight limits for C-30 lift, they will still be far lighter than
current Armys combat vehicles, such as the Abrams tank and Bradley infantry fghting vehicle.
93
Alec Klein, The Armys $200 Billion Makeover, Washington Post, December 7, 2007, p. A.
9
Dr. A. Michael Andrews, Army S&T and the Objective Force . . . Accelerating the Transformation,
Briefng (Washington, DC: AUSA Future Combat System Symposium, June 27, 2000), p. 7.
95
I am indebted to my colleague, Robert Martinage, for raising these insights to my attention.
The FCS may not only
represent a marginal
improvement in terms
of deployability, it
may also be far less
survivable than more
heavily armored
systems, like the
Abrams tank.
all of which are designed to be linked by a state-of-the-art network.
96
Specifcally, the
FCS includes the following systems:
> Mounted Combat System (MCS). The XM202 MCS provides line-of-sight and be-
yond line-of-sight (BLOS) frepower enabling BCTs to close with and destroy the
enemy. It is armed with a 20mm lightweight cannon.
> Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV). The XM206 ICV comes in four versions: a Company
Commander, a Platoon Leader, a Rife Squad, and a Weapons Squad. A standard
infantry platoon will include an ICV Platoon Leader variant, three ICV Rife Squad
variants, and an ICV Weapons Squad variant. Each will carry a nine-person squad.
The vehicle is armed with a 30mm cannon and 7.62mm machine gun.
> Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicles (RSVs). The XM20 RSV is the units
eyes and ears on the battlefeld, featuring a suite of advanced sensors to detect,
locate, track, classify, and automatically identify targets from increased stand-
off ranges under all climatic conditions, day or night. The RSV is equipped with
UGSs, a Class I UAV and a Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle. It is armed with a
30mm MK44 cannon and a M240 coaxial machine gun.
> Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C). The XM203 NLOS-C is a self-propelled
howitzer that provides extended-range indirect fre support employing a range of
munitions that includes special-purpose capabilities to provide a variety of effects
upon demand, including precision-guided fres using the XM982 Excalibur guided
munition.
> Non-Line of Sight Mortar (NLOS-M). The XM 20 NLOS-M provides short to
mid-range indirect fre support, employing a range of 120mm munitions.
> Recovery and Maintenance Vehicle (FRMV). The XM205 FRMV provides recov-
ery and maintenance support to the BCT.
> Medical Vehicles (MV-T and MV-E). The Medical Vehicle-Evacuation (MV-E) is
used for casualty evacuation, while the Medical Vehicle-Treatment (MV-T) sup-
ports more rapid casualty interventions and evacuation from the battlefeld.
> Command and Control Vehicle (C2V). The XM1209 C2V is the hub of battlefeld
command and control, enabling commanders and their staffs to access and ex-
ploit the FCS battle network.
96
The FCS descriptions presented below are drawn from https://www.fcs.army.mil/systems/mcs/
index.html, accessed on September , 2008.
unmanned ground Vehicles (ugVs)
> Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE) Vehicle (MULE-T). The
XM27 (MULE-T) supports dismounted and air assault operations. It can be
transported by sling under military rotorcraft and comes in three variants: trans-
port, countermine, and Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV)-Assault-Light (ARV-A-L).
> Countermine MULE Vehicle (MULE-CM). The XM28 MULE-CM supports dis-
mounted and air assault operations, detecting, marking and neutralizing anti-tank
mines. It is equipped with an integrated mine detection mission package from the
Ground Standoff Mine Detection System (GSTAMIDS).
> Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle (SUGV). The XM26 SUGV is a lightweight,
manportable UGV capable of conducting military operations in urban terrain, tun-
nels, sewers and caves.
fi gure 3. 1R FC5 5Y51M 0F 5Y51M5
*
* The systems marked with an x are the four that have been dropped from the original eighteen.
Source: Department of the Army
unmanned aerial Vehicles
> Class I Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The XM56 Class I UAV is a platoon-level asset
that provides soldiers with RSTA support to include hover and stare capabili-
ty and a laser-designation capability. The entire system weighs less than ffty-
one pounds. The system is scheduled for felding in FY 2011.
> Class IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The XM57 Class IV UAV is designed for sup-
port at the brigade level of operations. It provides: wide band communications and
can serve as a wide-band communications relay; standoff Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) detection with on-board processing; a long-en-
durance persistent stare capability; and wide area surveillance with the ability
to cross-cue multiple sensors. The Class IV UAV development is linked with the
Navys Fire Scout program.
The Army has been pursuing an aggressive plan with regard to felding the FCS
family of capabilities. The Services original plans envisioned the FCS moving into
the system development and demonstration phase in FY 2006, beginning production
in FY 2008, and being deployed to the feld in FY 2010.
97
The rapid pace was driven
by a sense among the Army leadership that, in the words of General Shinseki, who
initiated the program, If we dont have these systems felded by the end of this decade
[i.e., 2010], we begin to lose relevancy.
98
However, owing to technical and funding constraints, the Army has restructured
the program three times since 2003, most recently in June 2008, and delayed the
felding of the initial FCS units until FY 2015, at the earliest, fve years beyond General
Shinsekis original deadline.
99
These restructurings are intended to accelerate the
felding of individual technologies to forces in the feld through a process known as
spin outs, and to reduce the programs scope from eighteen to fourteen systems. The
Army also cancelled the Comanche helicopter, which was to play a central role in FCS
operations.
00
97
John G. Roos, Tools of Transformation, Armed Forces Journal (October 200), p. 58.
98
Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., Futuristic Army Vision, Armed Forces Journal (May 200), p. 28.
99
The Army has insisted that funding shortfalls alone drove the initial decisions to delay the FCS felding.
Megan Scully, Riggs: Affordability Driving Force Behind FCS Schedule, Inside the Army (May 2,
2003), p. .
00
General Shinseki declared Comanche to be the quarterback of whatever we see offensively in terms of
deep-armed reconnaissance [and] armed escort for ground forces. According to LTG John Riggs, for-
mer Director of the Future Task Force, the Armys feet of helicopters had neither the range nor the reac-
tion time to support the projected FCS force. General Jack Keane, then serving as the Armys Vice Chief
of Staff, confrmed this when he declared that Comanche is integral of the Objective [Future] Force of
the Army, and we see it working hand in glove with the Future Combat System, our centerpiece ground
component . . . . Frank Wolfe and Marc Strass, Keane: Comanche Vital to Objective Force, Army Has
No Plans for Alternatives, Defense Daily (July 25, 2002), p. .
* The systems marked with an x are the four that have been dropped from the original eighteen.
Owing to technical
and funding
constraints,
the Army has
restructured the
program three
times since 2003,
most recently in
June 2008, and
delayed the felding
of the initial FCS
units until FY 2015,
at the earliest.
Spin Out consists of FCS (BCT) Battle Command capability, the Armys Joint
Tactical Radio System (JTRS)
0
, Unattended Ground Sensors, the Non Line of Sight-
Launch System, the small unmanned ground vehicle (SUGV) and the Class I Block O
Unmanned Air Vehicle. These systems are currently being evaluated by the 5
th
Brigade,
st
Armored Division, which is serving as an Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF).
02

The Army plans to provide Spin Out equipment to Infantry Brigade Combat Teams.
This shifts the focus away from an earlier emphasis on the heavy BCTs, which had
been scheduled to receive the spin outs in 20; now the IBCTs will receive the spin
outs in 20, as opposed to their originally scheduled date of 20.
03

In the interim, the Army is moving early versions of FCS components to forces in
Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, eighteen Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) are de-
ployed with Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal units, and an Army BCT is deploy-
ing to Iraq with thirty-six MAVs. Additionally, there are approximately ,000 robots
in combat theaters today. Many of these systems are precursors like the FCS Small
Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle that performs vital IED functions that might oth-
erwise need to be conducted by soldiers.
0
Program risk
As with any major modernization effort that seeks to incorporate new, unproven tech-
nologies and concepts of operation, the Army is incurring technical risk. As the
Armys original concept for the FCS notes, Technology is not a panacea, and it brings
its own set of unique challenges and vulnerabilities.
05
The Armys challenge is to sur-
mount formidable technological challenges on a range of capabilities key to its trans-
formation strategy from meeting strategic lift weight limitations, to system weight
and support reductions, to new forms of munitions, to novel forms of propulsion, to
advanced self-protection capabilities, to the integration of a wide array of information
systems comprising the FCS battle network.
At present, it appears the Armys exposure to technical risk is substantial. For ex-
ample, as early as 200 the Army Science Board concluded that, of the thirty-two
technologies required to support the felding of the Future Force, sixteen will not be
0
The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS, pronounced Jitters) is a family of affordable, high-capacity
tactical radios designed to provide soldiers with both line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight command,
control, communications and intelligence (CI) capabilities. Accessed at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/systems/ground/jtrs.htm, on September 5, 2008.
02
Army, July 25, 2008), p. 66.
03
Nathan Hodge, US Army Decides to Restructure FCS Programme, Janes Defense Week, July 2, 2008,
p. 7.
0
Army, July 25, 2008), p. 60.
05
United States Army White Paper, Concepts for the Objective Force (Washington, DC: US Army,
November 200), p. 5.
As with any major
modernization
effort that seeks
to incorporate
new, unproven
technologies
and concepts of
operation, the
Army is incurring
technical risk.
ready by the time the initial units of the force are being felded.
06
Two years later, in
2003, the Defense Science Board Task Forces Report of the Independent Assessment
Panel for the Future Combat System concluded that of thirty-one technologies identi-
fed as critical to the FCS, only seven had achieved a green rating.
07
Five years later, a Government Accountability Offce (GAO) report raised similar
concerns over the programs viability. The GAO noted that The FCS program is rec-
ognized as being high risk and needing special oversight.
08
Specifcally, the GAO
found:
> The amount of estimated software code required for the FCS network and plat-
forms has nearly tripled since 2003, to over 95 million lines. The software coding
requirements exceed those of any other US weapon system by a wide margin.
> The frst large-scale demonstration of the FCS network is scheduled for 2012, only
one year before the Army plans to initiate production. Also of concern, the Army
will not attempt a large-scale demonstration of its battle network until after the
FCS manned ground vehicles, whose effectiveness is highly dependent upon the
network, are already designed and prototyped.
> The FCS software development is further compromised by incomplete require-
ments and designs for the battle network. Hence the Army is projecting the dra-
matic increases in force effectiveness based on results achieved solely from model-
ing and simulation, which may or may not be validated by feld demonstrations.
> As revealed by earlier assessments, a number of key FCS technologies remain at
low maturity levels. According to the Armys own latest technology assessment,
only two of the FCSs forty-four critical technologies have achieved maturity levels
that should have been demonstrated at program start, according to best practice
standards.
09
The GAO concludes that It is not clear if or when the information network that is at
the heart of the FCS concept can be developed, built and demonstrated.
0
The Armys
06
Offce of Program Analysis and Evaluation, Army Transformation, Briefng, July 26, 2001.
07
Objective Force and Future Combat Systems Independent Assessment Panel, Briefng (May 2, 2003),
pp. 5960. The ratings are used to determine technology readiness levels for the Technology Readiness
Assessment (TRA) required for a program to enter Milestone B. DoD acquisition guidelines call for key
technologies to be rated at TRL 6 demonstration in a relevant environment or green prior to
initiation of system development and demonstration (SDD). Despite its technological immaturity, the
FCS program proceeded to Milestone B (i.e., the start of the SDD phase), which means its constituent
technologies have demonstrated an affordable increment of military-useful capability . . . in a relevant
environment. Two of the critical technologies were rated red, meaning that no acceptable sources
were identifed to meet the need for these technologies.
08
Testimony, Paul L. Francis, General Accountability Offce, 2009 Review of Future Combat System Is
Critical to Programs Direction, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, April 0, 2008, p. 3.
09
Ibid., pp. 6.
0
Ibid., np.
In 2003, the
Defense Science
Board Task
Forces Report of
the Independent
Assessment
Panel for the
Future Combat
System concluded
that of thirty-
one technologies
identifed as critical
to the FCS, only
seven had achieved
a green rating.
former assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, Claude Bolton,
has expressed concerns over whether the Army will have suffcient bandwidth to sup-
port the network, even if it is technically feasible.
In short, the Army has placed it-

