Russias Military Strategy and Doctrine Web

RUSSIA’S
HOWARD AND CZEKAJ

RUSSIA’S MILITARY
MILITARY STRATEGY
AND DOCTRINE STRATEGY
Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine is designed to educate Russia watchers,
AND DOCTRINE
RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

policymakers, military leaders, and the broader foreign policy community about the Russian
Armed Forces and security apparatus across the full spectrum of geographic, doctrinal
and domain areas. Each chapter addresses a different strategic-level issue related to the
Russian military, ranging from “hybrid” warfare doctrine, to the role nuclear weapons play
in its strategy, to cyber and electromagnetic warfare, to Moscow’s posture in the Arctic or
the Black Sea, to the lessons its Armed Forces have learned from their ongoing operations
in Syria and eastern Ukraine. And each section of the book is written by one of the world’s
foremost experts on that theme of Russia’s military development.

■ ■ ■
The key questions emphasized by this book include “how Russia fights wars” and “how its
experiences with modern conflicts are shaping the evolution of Russia’s military strategy,
capabilities and doctrine.” The book’s value comes not only from a piecemeal look at
granular Russian strategies in each of the theaters and domains where its Armed Forces
may act, but more importantly this study seeks to present a unifying description of Russia’s
military strategy as a declining but still formidable global power. Russia’s Military Strategy
and Doctrine will be an essential reference for US national security thinkers, NATO defense
planners and policymakers the world over who must deal with the potential military and
security challenges posed by Moscow.

■ ■ ■
“This book is a major addition to the field of Russian military studies and should Glen E. Howard and
be required reading by many of our senior civilian and military policymakers. Its
insights on Russian military strategy in key regions of the world are of great
Matthew Czekaj, Editors
value and will last for years to come. Jamestown is always a pivotal source of
information and a resource I greatly value, both now and since I left the US Army.” Foreword by
—LTG (ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of US Army Europe, Former NATO SACEUR
The Jamestown Foundation
and Pershing Chair at the Center for European Policy Analysis

General Philip M. Breedlove
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RUSSIA’S MILITARY
STRATEGY AND
DOCTRINE
__________________________________________________
Glen E. Howard and

Foreword by
Former NATO SACEUR
Washington, DC
February 2019
THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
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Jamestown’s Mission
The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy

makers and the broader community about events and trends in those
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Utilizing indigenous and primary sources, Jamestown’s material is
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Origins
Founded in 1984 by William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation

made a direct contribution to the downfall of Communism through
its dissemination of information about the closed totalitarian societies
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
William Geimer worked with Arkady Shevchenko, the highest-

ranking Soviet official ever to defect when he left his position as
undersecretary general of the United Nations. Shevchenko’s memoir
Breaking With Moscow revealed the details of Soviet superpower
diplomacy, arms control strategy and tactics in the Third World, at
the height of the Cold War. Through its work with Shevchenko,
Jamestown rapidly became the leading source of information about
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Jamestown ensured that both men published their insights and
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regime in his bestselling book Red Horizons with the fall of that
government and the freeing of Romania.
The Jamestown Foundation has emerged as a leading provider of

information about Eurasia. Our research and analysis on conflict and
instability in Eurasia enabled Jamestown to become one of the most
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and Central Asia as well as China. Furthermore, since 9/11,
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By drawing on our ever-growing global network of experts,

Jamestown has become a vital source of unfiltered, open-source
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government officials and military officers, political scientists,
journalists, scholars and economists. Their insight contributes
significantly to policymakers engaged in addressing today’s newly
emerging global threats in the post 9/11 world.
iii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements……………………………………………….v
Foreword
By Philip M. Breedlove……………………………………………vii
Introduction
By Glen E. Howard and Matthew Czekaj………………………….ix
Part I: The Geographic Vectors of Russia’s Strategy
1. The Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East

By Pavel Felgenhauer………………………………………………3
2. Strategy in the Black Sea and Mediterranean

By Ihor Kabanenko………………………………………………..34
3. Russia’s Arctic and Far East Strategies

By Pavel K. Baev…………………………………………………..75
4. Baltic Sea Strategy

By Jörgen Elfving………………………………………………....102
Part II: Non-Conventional Elements of Strategy and Doctrine
5. Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare

By Jānis Bērziņš………………………………………………….157
Cont. next page…

iv
…Contents, cont. from last page
6. Russian Nuclear Policy, Doctrine and Strategy

By Stefan Forss…………………………………………………...185
7. Putin’s ‘Asymmetric Strategy’: Nuclear and New-Type

Weapons in Russian Defense Policy
By Stephen Blank………………………………………………...251
8. Russia’s Offensive and Defensive Use of Information Security

By Sergey Sukhankin…………………………………………….302
Part III: Lessons Learned and Domestic Implications
9. Deciphering the Lessons Learned by the Russian Armed

Forces in Ukraine, 2014–2017
By Roger N. McDermott…………………………………………345
10. Russian Lessons Learned From the Operation in Syria: A

Preliminary Assessment
By Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky…………………………………….379
11. The Concept of Mass Mobilization Returns

By Aleksandr Golts………………………………………………411
Contributors’ Biographies…………………………………….436
v
Acknowledgements
As one of the premier research and analysis organizations in

Washington, DC, not funded by any branch of the US government,
The Jamestown Foundation occupies a unique niche in providing
timely, opinion-free and data-driven analysis to the policymaking
community. And since its founding in 1984, the key to Jamestown’s
success has always been our rich and unmatched network of
international experts and researchers. Within the core group of our
regular writers, however, is another sub-strata of Jamestown analysts,
who represent our own elite of sorts—the best of the best within the
analytical community of Russia and Eurasia experts. It is these elite
analysts that we immediately turned to in order to make this book
possible. The majority of the contributors who have written chapters
for Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine are not freshly graduated
from universities; they are specialists who have been writing about this
region and closely examining Russian actions and behavior for
decades. Each of this book’s chapters, therefore, is informed by the
author’s extensive professional experience and, in many cases,
invaluable retrospective analysis combined with modernity. That
analytical approach provides an unmatched collective assessment of
Russian goals and regional strategies emerging from Syria to the
Arctic that blend together the lessons of the Soviet past with the
present to help us understand the course of Russia’s future military
strategy and behavior.
Such a volume has been long overdue. The field of Russian military
studies, as a whole, has noticeably declined in the United States. And
this has been the case despite three Eurasian wars since 2008: the
Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, the invasion and
annexation of Crimea in February–March 2014, and the subsequent
Russian invasion of eastern Ukraine in mid-2014 (four if one includes
Russia’s brutal suppression of the militant insurgency in Chechnya).
vi
As such, one would have thought the US think tank and policy
community would had supported such a reference work on the
Russian military long before 2019. But living up to Jamestown’s
mission statement, our faithful Board of Directors stepped forward
last year to make this book possible, providing constructive
encouragement and opening their pocketbooks.
The list of backers of this project is quite long, but a debt of gratitude
is owed first and foremost to our Board Chairman, Willem de Vogel,
who provided the leadership and support for this project as part of his
ceaseless quest to assist Jamestown and make it truly what it is
today. A very special note of thanks is also due to Board Member
Robert Spring, who played a distinctive role in coming up with the
idea to create this edited volume of articles on Russian military
strategy and then stepped forward to provide the effort with his
generous backing. We would also like to recognize the two co-
founders of Jamestown, James G. Gidwitz and Clint Smullyan, for
their contributions to this project and for never saying no when
asked. We would additionally like to express our thanks to Board
Member Michael Kavoukjian, who is always there to support this
organization.
Moreover, we wish to thank the former Supreme Allied Commander

of Europe, retired General Philip Breedlove, for taking the time to
write the Foreword to this book as well as offering his insights along
the way as the project was being finalized.
And last but not least, we thank the readers of our publications for
their continued interest in our work, helping sustain Jamestown year
and after and continually allowing us to reach new generations of
policymakers and experts.
vii
Foreword
The Russian invasion of Crimea in February 2014 was a turning point in

Washington’s relations with Moscow. Learning from that experience
remains important. As the former Supreme Allied Commander for
Europe, I witnessed these events first hand. The crisis both transformed
our relationship with Russia and reinvigorated our ties with allies in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
This book comes at a critical time in US-Russian relations. Based upon

the experience of Crimea and Donbas, the United States and its NATO
allies need to be more prepared in how we think about our strategy for
the future. Certainly, the West does not want to end up in a shooting war
with Russia and we need to continue to engage the Russians—but we
must do so from a position of readiness and strength. Anything less will
be apparent to them, likely undermining our bargaining position vis-à-
vis Moscow.
The present rancorous political climate in Washington, however,

prevents us from effectively engaging with Russia. We, therefore, must
move beyond our political quagmire (where taking any position is seen
as partisan to one or the other side) in order to somehow reach a
constructive internal agreement on how to deal with Russia.
Importantly, Russia represents a multi-domain challenge: Moscow

applies an all-of-government approach, including diplomatic, military,
economic, and informational tools against us or anybody else they
perceive as a threat. Washington’s approach, however, has so far been
largely limited to fighting the Russians economically. A fuller and more
effective response—one that can also offset Russian pressure on other
vulnerable allies and partners—will require us to compete while making
use of the full spectrum of US government tools at our disposal.
viii
From a policymaker’s perspective, we have dropped our focus on great

power rivalry with Russia for many (and often good) reasons. Our
soldiers, airmen and sailors had been focused for almost two decades on
Afghanistan and Iraq. What we need to do now is regain our
“Operational” and “Tactical” views about Russia.
First of all, we need to understand that Vladimir Putin’s Russia does not
want to be our partner. For the last two decades, our efforts to turn
Moscow into one have repeatedly failed. Instead, of seeking to integrate
itself into the Western rule-based system, Russia has used force to change
internationally recognized borders on several different occasions:
Georgia in 2008 and then Ukraine in 2014. This should serve as an
important lesson to us as we assess the paths ahead for how to contend
with a revanchist Russia.
The United States has a substantially different posture today than during
the Cold War. And while the Cold War era was reasonably contained and
well understood, today the threat coming from Moscow is much broader
in terms of its geographic scope, stretching from the Levant to the North
Pole. Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine should serve as a valuable
reference guide for policymakers and all those seeking to comprehend
the multifaceted challenges posed by Moscow—particularly when it
comes to understanding the various theaters in which Russia operates as
well as regarding issue-based threats, such as this country’s nuclear or
cyber strategies. Jamestown has made an important contribution to
helping us achieve this goal. I commend their efforts to bring together
such a diverse array of authors and perspectives about Russian strategy
and trust you will benefit from the resulting study as well.
General Philip M. Breedlove, former NATO SACEUR

November 1, 2018
ix
Introduction
In the early morning of November 25, 2018, four Ukrainian naval

vessels rounded the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula, on their
way to the Kerch Strait. The ships, two Gyurza-M-class artillery boats,
accompanied by a tug and a transport ship, had left Odesa several days
earlier and were headed toward the Ukrainian port of Berdyansk, on
the Azov Sea. At 3:58 a.m., local time, the Ukrainian detachment
radioed its request to enter the strait to Russia’s Kerch/Kavkaz port
control—de facto in charge of monitoring all maritime traffic there
since Moscow’s forcible annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Russians
never responded, nor even acknowledged the Ukrainian radio
message. About one and a half hours later, leaving the transport vessel
behind, the two Gyurza-Ms and the naval tugboat began heading
north toward the mouth of the strait, crossing inside the 12-mile zone
around Crimea at 6:08 a.m.1
Within 15 minutes, the Ukrainian ships found themselves surrounded

by Russian coast guard and Black Sea Fleet naval forces. Two Federal
Security Service (FSB) Coast Guard corvettes and three patrol boats
carried out dangerous maneuvers around the Ukrainian vessels,
repeatedly attempting to ram the Ukrainian tug and eventually
damaging its engine.
For the next several hours, as the Ukrainian detachment slowly moved
northward to enter the Kerch Strait, Russian naval surface and air
assets continued to harass them. Starting at 11:00 a.m., and lasting for
the next six hours, the Gyurzas and their accompanying tug repeatedly
lost communications as a result of Russian jamming, while their crews
were targeted by various psychological pressure tactics. As Russian
Ka-52 attack helicopters circled overhead, two Su-25SM attack jets
overflew the Ukrainian ships at an altitude of 50 meters, with their
fire-control systems activated.
x | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
At 1:42 p.m., Russia dramatically escalated the situation by hauling a

container ship underneath the main archway of the Kerch Strait
Bridge, thus blocking all maritime traffic through the strait until the
following day. Images of the large ship standing under the Kerch
Bridge flashed across media outlets around the world, thus driving
home the narrative that Moscow can and is willing to close off the
Azov Sea whenever it chooses.
Having received stern warnings from Russian authorities that passage

through the strait would be prohibited, the Ukrainian vessels, under
orders from Navy Headquarters, turned around and began heading
back to Odesa, around half past five in the evening. Yet, less than 30
minutes later, even as the Ukrainian ships were proceeding
southward, an FSB corvette suddenly attempted to physically impede
their passage. An hour after that, the Ukrainian crews found their
radio link with HQ jammed.
Night fell. And at 7:48 p.m., after the two Gyurza-Ms and the tug
moved beyond the 12-mile zone around Crimea, the Russian vessels
opened fire, hitting the superstructure of one of the Ukrainian artillery
boats and injuring three of its sailors. The damaged ship’s captain
radioed “Mayday,” around 8:00 p.m. But just minutes later, Russian
FSB special forces troops forcibly began boarding the Ukrainian
vessels, as Su-30, Su-25 and attack helicopters fired on the ships from
above. The Russian forces seized and hauled away the three Ukrainian
naval ships overnight and took the 24 Ukrainian crew members into
custody. As of early February 2019, they remain in Russia, awaiting
trial.
Some analysts have focused on the ad hoc nature of Russia’s reaction

during the November 25 incident in the Black Sea and Kerch Strait,
noting the confused, profanity-laden and frantic-sounding orders as
well as the accidental collision between two of the Russian vessels
during their aggressive maneuvers.2 Nonetheless, the actual Russian
attack and seizure of Ukrainian vessels in international waters that day
Introduction | xi
represented a culmination of related, regional activities Moscow had

been undertaking for months.
Since the spring of 2018, Russia had deployed well over 40 warships
to the Azov Sea as well as strengthened its aerial and coastal assets in
Crimea. It had been using its greatly enhanced naval presence to
obstruct international shipping to and from Ukraine’s ports on the
Azov Sea. The long-term goal of this approach is clearly to reinforce
the perception of Moscow’s total control over maritime navigation in
the Azov Sea as well as to strangle the economy of Ukraine’s industry-
heavy southeastern coast. Thus, the dramatic November 25 naval
skirmish served to further buttress that narrative, with almost certain
lasting implications for commercial actors’ willingness to do business
with the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk.3
Russia’s reaction to the approach of the three Ukrainian vessels to the

Kerch Strait that late-autumn morning also did not appear entirely
improvised. Nor did it conclude with the seizure of the Ukrainian
ships and their crew. Most notably, some advanced planning must
have been required to tow a large Russian cargo ship into place to close
off all maritime traffic through the Kerch Strait. And in the week prior
to the November 25 naval clash, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointedly declared that Moscow
was not bound by international law in the Kerch Strait, allowing it to
unilaterally close this passage at will. Moreover, several days after the
incident, as Ukraine was debating the passage of Martial Law, Russian
Electronic Warfare (EW) units sent out spoof mobile phone text
messages to residents of Ukrainian border areas, which called for
mobilization or presented other fake news stories.4 To date, Russia
continues to hold the captured Ukrainian ships and their crews, which
will likely be used as a means to pressure Kyiv and President Petro
Poroshenko during the run-up to the Ukrainian presidential elections
in March 2019.
* * *
xii | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
Russia’s November 25, 2018, assault in the Black Sea on three small
Ukrainian naval boats traveling through international waters toward
the port of Berdyansk provides a valuable case study for how Russia
engages in conflicts while operating below the threshold of war.
Indeed, an even more extreme manifestation of this modus operandi
was the annexation of Crimea in February–March 2014, followed
weeks later by the use of surrogate forces to invade eastern Ukraine.
These events ushered in the era of “Hybrid War” as the West struggled
to define Russian President Vladimir Putin’s use of non-linear
warfare—just as Western journalists adopted the term “Blitzkrieg” to
describe the use of German tactics used in their 1939 invasion of
Poland. To the degree that Poland was a testing ground for new
weapons and tactics used by the Wehrmacht, Ukraine is also
becoming a modern laboratory for 21st century warfare. For this
reason it is important to understand how Russia is adjusting,
calibrating, and even redefining our description of non-linear means
used for achieving objectives short of open conflict. In other words:
limited war.
The concept of limited war often defined inter-state conflict in Early

Modern Europe, starting from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the
French Revolutionary Wars, and then from the Congress of Vienna in
1815 until the outbreak of World War One, when “total war” again
became ascendant.5 Many Western experts have thus argued that the
style of warfare used by Russia in Crimea and Donbas was nothing
new—simply a revival of old Soviet concepts used to fit the strategic
objective. Putin’s wars today, in other words, represent a return to
limited war as Russia seeks to Finlandize its periphery by pursuing
strategic goals such as gaining unfettered access to the Russian Black
Sea naval base at Sevastopol or the domination of the steel industry in
eastern Ukraine. The case of Ukraine certainly exemplifies this
approach, although the stakes are much larger: were Russia to
consume Ukraine, this would radically change the regional balance of
power. The late Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former US National
Security Adviser to President Jimmy Carter and former member of
Introduction | xiii
the board of Jamestown, famously noted that, “without Ukraine,

Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then
subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”6 Indeed, by
regaining Ukraine, Russia would once again become a Balkan power
and further consolidate its control over the Black Sea basin.
To alter the balance of power throughout Europe’s East, Putin’s Russia

is returning to the notion of limited war by exercising a multi-pronged
approach. First, it is changing state borders along the country’s non-
NATO periphery in order to carry out the Kremlin’s neo-imperialistic
aims. Short of outright conflict with the North Atlantic Alliance, Putin
is focused for the time being on NATO’s new borderland, or the “gray
areas” between Russia and the West. Influenced by both Soviet and
Tsarist nostalgia, Putin is in fact a hybrid post-Soviet man, a product
of two systems—the old Soviet Union and the new post-Soviet Russia
minus the Warsaw Pact and former republics. Armed with an aging,
predominantly legacy Soviet-era arsenal of weaponry, while suffering
from decaying infrastructure and steep demographic decline, Putin’s
Russia does not have the immense military and economic resources
of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, compared to the former captive
nations along Russia’s western and southern periphery, there is still
an enormous strategic mismatch. Within the post-Soviet space,
Putin’s Russia is a powerful force in its own right and can adequately
confront any of its non-NATO and even NATO neighbors, such as
the Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria, if these somehow find
themselves alone and without outside support.
With each irredentist move in the post-Soviet space, Putin has

redefined the threshold of war by following a common model:
achieving a short-term military gain, pausing hostilities, then seeking
diplomatic negotiations and international assent or at least passive
acceptance of the status quo, followed, ideally at the time of Moscow’s
choosing, by a further grab for territory, thus starting the cycle all over
again. Essentially this modus operandi created most of the so-called
“frozen conflicts’ of the former Soviet space—the forgotten
xiv | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
battlefields of Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Transnistria—which Moscow maintains in an indefinite state of
unresolved tension, with the hope that the West will ultimately lose
interest. The idea of frozen conflicts is nothing particularly new to
Russian/Soviet behavior. It was certainly a part of the Tsarist toolkit
in its occupation of 19th century Poland, and Putin—as well as his
predecessor, Boris Yeltsin—revived the concept with a post-Soviet
touch.
Relatedly, limited war was a hallmark of Soviet behavior. During the

Cold War, Moscow became involved in several conflicts on its
Eurasian periphery that were confined to one geographic theater and
never became global or reached the scale of total war. Indeed, conflicts
in Korea, Greece, and Vietnam were referred to as “brushfire wars”
along the Eastern Bloc’s European and Asian periphery. These short-
lived conflicts were started but never finished satisfactorily for the
aggrieved side, becoming strategic stalemates until one side eventually
lost, either through imperial overstretch or was simply overrun by
conventional forces. The “frozen conflict” on the Korean Peninsula
ended with a paranoid, hostile and aggressively nationalistic, Soviet-
supported Communist regime north of the 38th parallel; but the US-
backed government in Seoul eventually oversaw the development of a
regional political-economic success story in South Korea that is today
much more capable of defending itself. In Greece, the planning and
on-the-ground efforts of American military advisers inserted at the
battalion level through President Harry Truman’s newly created
Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG) successfully defeated
the Stalin-backed insurgency. As for Vietnam, the United States
proved unable to win a limited war against the northern Communist
forces and hastily abandoned its southern ally. Alone, South Vietnam
could not stop a conventional conquering attack across the 17th
parallel spearheaded by seventeen North Vietnamese divisions backed
by Moscow.7 Each of the above-mentioned limited wars were fought
with limited aims but, collectively, ended with mixed results for the
Soviet Union.
Introduction | xv
Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, has proven to be a master at

limited war. In the footsteps of his Tsarist and Soviet predecessors, the
Russian leader has pursued a series of limited wars in the post-Soviet
space, using his proclaimed aim of halting the expansion of NATO up
to Russia’s borders as the strategic pretext to Finlandize the non-
NATO European periphery. Whether it be Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia or Azerbaijan, Russian goals remain the same: weaken their
national identities through prolonged territorial division, using force
when necessary.
Putin’s long-term goal in this approach is to show that NATO is

unable to respond militarily to situations in its neighborhood below
the threshold of war—to build up the perception that Russian
aggression will always end in an unchallenged fait accompli. And in so
doing, he is further laying the groundwork for the questioning of
NATO’s Article V itself, if and when Russia attempts to employ
limited war against an exposed Alliance member. When that day
comes, it will be at Putin’s choosing. For him, Eurasia represents a vast
playing field, and he is the Kremlin quarterback, running a spread
offense against an overextended NATO defense accustomed to the old
rules of the game, completely unaware that offensive innovations are
being developed in the plan of attack. And as the rules of the of the
game have changed, NATO’s old-school defense has shed the ground
forces and the military command structure required to prevent Putin
from running team Russia up and down the Eurasian playing field,
outmaneuvering the West at every turn, whether it be Crimea,
Donbas, or Syria.
Not since Otto von Bismarck, has a European leader more skillfully
redrawn the borders of his country’s periphery than Putin. During the
latter half of the 19th century, Bismarck sought to unify Germany
through a series of short-lived campaigns, first by defeating Denmark
in the Second Schleswig War in 1864, then, two years later, beating the
Austrians at Königgrätz in 1866, followed four years after that by
summarily defeating France in 1870/1871 in the Franco-Prussian war,
xvi | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
which led to the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine. In each case, these

conflicts were short wars, fought with limited aims, designed to help
Prussia consolidate itself into a modern German state while isolating
France. And in a manner reminiscent of the 19th century Prussian
statesman, Putin has repeatedly changed existing state borders by
force in the pursuit of Russia’s rebirth. The Kremlin leader is
determined to chart a path of imperial conquest for a greater Russia
focusing on achieving short, limited objectives, with each step aimed
at incremental changes to the regional balance of power.
Within the post-Soviet space, Putin is applying a boa constrictor

strategy, seeking to regain lost territory without resorting to total war
as he suffocates his neighbors. However, the boa constrictor
understands its limits, as it can only digest one prey at a time.
Likewise, Putin keenly understands Russia’s own military limitations
and its ability to project power—today’s Russia cannot match the full
strength of NATO once the latter’s forces have been mobilized. At the
same time, however, he is cognizant of the North Atlantic Alliance’s
own limitations in East-Central Europe as well as Paris or Berlin’s
reluctance to directly confront Moscow. Based upon these strategic
goals and realities, one can easily understand why notions of non-
linear war or “hybrid war” fit into the toolkit of Russian military
strategy.
* * *
Against this setting, a major objective of this book is to outline and

identify the trends in contemporary Russian strategy, military affairs
and the lessons learned from Putin’s spread offense. While the
analysis found therein is highly comprehensive and carefully
contextualized, we leave it up to the reader to draw his or her own
policy conclusions as to how the US should respond to a revanchist
Russia. That said, in identifying a possible strategy for dealing with
Moscow, it would be worthwhile to briefly retrace the US’s military
involvement in Europe since World War I. Doing so may shed some
Introduction | xvii
light on why Russia has been so successful recently in resorting to

non-linear warfare methods as part of its warfighting toolkit.
First of all, Russian strategists understand that the American

experience in European warfare is relatively new compared to
Russia’s. The battlefields of East-Central Europe, the Balkans, Ukraine
and the Black Sea basin are quite familiar to Russia. Its greatest
polkovodets, or military commanders, ranging from Viktor Suvorov
to Georgy Zhukov, fought wars in these regions with great success,
alternating between carrying on regional wars on a limited scale or
total war, such as against Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany.
Compared to Russia, the US experience in Europe and Eurasia, is only

about a century long and limited to waging war on the western side of
the European continent. US involvement in Europe since 1917 has
been dominated by either total war—as seen through its involvement
in the First and Second World Wars—or by the Cold War stalemate
that resulted in dividing lines between East and West. Strategically,
the situation of two vast opposing military camps facing off at the
Fulda Gap was easier to deal with for US policymakers and grand
strategists than, say, developing the operational concepts necessary for
fighting limited wars.
As the Cold War ramped up, the US posture in Europe went from
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s New Look defense strategy, which
relied on technology and air power, to soon be overtaken by John F.
Kennedy’s conventional buildup, rooted in the doctrine of Flexible
Response and strategic mobility. However, little room was left to
adapt to social instability or upheaval on the Soviet periphery. And
this visibly restricted Washington’s ability to react to unrest in the
Soviet empire, such as the 1956 Hungarian uprising or the
Soviet/Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Even in
retirement, Eisenhower deliberated at great length over his own
perceived failure to respond adequately to the Hungarian rebellion
and bloody Soviet repression that occurred afterward. As he noted,
xviii | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
“Hungary was in the circumstances as inaccessible to us as Tibet…

and… was the last provocation that my temper could stand.8 Indeed,
the geographic complexities of Eastern Europe always seem to have
intimidated and even eluded US policymakers. It was not until they
were faced with a real crisis—like the Berlin Crises of 1947 and 1961—
that they were forced to change their thinking. To their credit, in each
such case, US policymakers came up with creative solutions to these
strategic problems. That said, for the first three decades, the American
response always avoided full-scale confrontation. It was not until the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and the effort to contest Soviet
power head on by President Ronald Reagan that the Soviet colossus
was stopped in its tracks. Reagan did so by arming the Afghan rebels
through National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 166, eventually
pushing the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.9
American officials tended to be more comfortable with the ideas of

détente and peaceful coexistence than confrontation until the Cold
War struggle shifted to areas outside of Europe, such as Afghanistan,
the Middle East or Africa. And with the bipolar struggle metastasizing
to the Third World in the 1960s via regional proxies and client states,
the concept of limited war finally began to make its way into American
strategic thinking. Noted strategists like B. H. Liddell Hart stimulated
this debate on how best to confront limited war. Indeed, Hart’s 1960
book Deterrent or Defense ended up influencing the thinking of then-
Senator John F. Kennedy.10
Today, we are again seeing a return to limited war. As was the case
with the US experience of Korea (38th parallel) and later Vietnam (17th
parallel), demarcation lines are again influencing US policymakers in
their strategic decision-making as policy responses are being shaped
by dividing lines between old and new Europe and between what
constitutes an actual violation of NATO’s sacred Article V. For all
practical purposes, NATO response lines seem to end at the Alliance’s
edge. But serious uncertainties lie in the new demarcation lines of the
non-NATO periphery. This is the current challenge for policymakers
Introduction | xix
as they seek to chart a course for strategy and response—similar to the

challenge faced, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, by strategists from
Bernard Brodie to Liddell Hart, who understood the necessity to
replace Eisenhower’s New Look based on a reliance on airpower and
nuclear missiles.
It is important to keep in mind that the military strategies formed in

response to the Cold War’s various regional conflicts in the Third
World were imposed by civilian political leaders and not by the
American military. General (ret.) H. R. McMaster’s book Dereliction
of Duty goes to great lengths to describe how these dividing lines often
influenced strategy as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were sidelined by
civilian policymakers during the critical phases of the Vietnam War.
Notably, it was George Kennan’s long cable that conceived the
concept of containment, which defined US strategy during the Cold
War—and from this overarching approach, Washington developed a
suitable military strategy. However, over time, the Soviet Union
learned to “leap frog” containment by shifting its activities to the
Third World, forcing the US to develop new strategic concepts to
counter these efforts.
The United States now appears to be at a similar juncture in

formulating its grand strategy. Conflict at the margins of NATO has
restricted the ability of US strategists to consider ways to deal with
limited wars—particularly in the zones just beyond the reach of
Article V. The Russian Federation of today is not the Soviet Union of
old; it is not likely to engage in full-on proxy wars against the United
States in the Developing World. Rather, Moscow will continue to
ignite new instances of limited warfare on the margins of Europe,
especially in vulnerable areas of particular strategic value to Russia,
like the Baltic and the Black Sea. The contours of this new battlefield
make up what geopolitical theoretician Nicholas J. Spykman referred
to as the “Eurasian Rimland,” the giant buffer zone between sea power
and land power. As Spykman famously noted in his 1944 book The
Geography of the Peace, “he who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia,
xx | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
[and he] who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.”11
Indeed, in many ways, today’s struggles are returning to the Rimland,
as the balance of power of world politics lies in Eurasia. Moreover, it
was Spykman who asserted that it would be up to the United States to
be the chief balancer in the competition to control the balance of
power in Eurasia.12
Frozen conflicts are at the heart of the struggle being fought in the
Rimland. The post-Soviet space is emerging as a contest where
Russian-backed rebellions threaten state sovereignty and political
stability in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and now Ukraine.
Understandably as the United States charts a new strategy of
deterrence, open conflict is no longer to be found only at the
geopolitical margins or in the Developing World, as was the case in
the 1960s. Instead, conflict threatening Western security and
transatlantic solidarity has now shifted to the borderlands of the post-
Soviet space, where a revanchist Russia endangers NATO’s youngest
and most exposed members. In order to safeguard the North Atlantic
Alliance’s eastern flanks, the United States should formulate a new
model of deterrence to not only safeguard those NATO member states
that border Russia but also their transatlantic-leaning neighbors, such
as Georgia and Ukraine.
Today, the entire center of gravity of NATO is shifting to the east, with
the critical allies of Poland, the Baltic States and Romania making up
the Alliance’s vulnerable flanks. It took the United States decades to
adjust to the geopolitical realities of the Cold War before becoming
comfortable with its presence in Western Europe and in its ability to
deter the Soviet Union. But that strategy was significantly more
geographically limited: over 360,000 US ground forces manned the
Fulda Gap, and its immediate flanks were guarded by NATO member
Italy in the South and Norway in the North. Now, NATO must adjust
to a new center of gravity east of the Oder River, an expansive region
where the US lacks geographic familiarity and operational certainty.
The Baltic and Black Seas, for example, were once areas that NATO
Introduction | xxi
feared to tread, as the maritime chokepoints of Skagerrak and the

Bosporus formed the geographic dividing lines for power projection.
Former NATO SACEUR Admiral James Stavridis echoed this view by
noting that the US Navy largely viewed the Black Sea as a potential
death trap for US warships.13 And despite the lessons of Ukraine in
2014, this mentality still seems to dominate in Washington and across
European capitals. Euro-Atlantic policymakers habitually retreat into
the cocoon of thinking that “if it is not a violation of Article V, then
everything is fine along NATO’s flanks”—even as the balance of
power in Eurasia changes. NATO’s reluctance to think about ways to
operate along those flanks must change as well, and for good reason.
An often-overlooked mechanism the Alliance possesses is Article IV,
which allows any member that feels threatened to invoke this clause
and bring it to the North Atlantic Council for discussion—something
of particular value for the exposed NATO members along the eastern
flanks.14
* * *
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and start of its operations

in Syria in 2015, Western analysts, policymakers and military leaders
have grappled with what lessons to draw from the Russian
involvement in those military campaigns as well as how to confront
the growing threat to the international order from an increasingly
belligerent Moscow. Russia’s pullout from the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) treaty in 2007 as well as its aggression against Georgia
in August 2008 were two clear shots across the bow of the transatlantic
community. But it was not until Russia forcibly changed borders on
the European continent by annexing Crimea that the West realized
Russia has become more threat than partner. Indeed, in July 2015,
then-nominee for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph
Dunford, testified before Congress that Russia posed the greatest
“existential” threat to the United States. As such, the US and the
NATO alliance have been upgrading their deterrence posture along
Europe’s eastern flank. Meanwhile, Russia’s bold reassertion of
xxii | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
political and military influence across the wider Middle East has
hampered and complicated the US-led international coalition’s anti-
terrorism operations against the Islamic State in Syria and beyond.
To effectively confront Russia, Western policymakers and military

commanders will need a more thorough understanding of the
strategic calculus behind Russia’s behavior in each global region it is
involved in—the Arctic, the Far East, the Greater Middle East and
Europe’s eastern flank. In addition, there is a need to better
comprehend the Russian Armed Forces’ strategic and doctrinal
approaches to all the various domains in which they operate. Russia’s
Military Strategy and Doctrine is designed to educate Russia watchers,
policymakers, military leaders, and the broader foreign policy
community about the Russian Armed Forces and security apparatus
across the full spectrum of geographic, doctrinal and domain areas.
This book is divided into three main sections. Part I focuses on the
four main geographic vectors of Russia’s strategy, delving into the
most important regions and front lines against which Moscow arrays
its forces and political-military efforts. Part II features chapters that
explore key functional aspects of Russia’s warfighting and defense
posture. Whereas, Part III includes analysis of the lessons Moscow has
learned from its two ongoing foreign wars, in Syria and Donbas, as
well as how its national security and defense strategies have impacted
changes to mobilization and military reforms domestically.
One of the key takeaways of this collective study is that Moscow

continues to view its southwest vector, including the Black Sea,
Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean—or what Russian military
planners call the Iugo-Zapadnoe Napravlenie (Southwestern
Direction)—as most consequential to the security of the state. As
such, the book begins with twin pieces on Russia’s strategy in this
direction. The first chapter, “The Russian Strategic Offensive in the
Middle East,” is written by long-time Moscow-based defense analyst
Pavel Felgenhauer. His contribution delves heavily into Russia’s
Introduction | xxiii
prosecution of its military intervention in Syria as well as the political-

informational strategy surrounding building regional coalitions and
attracting international support for Moscow’s broader policies there.
Additionally, Felgenhauer examines Russia’s wider Middle East
posture from a political, economic and security standpoint.
Importantly, he argues that Russia’s intervention and ongoing
military presence in Syria and the wider region needs to be
understood as first and foremost helping to assert Russian control
over its access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean via the Turkish
Straits. In other words, Russia’s newly acquired and expanded bases
in Syria offer strategic depth to the Iugo-Zapadnoye Napravleniye.
Former chief of Ukrainian naval operations Ihor Kabanenko echoes

many of these points in his contribution to this book, “Strategy in the
Black Sea and Mediterranean.” As he notes in his chapter, Russia’s
Black Sea strategy naturally extends into the Mediterranean since the
country’s only year-round ice-free ports with access to the world
ocean are all located there. Examining Russia’s regional strategy
though a naval and maritime security lens, Kabanenko outlines the
steps Moscow has been taking to reinforce its military posture in the
Black Sea. Specifically, and exploiting its occupation of the
geostrategically located Crimean peninsula, Russia has been creating
progressively stronger anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) bubbles
over the Black Sea region. Moreover, Russian actions in the Black Sea
have been characterized by the continual creation of new high-
probability offensive threats and then periodically raising their
perceived likelihood for political-military reasons.
The third chapter, “Russia’s Arctic and Far East Strategies,” by Pavel
K. Baev, pointedly links these two regions in light of Moscow’s focus
on developing the Northern Sea Route, which will connect the
European and East Asian markets via a maritime passage along the
country’s Arctic coastline. As the Arctic continues to open up, the
strategically important Northern Sea Route as well as economic
opportunities associated with extracting natural resources from the
xxiv | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
High North have been translating into growing focus on this region
by Moscow. However, as Baev points out, the inflated and entirely
unrealistic threat assessments pushed by the Russian military have
resulted in an unreasonable resource allocation to the Arctic, resulting
in more attention paid to building a string of new military bases and
A2/AD bubbles than actual economic development or commercial
investment there. The Far East, on the other hand, suffers from the
exact opposite situation, he notes. Despite quite real security
challenges to Russian Siberia and the Asia-Pacific region stemming
from an increasingly confident China and a nuclear North Korea, for
example, Moscow has been naively trying to link itself politically to
Beijing’s rise while misallocating billions on dubious economic and
infrastructure projects that have no hope of ever turning a profit.
The final chapter of the geography-driven section is Swedish defense

ministry advisor Jörgen Elfving’s “Baltic Sea Strategy.” Specifically, his
contribution details the steps Russia has been taking to counteract
NATO’s growing presence and activities in the Baltic region that,
themselves, were spurred by Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Additionally, he looks at Moscow’s attempts to ensure that Sweden
and Finland remain outside of the North Atlantic Alliance. As he
contends, particularly when it comes to armament acquisition and
creating new military units, Russian military planners are currently
giving the most attention to the country’s western strategic
direction—i.e., the Baltic Sea Region—because of NATO’s increased
activities there as well as the area’s history as an east-west invasion
corridor.
The second section of this book pulls back and focuses on the non-
conventional elements of Russian strategy and doctrine that are
common to most if not all areas of conflict or political-security
competition with other powers that Moscow engages in around the
world. Chapter 5, “Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare,” by
Latvian defense analyst Jānis Bērziņš, seeks to dispel some of the
pervasive myths in the West about what role asymmetric, non-
Introduction | xxv
conventional, informational and below-the-threshold-of-conflict

elements play in Russian military thought. His chapter not only
defines the overlapping terms and concepts found in Russian military
theory but also importantly provides a framework for how these
elements fit together in practice under the overarching concept of
New Generation Warfare. Of particular value is Bērziņš’s outline of
the eight phases of New Generation Warfare, which the Russian
military is likely to follow—though, as he cautions, not necessarily in
a purely linear fashion—as hostilities in a conflict escalate.
Nuclear weapons clearly form a key element of such a non-conventional

war-fighting or military-political intimidation strategy for Russia. Thus,
the following pair of chapters tackles this topic head on. Well-known
Finnish defense researcher, Stefan Forss, provides a detailed background
and history of the role nuclear arms play in Russian strategy and doctrine.
In particular, he offers an overview of the various missiles and nuclear
warheads in Russia’s inventory as well as analyzes the major US-Russian
arms control treaties that have limited Moscow’s deployments. At the same
time, he notes that since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after
having recovered from the politically and economically turbulent 1990s,
Russia has been undertaking a massive rearmament and modernization
program of its nuclear stockpiles—an effort that has picked up significantly
in recent years as ties to the West have deteriorated.
Long-time expert on the Russian Armed Forces, Stephen Blank, drills

down further on this topic while also expanding the discussion in his
contribution, “Putin’s ‘Asymmetric Strategy’: Nuclear and New-Type
Weapons in Russian Defense Policy.” In particular, he explores Moscow’s
use of nuclear saber-rattling and intimidation to try to control every phase
of a conflict. And through a close reading of the writings produced by
Russian military theorists, Blank provides an important corrective to the
popular but misleading idea in the West of an ostensible Russian “escalate
to deescalate” doctrine of nuclear weapons use. Additionally, Blank’s
chapter looks at the increasing focus by Russian military planners on
boosting deterrence via ultra-modern “new-type” weapons, such as lasers,
xxvi | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
robotics, energy beam systems, hypersonics or even genetically modified

biological agents.
The final chapter in this section, “Russia’s Offensive and Defensive Use of
Information Security,” by Russian researcher Sergey Sukhankin, examines
the role that cyberspace and the broader information domain play in
Russian war making. Of particular note, Sukhankin writes that Moscow’s
attitude toward the information domain strongly retains many of its Soviet
legacies, including its use as both an offensive weapon against outside
enemies as well as a means to internally control the domestic population.
As he points out, modern Russian theorists frequently ascribe the collapse
of the Soviet Union to the authorities’ forfeiture of control over
information flows in and out of the country. At the same time, he writes
that, when it comes to defense, Russia’s view of information security differs
dramatically from the Western approach, with practice regularly
outrunning theory, thus making Russian actions more difficult to predict.
Part III of this book begins with two chapters analyzing the lessons Russia
has learned from its ongoing wars abroad and how those lessons are being
incorporated into its military reforms, rearmament processes as well as
doctrine and strategy. Chapter 9, “Deciphering the Lessons Learned by the
Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine, 2014–2017,” by Russian military expert
Roger N. McDermott, concludes that the “covert” campaign in Donbas,
first and foremost, revitalized the General Staff’s support for large, heavy
armor maneuvers. It also pushed a reorganization of Russia’s military
structure back to reintroducing some divisional units. In turn, analyst
Dima Adamsky contributed a chapter on Russia’s “open” foreign war:
“Russian Lessons Learned From the Operation in Syria: A Preliminary
Assessment.” One of the key points he makes is that the Russian
intervention in Syria has provided invaluable combat experience for the
country’s military commanders, who have been rotated in and out of the
campaign continually for the past several years. Moreover, his chapter
looks at the ways in which the Syrian campaign has been influencing how
Russia utilizes intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets in
combat, as well as the war’s impact on Russian disinformation operations.
Introduction | xxvii
The final chapter in this collective study is written by the well-known

Russian military analyst and defense journalist Aleksandr Golts. In “The
Concept of Mass Mobilization Returns,” Golts turns to the ongoing
reforms to Russia’s domestic mobilization system. Specifically, he outlines
how and why the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces is progressively
turning away from previous plans to create a fully voluntary army.
Moreover, he analyzes what a reliance on a Soviet-style conscript-based
force will mean for the capabilities of the Russian military to deal with the
types of conflicts it can actually expect to face, versus the kind the Kremlin
appears to be preparing for under the guidance of the General Staff.
The key questions emphasized by this book are “how Russia fights wars”
and “how its experiences with modern conflicts are shaping the evolution
of Russia’s military strategy, capabilities and doctrine.” The book’s value
comes not only from a piecemeal look at granular Russian strategies in each
of the theaters and domains where its Armed Forces may act, but also from
the collective work’s unifying description of Russia’s military strategy as a
declining but still formidable global power. It is our sincere hope that
Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine will be an essential reference for US
national security thinkers, NATO defense planners and policymakers the
world over who deal with the potential military and security challenges
posed by a revanchist Russia.
Glen E. Howard
President, The Jamestown Foundation
Matthew Czekaj
Editor-in-Chief, Eurasia Daily Monitor and
Senior Program Associate for Europe and Eurasia, The Jamestown
Foundation
February 5, 2019
Washington, DC
xxviii | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
Notes
1
The presented timeline of events can be found in “Russian Attack Against
Ukrainian Navy Ships,” Presentation, Ukrainian Navy, December 14, 2018; “How
Russia occupied Sea of Azov: full chronology,” Empr.media,
https://empr.media/opinion/analytics/how-russia-occupied-sea-of-azov-full-
chronology/, accessed January 4, 2019.
2
Michael Kofman, “The Kerch Strait Naval Skirmish,” Russia Military Analysis,
November 28, 2018, https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/11/28/the-
kerch-strait-naval-skirmish/.
3
Maryna Vorotnyuk, “In Serious Escalation, Russia Openly Attacks Ukrainian
Vessels in Azov Sea,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 165, November 26,
2018, The Jamestown Foundation,
https://jamestown.org/program/in-serious-escalation-russia-openly-attacks-
ukrainian-vessels-in-azov-sea/; Ihor Kabanenko, “Strategic Implications of Russia
and Ukraine’s Naval Clash on November 25,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 15,
Issue 167, November 28, 2018, The Jamestown Foundation,
https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-implications-of-russia-and-ukraines-
naval-clash-on-november-25/.
4
Yuri Lapaiev, “Martial Law in Ukraine: A Rehearsal for War,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 175, December 12, 2018, The Jamestown Foundation,
https://jamestown.org/program/martial-law-in-ukraine-a-rehearsal-for-war/.
5
See for example: Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to
American Strategy University of Chicago Press, 1957, p. 62. Osgood’s book, written
in 1957, is considered the classic work on the term limited war that heavily
influenced American strategic thinkers in the l960s. Many experts consider this time
period to be the golden age of academic thinking on strategy.
6
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, New
York: Basic Books, 2012, p. 95.
7
Harry G. Summers, Jr. On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (Fifth Printing),
January 1989, p. 70.
Introduction | xxix
8
Ralph Gordon Hoxie, Command Decision and the Presidency: A Study of National
Security Policy and Organization, New York: Readers Digest Press, 1977, p. 208.
9
“National Security Decision Directive 166,” The White House, Washington, DC,
March 27, 1985, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-166.pdf.
10
Basil H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West’s Military
Position, New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1960.
11
Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace. New York: Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1944, p. 43.
12
Geoffrey R. Sloan, Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890–1987,
Brighton, United Kingdom: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1988, p. 16.
13
James Stavridis, Seapower: The History and Geopolitics of the World’s Oceans, New
York: Penguin Press, 2017, p. 133.
14
Stavridis, op. cit., p. 161
Part I
The Geographic Vectors of
Russia’s Strategy
1. The Russian Strategic Offensive in the
Middle East
Pavel Felgenhauer
Introduction
As Russian military forces began to massively deploy to Syria in

September 2015, questions proliferated about Moscow’s true
objective. It seemed difficult to understand why Russia was
undertaking a new massive overseas combat mission while already
engaged in other conflicts and a serious standoff with the West over
Crimea and Donbas. Moreover, the Russian budget suffered from
sizeable deficits, household incomes were steadily decreasing, and
sanctions were harming the flow of Russia’s capital and technologies.
Some, in Moscow and abroad, posited that the Syrian encounter may
have been designed to deflect public opinion away from the doldrums
of a seemingly unending Ukrainian crisis. Others suggested that
Moscow may have been trying to somehow “exchange” Syria for
Ukraine—by joining the West in fighting the Islamic State (IS) and
other jihadists, Russia could obtain sanctions reprieve or maybe de
facto parole for its other presumed transgressions. Subsequent
developments soon suggested, ostensibly at least, that this latter group
of observers seemed closer to the mark.
3
4 | RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE
In September 2015, speaking in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, at a summit of

the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO—the Russian-
dominated regional defense alliance), President Vladimir Putin called
for a joint effort by the international community to resist the IS threat.
Furthermore, he promoted the formation of a “broad coalition” to
support the Iraqi and Syrian government forces “that are already
fighting ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—the former name for
IS].” Putin also called on other countries to join in providing military
assistance to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.1 Later that same
month, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, in New
York, Putin repeated his call for forming a grand anti-terrorist
coalition along the outlines of the Second World War anti-fascist
alliance. In addition, however, Putin condemned “the export of
democracy” by the West as one of the main reason for the
destabilization of the Middle East and the original rise of the Islamic
State.2
Moscow's pitch to the West—joining forces in a grand anti-terrorist

coalition with al-Assad, Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard (IRGC) Quds Force militias—did not work. Indeed, the main
targets of Russia’s military campaign in Syria turned out to be Syrian
opposition groups that Moscow labeled “terrorist.” The Syria
operation, thus, did not help build up confidence between Moscow
and the West, and in some cases it actually created additional lines of
tension. In October 2015, Putin offered to send to Washington a high-
level delegation headed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to
discuss Syria and “to work together and find solutions”; but the
United States, according to Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, “refused
to send a top delegation to Moscow to discuss Syria and declined to
receive a delegation led by Medvedev.” According to Lavrov, the US
agrees to discuss only purely military measures to avoid mid-air
clashes between US and Russian aircraft.3 In an interview published
in Moscow in December 2017, first deputy defense minister and the
chief of General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, confirmed
that the bilateral memorandum on air safety or “de-confliction” in
Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East | 5
Syria, signed in 2015 with the US military, had been working fine for
more than two years, with both sides fully complying. But according
to Gerasimov, all further Russian proposals for joint operations “did
not interest the Americans.”4
The Syrian overseas campaign was not particularly popular with the
Russian public. The Russian military effort in Syria seemed at times
like an outdated, imperialistic foray into the Middle East and the
Mediterranean—a theater in which the Russian tsars and Communist
leaders traditionally wrestled against Western opponents for
influence. Putin’s Russia seemed to be acting out of its depth, taking
on too heavy a strategic role it did not have the resources or manpower
to complete, for reasons that did not seem clear-cut or imperative.
But the real reason for entering the Syrian civil war was complex,
involving different internal and foreign policy considerations. On the
one hand, preventing the fall of the al-Assad regime and reversing the
course of the Syrian civil war was seen as another manifestation of
Russian national state revival, of its military demonstrating the ability
to take on a logistically and organizationally challenging overseas
mission. The world and the Middle East were supposed to see that
Russia is once again on par with the mighty United States, like the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. And on the other hand, the
Kremlin believed, thanks to the Russian intervention, the balance of
power in a strategically sensitive region of the world could be
significantly altered—with global ramifications.
The Southern Dimension of Russia’s Global Anti-Western

Standoff
In February 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, in Germany,

Putin declared a watershed change in Russia’s national security,
defense and foreign policies. As such, he negated any future possibility
of comprehensive strategic cooperation with the West and the US,
while retaining the option of limited collaboration on some issues, like
fighting terrorism.5 The Cold War–tested strict rules of global zero-

sum gaming had once again become the true international rules of the
game for Moscow.
A year and a half later, in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia—

Moscow’s first direct use of military power to roll back assumed
Western encroachment into what the Kremlin considered Russia’s
security backyard. In the immediate aftermath of the short Russian-
Georgian war, the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) deployed naval forces to the Black Sea, setting
off alarm bells in Moscow. Its dilapidated Black Sea Fleet (BSF) was
clearly no match for North Atlantic Alliance vessels; and both
Moscow and the de facto second Russian capital, Sochi, where Putin
stays about half of the year, suddenly seemed under threat from a
potential stealthy and massive precision cruise missile attack.
As a countermeasure, Russian authorities planned a massive

rearmament of the Black Sea Fleet, including the establishment of a
cruise missile–armed attack submarine force and the introduction of
new Bastion long-range land-based anti-ship missiles. But the
revamping of the BSF was considered insufficient for building an
impenetrable southwestern Russian defense perimeter. Thus, in
February 2013, soon after the government adopted the country’s main
top-secret strategic defense document—the “Plan of Defense of the
Russian Federation” (“Plan Oborony Rossyskoy Federatsiy”—
PORF)—a decision was announced to reinstitute a permanent
Mediterranean naval operational task force (Operativnoye
Soedineniye VMF RF na Sredizemnom More—OSVMFRFSM) “to
defend Russian national interests.” And a reinvigorated BSF would
form this reconstituted naval group’s backbone.6 Officials declared
that the OSVMFRFSM would be modeled on the Cold War–era 5th
Mediterranean Soviet Naval Squadron, which numbered 30–50 ships
and was deployed until 1992 to counter the US 6th Fleet as well as to
support Moscow’s client Arab states in the region.7 Acting in concert
with the Black Sea Fleet and under BSF operational command, the
OSVMFRFSM could help prevent a massive breakthrough of NATO

naval forces into the Black Sea, as occurred in August 2008.
The PORF is a top-secret document incorporating threat assessment,

rearmament, mobilization and integrated defense plans. As reported
by the Kremlin Press Service, on January 29, 2013, Defense Minister
Sergei Shoigu and Gerasimov presented Putin with the draft text of
the PORF. According to Shoigu, “the PORF is very detailed and has
been worked out with the input of 49 ministries and [government]
departments.” The PORF, continued Shoigu, will define Russian
defenses for decades and serves as a “live document” that integrates
all defense plans and efforts and will be regularly corrected to take into
account the changing threat environment and “other events."8 The
PORF seems to be a new type of integrated strategic blueprint that
does not have a direct equivalent in old Soviet planning practice. In
January 2013, Shoigu told Putin that the PORF was ready to be signed
into law—which apparently did take place.
Concrete military plans to defend Russia and its allies against all
possible threats are kept under wraps, as are most of the
tactical/technical capabilities of deployed and newly developed
weapons systems. And yet, the underlining threat assessment seems
to be less of a secret. Just two weeks after the PORF was approved by
the Kremlin, Gerasimov delivered public remarks at a conference in
Moscow, where he presented a gloomy forecast of impending danger,
apparently based on the PORF threat assessment analysis: “In the
period until 2030, the level of existing and potential military threats
may grow substantially.” Leading world powers will be fighting to
control natural energy resources, markets and “Lebensraum [Nazi
German term meaning ‘living space’; a call for eastward territorial
expansion],” actively using military means to achieve national goals.9
Since the adaption of the PORF, the concept of Russia under siege and
the growing threat of enemy attack has dominated strategic military
planning, rearmament, as well as the country’s foreign and domestic
policies. Moscow has been reinforcing its defenses in all strategic
directions: North, West, East and South. But the southwestern

direction (Iugo-Zapadnoye Napravleniye)—the Black Sea, the
Mediterranean and the Turkish Straits connecting the two—is seen
from the Kremlin as one of the most important and potentially
vulnerable.
In September 2016, the battle-readiness of the Iugo-Zapadnoye

Napravleniye was tested in the massive Kavkaz (“Caucasus”) 2016
strategic military exercises in southwestern Russia and occupied
Crimea. The General Staff mobilized over 220,000 soldiers and
civilian defense ministry contractors. Gerasimov told journalists the
reinforced BSF (possibly with the help of OSVMFRFSM vessels) had
the capacity to destroy “potential enemy [NATO]” ships “before they
leave home ports [apparently in the Mediterranean] or in the
Bosporus—we have long-range targeting reconnaissance capabilities
and land-based Bastion anti-ship missiles with a range of 350 km, in
addition to submarines with [long-range] Kalibr cruise missiles, naval
attack jets, strategic bombers with cruise missiles and more.”
According to Gerasimov, “The enemy will never come close to
Crimea, no matter from where they come.”10
The takeover of Crimea in March 2014 tremendously reinforced

Russia’s control of the Black Sea, but this did not negate the need to
continue to maintain the OSVMFRFSM. To keep the OSVMFRFSM
operational, Russian command needed a permanent naval base in the
Mediterranean and a large military airbase to provide the flotilla task
force with air cover and support. The small mothballed Cold War–era
naval supply base in Tartus, Syria, was increasingly dysfunctional
because of the Syrian civil war, while the seemingly imminent collapse
of al-Assad’s regime threatened to result in its permanent shutdown.
Moreover, there was no airbase in Tartus. In 2015, in coordination
with Damascus and Tehran, the Russian military began preparations
to establish a major airbase at Hmeymim, in Syria’s Latakia province.
At the end of September 2015, the Russian military, in coordination
with Damascus and Iranian-led Shia militias, began a major military
operation in Syria that has since turned the course of the civil war. At
the same time, however, Moscow’s Syria intervention has secured a
possibly much more fundamental strategic goal: reinforcing the Iugo-
Zapadnoye Napravleniye and providing it with strategic depth. Only a
couple of weeks into the operation, in October 2015, the Russian
General Staff announced that Hmeymim, together with the Tartus
naval facility, would become “permanent” naval, army and air force
bases on the Syrian Mediterranean coast.11 The al-Assad regime,
dependent on Russian military support for its survival, immediately
consented that the Russians could have any bases they wish.12
In December 2017, the Russian parliament ratified an agreement with

the al-Assad regime in Damascus, establishing Tartus as a permanent
naval base for 49 years with the option of an automatic prolongation
of the lease for another 25 years. According to Deputy Defense
Minister Nikolai Pankov, Russian personnel, equipment and facilities
in Tartus will be covered by full legal immunity, effectively granting
them exterritorial status. The territory of the previously small Russian
naval facility in Tartus will be expanded to some 24 hectares (about 60
acres). The base has been reinforced by anti-aircraft batteries and anti-
ship Bastion guided missiles. New piers, warehouses and living
facilities are being constructed. Tartus may eventually have the
capacity to house up to 11 warships, including nuclear-powered ones.
Air and sea defenses of Tartus are the responsibility of the Russian
Armed Forces, with the local Syrian forces providing outer perimeter
defenses on land. Tartus is apparently planned to be the main home-
port of the OSVMFRFSM and “will enable the expansion of Russia’s
naval presence and influence in the Mediterranean,” according to
Pankov.13 Dmitry Sablin, a Duma deputy from the ruling United
Russia party, noted, “NATO was doing its best to expel Russia from
the Mediterranean,” but these plans have been thwarted. The
transformation of the small Tartus supply facility into a major naval
base implies Russia has a long-term strategy of military presence in
the Mediterranean, according to Sablin. 14
The Russian military intervention in Syria was always primarily about

countering the United States in the Middle East and the
Mediterranean. Fighting the Islamic State and other jihadist groups,
together with al-Assad forces, the IRGC Quds Force and Iranian-
backed militias, is an important, but secondary task. In May 2017,
speaking at a session of the upper house of parliament—the
Federation Council—Shoigu announced the main strategic
accomplishment of the Russian Syrian campaign was the
establishment of a strong military force (Gruperovka) “on the south
flank of NATO, which dramatically changed the strategic balance of
power in the region.” In the same speech, the defense minister called
on the Russian people “not to be blind” to the growing menace “of
NATO activities on the borders of Russia.”15 Building an impenetrable
southwestern defense perimeter in the Black Sea region and the
Caucasus against the US and its allies apparently continues to be the
main strategic objective. Occupying a position of overall influence in
the Middle East is considered equally important, especially if this
undermines US positions in the region in zero-sum game terms.
Tank Generals in Command of the Syrian Air Campaign
The desire to hold on to the Tartus naval base may have been one of
the main strategic reasons behind why the Russian military began its
prolonged and costly foray in Syria to secure the survival of Bashar al-
Assad. Indeed, the embattled Syrian president, in turn, could
guarantee continued Russian military permanent presence in the
Eastern Mediterranean. But during the Russian campaign in Syria
from 2015 through 2017, the Tartus naval facility, though an
important logistics hub on the Syrian coast, did not see much military
action per se. Importantly, it is situated in a region inhabited by
friendly pro-al-Assad Alawites, with practically no insurgent activities
by armed opposition or jihadist groups. The most notable exception
was a series of brazen drone attacks on the Tartus and Hmeymim
bases in early January 2018. Although these terrorist strikes ultimately
caused little damage and were repelled by Russian forces.16
The headquarters and the main operational base of the Russian forces
in Syria were instead located in Hmeymim. High-ranking Russian
generals regularly rotated through this military airfield. In an
interview published in December 2017, Gerasimov mentioned five
colonel generals—Aleksandr Dvornikov (56), Andrei Kartapolov
(54), Sergey Surovikin (51), Vladimir Zarudnitsky (59) and Alexander
Zhuravlyov (52)—who rotated as commanders of the Armed Forces
Gruperovka in Syria. According to the General Staff chief, each of
these generals arrived in Hmeymim with his own operational staff,
intelligence and reconnaissance chiefs, artillery and rocket
commanders, and so on from one or another of Russia’s military
districts. The constant rotation of top military commanders and staffs
through Syria (a typical tour lasts three months) have allowed,
according to Gerasimov, to provide all the military districts and army
staffs, together with 90 percent of divisional command staffs, with
firsthand combat experience. In all, over 48,000 servicemen did tours
in Syria in 2015–2018, and a quarter of them were decorated.
Zhuravlyov commanded the Syria Gruperovka in 2016 and took over
for a second tour in December 2017.17
The Kremlin has been portraying its Syrian campaign as a non-

contact, low-casualty Western-style war, mostly being carried out via
bombing by the Russian Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-
Kosmicheskiye Sily—VKS). The ground fighting was the responsibility
of al-Assad’s Syrian Arab Army (SAA) as well as various local and
Iranian-backed militias, including Hezbollah. Gerasimov complained
of serious problems during the beginning of the campaign in
organizing effective cooperation between the VKS and different local
allied military units and militias. Other challenges for Russia related
to organizing the logistics of supplying and training these foreign
ground forces. In 2015, the SAA controlled only 10 percent of the
territory, according to Gerasimov; but with the help of the VKS and
Russian advisors, the SAA, supplied with new weapons, dramatically
improved. Russian military advisors are present in SAA units up to
the battalion level: “They gather intel, [as well as] plan and command
operations under orders coming from the Gruperovka headquarters

in Hmeymim.”18
Though the VKS and its bombers were the decisive military arm of the
Gruperovka, its commanders were all tank and mechanized infantry
(motor-rifle) generals. All of them have since been decorated and
promoted. Dvornikov, Surovikin and Zhuravlyov received the Order
of Heroes of Russia medal. Only Zarudnitsky, who is approaching
retirement age from active service, was appointed to the honorary
position of commandant of Russia’s top military school—the
Academy of the General Staff—following his Syria tour. The Syrian
campaign was hailed by state propaganda as a spectacular VKS
operation, but not a single flyer general was in overall command of
the Gruperovka. Apparently, Gerasimov, himself a tank general
(tankyst), used the Syrian campaign as an opportunity to promote
fellow tank and army generals who traditionally dominate the Russian
military and the General Staff and do their best to keep the admirals,
the flyers and the rocket generals at bay. In November 2017, in an
unprecedented move, Surovikin was appointed the commander of the
VKS. Surovikin, a “tank” general, replaced Army General (ret.) Viktor
Bondarev, a former pilot, who was recently appointed chairman of the
Federation Council defense and security committee.19
Surovikin, a veteran of the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the late 1980s

and both Chechen wars in the 1990s and 2000s, reportedly several
times wounded in action, has a notorious reputation. After the
unsuccessful August 1991 coup that eventually terminated the Soviet
Union, Surovikin spent some six months in prison after solders under
his command killed three anti-Communist protesters in the streets of
Moscow. But he was eventually released without trial. In 1995,
Surovikin received a suspended sentence for illegal arms trade. This
felony conviction was later overturned. In the army, Surovikin has a
reputation for total ruthlessness. In 2005, while commander of the
42nd mechanized (motor-rifle) division in Chechnya, Surovikin
reportedly announced he would kill three Chechens for every one of
his soldiers killed.20 In 2004, Surovikin, as commander of the 34th

motor-rifle division, was accused of physically assaulting subordinate
officers. Colonel Andrei Shatkal reportedly fatally shot himself in the
head using his service sidearm in Surovikin’s office after a dress-down
by the general.21
Surovikin made a stellar career in the top echelons of the General Staff
and defense ministry after 2008, during the radical military reform
that required ruthlessness in dismissing unneeded veterans and
building a more battle-ready and leaner force. Surovikin’s readiness
to vigorously execute any orders trounced any potential questions
about his checkered curriculum vitae.22
The Navy’s Shortcomings in Syria Campaign
Today, Russia has four main military districts (West, South, Central
and East). Russia’s most powerful Northern Fleet was expanded in
December 2014 into a separate Joint Strategic Command “North,” in
charge of the entire Arctic, reinforced by an Army corps and VKS
units.23 Joint Strategic Command North is seemingly on par with the
other four military districts, but its commander, Admiral Nikolai
Yevmenov, has never command the Gruperovka in Syria—nor has any
other Russian admiral. Russia’s navy, the Military-Maritime Fleet
(Voyenno-Мorskoy Flot—VMF), played a vital part in the Russian
expansion in the Middle East. It could be said the entire operation in
Syria was in large part undertaken to establish a solid home base for
the OSVMFRFSM in the Eastern Mediterranean. But the VMF
apparently did not gain much in terms of top echelon influence and
was often criticized for its deficiencies.
Navy frigates, corvettes and submarines repeatedly fired long-range

Kalibr cruise missiles at targets in Syria. In the first spectacular attack
on October 7, 2015 (Putin’s 63rd birthday), four corvettes of the
Caspian Flotilla launched 26 Kalibr-NK 3M14 missiles, which flew
more than 1,500 km over Iran and Iraq from the Caspian Sea to reach
targets in Latakia and Idlib provinces. Russian state TV propaganda

aggressively played up this first launch of Kalibr-NKs at Syria—a
demonstration of Russian military might and a snub to the
Americans. Moreover, the Kremlin press service released footage of
Shoigu personally briefing Putin, who was spending his birthday at his
Black Sea residence in Sochi.24
Over the next three years, the VMF continued to launch Kalibr-NK
missiles, but none of the individual volleys were as massive as the
October 7, 2015, strike. Since that first attack and through the end of
2017, over 25 volleys of, together, more than 140 Kalibr-NK missiles
were reportedly fired by Russian Black Sea Fleet frigates operating in
the Eastern Mediterranean, over a hundred miles off the Syrian coast.
Each Kalibr-NK volley consisted of four to eight missiles. Newly built
Project 636.3 (Kilo) diesel-electric BSF submarines fired Kalibr-PL
(the submarine version of the Kalibr) cruise missiles at targets in Syria,
some of them as the subs were transiting from the Baltic Sea, where
they were built. In all, some 40 Kalibr-PLs were reportedly fired at
targets in Syria, in volleys of 2 to 4, through the end of 2017. By this
time, the BSF had received six 636.3 (Kilo) submarines. The Kalibr
missiles launched by the navy from the Mediterranean hit targets 400–
900 km away in Syria. The Kalibr missiles appeared to be a reliable
weapon, but the navy apparently had insufficient stockpiles of these
cruise missiles to organize more massive attacks. Moreover, the VMF
could not properly test the ability of the Kalibr-NK to pierce enemy
defenses, because the Syrian opposition and jihadists groups lacked
any anti-aircraft capabilities or early-warning radars.25
The need to assess the ability of new Russian ships, including frigates,
small corvettes and diesel-electric submarines, to launch long-range
missiles was clearly one of the main reasons to use a relatively large
number of different ships. The Kalibr missiles are extremely
expensive, reportedly some $3 million–$6.5 million apiece, and there
was no clear tactical reason to use these stealthy weapons against
targets that lack air defenses and were already being bombed with
impunity by Russian jets.26
It seems, Russian admirals wanted to impress the Kremlin with the

navy’s ability to effectively intervene in overseas conventional
regional conflicts in order to be able to lobby for financing of
expensive shipbuilding projects. Despite the obvious propaganda
success of spectacular sea and underwater Kalibr launches, the
strategic result was rather mixed: The VMF apparently did not
demonstrate the ability to perform massive conventional cruise
missile attacks. Having small corvettes and nonnuclear submarines as
carriers of long-range missiles that may potentially be nuclear-tipped
is strategically important in a possible standoff with a strong enemy
like the US. An attack by just several missiles can be effective if they
are nuclear and at least one reaches its target with a 200-kiloton
warhead. But the ability of the Russian navy to perform effectively in
conventional local overseas battle zones is clearly still limited.
In another apparent attempt to demonstrate to the world and the

Kremlin its battle capabilities, the VMF sent the aircraft carrier
Admiral Kuznetsov with a battle group to the Mediterranean. On
October 15, 2016, the Kuznetsov, nuclear battle cruiser Pyotr Velikiy,
along with two guided-missile frigates and several support vessels
departed Severomorsk—the main naval base of the Northern Fleet, on
the Barents Sea. This naval grouping returned to port on February 9,
2017. During its voyage around Europe, via the Channel and through
the Strait of Gibraltar, the Kuznetsov was belching dark smoke
reminiscent of a coal-driven World War I battleship and moving at an
incredibly slow pace for an aircraft carrier—less than ten nautical
miles per hour, on average—from Severomorsk to Gibraltar.27 This,
together with the thick smoke, indicated serious engine trouble.
After returning to its home port in February 2017, the Kuznetsov—