self in a diffcult position with respect to the FCS program, as it is unclear whether the
battle network essential to its success can be realized at an acceptable cost and within
the projected time frame. Moreover, it is open to debate whether the battle network, if
it can be created, will provide enough payoff in terms of enhancing force effectiveness
to justify its expense. When one considers that the Army has essentially bet its future
on the FCS, the programs current status cannot help but be a cause for concern.
The Army also faces fscal risk. The Service estimates the FCS will cost around
$60 billion. This estimate has held steady over the last year, even though the Army
has reduced the FCS program from eighteen systems to fourteen. The Government
Accountability Offce believes the program could run as much as $200 billion.
2

Two other independent cost estimates, one undertaken by the Institute for Defense
Analysis (IDA), and the other by the Offce of the Secretary of Defenses Cost Analysis
Initiatives Group (CAIG) show results signifcantly higher than those presented by the
Army. These estimates use historical cost growth rates for defense programs, whereas
the Army estimates do not.
3
The FCS concept also involves some level of what might be termed joint risk, in
that the Army is counting heavily on its sister Services to enable its operations. In fact,
the Future Force concept of operations includes important assumptions concerning
joint CISR, to include joint operational and tactical sensor-shooter linkages, integrat-
ed logistics and strategic and operational lift. The Army approach also makes major
assumptions with respect to the kind of support it will receive from the Air Force and
Navy in an anti-access/area-denial environment, to include a comprehensive joint
force protection umbrella that includes air and missile defense [that] provides secu-
rity of air and sea ports of debarkation, and enables uninterrupted force fow, against
a diverse variety of anti-access threats, including weapons of mass effects.
Army assumptions with respect to the capabilities that its sister Services will have
to support the Future Force seem optimistic. A number of questions have yet to be
Kris Osborn, US Army Faces Spectrum Crunch, Defense News, January 7, 2008, p. . Osborn notes
that even the Armys efforts to exploit data compression, as with its JTRS radios, represents only a
Band-Aid, not a solution to the problem. The Defense Science Board has also raised concerns over
the amount of FCS code being developed by foreign programmers, noting that malicious code is a
key concern of the FCS program. The DSB went on to declare that it lacks confdence in current tools
for detecting malicious code. Alec Klein, The Complex Crux of Wireless Warfare, Washington Post,
January 2, 2008, p. D.
2
Andrea Shalal-Esa, Army Defends Progress on Modernization Program, Reuters.com. May 3, 2008.
3
Testimony, Paul L. Francis, General Accountability Offce, 2009 Review of Future Combat System Is
Critical to Programs Direction, Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, April 0, 2008, p. 0.
US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The United States Army
Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept (Draft) (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC,
December 8, 200), p. 20.
When one considers
that the Army has
essentially bet
its future on the
FCS, the programs
current status
cannot help but be a
cause for concern.
answered. Which Service (or Services) will provide the strategic lift of the type and in
the quantities required by the FCS force? Can other Services provide missile defenses
suffciently effective to enable FCS and other BCT deployments in an A2/AD threat
environment? Can they rapidly defeat the enemys anti-access forces? Will they quick-
ly clear littoral zones and establish sea control over coastal areas to facilitate the rapid
resupply of rapidly deploying Army units? Will they provide their respective elements
of a joint CISR architecture? It is far from clear that the Air Force and Navy either
plan to, or can, develop the capabilities needed to execute these key enabling missions
as quickly or effectively as the Army anticipates. In brief, the Army may be taking on
considerable risk in assuming that its sister Services will provide key enabling capa-
bilities for its Future Force.
Finally, the Army is assuming what might be termed operational risk, meaning
that the Future Force may be optimized for conficts that are not likely to be encoun-
tered, rather than those that will be more likely or more demanding. Here the risk
has three dimensions. First, the Army may fnd it diffcult to perform its role as part
of a joint force engaged in regime change operations against a minor nuclear-armed
power. Second, the Army may be felding more capacity for this kind of mission than
is warranted, given the range of contingencies for which it must prepare. Third, the
Army may fnd that, while its full-spectrum force is weighted toward conventional
war, the capabilities associated with that form of confict may undermine the Services
efforts to feld forces that are highly effective in irregular warfare, particularly stabil-
ity operations.
The Armys vision of how its Future Force will operate is, in one sense, truly revo-
lutionary. It displaces the combined arms mechanized operations that have domi-
nated major conventional warfare since the introduction of the blitzkrieg in the early
days of World War II with a force built around a battle network whose focus is not
to close with and destroy the enemy, but rather to fght the decisive engagement at
extended ranges, using information and precision fres to see frst, understand frst,
act frst, and fnish decisively. However, several serious risks remain associated with
this vision.
The great risk is in creating an Army for the wrong future. The Services force
structure and modernization efforts appear focused heavily on open battle against an
enemy with conventional forces, even though there is no compelling evidence that any
current or prospective rivals have felded, or plan to feld, forces that would present
this kind of challenge. This tilt of the full-spectrum force in the direction of conven-
tional warfare courts risk by not adequately balancing the Future Force to account for
the full range of operational contingencies the Army is likely to confront.
Then there is the risk that the Army may also be over-emphasizing the forces re-
quired to address the A2/AD threat. To be sure, the Army may confront a contingency
in which it must deploy substantial numbers of BCTs rapidly and sustain them in an
A2/AD threat environment, to include cases where the enemy has a small nuclear
arsenal. However, if the Air Force and Navy are able to suppress promptly an enemys
The great risk is in
creating an Army
for the wrong
future. The Services
force structure
and modernization
efforts appear
focused heavily on
open battle against
an enemy with
conventional forces.
A2/AD capabilities to enable the Army to deploy rapidly into the combat zone at an
acceptable level of risk, it is not clear that a ground force along the lines envisioned by
the Army would be necessary.
Simply stated, as long as the US military maintains the air superiority that enables
persistent reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition and on-call precision
strikes, the joint force can see frst, understand frst, act frst, and fnish decisively
against any enemy seeking to concentrate ground forces and engage in traditional
conventional combat operations. This capability was demonstrated in the Second
Gulf War, when US air power proved so effective that the Army had no need to engage
in any signifcant tank battles with Iraqs Republican Guard.
5
American air power
saw the Iraqi combined arms mechanized forces frst, understood what they were
trying to do, and acted before the enemy could take effective action, so that when
US Army and Marine Corps ground forces encountered them, they could fnish the
Iraqis off decisively. Investing upwards of $200 billion to create a stand-alone Army
capability through the FCS program hardly seems the best use of what are likely to be
increasingly scarce resources.
On the other hand, if the Air Force and Navy are unable to penetrate and fracture
an enemys A2/AD forces and create the conditions for a modern D-Day, the Army
will confronts a situation similar to a latter-day Gallipoli or Anzio, where the costs of
introducing ground forces becomes prohibitively high.
Hence the irony: the Armys Future Force, confgured around the FCS, will likely
be deployable only against an A2/AD threat that has already been defeated by air
and maritime forces. Those same forces, however, could locate, track, and destroy
enemy ground forces operating in the open, which would likely compel the enemy
to move into restricted terrain (e.g., urban areas) and employ irregular warfare tac-
tics, for which the FCS is poorly suited. During the major combat operations phase of
the confict, Army forces would likely need to engage in protracted security, stability,
transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations. On the other hand, if the Air Force
cannot stage out of forward air bases and if the Navy is forced to operate outside the
littoral, it is diffcult to see how an enemys A2/AD system could quickly be degraded
to the point where signifcant Army forces could be introduced quickly and at accept-
able cost. Simply stated, solving the A2/AD challenge enables the Future Forcewhile
marginalizing it at the same time.
Third, how effective will the FCS-centered Future Force be in irregular warfare?
Both Army doctrine and the statements of Army leaders note the substantial differ-
ences in the character of conventional operations and those associated with irregular
warfare (e.g., counterinsurgency; stability operations; foreign internal defense). This
difference involves not only the skill sets required of soldiers, but extends to their
equipment as well.
5
Andrew F. Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment (Washington, DC: CSBA,
2003), pp. 202.
As long as the US
military maintains the
air superiority that
enables persistent
reconnaissance,
surveillance and
target acquisition
and on-call precision
strikes, the joint
force can see frst,
understand frst,
act frst, and fnish
decisively against
any enemy seeking
to concentrate
ground forces and
engage in traditional
conventional combat
operations.
Intelligence is a critical factor in every form of warfare, but especially so in opera-
tions at the lower end of the confict spectrum. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that
if Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq knew the enemys location, the confict
would be resolved quickly and successfully. This sort of intelligence is typically de-
rived primarily from the native population, within which the insurgent forces attempt
to blend, rather than by systems such as UAVs or unattended ground sensors (although
these capabilities can prove to be valuable in a supporting role). That is why defeating
an enemy waging forms of irregular warfare insurgency in particular depends on
winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Ground forces attempting to
accomplish this, or failing to accomplish this, often fnd themselves vulnerable to at-
tacks by irregular forces.
The Armys FCS units will rely on networked sensors and unmanned vehicles [to]
allow companies and platoons to develop the situation with far greater precision be-
fore making contact with the enemy. These capabilities may work in detecting con-
ventional enemy forces, but it is diffcult to see how they would be the primary means
of identifying insurgent elements, unless they were massed for attack. Nevertheless,
the Army argues that These capabilities are essential in irregular warfare typical-
ly fought among the population.
6
Thus the FCS Reconnaissance Strike Vehicle is
equipped with unattended ground sensors, along with a small unmanned ground ve-
hicle and a Class I unmanned aerial vehicle system; but these systems would appear
to be of limited utility in identifying an enemy embedded in the noncombatant popu-
lation. A far better use of resources, it would seem, would involve human intelligence
teams working among the population and with local security forces (e.g., the police).
Given these considerations, it is not clear that the FCS, even if it works as the Army
hopes, will prove worth the enormous investment in resources, either in terms of its
effectiveness at the high or the low end of the confict spectrum.
Finally, there is the growing threat posed by irregular forces equipped with G-
RAMM capabilities. The Armys leaders recognize that the Services modernization
efforts must take into account the complex and changing operational environment
where increased ballistic and cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aerial vehi-
cles, rockets, artillery and mortars, coupled with WMD payloads are plausible for use
against the homeland and from inside and outside a Joint force commanders AOR
[area of responsibility].
7
The question that immediately comes to mind here is: How
will the Army defend the ground it takes? Where are the air and missile defense sys-
tem that can defend against this kind of threat, and do so at an acceptable cost?
6
Army, July 25, 2008), p. 70.
7
Ibid., p. 37.
The FCS
Reconnaissance
Strike Vehicle is
equipped with
unattended ground
sensors, along with
a small unmanned
ground vehicle and
a Class I unmanned
aerial vehicle system;
but these systems
would appear to
be of limited utility
in identifying an
enemy embedded in
the noncombatant
population.
Army systems such as Patriot-3 (Pac-3) and the Terminal High-Altitude Area
Defense
8
(THAAD) system fre interceptor missiles that far exceed the cost of the
rockets and short-range missiles fred by groups like Hezbollah during the Second
Lebanon War with Israel in 2006. In any event, most G-RAMM munitions do not fol-
low fight trajectories and timelines that are conducive to their being intercepted by
these systems. The only approach on the horizon that seems promising at this point
in time involves active defenses enabled by solid-state laser (SSL) technology, which
might not only reduce the cost per interceptor shot to tolerable levels, but also make
it possible to engage multiple incoming munitions very rapidly. The Army is investing
in this technology, but the Service needs to move more aggressively in this area, given
the state of the threat.
9
Combating this threat will almost certainly require a joint effort from the Services,
involving hunter-killer air-ground forces designed to suppress the enemys ability to
fre such munitions, especially in salvoes, systems capable of intercepting G-RAMM
munitions in fight, counter-battery fres to destroy missile launchers promptly once
they have fred and revealed their location, and passive defenses (e.g., hardening of
key facilities, built-in redundancies to key infrastructure, etc.) to mitigate the damage
from strikes that are not intercepted.
F0PC 51PUC1UP: FULL-5PC1PUM
0P PPIMAPY-F0CU57
To fulfll its role as part of the joint force addressing the full range of challenges to
US national security, the Army has concluded that soldiers and units must be able to
adapt quickly to any threat along the confict spectrum. This must be accomplished,
they believe, if the Army is to respond with suffcient forces to meet the anticipated
8
This system, originally the Theater High Altitude Area Defense system, has been moved from the Army
to the Defense Departments Missile Defense Agency (MDA). The THAAD missile destroys incoming
missiles by colliding with them, using a kinetic or hit-to-kill approach, as with the Patriot-3 (although
the PAC-3 also contains a small explosive warhead). Similar to the Patriot-3 anti-missile missiles, the
THAAD is designed to knock out ballistic missiles in their fnal phase of fight, known as the terminal
phase. However, as the THAAD is designed to intercept targets at higher altitudes, it can defend a larger
area. The THAAD has posted a strong record of recent test successes, having intercepted thirty-fve
targets in forty-three attempts in the atmosphere and in space since 200. Over the past three years,
THAAD has successfully engaged twenty-nine of thirty targets. The THAAD is scheduled for initial de-
ployment in 2009. THAAD shoots down missile from C-7, Air Force Times, June 27, 2008. Accessed
at http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/06/ap_thaad_062608/, on September 9, 2008.
9
There are several SSL programs under way, including the High-Energy Laser Technology Demonstrator
(HEL TD) and the Joint High Power Solid-State Laser (JHPSSL). Northrop Grumman is projecting that
it will be able to a demonstrate weapons-grade SSL in 2008. This would represent a big step up from
chemical-powered lasers, which until recently had been the focal point of DoD research into laser sys-