Russia’s only aircraft carrier—has remained moored, awaiting serious
renovation. The defense ministry and the government evidently
disagree on how much money the Russian budget can allocate to

remodel the Kuznetsov and how substantial the renovations should
be. The vessel’s main engine must be replaced, but the extent of other
overhauls are still under discussion. A “minimal sum” of 50 billion
rubles ($850 million) was reportedly allocated for the renovation; but
later news reports suggested only one half of that amount may
ultimately be spent.28 As of August 2018, the Kuznetsov remained in
limbo, moored, not battle-ready and awaiting repairs and
modernizations that “may last some years."29
The Kuznetsov has the capacity to carry up to 50 jets and helicopters,

but it sailed to the Mediterranean in October 2016, with only 14 jet
fighters (10 Su-33s and 4 new MiG-29K/KUBs) and several
helicopters. The Kuznetsov air wing was reportedly incomplete
because of lack of jets and trained carrier pilots. The vessel lacks a
catapult, and its jet fighters take off using a jump ramp and thrust; the
forward motion of the carrier in the water helps provide additional
take-off speed to the jets. Because of its faulty main engine, however,
the Kuznetsov’s maximum speed seems to be less than 20 nautical
miles per hour, thus further impeding its capability to launch fixed-
wing aircraft into the air while carrying heavy bomb payloads.
According to official reports, the Kuznetsov’s jets flew 420 combat
sorties in Syria, but more than two thirds of them were from the
Hmeymim airbase: The jets took on attack payloads and fuel at the
land base, instead of flying into action directly from the carrier’s deck.
The Kuznetsov also lost two jet fighters (an Su-33 and a MiG-29K),
which sank in the sea because of either technical failure related to the
landing gear or pilot errors caused by insufficient training, or both.30
The Pyotr Velikiy’s voyage to the Mediterranean was uneventful: It

traveled with the Kuznetsov but did not take part in any action. Plans
exist to eventually refit the Pyotr Velikiy with 3S14 universal launch
tubes, so it may fire Kalibr-HK or other land-attack and anti-ship
missiles. The Pyotr Velikiy may be docked for renovation in 2019—
repairs and refits that may take several years. At present, the nuclear
cruiser is not designed to attack land targets.
The frustrated Russian navy will have to make do without any aircraft
carriers for some years to come, and the fleet’s land-attack capabilities
are limited. Still, the VMF played a decisive role in the logistics of the
Syrian campaign by organizing the so called “Syrian express” route to
deliver weapons, munitions and other essential supplies to Russian
troops and their local allies from Black Sea ports (mostly
Novorossiysk) to Syria (Tartus). According to the chief of staff of the
Russian naval base in Tartus, Alexei Tarasov, the port handles 100,000
tons of traffic a month “and most of that traffic is to supply the
Gruperovka in Syria"31 The overall supply traffic from 2015 to 2017
through the “Syrian express” could be over two million tons. To
handle this massive traffic, the VMF mobilized its landing ships, first
of all Project 775 Ropucha-class vessels built in Poland in the 1970s
and 1980s, which have the capacity to carry a marine battalion, 12
tanks and supplies. The landing ships moved troops and supplies and
were supplemented by a number of old general-transport and
container-cargo vessels purchased in Turkey, Greece and Ukraine.
These ships, though unarmed and operated by civilian crews, were
repainted and carried the naval Russian flag as Black Sea Fleet support
vessels so that they could not be stopped and searched by the Turks as
they passed through the Straits. Il-76 and heavy An-124 military
transport jets flying directly to Hmeymim have been supplementing
the “Syrian express” maritime route. Military and civilian personnel
has been moved to and from Hmeymim by transport planes and
defense ministry passenger jets.32
Gerasimov has commended the logistics part of the overseas

operation in Syria and compared it with the secretive deployment of a
massive Russian nuclear-armed military Gruperovka in Cuba in 1962,
during the Cuban Missile Crisis—“operation Anadyr.” Strategic
mobility is seen today as a key component of Russian military strategy,
since the Russian Armed Forces are much smaller than during the
Cold War. Effective strategic mobility is being tested by the Russian

military in multiple massive snap exercises and has been successfully
implemented, according to Gerasimov, during the Syrian operation.33
In March and again in December 2016, Putin publicly announced the
military mission in Syria “mostly accomplished,” saying that the
Gruperovka shall be withdrawn home. Some withdrawals did happen,
but they were soon secretly reversed while the war continued. This
flexibility and mobility is seen in Moscow as an important
achievement. In any crisis in the Middle East, the Russian military
believes it can swiftly reinforce and possibly play a decisive future
role.34
The Israeli Connection Revolutionizes Russian War-Making
Putin, Shoigu, the Russian state TV propaganda machine and the

expert community have been heaping praise on the VKS for an
exemplary air campaign in Syria. The Syrian opposition, jihadists and
Islamic State fighters are portrayed as a formidable foe, a well-
organized “terrorist army” that was gallantly defeated by the VKS with
minimal casualties. Of course, this foe had no radars and only a small
number of old Soviet-made shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles
or short-range man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). To
avoid risk, VKS attack jets tended to bomb from heights of over 5 km,
where the opposition’s MANPADS could not reach. As a result, only
four jets were reportedly lost in Syria before the end of 2017, of them
only one directly in action—an Su-24M bomber shot down in
November 2015 by a Turkish F-16, after briefly flying into Turkish
airspace. Two jets were lost by the Kuznetsov due to some technical
mishaps. Russian helicopters, attack and transport, did fly much lower
than the bomber jets: They frequently operated in harms’ way and at
least six were lost in action.35 On October 10, 2017, an Su-24M bomber
ran off the runway at Hmeimim during takeoff, crashed and exploded,
killing its crew of two. 36
The Russian military insists all of its bombing missions were super
accurate, hitting only jihadist and opposition fighters designated as
terrorists. During the Syrian campaign, the Russian military has
employed some precision-attack weapons: hundreds of long-range
naval (Kalibr) and air-launched (KH-555 and Kh-101) cruise missiles,
guided bombs, as well as Iskander and Tochka-U tactical ballistic
missiles. According to Shoigu, the VKS “in two years, flew some
34,000 combat [bombing] sorties” and killed over 60,000 enemy
combatants or “terrorists.” Yet, most of the bombing missions were
carried out using “dumb” OFAB bombs of various caliber. It is
claimed the new Su-34 bombers have modern targeting equipment,
while older Su-24M and Tu-22M3 swing-wing bombers have been
modernized and equipped with the SVP-24 targeting devices that
allowed them to use simple OFAB bombs as precision weapons,
“never hitting schools or mosques”37
Targeting intelligence was collected by satellites and, for the first time
in any Russian air campaign, by drones. According to Gerasimov,
there are some 50–70 drones in action over Syria one any given day.
The targeting intelligence and footage is provided simultaneously to
the command staff in Hmeymim and the General Staff in Moscow.
According to Gerasimov, the Russian military “made great strides” in
drone usage in the last five years. “Today, it is impossible to fight
without drones, and everybody uses them—special forces, the pilots
and artillery units,” concluded Gerasimov.38
The Russian defense ministry’s narrative about the super-accurate

targeting of its mostly “dumb” OFAB bombs is highly exaggerated at
best. But it also reflects a genuine effort to enact a new, probably
revolutionary by Russian standards, strategy of effective surgical-
precision air campaigns, surely mimicking the US aerial warfare
practices over the former Iugoslavia and Iraq, replacing the traditional
Russian model of massive use of brute firepower exercised in
Afghanistan in the 1980s and in the two Chechen wars. Investment in
the use of drones to provide live targeting information and the
development and mass production of various precision-guided

weapon systems is seen as a new and highly important part of Russia’s
strategic outlook and how the General Staff believes it will fight wars
in the future.39
Gerasimov is correct: Only five years ago, the Russian military did not
have any modern usable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and the
acute need to acquire them was not universally recognized. Aerial
reconnaissance and attack missions were carried out by manned
aircraft, either taking photos or the crew simply observing visually.
This situation began to change when, in 2012, the Yekaterinburg
(Urals)–based Uralskiy Zavod Grazhdanskoy Aviatsii (UZGA) began
producing the Forpost UAV, using Israeli-provided components. The
Forpost is a Russian-assembled licensed replica of the Israeli
Aerospace Industries’ Searcher II reconnaissance UAV. This Russian
drone is produced together with Israeli-designed command, control
and communications (C3) equipment. The Forpost has been the
backbone of successful Russian military UAV operations in Syria and
Donbas. According to defense ministry sources the Israeli-designed
Forpost is still the most potent operational Russian UAV, with the
biggest payload (up to 70 kilograms) and the longest flight endurance
(some 18 hours). The Russian-designed Orlan-10 UAV, also used by
Russian forces in Syria, can carry only a 5 kg payload.40
The Russian military has built up special drone units and successfully
integrated the Forpost and other drones to provide targeting
information to artillery, multiple rocket-launch systems (MRLS) and
attack aircraft. Footage provided by UAVs in Syria has been regularly
displayed by the Russian military for PR purposes. But while images
and videos of jets, helicopters and other attack systems are frequently
distributed by official government sources, the UAVs operating in
Syria are never pictured. In particular, the Forpost is not even
mentioned at all. It would appear that the Russian authorities are
embarrassed and hesitant to display Israeli-designed Russian UAVs
deployed on Arab soil and used against Muslim (jihadist) rebels.
In Syria and in Donbas, Russian UAVs have been used exclusively on

reconnaissance missions, which has revolutionized Russian war-
making. Russia inherited heavy-load land- and air-based attack
systems from the Soviet Union that it has been modernizing; but until
recently, the Russian Armed Forces lacked effective reconnaissance
and targeting capabilities. So by integrating Israeli-designed UAV
assets with preexisting attack systems, including precision-guided
ones, the Russian military leapfrogged into the future, acquiring
abilities it did not have even as recently as during the two Chechen
wars and the August 2008 short war with Georgia. Still, Russia does
not possess attack UAVs and cannot perform the types of stealthy
surgical assaults from unmanned aerial platforms that have become a
trademark of US military operations. Numerous reports have alleged
that various Russian companies are developing “heavy” attack UAVs;
but as of the end of 2017, nothing usable or deployable has been
revealed. This is seen as a serious deficiency, especially in running
low-intensity anti-guerrilla or anti-terrorist operations.
When Russia imported Israeli UAV technology some five years ago, it
did not manage to buy any drones more advanced or bigger than the
Searcher II. On the condition of anonymity, some Russian officials say
Washington forbid the Israelis from selling bigger or more modern
attack-capable UAVs. In an apparent sign of desperation, the Russian
defense ministry allocated budgetary funds to modernize the Forpost,
providing it with attack capabilities. It has been announced that, in
2019, the Yekaterinburg-based military contractor UZGA will begin
producing a modernized Forpost-M, “using Russian-made
components and with attack capabilities.”41 Russian defense industry
sources boast the Forpost-M will be “the best UAV in Russia and
possibly in the world.”42 Of course, a modernized Searcher II is too
light and small to be an effective attack UAV on par with the US MQ-
1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, Israeli Elbit Hermes 450 or IAI Heron. But
at present, it seems to be the only reliable and usable UAV Russia
might be able to convert to perform attack missions.
The Russian Deployment Stays Focused on the Coast
In addition to bombers, attack jets and helicopters, the VKS deployed

in Hmeymim Su-35S, Su-30SM and Su-27SM3 fighter jets to fend off
possible NATO or US-led aerial attacks on Russian troops, aircraft or
bases. The fighters escorted Russian bombers as they flew attack
sorties close to the zones of deployment of US and coalition air forces.
Moreover, the Russian aerial platforms were reinforced with an
elaborate anti-aircraft system, including S-400, S-300B4 and short-
range Pantsir-S1 systems. The Russian fighters in Syria apparently did
not fire a single shot in anger at least until 2018. Nor did the anti-
aircraft missile batteries, with the exception of the Pantsir-S1 that,
according to Shoigu, was used to intercept opposition drones and
rockets (apparently 122-millimeter Grad-type munitions) fired at
Russian troops and bases.43
By 2018, Russian command reorganized the VKS anti-aircraft

defenses in Syria. A mobile anti-aircraft missile battery (“division” in
Russian military terminology) of S-300B4s—apparently the
foundation of anti-aircraft defenses of the Tartus naval base—was
withdrawn back to Russia. The battery had been deployed in Syria
since October 2016 but did not fire a shot. Nonetheless, its long-range
targeting radars locked on “US tactical jets and recon aircraft at
distances of 200–300 kilometers,” according to Lieutenant General
Aleksandr Leonov, the commander of the Army Anti-Aircraft Forces
(Voyskavaya PVO Booruzhonykh Syl RF). “The US tactical pilots were
rattled by the radar lock on,” added Leonov.44
The S-300B4 has been replaced by a second battery or “division” of S-

400s, which has been reportedly deployed close to the city of Masyaf—
once the stronghold-capital of the historical Assassins (Hashashin) in
the Levant—on the border of Hama and Latakia provinces. One S-400
battery is deployed together with several Pantsir-S1 launchers directly
in the vicinity of Hmeymim to defend the base. But the eastward radar
outlook from Hmeymim is hampered by the Syrian Coastal Mountain
Range. A second S-400 battery (together with Pantsir-S1) has

apparently been based on top of the Coastal Mountain Range close to
Masyaf, overlooking Hmeymim and Tartus, providing both bases
with an air-defense umbrella and good radar coverage in all
directions.45
During the fall of 2017, the main campaign effort shifted to the
northeast corner of Syria, close to the Iraqi border. There, Russian
bombers, special forces and privateers or mercenaries from the
notorious private military company (Chastnye Voennie Companiy—
ChVK) “Wagner” were helping pro-al-Assad forces to take over the
oil and natural gas–rich province of Deir el-Zour. Russian sappers
were rushed into Syria using heavy-load An-124 transport jets.
Equipped with the newest PP-2005 pontoon bridge complex
equipment, the sappers built a 210-meter floating bridge over the
Euphrates River at Deir el-Zour for the pro-al-Assad forces to cross.46
On September 23, 2017, a number of top Russian commanders were
killed and wounded in Deir el-Zour, including the commander of the
5th Army in the Eastern Military District, Lieutenant General Valery
Asapov, as well as the commander of the 61st Marines Brigade of the
Northern Fleet, Colonel Velery Fedyanin. Other Russian casualties
included fighters from the Private Military Company (ChVK)
Wagner Group.47
The Deir el-Zour operation was seen as the climax of the Syrian
campaign to vanquish the Islamic State and reinstall President al-
Assad’s rule. By December 2017, the joint efforts of Russian, pro-al-
Assad and pro-Iranian forces, along with the Syrian Democratic
Forces (SDF—a militia alliance composed of Arab and Kurdish
fighters, backed by the US coalition and US Special Forces) effectively
crushed the Islamic State as an organized semi-state. On December
11, 2017, Putin landed on the tarmac of Hmeymim for a surprise visit.
At the airbase, Putin met with his Syrian counterpart, whose regime
had been salvaged by the Russian and Iranian war effort. Putin
announced victory over the Islamic State—“the vanguard of terror”—
thanked Russian pilots and soldiers, and announced the withdrawal

of “a large part” of the Russian forces. The bases in Hmeymim and
Tartus and their garrisons were to stay, of course.48
When the fighting in Deir el-Zour was at its height, the Hmeymim
base turned out to be somewhat too far from the action: Su-25 attack
jets were simply out of range, and Su-24M bombers were operating at
the limit of their effective combat radius. The VKS does not have any
air-refueling capabilities over Syria. To step up the bombing, a force
of heavy Tu-22M3s from different bomber units across Russia was
gathered at the Mozdok airbase, in the steppes of the North Caucasus,
to fly missions from there to Deir el-Zour province—a return sortie of
some 5,000 km.49 Significantly, the Russian military did not try to
establish another airbase somewhere in central Syria in addition to
Hmeymim to better cover all the battlefields. Before the war broke out,
Hmeymim was a civilian airfield; the Russian VKS had transformed it
into a military facility. Russia’s helicopter fleet has established some
refueling and operational stations outside of Hmeymim, but the VKS
jets stubbornly stayed, even though al-Assad would surely have given
the Russians any additional base they might have asked for.
For now, Moscow appears to be focusing on the core mission of

securing the Tartus and Hmeymim bases and does not seem
particularly interested in spreading its thin, limited resources all over
Syria. The Russian force in Syria has dug in where it always wanted to
be: a strategic naval and airbase area on the coast, with a long-range,
multilayer anti-air and anti-ship defensive perimeter. From there, the
Russian military is capable of projecting naval and aerial forces deep
into the Mediterranean and focusing on the always all-important
Turkish Straits.
The Intricate Network of Russian Middle Eastern Alliances
By the end of 2017, the Islamic State had been almost entirely defeated
in both Iraq and Syria. The course of the Syrian civil war had reversed,
and the al-Assad regime now seems more secure than at any point
since the war started, back in 2011. The revived government in
Damascus signed agreements with Moscow, securing for Russia
permanent sea and airbases in Tartus and Hmeymim, on the
Mediterranean coast. Russian Army (“tank”) generals have extended
and fortified their dominance in the main center of gravity of military
(strategic) power in Moscow—the General Staff—at the expense of the
VMF and the VKS commanders. Putin, his generals and the state
propaganda machine are trumpeting a victory in Syria; and Russia has
surely dramatically extended its presence and influence in the Middle
East—in some aspects probably outdoing the mighty Soviet Union’s
outreach in the region at the height of the Cold War, in the 1970s and
1980s.
Moscow cannot match Washington’s military, financial or

technological capabilities in the Middle East or the Mediterranean,
but it seem to be in a unique position to have workable relations with
almost all the different warring parties in the region: Iran, Israel,
Turkey, Iraq (Baghdad government), Damascus (al-Assad), Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Kurds, different Lebanese and Libyan
fractions, Algeria, Qatar, and other Gulf states. Moscow looks to be
trying to position itself as an indispensable force and middleman
everywhere across the Middle East. Putin’s grand all-inclusive anti-
terrorist coalition proposal made in 2015, thus, looks to be
materializing at least on a regional level. The ultimate strategic goal of
this initiative is to weaken Washington’s key Middle Eastern alliances,
diminishing overall US influence and presence in the region.
Moscow has managed to build up a significant

military/security/political relationship with Israel—something
Moscow previously enjoyed only in the 1940s, during the Israeli War
of Independence, and never since. Putin regularly meets and talks
with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And Russian top
military/intelligence chiefs meet, talk and coordinate activities in Syria
with their Israeli counterparts. In December 2017, Avi Dichter, the
chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee,

from the ruling Likud party, visited Moscow leading a parliamentary
delegation. Dichter—a Sayeret Matkal soldier under commander
Ehud Barak, career Shin Bet (internal security service) officer and later
Shin Bet director, as well as former minister of internal security and
home front defense—told Interfax, “Russia is not an enemy, and we
[Israel] have no problem with permanent Russian military presence
in Syria.” Dichter described Russia as a “superpower and ally” that
wants a strategic presence in the Mediterranean, “and we say:
‘Welcome!’” According to Dichter, there are some 10,000 Hezbollah
fighters in Syria and some 20,000 other, mostly Iraqi, pro-Iranian Shia
militia combatants. Israel will not allow these forces to establish
positions anywhere close to the Golan Heights and has been regularly
bombing Iranian and Hezbollah positions in Syria “to send a message”
as well as to prevent offensive arms transfers to Hezbollah, he noted.
Israel has no problem with continued al-Assad rule in Syria as long as
the Iranian influence is kept in check; the government hopes Moscow
will help ensure that happens.50
Russia and Israel have been closely cooperating. Moscow tacitly

accepts intermittent aerial strikes by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
inside Syria, though they have been hitting Russia’s battlefield allies.
Based on unconfirmed reports coming from Iran, the Russian military
allegedly may have provided the IDF with aircraft transponder “friend
or foe” (IFF) identification codes that would automatically prevent the
intentional or accidental launches of SAA or VKS anti-aircraft
missiles from land, air or sea against IDF jets.51 Such an arrangement
would allow the IDF to carry out attack sorties over Syria with
impunity, as a de facto Russian ally; but the IFF codes change often,
and the IDF would lose this privilege (if it indeed obtained it) as soon
as the Russian military command decides Israel should no longer be
counted as an ally. By the end of 2017, both Israel and Russia were
doing their best to keep the tacit alliance alive. It was reported that
Moscow had protested the IDF allegedly helping Syrian rebels. The
Israeli military explained that it was only providing humanitarian aid
to villages in a zone close to the Golan Heights.52 Apparently, both

sides are doing their best to keep their cooperation agreement on an
even keel.
Moscow seems not to mind too much when the IDF selectively attacks
Hezbollah and Iran in Syria. In contrast, when Washington
condemned the clampdown by the Iranian authorities and the IRGC
on street protests inside Iran, Moscow decisively sided with Tehran.
The Russian representative at the UN, Vasily Nabehzya, accused the
US of infringing on Iranian internal affairs and of seeking an excuse
to undermine the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.53
Fighting Sunni jihadists in the Middle East and propping up the al-
Assad regime together with Iran and Hezbollah is seen in Moscow an
important task, but clearly secondary in the overall zero-sum standoff
with the US. The Russian military command accuses the US military
of being in league with the Islamic State and former al-Nusra jihadists
in Syria. It is unclear how much of that is propaganda and what
Russia’s top brass truly accepts (in a zero-sum mindset) as covert
interactions that any reasonable military leader would presumably do.
In any case, this level of institutionalized mutual mistrust greatly
prohibits any meaningful US-Russian anti-terrorist cooperation.
After dark, on December 31, 2017, when the Russians at Hmeymim

and apparently the local Alawite-dominated Syrian security forces
were busy celebrating the New Year, the base was shelled by mortar
fire. The Russian defense ministry acknowledged two fatalities of
service members and an unspecified number of wounded. Several
aircraft were reportedly hit, though the authorities refused to confirm
this. The severity of the damage to the base and aircraft is unclear as
is whether there are plans to restore or eventually scrap any or all of
the hit aircraft. Unconfirmed reports say the two servicemen killed in
the attack were helicopter pilots. Apparently, a small group of repels
(sources in the Russian Defense Ministry say they were from the
former al-Nusra Front) infiltrated the outer perimeter of Hmeymim,
sprayed the tarmac with mortar shells from several kilometers away
and escaped undetected. The outer perimeter defenses were
reportedly the responsibility of the Syrian (Alawite) forces that are
now accused of failing their mission. Hmeymim—a former civilian
airstrip—did not have reinforced concrete hangers for the aircraft,
known in Russia as “caponiers,” or bunkers for the personnel. While
occupying Hmeymim since 2015, the Russian military did not bother
to build permanent fortifications, and the VKS’s highly expensive
aircraft, armed and fueled, stood out in the open.54
The Russian military is now responding by reinforcing the Hmeymim

airbase’s defenses. Caponiers and bunkers will most likely be built. The
Russian military will dig in and mine the entire perimeter with anti-
personnel mines.55 The spectacular New Year’s attack on Hmeymim,
however, raises more serious concerns for Moscow. Its strategic
airbase—where Russia has deployed a bomber and fighter force, long-
range anti-aircraft assets, as well as theater Iskander and Bastion
missiles that potentially may be nuclear tipped—was apparently
vulnerable to a sudden artillery strike and might even be targeted by a
suicide bomb attack in the future. Of course, Russian propaganda
swiftly accused the US and its Special Forces of being behind the attack
on Hmeymim. And angry threats materialized about organizing
attacks on US bases in the Middle East in a similar fashion.56
Conclusion
Russia returned to Syria and the Middle East primarily to secure an

operational base to deter NATO and the United States in the
Mediterranean. But will its Middle Eastern bases ever truly be secure?
Can those bases be an effective strategic asset? And what will be the
cost of keeping them, surrounded by a hostile, unstable and unruly
security environment in Syria? If Hmeymim could be hit by motivated
rebels, so might Tatrus—particularly since both bases were already
targeted by a swarm aerial drone attack in January 2018.
Moscow has a clear strategy in the Middle East, and so far it appears
to be working fairly well. Deadly glitches occur regularly, but they
seem to be manageable and are seen as mostly the result of sloppiness
by the “unreliable” locals the Russian military has always disdained.
The most important fundamental detractor to Russian efforts to
return to the Middle East, looks to be a lack of overall resources to
match Moscow’s overly ambitious objectives. In contrast,
Washington possesses abundant resources, military and otherwise,
but no obvious coherent strategy in the region: US strategy was
reactive under President Barack Obama and apparently has not
improved much since. It is a fascinating contest.
Notes
1
“Sammit ODKB,” Kremlin.ru, September 15, 2015,
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50291.
2
“S tribuny k miru,” Interfax, September 29, 2015, http://www.interfax-
russia.ru/print.asp?id=656523&type=view.
3
“SSHA otkazalis’ prinyat’ delegatsiyu vo glave s Medvedevym dlya obsuzhdeniya
Sirii,” Interfax, October 14, 2015, http://www.interfax.ru/world/473318.
4
“Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennykh sil Rossii general armii Valeriy
Gerasimov: ‘My perelomili khrebet udarnym silam terrorizma,’ ” Komsomolskaya
Pravda, December 27, 2017, https://www.kazan.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693/.
5
“Vystupleniye i diskussiya na Myunkhenskoy konferentsii po voprosam politiki
bezopasnosti,” Kremlin.ru, February 10, 2007,
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
6
“Operativnoye soyedineniye VMF zashchitit interesy RF v Sredizemnom more RIA
Novosti,” RIA Novosti, February 27, 2013,
https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130227/924884303.html.
7
RIA Novosti, “Operativnoye soyedineniye VMF zashchitit interesy RF v
Sredizemnom more RIA Novosti.”
8
“Prezidentu predstavlen Plan oborony Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Kremlin.ru, January
29, 2013, http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17385.
9
“Uroven’ voyennykh ugroz dlya RF k 2030 godu mozhet sushchestvenno
povysit’sya,” RIA Novosti, February 14, 2013,
10
“VS RF na ucheniyakh ‘Kavkaz-2016’ otrabotali bor’bu s krylatymi raketami,”
Interfax, September 14, 2016, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/528124.
11
“General-polkovnik Andrey Kartapolov: U Rossii mozhet poyavit'sya baza v Sirii.
Ona budet i morskoy, i vozdushnoy, i sukhoputnoy,” Komsomolskaya Pravda,
October 16, 2015, https://www.kp.ru/daily/26446/3316981/#close.
12
“Mesto raspolozheniya voyennoy bazy RF v Sirii poka ne opredeleno,” Interfax,
October 16, 2015, http://www.interfax-russia.ru/print.asp?id=663181&type=view.
13
“Soglasheniye s Siriyey o rasshirenii voyenno-morskoy bazy v Tartuse usilit
pozitsii Rossii v Sredizemnom more - Minoborony RF,” Interfax-AVN, December
21, 2017, http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=469716.
14
“U Rossii yest’ dolgosrochnaya strategiya voyennogo prisutstviya v Sredizemnom
more-Sablin,” Interfax-AVN, December 21, 2017,
http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=469750.
15
“Ministr oborony vystupil na zasedanii Soveta Federatsii v ramkakh
‘pravitel’stvennogo chasa,” Interfax-AVN, May 24, 2017,
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12125102@egNews&.
16
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Despite Putin’s Declaration of Victory, Fighting Escalates in
Syria,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 15, Issue 4, The Jamestown Foundation,
January 11, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/despite-putins-declaration-
victory-fighting-escalates-syria/.
17
Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Nachal'nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennykh sil Rossii general
armii Valeriy Gerasimov: ‘My perelomili khrebet udarnym silam terrorizma.’ ”
18
Ibid.
19
“Glavkomom VKS RF naznachen general Surovikin,” Interfax-AVN, November
29, 2017, http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=467806.
20
Interfax, October 31, 2008.
21
“Ofitser pokonchil zhizn' samoubiystvom,” Kommersant, April 23, 2004,
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/469455.
22
“Voyennuyu prokuraturu ne ustroil politseyskiy kandidat,” Kommersant,
December 14, 2011, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1837567.
23
“Na vooruzhenii Sevflota nakhodyatsya samyye sovremennyye podvodnyye lodki,
korabli i samolety – komanduyushchiy,” Interfax-AVN, December 15, 2017,
24
“Demonstratsiya vozmozhnostey: chem i iz chego Rossiya udarila po IGIL s
Kaspiyskogo morya,” Vesti, October 7, 2015,
http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2672786&cid=3962.
25
“ ‘Kalibr’ na chas,” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, December 26, 2017,
https://vpk-news.ru/articles/40592.
26
“Zachem kaspiytsy obnazhili ‘Tomagavki,’ ” Fontanka, October 7, 2015,
https://www.fontanka.ru/2015/10/07/159/.
27
“SSHA nadeyutsya ostavit’ ‘Kuznetsova’ bez topliva,” Vzglyad, October 26, 2016,
https://vz.ru/politics/2016/10/26/674906.html.
28
“Byudzhet remonta i modernizatsii avianostsa, ‘Admiral Kuznetsov’ mozhet byt’
sokrashchen pochti vdvoye,” Interfax-AVN, October 7, 2017,
29
“Tochnyye sroki nachala remonta ‘Admirala Kuznetsova’ poka ne opredeleny,”
Interfax-AVN, December 14, 2017,
30
Interfax-AVN, “Na vooruzhenii Sevflota nakhodyatsya samyye sovremennyye
podvodnyye lodki, korabli i samolety – komanduyushchiy.”
31
“Punkt material’no-tekhnicheskogo obespecheniya VMF Rossii v Tartuse.
Dos’ye,” TASS, December 13, 2017, http://tass.ru/info/4808523.
32
“ ‘Siriyskiy ekspress’ zabuksoval,” Free Press, September 20, 2017,
http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/181633/.
33
Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Nachal'nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennykh sil Rossii general
armii Valeriy Gerasimov: ‘My perelomili khrebet udarnym silam terrorizma.’ ”
34
“Pokoreniye voyny,” Izvestia, December 27, 2017,
https://iz.ru/688413/konstantin-bogdanov/pokorenie-voiny.
35
“Ni razu ne promazali,” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, December 20, 2017,
36
“Bombardirovshchik okazalsya ne v tom polozhenii,” Kommersant, October 11,
2017, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3435128.
37
Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, “Ni razu ne promazali”; “Rasshirennoye
zasedaniye kollegii Ministerstva oborony,” The Kremlin, December 22, 2017,
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56472.
38
Komsomolskaya Pravda, “Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennykh sil Rossii
general armii Valeriy Gerasimov: ‘My perelomili khrebet udarnym silam
terrorizma.’ ”
39
“Tochnaya Stavka,” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, December 26, 2017,
40
“Samyy tsennyy bespilotnik Rossiyskoy armii rusifitsiruyut za 2 mlrd rubley,”
Vedomosti, June 7, 2016,
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016/06/07/643859-mlrd-rublei-
beskonechnii-forpost.
41
“Razvedyvatel’nyye drony ‘Forpost’ prevratyat v udarnyye bespilotniki,”
Rossyskaya Gazeta, May 5, 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/05/05/razvedyvatelnye-drony-
forpost-prevratiat-v-udarnye-bespilotniki.html.
42
“Izrail’skiy BPLA ‘Forpost’ moderniziruyut v Rossii,” Defense.ru, March 17, 2017,
https://defence.ru/article/izrailskii-bpla-forpost-moderniziruyut-v-rossii/.
43
Kremlin.ru, “Rasshirennoye zasedaniye kollegii Ministerstva oborony.”
44
“Divizion sistemy PVO S-300V4 vozvrashchen iz Sirii v punkt postoyannoy
dislokatsii – Minoborony,” Interfax-AVN, December 28, 2017,
45
Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, “Ni razu ne promazali.”
46
“Rossiyskiye voyennyye privezli mashiny dlya forsirovaniya Yevfrata siriyskoy
armiyey-SMI,” Interfax-AVN, September 24, 2017,
http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=462598; “Most cherez Yevfrat
dlya perebroski voyennoy tekhniki i lichnogo sostava na vostochnyy bereg vozveli v
Sirii rossiyskiye avtodorozhniki,” Interfax-AVN, September 26, 2017,
47
“Ikh prosto net. Rassledovaniye,” Novaya Gazeta, October 9, 2017,
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/10/09/74125-ih-prosto-net.
48
“Putin prikazal nachat’ vyvod voysk iz Sirii,” Interfax-AVN, December 11, 2017,
49
“V Murmanskuyu oblast’ vernulis’ samolety Tu-22M3, uchastvovavshiye v
nanesenii aviaudarov po terroristam v Sirii,” Interfax-AVN, December 12, 2017,
50
“Avi Dikhter: yesli kto-to iz terroristov poschitayet Siriyu spasitel’noy gavan’yu,
my prevratim yego zhizn’ v ad,” Interfax, December 5, 2017,
http://www.interfax.ru/interview/590501.
51
“Report: Iran accuses Russia of giving Israel codes for Syrian air defenses,”
Jerusalem Post, March 21, 2017, http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-
Conflict/Report-Iran-accuses-Russia-of-giving-Israel-codes-for-Syrian-air-defenses-
484777.
52
“Rossiya zayavila protest v svyazi s okazaniyem Izrailem pomoshchi siriyskim
povstantsam,” December 14, 2017,
http://www.newsru.co.il/mideast/14dec2017/ru_il_103.html.
53
“Postpred Rossii pri OON prizval SSHA ne vmeshivat’sya vo vnutrenniye dela
Irana,” Interfax, January 6, 2018, http://www.interfax.ru/world/594491.
54
“Khmeymim pod udarom: pochemu rossiyskaya aviabaza v Sirii popala pod
obstrel,” RBK, January 4, 2018,
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/04/01/2018/5a4def379a7947a9e3f00a5b.
55
“Ekspert rasskazala, kak zashchitit’ samolety na aviabaze Khmeymim,” RIA
Novosti, January 5, 2018, https://ria.ru/syria/20180105/1512157084.html.
56
“Obstrel Khmeymima vyyavil probely vo ‘vtorom kol’tse’ oborony,” Vzglyad,
January 5, 2018, https://vz.ru/politics/2018/1/5/902400.html.
2. Strategy in the Black Sea and
Mediterranean
Ihor Kabanenko
Introduction
The current Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation Until 2030

defines six important regional directions for the country’s maritime
policy: Atlantic, Pacific, Indian Ocean, Arctic, Antarctic and Caspian.
And of those, the Atlantic direction—which includes the Baltic, Black
Sea and Sea of Azov, the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the Atlantic
Ocean—is ranked first. The Black Sea region (BSR)—composed of the
Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, and which is closely connected with the
Eastern Mediterranean—is a particularly notable geopolitical space
for Moscow. This region plays an important role in Russia’s military
policy and features its own specifics determined by historical,
geopolitical and other aspects that significantly affect Russia’s broader
southwestern military strategy.
One year prior to Moscow’s illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian

Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stressed that,
The Black Sea Fleet of Russia (BSF) is protecting Russia’s interests

in the southwestern direction, where the most essential threats to
our national interests are concentrated. The fleet is able to carry
34
Strategy in the Black Sea and Mediterranean | 35
out tasks in any areas of the World Ocean important for our
national interests, including, currently, the Mediterranean Sea.1
Additionally, Shoigu has called Ukraine, Syria and the Korean

peninsula strategically important [regions] for Russia.2 And Ukraine,
whose sovereignty has repeatedly been violated as a result of these
“important interests,” is not the only country under threat as a result.
This chapter will analyze Russia’s BSR strategy across the full
spectrum of historical, geopolitical, doctrinal and other domains as
related to the Russian military. Of particular focus will be Russia’s
regional naval and maritime doctrines, the roles electromagnetic
warfare and nuclear weapons play in its strategy, Moscow’s posture in
the Black Sea, as well as the lessons its Armed Forces have learned
from their ongoing operations in Syria and eastern Ukraine.
Historical and Geopolitical Context
For millennia, the Black Sea region, with its complex ethnic diversity,
difficult geography and variable climactic conditions, played the role
of a natural barrier between various civilizations that would otherwise
have clashed. This began to dramatically change with the rise (1299–
1453) and expansion (1453–1566) of the Ottoman Empire, which
eventually became the dominant naval power in the Black Sea, in
control of much of the wider region’s transport routes, including the
sea lanes.
The expansion of Islamic frontiers to the north of the Black Sea

bumped into growing resistance from the Russian Empire.3 Beginning
in the 17th century, the rivalry between the Russian and Ottoman
empires transformed into a hard confrontation, with Russia’s goal
becoming the destruction of its rival. The littoral Black Sea territories
of Crimea, Bessarabia, the Caucasus and the adjacent Balkans thus
became centers of gravity in Russia’s imperial efforts to secure
unimpeded passage for its ships and vessels passing through the
Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Since that time, Russia’s

southwestern geopolitical ambitions became intimately tied to the
geostrategic goal of dominating the Black Sea.
Throughout this period, slogans of “Slavic (Orthodox) unity” served

as a useful tool or justification for securing control over the wider
region’s strategic territories. Similarly, political-diplomatic rhetoric
about “protecting Orthodox populations outside Russia from
oppression under the Ottoman Empire” as well as “supporting
Orthodox Slavic national liberation movements” served as useful
pretexts for the Russian Empire to annex additional territories around
the Black Sea. Though once under control, the Kremlin’s cruel
treatment of populations living on the annexed lands led to mass
forced migrations of various indigenous peoples, as the historical
record shows. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that Moscow’s modern
interpretation of this centuries-old approach, today characterized as
“protecting Russian-speaking population outside Russia,” served as
an ideological basis for the Russian invasions of Georgia (2008) and
Ukraine (2014).
The conviction of Russian and Ottoman leaders in the historical

correctness of their ambitions for Black Sea dominance turned the
region into a theater of nearly continuous bloody wars, with varying
levels of success for the two warring sides. In the Russo-Turkish War
(1768–1774), Russia won a number of Crimean territories and, in line
with its rights negotiated under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, took
the opportunity to conduct sea trade and create new naval forces on
the peninsula. Indeed, since its creation in 1783, the Russian Black Sea
Fleet has been an important hard power instrument of Russian policy
in the region. Its offensive nature, strongly shaped by autocratic
Russia’s 18th-century desire to “restore Orthodox Byzantium,” was
further developed in the years of World War I, World War II and the
Cold War; and these capabilities were explicitly demonstrated during
the annexation of Crimea in 2014.4
Also in 1783, the Russian Empire forcefully annexed the Crimean

Khanate and, later, Ukrainian lands between the Southern Bug and
the Dniester rivers. Then, in 1791, the Sea of Azov became an internal
Russian waterway. Subsequently, the Russian Empire concentrated its
efforts on strengthening its position along the northwestern part of
the Black Sea. Whereas, during succeeding wars with the Porte, Tsarist
Russia moved into Bessarabia, the Caucasus and the Balkans.
Russia’s defeat in the Crimean (Eastern) War of 1853–1856 suspended

and limited Moscow’s expansion in the region for 15 years. Under the
terms of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856, Russia lost its fleet on the
Black Sea. Moreover, Russia was forced to give up the rights it had
been accorded as a result of the earlier Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca
(1774) it signed with the Ottomans: its protectorate over Moldavia
and Wallachia as well as the exclusive right to protect the Christian of
the Ottoman Empire. However, after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–
1878, Russian soldiers returned to the southern part of Bessarabia, the
Karsk region inhabited by Armenians and Georgians, as well as the
strategically important eastern Black Sea port of Batumi. And a series
of victories over the Turkish army in January 1878 allowed Russian
troops to reach Istanbul’s outskirts. Only English ships deployment to
the Sea of Marmara as well as political-diplomatic efforts by Great
Britain and Austria-Hungary forced the Russian tsar’s government to
abandon further offensive actions.5
The Black Sea region played a key role in Russia’s southwestern policy
for centuries. But for most of this long historical era, Russian Black
Sea maritime strategy was oriented along the vertical, “North-South”
axis. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI and subsequent
friendly relations between the newly born Republic of Turkey and
Bolshevik Russia turned the latter’s regional maritime policy 90
degrees, to proceed along the horizontal “East-West” axis. Following
the end of WWII, the Soviet Union’s Black Sea horizontal vector
became dominated by hard power. The Kremlin took control over
most of the Black Sea the Balkan countries, and advanced to North
Africa and the Middle East. When Turkey joined the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952, this was seen in Moscow as
vindication of the Soviet naval strategy, which from the 1970s was
built according to the formula “keep Turkey below the 43rd parallel
and the US beyond the 23rd meridian.”
After the end of the Soviet period, Russia lost much of its influence in
the Black Sea territories occupied or annexed during the bloody wars
of the 18th–20th centuries because Moscow’s former Soviet republics
and satellites, including Ukraine, became independent states. Russian
naval bases, in particular Sevastopol, survived in Crimea, but their
status was not clear. In 1997, the Partition Treaty on the Status and
Conditions of the Black Sea Fleet gave Russian naval forces the
opportunity to stay in Crimea up to 2017. In 2010, this agreement was
prolonged to 2042 by the so-called Kharkiv Pact, signed by then-
president Viktor Yanukovych.
Russia’s Naval Strategy at the Turn of the 20th Century
Historically, Russian (both imperial- and Soviet-era) maritime policy

was militarily and politically motivated, rather than geared toward
maximizing the benefits of maritime commercial activity. Modern
Russia is no exception—the aging and withdrawal of the main Russian
naval assets in the 1990s triggered new thinking on the development
of strategic views and doctrinal provisions of Russian maritime policy,
with no major effort put into addressing the dismal state of the
country’s merchant fleet. The Russian naval leadership’s vision as to
the place and role of Russia in the world/s oceans, built mainly on the
basis of theory and practice of the strategic use of the Soviet Navy, has
become the determining factor in the further development of Russia’s
maritime strategy.
The Russian naval lobby initiated the development of Russian naval

policy in 2000—in particular, “The Fundamentals of the Russian
Federation’s Policy in the Sphere of Naval Activities for the Period
Until 2010.”6 One year later, the “The Maritime Doctrine of the
Russian Federation for the period until 2020”7 was signed by the
president of Russia and the Maritime Board under the government of
the Russian Federation, headed by the prime minister, was formed.
His deputy became the commander-in-chief of the Russian navy
(Voyenno-Мorskoy Flot—VMF).8 The influence of Russian admirals
resulted in the adoption of “The Fundamentals of the Russian
Federation State Policy in the Field of Naval Activities” in 2012,9 this
document’s significant revision in 2017,10 as well as an updated
version of the Maritime Doctrine of Russia in 2015.11
Like during the Soviet era, the Kremlin today links Russia’s naval
activities in the Atlantic direction to opposing NATO and the United
States. Notably, “The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for
the period until 2020” states,
Growing economic, political and military pressure from NATO,

its enlargement to the East was clarified as a determining factor of
Russia's national policy in the Atlantic direction.7
And Russian wording in 2015 became even more stringent: “The

Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation” declares that Moscow
must prevent the advancement of
the [North Atlantic] Alliance’s military infrastructure toward

[Russia’s] borders and attempts to confer global functions [to
NATO].12
While in 2017, one of the main threats to Russian national security

was clarified as,
A number of states’ desire to dominate in the World Ocean,

primarily the United States of America and its allies.13
Key provisions of “Russia’s Naval Policy Until 2030”14 should also be

recognized:
The Russian Navy’s operational and combat capabilities must be

maintained at one of the leading positions in the world, and
second place in terms of combat capabilities;
The Russian Navy must pursue balanced development in order to

prevent the exclusive superiority of the US Navy and other leading
naval powers over it;
Strategic (nuclear and non-nuclear) deterrence, including the

prevention of a “global strike” by the United States [is vital];
The Russian Navy is one of the main instruments of the Russian

Federation’s foreign policy;
The Black Sea Fleet’s operational and combat capabilities [are to

be increased] by developing an interspecific grouping of forces
(troops) on the territory of the Crimean peninsula;
The Russian Federation must keep a permanent naval presence in

the Mediterranean and other strategically important areas of the
world’s oceans, including areas of major maritime transport
communications;
Priority must be given to the development of long-range naval

high-precision cruise missiles with a qualitatively new task of
destroying the enemy's military and economic potential by hitting
its vital facilities from the sea;
Common, interconnected and unified next-generation systems of

naval armaments, ships, submarines, naval aviation and coastal
complexes must be created.
The adoption of these basic strategic maritime policy documents

required a clear long-term concept for the rearmament and
development of the Russian navy. Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, the
commander-in-chief of theVMF (2007–2012) proposed this concept
in April 2008.15 The triad of strategic nuclear submarines, heavy
combat systems (based on aircraft carrier, cruiser and amphibious
forces) and mobile multipurpose offshore platforms (non-nuclear
submarines, corvettes, frigates and destroyers) equipped with long-
range high-precision cruise missiles and air-defense systems
permeates the above-mentioned concept. But in the reality, budgetary
and other restrictions during 2012–2017 significantly hampered
Russia’s naval ambitions.16 Nonetheless, in December 2017, a new
state armament program (covering 2018–2027) was announced. It
placed a special emphasis on equipping troops (forces) with high-
precision air-, land- and sea-based weapons, unmanned strike
complexes, as well as the newest reconnaissance, communications and
electronic warfare systems.17
Domination of the Black Sea Region: From Hidden Underwater

Threats to ‘All-Inclusive’ Naval Platforms and Beyond
The illegal annexation of Crimea opened the door for the

implementation of the Kremlin’s aggressive southwestern ambitions.
Broadly speaking Moscow has resurrected the former Soviet
southwestern policy that envisioned the Black Sea as an “internal
Russian lake” from which it could project naval power into the Eastern
Mediterranean.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the BSF primarily concentrated on sea power
projection to the Mediterranean in order to be able to carry out so-
called “sea control and strike” missions in important sea zones. Today,
however, at least two strategic developments have modified this
primary mission profile: the appearance of General Valery
Gerasimov’s doctrine of modern warfare as well as the creation of
Russian naval long-range cruise missile capabilities.
Modern Russian Black Sea strategy requires maintaining regional

dominance, predicated on developing key combat capabilities that
allow Moscow to:
1. Block attempts by any regional adversary to obstruct Russian

ambitions to dominate the Black Sea or impede its passage
through the Turkish Straits;
2. Provide anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) bubbles in the Black

Sea and Eastern Mediterranean maritime zones (areas);
3. Create a balanced composition of naval forces able to fight on

land, sea, air and the electro-magnetic domains;
4. Provide amphibious power projection into the Black Sea and

the Eastern Mediterranean;
5. Keep Crimean infrastructure and naval assets ready for

nuclear weapons deployments.
Countering Opponents’ Attempts to Obstruct Russian Dominance

of the Black Sea and Free Access to the Mediterranean
Since 2014, Russia has significantly increased the number of its Black
Sea military assets capable of carrying out hidden and covert missions.
Notably, between 2014 and 2016, it has deployed six recently built
Improved Kilo–class submarines to Crimea.18 Thus, at least two
Russian Kilos are likely carrying out 24/7 combat duties in the Black
Sea and beyond, at any given time.
The Kilo-class submarine’s noise-reducing attributes have earned this

vessel the nickname “the Black Hole.” Moreover, it is armed with
land-attack (Kalibr-PL), anti-ship, and anti-submarine weaponry and
can carry out long-term hidden underwater missions, ready to hit
surface or land targets not only within the vicinity of its region of
operation, but far beyond. Throughout the summer of 2017, the

Krasnodar, an Improved Kilo–class submarine subordinated to the
BSF, engaged in a prolonged cat-and-mouse chase with NATO Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) forces during its deployment in the
Eastern Mediterranean. Subsequently, US Navy Captain Bill Ellis,
commander of US ASW planes in Europe, declared, “One small
submarine has the ability to threaten a large capital asset like an
aircraft carrier.”19
Russian could also use Improved Kilos as hidden platforms for naval
special forces (SEAL) operations, particular against undersea cables
connecting the global economy in the Atlantic and the
Mediterranean.20 And it appears Moscow has already attempted such
actions. US Navy Rear Admiral Andrew Lennon, the commander of
NATO’s submarine forces, observed in late 2017,
We are now seeing Russian underwater activity in the vicinity of

undersea cables that I don’t believe we have ever seen. Russia is
clearly taking an interest in NATO and NATO nations’ undersea
[possessions].21
At the same time, Russia demonstrates a readiness for overt military

actions in the Black Sea. Near the Russian-occupied Odeske and
Holitsynske oil and natural gas fields, located within Ukraine’s
exclusive maritime economic zone (EEZ), Russia has created mobile
A2/AD bubbles. BSF combat ships and other assets operate there
around the clock. The 41st Missile Boats Brigade (12 missile corvettes
and boats with 68 cruise and anti-ship missiles on board) is
subordinated to the so-called Crimean Naval Base, located in
Donuzlav Lake, in the northern part of the peninsula.22 In 2016, this
naval unit approached the northwestern part of the Black Sea and
began operating within the vicinity of ten Russian-captured rigs in
four gas fields inside Ukraine’s EEZ. Based on the ranges of their
onboard missiles, these Russian naval assets based out of Donuzlav
could threaten the maritime industrial-port facilities of at least two

littoral states.
The creation of high-probability offensive threats and periodically

raising their perceived likelihood for political-military reasons is, in
fact, characteristic of Russian activities in the region. An important
element of this practice is the flexing of Russian military muscle
whenever NATO members, particular the US, bring warships or
patrol aircraft into the Black Sea. Frequently, these types of
demonstrations by Moscow have resulted in potentially dangerous
military incidents. It should be pointed out that there is not only a
political-military, but also a psychological aspect to these incidents,
associated with Russia’s paranoid desire to “show the Americans.”23
Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, several dangerous military
episodes took place in the Black Sea:
Perhaps the most publicized cases have involved provocative

overflights of NATO ships by Russian strike aircraft. The first such
incident in the Black Sea took place in April 2014, when an Su-24
tactical bomber simulated an attack on the USS Donald Cook (DDG-
75). Soon thereafter, in September 2014, a group of Russian bombers
performed flight maneuvers near the Canadian frigate HMCS Toronto
(F333); one of the aircraft flew at an altitude of only about 300 meters
above the vessel. In June 2016, a Russian aviation group, including
four Tu-22M3 strategic missile bombers, four Su-27 fighters and an
A-50 aerial early warning (AEW) aircraft, carried out a mock
bombing run seemingly targeting a group of NATO ships located in
Constanța (Romania).24 Three incidents in which four Russian aircraft
made low passes occurred on February 2017, as the USS Porter (DDG-
78) was operating in international waters in the Black Sea. One
Russian bomber even came within 200 yards of the US ship.25
Russian fighters have also periodically performed unsafe interceptions

of NATO aircraft. Such incidents took place, notably, on May 9, 2017,
and on November 25, 2017, involving US P-8A Poseidon patrol jets.26
Additionally, Russian intelligence and combat ships routinely track

Alliance joint naval exercises in Black Sea international waters.27 And
indeed, the Russian Ministry of Defense unequivocally warns NATO
countries that their ships will be tracked by Russian radars during
their maneuvers in the Black Sea and that they will be explicitly
targeted by Russian anti-ship missile systems.28
These types of incidents increase the possibility of a serious military

accident with casualties. Moreover, all the above-cited examples took
place in or over international waters, and thus in violation (by Russia)
of the principle of freedom on the high seas recognized by the
Convention on the High Seas (1958) and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982). According to
international law, no state has the right to extend its sovereignty to
any part of the high seas or to the airspace above it or to prevent other
states from exercising their right of freedom of the high seas, including
when it comes to shipping and/or overflights. Instead, Moscow uses
its naval buildup, provocative military activities, and a wide spectrum
of hidden and overt security threats in the region to gain sea and air
superiority and thus demonstrate—explicitly through hard power—
to its regional neighbors “who owns the Black Sea.”
Russian A2/AD Bubbles in Key Maritime Areas
Russia has deployed Bastion and Bal mobile coastal-defense missile

systems, its most advanced S-400 Triumph air-defense missile system,
and high-tech electronic-warfare equipment to Crimea. The occupied
peninsula is also undergoing ongoing refurbishment of Soviet-era
bunkers there and the reanimation of early-warning radar stations.
Together, these upgrades and deployments have effectively
transformed Crimea into the epicenter of a nearly impenetrable land-
based anti-access, area denial bubble, barring enemy forces from
entering or freely operating in the region during a conflict.29
The Crimean peninsula–centered A2/AD bubble is further reinforced

via a “a fortress fleet” in the Black Sea composed of minelayers and
submarines, land-based air support, and coupled with ground-based
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and
electronic warfare systems. This kind of force mixture arguably
represents the most cost-effective and hardest-to-counter method of
controlling littorals and nearby seas. It is characterized by echeloned
missile warfare and coastal-defense systems—in a sense, replicating
the strengths of a naval fleet without its vulnerabilities and thus
playing a prominent role in littoral operations. Indeed, in a tactical
engagement in the littorals, numerous land-based ASCM and SAM
systems can either reinforce the fleet’s firepower in a cost-effective
way, batter the adversary navy, or give the littoral state’s vessels the
opportunity to engage the enemy on more favorable terms.
The installation of a Black Sea A2/AD zone was essentially

acknowledged by the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed
Forces, General Valery Gerasimov, in September 2016. He clearly
noted that,
The balance of forces in the Black Sea has changed in recent years,
and the Turkish navy cannot be called the master in the region
anymore.30
Importantly, Russia’s A2/AD zone in the Black Sea encompasses

Ukrainian waters near Odesa since at least 2015. Though this
maritime territory is part of Ukraine’s continental shelf and EEZ,
Russia has been illegally extracting natural resources from this area’s
seabed, including annual extraction of up to 2 billion cubic meters of
natural gas.31 BSF assets (ships, missile boats, air defense and aviation,
as well as special forces) have routinely and aggressively (including
with the use of weapons) denied Ukrainian naval forces and the State
Border Service of Ukraine access to this area.32
The Black Sea exclusion and area-denial bubble is complemented by

a similar A2/AD zone in the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia began
creating the latter already in 2013, with the deployment of a Russian
Naval Operational Group to the logistics port of Tartus, in Syria. For
now, however, despite the widely advertised deployment of Russian
air-defense systems to Syria in order to defend the country’s air bases
from US cruise missiles,33 those Russian A2/AD asset deployments
have not been sufficient to prevent such Western aerial attacks.34
Tensions Between Modern Naval Warfare Requirements and

Russian Capabilities
One of the key objectives of modern Russia’s “Naval Policy Until

2030”35 is the creation of a balanced composition to the VMF:
The Russian Federation in 2030 has to possess powerful balanced

fleets in all strategic directions, including designed ships capable
of performing tasks in littoral and blue waters as well as ocean
areas; naval aviation and coastal troops equipped with high-
precision weapons; and an advanced system of naval bases and
logistic support.36
But in practice, Moscow has been visibly tilting the balance of its fleet
more strongly toward underwater capabilities. In the last decade,
Russia has dramatically boosted its submarine activity near the
maritime borders of various NATO members.37 At the same time, it
has been actively building blue-water nuclear ballistic-missile
submarines as a key element of Russia’s nuclear triad, as well as multi-
purpose nuclear-powered and conventional submarines. Conversely,
Moscow has paid relatively less attention to the development of its
surface naval forces and maritime aviation. As a result, Russia’s blue-
water surface fleet experienced a dramatic decline in the 1990s and
early 2000s. Only one of its eight Soviet-built Kirov-class
battlecruisers, the Pyotr Velikiy, can still be put out to sea.38
Meanwhile, the Russian aircraft-carrying cruiser, Admiral Kuznetsov,
is undergoing repairs after its late-2016 campaign in Syria, and it is

not clear when it will again be fully operational.39 Russian Krivak-class
frigates have limited capabilities, according to modern naval
standards. Moreover, the Russian navy urgently needs to replace its
Sovremenny-class destroyers and Udaloy-class frigates because their
service lives are ending.40
The same is true of the Black Sea Fleet. More than 80 percent of its
surface ships were built in Soviet times, and their capabilities are now
quite limited. The BSF’s maritime aviation is old as well, excluding the
Su-24M bombers and Su-30 fighters that were deployed in Crimea in
2014–2016. Thus, Moscow’s ambition to create a well-balanced fleet
is being undermined due to two factors: by the BSF’s limited surface
forces capabilities as well as insufficient financing and shipbuilding
capacities. That inherent tension has forced the Russian leadership to
look for alternatives to a balanced naval capabilities development.
And under influence from these factors, Moscow has been looking to
develop operational means to carry out combat actions against an
enemy located within a Russian anti-access, area denial bubble.
The land-based air-defense, anti-surface and early-warning

capabilities that are integral components of Russia’s A2/AD bubbles,
together with long-range offensive and defensive naval means,
provide the BSF with impressive capabilities to hit the enemy and, at
the same time, maintain the combat resilience of Russia’s own naval
assets operating inside the A2/AD zone. Russian military leaders have
assured that this approach is effective in the Black Sea, where
operational dimensions are commensurate with size of the local
A2/AD bubble,41 as well as when engaging in warfare with a weaker
enemy in a small-to-medium-intensity conflict. High-intensity war,
on the other hand, would require maritime activities beyond the
vicinity of land-based A2/AD bubbles. So Russian naval assets could
remain vulnerable while in the Mediterranean, outside of the Syrian
A2/AD bubble.
In the past, Russian naval capabilities development never fully

matched the comprehensive requirements for modern naval warfare;
often, Russian political-military authorities have tried to figure out a
separate way. Notably, the Kremlin decided to postpone building a
previously advertised nuclear destroyer until 202542; whereas, a new
Russian aircraft carrier was never constructed,43 because of financial
and technological constrains. Instead, Russia plans to build six multi-
purpose Admiral Gorshkov–class blue-water frigates. This decision
was facilitated by some key aspects: though the Admiral Gorshkov
frigates are smaller and substantially cheaper than destroyers and
cruisers, at the same time they have a long-enough range to carry out
multipurpose missions in so-called (in Russia) “far maritime zones”
that include the Mediterranean as well. Russian authorities believe
that multi-purpose frigates will allow the country’s surface forces to
increase their capabilities by up to 30 percent. Such outcomes are
expected to be achieved through modern onboard naval weapons:
Kalibr long-range cruise missiles, Onyx anti-ship missiles and
Polyment-Redut missile-defense systems.
Nonetheless, not everything appears to be going smoothly with the

production of the new Russian frigates. Construction of the original,
titular ship of this class, the Admiral Gorshkov, took more than
decade. Russia was supposed to build ten such frigates by the end of
2020.44 But in March 2017, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu admitted
that only two of these ships will be commissioned in 2020.45 Their
number is planned to be increased by up to six in 202546; however,
problems with building the needed gas turbines as well as installing
the Polyment-Redut missile-defense system and other equipment on
these frigates have still not been solved, as of summer 2018.47
Realizing that the mass construction of new Admiral Gorshkov–class

frigates will not take place in the near future, Russia commissioned
three less capable Krivak V–class frigates and deployed them in
Crimea.48 And three additional frigates are waiting on gas turbines in
their shipyard. Originally designed for India, but ultimately purchased
by the Russian VMF, the Krivak V–class frigates are equipped with
Kalibr-NK cruise missiles and should be counted as part of Russia’s
blue-water fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Although loudly voiced as a “success” story by Russian officials, the

indigenous shipbuilding program has been far less impressive in
reality—since 2013, only 16 blue-water-capable multi-purpose naval
platforms (frigates, corvettes and conventional submarines) were
commissioned. Of those, 12 can carry long-range cruise missiles49 and
seven were deployed to the Black Sea.
Chronic delays in the Russian shipbuilding program have forced the

VMF leadership to resuscitate old heavy ships through repair and
modernization. But warship repair plans have been postponed several
times.50 The Slava-class missile cruiser Moskva, the flagship of the
Black Sea Fleet, has been waiting for renovations and modernization
since January 2016.51 Another Russian heavy Kirov-class battlecruiser,
Pyotr Velikiy, part of the Russian campaign in the Mediterranean in
late-2016, needs deep repairs as well. While the battlecruiser Admiral
Nakhimov, which could potentially also undertake such deployments,
is still undergoing long-time repairs that are not scheduled to end
until 2021–2022. Earlier, Moscow planned to install 80 universal
vertical launchers for cruise, anti-ship and air-defense missiles
onboard these warships.52
Based on the above-cited capabilities, Russia may be creating

operational warship groups for short-term, blue-water missions in
limited areas. Therefore, the periodic use of new frigates and
submarines, along with modernized old ships, primarily in the
Eastern Mediterranean, should be expected in the coming years. Yet,
this composition of ships is not enough to deploy balanced naval
groups far from the Russian coast on an ongoing basis—which would
be important to maintain constant sea control. Nevertheless, two
former Supreme Allied Commanders Europe (SACEUR), General
(ret.) Philip Breedlove and Admiral (ret.) James Stavridis, believe
Russian naval activities near NATO’s borders require an adequate

assessment and response from the Alliance.53
Russian Amphibious Capabilities in the Black Sea: Naval Assault

Power Projection
Following the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Moscow

discovered a huge gap in its military capabilities—especially when it
came to carrying out offensive operations. At this time, Russia became
interested in acquiring French Mistral-class helicopter-carrier landing
ships. Their capabilities were considered invaluable for to Russian-
style rapid amphibious-assault operations, allowing for the seizure of
enemy coastal infrastructure via simultaneous attacks from the sea
and air. The commander-in-chief of the VMF at the time, Admiral
Vladimir Vysotsky, bluntly stated in 2011, “The Mistral would give
the Black Sea Fleet the opportunity to carry out its mission in Georgia
in 40 minutes instead of the 26 hours that were required to deliver
Russian troops to the coast.”54
Moscow planned to build four such ships—two in France and then

two in Russia. Notably, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated,
“When we buy [these] ships, we will use them however we please.”55
In other words, the Mistral’s appearance in the Black Sea could not be
excluded. Thus, on September 3, 2014, then–French President
François Hollande decided that the Mistrals would not be delivered to
Russia due to Moscow’s “recent actions in Ukraine.”56
After Russia’s failure to procure the French Mistrals, a new doctrinal

provision appeared in Russian naval policy aimed at “increas[ing] the
BSF’s operational and combat capabilities by developing an
interspecific [sic] grouping of forces (troops) on the territory of the
Crimean peninsula.”57
Within Russian naval doctrine, “interspecific” means simultaneous

military forces at sea, on land and in the air to fulfill operational and
strategic tasks. Historically, amphibious operations have been the

most revealing example of these types of BSF activities. Marine
infantry makes up the main component of these kinds of operations
today—specifically, the 801st Marine Infantry Brigade, traditionally a
well-equipped and well-trained amphibious-assault unit. The
capabilities of this unit have increased substantially since 2014.58 And
in line with the above-mentioned doctrinal shift, Russian military
authorities made the decision to work out joint amphibious
operations. A series of exercises of this type were conducted in Crimea
in 2014–2017, with the largest (as of fall 2018) land, air and sea drills
taking place on March 2017, at the Opuk combat training area, located
near the city of Theodosia. These well-coordinated exercises,
involving thousands of troops, notably marked the first time that the
Russian military “simultaneously alerted” its three large airborne
units—the 7th Mountain Airborne-Assault Division (Novorossiysk),
the 11th Airborne-Assault Brigade (Ulan-Ude) and the 56th Airborne-
Assault Brigade (Kamyishin). During the exercises, these airborne
units worked out joint offensive actions in close interaction with the
801st Marine Infantry Brigade, the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade,
aviation and ships, as well as units of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
In total, more than 2,500 troops, up to 600 combat and auxiliary
vehicles as well as combat ships (including landing vessels), and more
than 45 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters took part in these land-air-
sea exercises.59
After these exercises, Russia deployed the 171st Separate Airborne

Assault Battalion to Crimea.60 This battalion is subordinated to the 7th
Guard Airborne Mountain Assault Division of the Southern Military
District. The 171st Airborne Assault Battalion’s specialization is
reconnaissance-assault operations in mountainous and urban areas
along with raid actions. But, the unit’s most important mission is to
establish a forward airborne bridgehead to provide the 7th Division’s
deployment in Crimea, if needed.
At the same time, Russian landing ships’ capabilities in the Black Sea
remain limited. Moscow is attempting to close this gap by building
Priboy-class amphibious-assault ships.61 Two such ships are included
in the state armament program for 2018–2025. According to Russian
Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov, the first of these new ships will
be commissioned in 2022, and the second—five years later.62 And
given Russia’s broader southwestern strategy, it cannot be ruled out
that these vessels will eventually also make an appearance in the
Eastern Mediterranean.
Russian Electronic Warfare Operations in the Black Sea Region
Russia has consistently invested in Electronic Warfare (EW)

capabilities for the Armed Forces since 2009. Indeed, modernization
of the EW inventory is a key element of the State Armaments Program
up to 2025.
Traditionally, Russian EW has been part of so-called “combat

support,” aimed to provide forces (troops) sustainability/resilience
during combat operations. It is clearly tailored to target NATO’s
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and is an integral part—an
“electronic bastion”—of Russia’s A2/AD bubbles in the Black Sea.
Russian military strategists and experts believe that electronic warfare
capabilities can increase the combat potential of military forces by up
to two times, reduce aircraft losses by up to six times, and combat ship
losses—up to three times. Namely, Russian EW involves
damaging/destroying command-and-control networks through
jamming, disrupting and interfering with radio communications,
hampering the work of radar and other sensor systems, and muting
GPS signals of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and other assets63.
Russia is actively developing a “total package” of EW systems to

include a broad frequency range; these seem advanced and capable. In
addition to systems for surveillance, protection and countermeasures
(jamming), it has also introduced measures to protect Russia’s own

usage of the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). These systems offer
countermeasures against “Western” civilian and military usage of the
EMS. Much of this technology in the Russian inventory is highly
mobile, including small systems deployable on UAVs, making
targeting and neutralizing them more complex and challenging.
More than a dozen different Russian EW systems have been created

in recent years. And many are already being introduced in units across
all the services stationed in the Southern and Western Military
Districts as well as the BSF. The most capable such systems in the
Black Sea region are:
 Murmansk-BN64—designed for electronic suppression of

enemy radio reconnaissance. The complex, which is included
in the 475th Electronic Warfare Center of the Black Sea Fleet,
can “stun” and “dazzle” reconnaissance sensors of
“intelligent” enemy weapons at distances of up to 5,000
kilometers;
 Moskva-165—designed to conduct radio-technical

intelligence. It gathers information about sources of
electromagnetic radiation within a radius of 400 km,
including from aircraft, homing missiles, mobile and
stationary air-defense systems, radio transmitters, and other
objects emitting radio waves. Data from the Moskva-1 is
useful for anti-aircraft missile systems, including the latest S-
400 complex, which has the same range of detection as the
Moskva-1;
 Krasuha-466—designed to defend against enemy attacks on

command posts, force groupings, as well as industrial and
administrative facilities. The system suppresses the
functioning of electronics-powered stationary and mobile
objects with the help of interference effects in what one
Russian source describes as “smart” operations in order to

distinguish between enemy and friendly signals inside the
Krasuha’s area of operations. This system is capable of
blinding not only enemy fighters or bombers, but also
ground-based radars, airborne early-warning and control
(AWACS) aircraft, and even spy satellites. The complex’s
horizontal and vertical ranges reach 300 km. It also counters
enemy drones and unmanned systems. It should be noted
that, in 2015, the “Krasuha-4 was deployed at Russia’s
Khmeimim military airbase in Syria;
 Mi-8MTPR-167—electronic warfare helicopters equipped

with Rychag-AV jamming stations. One of the main ways
these systems have been employed by Russia has been to deal
with counter-air-defense systems and complexes by reducing
their effectiveness though muting and jamming their radio
signals.
Moscow is stepping up its efforts to renew and modernize the Russian