tems. Chemical lasers are capable of generating powerful bursts of laser energy, but require large quan-
tities of highly toxic chemicals, making chemical laser weapons impractical for most military tasks.
Noah Shachtman, Weapons-Grade Lasers by the End of 08?, Wired, September 02, 2008. Accessed
online at http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/09/weapons-grade-l.html, on September 0, 2008.
demand for ground combat forces. Thus the Army has decided to feld a full-spec-
trum force rather than build [a] large-scale, dedicated force structure whose units
are oriented primarily on accomplishing either conventional war or irregular war
missions.
20
Given the limits on size imposed by resource constraints and a volunteer force, the
Army leadership believes it has no choice but to pursue this path.
The Armys operational concept is full spectrum operations: Army forces combine of-
fensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an
interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent
risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.
2
[Emphasis in the original]
To feld an effective full-spectrum force, the Army needs soldiers able to operate
in several highly complex, highly demanding environments. As the Armys recently
released capstone feld manual, 3-0, Operations, declares
Future operational environments will be complex . . . . Soldiers can expect to deal with
more complicated situations than ever before. The nature of land operations has ex-
panded from a nearly exclusive focus on lethal combat with other armies to a compli-
cated mixture of lethal and nonlethal actions directed at enemies, adversaries, and the
local population, itself often a complicated mix . . . . Army forces work with and around
a bewildering array of agencies and organizations government, intergovernmental,
nongovernmental, and commercial and usually within a multinational military frame-
work . . . . These and many other factors increase the complexity of operations and stress
every dimension of the Armys capabilities, especially the strength and depth of Army
leaders . . . .
22
In attempting to stretch its forces across the entire spectrum of confict, the Army
must address the signifcant disparity in skill sets needed for conventional warfare
and various forms of irregular warfare. Not only are the skills both demanding and
disparate, the time to shift from one set to the other may be very limited. As Army
Field Manual 3-0, Operations, states
For maximum effectiveness, stability and civil support tasks require dedicated train-
ing, similar to training for offensive and defensive tasks. Likewise, forces involved in
protracted stability or civil support operations require intensive training to regain pro-
fciency in offensive or defensive tasks before engaging in large-scale combat opera-
tions.
23
[Authors emphasis]
20
Department of the Army, Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Confict (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, June , 2008), p. 8.
2
Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 27,
2008), p. 3.
22
Ibid., p. 36.
23
Ibid., pp. 32, 33.
Although intensive, dedicated training is required to reorient soldiers from
conventional to stability operations,
Units must be agile enough to adapt quickly and be able to shift with little effort from a
focus on one portion of the spectrum of confict to focus on another. Change and adap-
tation that once required years to implement must now be recognized, communicated,
and enacted far more quickly.
124
[Authors emphasis]
In short, the Army requires soldiers who can operate in increasingly complex en-
vironments, some of which are very different from one another, and to shift from one
to the other within compressed time frames. This leads to an obvious question: While
felding a full-spectrum force may be desirable, is it a realistic course of action for the
Army? Is it possible to feld forces that can perform such disparate missions on short
notice, and at a high level of effectiveness? In fact, there are serious concerns regard-
ing this approach to organizing, training and equipping the future Army.
First, as Army doctrine makes clear, the skills sets required of soldiers are very
diverse and very demanding, ranging from executing complex combined arms ma-
neuver warfare as part of a joint battle network involving BCTs equipped with the
Future Combat Systems, to seamlessly transitioning to operating effectively among
people of alien cultures. It is a challenging undertaking to master one of these skill
sets, let alone two.
Second, embedded in this approach is the major assumption that the Army can
shift with suffcient speed to orient itself to address any threat along the confict spec-
trum, from stability operations and irregular warfare, to conventional warfare, to
operations against a nuclear-armed adversary. In particular, the Armys track record
in reorienting conventional forces rapidly for irregular warfare is not encouraging.
Twice in the last half-century the Army has had to adapt forces to conduct large-
scale irregular warfare campaigns, frst in Vietnam and more recently in Afghanistan
and Iraq. In both cases, the Army required at least three years to adapt its general-
purpose forces to this kind of warfare. What evidence is there that full-spectrum
forces the term seems a euphemism for general-purpose forces will be able to
make an even greater shift from conventional to irregular warfare?
Third, making matters even dicier, the Army may not be able to rely upon its part-
ners in the Interagency to provide the capabilities they are responsible for as part of
the whole of government solution to the challenges posed by stability operations.
Should the Interagency fail to meet its obligations:
2
Ibid., p. 20.
While felding a
full-spectrum force
may be desirable, is
it a realistic course
of action for the
Army? Is it possible
to feld forces that
can perform such
disparate missions
on short notice, and
at a high level of
effectiveness?
The Army must be prepared to perform mission critical stability operations tasks if other
mission partners cannot. Moreover, the Army must be capable of establishing conditions
conducive to building functional institutions across a society. By implication, the capa-
bility to execute all fve stability operations tasks must be inherent, in some degree, in
the forces the Army provides to a combatant command.
25
To paraphrase former Army chief of staff, General (Ret.) Gordon Sullivan, hope is
not a strategy.
26
Yet the Army does appear to be relying heavily on the hope that its
partners in the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, and
the intelligence community do their part, despite their inability in many instances to
execute their responsibilities, even after seven years of persistent irregular confict.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the Army is attempting to create the full-
spectrum force, with the unprecedented demands it places on soldiers, at the very
time it is experiencing a serious and steady erosion in the quality of the force, in both
the offcer and NCO corps, and in recruiting standards.
a Conventional tilt in an era of Persistent irregular Confict
In posturing itself for full-spectrum operations, the Army appears to have placed its
institutional center of gravity squarely in the area of conventional warfare. This is true
both for the Armys core modernization program, the Future Combat Systems, and its
force structure. Recall that, although it will be capable of conducting other kinds of
operations, the Future Combat Systems is optimized for conventional warfare.
27
The Armys force structure also appears to be far more oriented on conventional
operations than seems warranted. The Modular Force calls for the Active Army to feld
eighteen Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (HBCTs) and one Armored Cavalry Regiment,
for a total of nineteen HBCTs, and twenty-three Infantry Combat Teams (IBCTs),
along with six Stryker BCTs (SBCTs), for a total of forty-eight BCTs. Thus roughly 0
percent of the Active Component will comprise heavy brigades. However, the National
25
Department of the Army, June 1, 2008), pp. 3, 11. The fve stability operations tasks are to establish civil
security, establish civil control, restore essential services, provide support to governance, and provide
support to economic and infrastructure development. FM 3-07, Stability Operations, reinforces the
point, noting that while generally the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests
with the host-nation government of designated civil authorities, agencies, and organizations . . . [w]hen
this is not possible, military forces provide essential services to the populace until a civil authority
or the host nation can provide these services. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, Stability
Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, October 6, 2008), p. 22.
26
The generals observation that Hope is not a method has been modifed by many, including Senator
Hillary Clinton, to hope is not a strategy. See Captain James G. Alden, Eyes Wide Shut, Armed Forces
Journal, accessed at http://www.afji.com/2007/03/239227 on September , 2008; and Brigadier
General (ret.) Kevin Ryan, Hope is a Strategy, Orlando Sentinel, December 21, 2006.
27
Although optimized for offensive operations, the FCS BCT will be capable of executing full-
spectrum operations. LTG Stephen M. Speakes, 2008 Army Modernization Strategy (Washington,
DC: Department of the Army, July 25, 2008), p. 69.
The Army is
attempting to create
the full-spectrum
force, with the
unprecedented
demands it places
on soldiers, at
the very time it
is experiencing a
serious and steady
erosion in the
quality of the force,
in both the offcer
and NCO corps,
and in recruiting
standards.
Guard (i.e., the Reserve Component) will have seven HBCTs, twenty IBCTs, and one
SBCT. Only 25 percent of the National Guards BCTs will be heavy formations.
The BCT force structure raises several interesting issues. For one, the Reserve
Component is weighted far more heavily than the Active Component toward lighter
forces. As stability operations and counterinsurgency operations are typically con-
ducted by lighter formations, it would appear that, relative to the Reserves, the Active
Army is far more heavily weighted toward conventional warfare. This seems odd at a
time when the Army fnds itself in an era of persistent irregular warfare, in which it is
struggling to sustain forces in the feld. The Services AC brigades can be rotated much
more frequently (as frequently as one third of the time, according to Army plans)
than RC brigades (only as often as one sixth of the time). Why weight the number
of BCTs best suited for irregular warfare in the RC, especially given that the wars in
both Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be protracted, and myriad other mid- to large-
scale irregular warfare contingencies (e.g., a destabilized Nigeria and/or Pakistan)
are highly probable?
Perhaps the Army sees maintaining a conventional heavy Active Component as
necessary in the event of a major regional war, perhaps involving North Korea or
Iran, in which the Army will need to deploy HBCTs with little warning. Since it takes
several months at least for National Guard brigades to prepare for combat, this would
seem to make sense. However, upon examining these two contingencies, the case for
maintaining nineteen Active Component HBCTs seems hard to defend, especially
given current and likely prospective contingencies.
Take the case of North Korea. The principal threat here is from Pyongyangs bal-
listic missile forces, potentially armed with nuclear or chemical warheads; its spe-
cial operations forces infltrating into the South, armed with chemical or biological
agents; and its thousands of artillery pieces tucked away in mountain caves just be-
yond the demilitarized zone.
RBC1s IBC1s 5BC1s
Act|ve Cemenent 19 23 6
Peserve Cemenent 7 20 1
1eta| 26 43 7
taBLe 1. 1R M0ULAP F0PC BPI 6A C0MBA1 1AM5 (FY 2013)
The case for
maintaining
nineteen Active
Component HBCTs
seems hard to
defend, especially
given current and
likely prospective
contingencies.
It is also very unlikely that South Korea will confront a North Korean combined
arms mechanized force conducting offensive operations. The North Korean Army has
antiquated equipment that is not in good repair. It suffers from a lack of adequate lo-
gistics support to mount a sustained ground offensive campaign. Should Pyongyang
decide to launch a ground offensive despite these shortcomings, US air power can
visit the same destruction on advancing North Korean mechanized forces as it has in
other recent conficts, such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the Second Gulf War.
The terrain separating the two countries generally mountainous with both fanks
anchored on the sea provides few avenues of advance for a mechanized ground of-
fensive, making the defenders job all the easier.
Moreover, as South Korea has over twice the population of the North and an econ-
omy many times as large, it seems reasonable to conclude that Seoul can provide
ground forces for its own defense. Since it would likely take several months to trans-
port even a sizeable fraction of the Armys nineteen HBCTs to South Korea in the
event of a confict, having the South Koreans assume responsibility for ground forces
makes even more sense. Indeed, the US militarys greatest comparative advantage in
this contingency is its maritime and aerospace forces.
As for Iran, the threat is not that the Army will confront a better version of Iraqs
Republican Guard. Rather, it is that Iran will rely on a small nuclear arsenal, the kind
of hybrid warfare pursued by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War, and low-end
anti-access/area-denial capabilities to make the Persian Gulf a killing zone and ac-
cess to nearby forward bases a risky proposition. As noted earlier in this report, if
Irans A2/AD forces can be taken down, the Army may be able to deploy signifcant
forces into the combat zone at an acceptable level of risk. However, it seems very un-
likely they will confront an Iranian Army conducting conventional, combined-arms
operations. Given these operations spectacular lack of effectiveness in the two Gulf
Wars, and the relative effectiveness of irregular forces in Iraq and during the Second
Lebanon War, it would appear that Army forces would be confronted with an Iranian
Army waging irregular warfare.
Should the Army confront an enemy willing to engage in conventional war, or open
battle, nineteen HBCTs would likely prove far more than needed for the task, espe-
cially given the US militarys advantage in air power. Since 99, enemy ground forces
massing against the US military have been utterly devastated, whether it be during
the First Gulf War, the 999 Balkan War, the initial campaign in Afghanistan to top-
ple the Taliban Regime, or the Second Gulf War. As long as the US military maintains
control of the air, enemy ground forces attempting to mass have been devastated.
Thus in the Balkan War the Serbian forces were defeated without the Armys direct
involvement. In Afghanistan, US Special Operations Forces, working with indigenous
Afghan tribes, were able to unseat the Taliban regime, again without deploying a sin-
gle BCT. In the Second Gulf War, the Armys 3
rd
Infantry Division (Mechanized), with
Should the Army
confront an enemy
willing to engage in
conventional war,
or open battle,
nineteen HBCTs
would likely prove
far more than
needed for the task,
especially given
the US militarys
advantage in air
power.
its three heavy brigades, proved suffcient to defeat the Iraqi Army.
28
If one includes
the heavy brigades provided by US Marine and British units during the major combat
operations phase of the confict, the total rises to nine, or less than half the HBCTs the
Army proposes to maintain in its active force structure.
Stability operations: once again, a Lesser included Case?
While the FCS is optimized for conventional operations, and while the Army, in the
interim, plans to feld an Active Component that arguably is overly weighted toward
conventional operations given likely contingencies the Service has also decided
against felding BCTs oriented on irregular warfare missions such as stability opera-
tions, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense. To be sure, there is agreement
among the Army leadership that The institutional Army faces a critical shortcoming
in its ability to resource and prepare forces for stability operations tasks.
29
To address
this shortcoming, the Army plans to designate some BCTs in the force generation
cycle as Security Cooperation BCTs (SC BCTs) with the mission of focusing on Phase 0
stability operations.
30
These units will undergo limited training to become profcient
in the culture and institutions for the region within which they will operate.
3