EW inventory; and this effort is complemented by changes to
organization, doctrine, command structure, training and tactics, as
well as techniques and procedures. The effect of those changes is
evident in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, where EW forms an
organic part of Russia’s kinetic and non-kinetic operations—both in
support of proxy forces and conducted independently.
Currently, Russian EW development is shifting from combat support

operations to a legitimate electromagnetic warfighting domain—on
par with the air, sea or land. Major General Yuriy Lastochkyn, the
chief of the Russian EW Troops, in an interview on April 24, 2017,
outlined five key Russian EW transformations, including what had
been accomplished in 2009–2017 and what should be done by 202068:
1. Modern stage of Russian EW Troops development—

extension of the range of their tasks, aimed at the effect of
using advanced EW assets comparable in effectiveness with

high-precision weapon strikes;
2. Defining the objectives of innovative EW development in five

areas: the deployment of controlled fields of radio
suppression in enemy territory on the basis of unified small-
size reconnaissance and jamming modules delivered by
UAVs; the creation of the means of destruction via powerful
electromagnetic radiation on the basis of the application of
specialized ammunition and mobile complexes; the
development of software impact technologies against highly
organized management systems to violate the availability,
integrity and confidentiality of information; the introduction
of techniques to spoof radio electronic signals and confuse
enemy command-and-control systems; increasing the level of
information security of EW management bodies (points),
improving the algorithms of decision-making support at the
expense of a single contour of command and control of forces
and assets;
3. Practical commendation of the promising results of “Electron

2016,” a special Armed Forces research exercise involving
Russia’s EW. The troops practiced creating an EW grouping
in a strategic direction as well as carried out military-technical
experiments prepared by the specialists of the Defense
Research Institute. Most importantly, the exercise resulted in
new recommendations to military command agencies on
organization and operational doctrines;
4. Formation of the EW Situational Center and automation of

integrated information in EW units will be complete with the
creation of the Unified Information Space of the Russian
Armed Forces in the coming years. At that point, the Russian
military will be able to use all available data in the operational
and radio electronic environment;
5. Forecasts to 2020—the whole complex of measures for the

development of EW Troops will significantly increase their
contribution to gaining battlefield superiority in the
management and use of weapons. The volume of effectively
performed EW tasks in various strategic directions will
increase by 2–2.5 times and will reach 85 percent by 2020.
Certainly, strong Russian ambitions have not translated to 100

percent implementation. But, the trends are clear. Moscow is looking
to secure integrated and synchronized C2 and EW capabilities that
will not only contribute to greater force resilience, but will also allow
Russia to conduct independent and joint EW operations with other
military assets—from the strategic to the tactical level. In this way, the
“BAIKAL-1” automated C2 system has been upgraded to the
“BAIKAL-1ME” version.69 Such developments allow Russian forces
to, for instance, establish highly integrated air-defense networks and,
thus, improve response times, promote situational awareness and
enhance coordination between force elements.
One more notable example of Russian advances in EW could be

observed in a peculiar case of satellite navigation problems in the
Black Sea, on June 22, 2017. The master of a ship off the Russian port
of Novorossiysk, not so far from Kerch Strait, discovered that his GPS
put him in the wrong spot—more than 32 kilometers inland, at
Gelendzhik Airport. After double-checking that the navigation
equipment was working properly, the captain contacted other nearby
ships. Their AIS traces—signals from the automatic identification
system used to track vessels—placed them all at the same airport. At
least 20 ships were affected this way. Experts now consider this a
documented use of GPS misdirection—a spoofing attack of the type
long warned about but that, heretofore, had never been seen in the
wild. As such, it is evidence of Russian experiments with new forms of
electronic warfare.70
All of the above incidents and stated goals illustrate Russia’s growing
confidence in its ability to operate in the electromagnetic (and cyber)
warfighting domain.
The Growing Threat of Naval Mines in the Black Sea
Historically, naval mines played an important role in maritime

warfare in the Black Sea. Spurred on by lessons learned during World
War I and World War II, the Soviet Black Sea Fleet deployed
considerable numbers of offensive and defensive mines in the Black
Sea littoral waters, particularly in the northwestern portion of this
body of water.71 Unexploded WWI- and WWII-era naval mines still
lay at the bottom of the Black Sea to this day, threatening local
shipping.72
The modern BSF has accumulated considerable experience in mine

warfare in the region. This fleet has traditionally been the navy’s leader
when it comes to its ability to lay multiple large minefields.73 The
Fleet’s minesweepers and landing ships as well as maritime aviation
are able to lay more than 1,000 naval mines at once. It fields 500–
1,500-kilogram anchor and bottom mines, equipped with combined
fuses, which can be used by aircraft, surface ships and submarines.
Among the modern types are MDM-1 and MDM-3 mines, which
weigh about a ton each.74 The depth of their setting can reach 120
meters, and the radius of the affected zone—up to 50–70 meters. A
significant number of traditional anchor mines (mostly non-contact
mines), including deep-sea mines, can be used at depths of up to 1,500
meters. The Russian arsenal also includes a considerable number of
RM-1 and PM-2 reactive-emerging mines. The most modern model
is the anti-submarine complex PMK-2. Russia increased the
production of naval mines after annexing Crimea.
Naval mines, which are characterized by great destructive power and

cost-effectiveness, are particularly difficult to detect and neutralize. As
such, they have a powerful psychological effect. Minefields to
blockade particular sea areas, naval bases or ports can be installed

densely (whereby the probability of detonation is 0.6–0.8) or sparsely
(with probability of detonation being 0.1–0.3). Even a single naval
mine could be used in order to pose a threat to freedom of navigation
in an area where merchant shipping is particularly heavy. The
northwestern part of the Black Sea is particularly prone to naval
mines. And the operational size of this area is such that were a mine
to suddenly explode beneath the hull of even just one or two
commercial vessels, this would likely entirely hinder further maritime
navigation throughout the Black Sea until adequate counter-measures
could be taken—negatively affecting the economies of all littoral
states. The Crimean annexation underscored that surprise,
stealthiness and maskirovka are key elements of Russia’s military
approach. Therefore, it would not be outside the realm of possibility
for Russia to carry out concealed offensive mine activities in the
northwestern portion of the Black Sea. Whereas, in the event of open
hostilities, the probability of more intensive and more overt mine
warfare in the Black Sea should be expected.
The BSF intensively trains for minelaying and mine countermeasure

operations; landing ships, corvettes, minesweepers and other assets
are all involved in these activities.75 Admiral Alexander Vitko, the
commander of the BSF, noted that, in 2017, “Crew training for laying
minefields was resumed for the first time after a long break.”76
Taking this threat of mines into consideration, therefore, NATO and

its regional partners will need to develop relevant naval capabilities
for systematic and “on-call” mine-countermeasure (MCM)
operations in the Black Sea.
Russian Black Sea Nuclear Policy: Crimean Nuclear Intrigue and

Pragmatic Reality
During the December 2017 Defense Ministry Collegium, Russian

President Vladimir Putin noted that, within the context of the
modernization of the Russian Armed Forces, special attention will be

accorded to the Strategic Nuclear Forces.77
The Black Sea was never excluded from Moscow’s nuclear policy.
Indeed, a developed system of nuclear ammunition bases,
transportation and loading facilities has existed in Crimea since Soviet
times. And during the 1970s–1980s, Black Sea Fleet assets carried out
their combat duties with nuclear munitions on board. Nuclear-
capable ships and submarines would sail out into the Mediterranean
Sea, while the 2nd Naval Missile-Carrying Air Division (Tu-22M3
aircrafts) operated out of an airbase near Simferopol.
As the Cold War came to a close, nuclear warheads were moved out
of Crimea based on a set of strategic agreements made in 1991 by
George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev to remove nuclear sea-
launched cruise missiles from ships and submarines—a decision
subsequently confirmed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.78 At the
same time, however, the relevant systems for operating or
safeguarding onboard nuclear munitions were never dismantled from
BSF vessels. These systems have been maintained in good working
order to this day.
Intrigue over whether Moscow might be planning to redeploy nuclear

weapons to Crimea was rekindled based on a statement by Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in December 2014—asked whether
the annexed peninsula could host Russian nuclear weapons, he
pointedly answered in the affirmative. This pronouncement was
further exacerbated by news suggesting that the Crimean nuclear base
Feodosia-13, located underneath a mountain, was being renovated.79
According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of
Defense of Ukraine,
Nuclear weapons delivery systems are now located on the

territory of Crimea—at military airfields and at the Sevastopol
naval base. The nuclear warheads themselves are located on the
territory of the Southern Military District of the Russian

Federation. They can be delivered either to Crimea to equip naval
assets there, or these nuclear munitions can be placed onto
[Crimean-based] aircraft that land at airfields of the Southern
Military District.80
Drills to work out the logistical models for supplying nuclear

munitions to Crimea should be noted as well.81
Undoubtedly, nuclear ammunition facilities located on the territory

of the Russian Southern Military District allow for the delivery of
nuclear warheads to ships, submarines and aircraft. The Novorossiysk
naval base, equipped with piers and loading capabilities, as well as the
Southern Military Districts’ network of military airfields already exist
in part for this very purpose. Therefore, there is no direct expediency
to deploy nuclear weapons to Crimea. Moreover, Russia’s sensitivity
to the political consequences associated with a unilateral repudiation
of the above-cited 1991 agreement by, for example, deploying cruise
missiles with nuclear warheads to Crimea, should also be taken into
account.
At the same time, the Kremlin may be willing to use “nuclear

blackmail” within the Crimean context at various levels of intensity—
from exacerbating the rumors and intrigue about purported
deployments of nuclear arms to Crimea (low threat level) to actual
transfers and their deployment to naval vessels in the Black Sea (high
threat level). Simultaneously, a wide spectrum of “hybrid”-style
contingencies likely exist between these threat levels. Experience
shows that nuclear saber rattling and rhetoric has always been of a
purely strategic nature for Russia and been employed as part of a
broader military-political package—as was particularly notable
during the Cold War. Time will tell exactly how modern-day realities
shape up.
Conclusion
The Kremlin’s ambitions for the military-strategic domination of the

Black Sea region have not faded away since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Particularly in the recent decade, Russia activities in the region
have trended toward encouraging instability, confrontation and wars.
Armed conflict in Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea and war
in Donbas, as well as the involvement in the Syrian civil war all
represent separate links in a single chain connecting the Kremlin’s
southwestern ambitions with new rounds of regional turbulence.
Russia’s military strategy in the Black Sea region is highly centralized,

as the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces seeks to strictly follow
the Kremlin’s strategic and doctrinal provisions and decisions. First
of all, the Kremlin is determining the Russian navy’s combat
capabilities development until 2025 and beyond. According to expert
estimates, in 2014–2017, total missile salvo capacities of the Black Sea
Fleet increased by 2.4 times and its capabilities to project sea power
into the Eastern Mediterranean grew 1.4 times. Strike, assault and
fighter aviation units were deployed to airfields across Crimea; the
22nd Russian Army Corps was formed; and the 810th Marine Infantry
Brigade was reinforced with modern weapons. Additionally, modern
Russian air-defense systems, including the S-400 Triumph, were
deployed to the peninsula. Finally, A2/AD zones were created in the
Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.
The rise in military incidents in the Black Sea over the last several
years have correlated with Russia’s growing vision of this body of
water as an “internal Russian lake” and mounting ambition in
Moscow to “return Russia to its former greatness” in the region via
hard power domination. Generally, the degree of Russia’s hard-power
activity in the Black Sea, the transformation of Crimea into a
“peninsula-fortress” and further plans to build up Russian military
capabilities in the rest of Black Sea region, including the Sea of Azov
as well as the Eastern Mediterranean, should be taken seriously.
Lessons from the Caucasus, Crimea and Donbas seem to underscore

that the Kremlin’s southwestern policy agenda again includes
territorial claims on regional neighbors, which Russia is willing to act
on using military force. Meanwhile, the Kremlin continues to seek out
weaknesses in its neighbors, directly influencing the most vulnerable
areas in order to create advantageous condition for the potential use
of military power.
Russian logic to adopt “all-inclusive” naval platforms for

simultaneous warfare in the sea, land and air domains is clear. At the
same time, budgetary shortfalls, technological problems and import
restrictions due to Western sanctions have significantly impacted the
implementation of Russia’s ambitious southwestern plans.
Undoubtedly, at least a portion of the number of doctrinal provisions
in Russia’s naval strategy has become declarative. The BSF is far from
a balanced force: even as most of its naval forces still date back to the
Soviet period, shipbuilding, repair and modernization processes have
been progressing too slowly, thus preventing Russia from achieving
its blue-water ambitions in the medium-term perspective. An
estimated ratio of BSF warships presently under operational use is
only about 22–25 percent, thus highlighting the fleet’s low technical
and operational readiness. The military assets newly deployed to
Crimea in 2014–2017, including EW complexes, fell short of their
planned operational capabilities. Furthermore, the lack of modern
amphibious ships limits the BSF’s actual offensive capabilities on
shore. In recent years, only two multipurpose frigates were
commissioned instead of the originally planned six such vessels.
However, it would be a mistake to consider Russia’s Black Sea strategy
purely from the standpoint of traditional military capabilities. In
accordance with the Russian style of so-called “Hybrid” or, more
accurately, New Generation Warfare, Moscow’s regional strategy
pointedly includes different interconnected hidden and overt actions.
Thus, Russian activities in the Black Sea and beyond over the past
decade or so have included propaganda, disinformation and the
dissemination of “fake news”; the subversion of spies, agents of
influence and “useful idiots”; foreign infiltration, forced

disintegration, subversion and defection; as well as assassinations,
sabotage, coup d’états and so on. Such politico-diplomatic,
informational, and special forces actions, along with other New
Generation Warfare tactics have been complemented periodically
through the overt use of military force of various scale and intensity.
Russian Black Sea naval assets play an important role in this type of
warfare, which has clear similarities with Soviet-style “Political
Warfare.”82 The BSF has accumulated a great deal of political warfare
experience thanks to the use of the fleet’s so-called “cultural-
enlightenment institutions” (officers’ and sailors’ clubs, theater
troupes, music bands, military newspapers, etc.) to influence the local
Crimean community and even to engage in direct information
warfare. Not only Ukraine, but the Balkans and the Caucasus have
been identified as bridgeheads for Russian expansion into the region.
In general, Moscow’s Black Sea strategy of achieving regional

dominance is based upon a multi-pronged approach: 1) naval
activities specifically designed to threaten other regional states; 2) the
creation of A2/AD bubbles to boost the resilience of Russian naval
forces; 3) the intimidation of Black Sea neighbors by pumping Russian
military muscles; 4) the identification of the United States and NATO
as the main threat to Russia’s maritime interests; 5) the development
of naval capabilities based on long-range missiles; 6) the
establishment of a geopolitical raison d’être for Russia’s regional
military ambitions; 7) the maintenance of the other littoral states
under Moscow’s influence, with a peculiar policy concerning Turkey
aimed at ensuring unimpeded passage through the Turkish Straits for
Russian naval assets; and 8) the achievement of superiority in the EW
warfighting domain. Overall, the goal of this strategy is to allow the
Russian state to be able to push itself out beyond the geopolitical
triangle composed of:
 The US and non-Black Sea NATO countries—to allow Russia

to operate freely both in the Black Sea and, if possible, the
Eastern Mediterranean;
 The Black Sea NATO countries (except Turkey), as well as

Ukraine and Georgia—to ensure freedom of action near their
coast lines;
 Turkey—for the ability of its naval forces to operate below the

43rd parallel and out in the Mediterranean; at the same time,
to convince Ankara that Moscow’s political-military game in
the region complements their bilateral “common regional
interests.”
In this situation, NATO’s southern flank is becoming a problem for

the Alliance. The way to solve these problems is largely determined by
two aspects: the Alliance’s ability to properly assess the security
situation in the region as well as its subsequent response. NATO and,
in particular, US maritime activities in the region, with the
involvement of Ukraine and Georgia, are thus vital in this regard. The
creation of a common regional naval project (a Black Sea NATO
Naval Formation that would include Ukraine and Georgia) and its
activation could be a particularly useful response to Russia’s Black Sea
strategy and its activities. Of particular importance to such a NATO
Black Sea partnership policy would be a Turkey-Ukraine tandem due
to these countries’ geostrategic locations (both have the longest Black
Sea coastlines and largest exclusive maritime economic zones, with
Ukraine’s bordering with Russia, while Turkey borders Syria and
Iraq) as well as their chosen geopolitical orientations (Turkey is
member of NATO, while Ukraine is a distinctive partner of the
Alliance). Strengthening the Turkey-Ukraine security and defense
partnership could thus help catalyze the efforts of other Black Sea
states as well as jumpstart the integration of their approaches into a
common, rational whole.
At the same time, however, Russia could try to take advantage of

Turkey’s steadfast position on the principles of the Montreux
Convention, the Black Sea Harmony framework as well as the
prerogatives of the region’s countries to solve their own problems—
i.e., without the involvement of outside powers like the US. The
Russian proposal to build a Black Sea security agenda “exclusively
[with the involvement of] the two main regional powers” could
encourage Turkey to turn eastward geopolitically while exerting
additional political pressure on the Alliance. Nevertheless, the
budding relationship between Moscow and Ankara could be more
fragile that it may outwardly appear: ultimately, Moscow is more than
likely to once again show Turkey Russia’s real face by unilaterally
violating international agreements or playing geopolitical games even
as Russian diplomats continue to promise Ankara they can be
“partners and friends.”83
Notes
1
Andrey Gavrylenko “Na Chernomorskom rubezhe,” Red Star, February 22, 2013,
http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/nekrolog/item/7671-na-chernomorskom-rubezhe.
2
“Shoygu nazval Ukrainu, Siriyu i Koreyskiy poluostrov strategicheski vazhnymi
dlya RF regionami,” TASS, May 24, 2017, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4276229.
3
Olga Kovalevska “Chorne more v heopolitychnykh viziyakh ukrayintsiv,” Tyzhden,
October 22, 2016, http://tyzhden.ua/History/176543.
4
“Kak Rossiya zakhvatila Krym: Minyust sozdal khronologiyu anneksii,”
Segodnya.ua, June 1, 2017, http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/pnews/kak-rossiya-
zahvatyvala-krym-minyust-sozdal-hronologiyu-anneksii-1026294.html.
5
Ihor Kabanenko “Strategic Overview of the Russian Maritime Threat to Ukraine:
Mariupol and Odesa at Stake,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation,
July 13, 2017 https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-overview-russian-maritime-
threat-ukraine-mariupol-odesa-stake/.
6
“Osnovy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyenno-morskoy deyatel'nosti na
period do 2010 goda,” Flot, March 4, 2000,
http://flot.com/nowadays/concept/osn_napr.htm.
7
“Morskaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2020 goda,” Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, August 18, 2004,
http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/462098.
8
“Morskaya kollegiya pri pravitel'stve Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” http://marine.gov.ru/.
9
“Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyenno-
morskoy deyatel'nosti na period do 2020 goda,» BlackSeaFleet, January 20, 2013,
http://blackseafleet-21.com/news/20-01-2013_osnovy-gosudarstvennoj-politiki-
rossijskoj-federatsii-v-oblasti-voenno-morskoj-dejatelnos.
10
“Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyenno-
morskoy deyatel'nosti na period do 2030 goda,” President of the Russian Federation,
decree № 327, July 20, 2017, http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42117.
11
“Osnovopolagayushchiye dokumenty Morskoy kollegii pri pravitel'stve
Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” http://marine.gov.ru/about/maindocs/.
12
“Morskaya doctrina of the Russian Federation,” July 26, 2015,
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50060.
13
President of the Russian Federation, “Osnovy gosudarstvennoy politiki
Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyenno-morskoy deyatel’'nosti na period do 2030
goda.”
14
Ibid.
15
“Glavnokomanduyushchiy VMF Rossii admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy vstretilsya s
predstavitelyami SMI,” Ministry of Defence of Russian Federation, February 17,
2012, http://mil.ru/et/news/more.htm?id=10956737@egNews.
16
“Avianostsam byt,” Lenta.ru, July 28, 2008,
https://lenta.ru/articles/2008/07/28/carrier/; “Perspektivnyy esminets rossiyskogo
VMF budet mnogotselevym, osnashchen udarnym raketnym oruzhiyem i pochti
nevidim,” Novosti OPK, June 23, 2009; “MO RF reshilo zakazat' vosem' atomnykh
esmintsev ‘Lider,’ ” TASS, September 10, 2016, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3610760.
17
Alexey Zakvasyn, “‘Rossiya dolzhna byt' sredi gosudarstv-liderov’: Putin prizval k
stroitel'stvu armii novogo pokoleniya,” RT, December 22, 2017,
https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/463425-putin-armia-minoborony-shoigu.
18
Anastasiia Ivanova, “‘Rasshireniye voyennogo prisutstviya’: v Krymu sozdana
samodostatochnaya gruppirovka voysk,” November 7, 2017,
https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/447129-genshtab-krym-gruppirovka.
19
Christopher Woody, “A cat-and-mouse game between NATO ships and a Russian
sub hints at changes happening in naval warfare,” October 20, 2017, Business
Insider, http://www.businessinsider.com/nato-ships-russian-sub-in-mediterranean-
hint-at-changing-naval-warfare-2017-10.
20
Submarine Cable Map, TeleGeography, https://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/.
21
Christopher Woody, “Russia’s undersea naval activity is at record levels, and
NATO is worried about a crucial lifeline to the world,” Business Insider, December
24, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-increased-naval-activity-
threatening-undersea-cables-2017-12.
22
Pavel Zavolokyn, “Krymskaya VMB: vozrozhdeniye utrachennogo,” Red Star,
December 5, 2014, http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/newspaper/item/20382-
krymskaya-vmb-vozrozhdenie-utrachennogo.
23
“On this day: Russia in a click,” RT Russiapedia, July 26, 2017,
https://russiapedia.rt.com/on-this-day/july-26/.
24
Andrey Klymenko, “Voyenno-morskoye prisutstviye NATO v Chernom more i
militarizatsiya Kryma,” Black Sea News, July 08, 2016,
http://www.blackseanews.net/read/116989.
25
Sam LaGrone, “USS Porter Buzzed by Russian Planes in Black Sea,” February 14,
2017, https://news.usni.org/2017/02/14/uss-porter-buzzed-russian-planes-black-
sea#sthash.C5DFZ6NG.dpuf.
26
Sergey Gromenko, “Rossiya i SSHA v nebe nad Krymom: nazrevayet li voyennyy
konflikt?” Krym Realii, May 25, 2017, https://ru.krymr.com/a/28508483.html; Ryan
Browne, “Russian jet makes ‘unsafe’ intercept of US Navy aircraft,” CNN, November
27, 2017, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/27/politics/russia-us-unsafe-
intercept/index.html.
27
“V rayone provedeniya ‘Si Briz-2016’ obnaruzheny rossiyskiye korabli-
razvedchiki,” 112 Channel, July 27, 2016, https://112.ua/obshchestvo/v-rayone-
provedeniya-si-briz-2016-obnaruzheny-rossiyskie-korabli-razvedchiki-
327694.html; “Za ucheniyami ‘Si Briz – 2016’ v Chernom more sledyat korabli-
razvedchiki Rossii,” Gordonua, July 29, 2016,
http://gordonua.com/news/politics/za-ucheniyami-si-briz-2016-v-chernom-more-
sledyat-korabli-razvedchiki-rossii-142932.html.
28
“Shoygu rasskazal, chto Rossiya sdelayet s flotom NATO u Kryma,” Pravda.ru,
February 6, 2017, https://www.pravda.ru/news/world/06-02-2017/1324015-nato-0/.
29
Bleda Kurtdarcan, Barın Kayaoğlu, “Russia, Turkey and the Black Sea A2/AD
Arms Race,” The National Interest, March 5, 2017,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-turkey-the-black-sea-a2-ad-arms-race-
19673.
30
“Genshtab: Chernomorskiy flot Rossii mozhet unichtozhit' desant protivnika
yeshche v portakh,” TASS, September 14, 2016, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3619937.
31
“Rossiya nezakonno dobyvayet na shel'fe Chernogo morya 2 milliarda
kubometrov gaza v god – ‘Chernomorneftegaz,’ ” UNIAN, November 3, 2016,
https://economics.unian.net/energetics/1604426-rossiya-nezakonno-dobyivaet-na-
shelfe-chernogo-morya-2-milliarda-kubometrov-gaza-v-god-
chernomorneftegaz.html.
32
“Ukrayins’kyy litak obstrilyaly nad morem iz zakhoplenykh RF vyshok,”
Ukrainska Pravda, February 1, 2017,
http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2017/02/1/7134135/.
33
Andrey Rezchikov, Nikita Golobokov, Mikhail Moshkin, “Rossiyskiye S-300
zakryli nebo Sirii ot amerikanskikh krylatykh raket,” Vzglyad, October 7, 2016,
34
Tom Balmforth, “After U.S. Strikes Syrian Air Base, Russians Ask: ‘Where Were
Our Vaunted Air Defense Systems?’ ” Radio Free Liberty, Radio Liberty, April 7,
2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/weher-was-the-s-300-s-400-missile-defense-
systems/28417014.html.
35
Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyenno-morskoy deyatel’nosti na period do 2030
goda.”
36
Ibid.
37
112 Channel, “V rayone provedeniya ‘Si Briz-2016’ obnaruzheny rossiyskiye
korabli-razvedchiki.”
38
“‘Petr Velikiy’ postavyat na remont posle 2018 goda,” RIA Novosti, November 16,
2016, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20161116/1481474295.html.
39
“Remont ‘Admirala Kuznetsova’ nachnetsya srazu posle soglasovaniya
goskontrakta,” Voenno-Promyshlenniy Kuryer, December 25, 2017, https://vpk-
news.ru/news/40575.
40
Andrey Rezchikov, “Rossiya bol’she ne mozhet pozvolit’ sebe okeanskiy flot,”
Vzglyad, April 21, 2017, https://vz.ru/politics/2017/4/21/324418.html.
41
Voenno-Promyshlenniy Kuryer, “Remont ‘Admirala Kuznetsova’ nachnetsya
srazu posle soglasovaniya goskontrakta.”
42
Alexander Chrolenko, “Atomnyy esminets ‘Lider’: kak Rossiya poluchit
prevoskhodstvo v Mirovom okeane,” RIA Novosti, July 29, 2017,
https://ria.ru/analytics/20170729/1499181539.html.
43
“Avianostsam byt’,” Lenta.ru, July 28, 2008,
https://lenta.ru/articles/2008/07/28/carrier/.
44
Voenno-Promyshlenniy Kuryer, “Remont “Admirala Kuznetsova” nachnetsya
srazu posle soglasovaniya goskontrakta."
45
“VMF poluchit dva novykh fregata s ‘Kalibrami’ do 2020 goda,” Red Star, March
7, 2017, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/opk/content/201703071208-rjte.htm.
46
“VMF Rossii poluchit noveyshiye fregaty s opozdaniyem,” Lenta.ru, May 4, 2016,
https://lenta.ru/news/2016/05/04/frigates/.
47
Oleg Winer, “Proklyat’ye rossiyskogo ‘importozameshcheniya,’ ” Defense Express,
January 13, 2017, https://defence-ua.com/index.php/statti/2222-proklyat-e-
rossijskogo-importozameshcheniya.
48
“VMF poluchil noveyshiy fregat “Admiral Essen,” Red Star, June 07, 2016,
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201606071654-z5gu.htm; “Fregat ‘Admiral
Makarov’ voshel v sostav Voenno-Morskogo flota RF,” Regnum, December 27, 2017,
https://regnum.ru/news/2363058.html.
49
Alexander Mozgovoy, “Zhdet li nas novaya Tsusima,” Nezavisimoye Voennoe
Obozreniye, December 22, 2017, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2017-12-
22/1_978_cusima.html.
50
“Remont korabley dalney morskoy zony,” Oruzhiye Rossyi, December 24, 2017,
http://www.arms-
expo.ru/news/novye_razrabotki/su_57_poluchil_dvigatel_vtorogo_etapa/.
51
“Kreyser ‘Moskva’ otremontiruyut v Sevastopole,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta, August 21,
2017, https://rg.ru/2017/08/21/reg-ufo/krejser-moskva-otremontiruiut-v-
sevastopole.html.
52
Kirill Ryabov, “Novosti modernizatsii kreyserov ‘Orlan,’ ” Voennoye Obozreniye,
April 18, 2017, https://topwar.ru/113686-novosti-modernizacii-kreyserov-
orlan.html.
53
Andrew Chuter, “Report flags NATO's naval shortfalls vis-a-vis Russia,” Defence
News, March 5, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2017/03/06/report-flags-
nato-s-naval-shortfalls-vis-a-vis-russia/.
54
Yevgen Tzybulenko, “Hruzynsʹka viyna: pravo i Pravda,” Tyzhden.ua, August 8,
2011, http://tyzhden.ua/World/28165; “Vertoletonostsy ‘Mistral’ sushchestvenno
povysyat boyevyye vozmozhnosti VMF Rossii,” Interfax, June 17, 2011,
http://www.interfax.ru/business/195096.
55
“ ‘Chernaya smert'’ nastupayet: morskuyu pekhotu zhdet global'naya
modernizatsiya,” Red Star, November 27, 2017,
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201411270254-tpal.htm.
56
“Ukraine crisis: France halts warship delivery to Russia,” BBC News, September 3,
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29052599; “France Suspends Mistral
Warship Delivery to Russia,” Defense News, November 25, 2014
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2014/11/25/france-suspends-mistral-
warship-delivery-to-russia/.
57
Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyenno-morskoy deyatel'nosti na period do 2030
goda.”
58
“ ‘Chernaya smert'’ nastupayet: morskuyu pekhotu zhdet global'naya
modernizatsiya,” November 27, 2017.
59
Ihor Kabanenko, “Large Russian Land-Air-Sea Exercises in Crimea Highlight
Vulnerabilities in Ukrainian Navy and Coastal Defense,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
The Jamestown Foundation, April 12, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/large-
russian-land-air-sea-exercises-crimea-highlight-vulnerabilities-ukrainian-navy-
coastal-defense/.
60
“Krymchane budut osnovoy dislotsiruyemogo v Krymu desantno-shturmovogo
batal’ona,” RIA Novosti, December 2, 2017,
61
Alexander Chrolenko, “Bez frantsuzskogo aktsenta: rossiyskiy vertoletonosets
prevzoydet ‘Mistrali,’ ” RIA Novosti, July, 1, 2017,
62
Victor Baranets, “Avianosets ‘Shtorm’: proyekt korablya super-klassa oboydetsya
v Z50 milliardov,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, July 6, 2017,
https://www.crimea.kp.ru/daily/26701/3725840/.
63
Roger N. McDermott, Michael Hayden, “Russia’s Electronic Warfare Capabilities
to 2025” International Centre for Defence and Security, Tallinn, Estonia, September
2017,
https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/doc/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic
_Warfare_to_2025.pdf.
64
“Voyennyye razvernuli sverkhmoshchnyy kompleks REB ‘Murmansk’ v Krymu,”
Red Star, March 10, 2017, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201703101746-
kdgq.htm.
65
“Ucheniye “Elektron-2016,” Concern Radio-Electronic Technologies, August 20,
2016, http://kret.com/media/news/uchenie-elektron-2016/.
66
Vladimir Tuchkov, “Amerikanskiy general: “My bessil’ny pered ‘Krasukhoy’ i
‘Moskvoy,’ Svobodnaya Pressa, August 28, 2017,
67
“Perekhoplennya radioefiru helikoptera REB VPS RF (Mi-8MTPR-1) u Krymu,”
InformNapalm, October 4, 2017, https://informnapalm.org/ua/perehoplennya-mi-
8mtpr-1-krym/.
68
Yuri Lastochkin, Oleg Falichev, “Kupol nad Minoborony,” Voenno-
Promyshlenniy Kuryer, April 24, 2017, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/36422.
69
“Avtomatizirovannaya sistema upravleniya ‘BAYKAL 1-ME,’” Raketnaya
Technika, September 28, 2012, http://rbase.new-
factoria.ru/gallery/avtomatizirovannaya-sistema-upravleniya-baykal-1-me.
70
“Ships fooled in GPS spoofing attack suggest Russian cyberweapon,” New
Scientist, August 10, 2017, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-
fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/.
71
“Boyevoye traleniye v pervyye poslevoyennyye gody - surovoye prodolzheniye
voyny,” Voennoye Obozreniye, September 5, 2016, https://topwar.ru/100116-
boevoe-tralenie-v-pervye-poslevoennye-gody-neotemlemaya-chast-velikoy-
otechestvennoy-voyny.html.
72
“Vnimaniye! V Sevastopole iz-za opasnoy 1000-kilogrammovoy miny polnost'yu
ostanovyat sudokhodstvo,” Sevastopolskiye Novosti, June 6, 2017,
http://sevastopolnews.info/2017/06/lenta/sobytiya/069271045/.
73
“Kapkan na vsekh moryakh,” Voenno-Promishlennuy Kuryer, September 16,
2015, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/27023.
74
“V lyubom rayone Mirovogo okeana,” Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye, June
23, 2017, http://nvo.ng.ru/armament/2017-06-23/8_953_ocean.html.
75
“Korabli Chernomorskogo flota otrabatyvayut postanovku minnykh zagrazhdeniy
i protivominnyye deystviya,” Red Star, December 4, 2017,
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/efd4c5dd4ee05752ba0c5f85b7c43901d0ac3
5b5e26745ee7616fa6e886f743f; Evgeniya Artemova, Yevgeniya Artemova “Proverka
flota,” Interfax-Russia, March 18, 2015, http://www.interfax-
russia.ru/Crimea/view.asp?id=592667.
76
“Komanduyushchiy CHF: v blizhaysheye vremya flot poluchit shest' korabley s
‘Kalibrami,’ ” Interfax, December 1, 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/interview/589923.
77
“‘Rossiya dolzhna byt’ sredi gosudarstv-liderov’: Putin prizval k stroitel'stvu armii
novogo pokoleniya.” RT, December 22, 2017,
https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/463425-putin-armia-minoborony-shoigu.
78
“Lavrov ne isklyuchil razmeshcheniya yadernogo oruzhiya v Krymu,” Interfax,
December 15, 2014, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/413164; Vladimir Belous,
“Opasny, kak i strategicheskiye nastupatel'nyye vooruzheniya,” Nesavisimoye
Voennoye Obozreniye, November 20, 2009, http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2009-11-
20/1_control.html.
79
“Muzhenko: Rossiya vosstanavlivayet ob’yekty dlya khraneniya yadernogo
oruzhiya v Krymu,” Krym Realii, July 7, 2017,
https://ru.krymr.com/a/news/28601314.html.
80
“V Krymu mogut primenit' yadernoye oruzhiye – razvedka,” Korrespondent.net,
August 11, 2016, https://korrespondent.net/ukraine/3730077-v-krymu-mohut-
prymenyt-yadernoe-oruzhye-razvedka.
81
“Rossiya otrabatyvayet postavki yadernykh boyepripasov v Krym – GUR,”
Segodnya, July 30, 2016, https://www.segodnya.ua/regions/krym/rossiya-
otrabatyvaet-postavki-yadernyh-boepripasov-v-krym-gur-738252.html.
82
Jeffrey V. Dickey, Thomas B. Everett, Zane M. Galvach, Matthew J. Mesko, Anton
V. Soltis, “Russian political warfare: origin, evolution, and application,” Monterey,
California: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2015,
https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/45838/15Jun_Dickey_Everett_Gal
vach_Mesko_Soltis.pdf.
83
Dave Majumdar, “Why are Russia and Turkey Holding Joint Naval Exercises in
the Black Sea?” National Interest, April 5, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/why-are-russia-turkey-holding-joint-naval-exercises-the-20041.
3. Russia’s Arctic and Far East Strategies
Pavel K. Baev
Introduction
Development of the enormous economic resources of the Arctic and

the Far East is one of the main challenges for the Russian state, and
asserting control over these vast and thinly populated regions is one
of Russia’s core national interests. The Russian leadership
understands these interests and is aware of the scope of the associated
challenges; it thus seeks to allocate efforts and resources, including
military power, accordingly. At the same time, however, the evolving
confrontation with the West, triggered by the annexation of Crimea
in spring 2014 and sustained by the ongoing war in Ukraine, has
determined deep shifts in Russia’s national security strategy. Political
attention in Moscow is centered on managing this confrontation, and
resource allocation necessarily prioritizes the Western theater.1
This distortion has a profound impact on setting political goals,

executing economic projects, and engaging in military activities in the
Arctic and the Far East. In the most general terms, it is possible to
establish that Arctic matters receive plenty of political attention,
perhaps even more than they would rationally deserve. Thus, at the
long press conference on December 14, 2017, in which he announced
his intention to claim yet another presidential term, Vladimir Putin
made a particular point on military security in the Arctic. He followed
75
up on this theme in his presentation at the Collegium of the Ministry

of Defense, noting the capacity for “rapid reinforcement of the units
in the Arctic.”2 At the very end of that long press conference, President
Putin also praised the “breakthrough” in the development of
Vladivostok, but the only foreign policy issue in the problem-rich
Asia-Pacific region that received attention was the cultivation of the
“strategic partnership” with China. The crisis in North Korea was
mentioned solely in the context of Russia’s relations with the United
States, as if it were happening far away from Russia’s borders.
The sustained political attention to the Arctic remains seriously

incoherent because the emphasis on preserving the pattern of
international cooperation and bracketing this region out of the new
pattern of confrontation is poorly compatible with the commitment
to expand Russia’s military presence and activities in the High North.
The desire to ensure economic development of the Far East is also in
conflict with Moscow’s expectations that great-power competition is
bound to escalate in the Asia-Pacific region; moreover, that
development is highly unlikely to be achieved only by expanding the
partnership with China.3 These contradictions are reflected in the
strategic assessments of, and military planning for, possible security
risks in these regions.
These assessments and guidelines should have been summarized and

elaborated in the series of fundamental and recently updated state
documents, from the National Security Strategy (approved on
December 31, 2015) to the Military Doctrine (approved December 25,
2014). These documents, however, provide long lists of threats and
dangers in the most general terms, while giving little in terms of
priorities. For instance, among the tasks for the Russian Armed
Forces, the Military Doctrine mentions “the contribution to the
construction in the Asia-Pacific region of a new security model based
on collective non-aligned foundations,” and gives as the last one in the
long list “guaranteeing the national interests of the Russian Federation
in the Arctic.”4
Russia’s Arctic and Far East Strategies | 77
This traditional vagueness of those key documents raises an important

question about the real content of Russian doctrinal and strategic
propositions. This chapter attempts to address this question regarding
the Arctic and Far Eastern regions, which are compared and
juxtaposed to one another. It starts with the examination of Moscow’s
threat assessments to the perceived security interests in these regions.
Then, the nuclear strategic level of assessments and goals is examined,
followed by the naval strategic guidelines for the Northern and Pacific
fleets, and preparations for countering conventional and “hybrid”
threats. The range of possible implications for the US and its allies is
outlined before the conclusion.
Security Interests and Threat Assessments
The gradual maturing of Putin’s corrupt authoritarian regime has

brought about a re-evaluation of Russia’s security interests, which are
increasingly identified with guaranteeing the survival of this regime
against perceived hostile Western attempts at “regime change.” Such
means as, for instance, strengthening the newly created National
Guard, are directed toward this key interest.5 In this strategic
perspective, both the Arctic and the Far Eastern regions are rather
peripheral, since few disturbances in these remote areas could
resonate in Moscow, which is the natural focal point of Russian
security interests. The remoteness and vastness of these regions, as
well as their underdeveloped infrastructure, determine the particular
character of national interests, with a pronounced emphasis on the
issue of sovereignty over harsh and essentially uncontrollable spaces;
consequently, the question of Russia’s territorial integrity looms large.
It is, therefore, quite remarkable that this question has quite different
manifestations and answers in the Arctic and in the Far East.
In the Arctic, the Russian leadership sees an urgent need to ascertain

sovereignty over uninhabited and uninhabitable islands as well as the
continental shelf, despite the absence of any territorial disputes (after
the settlement of the maritime border with Norway in 2010).6 At the
aforementioned December 2017 press conference, Putin found it

opportune to refer to some foreign tourist guides who allegedly
claimed that Russia had only recently took control over the Franz
Josef Land—which makes a rather peculiar justification for the
construction of a modern military base there.7 A string of new
northern bases spans all the way to the tip of Kamchatka, where the
Arctic theater meets the Far Eastern theater. Those bases are meant to
assert Russia’s control over the Northern Sea Route (Sevmorput) and
to guarantee its right to enforce the rules for maritime
communications in the Arctic.
Moscow’s main concerns include the official claim to expand its

continental shelf between the Lomonosov and Mendeleev underwater
ridges up to the North Pole. After much work on gathering scientific
evidence, Russia resubmitted this claim to the United Nations
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN CLCS) in
August 2015. Putin, who repeatedly extolled the prospect of
expanding Russia’s Arctic “possessions” after Arthur Chilingarov’s
famous flag-planting expedition to the North Pole seabed in August
2007, has stopped mentioning it since deliberations over the claim
started in February 2016.8 It is entirely possible that the UN CLCS will
ultimately postpone its recommendation on the Russian claim,
particularly since it clashes with the claim submitted by Denmark.
This procrastination may prompt Moscow to resort to unilateral
measures for asserting control over the icy waters to the north of its
200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
In the Far East, there are several unresolved issues with Russia’s
maritime and land borders, and a looming threat to its sovereignty
over that region. Russia’s claim for expanding its continental shelf in
the Sea of Okhotsk was approved by the UN CLCS in November 2013,
making it possible for Russian energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft to
proceed with exploration and drilling.9 However, the 1990 Maritime
Boundary Agreement with the United States (known as the Baker-
Shevardnadze line) is yet to be ratified by the Russian parliament.
Perhaps the most controversial territorial dispute in the Far East

involves Russia’s control over the South Kurile Islands (Iturup,
Kunashir, Shikotan, and the Habomai rocks), which are claimed by
Japan as the Northern Territories. While bilateral negotiations on the
status of those islands continues to drag on, Moscow has been
strengthening its military presence there, including the deployment of
Bastion-P (SS-C-5 Stooge) and Bal-E (SS-C-6 Sennight) coastal
defense missile systems, as well as declaring the resolve to respond to
the increasing US military activities in the region.10
In contrast, border issues with China have been resolved quietly

through a series of compromises and concessions, starting with the
border agreement ratified by the newly-empowered Russian
parliament in February 1992. Most of the islands on the Amur River,
including Damansky (Zhenbao), which saw fierce fighting in 1969,
were transferred under China’s control, and in October 2004, Putin
signed an additional agreement on the Eastern part of this border,
which granted China even more territory.11 In May 2016, China’s
President Xi Jinping visited the recently gained Heixiazi Island
(Bolshoi Ussuriisky), close to Khabarovsk, and extolled the prospects
of cross-border ties, but also reminded about the need to increase the
readiness and capabilities of border troops.12 Russia assumes that the
issue is closed, but China still harbors reservations about the border
problem. For that matter, the installation of granite markers on the
newly-demarcated border near the city of Hunchun provoked an
explosion of protests on Chinese social networks against accepting
this “colonial” border.13 Beijing’s official position asserts the absence
of any territorial claims, but the authorities routinely employ
discourse on rejecting the historical injustice of “unequal treaties,”
including the 1858 Aigun Treaty with Russia.14
Overall, it is apparent that the threats to Russia’s sovereignty in the

Arctic are significantly overestimated in Moscow, while the problems
in the Far East are downplayed. Great symbolic value is attached to
the capacity and determination to “conquer” the Arctic, and military
capabilities are presented as the main instrument ensuring Russia’s

control over the hydrocarbon riches believed to exist there.
Meanwhile Eastern Siberia and the Far East are also extraordinarily
rich in natural resources, but these vast regions have been steadily
losing the scant population they retain from earlier Soviet efforts at
channeling internal eastward migration. Military power might be
necessary to guarantee Russia’s security interests because it is at a deep
disadvantage compared to its more dynamic and assertive Asia-
Pacific neighbors. Yet, there are few signs of acknowledgment of this
imperative in the doctrinal thinking and hardly any indications of
prioritization of the Far East in the distribution of military resources.
Strategic Designs and Calculations
In Russia’s military security outlook, the Arctic and the Far East are
the two frontiers in which strategic matters have the highest priority.
The naval component of the country’s strategic nuclear deterrent—
reduced to just 12 nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN)—
is divided between the Northern and Pacific fleets. Moreover, the
main “corridors” for strategic patrols by long-range aviation—
consisting of 66 aging bombers—stretch across the Northern Atlantic
and Northern Pacific. Many early-warning radars are located in the
High North and the Far East, from Olenegorsk, in the Murmansk
region, to Vorkuta, in the Komi republic, and Zeya, in the Amur
region. Russia’s two space-launch facilities (cosmodrome) are the
small-capacity Plesetsk, Arkhangelsk region, and the newly-built
Vostochny, Amur region. Plans for modernizing these assets and the
tasks of ensuring their safety determine the key guidelines for regional
development in Russia’s Arctic and the Far East, as well as define the
international profile of these regions.
Providing that the Russia-US system of arms control is preserved,

submarine-launched nuclear warheads will increasingly make up a
greater share of Russian strategic capabilities in the near future.15 The
single most expensive item in the 2020 State Armament program was
the introduction of the new generation of strategic submarines; three

Borei-class (Project 955) SSBNs are currently operational, and five
more are in different stages of construction. The need to complete this
program ensures that the new 2027 State Armament program, which
was finalized only at the end of 2017, after a fierce struggle between
various military-industrial lobbies, is also significantly tilted in favor
of the naval leg of the strategic nuclear triad.16 Given the fact that three
Delta III–class submarines (the Podolsk, Ryazan and Georgy
Pobedonosets), which are assigned to the Pacific Fleet, have to be
retired in the next few years, it makes perfect strategic sense to
concentrate all SSBNs in the Northern Fleet. Putin, nevertheless.
claims personal credit for the decision to modernize the strategic
submarine base in Vilyuchinsk, Kamchatka, whatever the costs of
such a division of forces.17 The two basing areas are connected, so that
submarines from the Pacific Fleet travel for repairs and overhaul to
Severomorsk and Severodvinsk, and most missile tests are fired from
the Barents Sea to the Sea of Okhotsk.
The real problem with the sea leg of Russian deterrence is, however,
the main weapons system for the Borei-class submarines—the Bulava
(SS-N-32) ballistic missile. It has a checkered record of tests, and was
fired from the Yuri Dolgoruki (the first submarine in the series) only
once in 2016 and once in 2017, and the four-missile salvo from the
same submarine on May 22, 2018 has not eliminated all issues.18 Two
of the Boreis (the Aleksandr Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh) are
presently based in Vilyuchinsk, but they did not partake in the
exercises of strategic forces in October 2017, when Putin allegedly
launched personally (as technically improbable as that is) three
missiles from two submarines.19 Moscow apparently finds it necessary
to maintain strategic naval capabilities in the Pacific theater, but the
sustainability of this deployment in the logistically isolated
Kamchatka is rather uncertain.
In the course of the on-going confrontation with the West, Russia has
found that long-range aviation is in fact its most useful element of
deterrence for demonstrating resolve and putting North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) forces on alert, as well as for delivering
an occasional strike in Syria.20 The usual pattern of activity consists of
a pair of bombers flying from the Engels base, Saratov region,
northward toward the Arctic and then westward into the North
Atlantic, and a pair of bombers from the Ukrainka base, Amur region,
fly into the North Pacific with an occasional detour to Guam.21 The
fleet of Russia’s 55 Tu-95MS (Bear-H) and 11 Tu-160 (Blackjack)
strategic bombers is aging fast, however, and the deadly crashes of two
Bears at the Ukrainka base in summer 2015 showed that logistics has
not quite been able to cope with wear and tear. The plan for resuming
serial production of Tu-160s at the Kazan plant is technologically
challenged, and the proposition for developing a new generation of
strategic bombers (PAK-DA) has not been translated into a clear
target in the 2027 State Armament program.22
Despite the fact that Russia now cannot build anything resembling the
old Soviet “bastion” in the Barents Sea, its strategic assets in the Kola
Peninsula are reasonably safe and can perform efficiently. The
strategic capabilities in the Far Eastern theater are far less solid and
cannot in any meaningful way counter-balance the US naval or air
power deployed in the Pacific region. Furthermore, the fast
modernization of China’s strategic forces constitutes another indirect
challenge to Russia, even if there is no official acknowledgement of the
task of balancing the capabilities of this senior partner. Russian
strategic offensive forces have never had any interactions with their
Chinese counterparts; however, in December 2017, the first ever joint
Chinese-Russian command missile defense exercise was held in
Beijing.23 Undoubtedly, the escalation of the crisis driven by North
Korea’s nuclear and missile programs has prompted this advance in
cooperation, but Russia’s readiness to deal with the potentially grave
consequences of this fluid situation is highly uncertain. According to
informed Russian experts, the country’s early-warning system—
designed for quite different tasks—provided rather imprecise data
when it came to monitoring North Korean missile launches and
nuclear tests. Moscow has nevertheless made no effort at

strengthening missile defenses around its very vulnerable Pacific port
city of Vladivostok.24 Beijing is perfectly aware of this weakness; it
requested and obtained support from Moscow in opposing the
deployment of the US THAAD system in South Korea, but then opted
to resolve this issue with Seoul without any involvement from its
Russian partner.25
Russia’s strategic deterrence capabilities in the Far Eastern theater are

crucially important for asserting Moscow’s control over this remote
periphery, but they are clearly insufficient for the traditional task of
counter-balancing US capabilities—and entirely unprepared for
dealing with a potential real crisis developing in the immediate
vicinity of Russia’s borders. This unsatisfactory posture is pre-
determined by the vague and unrealistic doctrinal guidelines that are
focused on maintaining strategic parity with the United States, but
which give few considerations to the specific features and
vulnerabilities in the Far East.
Naval Ambitions and Deficiencies
The Arctic and the Far Eastern theaters are open to the sea as no other
areas of the Russian Federation, and this determines the key role of
naval forces in military planning and activities there. While Russia is
historically and geopolitically a land power, the navy has secured for
itself major functions in guaranteeing national security and plays a
prominent symbolic role.26 This role was performed with great fanfare
during the unprecedented naval parade on July 30, 2017, which
involved all naval bases from Severomorsk and Vilyuchinsk to Tartus,
Syria, and was attended by Putin in St. Petersburg.27 A week prior to
that demonstration of sea power, Putin signed a document entitled,
“The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Naval Activity for the
Period up to 2030.”28 The document is essentially doctrinal in scope
and presents the usual wide range of threats and dangers, based on the
fundamental assumptions of further escalation of competition
between global powers and increasing instability in all parts of the

world ocean.
The new naval policy sets as a general aim preventing other states
from achieving “significant superiority” over the Russian navy, which
has to retain “the second place in the world in combat capabilities”
(Article 39). It is quite clear from many statements in the document
that the US Navy is perceived as the main source of threat, but it is not
acknowledged that the fast build-up and modernization of China’s
navy makes the proposition of securing second place quite
unrealistic.29 Characteristically, the situation in the Asia-Pacific is not
mentioned once in the document, while there are several references to
the Arctic. Additionally, there is no hint in the official guidelines that
the Russian navy is set to suffer particularly painful cuts in funding in
the 2027 State Armament program, which has been curtailed due to
the sustained contraction of Russia’s economic base.30 The July 2018
naval parade, for that matter, was a more modest affair.
It is possible to figure out, nevertheless, that the Northern Fleet is set

to receive the bulk of new funding and is going to be significantly
reshaped. Its flagship, Russia’s only aircraft carrier, the Admiral
Kuznetsov, is scheduled to undergo long repairs after its rather
unsuccessful combat deployment to the Eastern Mediterranean in
2016–2017. Whereas, the long-cherished desire to build a nuclear-
powered ship of this class will almost certainly only materialize in
design models.31 The nuclear battle cruiser Petr Velikii is also going
into overhaul, so Russia’s new flagship will be its sister-ship, the
Admiral Nakhimov, which is about to come out of protracted
modernization.32 The main strength of the Northern Fleet is going to
be its submarine divisions, which are to be strengthened with the
arrival of the new generation of nuclear attack submarines armed with
cruise missiles (SSGN). Five Yasen-class (Project 885) submarines are
in different stages of construction. The design has been highly ranked
by naval experts, but the Severodvinsk, the first in the series (started
back in 1993) has entered the combat order only in mid-2014, while
the Kazan is still undergoing tests.33 The reasons for such delays are
never entirely explained, but it may presumably have to do with the
fact that the Severodvinsk shipyard has to prioritize the Borei
program, while also working on the Admiral Kuznetsov and
proceeding with the planned overhauls of the Delta IV–class SSBNs.
A new and hard task for the Norther Fleet is to ensure control over
the Sevmorput, and the new naval policy specifically points out among
the threats to Russia’s interests “military pressure on the Russian
Federation aimed at […] weakening its control over the Northern Sea
Route—the historically established national transport route of the
Russian Federation” (Article 24). Yet, the fact of the matter is that,
historically, the Northern Fleet operated primarily in the ice-free
Barents Sea and the Northern Atlantic, and even now lacks a single
ice-class surface combatant. So its annual (since 2012) summer cruises
into the Kara and Laptev seas require the mobilization of several
icebreakers.34 A new Ivan Papanin (Project 23550) series of ice-class
patrol ships was started at the St. Petersburg shipyard, but only two
ships have been contracted.35 The Northern Fleet received, in
December 2017, its first icebreaker, the Ilya Muromets (Project
21180), but no more ships of this class are planned, while the
construction of the nuclear icebreaker Arktika for the Atomflot
corporation has run into delays.36
The Pacific Fleet is facing a far more difficult situation and receives
far less attention. Its combat order was supposed to be reconfigured
around two Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, but the
cancelation of the deal with France in mid-2014, due to sanctions, has
left it with indefinite prospects.37 Its flagship cruiser, the Varyag
(Project 1164, launched in 1983), needs an overhaul and
modernization. The arrival, in 2017, of the corvette Sovershenny
(Project 20380) is not going to add significantly to the Pacific Fleet’s
strength, even if three more ships of this class are in construction.38
Problems with new designs for diesel submarines prompted the
Russian high command to focus on the still useful Kilo-class
(Varshavyanka, Project 636.3) ships, so six submarines were quickly

built in St. Petersburg for the Black Sea Fleet, and two are presently
under construction for the Pacific Fleet, with four more contracted.39
The plan for building a new naval base on the Kurile Islands is much
advertised, but it is unclear what ships could be possibly based there.40
The Pacific Fleet has a key role in achieving the goal vaguely
formulated in the new naval policy as “engagement of foreign states
in joint actions aimed at ensuring security and strategic stability in the
World Ocean” (Article 29), which means primarily expanding
cooperation with China. Joint naval exercises in the South China Sea
in September 2016 attracted much international speculation about
whether they signify an implicit support from Russia to Chinese
claims in this region.41 In September 2017, joint exercises were hold in
the Sea of Japan in order to establish that the US Navy grouping
concentrated near the Korean peninsula did not have total dominance
in the theater.42 Moscow is aware that Beijing is particularly interested
in exercising amphibious operations, but it is exactly this capability
that the Pacific Fleet increasingly lacks. The Ropucha-class (Project
775) large landing ships, including the Admiral Nevelsky and Oslyabya
(built in Poland in 1981–1982), based in Vladivostok, are worn out
beyond repair, and the new Ivan Gren series (Project 11711) has been
reduced to just two ships, which are supposed to join the Northern
Fleet—where this capability is even more exhausted.43
Ambitious goals in the naval doctrine translate into increased

demands that the Northern and Pacific fleets are able to perform a
wide range of tasks; and this accumulating stress increases the risk of
accidents, particularly as the aging ships receive insufficient
maintenance. In the Arctic seas, harsh conditions are the main
challenge. But in the Pacific, military tensions are growing, and
Russia’s naval grouping is unprepared for possible escalations and de-
prioritized when it comes to resource allocations.
Conventional Deterrence and Unconventional Challenges
Russian strategic thinking has evolved fast and far in the last few years
when it comes to placing new emphasis on conventional (rather than
nuclear) deterrence and on defending against a wide variety of
unconventional challenges, often conceptualized as “hybrid wars.” In
the former proposition, the main instrument is long-range high-
precision missiles, particularly the 3M-54 Kailbr (SS-N-27 Sizzler)
missile deployed on various naval platforms. As for the latter—though
Russia is often portrayed in Western analysis as the main perpetrator
of “hybrid wars”—in the Russian perspective, it is the US strategic
combination of counter-terrorism, information warfare, and “regime
change” methods that brings about a new quality of unconventional
warfare.44 Both doctrinal propositions have different manifestations
in the Arctic and Far Eastern theaters.
In the High North, Moscow saw a need to unite various elements of

its Armed Forces to be able to perform a particular set of tasks, so a
new Arctic (or North) Joint Strategic Command was established in
December 2014 on the basis of the Northern Fleet command. The
newly created Arctic brigade (based rather inconveniently in
Alakurtti, near the border with Finland) thus came directly under the
command of the Northern Fleet HQ; but the plan to deploy a second
Arctic brigade on the Yamal peninsula was quietly abandoned.45 The
main effort was directed instead on strengthening the air defense
system in the western part of the Arctic theater, so several units of S-
300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles (modified for the extreme cold
conditions) were deployed on the Kola Peninsula and even on Novaya
Zemlya.46 Instead of the old Soviet naval “bastion,” these missiles and
radars now form an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) “bubble” that
protects the main base and the patrol area of Russian strategic
submarines and extends into NATO’s northern flank.47 This air
superiority grants the army and marine brigades of Russia’s Arctic
Command, which are brought together in a newly-formed army
corps, a significant offensive edge in Northern Europe.48
In the Far East, it is difficult to turn conventional deterrence into a

workable proposition for Russia. One feasible task is to strengthen the
defense of the Kurile Islands: a battery of new Bastion (SS-C-5 Stooge)
anti-ship missiles was deployed on Iturup, and a battery of older Bal
(SS-C-6 Sennight) anti-ship missiles was delivered to Kunashir. The
plan to deploy a new army division to the Kuriles has been corrected—
instead, these units will be spread over the Sakhalin, Maritime and
Amur regions.49 The large-scale exercise Vostok 2018, held in August–
September of that year, tested the plans for moving reinforcements to
the Far Eastern theater, including by the Northern Fleet.50 The
shortage of combat-ready forces in this theater is, however, so deep
that Russian experts assume operational planning will focus on the
use of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons—even if no strategic
guidelines have officially been issued regarding the character of the
strikes by the thousands of munitions in this arsenal.51
In both the Arctic and the Far East, unconventional security

challenges have lower intensity than in such Russian frontier regions
as, for instance, the Caucasus, not to mention the barely contained
war zone in eastern Ukraine. The threat of terrorism, in particular, is
barely present. And yet, this has not stopped the Arctic Command
from defining many of its military exercises as counter-terrorist.52 The
only justification for that is the Greenpeace action against the
Prirazlomnaya oil platform in September 2013, but there is no
shortage of quasi-expert claims about Western “hybrid”
encroachments.53 In fact, international cooperation is crucial for
dealing with the many unique challenges in the Arctic, from the
disposal of empty barrels and other garbage around the old Soviet
bases to containing outbreaks of Anthrax.54 The responsibility for
managing many of these problems is given to the Ministry of Defense,
while funding for many civilian projects in the areas of environmental
protection and health care is cut.55 In the Far East, the security issue
that is both exaggerated and ignored is the illegal cross-border
migration from China, while Moscow’s policy of stimulating domestic
mobility into the depopulated areas, for instance by such mega-
projects as the Vostochny Cosmodrome, is entirely ineffectual.56 The

poaching of fish resources is another major problem, but its
international dimension is deeply intertwined with domestic
corruption, which is notorious even by Russian standards.57 The
military command stays clear of engaging with these challenges,
keeping a low profile in all matters that concern relations with China.
Overall, the pronounced trend of militarization of Russia’s policy in

the Arctic, only slightly camouflaged by the rhetoric of promoting
international cooperation, is not present in the Far East, where
Russian conventional military capabilities are insufficient for any
power projection and increasingly under-prioritized.
Implications and Prospects
Russian doctrinal views are expansionist in the interpretation of

threats that need to be proactively countered but too general to
capture the significant differences between the Arctic and the Far
Eastern theaters. In fact, Russia finds itself in nearly opposite security
situations in these two vast frontiers. In the Arctic, it has a position of
military superiority, but cannot find a way to capitalize on it politically
or to exploit it for tangible benefit. In the Far East, its position is
militarily vulnerable, while its political strategy of building a
partnership with China cannot compensate for this weakness.58
China, in fact, is a hidden but major part of Russia’s security problem,
and definitely not a part of the solution. Moscow can invite Chinese
units to partake in the Vostok 2018 exercises but this cannot alleviate
its concerns about the accelerated modernization of the Chinese
Armed Forces. The Russian navy can monitor the execution of
Beijing’s aircraft carrier construction program but cannot hope to see
a domestic workable design of such a dream ship.59
It is the assessment of Chinese intentions in the Arctic that drives

Moscow to expand its military infrastructure along the coast of the
Eastern Siberia. China is currently following the new Russian
regulations for the Northern Sea Route, but Russian experts warn that
climate change could make it possible for Chinese vessels,
accompanied by Chinese icebreakers, to set a polar course outside
Russia’s territorial waters.60 In the US security community, concerns
about Russia’s superiority in icebreakers are often emphasized,
particularly as the Northern Fleet adds icebreakers to its combat
order.61 Such worries are generally misplaced, since this Russian
capability presents no threat to US interests and is aimed at
strengthening control over the growing maritime traffic in the long
sea lines of communications in the Arctic. The transfer of
management of the Sevmorput to the state corporation Rosatom,
which owns the fleet of nuclear icebreakers, follows the same aim.62
Implications of the Russian military build-up in the western part of its

Arctic frontier are more difficult for NATO in terms of finding
adequate answers. It is hard to say whether Putin’s repeated
statements about US nuclear submarines “concentrated” off the coast
of Norway reflect serious worries about missiles reaching Moscow in
just 15 minutes.63 It is certain, however, that Russian SSBNs are indeed
concentrated in the Barents Sea, and that the A2/AD “bubble”
covering their patrol area has been strengthened to such a degree that
the Arctic Command has gained capabilities to launch offensive
operations against NATO’s northern flank. The units of this
Command train for operations in harsh conditions and have gained
combat experience in the Donbas war zone as well as in Syria, where
Colonel Valery Fedyanin, the commander of the 61st Marine Brigade
of the Northern Fleet, was killed in action.64
The Nordic states seek to find a balanced response to this threat,

increasing their defense budgets and military cooperation, while also
preserving the pattern of cooperation with Russia in various political
frameworks. The United States could contribute greatly to the
effectiveness of this response by demonstrating a commitment to
strengthening the defensive capabilities on NATO’s northern flank—
and to engage in various cooperative enterprises with Russia in the
High North.65 It is essential to acknowledge, however, that the

modernized US early warning radar at Vardø, Norway, may be among
the first targets, should Moscow ever attempt a real power projection
experiment in the Arctic.66 The Svalbard archipelago, over which
Norway exercises sovereignty according to the Spitsbergen Treaty
(1920), is perceived by the Russian high command as an easy target
because it is demilitarized and has a Russian settlement.67 In the
annual assessment of maritime national security, the Russian defense
ministry singled out Norway’s alleged attempts to establish full
sovereignty over Spitsbergen as a particular kind of threat.68 In this
fluctuating and tense situation, both sides are closely monitoring
every turn in military activities; and each seeks to compensate for its
perceived vulnerabilities. Together, this increases the probability of
accidents and miscalculations. And on the Russian side, every
technical failure (even of a smaller scale than the Kursk disaster in
August 2000) could be interpreted as a hostile act by NATO. 69
In the Far East, Russia is in no position to attempt any proactive

military move, but it might find itself compelled to respond to events
entirely outside its control. The naval strategic deterrent based in
Kamchatka is in no immediate danger but is also of little use in a crisis
situation. Whereas, Vladivostok—a major population center and the
base of the Pacific Fleet—is quite vulnerable to a possible crisis on the
Korean Peninsula. Moscow is trying to enhance its security by
following Beijing’s lead in managing this crisis, even if it has
reservations against the steady tightening of the sanctions regime
against Pyongyang. The Russian leadership is worried, however, that
China has developed a working cooperative relationship with the US
to put pressure on North Korea and has even proceeded to discuss
options for sorting out a sudden collapse of the over-militarized
regime.70 Putin may resent being taken for granted by Xi Jinping, but
unlike in the Western theater, he cannot put into play military
instruments of policy. And the Vostok 2018 exercises, in which a small
People’s Liberation Army contingent actually took part in for the first
time, were ultimately unlikely to impress the Chinese high command.
Overall, in the Far East, Russian strategic thinking centers not on a

forthcoming conflict with the United States, as the development of the
on-going confrontation would demand, but on a macro-conflict
between the US and China, in which Russia would presumably have
the advantage of flexibility. In the Arctic, the Russian doctrine aims at
both eliminating vulnerabilities in the eastern part of the theater and
asserting superiority in the western part, where limited opportunities
for projecting power give Russia some leverage in the confrontation
with NATO.
Conclusion
The reality of Moscow’s evolving confrontation with the West has

necessitated changes in the Russian military doctrine. But these
changes are only partly reflected in the new set of doctrinal
documents, which have actually increased the discrepancy between
formal and actual guidelines. The expanded demands on the Armed
Forces reveal a mix of the old geopolitical thinking about the multi-
polar world, in which competition between centers of power is driven
by the struggle to control natural resources, and the new perceptions
of a real and growing possibility of a large-scale conflict with the West.
The necessary preparations for such conflict, however, cannot square
the need for a military build-up with the reality of Russia’s domestic
economic stagnation. This confusion has different manifestations in
the strategic perspectives on the threats and opportunities in the
Arctic and Far Eastern theaters.
In the Arctic, the security assessments still do not reflect the economic
assessments of the negative cost-efficiency of projects for developing
off-shore oil and natural gas resources and continue to confirm the
need for Russia to assert control over these presumed natural riches
by military means.71 The strategic guideline to expand Russian
military infrastructure in the eastern part of this vast theater—in order
to assure control over the Northern Sea Route—clashes with the
guideline to build up the capabilities to project power in its western

part, which is one of the few areas where Russia has an advantage over
NATO. The risks related to maintaining and exploiting this position
of power are typically underestimated.
In the Far East, Russian strategic thinking struggles with finding

adequate responses to the challenges generated by fast-developing
crises, first of all on the Korean Peninsula. The military doctrine is
traditionally far less optimistic than high-level politics regarding the
rapprochement with China and does not discount the possibility of a
conflict.72 It cannot, however, find any way to counter this threat short
of multiple use of non-strategic nuclear weapons, including on
Russia’s own soil. Any option for proactive engagement in the fluid
conflict situations in this theater demands a significant reinforcement
of the thinly stretched grouping of forces. But this strategic direction
is significantly de-prioritized in the distribution of funding and other
resources.
The gap between strategic goal-setting and economic resource

allocation is widening across all directions and theaters in Russia’s
security posture. It is possible to establish that it is in the Far East that
the shortage of capabilities is particularly acute, while the Arctic
receives more attention and provisions in the 2027 State Armament
program than it deserves on the basis of realistic threat/counter-
measure calculations. This makes the High North a theater where the
Russian high command can, in the short term, contemplate a range of
opportunities for using military force as an instrument of
confrontational policy. This option could disappear in the medium
term as priorities in resource allocation shift to more demanding
theaters.
Notes
1
This trend is examined in Pavel K. Baev, “The military dimension of Russia’s
connection with Europe,” European Security, vol. 27, no. 1, 2018, pp. 82–97.
2
Both statements can be found on the Kremlin website; the former at
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/56378, and the latter at
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56472.
3
On the disappointment in expectations of an inflow of cross-border investments,
see Ivan Zuenko, “The ports of the Far East do not see Chinese investments,”
Carnegie.ru (in Russian), June 26, 2017, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/71383.
4
Both documents are available at the Russian Security Council website; the former
at http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/, and the latter at
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document129/.
5
One useful analysis of this priority is Mark Galeotti, “National Guard: The
watchdog that could break the leash”, Raamop Rusland, August 14, 2017,
https://raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/militair-beleid/677-national-guard-the-
watchdog-that-could-break-the-leash.
6
Useful examination of this case is Arild Moe, Daniel Fjærtoft & Indre Øverland,
“Space and timing: Why was the Barents Sea delimitation dispute resolved in 2010?”
Polar Geography, vol. 34, no. 3, pp 145–162.
7
Russian Defense Ministry presented on its website a virtual tour of this base; see
http://mil.ru/files/files/arctic/Arctic.html.
8
For my initial assessments of that claim, see Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Race for the
Arctic and the New Geopolitics of the North Pole,” Occasional Paper, Washington
DC: Jamestown Foundation, October 2007.
9
“Gazprom Neft has discovered new offshore field in the Okhotsk Sea,” Press
release, 4 October 2017, http://www.gazprom-neft.com/press-center/news/1166743/.
10
Nikolai Surkov, Aleksei Ramm, “Bastion on the Kurils,” Izvestia (in Russian),
November 29, 2017, https://iz.ru/676106/nikolai-surkov-aleksei-ramm/bastion-na-
kurilakh; Seth Robson, “Putin: Russian buildup on disputed islands is response to
US military,” Stars and Stripes, June 2, 2017, https://www.stripes.com/news/putin-
russian-buildup-on-disputed-islands-is-response-to-us-military-1.471616.
11
Elena Masyuk, “To love the dragon,” Novaya Gazeta (in Russian), July 4, 2015,
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/07/04/64786-lyubit-drakona.
12
See Peter Wood, “Xi visits China’s Northeast, emphasises revitalization,
environment, and food security,” China Brief, The Jamestown Foundation, June 1,
2016, https://jamestown.org/program/xi-visits-chinas-northeast-emphasizes-
revitalization-environment-and-food-security/.
13
Miles Yu, “Storm over Russian border rages,” Washington Times, November 12,
2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/12/inside-china-storm-
over-russia-border-rages/.
14
One informed Russian opinion is Igor Denisov, “Aigun, Russia, and China’s
‘century of humiliation,’ ” Commentary, Carnegie Moscow Center, June 10, 2015,
http://carnegie.ru/commentary/60357.
15
Thomas Nilsen, “Larger portion of Russia’s nukes will be on subs in Arctic
waters,” Barents Observer, March 3, 2017,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/03/larger-portion-russias-nukes-
will-be-subs.
16
Aleksandra Dzhordzhevich, Ivan Safronov, “Trillions have two allies – the Army
and the Navy,” Kommersant (in Russian), November 18, 2017,
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3500710?query=2027.
17
Vladimir Putin, “Being strong: National security guarantees for Russia,”
Rossiiskaya Gazeta (in Russian), February 20, 2012, https://rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-
armiya.html.
18
Nikolai Litovkin, “What’s wrong with Russia’s new Bulava missile?” Russia
Beyond the Headlines, October 23, 2016,
https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/10/03/whats-wrong-with-russias-new-bulava-
missile_635311.
19
“Putin launched four ballistic missiles in the course of nuclear triad exercises,”
Interfax, October 27, 2017, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/584940.
20
On the “homecoming” of a pair of Tu-22M3 bombers to the Olenegorsk base
from the forward base in Mozdok, North Ossetia, see Thomas Nilsen, “Murmansk
governor welcomes home Syria bombers,” Barents Observer, December 13, 2017,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/12/murmansk-governor-
welcomes-home-syria-bombers.
21
Bill Gertz, “Russian bombers again circle Guam,” Washington Free Beacon,
December 4, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russian-bombers-again-
circle-guam/.
22
Matthew Bodner, Aaron Mehta, “Op tempo, sustainment flaws hit Russian Air
Force,” Defense News, July 12, 2015,
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2015/07/12/russian-fleets-
crashing-ukraine-nato-fighter-bomber/29962399/.
23
Franz-Stephen Gady, “China claims ‘new breakthrough in anti-missile
cooperation with Russia,” The Diplomat, December 19, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/china-claims-new-breakthroughs-in-anti-missile-
cooperation-with-russia/.
24
Vladimir Dvorkin, “The global threat from the North Korean nuclear-missile
capabilities,” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie (in Russian), September 8, 2017,
http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2017-09-08/1_964_korea.html.
25
David Jozef Volodzko, “China wins its war against South Korea’s US THAAD
missile shield – without firing a shot,” South China Morning Post, November 18,
2017, http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2120452/china-wins-its-
war-against-south-koreas-us-thaad-missile.
26
Tom Fedyszyn, “Russia: A land power hungry for the sea,” War on the Rocks,
April 19, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/04/russia-a-land-power-hungry-
for-the-sea/.
27
Bruce Jones, “Russia’s Navy sets international strategic markers,” Jane’s Navy
International, August 1, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/72763/russia-s-navy-
day-sets-international-strategic-markers.
28
The text (in Russian) is available at the Kremlin website,
http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/by-date/20.07.2017.
29
Aleksandr Golts, “The Russian Navy: To deter US and to compete with China,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, August 1, 2017,
https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-navy-to-deter-the-us-and-to-compete-
with-china/.
30
Alexei Nikolsky, “New State Armament program will have new priorities,”
Vedomosti (in Russian), May 19, 2017,
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/05/19/690524-novoi-
gosprogrammi.
31
The original estimate of costs for Admiral Kuznetsov overhaul was about $US 900
million, but in the updated plan it is reduced by half, so that modernization would
be much reduced; see Mikhail Khodarenok, “Kuznetsov is not in the same league
with Washington,” Gazeta.ru (in Russian), October 15, 2017,
https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2017/10/15/10944080.shtml.
32
Matthew Bodner, “Russia’s most anachronistic warship is getting an overhaul,”
Moscow Times, August 31, 2015, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russias-most-
anachronistic-warship-is-getting-an-overhaul-49252.
33
Dave Majumdar, “Russia’s most powerful nuclear attack submarine is almost
ready for sea,” The National Interest, March 15, 2017,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-most-powerful-nuclear-attack-
submarine-ever-almost-19775.
34
Thoman Nilsen, “Warships of Russia’s Northern Fleet sail to Arctic waters,”
Barents Observer, August 15, 2017,
https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2017/08/warships-russias-northern-
fleet-sail-arctic-waters.
35
Nikolai Novichkov, “Russian Project 23550 Arctic patrol ship laid down,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, April 25, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/69803/russian-
project-23550-arctic-patrol-ship-laid-down.
36
On the criminal investigation of this delay, see Anastasiya Vedeneeva, Ivan
Safronov, et al, “Arktika is adrift,” Kommersant (in Russian), July 12, 2017,
37
John C.K. Daly, “Russia’s Pacific Fleet receives new ships, missions,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, March 12, 2014,
https://jamestown.org/program/russias-pacific-fleet-receives-new-ships-missions/.
38
Alexander Zudin, “Russia’s first Pacific-built 20380 frigate sets out on sea trials,”
Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 3, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/67441/russia-
s-first-pacific-built-20380-frigate-sets-out-on-sea-trials.
39
Franz-Stefen Gady, “Russia’s Pacific Fleet to receive 10 new warships in 2018,”
The Diplomat, November 29, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/russias-
pacific-fleet-to-receive-10-new-warships-in-2018/.
40
Ivan Petrov, “A new Russian naval base will appear on the Kurils,” Rossiskaya
Gazeta, October 26, 2017, https://rg.ru/2017/10/26/reg-dfo/na-kurilah-poiavitsia-
baza-vmf-rossii.html.
41
Aleksandr Khrolenko, “What is interesting about Russian-Chinese exercises in the
South-China Sea,” RIA Novosti (in Russian), September 12, 2016,
42
Matthew Little, “Russia and China send message to US, North Korea with military
drills,” The Epoch Times, December 12, 2017,
https://www.theepochtimes.com/russia-and-china-send-message-to-us-north-
korea-with-military-drills_2385698.html.
43
“Large landing ship Ivan Gren resumed trials in the Baltic,” TASS (in Russian),
June 5, 2017, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4313765.
44
Mark Galeotti, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Prague: Mayak Intelligence,
2016.
45
Steve Micallef, “Russia’s evolving Arctic capabilities,” Center for International
Maritime Security, February 7, 2017, http://cimsec.org/russias-evolving-arctic-
capabilities/30712.
46
Andrei Kots, “Cold arms: How Russia protects its interests in the Arctic,” RIA
Novosti (in Russian), August 17, 2017,
47
Alexei Ramm, Evgeny Andreev, “Russia will be protected from the North by an
impenetrable screen,” Izvestia (in Russian), February 20, 2017,
https://iz.ru/news/665208.
48
Alexei Ramm, Evgeny Andreev, “A new army corps is formed in Murmansk,”
Izvestia (in Russian), April 13, 2017, https://iz.ru/news/681638. The broader
perspective is given in Andrew Foxall, “Russia’s Policy Toward a Changing Arctic:
Implications for UK Security,” Research Paper 12, Russia Studies Centre, June 2017,
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Russias-Policies-
towards-a-Changing-Arctic-1.pdf.
49
“The Ministry of Defense emphasised the defensive character of the division to be
deployed in the Kurils,” Interfax, March 20, 2017,
http://www.interfax.ru/russia/554387.
50
“Shoigu told when the Vostok-2018 exercises would be conducted,” RIA Novosti,
December 5, 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171205/1510222671.html.
51
Vasily Kashin “Each party has its own victory,” EastRussia, December 12, 2017,
https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/vasiliy-kashin-u-vsekh-uchastnikov-svoya-
pobeda/.
52
“The Northern Fleet ships conducted counter-terrorist exercises near the
Prirazlomnaya platform,” VPK News (in Russian), September 5, 2016,
https://vpk.name/news/162629_korabli_severnogo_flota_proveli_antiterroristiches
kie_ucheniya_u_platformyi_prirazlomnaya.html.
53
Aleksandr Bartosh, “Hybrid threats have appeared in the Arctic,” Nezavisimoe
Voennoe Obozrenie (in Russian), December 2, 2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/gpolit/2016-
12-02/1_928_arctic.html.
54
Boris Nikolaev, “Garbage in the High North,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (in Russian),
April 11, 2017, http://www.ng.ru/ng_energiya/2017-04-11/11_6971_north.html.
55
“Russia postpones implementation of some Arctic projects,” Lenta.ru (in
Russian), July 27, 2017, https://lenta.ru/news/2017/07/27/arcticmedvedev/.
56
Ivan Tselichtchev, “Chinese in the Russia Far East: A geopolitical time bomb?”
South China Morning Post, July 8, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/week-
asia/geopolitics/article/2100228/chinese-russian-far-east-geopolitical-time-bomb.
On the failure to stimulate domestic migration, see Dmitry Shcherbakov, “Outflow
of population exceeds explanations,” EastRussia (in Russian), July 18, 2017,
https://www.eastrussia.ru/material/ottok-naseleniya-vykhodit-iz-pod-obyasneniya/.
57
“Salmon season 2017: How to stop poaching in the rivers of the Far East,” TASS
(in Russian), May 21, 2017, http://tass.ru/v-strane/4268367.
58
Pavel K. Baev and Stein Tønnesson, “The troubled Russia-China partnership as a
challenge to East Asian peace,” Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences,
vol. 10, no. 2, 2017, pp. 209–225.
59
Alekasndr Ermakov, “Flying sharks of the Celestial Empire,” Russian Council,
April 27, 2017, http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-
comments/analytics/letayushchie-akuly-podnebesnoy/.
60
Anastasia Bashkatova, “China is looking for alternatives to the Northern Sea
Route,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (in Russian), October 2, 2017,
http://www.ng.ru/economics/2017-10-02/1_7085_china.html.
61
Robert Farley, “How Russia could win a war in the Arctic,” National Interest, June
13, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-russia-could-win-war-the-
arctic-21134.
62
Anastasia Vedeneeva, Vladimir Dzaguto, Evgenia Krychkova, Ivan Safronon,
“Atomic sea route: Vladimir Putin approved the transfer of the Arctic to Rosatom,”
Kommersant (in Russian), November 8, 2017,
63
“Putin: Russia will monitor the activity of US Navy in the Arctic,” RIA Novosti (in
Russian), June 15, 2017 https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170615/1496565509.html.
64
Natalya Demchenko, Ilya Nemchenko, “The commander of marine brigade died
in Moscow from wounds inflicted in Syria,” RBC (in Russian), October 1, 2017,
https://www.rbc.ru/society/01/10/2017/59d0eb1f9a794765768648ca.
65
Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, Kristin Van Abel, Scott Stephenson,
Maintaining Arctic Cooperation with Russia. Santa Monica: RAND, 2017,
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1731.html.
66
Ilya Plekhanov, “In the mountain king’s cave: What US marines are hiding in
Norway,” RIA Novosti (in Russian), June 20, 2017,
67
Timo Koivurova, Filip Holiencin, “Demilitarisation and neutralisation of
Svalbard,” Polar Record, vol. 53, no. 2, March 2017, pp. 131–142,
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/polar-record/article/demilitarisation-
and-neutralisation-of-svalbard-how-has-the-svalbard-regime-been-able-to-meet-
the-changing-security-realities-during-almost-100-years-of-
existence/907DA8BACCA9FE39204C7FBBFC6E1024.
68
Aleksandra Dzhordzhevich, Ivan Safronov, Dmitri Kozlov, “Geopolitics in
support of logistics,” Kommersant (in Russian), October 10, 2017,
69
Mathiew Boulege, “The Russia-NATO relations between a rock and a hard place:
How ‘defensive inferiority syndrome’ is increasing the potential for error,” Journal
of Slavic Military Studies, vol. 30, no. 3, 2017, pp. 361–380.
70
Charles Clover, “US and China broach sensitive topic of N Korea regime
collapse,” Financial Times, December 19, 2017,
https://www.ft.com/content/074feca0-e485-11e7-97e2-916d4fbac0da.
71
Anastasia Bashkatova, “Arctic is a net loss,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta (in Russian),
March 30, 2017, http://www.ng.ru/economics/2017-03-30/1_6961_arktic.html.
72
Eugene K. Chow, “Are Russia and China preparing for war?” National Interest,
August 15, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/are-russia-china-
preparing-war-21907.
4. Baltic Sea Strategy
Jörgen Elfving
Introduction
“First and foremost I would like to point out that the military-political
situation on our western border remains tense and has a tendency to
intensify.”
– Sergei Shoigu, Russian minister of defense, October 27, 20171
The above quotation describes in a nutshell how Russia perceives the

situation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR)—an area comprising not only
the Baltic Sea but also the littoral territories that drain into the Baltic,
inhabited by more than 85 million people.2 The BSR has been of
crucial importance to Russia throughout its history. But does modern-
day Russia have what could be accurately considered a comprehensive
and coherent Baltic Sea strategy? One possible answer to this question
might draw on the declarations in official documents or statements
made by Russian officials and politicians. Indeed, the Russian military
doctrine, which calls on deterring and preventing military conflicts
“through political, diplomatic and other non-military means,”
strongly hints at one—especially in the context of Moscow opposing
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) enhanced presence
in the Baltic States or seeking to block Finnish and Swedish NATO
membership.3 But another approach is to analyze actual Russian
102
Baltic Sea Strategy | 103
activities targeting the countries of the BSR to discern whether they

show commonalities suggestive of an underlying strategy. The
following chapter will seek to pursue both methodologies in order to
build up a detailed outline of Russia’s goals in the BSR as well as the
ways in which it has been trying to accomplish them.
The Operational Environment
The BSR is a multifaceted and complex area. Its dominant central

feature, the Baltic Sea itself, is a brackish inland body of water with a
surface area of 377,000 square kilometers (146,000 square miles), the
size of Montana; its maximum depth is 459 meters (1506 feet), but
with an average depth of only 55 meters (180 feet).4 These
hydrological conditions make the Baltic well suited for submarine
warfare. A series of artificial waterways connect the Baltic to the White
Sea via the White Sea Canal and to the German Bight of the North Sea
via the Kiel Canal.5 The Baltic Sea is composed of several areas that
throughout history have been, and still are, of strategic importance:
the mouth of the Gulf of Finland, the Åland Islands, the island of
Gotland, and the exit to Kattegat and Skagerrak.
Since ancient times, the Baltic Sea has been an important waterway
and remains one of the most heavily trafficked seas in the world, with
about 15 percent of global cargo transportation. About 2,000 ships
navigate the area at any given time; and on a yearly basis, 7,600
tankers, 17,500 passenger ships and 25,000 other vessels travel
through the Baltic.6 Along the coastline, there are about 200 ports.
Russia has led in total port handlings since 2011.7
The Baltic Sea is also an important transit corridor for Europe-bound

energy resources. Of particular note is the offshore dual-string Nord
Stream natural gas pipeline (with an annual capacity of 55 billion
cubic meters), which stretches along the seafloor from Vyborg, Russia,
to Greifswald, Germany. Presently, Russian Gazprom plans to double
its capacity by constructing a parallel dual-string pipeline: Nord
Stream Two. This project has generated protests from a number of

European Union members—especially Poland and the Baltic States
(Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), in addition to non-member Ukraine—
which argue that it will divert trade and transit revenues away from
them and increase European dependence on Russian gas.8
Within the BSR, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland, the Baltic

States and Finland are members of the European Union. All of the
above-mentioned countries are also members of NATO, except for
Sweden and Finland, which nevertheless maintain close cooperation
with the Alliance. Since 2009, Sweden has maintained a solidarity
declaration in addition to a number of bilateral agreements with its
neighbors, not least with Finland. The solidarity declaration
specifically says that “Sweden will not remain passive if another EU
Member State or Nordic country suffers a disaster or an attack. We
expect these countries to take similar action if Sweden is affected.
Sweden should, therefore, be in a position to both give and receive
military support.”9 Following its adoption, the declaration was soon
forgotten and remained so until 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea.10
But in the ensuing, more uncertain European security environment,
the solidarity declaration has helped Sweden assure its neighbors and
other regional actors of its commitment to common action in case of
a crisis in the BSR.
A number of multinational projects further promote regional

cooperation within the BSR:
 The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region

(EUSBSR), initiated in 2009, is an agreement between the
member states of the EU and the European Commission to
strengthen cooperation between the countries bordering the
Baltic Sea in order to meet common challenges and to benefit
from common opportunities facing the region. The countries
involved in the project are Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden.11
 The Council of the Baltic Sea States, a political forum for

regional inter-governmental cooperation, brings together
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia,
Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden and a
representative from the European Union.12
 The Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission–

Helsinki Commission—the governing body of
the Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment
of the Baltic Sea Area, known as the Helsinki Convention
(HELCOM)—involves the European Union, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia
and Sweden.13
 Euroregion Baltic, an institutionalized form of sub-state-level

cross-border cooperation in the southeastern part of the BSR,
involves eight regions/provinces in Denmark, Lithuania,
Poland, Russia, and Sweden.14
Finally, it is worth pointing out that each of the Western countries in

the BSR are also trade partners with Russia. Indeed, in 2016, Germany
and Poland were among Russia’s top ten export partners.15
History
Throughout recorded history, the BSR has been a battleground for the
states situated along the Baltic Sea, which frequently entered these
wars in ever-shifting constellations of alliances.16 Since the 16th
century, Russia has strived to reach the eastern seaboard of the Baltic
Sea, an aspiration driven by the fact that Russia at that time was in a
disadvantageous situation from a maritime point of view: The Black
Sea was blocked by Tatars and the Ottoman Turks, whereas the White
Sea was remote and hard to reach, both by sea and by land from
central Russia.
The Russian “Drang nach Westen” resulted in a number of wars with

the Swedes. And after defeating Sweden in the Great Nordic War
(1700–1721), Russia emerged as the dominant power in in the BSR.
This position was soon reinforced by the partition of Poland at the
end of the 18th century and Russia’s annexation of Finland in 1809. As
a result of the 1917 revolutions, however, Russia (soon, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, or USSR) temporarily lost its foothold in
the Baltic when the Baltic States and Finland emerged as sovereign
countries. That situation was reversed thanks to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. That led to an unsuccessful war with
Finland 1939–1940 and basing of troops in the Baltic States in 1939,
followed by their occupation in 1940. In 1941, Finland once more
went to war with Soviet Russia—the so-called Continuation War. In
order not to be seen as the aggressor, Finland did not initiate
hostilities on June 22, when Operation Barbarossa began, but four
days later, when Soviet air attacks against Finland gave the Finnish
government the pretext needed to open hostilities.17 The
Continuation War ended in 1944; but unlike other countries siding
with Nazi Germany, Finland was not occupied by the Soviet Union.
The outcome of the Second World War resulted in the Baltic States
being reoccupied, but an active armed resistance against Soviet power
raged there from 1944 to 1953.18 Finland remained free. And in 1947,
it signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Union, limiting the size of the
Finnish armed forces as well as ceding the Petsamo area, on the Arctic
coast, and the Karelian Isthmus, in southeastern Finland, to Moscow.
Another provision, in force until 1956, was leasing the Porkkala area
near Helsinki to the Soviet Union to use as a naval base, which
included free access to the area across Finnish territory.19 In 1948,
Finland signed The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual
Assistance with the Soviet Union; this document was the basis of
Soviet-Finnish relations until 1992.20 The key provisions of the treaty
included military cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union
if Germany or a country allied with it attempted to invade Finland or
the Soviet Union using Finnish territory as well as military

consultations prior to actual cooperation.21 As such, the 1948
friendship treaty was a tool for the Soviet Union to influence Finland’s
internal affairs during the Cold War.
In addition to other territorial gains as a result of its victory in WWII,

Moscow took possession of the northern part of former East Prussia—
today, Kaliningrad oblast. All this, in connection with the
establishment of Communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe and
the creation of the Warsaw Pact, meant that the Baltic Sea essentially
became a Mare Sovieticum. That situation lasted until 1991, when the
demise of the Soviet Union resulted in a regional security
environment rather reminiscent of the period between the first and
second world wars. However, there was one major exception:
Kaliningrad oblast was now an enclave, effectively cut off from Russia
proper, like Germany’s East Prussia in 1920–1939.
To a certain extent, it can be said that the history in the BSR is

repeating itself. The geopolitical situation in the region today is quite
similar to both the beginning of the 1920s as well as the period during
the Crimean War, when the combined English and French fleet was
able to blockade Russian trade in the Gulf of Finland in 1854 and then
bombarded Russian naval bases the following year.22 At present, due
in large part to the annexation of Crimea and subsequent events in
eastern Ukraine, NATO’s naval activity in the Baltic Sea has
significantly intensified.
Doctrines and Concepts
Several preexisting doctrines and concepts, found within five key

Russian government documents, offer guidelines for a potential
Russian Baltic Sea strategy or at least the principles that might form
the basis for such a strategy. The official documents of interest are:
 “The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation”

 “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”

 “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”
 “The Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation”
 “Fundamentals of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030”
Of the above, the “National Security Strategy” and the “Foreign Policy
Concept” are fairly modern, with their most recent iterations written
since the events of 2014—the annexation of Crimea and subsequent
war in eastern Ukraine.
The “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,” approved

by President Vladimir Putin in December 2015, provides the basis for
forming and realizing the state’s security-related polices.23 The
strategy opens with an observation that, “In the areas bordering
Russia, a process of militarization and an arms race are developing.”
Both phenomena are ascribed to the United States and the North
Atlantic Alliance—particularly, due to the deployment of US missile-
defense and high-precision weapons systems close to Russia’s borders
and due to NATO enlargement. In order to protect Russia’s national
interests, the document advocates an open, rational and pragmatic
foreign policy that avoids a costly confrontation with neighbors,
including avoiding a new arms race.
The second vital planning document to consider, the “Foreign Policy

Concept of the Russian Federation,” was approved by President Putin
on November 30, 2016. It provides “a systemic vision of the basic
principles, priority areas, goals and objectives of the foreign policy of
the Russian Federation.”24 The introduction lists the main objectives
of Russia’s foreign policy. Among them there are several that arguably,
could form part, or even a foundation, of a Baltic strategy:
 To consolidate the Russian Federation’s position as a center

of influence in today’s world.
 To pursue neighborly relations with adjacent States, assist

them in eliminating existing as well as preventing the
emergence of new hotbeds of tension and conflicts on their
territory.
 To ensure comprehensive, effective protection of the rights
and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots
residing abroad, including within various international
frameworks.
 To bolster the standing of Russian mass media and
communication tools in the global information space and
convey Russia’s perspective on international process to a
wider international community.
When it comes to the BSR, it is specifically included in part IV of the

document—“Regional Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian
Federation.” On the one hand, this section of the foreign policy
strategy lauds Russia’s role in “Northern Europe” as maintaining trust
and stability. But on the other hand, it warningly refers to NATO’s
expansion, which has “accumulated systemic problems in the Euro-
Atlantic region.”
On December 25, 2014, a new, fourth version of the “Russian Military

Doctrine” was approved, replacing its predecessor from 2010.25
Interestingly, the doctrine was approved prior to the “National
Security Strategy” and not the other way around, which would have
been more logical. The “Military Doctrine” differentiates between
military risks and military threats. A risk is defined as “a situation in
inter-state or intra-state relations characterized by the totality of
factors, which can lead to a military threat under certain conditions”;
whereas, a threat is described in the document as “a situation in inter-
state or intra-state relations characterized by a real possibility of an
outbreak of a military conflict between opposing sides and by a high
degree of readiness of a given state (group of states) or separatist
(terrorist) organizations to resort to military force (armed violence).”
The BSR is not specifically mentioned in the doctrine. And yet, there
are passages applicable to that area, and these echo analogous points
in the “Foreign Policy Concept.” Notably, the mentioned military
risks include NATO deploying military contingents close to Russia’s
borders and the enlargement of the Alliance. Other described military
risks are the establishment and deployment of strategic missile
defense systems and implementation of the global strike concept by
Russia’s competitors or enemies. Military threats consist of, inter alia,
“the demonstration of military power during exercises carried out on
the territory of countries bordering on the territory of the Russian
Federation or its allies’ territories.” The wording is particularly
poignant considering the increased tempo, in recent years, of NATO
exercises in Central-Eastern Europe, which routinely receive
extensive coverage in the Russian media.26
In a 2017 study written for the European Parliament’s Sub-Committee

on Security and Defense, Isabelle Facon, a senior research fellow at the
Fondation Pour la Recherche Stratégique, compares and analyzes the
“National Security Strategy” and the “Military Doctrine of the Russian
Federation.”27 Her study concludes that the present strained relations
between Russia and the West long predates 2014 and the Ukrainian
crisis.28 Furthermore, according to Facon’s analysis, the Strategy and
the Doctrine both focus on the challenges that the Western states
supposedly create for Russia’s security and, tellingly, the two
documents “emphasize the importance of the role of military force in
international relations, suggesting that Russia has a legitimate right to
develop adequate military power to answer this international trend
(which, again, it tends to attribute primarily to the West).” Finally, the
study draws attention to Moscow’s perception of the West as an
obstacle to realizing its ambitions in the post-Soviet space—i.e., in the
former, and now independent, Soviet republics.29
The 2015 Russian “Naval Doctrine” is, according to its preamble, the
primary document determining the country’s national naval policy.30
It comprises of four functional sections—sea transportation,
exploitation and preservation of natural resources, maritime science,
and maritime military activities. Additionally, the “Naval Doctrine” is

divided into six geographic sections—the Atlantic Ocean, the Arctic,
the Caspian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Antarctic. Of these areas,
the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic are accentuated due, according to
the doctrine, to NATO activities in those theaters and the Alliance
moving closer to Russia’s borders. The Baltic Sea might been expected
to be highlighted, but that is actually not the case. The section covering
the Baltic is relegated to a subsection within the portion on the
Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, it is described in rather general terms,
mentioning only the need to develop maritime transportation, the
shipbuilding industry, tourism and fishing, as well as to create
preconditions for stable economic development in cooperation with
other BSR countries, to jointly use the Baltic’s maritime natural assets
in a sensible way, and to generate comprehensive confidence-building
measures in all areas of maritime activities. In addition to this, the
Naval Doctrine mentions the development of Baltic Fleet basing, but
it avoids going into any details on the matter.
On July 20, 2017, the Russian president approved the “Fundamentals

of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030.”31 This document does
not replace, but rather supplements the above-described 2015 “Naval
Doctrine” and reflects the Russian Military-Maritime Fleet’s
(Voyenno-Мorskoy Flot—VMF) improved capabilities, evolving
strategic and operational role, and future ambitions. The document
might probably be linked to the finalization of the armament program
for the period 2018–2027, with the intention to strengthen the VMF’s
hand regarding its future development
The conclusion is interesting and says a little about how Russia views
the role of its navy: “Trends in the development of the current
geopolitical situation in the world convincingly confirm that only the
presence of a strong Navy will secure the Russian Federation a leading
position in a multipolar world in the 21st century, as well as enable the
state to effectively implement and protect its national interests.”
Like the “Military Doctrine,” the “State Naval Policy” document

differentiates between what Moscow views as military risks and
military threats. Among these, two (characterized somewhat
ambiguously as both risks and threats) are presumably directly
applicable to the BSR:
 The pursuit by a number of countries of means to limit the

Russian Federation’s access to assets in the World Ocean and
its access to vital maritime lines of communication.
 The deployment of ship-based strategic, non-nuclear, high-
precision weapons, but also ship-based anti-missile systems,
in waters and the World Ocean adjacent to the Russian
Federation.
The document outlines a series of primary objectives of naval

operations in support of Russia’s foreign policy. And among those, it
lists ensuring “a sufficient naval presence of the Russian Federation in
strategically important areas of the World Ocean, as well as showing
the flag and demonstrating the military power of the Russian
Federation.” Another frequent theme is cooperation with foreign
countries, for example to ensure security and stability in the World
Ocean.
Russia and the Baltic States
As a result of having been part of the Russian Empire between the 18th
century until 1918, and then undergoing nearly continuous
occupation by the Soviet Union from 1940 to 1991, the Baltic States
have a distinct relationship to Russia. Based on that historical heritage,
and reinforced by an uncertainty concerning how post-Soviet Russia
would develop politically, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia put
membership in NATO and the EU high on their foreign policy
agendas soon after recovering their independence in 1991; those twin
goals were accomplished in 2004. Yet, Euro-Atlantic integration,
combined with diverging views on their shared history with Russia
strained the Baltic States’ relations with their large eastern neighbor.
It is worth noting that in 1991, neighborly relations could easily have
developed in a more positive trajectory. At first, the newly
independent Baltic States and Russia followed similar paths to
transition—i.e. democratization and market economy reforms.
Furthermore, the Baltics’ strive for independence at the time
coincided with then–Russian president Boris Yeltsin’s ambitions to
dismantle the Soviet Union. However, this congruence of interests did
not last, leading to decades of various levels of crises and conflicts that
culminated in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the
ongoing Moscow-sponsored war in eastern Ukraine.32 The widely
held notion, and hope, of the Baltic States acting as “a bridge” between
Europe and Russia has, for the time being, been shelved; but
Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė has hinted that it might one
day still be possible.33
The Russian view of the Baltic States is perhaps best characterized by

a passage published on the news portal RuBaltic.ru, whose chief
editor, Sergey Rekeda, is a well-known expert on the Baltic States at
the Moscow State University:
The international situation has discarded the last decades’ balance

of power. The world now oscillates between trying to form a new
international security architecture and ossifying into opposing
blocs. In this context Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia emerge as
some of the most active lobbyists of the realization of the second
scenario in European region. This activity of the Baltic republics
corresponds with the internal political processes presently
developing in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia—the growth of
authoritarian tendencies, deterioration of the economic situation,
social degradation, etc.34
That view not only influences Moscow’s relations with the Baltic
States, but also Russian activities directed against them.
One important aspect in the BSR is the presence of a Russian minority

still living in the Baltic States. As a percentage of the overall
population, Russians made up 25 percent in Estonia (as of 2017), 25.6
percent in Latvia (2016) and 5.8 percent in Lithuania (2011).35 The
levels of integration of these minorities in their respective societies are
mixed; and as such, they represent a possible tool of subversion for
Russia against these countries. Indeed, the unrest in connection with
the removal of a Soviet war memorial in Tallinn (the Bronze Soldier),
in 2007, illustrates how Moscow has previously exploited this tool.36
That said, the present-day level of susceptibility among the younger
generation of Baltic Russians to ideas linked to the so-called “Russian
World” (Russkiy Mir), or whether they can truly be characterized as
Russian “compatriots,” is open to debate. Indeed, judging by the
conclusions reached by Agnia Grigas in her book Beyond Crimea: The
New Russian Empire, neither may be particularly strong today—a
trend that may become even more pronounced as the older generation
of Baltic Russians fades away.37
Nonetheless, several political parties in the Baltic States continue to

attract the local Russian minority and maintain links to Russia:
 The Center Party in Estonia holds 27 seats in the parliament

as of mid-2018. Since November 23, 2016, it has headed a
coalition government, with Center Party leader, Jüri Ratas,
serving as Estonian prime minister.38 The party has
maintained a cooperation agreement with United Russia
since 2004.39 In May 2017, the then–minister of public
administration and member of the Center Party, Mihhail
Korb, stated at a meeting with army that he was not in favor
of Estonia’s membership in NATO, which later led to his
resignation.40
 The Harmony Party in Latvia won 22 seats in the parliament
in the October 2018 elections, but it is not represented in the
current coalition government. Its leader, Nils Ušakovs, stated
in connection with a visit to Russia in September 2014, that
Putin is the best president for Latvia.41 The party signed a

cooperation agreement with United Russia. And though this
agreement was recently said to have been canceled, Riga
mayor and Saskaņa (Harmony) Party leader Nils Ušakovs
declared that “a pragmatic cooperation with Russia would
remain important in the future.”42 Another party with
Russian links is the Latvian Russian Union. Presently, this
political faction has no seats in the national legislature.
 In Lithuania, the chairman of the Farmers and Greens Union,
Ramunas Karbauskis, is thought to maintain close ties to
Russia.43
Russia also supports non-governmental organizations (NGO) in the

Baltic States that are supportive of Russian policies. An investigation
in 2015 revealed that more than 40 such NGOs had received financial
support from Russia.44
This mixture of local Russian minorities, political parties with links to

Russia and Moscow-funded NGOs provides Russia with potential
leverage to influence the Baltic States. As Igor Korotyenko, the editor
of the Russian journal National Defense and a conservative military
hardliner, noted in a March 2016 interview with Pravda,
We [Russia] have enough powerful resources to influence the

Baltic countries both using economic tools and via the media. In
that aspect we should strengthen our informational and
propaganda activities to influence the media market in the Baltic
States because “nothing ventured, nothing gained.” […] We
should engage in a coherent reformatting of the political area,
which today is not friendly to us, and make it either neutral or
friendly.45
In March 2014, the EU imposed sanctions on Russia in response to

the latter’s actions against Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Later that year, in August, Russia responded to the Western
sanctions by adopting a ban on selected agricultural products from the

EU, the US, Canada, Australia and Norway.46 Both the European
sanctions and the Russian ban are still in effect, as of early-2019. They
have had a deleterious economic impact on the Baltic States,
particularly for their food exports. For instance, over 90 percent of the
Baltic States’ cheese exports went to Russia prior to the ban.47
The seaports of the Baltic States are also closely linked to Russian
infrastructure, such as important transnational east-west roadways,
along which Russian goods are exported to global markets. But in the
last 10–15 years, the volume of Russian goods transiting through the
Baltic countries has declined.48 For example, in 2015, nine million tons
of Russian oil exports transited via the Baltic States, compared with
five million tons in 2016; and this transit of oil products was projected
to completely cease in 2018.49
Intertwined electricity and gas networks represent another Soviet

legacy. The Baltic States operate on a Soviet-era power system,
connecting them with Russia and Belarus. But as a result of the
changed geopolitical situation, they are now determined to separate
their systems to become more independent of the Russian operator.50
It is important to point out that Russia has never cut the electricity
flow to the Baltics or threatened to do so. Nevertheless, by 2025 the
Baltic States will, with the support of the EU, decouple their power
networks from Russia.51 Meanwhile, dependence on Russian natural
gas had allowed Moscow to charge high prices and made the gas
networks vulnerable to Russian influence. This situation is now
changing, however, thanks to imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG),
increasing connections with the rest of Europe, and Gazprom’s
decreasing influence as a supplier to Baltic gas markets. All these
above-mentioned measures aim explicitly at decreasing the Baltic
States’ dependence on Russia for gas imports.52
In addition, Russia has frequently challenged the Baltic States’

sovereignty via military aircraft intruding their airspace. Among the
most provocative cases involved the abduction, in 2014, of an

Estonian security service operative by Russian agents from an
Estonian border post, on Estonian territory. The kidnapped Estonian
officer was later taken to Moscow and tried for espionage.53
Russia has responded to the presence of multinational NATO forces

in the three Baltic States by apparently orchestrating the publishing
and propagating of so-called “fake news,” reporting on supposed
incidents involving Alliance soldiers, with the aim of undermining
NATO’s regional presence.54 Such false media accounts often describe
NATO soldiers as rapists or drunkards seeking fights with local
inhabitants. In one example, Russian-linked media outlets charged
German soldiers stationed in Lithuania with fabricated rape claims—
bringing to mind the earlier “Lisa case” in Germany. Emails claiming
that German soldiers had raped an underage Lithuanian girl were sent
to the speaker of the Lithuanian parliament and Lithuanian media.
The allegations were investigated by the Lithuanian police, which
found no evidence of any wrongdoing or any truth to the sent emails.55
Russia and the Other Countries in the BSR
Russia views its western BSR neighbors, Denmark, Finland, Germany,

Poland and Sweden, as countries in decay due to their emerging
multicultural societies, the influx of immigrants, the legal recognition
of same-sex marriage, and so on. In a speech in 2013, President Putin
notably claimed,
We can see how many of the Euro-Atlantic countries are actually

rejecting their roots, including the Christian values that constitute
the basis of Western civilization. They are denying moral
principles and all traditional identities: national, cultural,
religious and even sexual. They are implementing policies that
equate large families with same-sex partnerships, belief in God
with the belief in Satan.56
Additionally, the countries in question are, to varying degrees,

depicted in Russia as “russophobic.”
These states’ relations with Russia and the way Moscow behaves
against them varies, depending on a number of key factors, including
history, membership status in NATO, as well as the actual degree—
perceived or real—of their levels of “russophobia.”
Denmark
Denmark is a major Arctic power and a small European nation. In the

wake of the annexation of Crimea and the ensuing events in Ukraine,
its relations with Russia have notably developed in a negative
direction.57 According to the Russian propaganda outlet Sputnik,
“Over the past [few] years, Denmark’s relations with Russia have been
marked by tension, which was exacerbated by EU sanctions and the
Nordic countries' paranoid fear of Russian ‘aggression.’ ”58 On the
other hand, a 2016 report by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
notes,
Denmark should support the EU position on a common,

robust and principled stance externally, as well as cohesion
and resilience internally. This is to be accomplished especially
through joint EU sanctions and NATO commitments,
including Danish participation in training exercises in the
neighboring area. Firmness should not stand alone, but must
be backed by dialogue with Russia on the basis of established
principles and cooperation in areas of mutual interest.59
Moreover, in recent years, Danish media has continued to depict

Russia in a negative way. Pointedly, an August 2017 article in the
Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten asserts that Russia is a substantial
threat.60
The deterioration in bilateral Danish-Russian relations stems from

more than just Crimea and the Ukraine crisis; it also dates back to the
hacking attacks of the Danish defense ministry, in 2015 and 2016, by
the group APT 28 (also known as Pawn Storm, Sofacy and Fancy
Bear), which is linked directly to the Russian government and security
services. The APT 28 hacks managed to gain access to Danish defense
ministry employees’ emails.61 Moreover, relations suffered in 2015,
when the Russian ambassador to Copenhagen warned Denmark
against becoming part of the US missile defense shield, stating that in
such a case, Danish warships could become targets for Russian nuclear
strikes.62
The right-wing populist Danish People’s Party (DPP), which won 21.1
percent of the vote in the 2015 elections and became Denmark’s
second-biggest political faction in the parliament, has been accused of
pro-Russian leanings.63 Indeed, in its appearances on Danish media,
the party frequently seems to express opinions favorable to Russian
positions. Moreover, Russia’s propaganda news channel RT mentions
the DPP twice as much as other Danish parties.64
Germany
Germany has enjoyed an on-and-off special relationship with Russia

since the time of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Subsequently,
bilateral relations became notably cordial during the 1920s, with
closer military cooperation, culminating perhaps most dramatically
for Central-Eastern Europe with the 1939 German-Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact signed by foreign ministers Joachim von Ribbentrop
and Vyacheslav Molotov. During the Cold War, in the 1960s, the
German government’s policy of Ostpolitik also encouraged closer ties
with Moscow. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two
countries again grew closer due to expanding trade and cultural ties.
This situation reversed abruptly in 2014, however. German President
Frank-Walter Steinmeier, in connection with his visit to Moscow in
October 2017, characterized the bilateral situation as “…far from
[having] normal ties, open wounds are still out there, there are
unresolved issues, first and foremost it concerns the takeover of
Crimea and the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which are a burden and
continue to be a burden for our ties.”65 And a Swiss paper described
the present German-Russian relations more bluntly as being in a state
of permafrost.66 Russian analyst Olga Lebedeva ascribes these current
tensions to the political agreements Germany has signed with the EU
and NATO.67 Nevertheless, a majority of respondents (58 percent) to
a German poll conducted in fall 2017 supported improving relations
with Russia—an opinion that has also been increasingly entering
German political debate.68
Frozen relations have also impacted on Russo-German trade. Russian

exports to Germany in 2016 declined by 16.1 percent, and Russia’s
imports from Germany dropped by 4.8 percent.69
Russian media is frequently accused of waging an information war

against Germany. As such, Moscow is assumed to be pursuing the
following objectives: exaggerate problems for Germany connected to
the European migrant crisis, push Berlin to relax its backing for EU
sanctions against Russia, as well as weaken voter trust in Chancellor
Angela Merkel.70 A particularly famous example has been the above-
mentioned “Lisa case”: In January 2016, Russian television reported
on a 13-year-old Russian-German girl who had allegedly been raped
by migrants. The story turned out to be a fake but was given extensive
coverage in Russian domestic and foreign media and resulted in
diplomatic tensions between Berlin and Moscow.71
Two German political parties exhibit significantly more pro-Russian

attitudes than any other domestic party: Alternative for Germany
(AfD) and the National Democratic Party (NPD). The latter is a right-
wing extremist faction with practically no national political influence.
The nationalist-populist AfD, however, received 12.6 percent of the
vote in the September 2017 parliamentary elections and entered the
parliament. It is routinely accused of having been financed by Russia,
and some of its members have acted as unofficial election observers in

eastern Ukraine and Crimea.72
Between 1950 and 2014, 2.4 million Russian-Germans immigrated to

Germany from the former Soviet Union. Consequently, this
immigrant group has the largest number of eligible voters in
Germany,73 a fact that makes them a tempting target for Russian
propaganda and might, to a certain extent, help explain the AfD’s
electoral success.74
Prior to the 2017 German parliamentary elections, speculation was

rife that Russia would attempt to influence the vote, as happened with
the earlier US and French presidential elections. Ultimately, however,
no such attempts were noted, to the disappointment of some
observers.75
Poland
Poland’s traditional distrust of Russia, its usual strong support for

common EU policies as well as its complex history with neighboring
Ukraine all impact on bilateral relations with Moscow. That
relationship became even chillier following then-president Lech
Kaczyński’s death in a plane crash in 2010 over Smolensk and its
aftermath as well as the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Indeed, according
to current Polish President Andrzej Duda, speaking in late 2017,
“After all, it was not only with Ukraine, but also earlier with Georgia,
in 2008; and one should not pretend that it [Russian invasions of both
of those former Soviet countries] did not happen. If we pretend that
this does not exist, then this will lead to a tragic ending as history has
already taught us.” Duda added that Russia is constantly acting in a
way that cannot in any way be politically accepted.76 And former
Polish foreign minister Witold Waszczykowski asserted around the
same time that, in his view, Russia is not interested in maintaining a
dialogue with Poland.77
A June 2017 report published by the Polish Ministry of Defense

explicitly describes Russia as a threat to Poland and other countries in
the region, but also for other state actors desiring a stable international
order. Furthermore, the report claims that it is not unrealistic that
Russia could incite a regional conflict and drag one or several NATO
countries into it.78
Gazprom estimates that Russian gas deliveries meet 60 percent

of Poland’s domestic demand.79 Poland, like the Baltic States, wants to
phase out these Russian energy imports in order to address its
vulnerability to potential “political actions” by Moscow using the
“energy weapon.” Warsaw’s intention is to become completely
independent of Russian gas supplies after 2022, when the present gas
purchase agreement expires.80
Russian trade with Poland has halved since 2014, as a result of Russia
banning the import of Polish fruit and vegetables. In 2013, Poland
exported €1.3 billion ($1.5 billion) worth of agricultural products to
Russia; and by 2015, that amount dropped to €398 million ($476
million).
While Poland is also subjected to Russian soft power, a recent study

by the Budapest-based think tank Political Capital concludes that such
leverage has been significantly less successful than in neighboring
Hungary, Slovakia or Czechia (the Czech Republic).81 Moscow’s
attempted use of soft power in Poland is driven by the fact that
Russian political influence over the country is limited; the political
establishment and Poles in general have a largely unfavorable attitude
toward Russia due to deep social, historical and political
preconditions. Moscow’s direct political influence extends to only a
handful of domestic actors, mainly around the fringe political party
Zmiana (Polish for “change”). Founded in 2015, with Mateusz
Piskorski as its chairperson, Zmiana espouses a strong anti-American
position, openly supports Putin’s politics, and sees Russia as a natural
ally for both Poland and the European Union.82 In the spring of 2016,
Piskorski was detained by Poland’s Internal Security Agency and

charged with “cooperation with Russian intelligence services, meeting
intelligence officers, and undertaking operational tasks from them as
well as accepting payments.”83 The pro-Russian Zmiana leader also
founded the European Center for Geopolitical Analysis in Warsaw, an
organization financed at least in part with obfuscated Russian money.
Over the past decade, the Center has organized a series of trips for
non-official election observers to dubious elections, including in
Abkhazia and Transnistria.84
Finland
Sweden and Finland are special cases within the BSR: they are not
NATO members but carry on extensive cooperation with the Alliance
and maintain intense internal debates regarding possible future
membership. Finland also differs markedly in its bilateral relations
with Russia compared with the other countries in the region. Despite
the changed European security situation since 2014, Helsinki has
preserved high-level contacts with Moscow, such as the visits to
Finland by the Russian foreign minister in May 2017 and the Russian
president that following July.85 According to Finnish Foreign Minister
Timo Soini, “We have been here for centuries and we know them
[Russia] and they know us. They respect our consistent approach to
them. They do not respect crawling on knees.”86 This attitude seems
to be largely reflected by the Russian side: its foreign ministry
spokesperson, Maria Sacharova, noted in a 2016 interview that Russia
and Finland have managed to maintain positive cooperation despite
negative relations between the EU and Russia.87 This attitude on the
part of Helsinki can be explained by Finland having a 1,340 km (830-
mile) border with Russia, the experience of relations with Russia since
the presidency of Urho Kekkonen (president in 1956–1982), and high
levels of bilateral trade. In 2016, Finnish exports to Russia amounted
to €6.145 billion ($7.589 billion) and imports from Russia totaled
€2.977 billion ($3.561billion), making Russia Finland’s third most
important trade partner.88
One stumbling block in relations between the two countries is the

possibility of Finland one day choosing to join NATO. Today, that
outcome still seems quite distant. The majority of Finns are against
membership: in a fall 2017 poll, 59 percent of respondents rejected
Finland becoming part of the Alliance, and only 22 percent approved
of joining.89 Considering such limited popular support, it is unlikely
that Finnish politicians will actively pursue NATO membership any
time soon, particularly since any move to join the North Atlantic bloc
would require public approval via a referendum.90 Nevertheless,
Russia continues to actively warn Finland against joining NATO.
Illustratively, in October 2017, the Russian ambassador to Finland
stated, “While each country has the right to define its own national
security and defense policy, everyone understands that should the
NATO infrastructure advance towards our borders, Russia would be
forced to take appropriate countermeasures.91 A similar warning has
also been given to Sweden at several occasions.
In comparison with other BSR countries, Finland appears to be

relatively less targeted by Russian subversion. Yet, potential cases can
be observed. During the first two months of 2016, about 1,000 asylum
seekers entered Finland from Russia compared with 700 in 2015.92
This breached common border practices without actually breaking
any official agreements and might have been a signal from Moscow
that good working relations cannot be taken for granted and that the
consequences of losing Russia’s trust could be significant for Finland.
Indeed, during subsequent bilateral negotiations over the asylum
seekers, a Russian official appeared to underscore the above sentiment
when he told his Finnish counterpart that Russia has 11 million
foreigners living on its territory.93 In another example, a 2016 report
from the Finnish security police notes that foreigners,
“Russians,” have bought property in sensitive areas on Finnish soil in
anticipation of a future “crisis situation.”94
Sweden
In comparison with Finland, relations between Sweden and Russia are

more strained and more similar to those of other countries in the BSR.
One contributing factor is probably also the fact that Russia is
domestically seen as Sweden’s archenemy as a result of the wars fought
with Russia. A 2017 poll published by the Pew Research Center
showed that only 18 percent of Swedes had a positive view of Russia.95
Swedish-Russia trade contracted in recent years. In 2016, Swedish

exports to Russia amounted to 14 billion Swedish crowns ($1.700
billion) compared with 23 billion ($2.793 billion) in 2012; while,
imports from Russia in 2016 amounted to 32 billion crowns ($3.887
billion), almost half of what it had been in 2012.96
Like the Finns, a majority of Swedes are opposed to NATO

membership: a poll from July 2017 showed 43 percent against and 32
percent in favor of joining the North Atlantic Alliance.97 At the same
time, however, the debate concerning NATO membership seems also
to be more intense in Sweden than Finland—although it tends to flare
up in connection with activities related to cooperation with the
Alliance or sudden appearances of Russian submarines off the
Swedish coast or similar provocative incidents. Sweden has also
frequently been warned by Russia against joining NATO. In June
2017, Putin declared, “We will consider this [Sweden’s joining
NATO] as an additional threat to Russia and will search for ways to
eliminate it.”98 The same message has also been delivered on separate
occasions by the Russian foreign minister, the Russian ambassador to
Sweden and the Russian foreign ministry’s spokesperson.99 Due to
Swedish and Finnish participation in NATO exercises, the
development of their interoperability with NATO, and Sweden’s host
nation agreement with the Alliance, Russia regards Sweden, and
possibly also Finland, as covert NATO members.100 This accusation
particularly comes to the surface when Russian media comments
upon Swedish participation in Alliance exercises or other activities
related to NATO. Therefore, it is possible to assume that the measures

Moscow has threatened to take as a result of a Swedish and Finnish
NATO membership have already been implemented as part of
Russia’s military planning.
Sweden has also been a target of what is assumed to be Russian “active

measures,” for example:
 Fake letters. One such forged document, which surfaced on

online social media, was purportedly signed by the Swedish
minister of defense and concerned the sale of artillery pieces
to Ukraine.101
 Infiltration of local political parties.102
 Attempts to influence public opinion in order to prevent the
signing of a Host Nation Support Agreement with NATO.103
 A simulated bombing attack on Good Friday 2013.104
 A series of articles by the Russian ambassador in Swedish
papers. In an October 2017 piece, he pleaded for better
relations between Sweden and Russia.105
In addition, there are also the recurring reports of suspicious

underwater activities in the Swedish archipelago, but so far none of
these have been conclusively linked to a specific country.
Besides what is mentioned above, the Russian intelligence and

security services—the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal
Security Service (FSB) and military intelligence (GRU)—are active in
the Baltic States and the other Western countries in the BSR. Many of
these activities continue to be highlighted in yearly reports published
by the security services of Germany, Latvia and Lithuania, for
instance.106
In the Western BSR countries, there are also a number of

organizations and societies for the Russian diaspora or for friendship
with Russia and the like. How many of these organizations actually
exist is difficult to establish, but judging from the Swedish experience,

some of them have sprung up since the spring of 2014 to promote
Russian views. Nevertheless, their impact on public opinion tends to
be marginal at best.
A more immediate source of concern is Russia’s increased military

activity in the BSR, which includes relatively frequent airspace and
territorial water violations and incidents. For example, in June 2017,
a Russian Su-27 Flanker flew dangerously close to a Swedish Air Force
S102B Korpen on an intelligence gathering mission over the Baltic
Sea.107 As the general security situation has deteriorated and tensions
have risen, there is a risk that such provocative behavior could lead to
a miscalculation, mid-air accident, loss of human life and/or
uncontrolled escalation.
Kaliningrad Oblast
Kaliningrad oblast, formerly the northern part of the German

province of East Prussia, is an exclave sandwiched between Poland to
the south and Lithuania to the north and east. As of February 2016,
the oblast numbered 975,600 inhabitants and has an area of 12,430
square kilometers (4,799 square miles), roughly the size of
Connecticut. The port of Kaliningrad is the only ice-free Russian port
on the Baltic Sea. It is one of the largest regional port complexes both
in terms of volumes of processed goods and in terms of technical
support and services provided to cargo owners.108
East Prussia was partitioned and its northern portion was annexed by
the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War (the
southern section was appended to post-war Poland). Particularly
starting in 1944, the region saw bitter fighting and suffered extensive
destruction. As a result of the fighting and annexation, the German
population either fled or was expelled. During the Soviet era, the
renamed Kaliningrad oblast was a closed military zone; but that ended
in 1991, when possibilities opened up for cooperation with foreign
countries.109 This raised hopes locally and abroad that the exclave
would become a Russian gateway to Europe and a Baltic Hong Kong,
hopes that have not materialized. In spite of its ice-free port and
proximity to the EU, Kaliningrad oblast has relatively high
unemployment and lower salaries than the Russian average.
Additionally, customs and transport costs raise local consumption
prices, which, combined with low salaries, lower Kaliningrad’s living
standards.110
A 1997 PONARS study suggested five possible future scenarios for

Kaliningrad oblast:111
1. The continuation of a heavily militarized exclave under

Russia’s direct jurisdiction.
2. Far-reaching autonomy for the oblast with a continued
military presence, though perhaps at reduced levels.
3. Far-reaching autonomy for the oblast and demilitarization.
4. A transfer of the oblast to Lithuania, Poland, or Germany.
5. An attempt by the oblast to secede or to negotiate
independence.
Twenty years later, the first scenario has come to pass: Kaliningrad
oblast is clearly a militarized exclave directly controlled by the central
government in Moscow. As a result of the withdrawal of
Soviet/Russian forces from Eastern Europe, the oblast become a
reception area for those units and, consequently, became heavily
militarized. In 1994, the Kaliningrad defensive district was formed
and later, in 1998, renamed the Kaliningrad special district, unifying
the ground, naval, air and air-defense units under a common
command, i.e. the Baltic Fleet.112 The 1990s saw a substantial (albeit
temporary) downsizing of the military presence in oblast, with
personnel reduced from 25,000 to 11,600; additionally, hundreds of
tanks, combat vehicles and artillery were transferred to Russia proper
or put in storage, and the number of ships in the Baltic Fleet was
reduced from 200 to 40.113 This changed in 2009, when the then–chief
of the Russian General Staff, General Nikolay Makarov, declared that

Kaliningrad oblast would be completely rearmed by 2012.114 Later, in
January 2015, the region was singled out as an area, together with the
Arctic and occupied Crimea, to be given priority in terms of
rearmament and development of military capabilities.115
But until 2016, not much happened in the Kaliningrad oblast

compared with the Arctic and Crimea. The reason for this might be
linked to the dismissal of the former commander of the Baltic Fleet,
Vice Admiral Viktor Kravchuk, and a number of other officers in June
of that year.116 Alternatively, Moscow may have decided that, by 2016,
the time had come to more assertively counter NATO in the BSR. Or
perhaps, there appeared to be growing likelihood at that point of
Sweden and Finland joining NATO.
Whatever the reason, developments in Kaliningrad oblast since 2016

have included, inter alia:
 The formation of the 11th Army Corps in April 2016.

 News suggesting an upgrading of the 7th Mechanized
Regiment to a full brigade.117
 Rearming the 152nd Missile Brigade with Iskander-M theater
ballistic missiles in November 2017.118
 The transfer of two corvettes from the Black Sea Fleet to the
Baltic Fleet in November 2016; another three of the same class
will reportedly be added prior to 2020.119
 Providing the 25th Coastal Missile Regiment with Bal missiles
and possibly upgrading the regiment to a brigade.120
 Completion of equipping the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade
with BTR-82A combat vehicles during 2017.121
 Providing the Baltic Fleet with Su-30SM fighters—one
aircraft in 2016 and five in 2017.122
 Plans to set up two new air regiments.123
 Refurbishing of infrastructure—notably, Chakalovsk

airbase.124
 A Russian-Chinese naval exercise in the Baltic Sea in July
2017.125
The above should not be treated as isolated events. They must be seen
within the broader context of what has taken place in the Western
Military District, which has a substantial impact on the BSR.
According to the Chief of the Russian General Staff the following units
have been set up in the Western Military District during 2012–2017:126
 One tank army, i.e. the 1st Guards Tank Army.127

 One army corps, i.e. the 11th Army Corps.128
 Three mechanized divisions, among them the 3rd and the 144th
Mechanized Division,129 and probably also the 2nd Guards
Mechanized Division.130
 One tank division, probably the 4th Guards Tank Division.131
 Two artillery brigades.
This is not the complete picture, as a number of other units have also
been organized. It cannot be excluded that additional military
formations will be organized in the Western Military District over
time, including potentially in Kaliningrad oblast, even though its size
limits how many new units would be able to be housed locally. It
remains open to debate whether the recently organized units are fully
manned and equipped or what their operational capabilities actually
look like in practice. Indeed, information gleaned from Russian open
sources suggests that at least some of these units are not yet fully
manned nor equipped and lack full operational capability. However,
their weaknesses may still be rectified in the long run. It is worth
noting that Russian military expert Aleksandr Golts assesses that the
new divisions are cadre units, only to be manned with reservists
during a full-scale mobilization in wartime—i.e., a return to Soviet
practice.132
All that said, Russia has deployed substantial forces in and around the
Baltic—ground, airborne/air assault, naval, and air defense units—
giving Moscow the possibility to carry out either offensive or
defensive operations in the BSR and to create a robust A2/AD bubble
over the area. Moreover, the forces present in the Western Military
District can easily be reinforced from elsewhere in Russia—something
Moscow has annually practiced on a large scale. Indeed, this is a
recurring feature in connection with the larger exercises carried out
on a yearly basis, including Vostok, Zapad, etc. The Russian Armed
Forces, including those of the Western Military District, are
significantly better trained and operate under higher readiness levels
today than they did than in 2008, during the war with Georgia.
Moreover, the ongoing Syrian operation and intervention in eastern
Ukraine have provided the Russian military with valuable combat
experience.
Conclusion
Does Russia have a Baltic Sea strategy? The combination of

documents laying out Russian doctrine and national security concepts
coupled with Russian activities targeting the countries in the BSR
certainly seems to point to one. The major doctrine and concept
documents are written in general terms; therefore, the guidelines
found therein can be applied to any region or activity, including the
BSR. However, a deeper analysis of Russian activities in, or targeting,
the BSR’s other countries shows a remarkable degree of consistency,
albeit adapted to the country in question—thus, indicating an
underlying strategy founded on general principles but modified to suit
the distinctive characteristics of the Baltic region. For obvious reason
such a strategy is not in the public domain. But by linking the content
of the government’s planning documents with the observed reality of
Russian activities, it is possible to formulate the apparent shape and
set of objectives in Moscow’s strategy toward the BSR:
 Establish a position as an important actor, the key actor, in the

BSR that cannot be ignored.
From a Russian point of view, this is a logical objective due to

its history of having long been a key player within the Baltic
Sea area. However, it also linked to Russia’s goal of
substituting unipolarity—i.e., the unmatched US role and
actions in international politics—with a multipolar world.
Raising Moscow’s status in the BSR, thus, locally contributes
to counteracting US initiatives in this part of Europe.
 Reestablish, maintain and advance bilateral relations—

political, trade, cultural, etc.—with other countries in the BSR,
with emphasis on Finland, while largely excluding the Baltic
States.
Russia’s relations with the other states in the BSR are today
more or less frozen. Reestablishing and developing these
relations would be advantageous for Moscow, not least in
order to gain influence and promote a positive image of
Russia. Additionally, improved relations would contribute to
reinforcing Russia’s status as a major actor in the BSR.
Finland has a special, longstanding and durable relationship
with Russia; and this bilateral association has endured despite
Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. During a tense political
situation, such as today, close ties to Finland may also enable
Russia to convey its viewpoints to the West and vice versa,
thus according the Helsinki-Moscow link additional value.
 Destabilize the Baltic States to encourage the emergence of a

political regime neutral or friendly toward Russia.
An outright invasion of the Baltic States would be a risky

enterprise for Russia. Undoubtedly, Russia has the military
means to accomplish an invasion; but the move would almost

certainly lead to a major war in Europe, and occupying
Russian forces would face popular resistance, likely more
intense and effective than the former Forest Brothers (Baltic
partisans who opposed Soviet encroachment after World War
II). Today, such resistance could not be as easily countered by
the same means as in the 1940s and 1950s—i.e. terror,
repression and collectivization. For one thing, modern-day
Russia must contend much more with international reaction
to its activities than the Soviet Union did. Moreover, it is
questionable whether Russia could even allocate adequate
forces to ensure an outright occupation. Therefore,
“encouraging” neutral or friendly political regimes represents
a better option than military force.
 Establish and maintain a credible military force in or adjacent

to the BSR in order to keep neighboring countries confused
regarding Russian military intentions, offensive or defensive.
To a certain extent this has already been accomplished, but

further increased military presence in or adjacent to the BSR
cannot be ruled out. That the BSR countries do not fully
comprehend Russia’s military intentions is obvious judging
from the commentaries and speculation regarding Zapad
2017 prior, during and after that Russian military exercise. In
this aspect, Moscow can be judged to have been successful.
 Exercise military shows of force on the ground, on the sea and

in the air.
This is almost routine and obvious when looking at Russian

military activities in the BSR, such as in connection with
Zapad 2013 and a more recent naval exercise, on April 4–6,
2018, in the southwestern part of the Baltic Sea, close to
Sweden. Notably, that area of the sea had seldom or never

been used for Russian naval exercises in the past.
 Develop a non-military capability to incapacitate vital

functions in countries in the BSR, but also to exert influence.
Moscow is looking to be able to exert pressure on as well as

influence political and other decisions favorable for Russia in
the BSR countries without resorting to military means. These
same non-military tools would presumably also allow Russia
to gain concessions from or destabilize and incapacitate a
potential or actual adversary.
 Establish a robust and aggressive intelligence collection effort

to support Russia’s Baltic Sea strategy.
Timely intelligence is of outmost importance for Russia due

to the present situation in the BSR, marked by increased
NATO presence and activity, the possibility of Sweden and
Finland joining the Alliance, and Western countries
contemplating or implementing various political actions
directed against Russia or Russian interests.
 Prevent Swedish or Finnish membership in NATO.
Were Sweden and Finland to become NATO members,

Russia would be completely surrounded by the North
Atlantic Alliance in the BSR. Such a situation would
dramatically change the security situation in the area, which
Moscow would view as utterly disadvantageous—needing to
be avoided using all possible means.
 Undermine NATO’s presence and exercise activities in the BSR,

mainly in the Baltic States, preventing the further growth and,
in the best case, actually diminishing the Alliance’s regional

presence.
Moscow views NATO’s presence close to the Russian border

as a threat. It alleges that this represents a broken a promise
by the West, at the end of the Cold War, not to enlarge NATO
beyond the borders of a reunited Germany. As Russian
President Putin said, in a speech on April 14, 2014, “… they
have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs,
presented us with a fait accompli. This happened with
NATO’s expansion [sic] to the East as well as with
the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders.”133
A NATO withdrawal from the Baltic States—brought about
by, for example, regime change or simply by influencing
public opinion in the West—would be an important victory
for Russia.
 Influence the political establishment, media and public opinion

though “active measures” in order to encourage local
acceptance of Russian viewpoints and a more positive attitude
toward Russia.
Active measures represent a “soft” alternative to military

pressure as a tool to incapacitate the vital functions of BSR
countries and to further extend Russia’s preexisting sources
of influence.
 Support political parties and organizations with positive views

of Russia or more widely promote traditional values regarding
the nation, family and religion.
Such support, open or covert, is already ongoing and

represents an important instrument with which Moscow
seeks to gain influence and/or impact public opinion in the
other countries of the BSR. Depending on the type of

organization being supported, Moscow’s goal may
additionally be to inspire violent acts or to incite internal
unrest. Unlike the Soviet Union, today’s Russia is not
ideologically constrained when choosing which foreign
parties and organizations to support.
 Protect and support the Russian diaspora and use it to promote

Russian interests.
Russian diaspora groups vary widely in size and activities

across the BSR. But in each case, these communities can be
exploited by the Kremlin as an instrument to promote
Russian interests. The Russian protests against the transfer of
the Soviet soldier statue in Estonia, in 2007, was an important
case in point. More recently, supposed mistreatment of
Russians and/or Russian speakers in eastern Ukraine served
as a pretext for Moscow’s intervention there in 2014. It is
debatable whether Moscow might one day attempt to put
forward the same kind of argument to justify a military
invasion of the Baltic States; but regardless, any occurrences
of discrimination or mistreatment of local Russian diasporas
fuel Russian propaganda, disinformation and political
activities.
Estonian journalist and European Council on Foreign Relations

senior policy fellow Kadri Liik, in her Riga Conference Papers 2017
article, “The Baltic States and Russia—On Diplomatic Dimensions of
Security,” claims that Russia has essentially given up on being a
dominant power in the Baltic States. Moscow perceives these three
countries, she writes, as already having been lost to the US’s sphere of
influence.134 Yet, that argument is difficult to fully accept when
considering the continued scope of Russian activities in the BSR, a
region important to Russia not least in light of increased NATO
presence there as well as the continued possibility of Sweden and