Each BCT has a core mission essential task list or CMETL that it must always
be able to execute. Brigades can also be assigned a directed mission-essential task
list, or DMETL, such as those associated with stability operations. The Army hopes to
provide a BCT with its DMETL roughly twelve to eighteen months before it deploys.
Based on the stability operations mission involved, this could lead to modifcations in
the BCTs organization and equipment in the process of creating a SC BCT.
32
But will every BCT designated for deployment as an SC BCT have twelve to eigh-
teen months to prepare? Could the Army count on such warning in the event of a
collapse of a government in a country of strategic signifcance to the United States,
such as Nigeria or Pakistan? Would the Army have over a years warning of a pending
confict with Iran in which regime change operations would very likely leave the Army
28
Britains
st
Armoured Division, comprised of three heavy brigades, also participated in the war, as did
the US Marine Corps
st
Division, which includes three heavy regiments.
29
30
An SC BCT will tailor its combat support and combat service support functions for the environment
in which it will operate. This may include training and deploying as force packages below the BCT
level. Department of the Army, Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Confict (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, Predecisional Draft), pp. 78.
3
The Army has directed that in order to prepare for operations across the GCCs [Geographic Combatant
Commands], SC BCTs will be regionally allocated to ensure appropriate training focus . . . . Department
of the Army, Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Confict (Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, June , 2008), p. 22.
32
Department of Defense, Bloggers Roundtable, LTG William Caldwell, Teleconference Subject: US
Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, February 26, 2008.
with a large-scale stability operations mission after the end of major combat opera-
tions? Again, history does not offer much comfort here.
Indeed, Army doctrine acknowledges the importance of units being able to shift
focus quickly.
No longer can responses to hostile asymmetric approaches be measured in months.
Solutions must be felded across the force in weeks and then be adapted frequently and
innovatively as the enemy adapts to counter the new-found advantages.
33
Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, emphasizes the point in declaring
The malleable situation following in the wake of confict, disaster, or internal strife pro-
vides the force with the greatest opportunity to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.
By quickly dictating the terms of action and driving positive change in the environment,
military forces improve the security situation and create opportunities for civilian agen-
cies and organizations to contribute. Immediate action to stabilize the situation and pro-
vide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the people begins the processes that lead
to a lasting peace. Failing to act quickly may create a breeding ground for dissent and
possible recruiting opportunities for enemies or adversaries.
3
In his book, Losing the Golden Hour, former USAID Mission Director James
Stephenson reinforces this point. The golden hour referred to by Stephenson is the
brief period of time after the introduction of US troops in which we enjoy the for-
bearance of the host-nation populace. The military instrument, with its unique expe-
ditionary capabilities, is the sole US agency with the ability to affect the golden hour
before the hourglass tips
35
and the local populace becomes disaffected.
36
An Army
called upon to surge BCTs to exploit the golden hour is not likely to have a year or
more to prepare them.
Even more worrisome, those BCTs designated for security cooperation mis-
sions the SC BCTs will only be modifed temporarily for this mission. The Army
has decided that
Barring contingencies, these allocations need only endure for the ARFORGEN cycle. As
part of the global force pool, BCTs will not permanently align with any one region.
37
33
Field Manual 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 27,
2008), p. 20.
3
35
James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, (Washington, DC: Potomac Press, 2007), p. 98.
36
LTG William B. Caldwell IV, and Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Leonard, Field Manual 3-07, Stability
Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change, Military Review, July-August 2008, p. .
37
Once the BCT rotates through its assignment as an SC BCT, whatever profciency
it develops in stability operations will be dissipated. The Army intends that a brigade
deployed as an SC BCT will not be designated as a SC BCT for the next ARFORGEN
cycle.
38
In summary, even though stability operations will be more leader intensive, re-
quiring different training and skills from those of conventional warfare, and even
though the Army views stability operations as refective of endemic problems [that]
require long-term, continuous solutions that are not episodic engagements, the
Service has decided to forego maintaining a force with a high skill level in these op-
erations.
39
If the demand for such forces were low, or episodic, or if the warning times
allowed for a thorough reorientation of general-purpose forces for the stability opera-
tions missions, this approach might have merit. However, this is not the case. The
demand signal for these forces is high. The Army fnds that
If there were more Army forces available, the combatant commands would likely request
more forces to participate in steady-state shaping activities. These unrequested forces
constitute a suppressed demand signal.
0
Moreover, in an era of persistent irregular confict, the demand signal for Army
forces profcient in stability operations is likely to remain persistent.
training and advising
The Armys aversion to institutionalizing its hard-won skills in irregular warfare, and
in stability operations in particular, threatens to extend into the area of training and
advising. The Defense Departments leadership has concluded the US armed forces,
and the ground forces in particular, are not large enough to address the full range of
plausible contingencies on their own. Consequently, it has made building partner
capacity a key part of its strategy for meeting its global commitments. The idea is to
organize, train and equip the forces of states threatened with aggression, especially
forms of irregular warfare, in order to increase the forces that can be brought to bear
to accomplish the mission. This is especially important in matters of internal security,
which are typically best handled by indigenous forces.
Refecting this priority, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael
Mullen, has declared that stepping up the US advisory efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq
is the way out, no question, in both countries. He went on to say I cant overstate the
importance of the American advisory teams.
While these teams represent the way

38
Ibid., p. 32.
39
Ibid., pp. 56.
0
Ibid., p. 0.
Ann Scott Tyson, Military Training Units Seen as Career Detours, Washington Post, October 25,
2007, p. A2.
The idea is to
organize, train and
equip the forces of
states threatened
with aggression,
especially forms of
irregular warfare,
in order to increase
the forces that can
be brought to bear
to accomplish the
mission.
out for Army combat units, their departure will likely be succeeded by the protracted
commitment of substantial numbers of advisors.
The need for a substantial Army capability to build partner capacity, both in terms
of training and advising, also stems from a realization that, beyond the current high
demand signal for this capability
The scope and scale of training programs today and the scale of programs likely to be
required in the future has grown exponentially. While FID
2
has been traditionally the
primary responsibility of the special operating force (SOF), training foreign forces is now
a core competency of regular and reserve units of all Services.
3
Like many other aspects of stability operations, organizing, training and equipping
host-nation security forces is a complex and challenging mission; building partner
capacity is typically a slow and painstaking process.
The effort extends beyond mili-

tary training teams (MTTs) that conduct security force assistance. It encompasses po-
lice training teams and civil affairs functional area specialists working to reform the
host nations entire security sector.
5
It might also include provincial reconstruction
teams (PRTs) engaged in building capacity in governance and in the economic sector.
The Army Security Assistance Training Management Organizations (SATMO)
has a key role in supporting the Services efforts to build partner capacity and con-
duct stability operations. SATMOs mission is to plan, form, prepare, deploy, sustain
and redeploy continental United States (CONUS)-based Security Assistance Teams
that provide technical assistance, training services, mobile training teams, and pre-
deployment site surveys. In FY 2007, sixty-fve teams were deployed to thirty-nine
countries. While the Army notes that this effort involved more than 80,000 work-
days overseas, this represents only 29 man-years.
6
The Army, however, has decided against substantially increasing its training and
advising capacity, citing a lack of manpower. The Armys chief of staff, General George
Casey has declared
2
FID, or foreign internal defense, is defned as Participation by civilian and military agencies of a gov-
ernment in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization
to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Joint Chiefs of Staff, (JCS)
Publication -02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, April 2, 200,
as amended through May 30, 2008, p. 28.
3
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-2, Counterinsurgency, December 2006, p. 63.
Ibid., pp. 6, 66.

5
Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change, Military Review, JulyAugust 2008, p. 2.
6
Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) -0, Generating Force Support for Operations, April 2,
2008; and SATMO Command Brief, 2008. Cited in Department of the Army, Stability Operations in an
Era of Persistent Confict (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Predecisional Draft), p. .
Like many other
aspects of stability
operations,
organizing, training
and equipping
host-nation security
forces is a complex
and challenging
mission; building
partner capacity is
typically a slow and
painstaking process.
Im just not convinced that anytime in the near future were going to decide to build
someone elses army from the ground up. And to me, the advisory corps is our Army
Special Forces thats what they do.
7
The generals views are echoed in the Services recently released statement on its
role in stability operations, which states
It is not in the militarys best interest to establish a permanent Training Corps
8
in the
conventional military to develop other countries indigenous security forces. The Special
Forces do this mission well on the scale that is normally required for theater security co-
operation and other routine foreign internal defense (FID) missions. Rather, we should
insure our conventional forces have the inherent fexibility to transition to this mission
when it becomes too large for the Special Forces.
9
This line of argument is less than persuasive. First, given the strong demand sig-
nal from the COCOMs for advisor support, and the growing role that building up the
capacity of indigenous and other partners forces has attained in the overall US strat-
egy for addressing the era of persistent irregular warfare, it appears the Army will
likely have a long-term requirement to provide signifcant numbers of trainers and
advisors. Hence the need to maintain a signifcant capability within the Army for this
mission seems appropriate. However, even with the planned increase in the Armys
Special Forces, they are not suffciently large to conduct the full range of operations
required of them and engage in the large-scale training of foreign militaries.
Second, the Armys plans to draw upon its BCTs for offcers and NCOs to serve as
advisors are a classic case of robbing Peter to pay Paul. In an Army already weak-
ened by a decline in the quality of its offcer and NCO cohorts, it makes little sense to
dilute the leadership of deployed BCTs to generate advisors. Despite assertions to the
contrary, it also seems unlikely that BCT commanders will release their best offcers
and NCOs to fll the role of advisors and trainers.
Furthermore, the Armys best offcers and NCOs are unlikely to view assignments
as advisors and trainers as career-enhancing. While Admiral Mullen believes that
Individuals have to see this as meaningful in their career, and that the Services have
to recognize this and start promoting those serving as advisors, assignment as an
advisor is generally seen as detrimental to ones career.
50
A widely circulated email
written by an offcer who worked with military trainers in Afghanistan begins: You
7
Yochi J. Dreazen, Training: Mission Unaccomplished, Wall Street Journal, February 29, 2008, p.
A.
8
The most ardent proponent of a Training, or Advisory, Corps is LTC (Ret.) John Nagl. See John A.
Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: Its Time for an Army Advisor Command, Military Review,
SeptemberOctober 2008, pp. 226. See also Major Michael D. Jason, Integrating the Advisory Effort
in the Army: A Full-Spectrum Solution, Military Review, SeptemberOctober 2008, pp. 2732.
9
50
Tyson, Military Training Units Seen as Career Detours, p. A2.
Even with the
planned increase in
the Armys Special
Forces, they are not
suffciently large
to conduct the full
range of operations
required of them
and engage in the
large-scale training
of foreign militaries.
have a pulse and have not been selected for command. Congratulations on your as-
signment! The message goes on to state that the Army has told you that this assign-
ment wont hurt your career . . . [and] you have been told the truth, as long as you do
not hope for further promotion.
5
Recognizing the problem, Army chief of staff General George Casey is seeking to
make advisory duty more attractive. He notes Soldiers that serve on our Transition
Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly
the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in
an era of persistent confict.
52
To ensure these skills are retained and that offcers are
incentivized to seek assignments as advisors, General Casey has directed that majors
and lieutenant colonels serving on these teams be given the credit they deserve in
the form of career-enhancing future assignments and in consideration for promotion.
This represents a signifcant effort on the Armys part to change offcers perceptions
of serving in training and advisory assignments. If history is any guide, however, it
will take time and persistent attention to this issue by the Army leadership to attract
and retain quality offcers for these assignments.
53
Third, the Army may be underestimating the amount of time needed for its offcers
and NCOs to be trained to serve effectively as advisors. As one offcer notes
Perhaps the most-often overlooked aspect is that advisers must possess knowledge be-
yond that of normal soldiers in order to be effective. An adviser must possess a mastery
of the tactical skills that would enable him to know what to do in the given situation
(much the same as his conventional counterpart), but he must also possess the skills
needed to impart his advice to a foreign counterpart effectively in order to achieve a
desired effect.
5
In fact, a study by the Rand Corporation fnds that In the past the U.S. military
has failed to comprehend the amount of experience and specialized area, language,