Finland joining the North Atlantic Alliance.
In this context, the question arises whether Moscow is giving the BSR
priority over other strategic directions. In 2014, the chief of the
Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, singled out Kaliningrad
oblast, Crimea and the Arctic as areas of precedence for the military.135
And indeed, these three territories show a remarkable similarity from
a military point of view: among other factors, all of them have seen
deployments of S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, the
introduction of Bal and Bastion coastal defense missiles, as well as the
organization of two new regiments, a new naval squadron and an
army corps. Despite these similarities, it is still possible to argue that
the Western strategic direction—i.e., the BSR—is currently being
given priority by Moscow because of the fact that traditional West–
East invasion routes traverse this region, due to the presence of NATO
forces deployed close to the Russian border there, as well as the
possibility of Swedish and Finnish NATO membership.
NATO’s forces in the Baltic States act as a trip wire and a deterrent;
but alone, they are not enough to counter a full-scale Russian attack.
This fact poses a dual challenge for the Alliance. First, increasing the
present forces in the Baltic States is hampered by the fact that
additional available forces are difficult to come by. Furthermore, even
if a reinforcement were successful, the forces are, in principle, stuck in
the Baltics, making it problematic to redeploy them in case of a crisis
or an armed conflict. Second, NATO would struggle to bring in
reinforcements quickly enough before the forces already engaged on
the ground become overwhelmed. In the latter context, the use of
Swedish and Finnish territory and facilities would be of crucial
importance; but they may not be wholly available, particularly if
Russian pressure or outright threats push Stockholm and/or Helsinki
to withhold their assistance.
Events during the last few years show continued Russian interest and
increased activity in the BSR, which Moscow considers to be of
strategic importance. Its regional Baltic strategy is likely to remain in
force for the foreseeable future, thus continuing to pose a challenge to
the other countries in the BSR. It is a challenge they have all begun to
meet, although a little belatedly.
Notes
1
“A meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense of Russia was held in
Moscow,” Russian MoD, October 27 2017,
https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12148569@egNews.
2
Softschools.com, http://www.softschools.com/facts/seas/baltic_sea_facts/3312/.
3
“The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” The Security Council of the
Russian Federation, December 25 2014,
4
JustFunFacts, “Interesting facts about the Baltic Sea,” 2017,
http://justfunfacts.com/interesting-facts-about-the-baltic-sea/.
5
Ibid.
6
The Baltic Ports Organization, “The Baltic Sea as a model region for green ports
and maritime transport,”
http://www.bpoports.com/BPC/Helsinki/BPO_report_internet-final.pdf; ITE
Transport & Logistics, “Russia & the Baltics: transport trials ready to be overcome,”
October 10 2017, http://www.transport-exhibitions.com/Market-
Insights/Russia/Russia-the-Baltics-transport-logistics.
7
Ibid.
8
Nick Butler, “Nord Stream 2: a test of German power,” Financial Times, July 3,
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/4875c9ff-0868-3798-8f66-4efa667eb5ba.
9
The Swedish Government, Ett användbart Försvar, Regeringens proposition
2008/09:140,
http://www.regeringen.se/49bb67/contentassets/1236f9bd880b495f8a9dd94ce1cb71
de/ett-anvandbart-forsvar-prop-200809140.
10
Ibid and Atlantic Council, “With a Little Help from My Friends: How Sweden is
Balancing its Security in the Baltics,” September 21, 2017,
”http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/with-a-little-help-from-my-
friends-how-sweden-is-balancing-its-security-in-the-baltics.
11
”EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region,” https://www.balticsea-region-
strategy.eu/about.
12
Council of the Baltic Sea States, http://www.cbss.org/.
13
HELCOM (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission - Helsinki
Commission), http://www.helcom.fi/about-us.
14
Euroregion Baltic, http://www.eurobalt.org/.
15
Daniel Workman, “Russia’s Top Trading Partners,” World´s Top Exports, March
27, 2018,
http://www.worldstopexports.com/russias-top-import-partners/.
16
Michail Nikolaevitj Tichomirov, “The struggle of the Russian people for exits to
the sea in the 13th-17th centuries: Introduction,” http://flot.com/history/io02.htm,
“The Russian Quest for Warm Water Ports,” Global Security,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/warm-water-port.htm and
René Nyberg, The Baltic Sea – Sea of Peace?, September 7, 2017,
http://www.anselm.fi/baltic-sea-sea-peace/.
17
Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. Finland: A Country Study.
Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, The Continuation War,
.http://countrystudies.us/finland/20.htm.
18
“Guerrilla war in the Baltic states” Wikipedia,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerrilla_war_in_the_Baltic_states.
19
“Finland - Soviet/Russia Relations,” Global Security,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/fi-forrel-ru.htm.
20
Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. Finland: A Country Study.
Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, The Cold War and the Treaty
of 1948,
http://countrystudies.us/finland/24.htm.
21
Ibid.
22
“Baltic theatre of the Crimean War,” The Gutenberg Project,
http://www.self.gutenberg.org/articles/Baltic_theatre_of_the_Crimean_War#Baltic_
theatre.
23
“The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,” The Security Council
of the Russian Federation, December 31, 2015,
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/docs/document133/.
24
“Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, November 30, 2016,
http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
25
“The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” The Security Council of the
Russian Federation, December 25 2014,
26
NATO Exercises, https://korrespondent.net/tag/175286/.
27
Isabelle Facon, Russia’s national security strategy and military doctrine and their
implications for the EU, European Union 2017.
28
Ibid, page 9.
29
Ibid.
30
The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” The Security Council of the
Russian Federation,,http://www.scrf.gov.ru/security/military/document34/.
31
“The Fundamentals of Russia’s State Naval Policy Through 2030,” July 20, 2017,
Official Internet-portal for judicial information,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201707200015?index=0&rang
eSize=1&mc_cid=8dbd8574d4&mc_eid=3baefa44e9.
32
Agnia Grigas, “Russia-Baltic Relations After Crimea’s Annexation,” Cicero
Foundation Great Debate Paper, June, 2014,
http://www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/Agnia_Grigas_Russia-
Baltic_Relations.pdf.
33
“The Lithuanian president declares that she does not renounce cooperation with
Russia,” Voenno-Promysjlennyj Kure, December 27, 2017, https://vpk-
news.ru/news/40563.
34
About the portal, Rubaltic.ru, https://www.rubaltic.ru/about/.
35
Statistics Estonia, June 9, 2017, https://www.stat.ee/34278, Latvia. Statistics in
Brief 2017,
http://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/nr_04_latvia_statistics_in_brief_2017_17_0
0_en.pdf; Jolanta Pivoriene, Ethnic Minorities In Lithuania, Sociológia a S
poločnoSť 1 / 1 (2016), http://www.sociology-society.ff.ukf.sk/archiv-cisel/c1/c1-
jolanta-pivoriene.pdf.
36
Dario Cavegn, “Monument of contention: How the Bronze Soldier was removed,”
ERR.ee, April 25, 2017, http://news.err.ee/592070/monument-of-contention-how-
the-bronze-soldier-was-removed.
37
Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, Yale University Press,
Danbury, Connecticut, 2016, pp. 140–145.
38
Swedish Embassy Tallinn, About Estonia, http://www.swedenabroad.com/sv-
SE/Ambassader/Tallinn/Landfakta/Om-Estland/ and the Estonian government,
Prime Minister Jüri Ratas, ,https://www.valitsus.ee/en/prime-minister-juri-ratas.
39
Dario Cavegn, “Overview: Center Party’s cooperation protocol with Putin’s
United Russia,” ERR.ee, November 8, 2016,
http://news.err.ee/119629/overview-center-party-s-cooperation-protocol-with-
putin-s-united-russia.
40
The Estonian government, Minister of Public Administration Mihhail Korb files
his resignation, May 24, 2017, https://www.valitsus.ee/en/news/minister-public-
administration-mihhail-korb-files-his-resignation.
41
“The Mayor of Riga named Putin the best Russian president for Latvia,” Lenta.ru,
September 4, 2014, https://lenta.ru/news/2014/09/05/riga/.
42
Dario Cavegn, “Latvia's Saskaņa party ditches agreement with Putin's United
Russia,” ERR.ee, October 10, 2017, http://news.err.ee/635146/latvia-s-saskana-party-
ditches-agreement-with-putin-s-united-russia.
43
“Lithuanian farmers party sweeps to victory in second round vote,” BNE
IntelliNews, October 24, 2016, http://www.intellinews.com/lithuanian-farmers-
party-sweeps-to-victory-in-second-round-vote-108717/.
44
Sanita Jemberga, Mikk Salu, Šarūnas Černiauskas, “The Kremlin's Millions, and
its support of pro-Russian activists in the Baltics,” The Baltic Times, September 7,
2015, https://www.baltictimes.com/kremlin_s_millions/.
45
Nina Novikova, “Russia's influence in the Baltic States tends to reach zero,”
Pravda.ru, March 15, 2016, https://www.pravda.ru/world/formerussr/latvia/15-03-
2016/1295133-korotchenko-0/.
46
European Parliament, Briefing April 2016 The Russian ban on agriculture
products,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/581971/EPRS_BRI%28
2016%29581971_EN.pdf.
47
Information Note on the Russian Ban on Agri-Food Products From the EU,
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/russian-import-ban/pdf/info-
note-03-09_en.pdf.
48
“Russia is Reducing Transit through Baltic States,” The Analytical Center for the
Government of the Russian Federation, May 29, 2017,
http://ac.gov.ru/en/events/013079.html.
49
“Meeting with the managing director of the company ‘Transneft,’ Nikolaj
Tokarev,” The Homepage of the Russian President, September 12,
2016,http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52879.
50
“Baltic States Seek Security, Reduced Dependence on Russia,” BIZNESALERT,
June 13, 2017,
http://biznesalert.com/baltic-states-seek-security-reduced-dependence-on-russia/.
51
“EU to work with Baltic States on decoupling from Russian power grid,” Reuters,
June 1, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/baltics-energy-eu-russia/eu-to-work-with-baltic-
states-on-decoupling-from-russian-power-grid-idUSL8N1IY455;” Integration of the
Baltic States into the EU electricity system,” EU Publications, June 2, 2017,
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8d3b7da2-562e-
11e7-a5ca-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-31392329.
52
https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/06/baltic-energy-sources-diversifying-away-
russia/.
53
Simon Hoellerbauer, “Baltic Energy Sources: Diversifying Away from Russia,”
FPRI Baltic Bulletin, June 14, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/9d016276-43c3-
11e4-baa7-00144feabdc0; Thomas Frear, Łukasz Kulesa, “Dangerous
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European Leadership Network, November, 2014,
https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/Dangerous-Brinkmanship.pdf.
54
“Drunkenness, rape and other “coforts” in the life of the NATO-soldiers in the
Baltic States,” NewInforma, February 22, 2017, https://newinform.com/45884-
pyanstvo-iznasilovaniya-i-drugie-prelesti-zhizni-soldat-nato-v-
pribaltike?utm_source=warfiles.ru; Anatolij Wasserman, Memo for Latvians: before
you refuse a NATO soldier, think twice, Sputnik, June 20,
2017,https://ru.sputniknewslv.com/columnists/20170620/5093872/anatolij-
vasserman-pamjatka-latyshkam-pribytie-soldat-nato.html.
55
“NATO: Russia targeted German army with fake news campaign,” Deutsche
Welle, February 16, 2017, http://www.dw.com/en/nato-russia-targeted-german-
army-with-fake-news-campaign/a-37591978.
56
“Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” September 19, 2013, The
Homepage of the Russian President,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243.
57
Hold Vinduet Åbent, En antologi om tilstandene i relationerne mellem Rusland
og Vesten, Rådet for International Konfliktløsning, September 2016.
http://riko.nu/wp-content/uploads/sites/11925/2017/02/samlet-1.pdf.
58
“Danish MP Challenges Russian Stereotypes, Calls for ‘Sober Analysis,’ ” Sputnik,
September 9, 2016, https://sputniknews.com/politics/201609201045507209-
denmark-russia-stereotypes-sober-analysis/.
59
Udredning: Dansk diplomati og forsvar i en brydningstid, The Danish Foreign
Ministry, May 1, 2016, http://um.dk/da/udenrigspolitik/aktuelle-emner/dansk-
diplomati-og-forsvar-i-en-brydningstid/.
60
Lars Kabel, ”Danske mediers dækning af Rusland,” Danmarks Medie- og
journalisthøjskole, December, 2016,http://njc.dk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Danske-mediers-d%C3%A6kning-af-Rusland.pdf; Jens-
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61
Martin Borre, Thomas Larsen, Rystet Claus Hjort: ”Rusland har hacket det danske
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https://www.b.dk/politiko/rystet-claus-hjort-afsloerer-rusland-har-hacket-det-
danske-forsvar-over-to-aar; “Denmark Says Russia Hacked Defense Ministry E-
Mails,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, April 24, 2017,
https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-denmark-defense-ministry-hacking/28448928.html.
62
”Ruslands ambassadør: Danske skibe kan blive mål for russisk atomangreb,”
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63
Hans Redder, ”Voldsom debat i Folketinget: - Dikkende lammehaler og Putins
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64
Caroline Damsgaard Christensen, “Russisk statspropaganda elsker Dansk
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65
“Germany's Steinmeier Tells Putin Improving Relations 'Essential',” Radio Free
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66
Ulrich Schmid, "Die Beziehungen zwischen Russland und Deutschland sind auf
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67
Olga Lebedeva, “Russian-German relations on the eve of 2018,”
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69
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71
Katja Bauer, “Der "Fall Lisa" und sein bitteres Nachspiel,” Stuttgarter Nachrichten,
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72
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haben_id_7480861.html; "Gold-AfD lässt sich jetzt von Pleite-Putin beraten,” Focus,
December 7, 2014, https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/gold-shop-spielt-
angeblich-keine-rolle-austausch-mit-diplomaten-macht-die-afd-jetzt-gemeinsame-
sache-mit-putin_id_4328505.html.
73
“Russlanddeutsche in der Bundesrepublik,” Deutscher Bundestag, February 10,
2016,
https://www.bundestag.de/blob/424502/e534deaef41f3f1f1efcf098f64cb013/wd-3-
036-16-pdf-data.pdf; Manuela Roppert , "Russlanddeutsche - die verführbaren
Wähler?,” BR24, September 13, 2017,
http://www.br.de/bundestagswahl/bundestagswahl-russlanddeutsche-manipulation-
100.html.
74
Ibid.
75
Fabian Reinbold, “Was plant Moskau?” Spiegel Online, September 1, 2017,
http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/web/bundestagswahl-2017-debatte-um-moegliche-
manipulationen-durch-russland-a-1165520.html; Michael Schwirtz, “German
Election Mystery: Why No Russian Meddling?” New York Times, September 21,
2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/world/europe/german-election-
russia.html.
76
“President of Poland: if we forgive Russia for Ukraine and Georgia, we are in for a
tragedy,” UAWIRE, November 13, 2017, https://uawire.org/polish-president-if-we-
forgive-russia-for-ukraine-and-georgia-a-tragedy-awaits-us.
77
“Polish FM says Russia uninterested in dialogue,” Radio Poland,
http://thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/333941,Polish-FM-says-Russia-uninterested-in-
dialogue.
78
The Concept of Defence of the Republic of Poland, The Polish Ministry of
Defense, May, 2017,
http://www.mon.gov.pl/d/pliki/rozne/2017/05/KORP_DRUK_v03_mn2.pdf.
79
Poland, Gazpormexport, http://www.gazpromexport.ru/en/partners/poland/.
80
“Poland aims to stop buying Russian gas after 2022,” Radio Poland, September 22,
2017, http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/326978,Poland-aims-to-stop-buying-
Russian-gas-after-2022-FM.
81
Łukasz Wenerski, Michal Kacewicz, Russian soft power in Poland, Political
Capital, Budapest 2017, http://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-
admin/source/documents/PC_NED_country_study_PL_20170428.pdf.
82
Paulina Pacula, “New pro-Russia party emerges in Poland,” Euobserver, March 23,
2015, https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/128075.
83
“Poland detains pro-Kremlin party leader for ‘spying,’ ” The Guardian, May 19,
2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/19/poland-detains-pro-kremlin-
party-leader-mateusz-piskorski-spying.
84
European Center for Geopolitical Analysis (ECAG),
https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/profiles/european-center-for-geopolitical-
analysis.
85
”Rysslands president på arbetsbesök till Finland,” The President of Finland, July
19, 2017,
http://www.presidentti.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=364575&nodeid=44809&co
ntentlan=3&culture=sv-FI; Thelia Johnson, ”Lavrov på besök i Finland – säkerheten
kring Östersjön på agendan,” Sveriges Radio, May 4, 2017,
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6689526.
86
“A century on, Finland has learnt to tame the Russian bear,” Financial Times,
December 5, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/927b91be-d9c5-11e7-a039-
c64b1c09b482.
87
”Maria Sacharova: Russia and Finland maintains nonconfrontational relations,”
RIA Novosti, June 4, 2016, https://ria.ru/interview/20160604/1442590887.html.
88
Statistics Finland, Trade,
http://www.stat.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_kotimaankauppa_en.html#foreigntrade,2016.
89
Lukas Lindström, Ann-Lis Fredriksson, “En klar majoritet av finländarna
motsätter sig ett medlemskap i försvarsalliansen Nato,” Yle, November 11, 2017,
https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2017/11/05/hs-rungande-nej-till-nato-i-finland.
90
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-nato/finnish-president-says-joining-
nato-would-require-referendum-idUSKBN1CZ2K6.
91
Tuomas Forsell, Jussi Rosendahl, “Finnish president says joining NATO would
require referendum,” Reuters, October 30, 2017,
https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2017/10/13/russia-promises-
countermeasures-if-finland-joins-nato/.
92
Mark Rivett-Carnac, “Finland and Russia Temporarily Close Border to Migrants,”
Time, March 23, 2016, http://time.com/4268754/finland-russia-border-restrict-
migrants/.
93
Katri Pynnöniemi, “Hybrid influence – lessons from Finland,” NATO Review,
June 28, 2017, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/Also-in-2017/lessons-from-
finland-influence-russia-policty-security/EN/index.htm.
94
Tom Batchelor, ”Finland stops Russians buying land near military sites amid
invasion fears,” Independent, February 13, 2017,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-finland-invasion-fears-
military-sites-land-sales-blocked-a7578601.html; ”Skypo misstänker att främmande
makt kan ha köpt fastigheter till soldater,” Yle, November 1, 2016,
https://svenska.yle.fi/artikel/2016/11/01/skypo-misstanker-att-frammande-makt-
kan-ha-kopt-fastigheter-till-soldater.
95
Global Indicators Database, Pew Research Center,
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/27/.
96
Ryssland, The Swedish Governement, http://www.regeringen.se/sveriges-
regering/utrikesdepartementet/sveriges-diplomatiska-forbindelser/europa-och-
centralasien/ryssland/.
97
Johan Pisoni, “Bara var tredje vill att Sverige går med i Nato,” Sveriges radio, July
3, 2017, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/bara-var-tredje-vill-att-sverige-gar-med-
i-nato-fragan-politiskt-dod.
98
“Putin emphasizes that Sweden's entry to NATO would jeopardize ties with
Moscow,” TASS, June 1, 2017, http://tass.com/politics/949067.
99
Michael Winiarski, “Om Sverige går med i Nato kommer vi att vidta nödvändiga
åtgärder,” Focus, April 24, 2016, https://fokus.dn.se/lavrov/; “Ekot
direktrapporterar från lördagsintervjun med ryske ambassadören,” Sveriges Radio,
October 1, 2016,
http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=83&artikel=6531651; ”Russia
May Take 'Reciprocal Steps' if Sweden Joins NATO,” Sputnik, September 10, 2015,
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201509101026834982/.
100
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Government of the
Kingdom of Sweden and Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander
Transformation as well as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe regarding
the Provision of Host Nation Support for the Execution of NATO
Operations/Exeercises/Similar Military Activity,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160214223359/http://natoutredningen.se/wp-
content/uploads/140904-HNS-MoU-Sweden-NATO.pdf.
101
“Russia spreading fake news and forged docs in Sweden: report,” The Local,
January 7, 2017, https://www.thelocal.se/20170107/swedish-think-tank-details-
russian-disinformation-in-new-study.
102
”Alexander, 34, är SD:s hemliga desinformatör,” Aftonbladet, September 3, 2016,
https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/article23449197.ab.
103
”Säpo: Rysk spion på svensk konferens, Sveriges television,” April 30, 2016,
https://www.svt.se/nyheter/utrikes/sapo-rysk-spion-pa-svensk-konferens; Mikael
Holmström, ”Säpo: Ryska agenter motarbetar på svensk mark,” Dagens Nyheter,
April 30, 2016, https://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/sapo-ryska-agenter-motarbetar-
pa-svensk-mark/?forceScript=1&variantType=large.
104
David Cenciotti, “Russia Simulated A Large-Scale Aerial Night Attack On
Sweden,” Business Insider, April 23, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/david-
cenciotti-russia-simulated-a-massive-aerial-attack-2013-4?r=US&IR=T&IR=T.
105
”Rysslands ambassadör: Hög tid att Sverige och Ryssland sluter fred,” Dagens
Industri, October 12, 2017, https://www.di.se/debatt/rysslands-ambassador-hog-tid-
att-sverige-och-ryssland-sluter-fred/?loggedin=true.
106
Verfassungsschutzbericht 2016, Bundesministerium des Innern,
https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/embed/vsbericht-2016.pdf, Annual Report for
2017, TheLatvian Security Police, http://www.dp.gov.lv/en/useful/annual-reports/;
“National Security Threat Assessment 2017,” The State Security Department of the
Republic of Lithuania and the Second Investigation Department under the Ministry
of National Defence, https://www.vsd.lt/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/AKATSKT_DRAFT-3-31-EN-HQ.pdf.
107
David Cenciotti, “Sweden Protests As Russian Fighter Buzzes Swedish Spyplane
Over The Baltic Sea,” The Aviationist, June 21, 2017,
https://theaviationist.com/2017/06/21/sweden-protests-as-russian-fighter-buzzes-
swedish-spyplane-over-the-baltic-sea/.
108
“Lithuania – Russia Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2014-2020,”
http://www.eni-cbc.eu/lr/data/public/uploads/2017/01/lt-ru-jop-_approved-2016-
12-19.pdf; “Population,” The Local Government Kaliningrad Oblast,
https://gov39.ru/region/peoples.php; Natural resources, The Local Government
Kaliningrad Oblast, https://gov39.ru/region/natural.php.
109
“Kaliningrad profile – Overview,” BBC, March 12, 2015,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-18284828; “History,” The Local
Government Kaliningrad Oblast, https://gov39.ru/region/history.php.
110
Beatrix Tolgyesi, “Kaliningrad – A bridge between two worlds or a military
outpost?” Baltic review, April 28, 2016, http://baltic-review.com/kaliningrad-bridge-
between-two-worlds/; Linas Kojala, Vytautas Keršanskas, (Un)convenient
Kaliningrad and Kremlin’s relationship, Delfi, December 7, 2016,
https://en.delfi.lt/central-eastern-europe/unconvenient-kaliningrad-and-kremlins-
relationship.d?id=73098334.
111
Mark Kramer, “Kaliningrad Oblast, Russia, and Baltic Security,” PONARS Policy
Memo 10, October 1997, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-
memos-pdf/pm_0010.pdf.
112
“Kaliningrad Special region,” The Ministry of Defence of the Russian federation,
uhttp://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=5867@mo
rfDictionary; Svetlana Ivanova Adamovitj, “The cognitive project ‘Kaliningrad
Special Area,’ ” Alye Parusa, January 22, 2017,
https://nsportal.ru/ap/library/drugoe/2017/01/22/poznavatelnyy-proekt-
kaliningradskiy-osobyy-rayon.
113
Dmitri Verchoturov, "Island Territories" of Russia, KM.RU, December 28. 2014,
http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2014/12/28/strategii-razvitiya-rossii/752972-ostrovnye-
territorii-rossii; Olga Gontyarova, “How the Baltic Fleet Commander frightened
NATO,” Kpomsomolskaya Pravda, May 18, 2017,

https://www.kaliningrad.kp.ru/daily/26680.4/3702932/.
114
Sergei Safronov, “The North Caucasian Military District and the Kaliningrad
Special Area will be rearmed before 2012,” RIA Novosti, June 17, 2009,
115
Jevgenij Krutikov, “The strategic directions of defense will be significantly
strengthened,” Vzgljyd, January 30, 2015,
116
“The commander and the chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet were sacked for
embellishing reality,” Lenta.ru, June 29, 2016,
https://lenta.ru/news/2016/06/29/za_upuschenia.
117
Sergey Isityenko, “A US division has already Kaliningrad in its sights,”
Svobodnaya Pressa, October 12, 2017, http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/183432/.
118
“The 152nd Guards Missile Brigade in Kaliningrad has received Iskander-M
missile systems,” bmpd, November 25, 2017,
https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2970466.html.
119
“Why the small missile boats ‘Serpuchov’ and ‘Zeljonyi dol’ arrived in the Baltic
Sea,” Voennoe Obozrenie, November 2, 2016, https://topwar.ru/103044-dlya-chego-
mrk-serpuhov-i-zelenyy-dol-prishli-na-baltiku.html; Vladimir Tytjkov, “The Baltic
Fleet asks for support,” Svobodnaya Pressa, December 12, 2016,
120
“New missile systems have arrived in the Baltic Fleet,” Interfax, April 15, 2017.
121
Andrej Gavrilenko, “Both on the sea and on land,” Krasnaya Zvezda, November
26, 2017, http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/2011-07-25-15-55-32/item/35208-i-na-
more-i-na-sushe.
122
“The airbase in the Kaliningrad oblast will be replenished with a Su-30SM
fighter,” Vesti.ru, December 8, 2016,
https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2830689&cid=17; “The naval aviation of the
Baltic Fleet received two more Su-30 SM fighters,” Novyi Kaliningrad, May 29, 2017,
https://www.newkaliningrad.ru/news/briefs/politics/13717780-morskaya-aviatsiya-
baltiyskogo-flota-poluchila-eshche-dva-istrebitelya-su-30-sm.html; “Three new Su-
30SM entered the naval aviation of the Baltic Fleet,” Voennoe Obozrenie, August 29,
2017, https://topwar.ru/123702-tri-novyh-su-30sm-voshli-v-sostav-morskoy-
aviacii-bf.html.
123
“The Baltic Fleet will be strengthened by two air regiments,” Interfax, October 10,
2017, http://www.interfax.ru/russia/582599.
124
“Shojgu told which military airfields to be renovated in 2018,” Politika Segodnya,
December 22, 2017, https://polit.info/379581-shoigu-rasskazal-kakie-voennye-
aerodromy-rekonstruiruyut-v-2018-godu.
125
Magnus Nordenman, “China and Russia’s Joint Sea 2017 Baltic Naval Exercise
Highlight a New Normal in Europe,” USNI News, July 5, 2017,
https://news.usni.org/2017/07/05/china-russias-baltic-naval-exercise-highlight-
new-normal-european-maritime.
126
“Statement by Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation - First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, General of
the Army Valery Gerasimov, at an open meeting of the Collegium of the Russian
Defense Ministry on November 7, 2017,” The Ministry of Defense of the Russian
Federation, November 7, 2017,
http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews.
127
“The formation of the 1st Guards Tank Army,” BMPD, June 15, 2015,
http://bmpd.livejournal.com/1324525.html.
128
“The composition of the army corps created in the fleets,” Voennoe Obozrenie,
May 25, 2017, https://topwar.ru/116427-sostav-sozdannyh-na-flotah-armeyskih-
korpusov.html.
129
“Two new divisions of the Western Military District and the Southern Military
District will be fully equipped in May 2017,” RIA Novosti, November 11, 2016,
https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20161111/1481182101.html; “A new mechanized
division is beginning to be organized in the vicinity of Smolensk,” Vzglyad, April 27,
2016, https://vz.ru/news/2016/4/27/807722.html.
130
“In Russia, the Taman and Kantemirov tank divisions have been recreated,”
Gazeta.ru, May 4, 2013,
https://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2013/05/04/n_2890657.shtml.
131
“4-ya gvardeyskaya Kantemirovskaya tankovaya diviziya (v/ch 19612),”
Voyskovyye Chasti Rossii, June 22, 2015, https://voinskayachast.net/suhoputnie-
voyska/tankovie/vch19612.
132
Alexandr Golts, Military Reform and Militarism in Russia, University of Uppsala,
2017, http://www.diva-
portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1138525/FULLTEXT01.pdf%20September%202017.
133
Address by President of the Russian Federation, The President of Russia, March
18, 2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
134
Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Realities and Prospects: The Rīga Conference
Papers 2017, The Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2017, pp. 148–158.
http://www.liia.lv/en/publications/security-in-the-baltic-sea-region-realities-and-
prospects-the-riga-conference-papers-2017-643.
135
“Russia strengthens its geopolitical borders,” KM.RU, January 15, 2015,
http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2015/01/15/vladimir-putin/753519-rossiya-ukreplyaet-
geopoliticheskie-rubezhi.
Part II
Non-Conventional Elements
of Strategy and Doctrine
5. Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation
Warfare
Jānis Bērziņš
Introduction
Since the beginning of Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, it has

been difficult for many to find a term that adequately describes the
way Russia conducted this operation. The most commonly accepted
term, at least in the West, is “Hybrid Warfare.” The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) itself has adopted this label. The
seminal work on Hybrid Warfare is Francis G. Hoffman’s “Hybrid
Warfare and Challenges.”1 The author develops the idea of a hybrid
strategy based on tactically employing a mix of instruments, resulting
in the difficulty of fully understanding and establishing a proper
counter-strategy for dealing with it. The main challenge results from
state and non-state actors employing technologies and strategies that
are more appropriate for their own field, in a multimodal
confrontation. This may include exploiting modern capabilities to
support insurgent, terrorist and criminal activities, as well as the use
of high-tech military capabilities combined with terrorist actions and
cyber warfare operations for use against economic and financial
targets. Therefore, this strategy still largely presupposes the
application of kinetic force or military power to defeat the enemy.
Instead, as will be argued and explored in depth below, the more
157
accurate term to apply here is “New Generation Warfare,” which

more fully captures the full range of tactics and strategies Russia
employs against potential enemies or rivals.
The argument that Russia conducted Hybrid Warfare, whether in

Crimea or elsewhere, presents two problems. First, this still
presupposes the application of kinetic force, while Russian New
Generation Warfare does not.2 Second, it is a conceptual mistake to
try to fit Russian New Generation Warfare, the result of a long military
academic discussion, into Western concepts. Naturally, the word
“hybrid” is catchy, since it can represent a mix of anything. However,
its basic framework differs from the one developed by the Russians
due to the former being a military concept and the result of American
military thought. Moreover, the concept of New Generation Warfare
actually includes conventional operations. In other words, Hybrid
Warfare might be part of New Generation Warfare but cannot define
it.
Therefore, it is a methodological mistake to try to frame a theory

developed independently by the Russian military as a theory
developed in another country. It reflects another culture’s way of
thinking and strategic understanding about the way warfare should be
conducted. Specifically, what the Russians call New Generation
Warfare is a combination of Asymmetric warfare with Low-Intensity
Conflict, Network-Centric Warfare and Sixth-Generation Warfare,
combined with components of Reflexive Control. Its main aim is to
achieve political objectives; therefore, the use of military power may
not even be necessary. To fully comprehend the way Russia sees
warfare, it is necessary to understand Russia’s security ambitions—
and therefore its tactical objectives—as well as its military doctrine.
Russia vs. NATO and the United States: Geopolitical Enemies
The rhetoric that the transatlantic community, especially the United

States, is Russia’s main enemy, has been developing in Russia for some
Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare | 159
years. Albeit relatively marginal until about 2005, the idea that Russia
is a victim of the US’s vested interests, which are allegedly being
implemented and executed by multilateral agencies and NATO, has
been gaining legitimacy in Russian security circles. This idea has been
gradually incorporated into Russian policymaking over the past ten
years. It has also had significant influence on the military.
A very comprehensive analysis of NATO and the transatlantic

community in relation to Russia was undertaken by Major General
(ret.) Aleksandr Vladimirov, the president of Russia’s Board of
Military Experts. He is the author of more than 150 publications on
defense and security issues. Vladimirov is also one of the protagonists
of the idea that a war between the United Stated and Russia is
inevitable within a decade. This notion was fully developed for the
first time in his article “The Great American War” in 2008. The article
begins with the statement “Tsely Vashingtona—Polnomasshtabnyi
kontroly nad prirodnymi resursami planet” (“Washington’s objective:
total control of the planet’s natural resources”).3 According to the
retired general, this is the result of five factors.
First, economic: Although the United States has the most powerful
economy in the world, it is also the most fragile, he argues. This is the
result of American external debt—trillions of dollars that cannot be
paid. The only way the United States can maintain its influence is to
provide security to the world and demonstrate its superior power.
Second, the military: The United States has extensive military and
technological superiority over the rest of the world (including Russia
and China). Third, information: The United States practically
controls all major sources of information and is thus able to portray
facts to its advantage, the president of the Russian Board of Military
Experts asserts. Fourth, geopolitical: The United States can control the
majority of the nations in the world, although this power is in decline.
It includes controlling Europe and attempting to push European
countries to the political periphery. Fifth, internal politics: In the
United States, the basis for internal stability is a high level of
consumption. Thus, any reduction in the level of individual

consumption will certainly result in social unrest and a loss of political
legitimacy. Since natural resources are limited, the US needs to
guarantee control over these resources at any cost. The conclusion is
that the United States never stopped conducting warfare against
Russia on several levels and in various forms, with the objective being
to submit Russia’s national interests to the needs of the US.4
Vladmirov’s two most relevant articles on understanding how the

Russian military considers NATO and the United States strategically
are: “NATO v paradigme obshchey teorii voyny” (“NATO in the
Paradigm of the General Theory of War”)5 and “SShA—Glavnyy
Aktor Mirovoy Voyny” (“The United States—The Main Actor in the
World War”).6 In the first, the author develops the idea that there are
many civilizations in the world, but only four are really relevant
geopolitically. The first is the Christian/Western civilization (US,
Europe and Australia), whose objective is to impose fundamentalist
liberalism globally. The second is Orthodox civilization (“white”
Russian), but its objectives are still developing. Third is Islamic
civilization, whose objective is to expand radical religious Islamic
fundamentalism. And the final is the Chinese civilization, whose
project is to slowly expand Chinese chauvinism. By applying this
division, all the significant conflicts in the world can be divided up as
between the West and the Orthodox, the West against Islam, all of
them against China, and vice-versa. The general rule is that each
civilization is fighting alone and will lose alone. Thus, Russia has no
other choice than to be independent and look for its own path of
development and interests.7
Vladimirov contends that the Western civilizational project is, in

reality, the United States’ project. As such, there are four implications
for NATO. First, the Alliance is intentionally and willfully failing to
fulfil its obligations. In the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, it
states that NATO members are “determined to safeguard the freedom,
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the
principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”8 In

other words, NATO’s main objective is to guarantee the security of
the Transatlantic community, and thus, of Western civilization and
its cradle, Europe. Vladimirov claims that NATO is failing at this goal,
however, because, in the face of the current war of civilizations
between Western and Islamic civilizations, Muslim immigrants and
their descendants are gradually physically displacing indigenous
European ethnic groups on European soil. At the same time, while the
West is losing the war of civilizations at home, it is doing nothing to
ensure its own salvation. On the one hand, it engages in a pointless
and costly war for freedom and democracy in places where these
values are not important, or are even not wanted; on the other, the
result is instead the radicalization of the Islamic people, not only in
places where NATO soldiers have been fighting for freedom and
democracy, but inside Europe and the United States.9
Second, in Vldimirov’s view, NATO is not ready to contain the

approaching “civilizational stress” that Europe is facing at this
moment because of Muslim immigration. Europe, he insists, is doing
nothing to save its own indigenous people; rather, it is instead hiding
behind the ideology of political correctness. This he sees as extremely
dangerous, since the result will, most probably, be a war between
civilizations within Europe, as immigrant revolts in Paris and
Stockholm have already signaled. Thus, he predicts Europe’s
implosion. Similar scenarios can be expected in the United States and
Russia. Third, he says that NATO has lost its meaning and purpose
and not yet found a new role. The North Atlantic Alliance’s security
guarantee to its members is still only to assure its members that first
the Soviet Union and now Russia will not engage in a war against
them. However, an annexation of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
or even non-NATO members Ukraine and Georgia is neither
necessary nor strategically significant for Russia, Vladimirov writers.
Therefore, in its present form, NATO is not needed for the defense of
its European member states, although it remains a prime necessity for
the United States, since the Alliance serves as an instrument to
legitimize US actions. By utilizing NATO in missions abroad, the

United States is, first of all, able to ignore the UN Security Council.
Reliance on the Alliance also props up Washington’s own
bureaucracy. And third, Vlaidmirov argues, NATO is useful for
splitting up foreign regimes, in the late Zbigniew Brzeziński’s terms.10
Vladimirov writes that NATO never confirmed its friendliness toward

Moscow. It continues to consider Russia an enemy and is constantly
preparing for war against Russian military forces. Finally, NATO
supports anti-Russian military-political trends in the regions within
Russia’s natural interests. Notwithstanding the difficult relationship
between the North Atlantic Alliance and Moscow, they both need
each other, he contends—first, as the basis for a certain continental
bipolar stability; second, as a necessary strategic deterrent; third, as
the “official” enemy; fourth, as an incentive for development; and
fifth, as a potential strategic ally to win the civilizational war. In this
sense, Russia’s efforts to weaken NATO are counterproductive.11
The obstacle to Russia establishing a productive relationship with

NATO countries, according to Vladimirov, is the United States. It has
to maintain its global hegemony to guarantee the dollar as the global
currency par excellence. This is necessary to guarantee financial
stability, mostly because of the US’s unpayable foreign debt. In
addition, it gives the United States the power to buy unlimited
amounts of whatever is necessary to maintain its global hegemony in
the first place. The US pursuit of globalization results in a state of
permanent war, causing poverty, injustice and lawlessness.
Furthermore, in the United States, the formation of values and the
development of financial, economic, ideological, technological,
informational and organizational power, guaranteeing national
survival were transferred from the state to private transnational
corporations. The result, according to Vladimirov, is the
establishment of global oligarchical fascism.12
More recently, the Kremlin backed the Izborsky Club’s “Defense

Reform as an Integral Part of a Security Conception for the Russian
Federation: a Systemic and Dynamic Evaluation.”13 The first point
made by the piece, attributed to military experts Aleksandr Nagorny
and Vladislav Shurygin, is the understanding that the 1990s idea of
Russia not having any direct external adversary has proved illusory.
Moreover, the adoption of a strategy of unilateral diplomatic
concessions—that is, showing Russia as a responsible and serious
international player and, therefore, persuading the West to accept it
in the international system as an equal partner—resulted in failure.14
The second point is that the main external threat to Russia consists of
the interests of the United States and its Western allies. According to
this idea, the West resists Russia restoring its status as a global power.
Instead, it pursues policies, mostly economic, to force Russia to
become a producer of raw materials, unable to develop its military
strength. To achieve supremacy over Russia, the Euro-Atlantic
community has been using so-called power instruments, including
the imposition of unbalanced agreements on, for example, the
reduction of strategic nuclear missiles and tactical nuclear weapons.
The authors of the Izborsky Club article conclude that Russia should
prepare for three possible military conflict scenarios: First, a major
war with NATO and Japan; second, a regional border-conflict
scenario, i.e. disputed territories; and third, an internal military
conflict as a result of terrorism. It is not believed that a direct military
conflict with NATO in the short term can be expected. However,
Russia has been facing severe pressure with the infringement of its
strategic national interests. NATO has politically and militarily wiped
out most of Russia’s natural potential allies. This can be exemplified
by NATO’s “expansion” into the former Warsaw Pact space. The
monetarist economic ideology imposed by the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other multilateral
organizations, not only had the objective of weakening Russian
society overall, but resulted in the underfunding of the Armed Forces

and, thus, an operational degradation.15
The authors argue for developing a strategy to neutralize the

information-network war of controlled chaos the United States and
NATO has been waging against Russia. The first step is to include in
Russia’s military doctrine the list of factors threatening the state:
rebels, bandits and mercenaries, extremists, ethno-religious and
nationalist organizations, as well as the conduct of warfare without
any rules or outside classical canons. The most important threat to
Russia, in the view of the authors, is a type of subversive weapon called
“Westernization,” that is, the imposition of a social system,
economics, ideology, culture, and way of life similar to the West. The
objective is to discredit Russia’s political and social system, resulting
in dividing the population into hostile groups, some of which are then
supported by the United States and NATO.16
The core ideas discussed above have now been explicitly included in
the latest versions of the Russian “Military Doctrine” (adopted in
December 2014) as well as the “National Security Strategy”
(December 2015). In both cases, the West, especially the United States,
appears as Russia’s main adversary, but not necessarily as the main
enemy. Other problems affecting Russia’s security are poor economic
development, demographics and the environment, among others.
Both documents stress the use of non-military instruments to achieve
political goals, the most important one being social destabilization via
color revolutions and terrorism.17 Since it is a broader strategic
document, the “National Security Strategy” also mentions radical
public associations, the activities of criminal organizations,
corruption, natural disasters, as well as the utilization of economic
methods and instruments of financial, trade, investment and
technological policy.18
Contrary to the idea of inevitable war among all civilization, the

National Security Strategy explicitly mentions China as a key partner
for maintaining regional and global stability, looking for an all-

embracing partnership and strategic cooperation. This denies the idea
of Russia feeling strategically encircled by a rising China. Other
countries, regions, regional blocks, and international institutions of
special interest to Russia are the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa), RIC (Russia, India, China), the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), Africa, Latin America, as well as the countries of
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. The Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS), the Republic of Abkhazia and the
Republic of South Ossetia, the latter two being separatist regions of
Georgia that have been occupied by Russian forces since August 2008,
are also listed within the National Security Strategy as key strategic
areas.19
As Putin and Medvedev stated many times, the idea is to form a

multipolar world in which Western influence is limited. Since Russia
considers itself a superpower, a multipolar world presupposes a
territorial division into spheres of influence. This means it feels
entitled to inherit the former Soviet space, and any attempt by those
countries to become closer to the West is considered a violation of
Russia’s security interests. In other words, Russia’s main strategic
interest is to maintain its sphere of influence: annexing and occupying
neighboring countries may not always be necessary in Moscow’s view,
but securing loyal governments along the Russian periphery certainly
is. It is within this framework that Russia’s military actions have to be
evaluated. This also means that the occupation and annexation of
Crimea is likely a unique case that, probably, will not be repeated.
The Russian Way of Warfare: New Generation Warfare
The Russian view of modern warfare is based on the idea that the main
battlespace is the mind. As a result, new-generation wars are to be
dominated by information and psychological warfare in order to
achieve superiority in troops and weapons control, morally and
psychologically depressing an enemy’s armed forces personnel and
civilian population. The main objective is to reduce the need to deploy

hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the
opponent’s military and civilian population support the attacker to
the detriment of their own government and country.20 It is interesting
to note the notion of permanent war in the Military Doctrine, since it
denotes a permanent enemy. In the current geopolitical structure, this
enemy is NATO, which—as Nagorny and Shurygin mentioned
above—stands for Western civilization, its values, culture, political
system, and ideology.
The main guidelines for developing Russian military capabilities by

2020 are to shift from:
1. direct destruction to direct influence;

2. direct annihilation of the opponent to bringing about its inner
decay;
3. a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
4. a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces
and commercial irregular groupings;
5. the traditional (physical, three-dimensional) battleground to
information/psychological warfare and a war of perceptions;
6. a direct clash to contactless war;
7. a superficial and compartmentalized war to a total war,
including targeting the enemy’s interior and center of gravity;
8. war in the physical environment, to a war in the human
consciousness and in cyber-space;
9. symmetric to asymmetric warfare via a combination of
political, economic, information, technological, and
ecological campaigns; and
10. war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as
the natural condition in national life.
In other words, the Russians have placed the idea of influence at the
very center of their operational planning and used all possible levers
to achieve this: skillful internal communications, deception
operations, psychological operations and well-constructed external

communications. This is relevant for understanding its strategic
significance, since it is the operationalization of a new form of warfare
that cannot be characterized as a military campaign in the classic sense
of the term. It is an opportunistic mix of different strategies. The key
to understanding Russian strategy is realizing that Russians are
eclectic, drawing on whatever works for a specific situation.
To fully grasp the foundational theory behind how Russia conducts

warfare, it is necessary to review the Russian military literature. It is
no surprise that chief of the General Staff General Valery Gerasimov’s
famous 2013 article discussing his view of modern warfare was called
“The Value of Science in Prediction.” It shows that, in Russia, military
theory is expected to provide both a political and a military theoretical
basis on which military art and military strategy are to be
constructed—just like during the Soviet era. Presently, Russian
military literature includes five main recurrent conceptual themes.
The first and most important one is Asymmetric Warfare. It forms the
main underpinning sustaining the next three. Second is the strategy
of Low Intensity Conflict, as developed by the Pentagon’s Joint Special
Operations Command; third is Russia’s own understanding and
theoretical development of Network-Centric Warfare; and fourth is
General Vladimir Slipchenko’s idea of Sixth-Generation Warfare. It is
their many possible combinations that define what, in a 2013 article
for Voennaia Mysl, Sergei G. Chekinov and Sergei A. Bogadanov
called New Generation Warfare.21 However, there is also an
additional, fifth factor: the strategic concept of Reflexive Control.
Only when this fifth conceptual theme is applied to New Generation
Warfare does the latter become fully operational. More recently, a new
term has also appeared in the Russian literature—“New-type (Hybrid)
Warfare”—but it has pointedly been used to refer to the allegedly
Western strategy of Color Revolutions, i.e. what the Russians call
“Hybrid Warfare.”
Russian New Generation Warfare is not something new. Rather, it is

the latest term for a particular understanding of Russian military

thinkers about the evolution of military art, especially in the West.
Although it is not correct to affirm that the Western way of
conducting warfare determined how Russian military thinkers
developed their own understanding on the subject, its influence is
undeniable. Both the strategy of Low-Intensity Conflict and Network
Centric Warfare were originally developed in the United States, while
Sixth-Generation Warfare very much reflects Slipchenko’s
understanding about the strategic implications of Operation Desert
Storm and the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is possible
to affirm that the concept of Hybrid Warfare is strange to the Russian
military, but New Generation Warfare results from the Russian
military’s own understanding and interpretation of Western military
strategy. This explains why many people have been saying it is not
new, while at the same time being unable to fully explain it. Similarly,
the term “hybrid” became quite popular exactly because it can be
understood as anything that is not monolithic.
As alluded to above, the fundamental operational applications of

Russian New Generation Warfare were discussed in a 2013 paper by
Chekinov and Bogadanov (2013) called “The Character and Content
of New Generation Warfare” (“O kharaktere i soderzhanii voi’ny
novogo pokoleniia”).22 Although their piece does not outline such a
clear division, it is possible to draw from their analysis a set of eight
phases that characterize New Generation Warfare. These phases are
to be employed, preferably, in a sequential way; but at the same time,
they are not rigid or mutually exclusive. Indeed, they can be engaged
simultaneously, or individual phases can start at any point.
Specifically, the eight phases are:
First Phase: non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing

information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and
economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political,
economic, and military situation).
Second Phase: special operations to mislead political and military

leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels,
media, and top government and military agencies by leaking false
data, orders, directives, and instructions.
Third Phase: intimidation, deception, and bribing of government and

military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their
service duties.
Fourth Phase: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among

the population, boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants,
escalating subversion.
Fifth Phase: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be

attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private
military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units.
Sixth Phase: commencement of military action, immediately preceded

by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. All types,
forms, methods and forces, including special operations forces, space,
radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, and secret service
intelligence, and industrial espionage.
Seventh Phase: combination of a targeted information operation,

electronic warfare operation, aerospace operation, continuous air
force harassment, combined with the use of high-precision weapons
launched from various platforms (long-range artillery and weapons
based on new physical principles, including microwaves, radiation
and non-lethal biological weapons).
Eighth Phase: roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy
surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by
reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and
transmit their coordinates to the attacker’s missile and artillery units;
fire barrages to annihilate the defender resisting army units by
effective advanced weapons; air-drop operations to surround points

of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.
The first four phases are basically non-kinetic, using strategies of Low
Intensity Conflict as understood by the Russians. The fifth phase is
when military action really starts. It is important to mention the use
of private military companies (PMC). The United States has
extensively used them in Iraq and Afghanistan—from operating mess
halls to providing security and, sometimes, performing military
duties. For the Russians, PMCs must be understood as mercenaries.
The objective is to have an active military force that cannot be linked
to the Russian Armed Forces. These mercenaries can act as if they are
locals, part of the enemy’s Armed Forces, police, or whatever is
necessary at that moment. They will often engage in sabotage,
blackmail, subversive activities, terrorism, kidnapping, or any other
activity that is not considered regular warfare. The Russian
government, in turn, can and will deny any connection with its
mercenaries, publicly accusing them of being part of the enemy’s
forces. The last three phases are a combination of Network Centric
Warfare, Sixth-Generation Warfare and Reflexive Control.
Asymmetric Warfare
The main element defining the Russian way of war is Asymmetric

Warfare. It provides the base on which Low-Intensity Conflict,
Network-Centric Warfare and Sixth-Generation Warfare will be
combined in different proportions to form the many faces of New
Generation Warfare. This is one of the most ignored aspect of the
Russian military art. Arguably, the biggest problem about using the
term “Hybrid” is that it obfuscates the asymmetric and kinetic
character of Russian tactics.
It is the basis for Russia’s practice of creating an alternative reality as

a military strategy. The idea is that, in a country at war, societal
support for the state’s strategic objectives—in other words, the
legitimization of war—is fundamental for achieving victory. Thus, the

success of military campaigns in the form of armed conflicts and local
wars is very much dependent on the relationship between military and
non-military factors—the political, psychological, ideological, and
informational elements of the campaign. Whereas, military power is
an isolated variable.
The objective of engaging in asymmetric warfare is to avoid direct

military operations or overt interference in internal conflicts in other
countries. Because Russia has been fighting exclusively weaker
adversaries, the following strategy has been predominant for it:
employment of small, specially trained troops; preventive actions
against irregular forces; propaganda among local populations;
military and material support given to certain groups in the country
being attacked; as well as a scaling-back of combat operations and
employing non-military methods to pressure the opponent. In general
terms, the Russians consider the following points as the most
important instruments of Asymmetric Warfare:
1. Measures to make the opponent apprehensive of the Russian

Federation’s intentions and responses;
2. Demonstrations of the readiness and capabilities of Russian
troops (forces) located in a strategic area to repel an invasion
with consequences unacceptable to the aggressor;
3. Actions by the troops (forces) to deter a potential enemy by
guaranteed destruction of its most vulnerable military and
other strategically important and potentially dangerous
targets in order to persuade the enemy that attack on Russia
would be hopeless;
4. The impact of state-of-the-art, highly effective weapons
systems, including those based on new physical principles
(remote versus contact);
5. Widespread employment of indirect force as well as non-
contact forms of commitment of troops (forces) and
methods;
6. Not always needing to seize and hold enemy territory; such

actions are only undertaken if the benefits are greater than the
“combat costs,” or if the end goals of a war cannot be achieved
in any other way;
7. Information warfare as an independent form of struggle along
with economic, political, ideological, diplomatic and other
forms;
8. Information and psychological operations to weaken the
enemy’s military potential by means other than armed force,
by affecting the enemy’s information flow processes, and by
misleading and demoralizing its population and armed forces
personnel;
9. Significant damage to the enemy’s economic potential, with
its effect showing up at a later time;
10. Pushing a clear understanding on a potential adversary that
military operations could turn into an environmental and
sociopolitical catastrophe.
It is interesting to note that much of what has been written by Russian

military experts about Russia’s strategic challenges reflects the way it
has actually itself been conducting warfare. Notably, Nagorny and
Shurygin, in analyzing Russia’s most important strategic challenges,
established ways and instruments the West could employ against it.
Although their analysis mostly refers to so-called Color Revolutions—
purported strategies of controlled-chaos deliberately being employed
by the West—it reveals more about Russian strategy itself. In their
paper, they formalize nine points that, although allegedly could be
used by the West against Russia, in reality strongly reflects the Russian
asymmetric strategy operationalized, for example, in Ukraine. The
nine points Nagorny and Shurygin ascribe to the West are as follows23:
1. Stimulation and support of armed actions by separatist

groups with the objective of promoting chaos and territorial
disintegration;
2. Polarization between the elite and society, resulting in a crisis
of values followed by a process of reality orientation toward

Western values;
3. Demoralization of armed forces and military elite;
4. Strategic controlled degradation of the socioeconomic
situation;
5. Stimulation of a socio-political crisis;
6. Intensification of simultaneous forms and models of
psychological warfare;
7. Incitement of mass panic and loss of confidence in key
government institutions;
8. Defamation of political leaders who are not aligned with
Russia’s interests;
9. Undercutting possibilities to form coalitions with foreign
allies.
The Russian view of Asymmetric Warfare is both systemic and

comprehensive, simultaneously employing political, diplomatic,
informational, economic, military and other indirect forms. It also can
use strategic high-precision non-nuclear weapons systems, with the
support of subversive and reconnaissance groups. Such asymmetric
attacks can resulting in unacceptable damage to strategically
significant targets like top government administration and military
control facilities, fuel and energy plants, life-support facilities,
chemical factories, or storehouses of poisonous agents, just to cite
some examples.
Low-Intensity Conflict
Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC) was developed by the United States in

the 1980s. It can be defined as:
…a political-military confrontation between contending states or

groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful
competition among states. It frequently involves protracted
struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from
subversion to the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination

of means employing political, economic, informational, and
military instruments. LIC’s are often localized, generally in the
Third World, but contain regional and global security
implications.24
The main factors making LICs possible are change, discontent,

poverty, violence, and instability. Change includes socio-economic
and political factors that may result in raising tensions. If a
government is not connected to or, in some cases, even concerned
about the wishes of the people, the result might be discontentment
leading to internal turmoil. Discontent can have many forms and is
linked to feelings of injustice. Moreover, the level of social violence is
directly related to the number of people sharing a common sense of
such injustice, which in turn determines the level of discontent.
Outside pressure can be a critical factor boosting such sentiment.
Poverty, especially as a result of unstable economic conditions, is also
an important factor influencing LICs. As a result, impoverished
nations have a great potential for revolution and change. Very often,
the spark can be a relatively simple need, but one that is ignored by
the ruling government. It is, thus, possible for a domestic or outside
actor to target what the population wants, stimulating revolutionary
actions (violent or not) and creating instability. Therefore, instability
can be considered an asset if it can be used to achieve one side’s goals
in an LIC mission.
Low-Intensity Conflict has five essential requirements. First is

political dominance, meaning that the military of a country engaged
in an LIC is subjugated to its civilian and political authorities. Second,
there must be unity of effort or the integration of military actions with
other government agencies’ initiatives. Interagency coordination is
critical, and commanders may answer to civilian chiefs or employ the
resources of civilian agencies. Third, a country participating in an LIC
must showcase adaptability to develop new approaches reflecting new
situations. Fourth, the government needs to maintain legitimacy to
rule. And fifth is perseverance, since an LIC involves protracted

struggles. Additionally, Low-Intensity Conflict has four main
operational categories: support for insurgency and
counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations,
and Peacetime Contingency Operations.
Returning to the Russian case, the main concept used by the Russians
is “controlled chaos.” It is mostly based on the US literature about
Low-Intensity Conflict and Counterinsurgency operations, and is
often referred to as a strategy of “Destruction and Attrition.” Its
objective is the geopolitical destruction of the victim state by a set of
measures aiming to neutralize any geopolitical advantage the enemy
might have, such as economic power, military might, international
status, size of territory and population, etc. In Moscow’s view, Color
Revolutions and the Arab Spring are examples of how the West uses
this concept.
“Controlled chaos” or “Destruction and Attrition” has three stages.

First, there is crisis-inspired destabilization and internal conflicts.
Second—degradation, impoverishment, and disintegration of the
country making it a failed state. Third, the aggressor, posing as a
benefactor and savior of the stricken country, steps in with troops to
change the political regime. The closing is a stabilization operation.
The main target is the self-awareness of the population, influencing
the nation’s mindset. The objective is to transfer aggression from the
physical space to the information-network one. In other words—to
attack the people’s national and cultural identity.
The main instrument here is the “technique of information

intervention”—already used during the Cold War—which
predominantly utilizes extremist nationalist, religious, or separatist
movements. All organizations and structures that might destabilize
the internal political situation in the country can thus be put in play.
This includes the direct and indirect support of subversive forces to
take control of government organizations, the mass media, culture
institutions, non-governmental foundations and social movements to

promote the political and ideological values of the attacking country.
The result is the destruction of the enemy’s social and ideological
system. Its mechanism of self-destruction and self-annihilation can be
compared to a virus penetrating the internal structure and governance
system. Also, it is conducted without any rules. There are no
borderlines between the front and rear, close- and long-range combat,
contact and non-contact actions, or offensive and defensive methods.
Sixth-Generation Warfare
The concept of Sixth Generation Warfare was developed by General

Vladimir Slipchenko to reflect what he considered a new way of
warfare. It is very much based on his views of Operation Desert Storm
and NATO’s aerial bombing campaign over Yugoslavia. It has three
main components. First is the use of advanced conventional systems
that approach nuclear effects, thus blurring the line on nuclear
deterrence. Second is non-contact warfare. Third—the use of high-
technology non-nuclear weapons. The main operational objective is
to make obsolete the massing the large forces in a conventional war.
However, since the aim of waging war is to achieve political objectives,
the strategic goal is to use high-precision weapons to destroy the
enemy’s means of retaliation. This means employing high-precision
non-nuclear weapons, together with the support of subversive and
reconnaissance groups, to target strategic points that, if destroyed,
result as unacceptable damage to the country being attacked.
Those key targets include top government administration and

military-control systems, major manufacturing plants, fuel and
energy facilities, transportation hubs and facilities (railroad hubs,
bridges, ports, airports, tunnels, etc.), and potentially dangerous
objects (hydroelectric power dams and complexes, processing units of
chemical plants, nuclear power facilities, as well as storages of strong
poisons, etc.). If the enemy’s armed forces are mostly composed of
ground units, it might not be necessary to destroy them. The idea is to
make the enemy’s political system collapse, with the local population
turned into an instrument to achieve victory. In this case, the
occupation of foreign territory might not be necessary. Russian
bombings of hospitals and food storehouses in Syria in recent years
are clear examples of Sixth-Generation Warfare.
Network-Centric Warfare
Although Network-Centric Warfare is a Western concept, for the

Russians it has a double character. One of the best definitions is by
Russian defense experts A. V. Raskin, V. S. Pelyak and S. A. Vyalov:
Network-centric warfare is a war in which the combat strength of

a troop (force) grouping is increased thanks to the creation of an
information-communication network that would link
information (intelligence) sources, control bodies and means of
destruction (suppression). This can be done by giving the
participants in operations reliable and complete information
about the situation practically in real time. 25
It presupposes (i) the organization of forces on the networking

principle with higher autonomy; (ii) it is global; (iii) the notion of a
“battlefield” includes emotions, figurative perceptions of reality and
the adversary’s state of mind (in other words, instruments of Reflexive
Control); (iv) without global communication among forces,
command and control (C2) is impossible; (v) that the proportion of
non-military tools of coercion has dramatically increased, while at the
same time there are no distinct state and national limits; and finally,
(vi) the abandonment of the classical hierarchical command-and-
control system for horizontal links between the parts involved.26
No longer based on divisions of between 15,000 and 20,000 troops,

Network-Centric Warfare relies on smaller units of between 3,000 and
5,000 men. Each of these formations is essentially an autonomous
module, able to independently conduct combat operations.
Depending on the conditions, smaller modules like a detached

battalion, a reinforced company, or even a platoon or small special
operations unit may be required to operate independently. It is of
fundamental importance that each individual unit possess a degree of
autonomy and capability to successfully perform its missions.
The autonomous information module assures proper cooperation

between each autonomous combat module and the command and
staff module. This is done by establishing a single information space
based on an aggregate database of loops of information collected by
the autonomous combat and command and staff modules. This
collected information must include data on the adversary, own troops,
intelligence, the navigation field and weather conditions, just to cite a
few. The information database is to be used to provide continuous
command and control, inform one’s own troops, misinform the
adversary (including by disrupting its information systems), protect
one’s own information systems, shape the desired image of reality to
shape public opinion, and create psychological pressure on the
adversary.
The autonomous information module has to be constituted of units

and subunits of intelligence and psychological operations, Electronic
Warfare, Information Warfare, one group of space-based support,
automatic C2, and communications support. This structure changes
the role of C2. First, command and control is redefined from a
supervisory to a coordination role; second, the process of decision
making and the conduct of combat operations is decentralized.
Therefore, it is necessary to establish superiority in C2 by destructively
taking control of the enemy’s network-centric organization to create
a situation of controlled chaos.
The first stratum must be understood as the procedures for reflexively

controlling the adversary. It is done at the personal level, since it
consists of selecting specific individuals from the adversary’s military
and political leadership to receive information to influence their
decisions. The main aim is to adversely influence the opponent’s

process of decision making, creating favorable conditions for the
controller’s own forces. The second stratum consists of controlling the
adversary in situations of uncertainty. The analysis of the information
indicators of the situation is used to escalate the conflict rather than
normalizing it. This is useful to decide the best courses of action in
case of incomplete or divergent information about the opponent’s
behavioral profile. The third stratum focuses on the destructive
control of the enemy’s entire network with the objective of creating
controlled chaos.27
Reflexive Control
Reflexive Control is the technique of providing the opponent

(controlled) with especially enemy information to make her or him
voluntarily take a predetermined action desired by the controller. It
may occur by changing the enemy’s information processing
(cognitive) or by selecting the messages (informational). It can also be
divided between “constructive” reflexive control, whereby the
opponent is influenced to voluntarily make a decision favorable to the
controller, and “destructive” reflexive control, when the objective is to
destroy, paralyze, or neutralize the procedures and algorithms of the
opponent’s decision-making processes. Reflexive Control
manipulates moral, psychological, and other factors, such as the
personal characteristics of the opponent, using psychological
deficiencies in deception operations.28
Conclusion
Since Russia annexed and occupied Crimea in early 2014, Western

analysts have been trying to find a term to define the strategy Russia
has been employing in Ukraine and across the post-Soviet space.
“Fourth-Generation Warfare” was proposed initially, followed by
suggestions of “Non-Linear Warfare,” until NATO started using the
term “Hybrid Warfare,” probably when Major General Gordon “Skip”
Davis uttered it during a briefing to refer to the Russian tactics in

Ukraine.29 Yet, none of these terms adequately to describe what the
Russians themselves call “New Generation Warfare.” Although it is
true that Western military thought has influenced Russian military
thinkers, it is methodologically incorrect to try to frame Russian
military thought within the Western rational framework. Therefore,
to fully apprehend the theoretical developments that resulted in
establishing the way Russia has been conducting warfare, it is
necessary to review the Russian military literature with the objective
of reversely deconstructing its theoretical fundaments.
Russian New Generation Warfare is not a new approach to

warfighting. Rather, it codifies the particular understanding of
Russian military thinkers about the evolution of military art. The
concept, in fact, comes out of a combined use of Asymmetric Warfare,
Low-Intensity Conflict, Network-Centric Warfare and Six-
Generation Warfare, in various proportions or combinations, and
based on Russia’s own interpretation of these methods. However, it is
only when combined with Reflexive Control that New Generation
Warfare approaches become truly operationalized.
As seen in Russia’s ongoing activities in Ukraine—but also against

multiple countries in Europe, the United States and the West more
generally—New Generation Warfare seeks to bring about political or
military outcomes without necessarily resorting to overt conventional
military means, although the latter is certainly not excluded. Crucially,
New Generation Warfare is based on the idea that the main
battlespace is the mind, which necessitates a predominant focus on
information and psychological warfare so as to morally and
psychologically depress an enemy’s armed forces personnel and
civilian population—preferably before overt hostilities can even break
out. The main objective is to reduce the need to deploy hard military
power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent’s military
and civilian population support the attacker to the detriment of their
own government and country.
The West’s answer to these threats must, therefore, be based on the

concept of Asymmetric Warfare. In the Russian case, it has two
meanings. First is the classic one, where the weaker fights the stronger.
And Russia considers itself the weaker party. Second is the asymmetry
resulting from the different views of what is, and what is not,
acceptable in warfare. Russia is ready to go much further than what
might be acceptable to the West. In this case, the weaker party inverts
the asymmetric relationship, since it is able to exploit the stronger
player’s unwillingness to cross its own red lines. At this moment,
NATO and Europe’s greatest challenge is to establish a feasible
strategy to cope with this, without jeopardizing their own values.
That is why NATO must develop a more pragmatic approach toward

Russia and, at the same time, must be ready for the prospect of
increasing instability on Europe’s borders. Furthermore, that is why
it is important to boost the presence of NATO in the frontline
border states, such as the Baltics. At the same time, the Alliance will
need to continue to engage in diplomatic talks with Russia to
promote arms control and perhaps even the ban on the use of
nuclear weapons.
Notes
1
Francis G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly, Issue
52, 1, (2009): 34–40.
2
Janis Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for
Latvian Defense Policy,” National Defence Academy of Latvia Center for Security
and Strategic Research, Policy Paper No. 2, 2014.
3
Aleksandr I. Vladmirov, “Bol’shaya amerikanskaya voyna” (“The Great American
War”), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’yer, September 24, 2008, http://vpk-
news.ru/articles/1776.
4
Voyenno-promyshlennyy kur’yer, “Bol’shaya amerikanskaya voyna” (“The Great
American War”).
5
Aleksandr I.Vladmirov, “NATO v paradigme obshchey teorii voyny” (“NATO in
the Paradigm of the General Theory of War”), 2014,
http://kadet.ru/lichno/vlad_v/NATO&Obschaya_teoriya_voiny.htm.
6
Aleksandr I. Vladmirov, “SShA - Glavnyy Aktor Mirovoy Voyny” (“The United
States – The Main Actor in the World War”), 2012,
http://kadet.ru/lichno/vlad_v/USA_gl_aktor.htm.
7
Vladmirov, “NATO v paradigme obshchey teorii voyny” (“NATO in the Paradigm
of the General Theory of War”).
8
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “The North Atlantic Treaty,”
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm.
9
Vladmirov, “NATO v paradigme obshchey teorii voyny” (“NATO in the Paradigm
of the General Theory of War”).
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
“SShA - Glavnyy Aktor Mirovoy Voyny” (“The United States – The Main Actor in
the World War”).
13
Aleksandr A. Nagorny and Vladislav V. Shurygin, “Defense Reform as an Integral
Part of a Security Conception for the Russian Federation: a Systemic and Dynamic
Evaluation,” Izborsky Club, http://www.dynacon.ru/content/articles/1085/. The
Izborsky Club was formed by a group of Russian nationalists, some of them
sympathetic to national-Bolshevik ideas. It has major influence on Vladimir Putin’s
thinking and policies, including in Eurasianism (as espoused by Aleksandr Dugin),
geopolitics (Leonid Ivashov), socio-economic doctrine (Sergei Glaziev), and the
concept of Russian civilization in a clash with the West (Andrei Platonov).
14
Nagorny and Shurygin, “Defense Reform as an Integral Part of a Security
Conception for the Russian Federation: a Systemic and Dynamic Evaluation.”
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
President of Russia, “Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (“The Military
Doctrine of the Russian Federation”), December 26, 2014,
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/news/47334; “O Strategii natsional'noy bezopasnosti
Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (“On the National Strategy of the Russian Federation”),

Ministry of Defense of the Russia Federation, July 26, 2017,
http://stat.doc.mil.ru/documents/quick_search/more.htm?id=12074117.
18
Ministry of Defense of the Russia Federation, “O Strategii natsional'noy
bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (“On the National Strategy of the Russian
Federation”).
19
Ibid.
20
Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian
Defense
Policy.”
21
Sergei G. Chekinov, Sergei A. Bogadanov, “O kharaktere i soderzhanii voyny
novogo pokoleniya” (“On the Nature and Content of a New-Generation War”),
Voennaia Mysl, no. 10 (2013).
22
Sergei G. Chekinov, Sergei A. Bogadanov, “O kharaktere i soderzhanii voyny
novogo pokoleniya,” pp. 13–24.
23
Nagorny and Shurygin, “Defense Reform as an Integral Part of a Security
Conception for the Russian Federation: a Systemic and Dynamic Evaluation.”
24
“Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict,” FM 100-20 / AFP 3-20,
Departments of the Army and Air Force, Washington, DC, December 5, 1990,
available at https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/100-
20/.
25
A. V. Raskin, V. S. Pelyak, S. A. Vyalov, “Kontseptsiya setetsentricheskoy voyny:
za i protiv (“The Concept of Network-Centric Warfare: Pro and Contra”),”
Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought), 2005, p. 7.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Timothy L. Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal
of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004), pp. 237–256, available at
https://www.rit.edu/~w-cmmc/literature/Thomas_2004.pdf.
29
The author heard this story from General Davis himself during a meeting at the
NATO/SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium.
6. Russian Nuclear Policy, Doctrine and
Strategy
Stefan Forss
Introduction
As the Cold War was coming to an end, if not earlier, the leaders of
the world’s two superpowers largely came to believe that the
enormous effort of building up and maintaining their vast nuclear
weapons stockpiles had been a mistake. The nuclear arms race
consumed extensive quantities of material and human resources in
the United States, but particularly in the Soviet Union. It also
remained unclear whether nuclear weapons could in fact be employed
operationally in armed conflicts.1
In addition, the need to store tens of thousands of nuclear warheads

was generating new problems of its own, as the aging nuclear
stewardship facilities in both countries approached the end of their
operational lives. Time was finally ripe for a radical change. Several
ground-breaking bilateral and multilateral nuclear arms treaties were
signed in just a few years’ time: namely, the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987, the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) in 1991, the Lisbon Treaty between the United States,
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1992, as well as START II
in 1993. Additionally, the US and the Soviet Union/Russia both signed
185
unilateral legally non-binding commitments to reduce their non-

strategic nuclear weapons, in 1991/1992. These have been referred to
as Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI).2
All five of the world’s original recognized nuclear weapons states (the
United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China) are
bound by their commitments made in the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) to pursue a policy aiming for the abolition of nuclear weapons.
The key commitment is found in Article VI: Each party
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective

measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control.3
In his State of the Union address in January 1984, then-President