5
Dreazen, Training: Mission Unaccomplished, p. A.
52
GOMO, CSA Sends Transition Team Commanders (UNCLASSIFIED), June 7, 2008, accessed at
Small Wars Journal at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/big-thumbs-up-to-general-casey/,
on October , 2008.
53
During the Vietnam War, General William Westmoreland, then the Army chief of staff, instituted a
series of incentives to increase the attractiveness of advisor duty. Despite his best efforts, the Army
failed to institutionalize the new incentive structure and advisor service continued to be viewed as less
desirable than serving in a line Army maneuver unit (e.g. battalion, brigade). See Peter M. Dawkins,
The United States Army and the Other War in Vietnam: A Study of the Complexity of Implementing
Organizational Change, Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton University, 979, pp. 779. See also Andrew
F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 986),
pp. 2070.
5
LTC Mark Grdovic, The Advisory Challenge, Special Warfare, JanuaryFebruary 2008, p. 23.
To ensure that
offcers are
incentivized to seek
assignments as
advisors, General
Casey has directed
that majors and
lieutenant colonels
serving on these
teams be given
the credit they
deserve in the form
of career-enhancing
future assignments
and in consideration
for promotion.
and military expertise needed for effective advisory and training missions in the
third world.
55
In September 2007, a team of Army offcers evaluating the advisor training pro-
gram concluded that the wrong soldiers were being chosen for advisor training, and
that their training was poor, seriously undermining the effectiveness of the overall
training mission, and fundamentally detracting from the US strategy for transition
in Iraq. The evaluation noted that while senior Army commanders want at least one
third of the instructors training advisors to have advisor experience, only 6 percent
did as of October 2007.
56
Even the advisory teams organization is inconsistent. In
Afghanistan, these teams comprise sixteen soldiers and no medic, while in Iraq the
teams have eleven soldiers and a medic.
57

This is made all the more worrisome given that the Army has yet to institutionalize
a way to generate suffcient numbers of quality advisors.
The Army lacks a core competency for GPF [general purpose forces] to train foreign secu-
rity forces or conduct combat advising. Though we have been executing these missions for
several years, the permanent institutions and a complete approach across DOTMLPF
58

is [sic] lacking. . . The Army lacks an intellectual center or institutional backbone for
stability operations. While there are many centers of excellence and other institutional
activities that support stability operations, there is no unifying organization.
59
The Army is also handicapped by the lack of a standing organization for training
host-nation forces, and a lack of equipment stocks with which to outft them. Given
the prospect of having to deploy on short notice and the importance of preventive
action and exploiting the opportunities presented by the golden hour, these capa-
bilities must be immediately available to the combatant commands, and not cobbled