Ronald Reagan tackled the problem head on:
People of the Soviet Union, there is only one sane policy, for your
country and mine, to preserve our civilization in this modern age:
A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The only
value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make
sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do
away with them entirely?4
Reagan discussed this issue with his Soviet colleague, Mikhail

Gorbachev, in Reykjavik in 1986. The Soviet president suggested, in
January of that year, that nuclear weapons should be abolished
altogether before the end of the century. That surprising move was
generally not taken seriously. Both heads of state were, however,
genuinely attracted to the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. In
an interview in 2012, President Gorbachev reflected on that meeting:
Russian Nuclear Policy, Doctrine and Strategy | 187
We had said that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be
fought, we could not tolerate the situation that we had, we needed
to deal with those mountains of weapons, to get rid of nuclear
weapons. […] It is strange that some people still think about nuclear
weapons in terms of deterrence—that the positive role of nuclear
weapons is that they deter. I have to say that this is not serious, if you
look at the big picture. So, when we talk about nuclear weapons and
what’s to be done about them, the answer is to get rid of them.5
The idea of a world without nuclear weapons lived on, despite some
unanticipated setbacks. For more than a decade, influential, bipartisan
U.S. politicians and observers (notably, proponents of the so-called
“Hoover Plan”)6 have strongly argued that such a world would certainly
be in the interest of the United States. And in his speech in Prague, on
April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama reiterated this same vision:
So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s

commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without
nuclear weapons. I’m not naive. This goal will not be reached
quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and
persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us
that the world cannot change.7
All US administrations from Reagan to Obama have undoubtedly acted

in the spirit of the NPT and achieved impressive results. The same can
essentially be said for Russia during President Yeltsin’s administration
and halfway into President Vladimir Putin’s second term. The nuclear
inventories in both countries have decreased to a small fraction of the
inventories at the end of the Cold War.8
The elimination of a full category of land-based shorter- and medium-

range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, altogether 2,926 weapons
systems during implementation of the INF Treaty in the early 1990s, was
groundbreaking. 9 The symbolic value of that landmark treaty for the
nuclear arms reduction process is difficult to overstate.
The reductions of strategic nuclear weapons proceeded well after the

START treaty entered into force, in December 1994. Ratification was,
however, delayed because of the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union
and the necessity to handle the situation, with Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan having a significant portion of the Soviet strategic nuclear
weapon systems on their territory. All Soviet nuclear warheads in Soviet
republics outside Russia had, however, been transferred to the Russian
Federation, the successor state of the Soviet Union as custodian of
nuclear weapons, already in 1992.
Yet, the simultaneous ratification process of START II, negotiated by the

administration of George H. W. Bush, became stuck in the US Congress.
That treaty carried a big prize, as it allowed only single-warhead, land-
based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and called for the
complete elimination of the only heavy ICBM in the Russian
inventory—the R-36UTTKh/M2 (SS-18 Mods 4/5 Satan)—the flagship
of the Russian Strategic Rocket forces, which carried ten high-yield
warheads. The United States had no comparable heavy ICBM at this
time.
The bilateral US-Russian treaty-based regulation of strategic nuclear

forces was intrinsically linked to restrictive measures in the field of
missile defense. The Soviet/Russian political and military leadership was
suspicious of President Reagan’s utopian Strategic Defense Initiative and
later more modest missile-defense aims.
President George W. Bush declared the US intention to withdraw from

the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December 2001, arguing
that “the ABM treaty hinders our government’s ways to protect our
people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.” Russia’s
President Putin said the move, although not unexpected, was a mistake
and that “the [ABM] treaty is a cornerstone of world security.”
Nonetheless, the Russian leader’s assessment of the implications was
sober:
As is well known, Russia and the U.S., unlike other nuclear

powers, have for a long time possessed effective means to
overcome missile defenses. […] Therefore, I fully believe that the
decision taken by the president of the United States does not pose
a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation.10
Moscow’s position has since then changed significantly.11 The US

missile-defense efforts may ultimately threaten Russia’s strategic nuclear
deterrence capability, the Russian side claims.
As the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty came into force, on June 13,
2002, Russia declared the next day that it was no longer bound by
START II.12 This set the stage for developments that have become core
issues one and a half decades later.
Russia’s Changed Attitude Toward Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear

Arms Control
The “Hoover Plan,” the denuclearization agenda initiated in 2007 by

senior US personalities, received wide international support, particularly
in the West.13 The official Russian response was less enthusiastic, and the
country now largely rejects the Gorbachev-era idea of a world without
nuclear weapons.
The changed attitude was felt, in 2008, in the United Nations Security
Council Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (ABDM), where
the Russian delegate strongly resisted that US proposals on nuclear
disarmament that were introduced on the ABDM agenda.14 Two
distinct motives help explain such a dramatic change in Moscow’s
approach to the total elimination of nuclear weapons: balance of
power and Russia’s global power status.
For Russia, a nuclear component is an irreplaceable counterweight to the

perceived conventional superiority of its rivals. The political
implications of possessing nuclear weapons, is as important as the

military factor. Put another way, Russia without nuclear weapons would
be reduced to a dwarf on the global scene.
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union—in President Putin’s

words one of the most catastrophic events of the 20th century—
Russia’s position as a major nuclear power was challenged in the mid-
1990s.15 The most important ICBM systems in service were
manufactured in Ukraine; and the primary project of the strategic
fleet, the development of the massive Typhoon-class strategic nuclear
missile submarine (SSBN), had proved to be a major disappointment.
Moreover, the industrial base and the economy of Russia could no
longer support maintaining its strategic forces at even a fraction of
their former levels. In this situation, the then–minister of defense,
Army General Igor Rodionov, not only supported the START II treaty
but also favored further reductions after meeting with Defense
Secretary William Perry in Moscow, in October 1996.16
START II and the outline of START III never became legally binding.
But even so, significant reductions on both sides continued during the
first decade of the 21st century. Presidents George W. Bush and
Vladimir Putin signed an unusually short (only a few pages long)
framework document, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT), without any meaningful negotiations in 2002. After the
Yeltsin era, Russia had embarked on a major, and still ongoing,
nuclear buildup, which consumes a significant portion of the defense
budget. Although the START process began to show signs of tiring, it
still was advantageous for Russia.
The Obama administration invested much political capital in bringing

the START process back on track. It led to the signing of the New
START Treaty in 2010, which is currently in force. The treaty ceilings
had to be met in February 2018 and it expires three years later unless
the parties agree to extend it for five years.
US efforts to start a new round of strategic talks and to expand these

talks to also include non-strategic nuclear weapons met with firm
resistance from Russia. The Global Zero Action Plan campaign,
launched in Paris in February 2010, is a case in point. The day before
the Paris Summit opened, Swedish and Polish Foreign Ministers Carl
Bildt and Radek Sikorski co-authored an op-ed for the New York
Times, advocating deep reductions in and eventual elimination of
non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons stockpiles currently located
in Europe. Accordingly, the authors called upon Russia to commit to
a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from areas adjacent to European
states and to the destruction of the relevant storage facilities. They also
supported including non-strategic nuclear weapons in an arms
control regime.17
When Russia refused to discuss non-strategic nuclear weapons,

President Obama repeated his offer for a new round of START
negotiations while in Berlin in June 2013.18 His aim was to encourage
Russia to agree to cut deployed strategic nuclear weapons by a third
from the New START Treaty ceiling, to about 1,000 deployed strategic
warheads. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov rejected the offer
and declared that all subsequent nuclear reduction talks will have to
be multilateral.19 This position is a clear deviation from a several-
decades-long tradition and a hard blow to the START process. It is
included—albeit slightly less categorically—in Russia’s foreign policy
White Paper (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation),
adopted in late 2016.20
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons and INF Treaty Issues
Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, one of the most prominent Russian

military officers of his time and chief of the international division of
the Russian ministry of defense, gave a lecture about Russia’s security
and defense policy in Helsinki, Finland, in September 2000. He is well
known as a nuclear hawk. In his address to the Finnish audience, he
maintained that the world had never been as close to World War III
as during the Kosovo War the year before.21 This author asked him
then to clarify the Russian implementation of the unilateral
presidential PNI commitments given in 1991/1992. General Ivashov
gave a lengthy answer with little information, but assured that Russia
fully abided by the given commitments.
A summary of the Soviet/Russian Presidential Nuclear Initiatives is as

follows:22
On October 5, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev responded
to the US unilateral moves with reciprocal Soviet measures.
Gorbachev committed to:
 eliminate all nuclear artillery munitions, nuclear warheads for

tactical missiles, and nuclear mines;
 remove all tactical nuclear weapons from surface ships and
multi-purpose submarines. These weapons would be stored
in central storage sites along with all nuclear arms assigned to
land-based naval aircraft; and
 separate nuclear warheads from air-defense missiles and put
the warheads in central storage. A “portion” would be
destroyed.
On January 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin reaffirmed

Gorbachev’s commitments and expanded on them in response to a
second round of unilateral US nuclear weapons cutbacks focused on
strategic forces. (Following the Soviet Union’s December 25, 1991,
collapse, Russia assumed responsibility for the Soviet Union’s nuclear
complex and arms-control commitments.) Yeltsin said Russia
would:23
 eliminate a third of its sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and

half of its ground-to-air nuclear missile warheads; and
 halve its airborne tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. Pending
reciprocal US action, the other half of this stockpile would be
taken out of service and placed in central storage depots.
Ample evidence suggests, however, that Russia did not fully

implement the above PNIs. This stands out particularly clearly for the
ground forces. In 2002, Russia declared to a preparatory meeting for
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty conference that it had
“practically” implemented all of its PNI obligations, “with the
exception of elimination of nuclear weapons in the army [i.e., the
Ground Forces].”24 But in 2007, Russia tried to clarify the meaning of
the commitments to destroy the Army’s nuclear warheads by
implying that it was more a matter of removing them than actual
elimination. A headline in Pravda, “Russia Determined to Keep
Tactical Nuclear Weapons for Potential Aggressors,” on October 31,
2007, is telling.25 The current Russian position is clearly stated on the
home page of the Missile Troops and Artillery of the Russian Ground
Forces:26
The Missile Troops and Artillery (MT & A) are an Arm of the
Land Force, which is the primary means of fire and nuclear
destruction of the enemy during conduct of combined-arms
operations (combat actions).
Dr. Igor Sutyagin, a senior research fellow at the Royal United Services
Institute in London, provided a thorough analysis of non-strategic
nuclear weapons in Russia’s armed forces in 2012.27 In particular, he
illuminated the dual-capable nature of many weapons systems in the
ground and naval forces, including ballistic and cruise missiles, rocket
launchers and artillery guns. The obvious conclusion is that Russia is
no longer bound by the political commitments of the presidential
initiatives.
The same Russian mindset is also at the core of the contentious INF
Treaty issue. Deep mistrust of this treaty was voiced in the Russian
nuclear weapons community more than two decades ago, in
September 1996. “We may have to withdraw from the treaty on the
elimination of medium- and shorter-range [INF] missiles and resume
manufacture of theses arms, if the threat [from NATO expansion]

becomes real,” the influential Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor
Mikhailov and two colleagues wrote at that time.28
Another prominent observer, Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, gave an

equally clear signal that Russia may ultimately not respect the INF
Treaty. In December 1999, he said that the Topol-M ICBM could easily
be converted to a medium-range missile:29
The missile would strike a target before its operator has time to
smoke a cigarette. Besides, we also have the navy and the air force.
They, too, can handle targets in Europe without ever leaving
Russian territory.
Possibly the first high-level political indication of Moscow’s new

position on the INF was received in September 2004, when then–
Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov told reporters that Russia hoped to
be able to pull out of the INF Treaty.30
Since then, Russian defense authorities have repeatedly raised the INF
question in talks with the United States, despite objections from the
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On his visit to Washington in
January 2005, Defense Minister Ivanov asked his counterpart Donald
Rumsfeld how the United States would react if Russia were to
withdraw from the INF Treaty. This was repeated in August 2006,
when the two top defense officials met each other in Fairbanks,
Alaska.31
Ivanov returned to the question in February 2007.32 His views

garnered stronger political weight a few days later, when President
Vladimir Putin stated that the INF Treaty no longer served Russia’s
interests and voiced serious concern regarding the US missile shield
plans in Europe. At the Munich Security Conference, on February 10,
2007, Putin said,
Today many other countries have these missiles, including the

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North Korea], the
Republic of Korea [South Korea], India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel.
Many countries are working on these systems and plan to
incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the
United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such
weapons systems. It is obvious that in these conditions we must
think about ensuring our own security. […] Plans to expand
certain elements of the anti–missile defense system to Europe
cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what
would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that
Europeans themselves do.33
On Moscow’s initiative, the United States and Russia jointly proposed

before the 2007 UN General Assembly and at the Disarmament
Conference that the INF Treaty should be made universally binding.34
This appeal was not successful, however.
In pursuing its new missile programs, Russia is following a long

military-political tradition and has used US missile-defense efforts in
general and the European missile shield issue in particular as
legitimacy.35 President Putin reaffirmed this position in in December
2017.36
Let’s be clear: this is offensive infrastructure that is being created

in Europe. This is about violations of provisions of the 1987 INF
Treaty by the United States, unfortunately. […]
For example, multi-purpose missile launchers have already been

deployed in Romania, and are being deployed in Poland, as part
of the missile defense system. Formally, they are deployed for
interceptor missiles, but the point is, and experts are well aware of
this, they are multi-purpose units. They can be used to launch
existing sea-based cruise missiles with a range of 2,500 kilometers
and, in that case, they cease to be sea-based missiles, and can easily
be moved to land. That is, anti-missile launchers can, at any time,

become units for medium-range cruise missiles.
Another example: target missiles used by the United State for

testing anti-ballistic missile systems are identical to medium- and
shorter-range ballistic missiles. They are already there and are
operational. Their production in the United States may indicate
the development of technologies outlawed by the INF Treaty.
Also, the Pentagon received funds for creating a mobile ground-

based missile system with a range of up to 5,500 kilometers in
2018. Thus, the United States is, in fact, working towards violating
the INF Treaty. They never stop looking for some kind of
violation on our part, while consistently engaging in violations
themselves, just like they consistently and persistently sought to
pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which, eventually, as
we know, they did in a unilateral manner. Of course, this
significantly reduces the level of security in Europe and the world
in general.
Shortly after Putin’s 2007 Munich speech, the Chief of the General
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Yuri Baluyevsky,
said that pulling out of the INF Treaty was possible, especially if the
United States were to implement their missile-defense plans in
Europe.37
Russia began to emphasize a policy of asymmetric response to address

perceived threats in novel ways. The new dual-capable Iskander
missile system became the tool of choice to nullify the alleged threat
from missile-defense deployments in Europe.38 A few months after
Russia’s war against Georgia in August 2008, where ballistic Iskander-
M missiles were fired in anger for the first time, then-President
Dmitry Medvedev declared Russia’s intention to deploy Iskander
missiles in Kaliningrad and to take other appropriate measures,
should the US missile-defense plans be implemented.39 From there on,
Russian missile plans for Kaliningrad became a political high-profile

issue, which eventually caused concern particularly in the Baltic States
and the Scandinavian countries.
The Russian 26th Missile Brigade in Luga, approximately 100 miles

south of St. Petersburg in the Western Military District (MD), was
among the very first units to receive Iskander missiles in late 2010.
Pravda reported of a nervous reaction in NATO. 40 Viktor Litovkin,
the editor of the prestigious military journal Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozrenie (NVO) explained why:
The missile can be equipped not only with a conventional but also
a nuclear warhead. The range of the tactical Iskander-M is 500
kilometers, and many military objects of the alliance will be
threatened.
If we place Iskander missiles in the Kola Peninsula, they would

cover a significant part of the Scandinavian Peninsula, including
a large area of Norway.
If we place them in Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions, then all

NATO facilities in the Baltic come under attack. Being stationed
on the territory of Kaliningrad region, Iskander units also cover
half of the territory of Poland.
The deployment of Iskander missiles to Luga did not become an issue

in Finnish-Russian relations. Yet, it undoubtedly posed a new level of
military-operational capability against Finland, too, as the missile’s
flying time to Finnish targets was only a few minutes. But there was
not much Helsinki could do about that, so the Finnish government
chose not to react. The concern in the West and particularly in the
other Nordic countries rose as deployments to Kaliningrad gradually
materialized.
After Iskander missiles were deployed with the 26th Missile Brigade,
they were occasionally employed during exercises in the Kaliningrad
region, such as the surprise readiness inspection in March 2015.41 The
152nd Guards Missile Brigade in Chernyakhovsk, in Kaliningrad, still
equipped with aging short-range OTR-21 Tochka-U (SS-21 Scarab)
missiles, was the eleventh brigade to receive new Iskander missiles in
late 2017.42
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu declared in the upper house of

Russia’s parliament in May 2017,
As for the general-purpose forces, self-sufficient groupings of

troops and forces capable of adequately responding to any
military security threats will be established in all the strategic
directions, including the Arctic, by late 2020. The Army is
expected to have been fully rearmed with modern Iskander-M
missile systems by that time.43
The adopted Russian terminology for the operational-tactical

Iskander missile system as well as restrictions imposed by the INF
Treaty create confusion about the missile system itself and its key
performance parameters, such as its range, which is limited to 500
kilometers by treaty.
The 9K720 Iskander missile system (SS-26 Stone) comes in two basic
variants: the fast (Mach 6–7) ballistic missile 9M723-1 and the sub-
sonic cruise missile 9M728 (a.k.a. R-500 or “Iskander-K”).
Collectively, the two are known as “Iskander-M.”44 Iskander-M
brigades consist of a mix of both ballistic and cruise missiles,
providing significant operational advantages. 45 Footage from the
Vostok-2014 exercise is quite illuminating, exhibiting launches of
both missile types.46 The Iskander-K was also fired in the Leningrad
region during the Zapad-2017 exercise in September 2017.47
Although both Iskander missile types may reach targets well beyond
500 kilometers, the US has not formally accused Russia of INF treaty
breach related to the Iskander missile system.48 This is due to
deficiencies in the treaty itself. Moreover, Russia’s “treaty compliance”
tends to blur the perception of the real capabilities of this missile
system. Russian arms control expert Dr. Pavel Podvig quoted a
colleague as implying that the range of the Iskander-K is dependent
on how much fuel is pumped into the missile. Extended range comes
with filling the fuel tank.49 The nuclear arms control treaties have, in
fact, become useful tools for deception.
Two recognized senior researchers, Roger McDermott and Dr. Tor

Bukkvoll, described the military-political role of the Iskander missile
system succinctly:
Since its introduction in 2007, the Iskander features in Russia’s

operational-strategic exercises, and its presence appears to
support President Putin’s adherence to the “escalate to de-
escalate” nuclear strike under certain circumstances. Putin also
frequently refers to the Iskander during his speeches on defense
issues. More recently its role in such exercises, as well as in
separate brigade level exercises, has been to rehearse “pre-
emptive” strikes on enemy targets.50
US concerns over possible Russian INF-related violations were voiced

earlier, in the 2010s. But a formal accusation with no specific technical
details was made in July 2014, in the State Department’s annual
Compliance Report:
The United States has determined that the Russian Federation is

in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess,
produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
with a range capability of 500 km to 5,500 km, or to possess or
produce launchers of such missiles.51
The New York Times reported, in February 2017, that Russia had
deployed two battalions of the new prohibited SSC-8 cruise missile.52
American officials have voiced concerns since 2014 about the tests of
this experimental missile, which they designated SSC-X-8. Dropping
the “X” meant that the missile was considered operational, and it
added substance to the accusation of INF Treaty breach. No details of
the missile itself were disclosed, however.
International observers generally assumed that the Iskander missile

system was at the core of the alleged treaty breach, but U. authorities
denied that repeatedly. The missile in question was officially disclosed
in November 2017 by National Security Council member Christopher
Ford: the missile is Novator’s cruise missile 9M729.53
Well-informed researcher Mikhail Barabanov, from the Center for

Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), estimates that the
missile is 1.3 meters longer than the same company’s 9M728
(Iskander-K) missile, significantly increasing the volume of the
missile’s fuel tank. The missile obviously was too long to fit the
Iskander 9P78-1 transporter erector launcher (TEL).54 Because of the
increased length of the missile, it was necessary to build a new
launcher, presumable named 9P701, and also a new transport-loading
machine, the 9T256. Both are built on the same Belarusian MZKT-
7930 chassis, as are the Iskander launcher and loader vehicles. As
such, they are not easily distinguished from each other, former NATO
Supreme Commander General Philip Breedlove has observed.55
Barabanov describes the 9M729 missile itself as apparently being the

same as the Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles deployed on ships and
submarines.56 The nominal range of the missile is 2,500 kilometers,
with an operational range about a thousand kilometers less.57
Given, that the conventional deterrence value of the new Russian

ground-based ballistic and cruise missile systems is limited, their
dual-use nature has to be taken into account. The Swedish Defense
Research Establishment (Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut—FOI)

continues to rely on Royal United Services Institutes’ Senior Research
Fellow Dr. Sutyagin as perhaps the best open source regarding the
number of operationally assigned non-strategic nuclear warheads in
the Russian arsenal.58
The number of offensive non-strategic nuclear weapons is growing.

Sutyagin estimates that in mid-2016 there were 156–200 operationally
assigned warheads for ship-launched cruise missiles, an increase of 50
percent since 2012. The number of operationally assigned warheads
for the Tochka-U and Iskander-M short-range surface-to-surface
missile systems has almost doubled to 248–372 warheads, according
to Sutyagin, who also holds it possible that warheads still are
operationally assigned to heavy artillery units. The marked increase in
offensive nonstrategic nuclear weapons noted by Sutyagin is mainly
due to the deployment of Kalibr and Iskander-M land-attack cruise
missiles.
Regarding the distribution of warheads between Russia’s Military

Districts, Sutyagin’s reports are the only available sources. Still, almost
half of the operationally assigned warheads are located in the Western
MD. However, the arsenal of the Southern MD has more than tripled
since 2012, increasing from 87–103 to 287–369 operationally assigned
warheads, surpassing the Eastern MD. The increase mainly consists of
new offensive weapons, such as land-attack cruise missiles and
warheads for Iskander-Ms and fighter-bombers. Noting that the
increase in offensive non-strategic nuclear forces has been at least one
and a half time faster in the western parts of Russia, Sutyagin
concludes that Russia is rapidly improving its ability to wage offensive
nuclear war in Europe.”59
In order to understand to what lengths Russia is prepared to go to

restore the capabilities that were lost at implementation of the INF
Treaty, one also needs to reflect about the new ballistic missile RS-26
Rubezh, a.k.a. Yars-M, which, according to some sources, has already
been accepted for active service.60 From an operational, albeit not

arms-control perspective, this missile should be compared with the
flagship in the eliminated Soviet missile inventory, the RT-12M
Pioner (SS-20 Saber), which was a two-stage, stripped version of the
Temp-S ICBM, carrying three nuclear warheads.
In December 2013, the commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces,

General Karakayev disclosed that the RS-26 is built on the basis of the
RS-24 Yars ICBM.61 In March 2015, it was finally acknowledged that
the RS-26 Rubezh has fewer stages and shorter range than the RS-24
Yars.62
The first test of RS-26, in September 2011, failed; but the second test
flight of the new missile, in May 2012, was successful.63 The missile
apparently flew with a light or empty payload from Plesetsk to the
Kura missile range in Kamchatka, 5,800 kilometers, i.e. to
intercontinental range. This automatically defined the missile as an
ICBM, covered by the New START treaty. The following test, in
October 2012, was performed from the Kapustin Yar proving ground
to Sary Shagan, in Kazakhstan, over a distance of approximately 2,000
kilometers.64
This was the first public telltale signal of a possible diversion from a
real intercontinental-range missile program toward the politically
dubious INF ground. However, being START accountable, the RS-26
evidently is not formally violating any treaty. All subsequent tests
have, however, been performed to the same medium-range distances,
indicating that the real operational purpose of this missile is sub-
strategic.
Although the RS-26 Yars-M is subject to New START’s verification

procedures, Russia has refused for several years to conduct the
required treaty demonstration of the missile and its launcher. This
treaty requirement involves viewing, measuring and photographing
these items before deployment. But this exhibition had still not been
conducted as of the autumn of 2017.65
The RS-26 case shows to what lengths Russia is going to mask its real
intentions in the INF field. Letting the missile fly once beyond the
5,500-kilometer ICBM range definition was a clever way to disguise
its real intent to reintroduce an improved version of the INF flagship
SS-20.
Features Regarding the Development of Non-Strategic and

Strategic Forces
Artillery as the “God of War” is an old maxim from Joseph Stalin’s

times, which the Russian Armed Forces still adhere to. Sweden’s FOI
covered Russia’s materiel programs extensively in its major report
“Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2016.”66 And
TASS gave a useful short summary about artillery and missile systems
developments in November 2017.67 Both reiterate that the Russian
ground troops’ missile forces and artillery are the primary means to
inflict fire and nuclear damage on the enemy on the battlefield.
As the short-range ballistic Tochka-U missile systems will be

completely phased out by 2020, they are being replaced with new and
more capable Iskander-M systems. “The Iskander’s large upgrade
potential will allow it to operate on a par with foreign analogues up to
2030,” TASS reports. “We continue further experimental design work
on developing new missiles for the Iskander-M complex. It is
constantly developed further. Several more missile types have been
developed. Externally, they look alike but differ radically from inside.
The complex currently has at least seven missile types or, perhaps,
more,” Valery Kashin Chief designer of the Machine-Building Design
Bureau said.
Range is a key parameter that can be improved. Former commander

of the Artillery and Rocket Forces Colonel General Zaritsky said in an
interview for Nezavisimaya Gazeta already in November 2007 that the

range can be increased if the political will to withdraw from the INF
Treaty is there. The Iskander missile system will plug the gap in
Russia’s operational-tactical missile arsenal, created by the INF
Treaty, the general emphasized.
According to Russian experts, the range could be increased to 1,000

kilometers without changes to the launcher.68 Presumably, this would
involve using a more effective propellant and advanced fly-by-wire
steering techniques, facilitating the removal of unnecessary dead
weight.
The military operational utility of ballistic Iskander-M missiles and

Iskander-K cruise missiles in the same 1,000-kilometer operational-
range ballpark is obvious. It would fill the gap in Russia’s sub-strategic
deterrence posture in Europe that was lost when the 1,000-kilometer-
range 9K76 Temp-S missile (a.k.a. SS-22 Scaleboard) was eliminated.
An air-launched version of the Iskander-M ballistic missile was

reported in March 2018. The launch of the Kh-47M2 missile, known
as Kinzhal (Dagger), took place from a modified MiG-31BM
Foxhound aircraft.69 Not much is still known about this system, but
given that it could also be carried by the Tu-22M3 bomber, the
Kinzhal’s range may be several thousand kilometers.70
In hindsight it is fair to say that the future of Russia’s strategic nuclear

forces looked increasingly bleak a few years after the breakup of the
Soviet Union. All three legs of the strategic triad were affected. The
bulk of the inventory of the Strategic Rocket Forces were built in
Ukraine. Several missile fields were located outside Russia. The
strategic fleet experienced severe problems, notably connected to the
massive investment in the Project 941 Typhoon submarines. These
colossal boats lay mostly in port, unable to perform their planned
patrolling duties. The Typhoon division of the Northern Fleet was
finally disbanded in 2004.71
Additionally, a significant portion of Russian strategic bombers were

based in Ukraine. Production of the newest strategic bomber, the Tu-
160 Blackjack had come to a virtual standstill, and the RuAF had to
rely mostly on modernized versions of the vintage Tu-95MS Bear
turbo-prop bomber.
This was the time for deep nuclear reductions and implementation
not only of the START treaty but also START II, including its ban
land-based ICBMs carrying multiple independently re-targetable re-
entry vehicles (MIRV). However, a fouled-up ratification process
resulted in START II being a lost opportunity. In the end, only the
United States abided by that treaty, and the Minuteman III missile was
converted to a single-warhead missile. Whereas, Russia ultimately
expanded its MIRVed ICBM stockpiles.
The first domestically produced ICBM to be taken into active service

in post-Soviet Russia was the silo-based and road-mobile RS-12M2
Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle-B/Stalin), deployed in December 1997 and
2006, respectively.72 The design of this three-stage, solid-fueled missile
was originally triggered by the United States’ missile defense
ambitions formulated in the Strategic Defense Initiative. In
anticipation of entry into force of the ban on MIRVed ICBM
warheads, mandated by the START II treaty signed in January 1993,
the Topol-M was initially designed as a single-warhead missile.73
It is difficult to determine when exactly development work on a

MIRVed version of the Topol-M began. But presumably it was several
years before the first test-flight on May 29, 2007.74
With completion of the deployment of 78 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1)

missiles in 2012, efforts have since shifted to deployment of a MIRVed
version of the SS-27, known as SS-27 Mod 2, or RS-24 Yars in Russia.
It is essentially the same missile as the Mod 1 version except the
payload “bus” has been modified to carry multiple independently
targetable warheads. Each missile is thought to be able to carry up to

four such warheads.75
The START treaty prohibited increasing the number of warheads

attributed to ICBMs. So Russia claimed the RS-24 was a completely
new ICBM model to justify the designation “SS-29” instead of “SS-27
Mod 2,” and thus to circumvent the treaty prohibition.
During the last five years, Russia produced 80 ICBMs, allowing for the
rearmament of 12 strategic missile regiments with RS-24s.76 The
Strategic Rocket Forces will obtain 20 Yars launchers in 2018, and all
single-warhead road-mobile Topol and Topol-M units will be
rearmed with Yars ICBMs by 2026.77 Dr. Pavel Podvig estimated, in
mid-2017, that 84 Yars missiles were deployed with four warheads
each.78 One hundred-fourteen Topol and Topol-M missiles were
eventually replaced.
The pride of the Russian nuclear weapons designers in their

professional achievements is unmistakable: they invented both the
world’s largest (the 100-megaton-yield “Czar Bomb”) and smallest
(152-millimeter nuclear artillery round) nuclear weapons.79 The same
can be said about Russian designs of heavy ICBMs, a unique feature
of the country’s Strategic Rocket Forces.80 The flagship, the liquid-
fueled ten-warhead SS-18 Satan (lift-off weight of 210 tons and a
throw-weight of 8 tons) was slated for complete elimination under
START II. The last SS-18s—model R-36M2 (RS-20V) Voevoda—are
to be retired as they are replaced by the new liquid-fueled heavy ICBM
RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30), which is scheduled for initial combat duty in
2021. Serial production of missiles should begin in 2020. According to
the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel General Sergei
Karakayev, the Voevoda will be in service at least until 2024, but their
operation can be extended until 2027.81
The true specifications of the missile were withheld until March 2018.
It was thought that the missile, designed and manufactured in Russia
(Makeev State Missile Center, Miass, Chelyabinsk region) would be

significantly smaller than the SS-18 and only slightly heavier than the
SS-19 Stiletto, which is just below the START treaty definition of
heavy ICBMs.82
In his speech to the nation on March 1, 2018, President Putin

disclosed that the weight of the Sarmat is over 200 metric tons, almost
twice the lift-off (l-o) weight of the SS-19, equaling the l-o weight of
the SS-18.83 Ample photographic evidence supports the estimates of
the Sarmat’s huge size. According to Deputy Minister of Defense Yuri
Borisov, the missile’s payload may be ten tons. 84
The Sarmat is likely to carry 8–10 warheads, but with yields lower than
the 750-kiloton warheads carried by the SS-18. The modern missile’s
increased accuracy ensures that “effect on target”85 will not be lost. It
also employs advanced penetration aids to defeat enemy missile
defenses. Finally, the missile has the option of carrying hypersonic
glide vehicles (HGV) as maneuverable reentry vehicles.86 TASS
reported in July 2018 that the work on the Avangard HGV was
completed and preparations made to accept the system for
operational service in the Strategic Missile Forces.87
The RS-28 Sarmat development program has experienced multiple

setbacks, and deployment by 2020 may be too optimistic. Three
successful ejection tests were performed between December 2017 and
late May 2018, paving way for real test flights yet to be performed.
Russia’s Strategic Fleet Developments
The Russian nuclear submarine fleet experienced extreme difficulties

during the first decades after the breakup of the Soviet Union. At
dawn of the new millennium, the number of operational strategic
missile submarines and nuclear powered and dual-use attack
submarines had dwindled to a small fraction from the levels during
the Cold War but have now stabilized.88
The biggest disappointment for Russian officials and the top brass was
almost certainly the Typhoon-class (Project 941 Akula) submarine.
Lack of funding and persistent maintenance problems kept most of
the Typhoon boats moored in harbor, indeed as destabilizing sitting
ducks as long as they carried their complements of SS-N-20 Sturgeon
(R-39/D-19) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The final
blow to this SSBN class was the failed effort to construct a reliable
follower to the SS-N-20 missile.89
Russia’s other operational SSBN classes experienced similar difficult

problems; and routine patrolling went down from about 20
submarines at sea at any given time to about two.90 Even the newest
SSBN class from the Soviet era, the Delta IV (Project 667 BDRM
Delfin), was affected. One of the seven boats, K-64 Podmoskovye, was
eventually removed from the SSBN force and converted for
underwater special operations in 2016. Production of the SS-N-23
Skiff (R-29RM/D-9RM) missiles had ceased in 1996 as development
of an improved model began. The Russian government, however,
made a decision to resume missile production in October 1999.91 After
a series of tests of the new version, the SS-N-23 (R-29RMU2 Sineva)
SLBM was accepted for service in 2007.92 It carries four 100-kiloton-
yield warheads. Then followed a further upgraded version, the R-
29RMU2.1 Liner, which may carry as many as 8–10 warheads. It was
adopted into service in early 2014.93
Sineva and Liner missiles have improved navigation systems,

upgraded warheads and penetration aids, and have flown in tests
more than 11,500 kilometers, presumably with light payloads. The
remaining six Delta IV–class boats have been thoroughly refurbished
and serviced. Together with the new missiles, they will remain in
service until 2030.94
Looking several decades ahead, the Borei-class SSBN (Project 955) is

clearly the key project of the Russian strategic submarine fleet, as these
boats will form the basis of Russia’s maritime strategic deterrent and
eventually carry the bulk of Russia’s nuclear second-strike capability.
The development of the Borei-class boats—“Borei” is a reference to

the North Wind—has also been a tedious and difficult process but is
now basically on track. Development of the boat started in 1996 as a
follow-on to the Delta-class boats, with their characteristic “hump
backs” to allow for the length of the R-39UTTH “Bark” missile. The
cancelation of this failed missile project led to a major redesign of the
boat itself. It was to be equipped with the new R-30 Bulava (SS-NX-
30), designed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT,
chief designer Yuri Solomonov). The institution is known for their
Topol-M and Yars missiles, but has never before developed SLBMs.
The Typhoon-class (Project 941) submarine Dmitriy Donskoi was
refitted as a test bed for the Bulava missile system. The Bulava missile
itself has had a mixed test history, but the major problems are solved.95
After a successful salvo launch of four Bulava missiles on May 22,
2018, the Bulava missile was finally accepted for operational service.96
The Bulava will carry six warheads.
Initial plans may have been to install 12 launch tubes. But after the
larger Bark missile was discarded, the Borei-class boats will carry 16
Bulava launchers. According to some sources, the upgraded Project
955A Borei II–class boats may obtain 4 additional launch tubes,
thereby increasing the missile load to 20, while others say that the
number of launch tubes will remain at 16.97
The lead ship, Yuri Dolgorukiy, the first of the planned eight, joined
the Northern Fleet in December 2013 and received its full
complement of missiles in 2014. Subsequent Project 955 submarines
are expected to join the Pacific Fleet. As of January 2016, three
submarines had been accepted for service—the Yuri Dolgorukiy,
Alexander Nevskiy and Vladimir Monomakh. 98
The lead boat of the Project 955A Borei II series, Knyaz Vladimir (laid
down in July 2012), set sail for the first time on November 17, 2017.
Plans are that Knyaz Vladimir will be delivered to the Navy in 2018.99
According to the Russian defense ministry, four other hauls are
already being used to build the remaining four Borei II–class
submarines: the Knyaz Oleg, Generalissimus Suvorov, Imperator
Alexander III and Knyaz Pozharsky. Construction on these nuclear
submarines is expected to be completed by 2025.100
The recovery of the Russian strategic fleet, literally from the brink at
the end of the 1990s, is remarkable. One visible sign of this is that the
operational tempo of the Russian submarine fleet has returned to
former levels. Admiral Vladimir Korolev, the commander-in-chief of
the Russian Navy, said in March 2017, “Last year, we returned to the
level we had before the post-Soviet era in terms of the days at sea.
Russia’s submarine fleet has spent 3,000 days at sea.”101
Defense Minister Shoigu’s mention that 102 SLBMs had been

produced during the last five years, is an indication that missile
production corresponds to a little more than one yearly boat-load of
missiles. SLBM and SSBN production seems to be in sync.
Nuclear missions are, however, not only the business of the Russian
strategic fleet. Dual-use weaponry, such as SS-N-21 Sampson (S-10
Granat) and Kalibr cruise missiles, SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700 Granit)
missiles as well as P-800 Oniks missiles, are found in the attack
submarine fleet as well as in guided-missile submarines, diesel
submarines and various surface vessels. The number of these are
counted in several tens.
One additional Russian nuclear naval system in development is the

alleged intercontinental-range nuclear underwater drone, Poseidon,
a.k.a. “the multi-purpose Status-6 system” (codenamed Kanyon by
NATO), disclosed in 2015.102 If successfully developed and deployed,
this weapon would be capable of transporting a megaton-yield nuclear
charge and provide Russia with a “third strike” weapon, an ultimate

doomsday weapon. It is said to be an asymmetric response to a US
missile defense shield.103 Citing Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer,
Dr. Mark Schneider warned that this weapon “may further embolden
the Kremlin to push for a new world order of its liking by intimidating
the United States and its allies.” Too little is, however, still known
about Poseidon to provide definite answers regarding the qualities of
the system. A video from July 2018 shows dimensions of the Poseidon
drone to be far larger than ordinary torpedoes.104
Strategic Aviation
The third leg of the strategic nuclear triad, long-range aviation

(Dal’nyaya Aviatsiya—DA), has always been inferior to the
corresponding US force. In the 1980s the Soviet Union was able to
produce a new heavy bomber aircraft, the Tu-160 Blackjack bomber,
somewhat reminiscent of the US B-1B Lancer.105 The Blackjack still
remains the most potent of the Russian bombers, but the fleet of
sixteen aircraft is worn out and the planes need both maintenance and
modernization.
The plan is that the manufacturer of the Tu-160 bomber, Tupolev’s

Kazan Aircraft Plant (KAZ,) will both refurbish the present fleet and
also produce 30–50 new modernized versions of Blackjack, called Tu-
160M2. The plan is not only ambitious economically, it is also a
military-industrial challenge: production at KAZ ceased in 1992, and
the Soviet production chains no longer exist.106 Deputy Defense
Minister Yuri Borisov said, in April 2017, that Tu-160s will remain in
service until the arrival of the new Tu-160M2s. 107 News that the first
Tu-160M2 airframe had reached final assembly at KAZ is not entirely
convincing.108 The first upgraded Tu-160M2 bombers are expected to
be built and delivered in the early 2020s.109
The old turbo-prop Tu-95MS Bear bomber, Russia’s answer to the

vintage US B-52 Stratofortress, is still operational. IISS’s “Military
Balance 2017” reports Moscow still wields 60 Tu-95 Bear aircraft in a
few slightly different configurations.110
Russia lacks a strategic ground-attack aircraft that would be

comparable to the United States’ B-2 Spirit stealth bomber. Plans have
been delayed for a new strategic bomber—for now, known as the
PAK-DA. This aircraft will be built with significantly improved low-
observability features and primarily replace the Tu-95 Bear. First
flight can be expected in 2025–2026, with initial production starting a
few years later.111 Given that the plans for the B-21 Raider, a US
successor to the B-2, are well advanced, it is likely that the United
States will be able to maintain overwhelming superiority in
penetrating strategic bombers.
Russia has used its strategic bombers for political signaling for more
than a decade, testing the readiness of the air forces of potential
adversaries around the world. This should not be interpreted as a
typical operational pattern in areas where they cannot fly uncontested.
This has largely been the case in Syria, where the Russian air force has
been able to test new weapons systems, including smart bombs and
cruise missiles.
Recognizing the operational limits of Russia’s strategic bombers to

penetrate strongly defended airspace, Russia increasingly sought to
circumvent the problem by making a sustained effort to develop new
air-launched long-range cruise missiles (ALCM), which could be
safely launched from deep within Russian territory. In addition,
Russia may reduce its aircraft’s vulnerability to being wiped out on the
ground by keeping them airborne in times of high tension.
This strategic choice evidently has borne fruit, as static objects in the
whole of Europe and parts of the US can now be targeted from safe
distances. The chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General
Valery Gerasimov, pointed out, in November 2017, that Russia is now

able to strike targets with cruise missiles up to a distance of 4,000
kilometers.112
Increasing the range of the cruise missiles simply requires more fuel.
This has been accomplished in various ways, such as making the
missiles bigger or fitting them with external fuel tanks. In addition,
more reliable navigation and homing systems are needed. The
performance of Russian cruise missiles used in combat in Syria has
been likened to that of the US Tomahawk cruise missiles used during
Operation Desert Storm, in 1991.113 The most powerful of Russia’s
new air-launched cruise missiles is the Kh-101, with a range of 4,500
kilometers, according to internationally respected Russian experts.114
The nuclear variant is called the Kh-102.
In early July 2017, President Putin praised the performance of Kh-101

cruise missiles used in Syria, saying they “showed a high degree of
reliability.” At the same time, the Russian defense ministry reported
that Russia’s Tu-95MS long-range bombers had struck Daesh (the
popular Arab name for the Islamic State) targets in Syria. The strikes
were made from a range of about 1,000 kilometers and marked the
sixth time that Russia has used the Kh-101 in combat, the ministry
said.115
The Kh-101 was developed over a long period of time to replace the
Kh-55 (AS-15 Kent), a Soviet/Russian ALCM. It has a low radar
signature and is equipped with a terrain avoidance system. An opto-
electronic flight correction system is used instead of a radio altimeter.
Stealth features, better resistance against jamming, flying at low
altitudes to avoid radars, and hiding behind terrain all contribute to
the Kh-101’s ability to defeat enemy defenses.
The Kh-101 uses the Russian GLONASS satellite navigation system

for trajectory correction, which enables more complicated route
planning, including flights over featureless terrain. The missile is

reported to have an accuracy of five to six meters.
Kh-101 can be equipped with a high-explosive, penetrating, or cluster

warhead. The conventional warhead contains 400 kilograms of
explosives. The nuclear warhead of the Kh-102 is thought have a yield
of 250 kilotons.
The Kh-101 is integrated with the Tu-160 (twelve missiles) and the
Tu-95MS16 (eight missiles). 116 The weapon can be dropped at aircraft
altitudes, between 3,000 meters and 12,000 meters. The medium-
range Tu-22M3/5 bomber is likely to receive a smaller ALCM.117
Russian experts argue that the new Kh-101 ALCM is a more potent
weapon than the Boeing AGM-86 ALCM carried by the B-52s. That
may very well be true. Had the General Dynamics/Raytheon
Advanced Cruise Missile AGM-129 not been retired in 2012, the
situation may have been different.118
The Basics of Russia’s Nuclear Doctrine
The massive nuclear buildup described above is not happening in a

vacuum, but is based on first principles guiding Russia’s military and
security policy. This is where nuclear doctrine, part of military
doctrine, enters. According to a long tradition, Russia’s full nuclear
doctrine remains secret. Nonetheless, it is known that the doctrine has
gone through many twists and turns during the last few decades, as it
has been revised and developed to suit present policies. And
throughout this time, Russian military planners have not forgotten the
Soviet legacy has not been forgotten.
Interviews by Pentagon consultants with former Soviet key officials in

the early 1990s revealed key features regarding the Soviet nuclear
doctrine in 1965–1985, also disclosing several potentially dangerous
misunderstandings.119 Although the US had repeatedly declared its
nuclear strategy to be based on deterrence, the interviewed Russian

professionals stressed that they did not believe that. From their point
of view, the US strategy evidently was consistent with preparations for
a first strike. Russia’s own nuclear doctrine was built on this premise.
According to the Russian professionals, the development of the highly

accurate MIRVed MX/Peacekeeper missile was one such sign of
Washington’s emphasis on a first strike.120 The relative vulnerability
of the US ICBM fields (silos and control centers) to ground bursts,
was another. The Russians found out through realistic field tests
performed in Semipalatinsk in 1964–1966 that ground bursts were
extremely effective at destroying silo-based ICBM systems and their
command centers. The charges used were evidently quite high but did
not exceed the blast energy effect of a 500-kiloton nuclear warhead.
Any ground burst closer than one kilometer away was highly likely to
“kill” a silo-based missile system.121 Having understood this, the
Russians began planning road-mobile ICBM missile systems as well
as hardening silos.
Other signs of US preparations for a nuclear first-strike were the large

and varied arsenal of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe,
Washington’s refusal to publicly adopt a no-first-use doctrine, and
finally the deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles. Ground- and
sea-launched cruise missiles were thought to be capabilities sought to
target the Soviet leadership itself in a surprise nuclear first strike. The
US Presidential Directive PD-59 was seen in this context.122 Similar
thinking, unfortunately, seems to be resurfacing again in the current
debate.
Soviet strategists considered the nuclear balance between the Soviet

Union and the States to be unstable. The only truly stable nuclear
situation was one in which one side had clear superiority over the
other. The imbalance had to be in Soviet’s favor. Therefore,
throughout this period, the Soviets attempted to gain strategic
superiority over the US, the primary goal not being to ensure victory
in a nuclear war, but to ensure the general security of the Soviet

leadership and the preservation of Soviet influence in Europe and
around the globe.123 The military leadership considered winning a
nuclear war unattainable in any meaningful sense; thus, they believed
nuclear war should be avoided at all cost.
The perception of the utility of nuclear weapons changed gradually,

in parallel with the evolution of these weapons. A brief but useful
summary of the changing Soviet nuclear doctrine was given, in 1991,
by Colonel General Andrian Danilevich: The period of “Nuclear
euphoria” between 1960 and 1965 was followed by “Descent to Earth”
and ICBMs in 1965–1975, and finally “Strategic Balance” during
1975–1991.124 Thus, in the early 1960s, it was thought that the
importance of nuclear weapons almost made all other weapons
superfluous. But with the ouster of Khrushchev, in late 1964,
conservatism and realism returned, together with the realization that
the main enemy of the Soviet Union possessed large numbers of
nuclear weapons capable of inflicting “unrecoverable losses.” A
clearer appreciation of the devastating consequences of a full-scale
nuclear exchange began to emerge. In a 1972 nuclear exercise 1972,
Soviet leaders were presented with the results of a simulated US first
strike using ground bursts against the Soviet Union. They were
horrified.125
At first, Soviet policy was to respond with a full nuclear attack to even
a single hit; but in the early 1970s, this policy was rejected. A more
“controllable way of conduct of nuclear war” was called for. This led
to doctrinal changes. Preemptive strikes were rejected as the only
option, and retaliatory strikes gained in importance. The military
situation was defining the preferred scenario of nuclear use, either
global or regional. The course of war itself was expanded to four
stages: a non-nuclear phase, a nuclear phase, follow-up actions and
concluding actions. The most important ingredient was the gradual
lengthening of the non-nuclear phase from hours to one week. With
Marshal Ogarkov as chief of the General Staff from 1977 onwards, the
conventional phase of war gained even more emphasis. The

operational planning assumed that the first frontal operations would
remain non-nuclear up through the advance to the Rhine.126
Rough parity in strategic systems characterized the period from 1975

to 1991. Until 1980, limited nuclear war was still officially rejected, but
it was considered possible to conduct conventional war from
beginning to end. A clear change of principle took place between 1980
and 1985. Limited nuclear war was now accepted in documents and
in planning options offered to the political leadership. The options
included nuclear use on the battlefield, against military targets, in
limited strategic strikes, as well as proportional retaliation for enemy
limited strikes.127
In the last five to six years before the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, a defensive nuclear doctrine was adopted. This, according to
General Danilevich, was based on the realization that a nuclear war
could not be won. Even a retaliatory strike with just 10 percent of the
strategic nuclear inventory that had survived an enemy first strike
would be enough to “put out of commission all elements of the
viability of a state and put that state to death.” Large-scale use of the
enormous nuclear inventories available toward the end of the Cold
War was inconceivable, as the aftermath of a first strike would have
brought “irreversible changes in the world’s ecology.” As a result, a
large-scale nuclear exchange “came to be perceived as the death of
civilization and the death of the Soviet Union.”128
General Danilevich’s description of the thinking within the Soviet

General Staff implies that the military was not opposed to negotiations
of nuclear reductions in principle but had major misgivings about the
INF and START treaties, which they found deeply unfair to Russia.
“Gorbachev talked about total reductions, but we in the GS [General

Staff] did not think this would really happen. […] We came from the
premise that an acceptable level compatible with mutual deterrence
should be found. We still maintain that nuclear weapons should be

preserved as an element of deterrence, given the real possibility of the
appearance of nuclear arsenals among third countries.” Danilevich
also called for “finding ways to use nuclear weapons so as to give them
a role in deterrence, but also the role of a strategic military factor, a
factor in armed conflict.”
Escalate to Deescalate
In 2011, Russian defense expert Andrei Kokoshin formulated the

basic challenge of nuclear doctrinal:129
The nuclear deterrence concept has a deep internal contradiction.

On the one hand, it is aimed to minimize the likelihood of a war
by making it abysmally destructive. For this purpose, the state
must have the nuclear forces that provide for annihilation of the
adversary and infliction of irreparable damage to the enemy even
if such a state is exposed to a first nuclear strike. On the other
hand, in order to attain deterrence, it is necessary to make the
threat of use of nuclear weapons credible and convincing.
Senior US nuclear experts published a thorough report, “A New

Nuclear Review for a New Age,” in April 2017. In that report, Russia’s
present nuclear doctrine was described as follows:
Russian nuclear doctrine has undergone fundamental changes

since the end of the 1990s, with an increasing salience for nuclear
weapons. Open-source reports and testimony by US and NATO
officials indicate that Russia has developed an “escalate-to-
deescalate” or, more accurately, “escalate to win” nuclear strategy
that includes the possibility of nuclear first use in regional and
local conflicts in order to terminate a conflict on terms favorable
to Russia.130
US Secretary of Defense James Mattis reiterated this assessment, in

February 2018, in Congressional testimony, when he described the
Russian nuclear doctrine as “escalate to victory and then
deescalate.”131 This Russian doctrine is at the core of the debate of how
the West should best respond. As the interviews with key Soviet
military and defense officials in the early 1990s show, it should be kept
in mind that the declared doctrine may differ substantially from the
real doctrine. Referring to the respected Soviet bomb designer Yuri
Trutnev, Dr. Kokoshin pointed out this fact:132
As academician Yuri Trutnev rightfully observes, “a material basis

means the weapon system defines the doctrine that exists in
reality as opposed to the declared doctrine.” One vital condition
for conducting an effective national security policy is the absence
of a gap between what Trutnev defines as the real doctrines and
the declared doctrines.
Russia undoubtedly adheres to this policy. Its present nuclear

weapons programs fit this picture, as the capability gaps in suitable
hardware are obscured by empty declarations.133
The emphasis of the theoretical work on which the escalate to

deescalate doctrine rests, is clearly at the lower end of the spectrum of
nuclear use. Several important aims of this effort may be readily
identified.134 One is to find a formula for limited nuclear use in certain
scenarios, deemed to be sufficiently decoupled from major nuclear use
as to be worth employing without unduly high risk of escalation
beyond control or with catastrophic consequences. The other aim is
to erase the notion of a nuclear taboo, which only gains strength as
time passes. In July 2045, a full century may have elapsed without
nuclear weapons having been used in anger. A widely held perception
that nuclear weapons lack credibility altogether as tools in military
operations would evidently be unattractive for those who have
invested heavily in these weapons.
De-escalation as a concept began to develop within the Russian

military and nuclear communities in earnest in the 1990s. The role of
nuclear weapons in Russia’s future military policy was the subject of
serious study. The aim and purpose of this effort was to find ways to
expand the utility of nuclear weapons from a predominant deterrent
role to possible employment in military conflicts without risking
escalation to full-scale nuclear war. Several important publications
appeared in 1999.
A basic reference is the article by Major General V. I. Levshin, Colonel

A. V. Nedelin and Colonel (Professor) Mikhail E. Sosnovskiy, “On the
Use of Nuclear Weapons for the De-Escalation of Combat Actions” in
Voennaia Mysl’ in May 1999.135 Dr. Jacob W. Kipp identified this
original paper as a critical new element in the Russian approach to
war.136 Accordingly, the following draws heavily on Levshin et al. Key
quotes (bold face and italics inserted):
In accordance with the Fundamentals of the Military Doctrine of

the Russian Federation, a preemptive strike (any strike, not only
a nuclear one) aimed at thwarting an aggression being prepared
against Russia and its allies is absolutely inadmissible in any
situation and nuclear weapons (NW) represent primarily a
deterrent. Proceeding from this premise, nuclear weapons ought
to be regarded not only as a means for bringing about a decisive
rout of the adversary but also as a means for de-escalating military
operations if deterrence proves insufficiently effective and an
aggression takes place after all.
Implementing the de-escalation function implies practical

employment of NW both to demonstrate determination and
directly deliver nuclear strikes against the adversary. It is
expedient to deal with this objective by using non-strategic
nuclear weapons, primarily operational-tactical nuclear weapons
(OTNW), which may ward off a “landslide” escalation of nuclear
warfare up to the point where an exchange of massive nuclear
strikes occurs, delivered by strategic assets. In this case, as we see

it, the most acceptable thing for the adversary will be to stop
military operations.
Levshin et.al. thus suggest singling out the following stages of OTNW
employment buildup:
“demonstration”—delivery of single demonstrative nuclear

strikes against desert territories (or water areas), against the
adversary’s minor, sparsely manned military facilities or such
ones with no military personnel at all;
“intimidation-demonstration”—delivery of single nuclear

strikes at transport hubs, engineer installations and other targets
in order to localize an area of military operations in the territorial
sense, and/or at separate elements of an opposing enemy force,
against which strikes lead to a disruption (reduction of efficiency)
of control over an invading force at the operational (operational-
tactical) level and do not cause relatively high losses among the
enemy forces;
“intimidation”—delivery of multiple strikes against the main

enemy force in a single operational sector in order to change the
balance of forces in this sector and/or eliminate an enemy
breakthrough to the operational depth of defenses;
“intimidation-retaliation”—delivery of concentrated strikes at

enemy theater operations (TO) force groupings within the limits
of one or several adjacent operational sectors if a defense
operation takes an unfavorable turn. The following objectives are
due to be attained in the process: to remove the threat of a rout
facing a friendly force; to resolutely change the balance of forces
in an operational sector (sectors); to eliminate an enemy
breakthrough of a defensive line held by an operational-strategic

large unit, etc.;
“retaliation-intimidation”—delivery of a massed strike against

an aggressor’s armed forces grouping in theater operations (TO)
in order to rout it and achieve a radical change in the military
situation in one’s own favor;
“retaliation”—delivery of a massed strike (strikes) at the

adversary within the limits of an entire theater of war (if
necessary, involving an engagement of separate military-
economic targets of the aggressor), one characterized by the
maximum use of all available forces and assets and coordination
with strikes launched by the SNF [strategic nuclear forces], if these
are going to be employed.
The choice of a scale, on which to use OTNW, will depend on how

the situation shapes up at the moment of decision-making and
after the delivery of nuclear strikes. The initial employment is on
the basis of a decision adopted by the Supreme Commander-in-
Chief and only in accordance with a separate order (signal) issued
by the Defense Minister (General Staff).
If necessary, the decision to deliver subsequent nuclear strikes

may come from persons authorized by the Supreme Commander-
in-Chief, who operate within the framework of limitations as to
the number and types of assets to be employed and targets to be
engaged, which he has imposed. (Seemingly, the said persons
should not be lower in position than commanders of operational-
strategic large units; if operations are conducted in isolated
sectors [in separate cases], they should not be lower in position
than commanders of operational large units.) As the sixth stage in
the employment of OTNW is reached after the first massed
nuclear strike, the subsequent ones in individual cases may be
delivered by decision of lower-level chain of command, this

within the limits of their organic nuclear missile (NM) resources
and upon authorization by a higher-level commander (as we see
it, these persons should not be lower in position than
commanders of operational large units, or commanders of
operational-tactical large units).
The general rule is this: the lower the stage of OTNW employment,
the higher the command level adopting the decision to deliver each
particular nuclear strike.”
Of particular interest for the present escalate to deescalate debate are

the arguments presented by Levshin et al. concerning the use of a
single nuclear weapon for demonstration purposes:
In definite conditions, the delivery of single or multiple nuclear

strikes may be required at enemy targets located outside of the
zone of direct military operations in order to cause a de-escalation
of military operations. In this context, one ought to proceed from
objectives pursued: to effect containment at the regional level, it is
preferable to use OTNW, while at the global level (by intimidating
the adversary with our readiness to go as far as mutual
annihilation) it is possible to use operational-strategic and even
strategic NW.
In the latter case, the degree of impact and effectiveness of

engagement are things of lesser importance than the “test of
nerves.” The calculation is that the fear of assured destruction will
not permit the adversary to go over to employing strategic offensive
forces and will make him deescalate military operations. […]
The most acceptable type of weapon for this kind of impact may
be represented by sea-based long-range cruise missiles, which are
launched from nuclear-powered attack submarines, this fact
meaning that the strike will not involve strategic nuclear weapons.
Moreover, their low flight altitude and small radar cross section,
as well as the difficulty for the adversary to spot their possible
launch areas make for greater undetectability of strikes by
comparison with any other assets.
Reliance on other types of strategic nuclear weapons (SNW) for

delivering single or multiple strikes in order to cause a de-escalation
of military operations would lead to the detection of the Russian
nuclear assets as early as at the launch stage and increase the risk of the
adversary launching full-scale nuclear retaliation, particularly since a
decision to that effect will be adopted in a situation where time is in
dramatically short supply.
Thus, employing SNW to deliver single (or multiple) nuclear

strikes with a view to causing a de-escalation of military
operations is warranted only if there are definite guarantees that
the adversary will not regard these strikes as the beginning of a
large-scale nuclear attack designed to destroy his military and/or
military-economic potential.
Levshin et al.’s article was followed up by a few other equally detailed

accounts.137 But the window for open discussion closed by 1999 or so.
These papers still form the basis for Western perceptions of Russian
nuclear doctrine. While this useful early Russian debate gives insights
about the Russian process of rethinking the role of nuclear weapons
in theater, much remains opaque.138
Official doctrinal wordings are basically political statements. At the

release of Russia’s 2010 military doctrine, Secretary of the Security
Council of the Russian Federation, Nikolay Patrushev summed up the
nuclear doctrine:
When do we reserve the right to use nuclear weapons? In response

to the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction against the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as

in case of aggression against Russia using conventional weapons,
if there is a threat to the existence of the state itself, its territorial
integrity and inviolability.139
The Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOI observed, in

December 2016, that there has been no public change in the Russian
nuclear position at the doctrinal level.
The revised Military Doctrine 2014 has the same wording as was
previously used to explain Russia’s policy with respect to the use
of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 27 states: “The Russian Federation
reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the
utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass
destruction against it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of
aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of
conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is
under threat. The decision to utilize nuclear weapons is made by
the president of the Russian Federation.”140
Perhaps the first mention of the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons

for deterrence in official doctrinal documents is found in a
presidential decree on the “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the
Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the period
until 2030,” in July 2017.141 Section IV deals with “the Navy as an
Effective Instrument of Strategic Deterrence.” Whereas, Paragraph 37
addresses the role of non-strategic nuclear weapons:
37. During the escalation of military conflict, demonstration of

readiness and determination to employ non-strategic nuclear
weapons capabilities is an effective deterrent.
This is nearly an acknowledgement of the veracity of the escalate to

win doctrine. It is interesting to note how the chief of the General
Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, described the role of nuclear

deterrence in November 2017:
Nowadays, the Strategic Nuclear Forces can deliver drastic

damage against any aggressor, including one that possesses
missile defense systems. At the same time, there are foundations
laid for sustained growth of combat capabilities amid the limits
imposed by international treaties on arms control.
Non-nuclear deterrence forces have gained high momentum.

Over the last five years, the Armed Forces have made a
breakthrough in long-range high-precision weapons. Iskander-M
missile systems, [as well as] underwater and surface warships with
Kalibr missile systems are being supplied. Long-range aircraft are
being upgraded to operate the new Kh-101 cruise missile.142
General Gerasimov’s use of the term “non-nuclear” in this context is

misleading. A more appropriate term to use would be “dual-use,” as
only the nuclear option has real deterrence value. Given, that Western
perceptions of what constitutes acceptable loss in war, or particularly
in nuclear war, has reduced markedly since the Cold War, a rather
limited amount of land-based or sea-based operational-tactical
nuclear weapons would make a difference.
In the opinion of one seasoned Russian observer, Major General (ret.)