55
Stephen T. Hosmer, The Armys Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 990), p. 8.
56
Dreazen, Training: Mission Unaccomplished, p. A.
57
LTC John A. Nagl, Institutionalizing Adaptation: Its Time for a Permanent Advisory Corps, Center
for a New American Security, June 2007, p. 5.
58
The term DOTMLPF stands for Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and
Facilities.
59
together on the fy. Equipment stocks to outft host-nation forces being trained should
be stockpiled, similarly to the POMCUS equipment that was positioned to support US
forces during the Cold War.
60
60
The term POMCUS stands for Prepositioning of Materiel Confgured in Unit Sets. During the Cold
War large quantities of equipment were prepositioned in Europe to facilitate the rapid reinforcement
of US forces there. By having a units equipment prepositioned, and thus not having to transport it
from the United States, the Armys airlift and sealift requirements were greatly reduced. The Army
eventually prepositioned roughly four divisions (or twelve brigades) worth of equipment in Western
Europe. Colonel (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot, LTC E. J. Degen, and LTC David Tohn, On Point: The United
States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 0, accessed at http://books.google.com/books?id=
7x8Ut-oJvcC&pg=PA0&lpg=PA0&dq=POMCUS+Cold+War&source=web&ots=ERAs0Gn8o&sig=
f3YuMfJOujYdk2gRJFAPmgfqbg&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=0&ct=result#PPR6,M,
on September 29, 2008.
Four decades after Westmorelands departure from MACV, military and
civilian leaders were relearning the same lessons he had ignored at the
height of the Vietnam War.
6
LTG William Caldwell IV and LTC Steven M. Leonard
The three challenges confronting the US military today the war against Islamist
terrorist elements, the prospect of nuclear-armed rogue states, and the potential rise
of China as a military rival differ greatly from those confronted during the Cold
War era. Nor do they resemble the threats planned for in the immediate post-Cold
War era: minor powers like Iran, Iraq and North Korea that lacked weapons of mass
destruction and were assumed to present challenges not all that different from Iraq
during the First Gulf War. Hence the focus on waging two such conficts in overlap-
ping time frames that animated the Defense Departments two major regional confict
posture sustained until the 9/ attacks.
62
For the Army, these new challenges all suggest the onset of an era of persistent,
irregular confict. The conficts in Afghanistan and Iraq show no signs of ending
soon; nor does the war against Islamist terrorist groups operating on a global scale.
Moreover, the rising youth bulge in Africa, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and
in parts of Latin America promises to increase instability. As unprecedented numbers
of young people in these parts of the world come of age, they will fnd themselves
competing in a global economy in which they are hampered by a lack of education and
6
Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change, Military Review, JulyAugust 2008, p. 9.
62
The two major regional confict (MRC) posture was succeeded by the two major theater war (MTW) and
major combat operations (MCO) postures, which essentially represented variations on the same theme:
regional wars against minor powers in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. The US force posture did
not begin to change signifcantly until after the 9/11 attacks and the onset of the wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
ChaPter 3 > 5UMMAPY AN PC0MMNA1I0N5
burdened by corrupt and incompetent governments. The communications revolution
will enable radical groups to access large numbers of these young adults. Even if they
succeed in winning over only a small percentage, they will have recruited millions. As
al Qaeda and Hezbollah have shown, thanks to the spread of destructive technologies,
even small groups can create widespread disorder.
It does not end there. Should minor powers hostile to the United States, such as
Iran, acquire nuclear weapons, it will likely enable them to take greater risks in back-
ing groups pursuing ambiguous forms of aggression. In Irans case, this could lead to
greater support for radical groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Mahdi Army. If the
United States is unable to convince China to abandon its attempts to exclude the US
military from East Asia and to threaten Americas access to the global commons, the
competition could spill over into irregular proxy wars in the Third World. China could
pursue this path both in an attempt to tie the United States down in costly, protracted
conficts, and to position itself for what is shaping up as a competition for access to
increasingly scarce raw materials, should the global market for them break down.
Given the advent of an era of persistent irregular confict, with its emphasis on
manpower-intensive operations on land, the Army is destined to play a central role
in US defense strategy. The Service will need to build on its hard-won expertise in
conducting these kinds of operations, whether they go by the name of stability opera-
tions, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, stability, security,
transition and reconstruction operations, counterinsurgency, or irregular warfare.
63
The Defense Department is pursuing an indirect strategy with regard to the chal-
lenges posed by irregular warfare. This is desirable, both as a means of avoiding hav-
ing US forces tied down in protracted conficts, and because internal threats are typi-
cally best handled by indigenous forces. It is also necessary, as the US military simply
lacks the capability to impose stability on the scale that might be required. Consider
that the Army is overstretched in Afghanistan and Iraq, countries whose combined
populations are under 60 million. Yet countries of concern, like Iran (70 million),
Nigeria (50 million) and Pakistan (65 million) have far greater populations. Hence
the need to emphasize building partner capacity in those friendly countries threat-
ened by instability, and in allied countries.
Of course the best strategy is to build partner capacity and engage in other preventive
measures before a friendly country is at risk. The Army must be prepared to engage
in substantial steady-state peacetime training and advising of indigenous security
forces, when requested by the host nation. These efforts should be undertaken on a
scale appropriate to the situation, and within the host nations comfort level. In an
era of persistent irregular confict, the Army will need to conduct persistent training
63
While the US armed forces appear to have little need to segment conventional warfare into discrete
types, the same cannot be said of warfare at the lower end of the confict spectrum. In addition to the
various favors of this form of warfare mentioned above, one might add peacekeeeping and peace
enforcement operations, operations other than war (OOTW), among others.
The Army must be
prepared to engage
in substantial
steady-state
peacetime training
and advising of
indigenous security
forces, when
requested by the
host nation.
and advising operations, much as maritime forces over the years have conducted
peacetime forward-presence operations as a means of maintaining stability by
reassuring partners and demonstrating resolve to rivals.
In the event preventive measures fail, the Army must have the ability to build part-
ner capacity rapidly, to create an indigenous/allied surge capability that can begin to
restore stability to the threatened area. In circumstances where US vital interests are
at stake, the Army must also be able to surge its own forces into the gap while partner
capacity is being created. The effort to build partner capacity will typically fnd the
Special Operations Forces in the lead. However, given their relatively small size, the
large demands placed on them as a consequence of the protracted war against Islamist
terrorist groups, and the prospective scale of the contingencies involved, the Army
and its sister Services must be prepared to conduct training and advising of host-
nation militaries and, where necessary, allied and partner militaries. If the Armys
partners in the US Governments interagency element e.g., the State Department,
Intelligence Community, USAID prove unable to meet their obligations as partners
in restoring stability, the Army must also be prepared to engage in operations to help
restore the threatened states governance, infrastructure, and the rule of law.
Consequently, the Army must maintain a signifcant standing training and advi-
sory capability that can be deployed on short notice, when necessary. This capability
can reside within the institutional Army, in the form of offcers and NCOs assigned to
Army schools as instructors or students; at Army headquarters (e.g., the Training and
Doctrine Command); or as staff, faculty and students at a school where instruction
is given on how to serve as a trainer or advisor. Rather than stripping existing BCTs
of their offcers and NCOs to support the training and advisory mission, and eroding
their effectiveness, the institutional Army can provide a surge capability while the
Service leverages its existing school-house facilities to generate additional trainers
and advisors.
Since the Army may need to fll gaps in the US interagency effort to restore gov-
ernance and enable economic reconstruction and sustained growth, it must remain
capable of responding quickly as part of any surge effort. Given this requirement, the
Army should strongly consider maintaining the ability to feld, on short notice, Civil
Operations, Reconstruction and Development Support (CORDS) groups capable of
providing advice, mentoring, and support to the host nations non-security institu-
tions (including its civil administration and its legal, economic, and healthcare sec-
tors). CORDS groups will create parallel advisory offces to host-nation ministries at
the national, regional, provincial, and (on a rotating basis) local levels. They should be
capable of immediately undertaking quick impact projects upon deployment, develop-
ing annual plans for civil operations, reconstruction, and economic development, and
engaging in longer-term capacity building efforts. CORDS groups would vary in size
depending on the circumstances, but they should include military personnel, civil-
ians made available from the interagency, and expert personal services contractors.
In the event
preventive measures
fail, the Army must
have the ability
to build partner
capacity rapidly,
to create an
indigenous/allied
surge capability
that can begin to
restore stability to
the threatened area.
A similar requirement exists for an Army surge capability for stability opera-
tions in the form of SC BCTs, which can also serve as the Armys Phase 0 forward-
presence forces, designed to keep weak states from becoming ungoverned states. The
SC BCTs, while similar to IBCTs in many respects, would have one artillery battery
instead of two in their fres battalion. SC BCTs would have an augmented Special
Troops Battalion. The military intelligence company would be increased in size and
accord greater emphasis on human intelligence and expertise in operating on com-
plex human terrain. The military police contingent would increase from one company
to two. Strong consideration should be given to increasing the battalions engineer
component, and to embedding civil affairs and psychological operations units. If nec-
essary, the SC BCT could also be augmented with quick-reaction-force squadrons,
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) rapid-response forces, military advisory teams,
and air and missile defense units. Soldiers serving in SC BCTs would also be expect-
ed to spend most of their careers in these brigades, although they should serve at
least one and perhaps several tours in other units (e.g., IBCTs, HBCTs, Airborne, Air
Assault, SOF) should they need to support a surge at the high end of the confict spec-
trum as a follow-on force behind the HBCTs.
The Army also needs to maintain a dominant capability for high-end conventional
warfare, of which the most demanding form is likely to be major combat operations
whose objective is to effect regime change of a minor nuclear power. The Army also
must preserve its dominant position in this form of warfare to dissuade rivals from
contemplating threatening US security interests by employing conventional forces.
To be sure, modern conventional operations are inherently joint, and US dominance
in the realm of air power provides the Army with a priceless advantage in conducting
conventional operations on land. While these factors may enable the Army to take
more risk in the area of conventional capabilities, it does not obviate the need to sus-
tain the Services dominant position. The focal point of this effort should be creating
a combined-arms battle network land force linked to the US militarys overarching
battle network that enables effective joint power-projection operations against a mi-
nor nuclear rogue state with a substantial A2/AD capability. This is likely to be the
Armys most demanding contingency at the higher end of the confict spectrum.
The Army must also meet its obligations to defend the US homeland. Most of the
skills and capabilities required to support this mission are also required to conduct
the two basic missions described above. Stability operations involve Army units en-
gaged in providing population security, securing key infrastructure, enabling recon-
struction, restoring governance, and numerous other tasks associated with defending
the homeland and supporting post-attack recovery. The same can be said of Army ca-
pabilities at the other end of the confict spectrum, which may involve defense against
WMD attack, damage limitation in the event of an attack, and consequence manage-
ment following an attack. The same can be said of the skill sets and capabilities re-
quired to deal with the so-called hybrid threat described earlier in this report.
The Army also
needs to maintain
a dominant
capability for high-
end conventional
warfare, of
which the most
demanding form is
likely to be major
combat operations
whose objective is
to effect regime
change of a minor
nuclear power.
These disparate missions argue for an Army that can operate effectively across
the entire confict spectrum. However, because the range of missions is so broad, and
the skill sets required suffciently different, attempting to feld forces that can move
quickly and seemlessly from stability operations to high-intensity confict appears
destined to produce an Army that is barely a jack-of-all-trades, and clearly a master
of none. This approach becomes all the more problematic when one considers the on-
going erosion of quality in the offcer and NCO corps, and in the Services recruiting
standards.
The Army has understandably felt compelled to pursue the full-spectrum ap-
proach owing to the need to cover a range of missions within the limitations on its size
imposed by fscal constraints and its all-volunteer character. Yet even if this approach
were viable, the Army remains too small for larger irregular warfare contingencies,
let alone those that occur simultaneously.
Fortunately, the authors of the US defense strategy have wisely chosen to address
the gap between the scale of the challenges confronting the nation and the forces
available to address them by focusing on building up the military capabilities of
threatened states, and of Americas allies and partners. The Army must give greater
attention to supporting this strategy, especially with regard to stability operations, as
the best means of addressing the challenge of preparing to conduct operations at high
levels of effectiveness across the confict spectrum.
The Army has specialized forces. It will need more.
The Service has for decades felded forces specialized for airborne operations and
air assault operations. Of course, the Army also has its Special Forces, expert in a range
of irregular warfare operations. It has forces specially designed for high-end warfare,