Vladimir Z. Dvorkin, “even the explosion of one powerful nuclear
bomb in a metropolis is inadmissible. I do not know how this problem
is looked at in China, but in the West damage at this level is now
considered unacceptable. Even one explosion is unacceptable, as a
result of which dozens or hundreds of thousands of people may
die.”143
Summary and Conclusions
Toward the end of the Cold War, US and Soviet leaders understood
that the enormous nuclear buildup had been a mistake. Presidents
Reagan and Gorbachev came to share a common view that “a nuclear
war cannot be won and must never be fought.” In addition, they
believed in the pursuit of a nuclear-free world.
The two leading nuclear powers started a bilateral process of real,

significant nuclear weapons reductions, which eventually brought
profound results. The nuclear stockpiles were reduced to only a small
fraction of the former inventories. The roles of nuclear weapons in the
military doctrines of both countries were reduced accordingly. For
nuclear arms control, the INF and START treaties were
groundbreaking, and both countries genuinely committed themselves
to the NPT, including its Article VI.
The turmoil after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the financial
bankruptcy of Russia created opportunities for nuclear arms control.
As successor to the Soviet Union, Russia assumed the responsibilities
and rights as a recognized nuclear weapons state. The 1990s were a
particularly difficult time. Russia’s armed forces, including the nuclear
forces and the nuclear community, were hit hard. Despite these
difficulties, Russian nuclear weapons laboratories, major missile
design bureaus and construction plants carried on their work and laid
the groundwork for a second coming.
These circles of conservative hardliners, including the military and

security sectors, received support when Vladimir Putin was elected
president. After the US left the ABM Treaty in 2002, Russia’s
immediate response was to declare that it no longer was bound by the
still unratified START II treaty, which forbid MIRVed ICBMs. The
Strategic Rocket Forces, traditionally the backbone of the
Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear deterrent, could again be developed
in full. The strategic element of the Navy, which had sunk into such a
sorry state that its whole existence was threatened, obtained a boost.
Work to restore capabilities lost in the INF Treaty was also started.
The treaty-limited shorter- and medium-range land-based missiles

had played a key part in the operational plans of the Soviet military in
the 1980s—not in an offensive role, as perceived in the West, but as a
deterrent against US/NATO first nuclear use in a large-scale
conventional war in Europe. Sacrificing these weapons was a hard
blow to the military, particularly because of the very asymmetric
reductions, more than 2:1 in favor of the United States.144
President Putin’s strongly worded landmark speech at the Munich

Security Conference in 2007 was a clear indication of Russia’s
intention to abandon the post–Cold War European security order,
built under the auspices of the OSCE and extending from “Vancouver
to Vladivostok.”
The United States and Russia still managed to conclude the New
START treaty, in 2010; but Moscow categorically rejected bilateral
negotiations with Washington on non-strategic nuclear weapons. The
US may prefer a world free from nuclear weapons—as President
Obama outlined in his speech in Prague in 2009—but for Russia, this
is unacceptable. Russia repeatedly declined US invitations for a
further round of strategic arms negotiations. After Obama’s last effort
in Berlin in 2013, Foreign Minister Lavrov responded that the time for
bilateral negotiations is over. From now on, the talks would be
multilateral, with all five NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states
participating. That put nuclear talks in limbo.
The nuclear policies of Russia and the United States have been
diametrically opposite for a decade. The US was committed to further
large-scale nuclear reductions and a reduced nuclear role. Only one
new nuclear weapon, the B61-12 nuclear bomb was in development.
Russia, on the other hand began to execute its ongoing massive

strategic and non-strategic forces rearmament program. Russia saw a
clear opportunity to use the US reluctance to invest more in nuclear
weapons, despite the fact that the US strategic triad was ageing. From
a Russian perspective, nuclear investments clearly were advantageous.
The US would have to follow suit sooner or later, but the heavy costs
of modernizing the US triad would diminish funds for development
of new and more capable conventional precision strike weapons, an
area where Russia could not compete seriously.
Russia’s introduction of new missile systems in all three legs of its

strategic triad is tilting the lifecycle comparison with the US triad in
Russia’s favor. The two are essentially out of step, and Russia may
think that this advantage should be utilized. While history never
repeats itself, some common features from the late 1970s can be
found.
The magnitude of Russia’s present strategic weapons programs clearly

indicates the potential for growth well beyond the New START treaty
limits.145 Russia’s economic possibilities to sustain all programs can,
however, be questioned.
Formally Russia remained within agreed New START treaty limits,

which took effect on February 5, 2018.146 The treaty itself, however,
facilitates creative accounting, which erodes the real substance of the
declared numbers. Russian officials and experts, some of them close
associates of the president, indicate that it is highly unlikely that New
START will be extended in 2021.147 One observer put it bluntly:
Russia has declared time and again since 2010 that it will not
accept new reductions in nuclear arms, including non-strategic
types, in a changing strategic environment and that the New
START treaty is more likely to be the last bilateral Russia-US
“grand treaty” on the limitation and reduction of the nuclear
arsenals.148
This Russian negative attitude toward extending New START is a

new, if not particularly surprising feature. Arms control has not been
a high priority on Russia’s political agenda for more than a decade.
One of the major long-term priorities of the Russian Armed Forces

has been to restore the capabilities lost following the implementation
of the INF Treaty. Since the early 2000s, Russia has wanted to step
away from the INF Treaty, at first through classic horse-trading with
the US, but that failed to produce the desired results. Meanwhile,
Russia’s development of new land-based ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles continued unabated. Some systems have already been
deployed in significant numbers, such as a dozen Iskander-M
brigades, consisting of both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.
Interestingly enough, the US has never accused Russia of an INF

Treaty breach related to the Iskander system. The reason is legal, not
technical. The US has not been able to detect a smoking gun—that is,
of Russia having tested either Iskander version to ranges in excess of
the allowed 500 kilometers. Undoubtedly, however, the maximum
range of both missiles is significantly higher; and the cruise missile
could likely fly to at least twice the allowed range.
On the other hand, the slightly larger land-based SSC-8 cruise missile
(9M729) is a clear treaty breach, although Russia denies this. On the
contrary, Russia claims to abide by the INF Treaty and, in its turn,
accuses the US of INF breaches.
The RS-26 Rubezh/Yars-M, essentially a strategic RS-24 Yars ICBM

minus one stage, has yet to be deployed. It evidently will assume the
same role as the famous SS-20, the Soviet flagship of the European-
theater weapons of the Cold War. The new missile is classified as an
ICBM, which may be one reason why Russia is uninterested in
extending the New START treaty.
The current “escalate to deescalate” debate touches upon the core of

these Russian developments. Yet, Russia vehemently denies that there
is any such Russian doctrine. This became quite clear at the Munich
Security Conference in February 2018. Former Russian ambassador
to the US, Sergey Kislyak tried to blur Russia’s real position and only
reiterated a few sentences from the 2014 Military doctrine.149
Russia’s position on negative security guarantees, of special interest

for small countries in good standing committed to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, is troubling. Russia refuses to adopt the same
policy as the US—i.e. to assure all such states that it will never use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. Denmark and Norway
are examples of countries, which, in recent years, have received direct
nuclear threats from Russian ambassadors, for miniscule reasons.
Sweden, in turn, was the target of a simulated attack by Tu-22M3
Backfire bombers on Good Friday 2013.
Russia has pursued a very determined nuclear policy during President

Putin’s era. The general conditions for sustaining Russia’s role as a
leading nuclear power were extremely challenging after the breakup
of the Soviet Union. A crucially important political decision was made
in 2007–2008, when Russia finally discarded President Gorbachev’s
view and ambition to pursue a policy with a nuclear-weapon-free
world as the final goal.
The Russian nuclear rearmament program has been surprisingly

successful. For all practical purposes, Russia has now restored almost
everything that was lost because of Gorbachev. It is prudent to assume
that there are nuclear weapons available for the whole spectrum of
distances, starting from the 152 mm nuclear artillery grenade to very
long intercontinental ranges. The yields of the nuclear charges
likewise encompass a full spectrum, starting from mini-nukes with a
few tens of tons TNT equivalent yields to multi-megaton yields of
some ICBM warheads. On the sub-strategic level, Russia has restored
a whole triad.150 All major services are able to operate non-strategic
nuclear weapons. It is, however, fair to say that Russia’s non-strategic

nuclear warheads are still stored at central storage sites. 151
Nuclear arms control has long served Russia well. Its main opponent,
the United States, remained committed to President Reagan’s policy
toward a world without nuclear weapons for three decades and, more
importantly, has continuously diminished its reliance on nuclear
weapons in its defense policy.
Meeting with US President Donald Trump in Helsinki, in July 2018,

President Putin suggested that the New START treaty should be
extended to 2026 and reaffirmed Russia’s commitment to uphold the
INF treaty.152 There are reasons to doubt both, as there were no firm
commitments to resume START negotiations with a clear aim of new
reduction goals. Russia’s record regarding upholding the INF Treaty
also lacks credibility. Russia evidently believes it has the upper hand
and will be able to negotiate from a position of strength. Only time
will tell.
Notes
1
Forss, Stefan: “Yhdysvaltain ydinasepolitiikka” (US Nuclear Policy), Finnish
National Defence University, Deparment of Strategic and Defence Studies,
Publication Series 2, No. 34, 2006. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral James A. Winnefield Jr. pointed out, “at the end of the Cold War, many felt
that the international system had evolved to the point where a nuclear deterrent was
obsolete.” House of the Armed Services Committee Hearing on NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, June 25, 2015, p.7,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-114hhrg95318/pdf/CHRG-
114hhrg95318.pdf.
2
Eli Corin, “Presidential Nuclear Initiatives: An Alternative Paradigm for Arms
Control,” NTI, March 1, 2004, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/presidential-
nuclear-initiatives/.
3
UNODA, “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Text of
the Treaty,” https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text.
4
Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union,” January 25, 1984, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205.
5
CTBTO, “STORY: Gorbachev on Reykjavik and Nuclear Weapons Today,”
September 12, 2012,
ftp://ftp.ctbto.org/Reykjavik_Press_Kit/VIDEO/Shotsheet_Gorbachev_soundbites_
cutaways_final.pdf.
6
George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World
Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007,
(https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116787515251566636). For a summary, see George
P. Shultz, “The War That Must Never Be Fought,” The Hoover Institution, March
12, 2015, https://www.hoover.org/research/war-must-never-be-fought-0.
7
Barack Obama, “Remarks By President Barack Obama In Prague As Delivered”,
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, April 05, 2009,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-
obama-prague-delivered.
8
Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, “Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead
Inventories 1945-2017,” https://fas.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/history2017.jpg. See also Global Affairs Press, “Status of
World Nuclear Forces 2017,” February 28, 2017,
https://globalaffairspressdotcom.wordpress.com/2017/02/28/status-of-world-
nuclear-forces-2017/.
9
U.S. Department of State, “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The
Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-
Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty),” Bureau of Arms Control,
Verification and Compliance, (https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm,
accessed February 21, 2018). A total of 2,926 missiles were eliminated, 866 for U.S.
and 1826 for the USSR. SIPRI Yearbook 2007: Armaments, Disarmament, and
International Security. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. p. 683.
10
Terence Neilan, “Bush Pulls Out of ABM Treaty; Putin Calls Move a Mistake”,
The New York Times, December 13, 2001,
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/13/international/bush-pulls-out-of-abm-treaty-
putin-calls-move-a-mistake.html.
11
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Policy Concept of
the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir
Putin on November 30, 2016),” December 1, 2016, § 27 g,

12
Wade Boese, “U.S. Withdraws From ABM Treaty; Global Response Muted,” Arms
Control Today, July/August 2002, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-
08/abmjul_aug02.
13
The Warsaw Reflection Group Report, “Arms Control Revisited: Non-
proliferation and Denuclearization,” The Polish Institute of International Affairs,
Warsaw, November 20–21, 2008, https://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=2941.
14
Private information from an advisor to the UN Secretary General, April 4, 2016.
15
Stefan Forss, “Rysslands problematiska ställning som kärnvapenstormakt”
(Russia’s problematic position as nuclear superpower), Proceedings of the Royal
Swedish Academy of War Sciences, No. 3, 1997, pp. 59–84.
16
Ibid. See also, Glen M. Segell, “European Security and the Russian Duma,” Journal
of Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2002, pp. 75–84.
17
Carl Bildt and Radek Sikorski, “Next, the Tactical Nukes,” New York Times,
February 1, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/opinion/02iht-edbildt.html.
Mr Bildt spoke at the Paris Summit. In a private mail, the late French nuclear expert,
Professor Thérèse Delpech soon reported: “What I can tell you, is that the Russians
were furious.”
18
President Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate
-- Berlin, Germany,” June 19, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-
germany.
19
Sputnik International, “Nuclear Arms Reduction Deals To Become Multilateral,”
June 22, 2013, https://sputniknews.com/world/20130622181811968-Nuclear-Arms-
Reduction-Deals-to-Become-Multilateral--Lavrov/.
20
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Foreign Policy
Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian
Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016),” December 1, 2016, § 27 f,
21
The Finnish moderator at the event at the Finnish National Defence University,
Colonel Heikki Hult challenged general Ivashov: “With all due respect, Sir, but what
about the Korean War, the Berlin crisis, and particularly the Cuban missile crisis of
1962?” Ivashov did not answer.
22
Arms Control Association, “The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on
Tactical Nuclear Weapons at a Glance,” Fact Sheets & Briefs, July 2017,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance.
23
Arms Control Association, “The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on
Tactical Nuclear Weapons at a Glance,” Fact Sheets & Briefs, July 2017,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pniglance.
24
Igor Sutyagin, “Atomic Accounting – A New estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic
Nuclear Forces” RUSI Occasional Paper, November 2012, p. 53,
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf.
25
Ibid.
26
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Missile Troops and Artillery,”
http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/ground/structure/rvia.htm (accessed 3
December 2017).
27
Igor Sutyagin, “Atomic Accounting – A New estimate of Russia’s Non-Strategic
Nuclear Forces.”
28
Vek, "NATO's Expansion and Russia's Security," Viktor Mikhailov, Igor
Andryushin, Alexander Chernyshev; 20 September 1996. See also, C. Austin Reams,
“Russia’s Atomic Czar: Viktor N. Mikhailov,” Center for International Security
Affairs Los Alamos National Laboratory, LA-UR-97-234, December 1996, pp. 16-17,
http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/28/077/28077312.
pdf.
29
Oleg Odnokolenko, “Russian Hawks Are Heard in Europe,” Segodnya, December
17, 1999, pp. 1, 3; Defence and Security, No. 150, 22 December 1999.
30
Nikolai Zlobin, “A close look at Russia’s leaders: Meeting Putin and Ivanov,” The
Defense Monitor 33, No. 5 (September–October 2004).
31
George P. Shultz, Steven P. Andreasen, Sidney D. Drell, James Goodby,
“Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons (complete
report),” Hoover Institution, August 6, 2009, p. 147. See also: Hubert Wetzel,
Demetri Sevastopulo, and Guy Dinmore, “Russia confronted Rumsfeld with threat
to quit key nuclear treaty,” https://www.ft.com/content/97c0ab8c-9013-11d9-9a51-
00000e2511c8, March 8, 2005. See also: STRATFOR, “Geopolitical diary: A polite
meeting about missiles,” https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/geopolitical-diary-
polite-meeting-about-missiles. Aug 29, 2006. See also: Nikolai Sokov, “Russia
military debates withdrawal from the INF Treaty,” October 2006. See also: Pavel
Podvig, “Russia wants to pull out of the INF Treaty,” August 25, 2006,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2006/08/russia_wants_to_pull_out_of_th.shtml.
32
Sputnik News, “Scrapping Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles a Mistake – Ivanov –
1,” February 7, 2007, https://sputniknews.com/russia/2007020760350944/.
33
Russian President Vladimir Putin, “Transcript: Putin’s prepared remarks at 43rd
Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Washington Post, December 2, 2007
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html (accessed December 3,
2017).
34
U.S. Department of State Archive, Office of the Spokesman, “Joint U.S.–Russian
statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly,” Oct. 25, 2007,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94141.htm and Vitaly I. Churkin,
“Statement by Vitaly I. Churkin, the Russian Federation’s Permanent Representative
to the UN, in the UN General Assembly’s first committee introducing the joint
Russian – United States statement on the INF Treaty,” Oct. 25, 2007,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/j.ctt3fh15z.16.pdf.
35
The arguments presented follow two lines: suspicion of deployment of offensive
arms in the BMD launchers, and fear of BMD eroding Russia’s nuclear deterrent,
strongly refuted by Russia’s leading missile designers and professionals. President
Putin: “if this missile [defense] system is put in place, it will work automatically with
the entire nuclear capability of the United States. It will be an integral part of the
U.S. nuclear capability.” President of Russia, “Interview with newspaper journalists
from G8 member countries, June 4, 2007,”
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24313. Yuri Solomonov, Chief
missile designer: “It is becoming obvious now that all that ballyhoo over the US
missile shield in Europe is just another bluff.” “US ballistic missile shield for Europe:
between propaganda and real threats,” Radio Voice of Russia, June 6, 2013, n.l. Dr.
Alexey Arbatov mentions several Russian top missile experts concurring. Alexei
Arbatov, “Strategic Dialogue: A Change of Priorities,” Carnegie Moscow Center,

December 10, 2013, http://carnegie.ru/2013/12/10/strategic-dialogue-change-of-
priorities/h1ht#. See also, “US missile shield unable to repel massive Russian ICBM
attack – chief of strategic missile forces,” RT, December 16, 2015,
https://www.rt.com/news/326121-us-missile-shield-russian-icbm/.
36
President of Russia, “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry Board”,
December 22, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56472.
37
“Russia to compensate for INF losses with Iskander system,” Sputnik International
(former RIA Novosti), November 14, 2007,
https://sputniknews.com/russia/2007111488066432/.
38
Roger McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll, “Russia in the Precision-Strike regime –
military theory, procurement and operational impact,” Nowegian Defence Research
Establishment (FFI), August 1, 2017, p. 17 https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/17-
00979.pdf.
39
President of Russia, “Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation,”
November 5, 2008, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/1968.
40
Sergei Balmasov, “Russia shows Iskander Missile systems to NATO,” Pravda,
December 17, 2010, http://www.pravdareport.com/russia/politics/17-12-
2010/116249-iskander-0/.
41
Johan Norberg and Fredrik Westerlund, ”Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016,” in
Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016 (Gudrun Persson, ed.),
The Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOI), December 2016, pp.53-54,
https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4326--SE.
42
Alexander Bondar, “Oruzhie v Umelykh Rukakh,” Krasnaya Zvezda, November
23, 2017, http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/35173-oruzhie-v-
umelykh-rukakh. See also Russian Defense Policy Blog, “Iskander-M in
Kaliningrad,” November 27, 2017,
https://russiandefpolicy.blog/2017/11/27/iskander-m-in-kaliningrad/ and Live
Journal, “152nd gvardeiskaya raketnaya brigda v Kaliningrade poluchilia raketnye
kompleksy ‘Iskander-M,’” Nov. 25, 2017,
https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2970466.html.
43
“Russian ground forces to be fully rearmed with ballistic Iskander-M missiles by
late 2020,” TASS, May 24, 2017 http://tass.com/defense/947360.
44
For a good general technical description, see MilitaryRussia.ru, “Комплекс 9К720
Искандер - SS-26 STONE,” http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-816.html.
45
Johan Norberg and Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016.” See also
World Daily News, “Russia wants to increase the Iskander-M missile range,” World
Daily News, May 23, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uH9pcDbLKSM.
46
“9K720 Iskander - SS-26 STONE,” Military Russia, 2014,
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-817.html.
47
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “Zapad 2017: Iskander-K Tactical
Ballistic Missile System launched a missile during active phase of drills (Leningrad
Region),”
http://eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/ground/media/photo/gallery.htm?id=45272@c
msPhotoGallery.
48
The nominal range for the ballistic missile Iskander-M is estimated to be about
700 kilometers. The range of the cruise missile is 1,500–2,000 kilometers. A rule of
thumb used by FOI is that operational ranges are about two thirds of nominal
ranges. For a technical assessment of the ballistic missile Iskander-M, see Stefan
Forss: “The Russian Operational-Tactical Iskander Missile System,” The Finnish
National Defence University, Department of Strategic and Defence Studies, Series 4:
Working Papers No 42, 2012,
https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/84362/StratL4_42w.pdf.
49
Pavel Podvig, “The INF Treaty culprit identified. Now what?” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces Blog, December 5, 2017,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/the_inf_treaty_culprit_identif.shtml.
50
Roger McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll 2017, p. 12,
https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/17-00979.pdf.
51
The U.S. Department of State, “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” July 2014, p.
8, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf.
52
Michael R. Gordon, “Russia Deploys Missile, Violating Treaty and Challenging
Trump,” February 14, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/world/europe/russia-cruise-missile-arms-
control-treaty.html.
53
Dave Majumdar, “Novator 9M729: The Russian Missile that Broke INF Treaty’s
Back?” The National Interest, December 7, 2017,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/novator-9m729-the-russian-missile-
broke-inf-treatys-back-23547.
54
Mikhail Barabanov, “Esho o razvertyvanii Rossei krylatyx raket 9M729,” (More on
the deployment of cruise missiles 9M729), CAST bmpd Blog, February 17, 2017
(https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2438303.html)
55
Semen Kabakaev, “Russia Deploys Banned Missile and Brags about It,” The
Atlantic Council Blog, May 10, 2017,
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/russia-deploys-banned-missile-
and-brags-about-it. See also Military Update, “Kalibr NK: The Russian Cruise
Missile - That Shocked the World,” October 13, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dtMDmTcW00Y. The video is interesting as it
also shows an animation of a land-based Kalibr system, possibly similar to the
system the US claims is prohibited by the INF.
56
See Barabanov “Esho o razvertyvanii Rossei krylatyx raket 9M729.” See Dave
Majumdar, “Novator 9M729: The Russian Missile that Broke INF Treaty’s Back?”
FAS researcher Hans Kristensen, however, tries to give the opposite impression
from a simple small deletion in an intelligence report. See Hans M. Kristensen,
“NASIC Removes Russian INF-Violating Missile From Report,” Federation of the
American Scientists, Strategic Security Blog, August 22, 2017
(https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/08/nasic-2017-corrected/.
57
See Norberg and Westerlund,” Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016.”
58
Ibid., p. 40.
59
Ibid.
60
Roman Azanov, “Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces as its decisive defense,” TASS,
December 19, 2017, http://tass.com/defense/981811. See also Mark Schneider,
“Additional Russian Violations of Arms Control Agreements,” RealClearDefense,
December 18, 2017,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/12/18/additional_russian_violation
s_of_arms_control_agreements_112795.html.
61
Pavel Podvig, “More news about the RS-26 missile,” The Russian Strategic Forces
Blog, December 18, 2013,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/more_news_about_rs-26_missile.shtml.
62
Pavel Podvig, “RS-26 missile is tested and ready for deployment,” The Russian
Strategic Forces Blog, March 26, 2015,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/more_news_about_rs-26_missile.shtml. See
also Interfax, “Razrabotka strategicheskoi raket’ RS-26 – odin iz otvetnykhh shagov
na rasvertyvanie PRO SshA – istotchnik v Minoborony’ RF” (Developing strategic
missile RS-26 - one of the reciprocal steps to the deployment of US missile defense -
source in the Russian Defense Ministry),
63
Pavel Podvig, “Russia tests new prototype of ICBM,” The Russian Strategic Forces
Blog, May 23, 2012,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/05/russia_tests_prototype_of_a_ne.shtml.
64
Pavel Podvig, “New ICBM tested in Kapustin Yar,” The Russian Strategic Forces
Blog, October 24, 2012,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/10/new_icbm_tested_in_kapustin_ya.shtml.
65
Aleksandr Golts, “Russia’s Rubezh Ballistic Missile Disappears off the Radar,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 27, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/russias-
rubezh-ballistic-missile-disappears-off-the-radar/.
66
See Gudrun Persson, ed., “Russia’s Armed Forces in 2016.”
67
“Russia’s latest rocket and artillery systems,” TASS, November 20, 2017,
http://tass.com/defense/976431.
68
See Stefan Forss, “The Russian Operational-Tactical Iskander Missile System.” See
also Viktor Myasnikov, “Full reverse,” Defense & Security, No. 131, November 23,
2007, http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/12998773.
69
Tom Demerly, “Russia Test Fires New Kh-47M2 Kinzhal Hypersonic Missile,”
The Aviatonist, March 12, 2018, https://theaviationist.com/2018/03/12/russia-test-
fires-new-kh-47m2-kinzhal-hypersonic-missile/.
70
Dave Majumdar, “Russia: New Kinzhal Aero-Ballistic Missile Has 3,000 km Range
if Fired from Supersonic Bomber,” The National Interest, July 18, 2018,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-new-kinzhal-aero-ballistic-missile-has-
3000-km-range-if-fired-supersonic-bomber.
71
Pavel Podvig, “Typhoon submarines decommissioned,” The Russian Strategic
Forces Blog, April 29, 2004,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2004/04/typhoon_submarines_decommissio.shtml.
72
Military Russia, “RT-2PM2, RS-12M1 / RS-12M2 Topol-M - SS-27 SICKLE-B /
STALIN,” January 7, 2018, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-894.html.
73
U.S. Department of State, “Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms (START II),” January 3, 1993,
https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102887.htm#treatytext. Reference: Article I, para
4(b) & 4 (c).
74
Military Russia, “RS-24 Yars / Topol-MR - SS-X-29 / SS-29 / SS-27 mod.2
SICKLE-B,” September 23, 2017, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-430.html.
75
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, ”Russian nuclear forces, 2017,” The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73:2, 2017, pp. 115 – 126,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1290375.
76
Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, in President of Russia, “Expanded Meeting of
the Defence Ministry Board,” December 22, 2017,
77
Roman Azanov, “TASS highlights the Strategic Missile Force’s modern combat
potential and its prospects,” TASS, December 19, 2017,
http://tass.com/defense/981811. Past history indicates that annual production goals
may not be achieved. An educated guess is that production in 2018 may be about
half of that announced.
78
Pavel Podvig, Strategic Rocket Forces,” The Russian Strategic Forces Blog, June 22,
2017, http://russianforces.org/missiles/.
79
Private information from Dr. Gunnar Arbman, Research Director, The Swedish
Defence Research Agency (FOI), October 11, 2004. The Russian designers were
particularly pleased that they were able to squeeze a nuclear charge into the 152 mm
artillery round, thereby beating their American colleagues with 3 millimeters.
Academician Yevgeny Avrorin confirmed this in an interview in 2013. See Российское
атомное сообщество (Russian Atomic Energy Community), Академик Евгений
Николаевич Аврорин: “Наука — это то, что можно сделать, а техническая
наука — это то, что нужно сделать” (Academician Yevgeny Nikolaevich Avrorin:
“Science is what can be done, and technical science is what needs to be done”), April
10, 2013, http://www.atomic-energy.ru/interviews/2013/04/10/41068.
80
A heavy ICBM has a launch weight larger than 106 metric tons and a throw-
weight larger than 4.35 tons. See U.S. Department of State, “START TREATY
DEFINITIONS ANNEX -TERMS AND THEIR DEFINITIONS,”

https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/27362.pdf.
81
“Istochnik Pervyi Polk s Raketnoi ‘Sarmat’ Dolzhen Zastupit' Na Boeovoye
Dezhurstvo v 2021 Godu” (“Source: The First Regiment With a Rocket ‘Sarmat’
Should Enter Combat Duty in 2021”), TASS, March 29, 2018, http://tass.ru/armiya-
i-opk/5076963.
82
“PC-28 / OCD Sarmat rocket 15A28 - SS-X-30,” MilitaryRussia.ru, March 31,
2018 http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-435.html.
83
President of Russia, “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly”, March 1,
2018, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957.
84
Yuri Avdeev, “V oboime – ‘Sarmat’, ‘Kinzhal’, ‘Avangard,’ ” Krasnaia Zvezda,
March 12, 2018, http://redstar.ru/index.php/newspaper/item/36438-v-obojme-
sarmat-kinzhal-avangard; “SS-30 ?? / RS-28 / 15A28 Sarmat New Heavy ICBM,”
GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ss-30.htm.
85
The accuracy of Soviet/Russian strategic missiles is generally believed to have been
lower than that of comparable US strategic missiles. Therefore, Moscow used
comparatively higher-yield warheads to ensure destruction of the designated target.
As missile accuracy has improved, the same effect on target can be achieved with
lower-yield warheads.
86
Franz-Josef Gady, “Russia Completes Ejection Tests of RS-28 Sarmat ICBM,” The
Diplomat, July 20, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/russia-completes-
ejection-tests-of-rs-28-sarmat-icbm/; “PC-28 / OCD Sarmat rocket 15A28 - SS-X-30
(draft),” Military Russia, March, 31, 2018, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-
435.html. See also “Russia's RS-28 Sarmat ICBM: Hypersonic Disaster for US
Missile Defense Shield,” Sputnik News, May 4, 2017,
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201705041053289933-russia-sarmat-us-missile-
defense/.
87
“Russia completes work on Avangard hypersonic missile system,” TASS, July 19,
2018, http://tass.com/defense/1014104.
88
Stefan Forss, ”Rysslands kärnvapenstyrkor,“ (Russia’s nuclear forces), FOI
Strategiskt Forum, No. 7, January 2001. According to Jane’s Fighting Ships 1999–
2000, Russia had only 17 SSBNs operational, a decline by almost ten in 1–2 years. In
addition, there were 27 SSGNs and SSNs capable of firing nuclear SS-N-21 Sampson
(S-10 Granat) cruise missiles and SS-N-19 Shipwreck (P-700 Granit) missiles. Harri
Tielinen, “Ryska marinen och dess framtidsperspektiv,” (The Russian Navy and Its
Future Prospects), FOA Strategiskt forum för säkerhetspolitik och omvärldsanalys,
No.3. May 1998, The Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOA), Stockholm.
For 2017, the corresponding numbers are 13 SSBNs and 26 SSGNs and SSNs. IISS,
“Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia,” The Military Balance 2017, p. 213,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271211.
89
Ibid.
90
Harri Tielinen, “Ryska marinen och dess framtidsperspektiv.”
91
Stefan Forss, ”Rysslands kärnvapenstyrkor.“
92
John Pike, “R-29RMU / R-29RGU / RSM-54 Sineva / SS-N-23 SKIFF,” Global
Security, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/r29rmu.htm.
93
Pavel Podvig, “Liner SLBM explained,” Russian strategic nuclear forces, Blog,
October 4, 2011 http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/10/liner_slbm_explained.shtml
and “Liner version of the R-29RM SLBM accepted for service,” April 2, 2014,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/04/liner_version_of_the_r-29rm_sl.shtml.
94
“VMF Rossii prinyal na vooruzhenie raketny kompleks s MBR “Lainer,” Voenno-
Promyshlenniy Kourier, April 2, 2014, https://vpk-news.ru/news/19774.
95
Pavel Podvig, “Bulava missile test history,” Russian strategic nuclear forces Blog,
June 20, 2017, http://russianforces.org/navy/slbms/bulava.shtml.
96
Pavel Podvig, “Bulava is finally accepted for service,” Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces Blog, June 29, 2018,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/06/bulava_is_finally_accepted_for.shtml
97
Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia to Launch Its Most Powerful Ballistic Missile Sub in
November,” The Diplomat, October 31, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/russia-to-launch-its-most-powerful-ballistic-
missile-sub-in-november/. See also, Lukas Andriukaitis, “#MeanwhileInTheArctic:
Prince Vladimir Submarine Sets Sail,” AtlanticCouncil's Digital Forensic Research
Lab, November 27, 2017, https://medium.com/dfrlab/meanwhileinthearctic-prince-
vladimir-submarine-sets-sail-71cebd22f77d.
98
Pavel Podvig, “Strategic fleet.”
99
Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu, “Expanded Meeting of the Defence Ministry
Board,” December 22, 2017, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56472.
100
Lukas Andriukaitis, “#MeanwhileInTheArctic: Prince Vladimir Submarine Sets
Sail.”
101
Zachary Keck, “Russia's Nuclear Submarine Force Is Back (Maybe),” The
National Interest, November 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russias-
nuclear-submarine-force-back-maybe-23255?page=show.
102
Dave Majumdar, “The Russian Defense Ministry Is Showing Off Some Truly
Terrifying Weapons,” The National Interest, July 22, 2018,
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russian-defense-ministry-showing-some-
truly-terrifying-weapons-26496, Dave Majumdar, “Just How Much of a Threat Is
Russia’s Status-6 Nuclear Torpedo?” The National Interest Blog, January 16, 2018,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/just-how-much-threat-russias-status-6-
nuclear-torpedo-24094?page=show. See also James Drew, “Russia’s Doomsday
Torpedo Is a ‘Third Strike’ Weapon,” Aerospace Daily, January 24, 2018,
http://aviationweek.com/defense/russia-s-doomsday-torpedo-third-strike-weapon.
103
Mark B. Schneider, “Escalate to De-escalate,” US Naval Institute Proceedings,
February 2017 Vol. 143/2/1,368,
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-02.
104
”Minoborony opublikovalo video podvodnogo bespilotnika ‘Poseidon’: polnaya
neuyazvimost,” MK.ru, July, 19, 2018,
https://tv.mk.ru/video/2018/07/19/minoborony-opublikovalo-video-podvodnogo-
bespilotnika-poseydon-polnaya-neuyazvimost.html; YouTube, “President Vladimir
Putin predstavil Rossii novyie vidy vooruzhenii” (President Putin Introduced New
Types of Weapons to Russia),” March 31, 2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cf_cjAutcY8.
105
First flight was in 1981, series production begun in 1984, in service 1987. Pavel
Podvig (ed.), “Ty-160 (Blackjack),” Strategicheskoye yadernoye vooruzhenie Rossii,
Moscow, IzdAT, 1998, pp. 338–339.
106
Thomas Malmlöf and Roger Roffey, “The Russian Defence Industry and
Procurement,” in Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016
(Gudrun Persson, ed.), The Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOI),
December 2016, p. 158, https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-
R--4326--SE.
107
Pavel Podvig, “Russia’s ambitious plans for strategic bombers,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces Blog, May 10, 2017,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/05/russias_ambitious_plans_for_st.shtml.
108
“Not Necessarily New,” Russian Defense Policy Blog, July 17, 2017,
https://russiandefpolicy.blog/2017/07/17/not-necessarily-new/.
109
Pavel Podvig, “First Tu-160M2 takes flight, production contract for ten aircraft
signed,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Blog, January 26, 2018,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/01/first_tu-160m2_takes_flight_pr.shtml.
110
IISS, “Chapter Five: Russia and Eurasia,” The Military Balance 2017, p. 211,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/04597222.2017.1271211.
111
Pavel Podvig, “Russia’s ambitious plans for strategic bombers,” Russian Strategic
Nuclear Forces Blog, May 10, 2017,
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/05/russias_ambitious_plans_for_st.shtml.
112
Ministry of Defense RF, “Remarks by Chief of General Staff of the Russian
Federation General of the Army Valery Gerasimov at the Russian Defence
Ministry’s board session (November 7, 2017),” Ministry of Defense RF, November 7,
2017, http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12149743@egNews.
113
Giovanni de Briganti, “Kalibr SLCMs in Syrian Theater of Operations,” Defense-
Aerospace, http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-
view/feature/5/178397/naval-cruise-missiles-and-russian-operations-in-syria.html.
The three-part article builds on information from TASS Defense, October 26–28,
2016. Although Kalibr is a sea- and land-based cruise missile system, the navigation
systems on air-launched cruise missiles are at least similar if not identical.
114
“What Makes Russia's Advanced Kh-101 Cruise Missiles Such a Powerful Force,”
Sputnik News, July 8, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/military/201707081055365770-
russia-kh101-cruise-missile/.
115
Ibid.
116
Ibid.
117
“Х-50 / статья 715/9-А-5015” (Kh-50 / Product 715/9-А-5015), Military Russia,
November 17, 2017, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-891.html.
118
However important and representative the Kh-101 may be for Russia’s ambitions
regarding air warfare, it still is only one weapons system in the vast inventory of the
Russian air force. The blog MilitaryRussia.ru offers a quality source to explore
systems omitted here, including retired weapon systems, weapons in use and
weapons in development, such as future hypervelocity weapons. See, “Raketny
Kompleks Knizhal,” Military Russia, 2018, http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/index-
40.html.
119
William Burr and Svetlana Savranskaya, “Previously Classified Interviews with
Former Soviet Officials Reveal U.S. Strategic Intelligence Failure Over Decades,”
The Nuclear Vault, National Security Archive, Washington, DC, September 11,
2009, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/. The two-volume report by
BDM Federal Inc. (John. G. Hines, Senior Author, Ellis M. Mishulovich and John F.
Shull) on SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965 – 1985, written in September 1995, can be
accessed using the links provided in Burr’s and Safranskaya’s summary.
120
The period dealt with here was well before the MX program got under way in the
1970s, but that did not convince Dr. V.L. Kataev, Senior Advisor to the Chairman of
the Defense Industrial Department of the Communist Party Central Committee. He
claimed that Soviet intelligence had found references to the U.S. MX missile, a
highly accurate counterforce weapon, were found possibly as early as 1963. BDM
report, Vol. I, p. 2.
121
Interview with Dr. Vitaly N. Tsygichko, December 21, 1991, in John. G. Hines,
Senior Author, Ellis M. Mishulovich and John F. Shull, “SOVIET INTENTIONS
1965 – 1985, An Analytical Comparison of U.S. – Soviet Assessments During the
Cold War,” Volume II, BDM Federal Inc., September 22, 1995, pp. 150–151,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Tysgichko.PDF.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
Interview with Colonel General (ret.) Andrian A. Danilevich, September 21,
1992, in John. G. Hines, Senior Author, Ellis M. Mishulovich and John F. Shull,
“SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965–1985, An Analytical Comparison of U.S.-Soviet
Assessments During the Cold War,” Volume II, BDM Federal Inc., September 22,
1995, p. 27,
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20iI%20Danilevich.pdf.
126
General Danilevich was a key officer as Assistant for Doctrine and Strategy to
Chiefs of the General Staff and having led the work on the top secret three-volume
Strategy of Deep Operations (Global and Theater), which was the basic reference
document for Soviet strategic and operational nuclear planning for at least the last
decade of the Soviet Union.
127
This probably is one of the first times that thoughts of “escalation” or “de-
escalation” in the sense it is discussed currently, was voiced.
128
Hines et al., “SOVIET INTENTIONS 1965 – 1985, An Analytical Comparison of
U.S. – Soviet Assessments During the Cold War.”
129
Andrei Kokoshin, “Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:
Theoretical and Applied Questions,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, June
2011, p. 34,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Ensuring%20Strategic%2
0Stability%20by%20A.%20Kokoshin.pdf.
130
National Institute for Public Policy, “A New Nuclear Review for a New Age,”
National Institute Press 2017, April 2017, p. 25, http://www.nipp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/A-New-Nuclear-Review-final.pdf.
131
Jeff Daniels, “Pentagon chief sees new nuclear missile as bargaining chip against
Russians” CNBC News, February 6, 2018,
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/mattis-sees-new-nuclear-missile-as-bargaining-
chip-against-russia.html.
132
Andrei Kokoshin, “Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present:
Theoretical and Applied Questions,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center, June
2011, p. 4,
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Ensuring%20Strategic%2
0Stability%20by%20A.%20Kokoshin.pdf.
133
Ministry of Defence RF, “Remarks by Chief of General Staff of the Russian
Ministry’s board session.”
134
Per Olov Nilsson, “Rysslands militärdoktrin i början av 2000-talet” (Russia’s
Military Doctrine in the Beginning of the 21st Century), Proceedings of the Royal
Swedish Academy of War Sciences, No. 3, 2000, pp. 43-68; Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” Military Review, May-June 2001, pp. 27–38
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/235/rec/
4; Stephen J. Blank, “Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future,” U.S.
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2011,
https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1087; James T. Quinlivan
and Olga Oliker, “Nuclear Deterrence in Europe – Russian Approaches to a New
Environment and Implications for the United States,” RAND Corporation, 2011,
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1075.
pdf; Elbridge Colby, “Russia’s Evolving Nuclear Doctrine and its Implications”,
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Note no01/2016, January 12, 2016,
https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/publications/notes/2016/201601.pdf.
135
Major General V. N. Levshin, Colonel A. V. Nedelin, Colonel M. E. Sosnovskii,
“O primenenii iadernogo oruzhiia dlia deeskalatsii voennykh deistvii,” (On the Use
of Nuclear Weapons for the De-escalation of Combat Actions), Voennaia Mysl, May
1999.
136
Jacob W. Kipp, “Russia’s Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons.”
137
Stanislav N. Voronin and Sergey T. Brezkun, “Strategicheskii v’igodnaiia
assimetria” (A strategically beneficial asymmetry), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozreniie,
No 36, September 18, 1999, http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/1999-09-18/assimetria.html;
Vladimir F. Sivolob and Mikhail E. Sosnovskiy: "Realnost sderzhivaniia” (A Reality
of Deterrence: Algorithms for Nuclear Weapon Use Should Become a Component
Part of Military Doctrine), Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozreniie, October 22, 1999,
http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/1999-10-22/reality.html.
138
James T. Quinlivan and Olga Oliker, “Nuclear Deterrence in Europe – Russian
Approaches to a New Environment and Implications for the United States.”
139
Matvei Kozhukin, “Iadernoe oruzhie – factor sderzhivaniia,” (Nuclear weapons –
a factor of deterrence), Krasnaya Zvezda, February 10, 2010,
http://old.redstar.ru/2010/02/10_02/1_03.html.
140
Jakob Hedenskog, Gudrun Persson and Carolina Vendil Pallin, ”Russia’s Armed
Forces in 2016,” in Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective – 2016
(Gudrun Persson, ed.), The Swedish Defence Research Establishment (FOI),
December 2016, p. 112,
(https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4326--SE.
141
Russia Maritime Studies Institute (Translation by Anna Davis), “Fundamentals of
the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the
Period Until 2030,” Russia Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island, 2017,
http://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsEN
G_FINAL%20(1).pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=i110Z1rxZVzKbB%2B
dHJ1CZuTxvwL3N7W34%2FLpksgT1Bs%3D, original in
http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/42117/page/2.
142
Ministry of Defense RF, “Remarks by Chief of General Staff of the Russian
Ministry’s board session (November 7, 2017).”
143
Ilya Kramnik, “Nedopustim dazhe vzryv odnoi bomby” (Even the explosion of
one bomb is inadmissible), Izvestia, October 16, 2017,
https://iz.ru/658069/nedopustim-dazhe-vzryv-odnoi-bomby.
144
U.S. Department of State, “Treaty Between The United States Of America And
The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their
Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).”
145
Mark B. Schneider, “Will Russia Build 8,000 Nuclear Weapons by 2026?”
RealClear Defense, January 26, 2018,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/01/26/will_russia_build_8000_nucl
ear_weapons_by_2026_112963.html.
146
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF, “Foreign Ministry statement,”
February 5, 2018, http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/maps/us/-
/asset_publisher/unVXBbj4Z6e8/content/id/3054864.
147
Anton Troianovski, “Putin ally warns of arms race as Russia considers response
to U.S. nuclear stance,” Washington Post, February 10, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-ally-warns-of-arms-race-as-russia-
considers-response-to-us-nuclear-stance/2018/02/10/23dd3cf2-0cf2-11e8-baf5-
e629fc1cd21e_story.html.
148
Dmitry Suslov, “Militarizing the Confrontation: Risks of the New US Nuclear
Posture Review,” Valdai Discussion Club, February 9, 2018,
http://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/militarizing-the-confrontation-risks/.
149
Munich Security Conference 2018 Panel Discussion, “Nuclear Security: Out of
(Arms) Control?” February 17, 2018, https://www.securityconference.de/en/media-
library/munich-security-conference-2018/video/panel-discussion-nuclear-security-
out-of-arms-control/filter/video/. Referring to the new “U.S. Nuclear Posture
Review,” ambassador Kislyak actually accused the US of adopting this posture. He
also said that Russia is not going to change its position regarding negative security
guarantees.
150
Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Air-Delivered Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,”
RealClear Defense, June 15, 2018,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/15/russian_air-delivered_non-
strategic_nuclear_weapons_113537.html.
151
Stefan Forss, “Extending the New START Treaty – Problems to consider,” The
Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences Blog, August 14, 2018,
http://kkrva.se/extending-the-new-start-treaty-problems-to-consider/.
152
Bryan Bender, “Leaked document: Putin lobbied Trump on arms control,”
Politico, August 7, 2018, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/07/putin-trump-
arms-control-russia-724718?cid=apn.
7. Putin’s ‘Asymmetric Strategy’:
Nuclear and New-Type Weapons in
Russian Defense Policy
Stephen Blank
Introduction
Vladimir Putin has been at war with the United States and the West
for over a decade.1 Already, on January 18, 2005, Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov told the Academy of Military Sciences,
Let us face it, there is a war against Russia under way, and it has
been going on for quite a few years. No one declared war on us.
There is not one country that would be in a state of war with
Russia. But there are people and organizations in various
countries who take part in hostilities against the Russian
Federation.2
More recently, Dmitri Trenin, the director of the Moscow office of the
Carnegie Endowment, observed that, for some time, “the Kremlin has
been de facto operating in a war mode.”3
Accordingly, this chapter focuses on a key aspect of that war, namely

Russia’s programs for nuclear weapons and hypersonics. These
251
weapons represent important parts of Putin’s so-called asymmetric or

indirect strategy. And their continuing procurement is unceasing.
These sectors are critical not only because the Kremlin considers them
procurement priorities but also because, until recently, Russia clearly
envisaged the possibility of having to fight a limited nuclear war and
may still think in terms of doing so. It is true that Russia’s most recent
military doctrines suggest a move toward greater reliance on what
might be called non-nuclear or conventional deterrence.4 But its
procurement programs and exercises, like the recent Zapad 2017 war
game, point to an entirely different conclusion: namely, anticipation
of actual nuclear war-fighting. Therefore, the controversy over the
role of nuclear weapons in Moscow’s strategy and the question of
whether or not Russia has a high or low threshold for nuclear use
remains unresolved.5
Nevertheless, these deployments and plans clearly highlight the

General Staff and government’s strategy as still being one of
(supposedly limited) nuclear war. Previously, key officials confirmed
this interpretation, conceding limited nuclear war as Russia’s officially
acknowledged strategy against many different kinds of contingencies.6
The correspondent Ilya Kedrov, in his 2010 discussion of armored
vehicles, also ratified his understanding of the doctrine as affirming
this strategy.7 Likewise, Colonel General Nikolai Solovtsov, the
commander-in-chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), stated in
2008 that new military uses for nuclear weapons are coming into
being. Thus,
The radical changes that have occurred since the end of the Cold
War in international relations and the considerable reduction of
the threat that a large-scale war, even more so a nuclear one, could
be unleashed, have contributed to the fact that, in the system of
views on the role of nuclear arms both in Russia and the US, a
political rather than military function has begun to prevail. In
relation to this, besides the traditional forms and methods in the
Nuclear and New-Type Weapons | 253
combat use of the RVSN, a new notion of “special actions” by the

groupings of strategic offensive arms has emerged… Such actions
mean the RVSN’s containment actions, their aim to prevent the
escalation of a high-intensity non-nuclear military conflict
against the Russian Federation and its allies.8
At a September 2008 roundtable on nuclear deterrence, Solovtsov

noted that Russia was giving explicit consideration to the concept of
“special actions” or “deterring actions of the RVSN aimed at the
prevention of escalation of a non-nuclear military conflict of high
intensity against Russia.” Solovtsov further stated that,
These actions may be taken with a view to convincingly

demonstrating to the aggressor [the] high combat potential of
Russian nuclear missile weapons, [the] determination of the
military-political leadership of Russia to apply them in order to
make the aggressor stop combat actions. In view of its unique
properties, the striking power of the Strategic Missile Forces is
most efficient and convincing in the de-escalation actions 9
Whatever changes have occurred since then in actual operational

planning, nuclear weapons remain Russia’s priority procurement
program item and new models are being developed with hypersonic
capabilities even as Russia modernizes older systems. And the extent
of these programs far outstrips current nuclear inventory
modernization efforts by the United States.10 Indeed, Russian
officials—e.g. Viktor Bondarev, head of the Federation Council
Defense and Security Committee—not only see no threat from recent
US nuclear exercises, but Bondarev actually claims that “Russia’s
nuclear potential is significantly superior to America’s.”11 According
to a 2015 report by the Fairfax, Virginia–based National Institute for
Public Policy,
Since the late 1990s, Russia has developed and deployed: two new
types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), including a
new road-mobile missile and a silo-based variant (Topol-M
Variant 2 and Yars); a new type of sea-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM), the Bulava-30, and two upgraded versions of an existing
SLBM (Sineva and Liner); a new class of ballistic missile
submarine (Borey); modernized heavy bombers, including the
Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95 (Bear); and a new long-range
strategic cruise missile (Raduga). Russia is also developing
additional strategic nuclear weapons systems, including: a new
road-mobile ICBM (Rubezh) and a new rail-mobile ICBM
(Barguzin); a new heavy ICBM (Sarmat) with multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs); a new “fifth
generation” missile submarine to carry ballistic and cruise
missiles; and a new stealthy heavy bomber to carry cruise missiles
and reportedly hypersonic missiles.12
In late 2017, the Barguzin project, which has been subjected to

numerous cancelations in the past only to be resurrected, was once
again terminated, presumably due to its cost—becoming unaffordable
given Russia’s difficult economic circumstances.13 But considering the
Barguzin’s past history, it would not be surprising if the program is
resurrected again at some later date.
Despite Moscow’s professed interest in new arms-control treaties, this

is clearly not the program of a state seeking disarmament.
Furthermore, Moscow has long sought and is continuing to test
weapons whose explicit purpose is to evade US missile defenses, which
it continues to regard, in defiance of all science and innumerable
American and Western briefings, as a major threat to its second-strike
capability. In September 2017, Moscow tested both the road-mobile
and silo-based versions of the RS-24 Yars solid-fuel ICBM in
conjunction with the Zapad 2017 exercises, using “experimental
warheads.”14 In addition, Russia announced impending plans to test a
new generation of ICBMs that “can beat US defense systems” and hold
the United States and Europe at risk. The new Sarmat (Satan-2) RS-
28 ICBM can allegedly destroy an area the size of Texas or France,
evade missile defenses and do so using hypersonic Multiple
Independent Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) that are now permitted under
the New START treaty. The hypersonic missiles that allegedly can be
fitted to this system are currently in development under the title
Project 4202, a label that evidently refers to the hypersonic glide
vehicle (HGV), the Yu-71.15 Russian sources claim an 11,000-
kilometer range and up to 15 warheads for this weapon, a yield of up
to 760 kilotons and the building of launch silos that could withstand
seven nuclear strikes.16
Russian nuclear modernization programs also encompass all three

legs of its triad of air, sea and land-based nuclear weapons, as well as
short, intermediate and long-range nuclear weapons. In addition, in
October 2017, Putin took the unusual step of publicly announcing his
personal participation in a nuclear exercise using all three elements of
Russia’s nuclear triad and some of the newest models of Russian air,
land and sea-launched nuclear weapons.17 Putin also highlighted
Russia’s ongoing militarization by announcing that, as of October 27,
over 2,500 military exercises had occurred in 2017.18 Moreover, given
current procurement plans and the counting rules under the New
START Treaty, Russia could actually increase its nuclear weapons
stockpile and still be in compliance with that treaty.19
Finally, all conventional plans and exercises have an accompanying

nuclear component, so nuclear options are integrated into operational
plans and rehearsed beforehand. Submarine-based nuclear strikes
from the Arctic accompanied the recent Zapad 2017 exercises as did
much less heralded nuclear exercises in Novosibirsk involving some
of the newest nuclear weapons in Moscow’s arsenal.20 And this
followed a pattern of coinciding nuclear and conventional exercises
for Zapad 2009 and 2013.21
The Roots of Putin’s Asymmetric Strategy
Putin’s so-called asymmetric strategy has deep historical roots. In

2014, in his annual address to the Federal Assembly (upper chamber
of the Russian parliament), Putin reiterated, “We have no intention to
become involved in a costly arms race, but at the same time we will
reliably and dependably guarantee our country’s defense in the new
conditions. There are absolutely no doubts about this. This will be
done. Russia has both the capability and the innovative solutions
for this.”22 Echoing such sentiments, Putin’s advisor for military
policy, General Alexander Burutin, wrote that, “A crucial element in
our plans for the development of new armaments must be an
orientation towards an asymmetric response to the development and
entering into service of the expensive new systems of the developed
foreign countries.”23 In this context, the Norwegian scholar Tor
Bukkvoll remarked that, in Russian thinking, asymmetric
technologies should have a disruptive effect on new Western
technologies, be developed in areas where Russian defense industry
has particular advantages, and be much cheaper to develop and
produce than Western technologies. And these discussions also stress
acquisition of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) systems and
technologies.24
Therefore, this orientation toward an asymmetric strategy must

emphasize nuclear weapons, including among them both long-range
Tu-22M3 strategic bombers and the short-range Iskander dual-use
ballistic missile, as well as ICBMs, nuclear-missile submarines,
ground-based ballistic and cruise missiles, and a modernized
conventional force to bypass the US’s ballistic missile defense (BMD)
network.25 More recently, Putin has stated that Russia’s acquisition of
sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles equalizes its status with
the US. Moreover, he threatened that if Washington repudiates the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Russia will respond
“immediately and symmetrically,” i.e., start building its own

intermediate-range (500–5,500 km) forces.26
Putin has repeatedly insisted that Russia focus on new and novel types
of weapons.27 Moreover, from Putin on down, Russian writers almost
unanimously see the US threatening both Russia and, more broadly,
the concept of strategic stability. Russia chides the US for
simultaneously building BMD systems in Europe and Asia as well as
for developing the capabilities to launch a Conventional Prompt
Global Strike (CPGS) using high-precision conventional weapons,
mainly delivered by air. Therefore, the aerospace attack is threat
number one. These new Russian weapons under construction
comprise nuclear, space, hypersonic weapons, and drones (unmanned
aerial vehicles—UAV) many of which are intended to rebuff just such
an attack, e.g. by using UAVs to counter UAVs.28
Putin’s emphasis on creating new generations of weapons includes

ones based on so-called new physical principles (beam, geophysical,
genetic, psychophysical and other technology). He also singled out
cyber, information and communications technology, noting that, as
high-precision weapons proliferate and become common, they will
become the main means for achieving a decisive victory over an
opponent, including in global conflicts.29 Evidently these are the
categories of weapons that comprise the asymmetric strategy. Under
the circumstances, the Armed Forces must follow a deterrence
strategy and prepare for a quick and effective response to challenges,
i.e. be ready for anything on the spectrum of conflict. Even so, nuclear
weapons and thus deterrence, mainly of the US/NATO but also of
China, in both the strategic and regional deterrence contingencies will
remain the priority until and unless Russia can field high-tech
competitive weapons. Subsequent directives regarding procurement
have followed along these lines.
Moscow’s deployment of nuclear and conventional weapons indicates

that it believes the former deter not only nuclear but also conventional
attacks. This mode of strategizing and thinking directly rebuts the
complacent and groundless notion that nuclear weapons only deter
other nuclear weapons. For Moscow, both sets of weapons are
intended to deter the US and/or NATO aerospace attacks (as Russia
calls it), thereby allowing Russia to operate offensively within the
umbrella of its potent integrated air defense system (IADS).
In other words, Russian defense policy emphasizes medium- to large-

scale conventional and even nuclear warfighting at the expense of
insurgency, counter-insurgency, stability operations, and the like,
even though those smaller-scale wars are the most likely threat its
troops will face either in the North Caucasus, as is now the case, or
potentially in Central Asia, once NATO leaves Afghanistan.
Consequently, nuclear weapons are at the core of this so-called
asymmetry in order to forestall the application of NATO’s
conventional superiority. In May 2016, complaining about US
placement of missile defenses in Romania, Putin told the leadership
of the Defense Ministry,
As we have discussed already, we are not going to be drawn into

this race. We will go our own way. We will work very carefully,
without exceeding the planned spending on the rearmament
of the army and navy, plans we have had for years, but we will
adjust them in order to curb the threat to Russia’s security.30
Thus, the impetus toward asymmetry vis-à-vis the West is a principled

long-term Russian military strategy that is clearly oriented toward
waging high-tech conventional war with substantial and potentially
usable nuclear weapons on standby and always on display. Even in
Moscow’s wars of a new type, where information warfare (IW), cyber-
strikes, media penetration, subversion, and so on play large roles,
nuclear weapons, too, play a major role. They are integral to this
“asymmetric” strategy and, in Russian thinking, this strategy could

not succeed without those weapons.
For example, in both the Black and Baltic Sea theaters, NATO and US
officials admit that Russia has created a combined-arms formation or
network of land, sea, air and electronic weapons that can bar NATO
entry to those “inland” seas.31 Professionals call this an A2/AD
strategy to bar NATO’s access to those seas and to Russian territory—
if not also the so-called near abroad. And in both cases, Russia’s
A2/AD posture is backed up by what appear to be credible threats of
first-strike nuclear weapons use in defense of Russia.32 In fact, Russia
has openly deployed nuclear-capable weapons to both theaters and
constantly talked of deploying the dual-use Iskander missile in
Kaliningrad before deploying these nuclear-capable weapons there in
2016.33
Nuclear weapons must deter both nuclear and conventional scenarios,

while also providing cover for what Moscow hopes will be limited
conventional wars; moreover, the nuclear arsenal must be capable of
intimidating all rivals and enemies. As a result, nuclear weapons are
strategic procurement priorities for Moscow.34 But when scholars
look at published Russian literature discussing issues related to
nuclear use it becomes clear that,
The Russian General Staff officers working on nuclear deterrence

theory attested that, despite their work, in 2010 there existed
neither a mechanism nor an organ that connected all deterrence
efforts in military and non-military fields. Lack of a main organ
responsible for organization, planning, coordination, command,
and control of deterrence policy is probably the best
demonstration of the conceptual deficit around NSNW [non-
strategic nuclear weapons]. Weapons procurement planners
argued that deterrence based on TNW [tactical nuclear weapons]
is a question not elaborate enough. There is no conceptual base
that enables Russia to establish the structure and quantity of this

arsenal and thus procurement policy. Chaos is inevitable.35
Yet, large-scale procurement—despite the absence of a clear,

coherent, and agreed-upon doctrine of nuclear use—is so robust in
Russia that, under present conditions, it will surpass the presently
agreed numerical thresholds of the New START treaty by mid-2018.36
As nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment Alexei
Arbatov has observed,
Firstly, developments in the sphere of offensive Strategic Nuclear

Forces (SNF) are proceeding at full speed, [procurement plan]
SAP-2020 stipulates the development by 2020 of 400 new
intercontinental ballistic missiles, 8 nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines, the creation of a new generation of heavy
bombers (PAK-DA) with air launched long-range dual mission
cruise missile X-101/102, and prior to that—relaunching the
manufacture of the modernized Tu-160 bombers. These systems
are intended to replace outdated equipment being withdrawn
from operational use, i.e. they are aimed at renewing Russian
strategic forces under the New START Treaty of 2010.37
Not unlike the US, we find a situation where Russian capabilities

outpace doctrine; yet, the strategy is to use these weapons quite
ostentatiously, as both political and warfighting weapons. Indeed,
many Russian analysts now argue that the present-day defense sector,
much like during the Soviet period, is virtually autonomous.38 That
means this sector is essentially producing, at least with regard to
nuclear weapons, systems for which no real mission is indicated.
Rather they are only producing what they can actually manufacture.
Producers subsequently rationalize the mission, often couched in
offensive and very threatening terms, to suit what is already produced
instead of matching production to strategy.39 If their analysis is
correct, then in many respects the Russian defense industry, much like
its Soviet predecessor, can supply many reasonably high-tech

weapons, including nuclear ones, to the Ministry of Defense and the
military. But also like its predecessor, Russia’s present-day defense
industry is regressing by imposing unfocused capabilities upon the
state. And it is risking nuclear war because there actually may not be
a truly coherent strategy for nuclear use in practice, rhetoric aside, at
a time when Moscow is increasingly at odds with the entire West.40
Since Putin cannot and will not offer Russians “bread”, i.e. economic
reform, he must instead provide imperial circuses to solidify his
domestic standing. And since the “war party” is ascendant in Russia,
it too must orient policy toward repeated probes, if not
confrontations, with the West.41 Finally, as the chairman of the Center
for Liberal Strategies, Ivan Krastev, has observed in fall 2017,
In my recent discussions with Russian foreign policy experts, they

have made clear that if Moscow wants to be a world power, on an
equal footing with Washington, it should be able and willing to
match the United States. Russian leaders believe that Washington
interferes in their domestic politics and that the United States
intends to orchestrate a regime change in Moscow. So if they take
that as a given, the Kremlin should be able to similarly meddle and
to show the world that it has the capabilities and will to do so.
Reciprocal action is, after all, how you gain the respect of your
enemies and the loyalty of your allies. The common sense in
Moscow foreign policy circles today is that Russia can regain its
great power status only by confronting the United States, not by
cooperating with it.42
And beyond these factors, the geopolitical presence of China also

drives Russia to confront the US. As Krastev also observes,
And contrary to conventional wisdom, Russia’s craving for global

power status is not simply about nostalgia or psychological
trauma. It is a geopolitical imperative. Only by proving its
capacity to be a 21st century great power can Russia hope to be a
real, equal partner with countries like China, which it needs to
take it seriously. Believe it or not, from the Russian perspective,
interfering in the American presidential election was a
performance organized mostly for the benefit of non-American
publics.43
Therefore, we should expect more probes, including nuclear ones or

conventional threats backed up by nuclear saber-rattling. For
example, Russia may already be violating the New START treaty with
its existing or impending capabilities. According to the state-run
Sputnik News, under New START, Russia will have 2,100 actual
deployed nuclear missiles. On the other hand, the Federation of
American Scientists estimates that Russia will have 2,500 actual
deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2025. Those estimates
preceded Russia’s announcement of a program to build 50 new Tu-
160 bombers. That program will push the number over 300 actually
deployed nuclear warheads by 2030.44 But it already appears that, by
2014, Russia had violated that treaty’s numerical limits. According to
Colonel General Sergei Karakayev, the commander of the Strategic
Missile Forces, speaking in December 2014,
Around 400 strategic missiles with warheads assigned for them

are currently on combat duty. The problem is that under New
START it is impossible to have more than around 300 deployed
ICBMs consistent with the Russian declared number of deployed
delivery vehicles.45
And the buildup continues. As Mark Schneider of the National

Institute for Public Policy has observed, the announced Russian
strategic nuclear modernization program includes:46
 A new road-mobile and silo-based Topol-M Variant 2 (SS-27

Mod 1) ICBM.
 A new SS-27 Mod 2 derivative with a Multiple Independently-
targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) payload that the
Russians call the RS-24/Yars.
 Improved versions of the Soviet legacy SS-N-23 submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) called the Sineva and the
Liner with many more warheads.
 A new MIRVed (six warheads) Bulava-30 SLBM being
deployed on two types of new Borei-class submarines.
 A program to modernize the SS-19 with a hypersonic vehicle.
 A new stealthy long-range strategic nuclear cruise missile
designated the KH-102.
 In December 2015, President Putin revealed that the long-
range KH-101, which was supposed to be a conventional air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM), was nuclear capable.
 Modernization of Blackjack (Tu-160) and Bear (Tu-95) heavy
bombers.
 In 2015, Russia announced that it would build at least 50 more
of an improved version of the Tu-160.
 Development and deployment of the new Sarmat heavy
ICBM with a mammoth ten tons of throw weight (which will
reportedly carry 10 heavy or 15 medium nuclear warheads) in
2018–2020.
 Development and deployment of a new rail-mobile ICBM in
2018–2020. (This is the Barguzin project that was canceled in
late 2017.)
 Development and deployment of a new “ICBM” called the
RS-26 Rubezh, in reality, an intermediate-range missile, by
2016 or 2017. It is not yet clear if this weapon is operational,
suggesting that the initial deadlines have not been met, and it
is presumably still under development
 Development of a “fifth-generation” missile submarine
carrying ballistic and cruise missiles.
 Development of a new stealthy heavy bomber that will carry

cruise missiles and reportedly hypersonic missiles.
 Development of the “Maritime Multifunctional System
Status-6,” a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, 10,000 km
range, very fast, drone submarine capable of operating at a
depth of 1,000 meters, which the Russian press says, carries a
100-megaton bomb and possibly a cobalt bomb.47
Theater nuclear weapons are also undergoing comparable

modernization and we have seen that they violate the INF Treaty. Late
in 2017, a detailed revelation of recent Russian accomplishments in
the fields of missile and aerospace attack and defense by the chief of
Russia’s General Staff, General Valery Gerasimov, openly admitted
that Moscow has violated and is violating the INF Treaty and has
developed multiple strike capabilities for ranges up to 4,000 km.48 On
November 29, 2017, Christopher Ford, of the National Security
Council, publicly identified the weapon that violates the treaty as the
Novator 9M729. And more than one Russian system may in fact be in
violation of the INF. Specifically, Russia is developing a ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range capability of 500–5,000
km, thus able to target all of Europe. Nor do the violations end here.
According to Schneider,
Another possible violation or circumvention of the INF Treaty is

the RS-26 “ICBM.” At a minimum, the Russian RS-26
circumvents a basic prohibition in the INF Treaty and it may
violate the INF Treaty or New START. Dr. Keith Payne and I have
laid out the case in a National Review Online article that the RS-
26 is a legal violation of the INF Treaty as it was interpreted to the
Senate in 1988.49
Schneider has also written that,

The Russian R-500 cruise missile, now deployed, is also a likely

violation of the INF Treaty. In 2013, Pavel Felgenhauer, a leading
Russian defense columnist [and a] very well noted Russian
journalist, said that there are two different versions of the R-500
cruise missile, one with a range of 1,000 km and the other with a
range of 2,000–3,000 km. There are many similar Russian press
reports concerning the range of the R-500.50
Beyond these troubling developments, the reported Iskander-M

tactical missile (range: 600–1,000 km) is probably an INF Treaty
circumvention, and the reported retention of the Soviet-era Skorost’
IRBM is an apparent INF violation since in should have been declared
and eliminated under the INF Treaty.51 And the defense
correspondent Felgenhauer even wrote back in 2010 that Moscow was
planning to quit the INF Treaty covertly because its S-300, S-400 and
forthcoming S-500 air-defense missiles, as well as the Moscow anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) interceptors are nuclear armed and can
function as “dual-use […] conventional or nuclear medium or shorter
range ballistic missiles.”52 If he is correct, in some cases these systems
would then constitute violations of the INF Treaty.53
Meanwhile modernization and testing of low-yield weapons and the

ongoing modernization of TNWs continue as well. Consequently, we
see a comprehensive modernization of nuclear weapons across the
board. According to President Putin, Russia is creating new-
generation nuclear weapons that have hitherto not existed as well new
kinds of delivery systems. For example, Russia is developing the drone
intercontinental-range torpedo (Status-6), recently reported in the
press, with a multi-megaton warhead for destroying naval bases and
ports. It is also developing precision, low-yield, “clean” nuclear
weapons. Russia has also stated that it could use EMP weapons
without precipitating nuclear war—“discrete” EMP weapons may
only cover an area of several dozen kilometers. Russia also has neutron
weapons, which are significantly more effective than their US
counterparts. Clearly, Russia is developing a spectrum of nuclear

weapons with tailored effects and the means to deliver them in order
to maintain escalation dominance all along the conflict spectrum.
That spectrum runs the gamut—from “de-escalating” conflicts to
conducting theater/strategic warfare for vital national objectives to
major nuclear warfare up to the most destructive levels where the
survival of the state is at risk.54
If we calculate all the programs for both new and incoming weapons
as well as life extension of exiting platforms we could see, by 2022, a
minimum of 2,976 warheads, and a maximum of 6,670 warheads, plus
another 800+ bomber warheads. These capabilities could allow Russia
a range of nuclear options from major nuclear war, where state
survival is at risk, down to limited nuclear war being conducted to
achieve vital national interests. For limited nuclear warfare scenarios,
the forces needed for attacks on adversary military forces/bases, fleets
and critical infrastructure to achieve conflict objectives could consist
of:
 Accurate, low yield, “clean” weapons: Kill targets.