and plans to continue in this vein with the FCS BCTs, which the Army properly recog-
nized are optimized for conventional warfare. These kinds of forces are designed to
surge on short notice to address conventional contingencies. While it was once argued
that such general-purpose forces could readily shift gears to handle contingencies
at the lower end of the confict spectrum, the evidence of Vietnam, Afghanistan and
Iraq suggests otherwise. Moreover, the Armys new doctrine confrms the triumph
of real-world experience over wishful thinking. Thus what the Army lacks are forces
designed to surge in the event of a major contingency at the lower end of the confict
spectrum, as well as forces designed to prevent such a contingency from arising in the
frst place.
The Army needs to feld two surge forces, one for conventional operations as de-
scribed above, the other for irregular warfare. Should either form of confict prove
protracted, the other wing of the force can, over the course of the initial twelve- to
ffteen-month surge, undergo training and the appropriate force structure modifca-
tions to enable it to swing in behind the surge force to sustain operations.
What might we call this Army? It might be termed the Dual-Surge Force, or de-
scribed as a High-Low Force. It could also lay claim to be a truly capable Full-
Spectrum Force.
The Army needs
to feld two surge
forces, one for
conventional
operations, the
other for irregular
warfare. Should
either form of
confict prove
protracted, the
other wing of the
force can undergo
training and
the appropriate
force structure
modifcations to
enable it to swing
in behind the surge
force to sustain
operations.
What changes in the Armys force structure and program would be necessary to
feld the Two-Surge Force? The following recommendations are provided for con-
sideration. While these recommendations might be further refned through more de-
tailed analysis than is practical here, the author is confdent that they represent a
signifcant improvement over the Armys current approach. It is assumed that force
structure modifcations will be completed at the same time as the Armys planned
completion date for the Modular Force, in FY 203. At that time, it is also assumed
that Army requirements for Afghanistan and Iraq will be signifcantly reduced from
current levels, perhaps by half.
F0PC 51PUC1UP
The Army must rebalance its force structure to enable persistent support for Phase
0 stability operations, to include building partner capacity where needed. This re-
quires converting ffteen Army IBCTs to the SC BCT confguration described earlier
in this report, as well as ffteen ARNG IBCTs to an SC BCT confguration. Given a 3:1
rotation rate for the Active Component, and a 6: rate for the Reserve Component,
the force generation process should be capable of felding seven and a half SC BCTs
on a sustained basis. In Phase 0 operations, these BCTs would typically operate in
small force packages conducting a range of stability operations missions, to include
taBLe 2. 1R FULL- 5PC1PUM F0PC AN UAL- 5UP6 F0PC
AC/PC Medu|ar Fu||-5ectrum Ferce Medu|ar ua|-5urge Ferce
RBC1s 19/7 13/9
5BC1s 6/1 6/1
IBC1s 23/20 8/0
5C BC1s 0/0 15/15
1eta| 48/28 42/25
Source: Department of the Army, CSBA
building partner capacity. In the event of a major stability operations contingency, the
Army would have a force of thirty brigades to draw upon for surge operations for up to
ffteen months, to enable the Armys other wing to reorient itself to sustain the initial
surge and to build up partner capacity within the threatened state and among allies
and partners, as necessary.
Should the Army be confronted with an irregular force capable of posing a hy-
brid warfare threat, HBCT elements (and, perhaps eventually, FCS BCTs) might be
deployed as part of the initial surge force. The stability operations surge force could
also be supported by the four Army airborne brigades of the 82
nd
Airborne Division,
as well as the four brigades of the 0
st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) and the six
middle-weight Stryker brigades, for a total of fourteen BCTs. To this might be added
the ARNGs single Stryker BCT.
The Armys heavy force oriented primarily on conventional operations would
comprise twelve HBCTs, perhaps eventually migrating to twelve FCS BCTS, and an
armored cavalry regiment, along with nine National Guard HBCTs (an increase of
two HBCTs over the current force). This would provide the Army with a heavy surge
force of up to twenty-two HBCTs, with six AC SBCTs and one ARNG SBCT available
if needed, along with the four brigades of the 0
st
, for a total of thirty-three heavy or
middle-weight brigades, far in excess of what is likely to be required for the MCO
portion of regime change operations against a nuclear rogue state like Iran, assuming
its A2/AD defenses can be reduced to a level that would permit the introduction of
large US ground combat forces.
The above recommendations result in an overall force structure of forty-two BCTs
in the Active Component, and twenty-fve BCTs in the Reserve Component, for a total
of sixty-seven BCTs. This represents a reduction in the Armys Modular Force goal of
forty-eight AC BCTs and twenty-eight RC BCTs. This reduction in the level of BCTs
(which would be matched by a corresponding reduction in support brigades) offers
several important benefts.
First, by reducing the need to generate large numbers of new offcers and NCOs, it
stems the highly corrosive decline in the quality of the Armys leadership. At the same
time, it enables the Army to restock the institutional Army the Services schools,
staffs, etc. that enable offcers and NCOs to receive the training and education
needed to enable a surge of trainers and advisors when needed, as opposed to pulling
from deployed brigades to fll the need. Along these lines, doctrine for advisors and
trainers needs to be developed, along with a school to ensure they receive the proper
training.
Second, a reduction of six AC BCTs and two RC BCTs along with programmed new
support brigades also mitigates the erosion in the quality of the offcer and NCO corps
stemming from the decision to increase dramatically the size of the US militarys
Special Operations Forces. This has created a whipsaw effect within the Army, as
it sees the quality of its recruits declining while the best of those who remain in the
Service are being recruited by the Special Forces.
In the event of
a major stability
operations
contingency, the
Army would have
a force of thirty
brigades to draw
upon for surge
operations for up
to ffteen months,
to enable the
Armys other wing
to reorient itself
to sustain the
initial surge and
to build up partner
capacity within the
threatened state and
among allies and
partners.
Third, a smaller force structure also reduces the pressure on manpower that has
led the Army to lower its recruiting standards. Finally, it also has a benefcial effect
on the Armys budget: fewer soldiers reduces strain on the personnel accounts, while
fewer brigades takes some of the stress of the procurement accounts, since there are
not as many of them requiring updated equipment.
The revised force structure is also more evenly weighted between the Active and
Reserve Components. Now roughly a third of the RC force is heavy, while slightly less
than a third of the AC is comprised of heavy brigades. This refects the Active Armys
ability to provide forces for stability operations on a more frequent rotation basis than
the RC, and the need to hedge against the possibility of high-end warfare. Finally, it
better positions the Army to free up offcers and NCOs for advisor and training duties
to support the defense strategys focus on building partner capacity.
To be sure, there are risks involved in reducing the Armys projected force structure.
However, this study fnds that the risks of continuing down a path that leads to declin-
ing offcer and NCO quality, a lack of capacity to support the defense strategys focus
on building up the capabilities of allies and partners, and the fawed assumption that
a latter-day general purpose Army that remains overly weighted toward conventional
warfare can quickly and effectively shift to conduct irregular warfare operations far
outweigh the risks inherent in this reports force structure recommendations.
5LC1 PP06PAM5
1he Future Cembat 5ystem
The Armys centerpiece modernization program, the Future Combat Systems, is re-
ally a cluster of fourteen systems of various types. These systems will rely heavily on
being linked as part of an overarching battle network that ties them together with
individual soldiers and the US militarys joint battle network. While revolutionary in
its concept, given the many technical challenges confronting the program, the FCS
program may not be executable at an acceptable cost. Moreover, it may not be pos-
sible to create the battle network, as currently envisioned by the Army, or to create it
within the timeframe projected. If this proves to be the case, the Army needs to have
a plan to harvest as many FCS capabilities as possible while identifying an alternative
modernization path. Thus far the Army is moving FCS components into the current
force as they become available. However, to date these capabilities are relatively mod-
est compared to the programs stated goals and the level of resources being invested.
A thorough program review, along the lines recommended by the GAO noted above,
by the incoming administration is warranted before the Army commits to seeing the
program through in its current form.
What might an alternative modernization path look like? In addition to harvest-
ing as much of the FCS program as possible, such as the unmanned aerial systems,
While revolutionary
in its concept,
given the many
technical challenges
confronting the
program, the FCS
program may not
be executable at an
acceptable cost.
unattended ground sensors, and ground robotics, the Army would need to experiment
with various options for building a battle network that is feasible, affordable, and that
enables a major boost in military effectiveness across the entire confict spectrum.
Since the effectiveness of the combat systems associated with the network is heavily
dependent upon the network, fnal decisions on the major combat systems designs
should be held off until the networks form and capability are well understood. In the
interim, the Army needs to continue recapitalizing the existing force, while engaging
in selective modernization only when necessary.
A 5tab|||ty 0erat|ens 5teck||e
The era of persistent irregular warfare presents the Army with the challenge of train-
ing and equipping indigenous and partner forces engaged in stability operations on
a major scale. The Army must also be prepared to replenish damaged or destroyed
equipment of Army units engaged in stability operations. Given the importance of
preventive action and exploiting the opportunities presented by the golden hour,
the equipment to support a sustained surge in stability operations must be available
to the combatant commands on short notice, and not cobbled together on the fy.
Thus equipment stocks to outft host-nation forces being trained should be stockpiled,
similar to the POMCUS equipment that was positioned to support US forces during
the Cold War. There must also be a warm production base that is capable of surging
equipment to replace those items lost during operations.
A|r and M|ss||e efense
The Army also needs to move energetically in developing air and missile defense ca-
pabilities to address the nascent G-RAMM threat before it matures and the Service
fnds itself engaged in another round of reactive transformation, as it has experi-
enced in Afghanistan and Iraq. The challenge here is not only to develop effective
capabilities, but capabilities that are cost-effective. At present, given the high cost of
kinetic interceptors, the most promising developments in this area are in the feld of
solid-state lasers (SSLs). A substantially greater effort should be devoted to translat-
ing this rapidly-progressing potential into felded military capability.
FINAL 1R0U6R15
The Armys leadership has rightly concluded that it needs a force capable of perform-
ing across the full spectrum of confict at a high level of effectiveness. But in its at-
tempts to make the entire Army as effective across a range of confict types, it risks
becoming marginally competent in many tasks, and highly effective at none. In at-
tempting to increase the size of the Army to feld forces large enough to deal with a
range of contingencies, the Service risks being unable to create the needed scale by
building up the capabilities of Americas allies and partners, a key part of the defense
strategy. It also risks a catastrophic leadership failure of a kind not seen since the late
stages of the Vietnam War, a failure that took the Army over a decade to repair.
Squaring this diffcult circle will require the Army to put more faith in the joint
forces ability to dominate confict at the higher end of the confict spectrum, and to
resist the temptation to return to a general-purpose force posture by another name.
This will allow the Army to truly orient itself on creating a full-spectrum capable
force by felding forces focused on irregular warfare on a scale and level of effective-
ness comparable to its world-class conventional forces.
C0NCLU5I0N
6L055APY
A2/AD anti-access/area-denial
AC Active Component
ARNG Army National Guard
ARV-A-L Armed Robotic Vehicle-Assault-Light
BCT Brigade Combat Team
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
C2V Command and Control Vehicle
C/D METL core/directed mission-essential task list
FCS Future Combat System
FRMV recovery and maintenance vehicle
G-RAMM RAMM with guided capability
GSTAMID Ground Standoff Mine Detection System
HBCT Heavy Brigade Combat Team
IBCT Infantry Brigade Combat Team
ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle
IED improvised explosive device
JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System
MAV Micro Aerial Vehicle
MCO major combat operation
MCS Mounted Combat System
MGV manned ground vehicle
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MRC major regional confict
MTW major theater war
MULE-T Multi-Functional Utility Logistics and Equipment (vehicle)
MULE-CM Multi-Functional Utility Logistics and Equipment (vehicle)-
Counter Mine
MV-T/-E Medical Vehicle Treatment/Evaluation
NLOS-C Non-Line of Sight Cannon
NLOS-LS Non-Line of Sight Launch System
?4 CSBa > 5trategy fer the Leng Rau|
NLOS-M Non-Line of Sight Mortar
NTC National Training Center
Pac-3 Patriot 3 (missile system)
RAMM rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles
RC Reserve Component
RSV Reconnaissance and Surveillance Vehicle
SBCT Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SSTR security, stability, transition, and reconstruction
SSC small-scale contingency
Stryker Armys name for the family of wheeled armored vehicles which will
constitute most of the brigades combat and combat support vehicles
SUGV small unmanned ground vehicle
THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (missile system)
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UGV unmanned ground vehicle
UGS unattended ground sensor
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the CSBA staff for their assistance with
this report. Special thanks go to Charlotte Brock and Eric Lindsey
for their editorial and production support, and Cutting Edge for their
design.
The analysis and fndings presented here are solely the responsi-
bility of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and the
author.
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
1667 K Street, nw, Suite 900
washington, dc 20006
Tel. 202-331-7990 Fax 202-331-8019
www.cSBAonline.org

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An Army at

The garrison Army that fred

Employing this process, a modular BCT force comprising forty-eight Active

In short, the Army has placed it-

While these teams represent the way

The effort extends beyond mili-

Ibid., pp. 6, 66.

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