 Neutron Weapons: Kill military personnel/leadership.
 EMP Weapons (Discrete & wide area): Kill electrons.
 X-Ray Weapons: Kill satellites and reentry vehicles (RV).
Nuclear weapons may play a major role in future space
warfare scenarios.
 Gamma rays and other tailored effects: To be determined.55
Thus, Moscow appears to be reaching for a global strike capability

comprising both nuclear and conventional weapons that could hold
US, European and, if necessary, Chinese targets at risk. These
developments portend serious threats. Russia is already violating the
INF and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE—which Moscow
unilaterally “suspended” its implementation of in 2007) treaties. And
before the end of 2019, it could be in violation of the New START or
Prague Treaty. Moreover, Moscow has broken a host of treaties with

respect to Ukraine and Georgia. Second, it clearly has a first-strike
capability that can hit targets throughout Europe while supposedly
holding the US at bay. Lastly, it also is a state that refuses to accept any
of the post–Cold War agreements of 1989–1991 concerning the
territorial integrity or sovereignty of the states that either became
independent then or regained their full actual sovereignty by leaving
the Soviet bloc. Inasmuch as Moscow has repeatedly displayed its
commitment to force and subversion and behaves like an outlaw state,
it should be clear that the general threats both to international order
and to regional security in Europe and the former USSR are
enormous. Thus, the threat to vital US interests, apart from the threat
to strike at the US with nuclear weapons, or as we are now seeing,
through cyber strikes, and/or a potential combination of kinetic and
non-kinetic means, is no less serious. However, new weapons
developments do not end here.
Biological, Chemical and ‘New Physical Principles’ Weapons
Based on Russian combat activities in Chechnya and in Syria, there is

reason to believe that Russia might not hesitate to use chemical
weapons, including thermobaric weapons, against less well-armed
opponents. In Syria there are reports of Russian use; and we know that
in Chechnya Moscow employed thermobaric weapons.56 Indeed, Igor
Sutyagin of RUSI reports that flamethrower elements are being
introduced into the structures of every Russian combined-arms
formation as well as into chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
defense brigades.57 The presence of such brigades itself testifies to
Russia’s expectation that nuclear, biological, chemical and/or
radiological weapons may be used in future wars involving its forces.
Earlier writings and statements by Russian commanders have
explicitly referred to nuclear war-fighting’s impact on tactical units
and operations, so this is by no means a fanciful interpretation. In an
otherwise unremarkable 2008 interview, General Vladimir Boldyrev,
then commander-in-chief of Russia’s Ground Troops, described the

missions of Russia’s tank troops as follows,
Tank troops are employed primarily on main axes to deliver

powerful splitting attacks against the enemy to a great depth.
Having great resistance to damage-producing elements of
weapons of mass destruction, high firepower, and high mobility
and maneuverability, they are capable of exploiting the results of
nuclear and fire strikes to the fullest and achieving assigned
objectives of a battle or operation in a short time.58
Boldyrev’s remarks, like those on armored vehicles, show that he, and
presumably his colleagues, fully expected that Russia if not both sides
will use nuclear weapons as strike weapons in combat operations.59
Such activities should additionally raise questions about Russia’s

adherence to the 1925 Chemical Weapons Convention, even though
it is a signatory of that agreement. The use of chemical or possibly
biological weapons (BW)—including new BW and chemical weapons,
e.g., chemical warfare robots yet to be deployed or even invented—
would not be a stretch. Indeed, the latter project is already underway.60
Certainly we have seen repeated efforts by Moscow to defend Syria’s
use of chemical weapons in its civil war and block UN investigations
into that use.61
First, we do not know whether or not Russia is continuing research

and/or development of new biological techniques based on genetic
manipulation that would create novel weaponized strains of bacteria
and viruses developed after the 1992 closure of the Soviet BW
program. Such weapons could interfere with immunological
processes or genes that control behavior; in fact, this kind of research
was at an advanced stage in 1991.62 Second, as noted above, Putin has
called for new-generations of weapons based on “new physical
principles” that include, beam, geophysical, genetic, psychophysical
and other technology.63 Third, once Putin was reelected as president

in 2012, the Ministry of Defense pledged to begin working on the
creation of weapons based on these new physical principles; and
certainly genetic weapons, as listed on the ministry’s website, fall into
those categories of weapons. Fourth, tripartite negotiations on BW
among the UK, US and Russia, have long since broken down.64
Consequently there is great concern that new labs and institutes or
for-profit corporations might base their work on the Soviet research
program and move forward with R&D on so-called “third generation”
BW programs.65 Given the range of our ignorance as to developments
inside Russia—which is deliberately fostered by Russian opacity and
refusal to be transparent or collaborative on these issues—it is not
surprising that some experts “presume” that there is an ongoing BW
R&D program currently operating in Russia.66
Another example of weapons development based on new physical

principles is Russia’s campaign to build and deploy hypersonic and
directed-energy weapons. Persisting and recent reports in the Russian
press contend that Russia is developing pulse weapons that could
trigger an attack on the US electromagnetic sphere by being detonated
in the atmosphere. This would make it an electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) threat.67 Similarly, there are reports of future land- and sea-
based directed energy weapons that could destroy or disable
sophisticated electronic guidance and navigation systems in both
manned and unmanned aircraft and precision-guided missiles, as well
as suppress foreign military satellites and their communications
systems (SATCOM).68 The development of such a weapon is not
surprising given Moscow’s proficiency in waging electronic warfare
(EW) and its fears about an aerospace attack and corresponding
efforts to build an integrated air defense system against it. And these
are only some of the futuristic projects upon which Moscow is
embarked.
Indeed, the list presented above of current Russian nuclear programs

includes some hypersonic weapons systems, e.g. a new stealthy heavy
bomber that will carry cruise missiles and reportedly hypersonic
missiles. But in addition, as noted above, the Project 4202 vehicle that
is to be delivered by the SS-19 Stiletto missile is also intended to be
hypersonic.69 And, as we have seen, the Sarmat or RS-28 is also going
to carry hypersonic weapons.70 These two programs suggest that both
the SS-19 and RS-28 will be hypersonic nuclear weapons, aiming to
evade US missile defenses and hold the United States and/or Europe
at risk. Hypersonic vehicles, or alternatively boost-glide vehicles,
travel at speeds between Mach 5 and Mach 10 (3,840–7,680 miles per
hour). They use sophisticated technologies for maneuvering and
boost in order to deliver warheads rapidly, evade defenses and target
precisely. This allows for high rates of survivability against missile
defense systems. Such qualities excite Russian designers and planners
because Moscow fully believes that the US ballistic missile defense
system now being built in Europe and Asia aims, despite all abundant
evidence to the contrary, to neutralize Russia’s nuclear strike
capability against Europe and the US. Therefore the obsession—not
too strong a word here—of Russian leaders is to build supposedly
invulnerable nuclear weapons like hypersonic missiles that cannot be
attacked by missile defenses.71
The development of such weapons strongly suggests that Moscow

wants to hold the US itself at increased risk of nuclear strikes and sees
military utility in nuclear weapons as warfighting instruments. The
2015 trials of the Project 4202 weapon comprised tests of what Russia
calls the Yu-71 hypersonic attack aircraft, which can supposedly reach
speeds of 7,000 miles per hour. In addition to being a warhead for the
Sarmat, the Yu-71 can apparently also be adapted for Russia’s
advanced long-range strategic bomber.72
In 2016, Moscow reportedly tested another hypersonic attack aircraft,

the Yu-74, evidently carried by the SS-19 Stiletto ballistic missile
system. The new state-of-the-art Sarmat ICBM can apparently carry

up to 24 nuclear-loaded Yu-74 gliders and can hit any target within a
6,200-mile radius in an hour.73 Each Yu-74 glider can be equipped
with a nuclear warhead and/or electronic warfare (EW) package or
false target simulators to ensure penetration of any missile defense
system and thus significantly raise the efficiency of Russia’s Strategic
Missile Forces.74
The search for missile penetration systems to break through any

missile defense by means of the use of new kinds of weapons with
hyper-modern technologies for maneuverability also helps explain the
modernization of old systems like the SS-19 Stiletto to serve as
launchers for these warheads. Although Russia’s labels for the
hypersonic vehicles are confusing, they suggest that these weapons are
also being built along the lines of the modularity principle, with
missiles that can be fitted onto one or more systems like the Sarmat
and the Stiletto. Thus, the Yu-71 and Yu-74 hypersonic vehicles
apparently conform to this modularity principle.
In deploying weapons with missile-defense-penetration capabilities,

Russia is clearly not just relying on speed or MIRV-ing its systems; it
is also building medium- or heavy-class weapons because the New
START treaty does not impose any penalties or prohibitions for doing
so, unlike START-1.75 These plans for countering the US Ballistic
Missile Defense program go back at least to 2004, when the latter was
just being announced, and are clearly part of the asymmetric
procurement strategy devised already at that time by Putin. As
Alexander Savelyev, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote in
2008,
Russia declared that it would undertake effective “asymmetric”

counter-measures in order to reduce this threat [of missile
defenses] and to make the strategic situation more stable. One of
these measures is to target the elements of the ABM system in
Europe with Russian strategic missiles. Alongside with this, some

experts and even military officials, including the chief of the
General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Yuri
Baluevsky, made rather straightforward statements about the
possibility that Russia would withdraw from the INF treaty as a
reaction and counter-measure to the deployment of an American
ABM system in Europe.76
Meanwhile, the project to create hypersonic ALCMs that are quite

similar to the Yu-74 is also allegedly entering its final phase.77 Lastly,
according to Savelyev,
Ostkraft analysts emphasize that the Yu-74 gliders would not only
evade NATO’s missile defense systems but will also be capable of
penetrating through the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) shield. The analysts argue that while the THAAD
system is effective in intercepting outdated R-17 Elbrus tactical
ballistic missiles, it is potentially vulnerable to the threat posed by
advanced missile systems. 78
Of course, if that is really the truth and Moscow can breach THAAD,
then it remains a mystery why Moscow, if not Beijing, are so upset
that South Korea, which clearly faces a serious missile and nuclear
threat from North Korea, opted to join the US THAAD network.79
Similarly, and in keeping with the idea that nuclear and futuristic
weapons are valued as much for their power to intimidate as for their
actual capabilities, it is not unusual to encounter statements of this
kind in the Russian media even as Moscow endlessly fulminates that
it is under threat from the US and its allies. Indeed, the following
statement tangibly manifests the combination of overcompensation
and groundless boasting to intimidate on the one hand, with
ingrained paranoia of the Russian leadership on the other:
The Russian military are about to test the first prototypes of the
S-500 Prometey air and missile defense system also known as
55R6M Triumfator M—capable of destroying ICBMs, hypersonic
cruise missiles, and planes at over Mach 5 speeds; and capable of
detecting and simultaneously attacking up to ten ballistic missile
warheads at a range of 1,300 km. This means the S-500 can smash
ballistic missiles before their warheads re-enter the atmosphere.
So […] the S-500 would totally eliminate all NATO air power over
the Baltic States—while the advanced Kornet missile would
destroy all NATO armored vehicles. And that’s not even
considering conventional weapon hell [Russian thermobaric
weapons].
If push came to nuclear shove, the S-400 and especially the S-500
anti-missile missiles would block all incoming US ICBMs, cruise
missiles, and stealth aircraft. Offensive drones would be blocked
by drone defenses. The S-500 practically consigns into the dustbin
stealth warplanes such as the F-22, F-35, and the B-2.
The bottom line is that Russia—in terms of hypersonic missile

development—is about four generations ahead of the US, if we
measure it by the development of the S-300, S-400, and S-500
systems. As a working hypothesis, we could describe the next
system—already on the drawing boards as the S-600. It would take
the US military at least ten years to develop and roll out a new
weapons system, which in military terms represents a generation.
Every Pentagon planner worth his pension plan should know that.
Russian—and Chinese—missiles are already able to knock out the

satellite guidance systems for US nuclear-tipped ICBMs and
cruise missiles. They could also knock out the early alert warnings
that the satellite constellations would give. A Russian hypersonic
ICBM flight time, launched, for instance, from a Russian nuclear
sub all the way to the US East Coast, counts for less than 20
minutes. So an early warning system is absolutely critical. Don’t

count on the worthless THAAD and Patriot to do their job. Once
again Russian hypersonic technology has already rendered the
entire missile defense system in both the US and Europe totally
obsolete.
So why is Moscow so worried by the Pentagon placing the Aegis

system so close to Russia’s borders? A credible answer is that
Moscow is always concerned that the US industrial-military
complex might develop some really effective anti-missile missiles
even though they are now about four generations behind.80
This long citation graphically combines the mendacity common to

Russian propaganda with the paranoia that pervades the government
and IW activity. Moreover, it epitomizes the use of false information
about the Russian military that is disseminated precisely to intimidate
or impress foreign audiences. Neither should we discount this
paranoia as merely cynical window dressing for it pervades the entire
defense sector and has been doing so for years. Felgenhauer long ago
wrote that,
Russia has a Prussian-style all-powerful General Staff that

controls all the different armed services and is more or less
independent of outside political constraints. Russian military
intelligence—the GRU, as big in size as the former KGB and
spread over all continents—is an integral part of the General Staff.
Through the GRU, the General Staff controls the supply of vital
information to all other decision-makers in all matters
concerning defense procurement, threat assessment, and so on.
High-ranking former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet
times the General Staff used the GRU to grossly, deliberately, and
constantly mislead the Kremlin about the magnitude and gravity
of the military threat posed by the West in order to help inflate
military expenditure. There are serious indications that at present

the same foul practice is continuing.81
More recently, a US Air Force medical wing tender for a medical

research project asking for samples from Caucasians outside Ukraine
led Putin to claim that the United States is collecting genetic material
from all over Russia for the purposes of launching a biowar against his
country.82 Thus, little has been done to alter “Russia’s virtual reality.”83
As long as this situation goes uncorrected—and considering the
overall nature of Russia’s political system, the role of defense and the
military in that system, the pressures articulated above by Ivan
Krastev, as well as the danger of ongoing probes—the threat of
military and even nuclear confrontation remain too high for comfort,
not to say complacency.
Meanwhile, Moscow’s investment in hypersonics occurs not just

because the US and China are also doing so but because the
capabilities that the US and presumably China are now developing
frighten Russia to no end. Specifically, Moscow knows it has no real
defense against the US Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
program, which will rely on long-range hypersonics. It also fears that
the US BMD network being built in Europe and Asia, including
THAAD, can neutralize its first-strike nuclear capability. If both these
programs are used together, Moscow believes Washington could
decapitate its command, control, communications and intelligence
(C3I) assets by conventional means, while its BMD system would
neutralize any retaliatory Russian nuclear strike.84 Therefore, nuclear
weapons carried by hypersonic vehicles are needed to deter this
conventional capability. As Sergei Karaganov, one of Russia’s leading
foreign policy and defense intellectuals recently observed, “Nuclear
weapons, on the one hand, stimulate an arms race, but on the other
hand, they contain it. […] The nuclear factor does not allow any
country to gain a decisive advantage in conventional forces.”85
Statements by senior officials abundantly display Russia’s fears and

apprehensions. Special envoy Grigory Beredennikov, in February
2015, denounced the US missile defense program for upending
deterrence. Supposedly the BMD network gives Washington the
illusion it could strike Russian nuclear systems or their C3I with
conventional weapons and use missile defenses to neutralize a second
strike, thereby overcoming the bilateral deterrence relationship. But
he also went further, reiterating that, for Moscow, strategic stability
depends on a host of non-nuclear factors. Specifically he stated,
We are prepared for a dialogue about further nuclear

disarmament steps. At the same time, we are convinced that they
are impossible without solving such problems as the unlimited
growth of global U.S. missile defenses, the project of using
strategic weapons with conventional warheads within the concept
of “global strike”—the refusal of the United States to pledge not
to deploy weapons in space, [and] the growth of qualitative and
quantitative conventional imbalances.86
Therefore, Moscow constantly attacks BMD in Europe, the CPGS and

US hypersonic programs, all of which, individually, or in tandem,
would explode strategic stability as Moscow defines it.87
These Russian concerns are a major reason why, beyond development

of both nuclear and conventional hypersonic weapons, Russia is also
developing “next-generation” air defenses against the expected US
and/or NATO or Chinese hypersonics.88 But even though Moscow is
developing such defenses, it is clear that its main thrust is to develop
offensive strike capabilities that can threaten not just Europe but the
continental US. Furthermore, Russian long-term acquisition plans
manifest a desire to use nuclear weapons as warfighting weapons, not
just as deterrents against conventional or nuclear attack. And this
procurement policy is outrunning doctrinal efforts to regulate
procurements in service of a coherent strategy. It has its own logic, as
we have shown above, namely: controlling escalation processes and

dynamics through all phases of any crisis.
Nuclear Strategy
The high-tech and nuclear elements of strategy and procurement as

well as these “non-military” instruments of Russian power that
represent critical components of Moscow’s gravitation toward
creative asymmetrical strategies, have their roots in Soviet thinking
and practice. Furthermore, these procurements and concepts stem
from at least 1991–2000, when the Soviet and Russian military
establishments were fiscally, morally, and intellectually bankrupt and
discredited due to their opposition to reform and inability to perform
effectively, e.g. in the first Chechen war (1994–1996). As a result, the
Russian “establishment” increasingly saw the US and NATO as
manifesting an ever greater and conventionally unstoppable threat to
Russian interests and self-identity as an imperial great power through
NATO enlargement, the 1999 war in Kosovo, and subsequent
democracy promotion.
Deliberately reckless rhetoric, nuclear overflights and submarine

probes all comprise this aspect of contemporary wars; and none of
these phenomena would be unfamiliar to the fathers of deterrence
theory, Thomas Schelling, Bernard Brodie, Henry Kissinger, Albert
Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, et al. But such Russian tactics highlight
the fact that the psychology and character of the regime are essentially
those of an intimidation culture. As Andrei Soldatov and Irina
Borogan observe, “The Putin system is all about intimidation, more
often than actual coercion, as an instrument of control.”89
Accordingly the emphasis on nuclear weapons not only relates to this
system or culture of intimidation, it also fully comports with the long-
standing element of Russian political culture that relies on the external
projection of fear in order to augment the regime’s domestic
support.90
Today, as Putin deliberately generates a war psychosis at home and

abroad, the prominent display of Russian nuclear capability aims to
frighten and reassure Russian audiences while intimidating Western
ones.91 Many writers have argued that Russia emphasizes its nuclear
arsenal because it is one of the few things that enables it to claim parity
with the United States and retain its overall great power status.
However, we also cannot lose sight of the overall importance in
Russian political culture of displaying the state’s capacity to intimidate
others. Just as Russia needs desperately to see itself as a great power, it
equally needs to be feared abroad. But since intimidation expresses,
above all, a psychological relationship between the parties involved, it
makes perfect sense that the prominent display of nuclear weapons
carries with it a powerful informational-psychological charge that also
fully comports with Russian strategic thinking.
Russian writers from about 2005 onward, increasingly delineated IW

and the manipulation of targeted adversaries’ psychological states as
the most crucial element in modern war.92 The intimidation effect
carried by the prominent display of nuclear weapons aims to convince
gullible foreign observers that defying Russia means war and
potentially a nuclear exchange. Since that is unthinkable, we must
yield, at least in part, to Russian demands. Consequently, efforts at
intimidation continue: regular probes, for example in the Baltic
region, serve many objectives, including keeping those states and
NATO psychologically off balance. And those probes regularly
include nuclear threats, as do the probes we have seen against the UK,
Sweden, Denmark, etc.
In a March 2015 meeting in Germany, Russian generals told Western

delegates that any NATO effort to retake Crimea and return it to
Ukraine would lead them to consider “a spectrum of responses from
nuclear to non-military.”93 Apart from the obvious physical threat and
its intimidation “quotient,” the information conveyed here clearly
partakes of IW—understood in Russian terms as manipulating
opponents’ psychological reactions and hence their ensuing policies.

Putin, too, has made numerous remarks threatening nuclear strikes
and the regular dispatch of bomber and submarine probes to all
members of NATO, clearly intending to intimidate and deter as that
is the mission par excellence of bombers and submarines in
peacetime.94 But it is equally indisputable that, for Russian leaders and
commanders, nuclear weapons are also to be used for war-fighting
missions and operations. Indeed, as Sir Richard Shirreff, who was
NATO’s Deputy SACEUR from 2011 to 2014, has stated, “Russia
hardwires nuclear thinking and capability to every aspect of their
defense capability.”95
Thus, since NATO’s Kosovo operation in 1999, Russia has gradually

developed both a capability and a strategy involving nuclear weapons
that Western elites either cannot or will not understand. And it is
much broader than the catch phrase “escalate to deescalate” implies.96
That formulation, unfortunately, exemplifies the increasing US
tendency (as US understanding of foreign governments and their
strategies decline) to mirror image countries like Russia and depict
their strategies and goals as if they were Americans. In fact the nuclear
strategy is much broader than the strategy that is imagined here.
Russia’s nuclear strategy, as it has hitherto evolved, must be viewed

within the context of its thinking about and conduct of contemporary
war. Thus, in Moscow’s view, we now face the challenge of an
innovative kind of asymmetric warfare comprising of many
simultaneous and constant conflicts that need not have any
discernible starting point or phases as in US literature. To use the US
military terminology, the world is always in phase zero, and there is
no discernible gap between war and peace. Or, as Vladimir Lenin
might have said, and certainly believed, politics is the continuation of
war by other means. Ceasefires, actual conventional warfare and
incessant information warfare—defined as attempts to alter mass
political consciousness in targeted countries—occur together or
separately as needed and are in constant flux. Regular forces can be

used conventionally or as proxies, irregular or even covert forces
allegedly for “peacekeeping” or other operations. The actual use of
military force depends on the effectiveness of non-military
instruments of power, including organized crime, ethnic or other
irregular paramilitary groups, espionage, political subversion and
penetration of institutions in the targeted country, economic warfare,
IW, and special operations forces. Outright victory need not be the
intended or victorious outcome. It may be enough to secure constant
leverage and influence on the military-strategic, political and social
situation in a state of no war and no peace. Therefore, both
prosecution of such a war and resistance to it demands “quick
decision-making processes, effective inter-agency coordination, and
well trained and rapidly deployable special forces.”97 Unfortunately
those are all areas where NATO, not to mention Ukraine in 2014, have
been particularly deficient.
Russia’s fundamental strategic posture involves the military primarily

in conventional operations; and yet, it is actually a whole-of-state
national security strategy, entailing the mobilization of much if not all
of the state. As such, we must envision issues of Russian nuclear use
in an innovative context.98 Specifically, the issues of nuclear use must
be seen in the context of this kind of war, where Russia may be seeking
a slice of territory and permanent leverage rather than the destruction
of its enemy or outright victory.
In other words, the most likely use (at least intended use before a war)
of Russian nuclear weapons has until recently been for what would be
considered a limited or local or regional war (the latter being the
Russian terminology). Indeed, Russian writings on nuclear strategies
distinguish between strategic deterrence contingencies and more
localized or regional deterrence scenarios. The first could involve a
“superpower” exchange of nuclear strikes with Washington, with
ICBMs and SLBMs figuring prominently. Whereas, in the second,
nuclear weapons may well be used in a warfighting context to control

escalation throughout the entire crisis period and be used if necessary
to force NATO to negotiate.99
This strategy goes far beyond the misconceived US idea that the
strategy is “escalate to deescalate.” That concept only applies in the
context of Russia losing a regional war. In fact these weapons are to be
brandished from the outset to deter and dissuade its rival from
reacting at all in the first place. Russia’s nuclear weapons would be
deployed to prevent any kind of NATO reaction to war or to deter
China from attacking in the East (though China’s threat is rarely
commented upon publicly in Moscow). Official or quasi-official
statements make this point openly. For example, Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergei Ryabkov has written that,
The Russian side notes that nuclear-weapon states regard nuclear

deterrence as a principal condition for preserving strategic
stability. It is acknowledged, in particular, by the existing US
national security policy documents as well as by the practical steps
our US partners are taking with a view to improving their nuclear
missile system.100 In order to ensure strategic stability and
equitable multilateral international cooperation, Russia is making
the necessary efforts to maintain parity with the United States in
strategic offensive weapons in the context of deployment of a
global missile defense system and implementation of the concept
of a prompt global strike with the possible use of strategic non-
nuclear delivery vehicles.101
Nuclear weapons’ psychological or intimidation effect is prominently

displayed at all times, and especially from the onset of any crisis that
could lead to war in order to control escalation from the outset and
paralyze potential resistance from any quarter. Actual use to compel
negotiations and a de-escalation is only a small part of this much
broader strategy of employing nuclear war contingencies and

weapons as an instrument of psychological or information war.
At least some Russian and Western scholars have observed this

comprehensive deterrence and war-fighting strategy involving
nuclear weapons as both a deterrent and potential war-fighting
instrument. At a special June 2012 NATO workshop on the future of
the Alliance’s deterrence posture, one British participant observed
that Moscow relies on nuclear weapons for “setting up a force field of
inhibition operating at an even more fundamental level than
generalized deterrence.”102 Thus, as Heather Williams of Kings
College, London has written, that Russian strategy, “relies on nuclear
coercion to avoid escalation.”103
For obvious reasons, Russia’s nuclear strategy and the conditions

under which nuclear use might be entertained have been kept
consistently opaque. But, as analyzed below, there is good reason to
believe that it still is a first-strike strategy despite whatever has been
written in its recent doctrines—and in spite of the considerable
improvement in the last five years of Russia’s non-nuclear deterrence
capabilities.104 Furthermore, there are reasons to believe it might even
evolve into or contain tendencies toward preemptive use against
NATO or China.
Certainly, the current construction projects of both new nuclear

weapons and extensions of existing ones make no sense if at least some
of these weapons are not intended for actual use. However, we argue
here instead that, given the framework we have laid out, Russian
nuclear strategy is much broader and more pervasive. The strategy’s
intention is for Russia to control the entire ladder of escalation, i.e. to
gain and retain escalation dominance through every stage of the
crisis.105
As described by Nikolai Sokov of the Middlebury Institute of

International Studies, Russian nuclear forces are supposed to be used
in a limited war scenario for limited purposes, namely to force a de-
escalation of the war in response to a large-scale conventional attack
beyond the capabilities of Russia’s forces. These strikes would inflict
what Russia calls tailored or pre-assigned damage (zadannyi
ushcherb) upon the enemy that is subjectively unacceptable to it and
would lead to de-escalation and presumably a return to negotiations.
Thus, the actual strikes are a means of intra-war escalation control.
Moreover, it is assumed that there is an asymmetry of interests
wherein the US and NATO would be fighting for principles like
democracy promotion, the self-determination of a particular group or
the like, whereas for Russia the issue is the territorial integrity of the
regime and even more importantly the survival of the governing
system and the state. Lastly, the strategy only works when strategic
stability—i.e., the ability to inflict a retaliatory strike even to a
conventional strike that takes out Russian nuclear weapons or their
C3I—is maintained. Therefore, from Russia’s point of view, the US
cannot be allowed to move forward on its prompt global strike or
missile defense programs.106
This strategy makes considerable sense for Russia from its perspective.
As Williams points out,
Russia has a sufficiently strong conventional force to make a land

grab on its periphery before NATO will be able to respond. The
land grab will build on earlier stages of escalation in generating
public support and utilizing regional military assets. However,
this conventional force does not have the longevity to withstand a
decisive and drawn out NATO response, largely due to the
transportation and infrastructure problems. Therefore Russia
must seize territory quickly. Then, in order to deter NATO
intervention and maintain any geographic gains, Russia turns to
nuclear coercion.107
Similarly, Gustav Gressel of the European Council of Foreign

Relations agrees that the dominant fact we must consider is that
Russia could start a war against its neighbors or even NATO but not
be able to sustain it. And this fact will be the prevailing paradigm for
at least another decade because Putin’s system cannot survive without
placing Russia in a state of constant cold war vis-à-vis the West.108 As
he and others have observed, that situation is fraught with the kind of
misperceptions and cognitive failures of the opposing side that could
lead to a much bigger war, particularly given Moscow’s emphasis on
overwhelming force to achieve a quick and decisive victory.109
Further adding to the risks on the Russian side is the fact that,
throughout Russian history, protracted war, often arising from such a
misperception of a quick and decisive victory, invariably put the
Russian state’s or political system’s survival at risk. Those conditions
are explicitly identified in Russia’s national security and defense
doctrines as justifying nuclear use.110 This is especially true when the
successful conduct of such supposedly quick and decisive wars and
conflicts is a (if not the) precondition of the system’s survival.
Therefore, the nuclear threat does not come into play after having
achieved strategic success but throughout all phases of the conflict,
including pre-military ones. This makes that attainment of decisive
strategic success in the initial or early phase/s of the war by
conventional and so-called “hybrid” (New Generation Warfare)
means all the more demanding a requirement—which is therefore
more susceptible to deterrence if Russia encounters a determined
conventional resistance.
Moscow might well launch short-range, tactical or low-yield nuclear

weapons (once they are proven to be usable) against NATO or US
targets in the initial period of the war—i.e., preemptively to short-
circuit a NATO defense. However, it probably knows a prolonged war
works against it since, historically, protracted wars put the Russian
state under enormous and sometimes excessive strain. So if the
continuation of the regime is in danger, this meets the doctrinal

language in Russia’s 2014 and 2015 defense and national security
doctrines to justify nuclear use.111 We are not just dealing here with
hypotheticals.
Some Russian generals and leaders have already called for placing
language in the defense doctrine or in the classified nuclear annex that
would spell out the conditions under which Russia might launch a
preemptive nuclear strike.112 Similarly, in 2009, Russian National
Security Council Secretary Sergei Patrushev revealed that Russian
nuclear doctrine provided for the first and even preemptive use of
nuclear weapons in local and regional wars, something not evident on
its face.113 It also appears that Russia has simulated such operations—
for example, in a 2013 aerial exercise that practiced a nuclear attack
on neutral Sweden.114 And there are calls in the military literature for
launching preventive or preemptive nuclear strikes against NATO in
the event of a war in Europe. In a limited war, these strikes might aim
to deescalate the war; but they also could be used in a bigger conflict,
apparently and presumably to escalate the war.115 Nevertheless, recent
official statements expressly say that Russia regards the kinds of
weapons that could be used in a preemptive attack—like TNW or low-
yield high-precision nuclear weapons—as destabilizing because they
inherently lower the threshold for nuclear strikes. Commenting on
the recent announcement that the US is developing the B61-12 TNW,
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said that,
As soon as these plans emerged, we said that this is about creating

a device that, according to publicly available information, will be
relatively higher precision but lower yield compared to the
existing types of such weapons in the US arsenal. This means that
the threshold for use of such ammunition could theoretically be
lowered, which of course destabilizes the situation to a certain
extent.116
Therefore it should come as no surprise that many Chinese observers

of Russian nuclear doctrine and strategy observe that since 1993
Russia has changed its posture from no first use to first use, and now
to preemption. As they note, Russia abandoned the no first use pledge
in 1993; declared in 1997 and 2000 that nuclear weapons would deter
conventional conflicts and invasion; ordered the expansion of TNW
production in 1999; and in statements in 2006 and 2010, cited nuclear
deterrence as a national security pillar.117
Under these conditions, the attainment of decisive strategic success in

the initial or early phase(s) of the war is, for Russia, all the more
demanding a requirement. And it demonstrates that Russian nuclear
strategy, contrary to far too much Western misunderstanding, is not
merely escalating to deescalate if the tide of conflict goes against
Russia. Instead, the purpose of the strategy is to obtain escalation
dominance as quickly as possible and hold it throughout the crisis in
all of its stages in order to intimidate adversaries against resisting
conventionally as well as by nuclear means. Therefore, Moscow hopes
not only to deter conventional responses to its aggression but also
impose escalation control throughout all of the crisis’ phases.
Although Moscow might preemptively use nuclear weapons to
forestall a NATO buildup during wartime, Russian strategy makes the
necessity for a pre-positioned robust conventional deterrent all the
more critical for the North Atlantic Alliance because NATO would
then gain escalation control at a much lower level of conflict and
trump Russia’s strategy before a shot is fired. Therefore, for NATO,
the primary strategic objective must go beyond merely deterring an
attack. Rather it must be to retain conventional and nuclear escalation
dominance from the start so that Moscow will be deterred both at the
conventional and nuclear levels.
Conclusions
Much more could and has been said about Russian nuclear strategy.
And based on the evidence of Zapad 2017, Moscow may be
reconsidering the possibility of having to fight a major theater
conventional war as a possible contingency that could quickly escalate
to the nuclear level.118 But in reality, a nuclear exchange would only
occur if Moscow triggers actual combat hostilities (not IW as is now
the case). Russia’s most recent doctrinal statements all evince a
preference for non-nuclear deterrence because it knows all too well
what nuclear war means.119 Nevertheless, as we have seen, Russia’s
nuclear procurements point toward first use rather early on,
suggesting that Dmitry Adamsky is correct in postulating a serious
disconnect between writings on nuclear war and Moscow’s actual
strategy, much as occurred under the Soviet Union.120 This is
disquieting and obliges us to take both doctrine and procurement, not
to mention exercises, with utmost seriousness.
Tragically, it appears that here, too, in this aspect of war, Moscow is

replicating Soviet precedents. And since Lenin introduced a state of
siege, first into Social Democracy and then into international politics
that spanned the entire Cold War, the reversion to past precedents
carries great dangers, not least to Russia. Karl Marx memorably wrote
that when history repeats itself, the first time is tragedy and the second
time is a farce. But there is nothing farcical about nuclear weapons.
And since Ivanov and Putin’s behavior cited above reminds us that
Russia sees itself in a state of war with the West, it is essential that we
understand what is transpiring in Russia: as we have suggested, Putin
and his team may not fully grasp the consequences of their
restorationist policy. And if this new cold war persists, it is quite
unlikely that they, like their Soviet predecessors, will go quietly into
the night when they lose again.
Notes
1
“Putin’s Revenge,” Frontline, PBS, October 25 and November 1, 2017,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/putins-revenge/.
2
M.A. Gareyev, Srazheniya na Voenno-Istoricheskom Fronte, Moscow: ISAN Press,
2010, p. 729 cited in MG I.N. Vorob’ev (RET) and Col. V.A. Kisel’ev (Ret),
“Strategies of Destruction and Attrition,” Moscow, Military Thought, in English,
NO. 1, 2014, January 1-2014-March 31, 2014, accessed, June 2, 2014.
3
Trenin quoted in Ivo H. Daalder, “Responding to Russia’s Resurgence
Not Quiet on the Eastern Front,” Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2017,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2017-10-16/responding-russias-
resurgence.
4
Text of Russian Defense Doctrine,
www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_militarydoctrine.pdf; “Military
Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” February 5, 2010, www.kremlin.ru, Open
Source Center, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia, (Henceforth
FBIS SOV), February 9, 2010; Voyennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, December
26, 2014, www.kremlin.ru; Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020
Goda, Moscow, Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009,
www.scrf.gov.ru, in English it is available from FBIS SOV, May 15, 2009, in a
translation from the Security Council website (Henceforth NSS); Natsional’naya
Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, www.kremlin.ru, December 31, 2015.
5
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,” War
On the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-lowered-
nuclear-threshold/, September 22, 2017.
6
Bildt Plays Down Russian Nuclear Threat,” The Local, August 18, 2008,”
http://www.thelocal.se/13780/20080818; Mark Franchetti, “Russia’s New Nuclear
Challenge to Europe,” The Times Online, August 17, 2008,
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russias-new-nuclear-challenge-to-europe-
5kngpw8vj6q.
7
Ilya Kedrov, “An Expert Evaluation: A universal Armored Vehicle; The Infantry
Needs a Fundamentally New Combat Vehicle and Not a Taxi to the Forward Edge
of the Battle Area,” Moscow, Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer Online, in Russian,
May 26, 2010, FBIS SOV, June 4, 2010.
8
FBIS SOV, October 19, 2008.
9
“Russia RVSN Military Academy Discussing Strategic Deterrence,” ITAR-TASS,
September 22, 2008, Johnson’s Russia List, No. 173, September 22, 2008,
ww.worldsecurityinstitute.org.
10
National Institute For Public Policy, Foreign Nuclear Developments: a Gathering
Storm, Fairfax, VA, National Institute For Public Policy, 2015, pp. 2-9; Dmitry
Adamsky, “If War Comes Tomorrow: Russian Thinking about “Regional Nuclear
Deterrence,” Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs,
the European Security Crisis, and the Threat to NATO,” James R. Howe, “Future
Russian Strategic Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces: 2022,” All Forthcoming in
Stephen J. Blank, Ed., The Russian Military In Contemporary Perspective, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2018.
11
“Corridors of Power; Head of Federation Council Defense Committee sees
no threat in U.S. nuclear exercise, Interfax-America, October 30, 2017, as made
available to the author by Mark Schneider.
12
National Institute for Public Policy, Foreign Nuclear Developments: a Gathering
Storm, Fairfax, VA, 2015, pp. 2–9.
13
“Barguzin Rail-Mobile Project Is Cancelled (Again),” Russian Strategic Nuclear
Forces Blog, December 4, 2017, http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/barguzin_rail-
mobile_icbm_is_c.shtml.
14
Dave Majumdar, “Russia’s Just Tested Its New ICBM Armed With “Experimental
Warheads”, www.nationalinterest.org, September 23, 2017.
15
Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia To Test Deadliest Nuke Twice Before Year’s End,”
www.thediplomat.com, October 25, 2017.
16
Ibid; Jon Sharman, “Russia to Test New Generation Of Intercontinental Missile
That Can’ Beat US Defense Systems,” www.independent.co,uk, October 24, 2017.
17
“Vladimir Putin Took Part In Strategic Nuclear Forces’ Training,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55929, October 27, 2017; Franz-Stefan
Gady, “Russia Test Fires 4 Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles,’
www.thediplomat.com, October 27, 2017.
18
“Presentation Of Officers Appointed To Senior Command Posts,”
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55923, October 27, 2017.
19
Ibidem.
20
Michael Kofman, “Zapad 2017: Beyond the Hype, Important Lessons for the US
and NATO,” https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/zapad-
2017-beyond-the-hype-important-lessons-for-the-us-and-nato/, October 27, 2017;
https://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/zapad-2017-what-did-these-military-
exercises-reveal/; Roger McDermott, “Zapad 2017 and the Initial Period Of War,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 115, The Jamestown Foundation,
September 20, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/zapad-2017-and-the-initial-
period-of-war/; Pavel K. Baev, “Militarization and Nuclearization,”: The Key
Features Of the Russian Arctic,”
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/11/01/militarization_and_nucleariz
ation_the_key_features_of_the_russian_arctic_112562.html, November 1, 2017;
https://forwardobserver.com/2017/10/recent-russian-nuclear-forces-exercises-
larger-than-first-believed/; Lukas Andriukaitis, #Military Matters: Russia’s Big Guns
On the Move: Analyzing Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces In Novosibirsk Oblast,”
www.medium.com, October 24, 2017.
21
Stephen Blank, What Do the Zapad-2013 Exercises Reveal?” Liudas Zdanavicius
and Matthew Czekaj Eds., Russia’s 2013 Zapad Military Exercise: Lessons For Baltic
Regional Security, Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2015, pp. 8–13.
22
“Presidential Address To the Federal Assembly,” December 4, 2014,
23
Quoted in Tor Bukkvoll, “Iron Cannot Fight-The Role of Technology in Current
Russian Military Theory,” Journal of Strategic Studies, XXXIV, NO. 5,2011, p. 690.
24
Ibid. pp. 690–691.
25
Denis Telmanov, “Polite But Formidable,’ Vladimir Putin Has Declared That the
Country Will Not Get Bogged Down In Costly Rivalry With the West,” Moscow,
Gazeta.ru, in Russian, December 4, 2014, FBIS SOV, December 4, 2014.
26
Zasedanie Mezhdunarodnogo Diskussionnogo Kluyba “Valdai,” October 19, 2017,
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/55882.
27
“Putin: Russia Not Going To Join New Arms Race But Will Develop Modern
Nuclear Arms,” Interfax, July 26, 2012, available at
http://search.proquest.com/professional/login; “Meeting of the Military-Industrial
Commission, “ www.en.kremlin.ru, June 28, 2016; “Meeting of Russian Federation
Ambassadors and Permanent Envoys,” www.en.kremlin.ru, June 30, 2016; “Putin

Says, Russia Will Build New Weapons but Avoid Arms Race.” Yahoo! News,
www.yahoo.com, January 20, 2015.
28
“Russian Military to Get “Drone-Killer UAV,” Izvestia, October 23, 2017,
Retrieved From BBC Monitoring, October 27, 2017.
29
“Putin Says, Russia Will Build New Weapons but Avoid Arms Race.” Yahoo!
News, www.yahoo.com, January 20, 2015.
30
“Meeting on Defense Industry Development,” May 13, 2016,
31
Andrew Fink, “Russia, Iran, and Inland Seas,” The American Interest, April 15,
2016, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/04/15/russia-iran-and-inland-
seas/.
32
Captain Steven Horrell (USN), speech at the event, “The Changing Military
Balance in the Black Sea,” Atlantic Council of the US, Washington, D.C., June 15,
2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/events/past-events/black-sea-energy-and-
security-conference.
33
Jens Stoltenberg, “Adapting to a Changed Security Environment,” Speech, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, May 27, 2015, available at
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_120166.htm (accessed October 14,
2015); “Russia To Respond to NATO Black Sea Force By Deploying New Weapons
– Report,” https://www.rt.com/politics/329414-russia-to-respond-to-nato/, January
19, 2016; “Russia Deploys Nuclear-Capable Missiles In Kaliningrad,”
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37597075, October 9, 2016.
34
Kristen Ven Bruusgard, “Russian Strategic Deterrence, Lecture at Lawrence
Livermore Nuclear Laboratory, February 10, 2016, www.youtube.com.
35
Dmitry Adamsky, “If War Comes Tomorrow: Russian Thinking about “Regional
Nuclear Deterrence,” Forthcoming in Stephen J. Blank, Ed., The Russian Military In
Contemporary Perspective, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College, 2018.
36
Mark B. Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs, the
European Security Crisis, and the Threat to NATO,” James R. Howe, “Future
Russian Strategic Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces: 2022,” All Forthcoming in
Stephen J. Blank, Ed., The Russian Military In Contemporary Perspective, Carlisle

Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2018.
37
“Russian Defense Analyst” Russia’s Being Drawn Into a New Arms Race With the
U.S. and NATO Countries,” www.memri.org, Special Dispatch No. 6449, May 26,
2016.
38
As stated in the remarks of Pavel Podvig and Nikolai Sokov a the Program,
“Russian Nuclear Strategy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC, June 27, 2016, https://www.csis.org/events/russian-nuclear-
strategy.
39
Ibid.; and for the Soviet period, Peter Almquist, Red Forge: Soviet Military
Industry Since 1965, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.
40
Deterrence.”
41
Pavel Felgenhauer, “‘Party Of War’ Triumphs In Moscow,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 137, October 26, 2017, The Jamestown Foundation,
https://jamestown.org/program/party-war-triumphs-moscow/.
42
Ivan Krastev, “Robert Mueller Will Never Get to the Bottom of Russia’s
Meddling,” The New York Times, November 1, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/opinion/mueller-election-meddling-
russia.html.
43
Ibid.
44
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015,”
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 24, 2015, p. 85, available at
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/3/84.full.pdf+html (accessed October 14, 2015).
45
Schneider, Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs, the European Security
Crisis, and the Threat to NATO,” Howe, “Future Russian Strategic Nuclear and
Non-Nuclear Forces: 2022, Forthcoming in Stephen J. Blank, Ed., The Russian
Military In Contemporary Perspective, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 2018.
46
U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Department of Defense, National Security
and Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, September 2008, p. 8, available at
http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popareports/upload/nuclear-weapons.pdf
(accessed October 14, 2015). “Military Dominance Over Russia Impossible, Nuclear
Deterrent Top Priority – Defense Ministry,” RT, January 30, 2015, available at
http://rt.com/news/227811-russia-military-supremacy-modernization (accessed
October 14, 2015); “New Heavy ICBM To Be Put Into Service in 2018—Karakayev,”
Sputnik News, May 5, 2011, available at
http://sputniknews.com/voiceofrussia/2012_12_14/Russia-to-build-new-heavy-
ICBM-by- 2018-Karakayev/ (accessed October 14, 2015); and Steve Gutterman,
“Russia Plans New ICBM to Replace Cold War ‘Satan’ Missile,” Reuters, December
17, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/17/us-russia-missiles-
idUSBRE9BG0SH20131217 (accessed October 14, 2015); “Russia to Revive Nuclear
Missile Trains—RVSN Commander,” Interfax, December 16, 2014, available at
http://search.proquest.com/Professional/login (accessed October 14, 2015);
“Deployment of First Regiment With New Strategic Missile Complex Will Begin in
2014 -- General Staff,” Interfax-AVN, June 7, 2013 (transcribed by World News
Connection); Mark B. Schneider, “Russia’s Noncompliance with Arms Control
Obligations,” Gatestone Institute, July 31, 2013, available at
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3906/russia-arms-control (accessed October 14,
2015); National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile
Threat, 2013, available at http://www.afisr.af.mil/shared/media/ (accessed October
14, 2015); Vitaly Ankov, “Russian 5G Subs to Be Equipped with Ballistic, Cruise
missiles—Source,” RIA Novosti, March 19, 2011, available at
http://en.ria.ru/militar_news/20110319/1630910 53.htm (accessed October 14,
2015); “Russia Goes Ahead with 5G Submarine Project,” RIA Novosti, March 8,
2013, available at http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130318/180092698/Russia-
Goes-Ahead-with-5G-Submarine-Project.html (accessed October 14, 2015); “Russia
Speeds Up Development of New Strategic Bomber,” RIA Novosti, November 28,
2013, available at http://en.ria.ru/military_news/20131128/185110769/Russia-
Speeds-Up-Development-of-New-Strategic-Bomber.html (accessed October 14,
2015).; “Russia’s New Bomber to Carry Hypersonic Weapons – Source,” Sputnik
News, August 30, 2013, available at
http://sputniknews.com/military/20130830/183062128/Russias-New-Bomber-to-
Carry-Hypersonic-Weapons--Source.html (accessed October 14, 2015); “Meeting
with Members of Political Parties Represented in the State Duma,” The Kremlin,
August 14, 2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22820 (accessed
October 14, 2015);“Russia to Produce Successor of Tu-160 Strategic Bomber After
2023,” Sputnik News, June 4, 2015, available at
http://sputniknews.com/military/20150604/1022954769.html; “The Kremlin,
Meeting with Members of Political Parties Represented in the State Duma,” August
14, 2014, available at http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22820 (accessed October 14,
2015); “Russia to Produce Successor of Tu-160 Strategic Bomber After 2023,”
Sputnik News, June 4, 2015, available at
http://sputniknews.com/military/20150604/1022954769.html (accessed October 14,
2015); “Russia Developing Two Types of Advanced Liquid-Fuel ICBMs,” Interfax,

August 25, 2012, available at http://search.proquest.com/professional/login
(accessed October 14, 2015); Lynn Berry and Vladimir Isachenkov, “Kremlin-
Controlled TV Airs ‘Secret’ Plans For Nuclear Weapon,” Associated Press,
November 12, 2015, available at https://www.military.com/daily-
news/2015/11/12/kremlin-controlled-tv-airs-ecret-plans-nuclear-weapon.html;
“Text Of Russian TV Reports Featuring Classified Weapon System Status-6,” BBC
Monitoring Former Soviet Union, November 2015, available at
http://search.proquest.com/Professional/login; Bill Gertz, “CIA: Leak of Nuclear-
Armed Drone Sub Was Intentional,” The Washington Free Beacon, November 19,
2015, available at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/cia-leak-of-nuclear-
armed-drone-sub-was-intentional/.
47
Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs, the European
Security Crisis, and the Threat to NATO,” Forthcoming in Stephen J. Blank, Ed.,
The Russian Military In Contemporary Perspective, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2018.
48
Pavel Lisitcin, “Army; Russia sets Up Delivery Vehicles.”
49
Ibid.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia Seeks to Impose New ABM Treaty On the US by
Developing BMD,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 7, Issue 136, July 16, 2010, The
Jamestown Foundation, https://jamestown.org/program/russia-seeks-to-impose-
new-abm-treaty-on-the-us-by-developing-bmd/.
53
Schneider, “Russian Nuclear Weapons Policy and Programs, the European
Security Crisis, and the Threat to NATO,” Forthcoming in Stephen J. Blank, Ed.,
The Russian Military In Contemporary Perspective, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2018.
54
Howe, “Future Russian Strategic Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Forces: 2022,
Forthcoming in Stephen J. Blank, Ed., The Russian Military In Contemporary
Perspective, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College,
2018.
55
Ibid.
56
Lester Grau and Timothy Smith, “A 'Crushing' Victory: Fuel-Air Explosives and
Grozny 2000, http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/fuelair/fuelair.htm,
2001; Angela Dewan, “Reports of Chemical Gas Attacks in 2 Syrian cities,”
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/02/middleeast/syria-aleppo/index.html, August 2,
2016.
57
Igor Sutyagin, “Russia Confronts NATO” Confidence-Destruction Measures,”
RUSI, Royal United Services Institute, Briefing Paper, 2016, p. 7.
58
Artem Troitsky, “Interview With CINC Ground Troops General of the Army
Vladimir Anatolyevich Boldyrev,” Moscow, Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuryer, in
Russian, October 1, 2008, FBIS SOV, October 19, 2008.
59
Kedrov, FBIS SOV, June 4, 2010.
60
“Russia Developing Chemical Warfare Robots,” The Moscow Times, August 4,
2014, https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-developing-robots-for-military-
use-54858.
61
Karen De Young, “Russia, China veto At U.N. On Syria Chemical Weapons Is
‘Outrageous,’ U.S. Says,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/russia-china-veto-at-un-on-syria-chemical-weapons-is-outrageous-us-
says/2017/02/28/c69adcf4-fdeb-11e6-99b4-9e613afeb09f_story.html, February 28,
2017.
62
Zilinskas, p. 44.
63
Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: We Should Not Tempt Anyone By Allowing
Ourselves to Be Weak,” Government of the Russian Federation, February 20, 2012,
http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/.
64
Milton Leitenberg, “The Biological Weapons Program of the Soviet Union,”
Statement to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, May 7, 2014; Zilinskas, p. 45.
65
Ibid., pp. 46-49; Leitenberg, “The Biological Weapons Program of the Soviet
Union.”
66
“Expert Tells Congress He ’Presumes’ Russia Has Biolo9igcal Arms Program,”
www.nti.org, May 9, 2014.
67
Alexei Ivanov, “Electromagnetic Bombs Created In Russia,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
September 28, 2017, retrieved from BBC Monitoring, September 28, 2017.
68
John Keller, “New Russian Directed Energy Weapon Could Complicate U.S.
Military Strategic Planning, www.militaryaerospace.com, July 7, 2015.
69
“Flight Test Of a New Project 4202 Vehicle,” www.russianforces.org, March 3,
2015.
70
Sharman, “Russia to Test New Generation Of Intercontinental Missile That Can’
Beat US Defense Systems.”
71
“Russian Top Secret Hypersonic Glider Can Penetrate Any Missile Defense,”
Sputnik News, June 13, 2016,
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201606111041185729-russia-hypersonic-glider/.
72
Olga Bozhyeva, “Sources: Russia Successfully Tested New Missile Super weapon:
Developers Called Launch of Sarmat ICBM Warhead a ‘Fantastic Success,’”
Moskovsky Komsomolets, April 20, 2016, BBC Monitoring, April 20, 2016.
73
Sputnik News.
74
Ibid.
75
Olga Bozhyeva, “The ‘Stiletto’ Is In the Drawer – Russia is Testing Warheads On
ancient Missiles From Penetrating American Missile Defenses,” Moscow, Moskovsky
Komsomolets, in Russian, October 22, 2011, FBIS SOV, October 22, 2011.
76
Alexander G. Savelyev, “Russian Defense and Arms Control Policy and its
Prospects After the Presidential Elections,” UNISCI Discussion Papers, BNO. 17,
May, 2008, p. 104 www.unisci.es.
77
Sputnik News.
78
Ibid. Ostkraft refers to the website www.ostkraft.ru.
79
Stephen Blank,” Missile Defense in Korea Further Roils US-Russian Relations,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 13, Issue 133, The Jamestown Foundation, July 22,
2016, https://jamestown.org/program/missile-defense-in-korea-further-roils-us-
russian-relations/.
80
Pepe Escobar, “Beware What You Wish For: Russia is Ready For War,” RT, May
22, 2016, https://www.rt.com/op-edge/344002-beware-russia-war-us/.
81
Pavel Felgenhauer, “Russia’s Imperial General Staff,” Perspective, XVI, NO. 1,
October-November, 2005, www.bu.ed./iscip/vol16/felgenhauer.
82
Matt Bodner and Aaron Mehta “How a Pentagon Research Project Convinced
Vladimir Putin Of a coming Biowar,” Air Force Times, November 2, 2017,
https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/11/02/how-a-
pentagon-research-project-convinced-vladimir-putin-of-a-coming-biowar/.
83
Kirk Bennett, “Russia’s Virtual Reality,” The American Interest, November 1,
2017, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/11/01/russias-virtual-reality/.
84
“The U.S. and Russia Plan For conflict,” Stratfor, May 25, 2016,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/us-and-russia-plan-conflict.
85
Sergei Karaganov, “A Cold War: A Forecast For Tomorrow,” Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
October 22, 2017, retrieved from Johnson’s Russia List, October 22, 2017.
86
Quoted in Rumer, pp. 19–20.
87
For descriptions of many of these programs see Amy F. Woolf, Conventional
Prompt Global Strike and Long-range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,
Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2014.
88
Ilyas Gilzatudinov, “Russian Work on Defense Against Hypersonic Weapons
Systems In Full Swing,” Sputnik, Military and Intelligence, July 3, 2016,
http://sputniknews.com/military/20160703/1042360880/russian-anti-hypersonic-
capabilities-development.html.
89
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Bogoran, The Red Web: the Struggle Between Russia’s
Digital Dictators and the New Online Revolutionaries, New York: Public Affairs,
2015, p. 314.
90
Robert Nalbandov, Not By Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin,
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2016, pp. 19–116; Jacek Durkalec, “Russia’s
Evolving Nuclear Strategy and What It Means For Europe,” European Council on
Foreign Relations, July 5, 2016,
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_russias_evolving_nuclear_strategy_and_w
hat_it_means_for_europe.
91
Marcel H. Van Herpen, Russia’s Nuclear Threats and the Security Of the Baltic
States, Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, No. 16/05, 2016, pp. 3–6.
92
Timothy L. Thomas, Recasting the Red Star: Russia Forges Tradition and
Technology through Toughness, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies office,
US Army, 2011.
93
Marvin Kalb, Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War,
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2015, p. 233.
94
Col. Thomas C. Kirkham, (USAF), “Modernizing the Nuclear Bomber Force: a
National Security Imperative”; Lt. Col. Donald M. Neff (USAF); and Stephen J.
Cimbala, “Nuclear Arms Reductions After NEW START: Obstacles and Options,”
all in Stephen J. Cimbala and Adam Lowther, Eds., Defending the Arsenal: Why the
Nuclear Triad Still Matters, Forthcoming, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company.
95
Charlie Cooper, “NATO Risks Nuclear War With Russia ‘Within a Year,’ Warns
Senior General,” The Independent, May 18, 2016,
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/nato-risks-nuclear-war-with-
russia-within-a-year-senior-general-warns-a7035141.html.
96
Mark B. Schneider, “Escalate To Deescalate” Proceedings of the US Naval Institute,
February 2017, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2017-02/escalate-de-
escalate.
97
Margarete Klein, Russia’s Military; On the Rise? Transatlantic Academy, 2015–
2016 Paper Series, German Marshall Fund, 2016, pp. 8–9.
98
Stephen Blank, “No Need to Threaten Us, We Are Frightened of Ourselves:
Russia’s Blueprint for a Police State,” in The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow:
Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald, Stephen J. Blank and Richard Weitz eds.,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2010, 19–
150; Andrew Monaghan, “Defibrillating the Vertikal: Putin and Russian Grand
Strategy,” Chatham House, 2014; Andrew Monaghan, Russian State Mobilization:
Moving the Country on to a War Footing – Chatham Hose, 2016,
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/dr-andrew-
monaghan#sthash.9Uf8wgVx.dpuf.
99
Deterrence.”
100
Since little or no modernization of US nuclear weapons has taken place, this
perfectly exemplifies the fictitious or mendacious, but certainly overwrought, nature
of Russian threat perceptions.
101
Sergey Ryabkov, “Changing Priorities in International Security,” Security Index,
XX, NO. 1, 2014, p. 23.
102
David S. Yost, “NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture After the Chicago
Summit,” U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Center on Contemporary Conflict, 2012,
p. 21.
103
Heather W. Williams, “Uncertainty in Escalation: Russian Strategy Interests and
Avoiding Nuclear Coercion,” unpublished paper, 2016.
104
Ibid.; Schneider; Prezident Rossii, Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, The
Kremlin, February 5, 2010; Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” The Kremlin,
December 26, 2014; Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020 Goda,
Moscow, Security Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009, in English it is
available from FBIS SOV, May 15, 2009, in a translation from the Security Council
website (Henceforth NSS); Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, The
Kremlin, December 31, 2015.
105
Heather W. Williams, “Uncertainty in Escalation: Russian Strategy Interests and
Avoiding Nuclear Coercion,” unpublished paper, 2016. Williams implies this but
does not say so outright; this is also based on the author’s conversations with high-
ranking US officials in Washington, DC, during 2016.
106
Nikolai Sokov, “Assessing Russian Attitudes Toward Phased, Deep Nuclear
Reductions,” The Nonproliferation Review, XX, NO. 2, 2013, pp. 251–252.
107
Williams, “Uncertainty in Escalation: Russian Strategy Interests and Avoiding
Nuclear Coercion.”
108
Gustav Gressel, “The Dangerous Decade: Russia-NATO Relations 2014 To 2024,”
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 5, 2016,
https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_dangerous_decade_russia_nato_relati
ons_2014_to_2024.
109
Ibid.
110
Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, The Kremlin, February 5, 2010;
Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, The Kremlin, December 26, 2014;
Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020 Goda, Moscow, Security

Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009, in English it is available from FBIS
SOV, May 15, 2009, in a translation from the Security Council website (Henceforth
NSS); Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, The Kremlin, December 31,
2015.
111
Ibid.
112
“Russian General Calls For Preemptive Nuclear Strike Doctrine Against NATO,”
The Moscow Times, September 3, 2014,
https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russian-general-calls-for-preemptive-nuclear-
strike-doctrine-against-nato-39016.
113
“Russia to Broaden Nuclear Strike Options,” RT, October 14, 2009,
http://rt.com/news/russia-broaden-nuclear-strike/; Schneider, The Nuclear Doctrine
and Forces of the Russian Federation, op. cit., p. 21.
114
Armin Rosen, “NATO Report: A 2013 Russian Aerial Exercise Was Actually a
‘Simulated Nuclear Attack’ On Sweden,” Business Insider, February 3, 2016,
https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-report-russia-sweden-nuclear-2016-2.
115
Eugene Rumer, Russia and the Security of Europe, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC, 2016,
https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_276_Rumer_Russia_Final.pdf, p. 21.
116
“Russia Says New US Nuclear bomb “Destabilizes Situation” RIA Novosti, August
3, 2016, retrieved from BBC Monitoring.
117
Lora Saalman, Gu Guoliang, Zou Yunhua, Wu Riqiang, Jian Zhang, “China and
Russia’s Nuclear Relations,” Carnegie-Tsinghua, July 7, 2013,
https://carnegietsinghua.org/2013/07/07/china-s-and-russia-s-nuclear-relations-
event-4167.
118
“Presentation Of Officers Appointed To Senior Command Posts,” October 27,
2017.
119
Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii, The Kremlin, December 26, 2014;
Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, do 2020 Goda, Moscow, Security
Council of the Russian Federation, May 12, 2009, in English it is available from FBIS
SOV, May 15, 2009, in a translation from the Security Council website (Henceforth
NSS); Natsional’naya Strategiya Bezopasnosti Rossii, The Kremlin, December 31,
2015; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “The Myth of Russia’s Lowered Nuclear Threshold,”
War On the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/the-myth-of-russias-

lowered-nuclear-threshold/, September 22, 2017.
120
Deterrence.”
8. Russia’s Offensive and Defensive Use
of Information Security
Sergey Sukhankin
Introduction
Over the last decade and a half, Russian policies in the domain of
information security have undergone a profound evolution in scope,
complexity and sophistication. Moscow has traditionally viewed the
information domain as a strategically crucial asset that allows it to
effectively control the domestic population and project influence
abroad. Yet, despite recent technological achievements, Russian
information security policy continues to retain many classical Soviet
traits that can be traced back to the writings of Vladimir Lenin and
Joseph Stalin.1 Russia’s attitude toward information security in many
ways dramatically differs from the Western approach. In the Russian
reading, it is practice that plays a dominant role; whereas, theory
(theoretical reflections) frequently appears post-factum, making
Russian moves difficult to forecast and/or pre-empt.
Adopted on December 5, 2016, the new “Doctrine of Information

Security of the Russian Federation”2 ought to be seen as a complex
phenomenon and an integral part of Russia’s integrated strategy (that
includes both military and non-military means) aimed at developing
302
Offensive and Defensive Use of Information Security | 303
both offensive and defensive mechanisms in its confrontation with the

West.
This chapter engages with both primary sources (with the text of the
Doctrine forming the central pillar) as well as authoritative writings
of prominent Russian thinkers and theoreticians in the information
security domain. This approach enables an exploration of the issue
from different angles and a discussion of Russia’s information and
cyber security doctrines from an interdisciplinary prospective.
Russian Stance on Information Security Between 2000 and 2010
Russia’s current view of “information security” is in many ways still

driven by the Soviet experience. This is reflected in two main ways:
 Positive: The Kremlin considers full and unconditional

control over information (generation and dissemination) by
the state as a useful means to secure greater mobilization
potential for achieving specific/immediate goals and
objectives. Post-1917 Russian/Soviet history witnessed
numerous instances seemingly corroborating this precept.
 Negative: Russia’s defeat in the Cold War is frequently linked

in Russian writings with the state’s forfeiture of control over
information flows (particularly because of the so-called policy
of glasnost introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the second
half of 1980s) and Soviet inferiority in its information war
with the United States.3 Taken together, these two factors are
seen as the main precursors to the collapse of the Soviet
Union, which President Vladimir Putin has referred to as the
“worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.”4
After the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(USSR), Russia’s information security policy was left in a chaotic state,
as demonstrated by the poor performance of the domestic mass media

during the course of the first Chechen war (1994–1996)5 and other
instances. Toward the end of the 1990s (particularly after 1996),
conservative circles inside Russia began to call for more consolidated
state control over the domestic information space. Specifically, they
suggested subjugating the country’s major mass media outlets6 and
establishing the necessary legislative framework to regulate this
transformation. The first step in this direction was made in 2000, with
the adoption of Russia’s Doctrine of Information Security. The
document sparked alarm among the liberally minded segment of
Russian society (The Union of Russian Journalists called it “the main
danger to Russian information security itself”7), but the real extent of
the peril was misunderstood. Both foreign and domestic observers
paid excessive attention to details and formalities, eclipsing the
doctrinal document’s true purpose and potential, which not only
paved the way for state control over the information sphere but also
identified foreign countries as the main source of threat to Russia in
the domain of information security. On the other hand, the document
called for the inclusion of counter-propaganda among the
government’s primary tasks and urged the creation of “conditions for
Russian representatives and organizations abroad to be able to
neutralize disinformation regarding the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation.”8
Some measures—mainly those concerned with the consolidation of

control over domestic information—were implemented throughout
Putin’s first term (2000–2004). Namely, on January 1, 2001, the state
news agency RIA Novosti offered its “newsline” for free to all media
outlets, thus essentially obtaining virtual control over the domestic
information sphere.9 Subsequently (2005), Moscow created Russia
Today (later renamed simply RT).10 This cable news channel,
consciously styled to resemble CNN and BBC International, was
designed to reach foreign audiences and convey Russia’s take on both
Russian domestic development and foreign events—in line with
practical objectives laid out in the Doctrine. But in addition, RT
specifically echoes Soviet-era practices of diversifying sources of

propaganda to reach both “domestic” (performed by the Soviet
Information Bureau) and “external” (Comintern and later
Cominform) audiences.
Meanwhile, the early 2000s witnessed a surge in Russian theoretical

thinking on issues related to information security. For instance,
Russia’s perception of “information” as a concept underwent a drastic
transformation, notably owing to works by Igor Panarin, a chief-
architect of the Russian theory of information confrontation/warfare.
Panarin emphasized the term “social information” (sotsialnaya
informatsiya), which, in his view, is one of the most essential criteria
demonstrating effective functioning of a state and its national security
apparatus. Specifically, he thought that the way information
(transmitted by mass media) is processed by both individuals and
groups of people has a direct effect on the ability of the state to
maintain its internal stability and coordinate external actions. This is
inseparable from the issue raised above, in reference to the collapse of
the Soviet Union, of “who controls information flows, controls the
destiny of the state.” Panarin argued that ignorance of this factor
would lead to “intellectual colonialism” (intellektualnyi kolonializm)11
and ultimately the destruction of the state and nation, thus resembling
the fate of the USSR. These ideas gained particular weight as the
growing rift in relations between Moscow and the West started to
acquire the shape of a veritable conflict toward the end of the 1990s.
Russia’s stance on information security in the late 1990s and early

2000s became inseparable from external development, increasingly
fixating on the United States and its actions and capabilities. For
example, US activities in the domain of information security—from
the implementation of concrete measures in the domain of cyber
operations (October 1998), to the impressive performance of the US
military during the Yugoslav conflict and initial stages of the Iraq war
(especially use of the “psychological element”12)—hugely contributed
to shifting Russia’s perspective from inward- to outward-looking.
This was underscored by two crucial transformations:
 The emergence and gradual popularization of the notion of

an “information confrontation” (informatsionnoe
13
protivoborstvo), which drew on achieving information-
psychological supremacy and the ability to provide an
asymmetric response to external threats posed by
technologically superior players;
 The notion of “information warfare” (informatsionnaya

voyna) entering the Russian vocabulary and, having
undergone critical changes compared to its original meaning
in the West (as noted below), gaining immense popularity.
It is worth pointing out that, at first, both notions were rather

incomplete and remained preoccupied with the US experience in
local/regional conflicts.14 The situation changed in light of the so-
called “color revolutions,” with Georgia (2003) and Ukraine
(2004/2005) playing a decisive role. Events in Tbilisi and Kyiv
demonstrated numerous weaknesses of Russian counter-propaganda
(especially its information-psychological elements) and the lack of
flexibility in the Kremlin’s understanding of the notion of
“information security.” This gave rise to a renewed search for how to
overcome these deficiencies. Consequently, by 2009, Russian theorists
(Irina Vasilenko, in particular) came to see information warfare as a
“systematic exertion of informational influence on the entire system
of informational communication of an adversary, in order to set a
beneficial global informational environment for conducting of
various political and geopolitical operations.”15 This new perception
exponentially broadened Russian understating of a “conflict” in the
“information sphere/space” by specifically adding a “(geo)political”
element, thus fully reflecting the course and trajectory of Russian
foreign and security policy amidst the “cold peace” with the West
(from Putin’s Munich Security Conference speech in 2007 and
onward). Nevertheless, at this point, both in terms of theory and

practice, the Russian side was lagging behind not only leading players
in the area of information security, but also much more modest actors,
such as Sweden, Estonia, and Finland, which had adopted their own
cyber security doctrines by 2008.
Crucial Changes: Evolution of Russian Information Policy, 2010–

2016
The period from 2010 to 2016 had a decisive meaning for the
development of Russian information security thinking, and owed to
both internal and external developments. Rapid technological
progress,16 which transformed new media and the Internet into
weapons of diplomacy and effective tools of foreign policymaking,
pushed Moscow to re-consider a broad range of aspects related to
information security.
Those transformations can be summarized in the following way:
1. The new role of information. For Russian policymakers, the Internet

(as the cheapest and most effective means of transmitting information
irrespective of state borders) came to be seen as a powerful medium
for carrying out various “geopolitical tasks” (such as overthrowing
“legitimate political authorities,” in Russia’s view), promoting
ideology, and mobilizing/channeling public opinion. Furthermore,
the continuing ideologization of foreign policy (with “inter-
governmental” and “national-governmental” elements assuming a
prominent role) made the proper dissemination of information
absolutely essential;
2. The global “information space” as a zone of confrontation. From the

early 2010s, Russia contested the assumption of the “global
information/cyber space as a free area.” Speaking in the Russian
parliament (Duma) on April 20, 2011, Putin stated that “the main
Internet resources do not belong to us, they are located over the hill
[‘za bugrom’] or, to be more accurate, on the other side of the ocean.
This allows some special services to use these resources for their own
purposes.”17 As a result, many Russian theorists and practitioners
stressed the need to make Russia’s section of the Internet more
autonomous from the rest of the global network;
3. Information as a weapon of asymmetric response. Events on the

Bolotnaya Square (2011) and in the Middle East (from 2010 on) had a
mixed effect on Russian perceptions of information security. They
demonstrated that public protests could be “accelerated” with the help
of new media and “channeled” against existing political regimes. At
the same time, information came to be seen as a weapon of huge
destructive power in an asymmetric conflict with
militarily/economically/technologically superior adversaries. In this
regard, aggravating relations with the West spurned Russian elites
into intensifying their search for how to deal with opponents. These
debates began to reflect on the reasons behind the Soviet defeat in the
Cold War, summarized in the following citation: “having attained
military parity with the US, the USSR was defeated on the information
battlefield.”18
By the 2010s, Russian experts came to view the concept of

“information confrontation” as a combination of political, economic,
diplomatic and military means—but comprised of two essential
elements19:
1. Information-technological confrontation consisting of:
 Electronic Warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence;
 Electro-optical warfare (“Elektronno-opticheskaya voyna”);
 Acoustic warfare;
 Computer warfare (so-called “hackers’ warfare”).
2. Information-psychological confrontation, which envisages targeting:
 Consciousness;
 Neurological systems (both individual and collective,

including military formations);
 State ideology;
 National consciousness.
By the end of 2011, Russia’s search resulted in a number of findings

that contributed to the clarification of Russia’s role and place in the
global information space, the range of informational challenges faced
by the country, as well as steps to be taken in order to boost its status,
which included:
1. Recognition of the strategic importance of new media and social

networks for Russian national defense and security20;
2. A declaration of the state of “information war” and naming of the

“foes.” According to Vladimir Dobrenkov “our country [Russia] is in
a state of information warfare that is waged on her territory and in
regions that have traditionally been thought as a part of Russia’s
sphere of national interests (Ukraine, the Baltic States, the Caucasian
Republics and others)”;21
3. Identification of the main aims of information war “against Russia”:
 Destruction of the will and intellectual capabilities of the

political leadership of the Russian Federation;
 Demobilization of Russian society;
 Moral stagnation of Russian citizens;
4. An outline of the main outlets through which “information war”

will be waged: television, radio, newspapers, books, magazines, songs,
movies and popular culture. Strangely, some elements (such as the
Internet and various social networks) were rarely mentioned by
mainstream Russian theorists;
5. Identification of specific counter-measures and the mode of

operation. It was argued that Russian policies in the domain of
information security had to be coherent, multi-layered, goal-oriented
and highly centralized. The list of counter-measures included:
 Correct detection of the adversary’s weak spots (drawing on

interdisciplinary analysis of an adversary and its/their
capabilities);
 Employment of “active measures” (a clear reference to Soviet

practices);
 Ability to use preventive and pre-emptive measures

(developing offensive mechanisms);
 Rapid implementation of new analytical

methods/technologies (modernization and innovation) via
knowledge exchange and preparing of qualified specialists;
 Creation of a single organ/institution tasked with

coordinating Russia’s information policy (centralization).
In spite of the growing number of these and similar initiatives, the

legislative framework in the domain of information security (still
regulated by the Doctrine adopted in 2000), no longer corresponded
to the challenges as well as the extent of technological progress
attained by Russia and its competitors.
Aside from the already mentioned “Arab Spring,” it was the

“EuroMaidan” revolution in Kyiv (starting in late 2013) that once
again intensified discussions (and this time, engaged military elites)
on the new role of information within “new type” conflicts. Those
ideas were extensively discussed in an article by the chief of the
General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia and first deputy defense
minister, General Valery Gerasimov.22 Perhaps for the first time in
Russia’s post-1991 history, non-military components of
confrontation (including, among others, the “informational”
element) started to not merely be viewed on par, but even prioritized
in comparison with conventional means of warfare. Similarly, the role
of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu is worth highlighting. Due
to his personal advocacy, so-called “research units” (established in
2012/2013) were given a boost. These units (the 6th and 7th research
units in particular), created under the umbrella of the Russian Armed
Forces, should be viewed as a totally new element of information
confrontation, which could develop both offensive and defensive
mechanisms.23
Indeed, the Ukraine crisis was a turning point that allowed Russia to
merge theoretical achievements with practice and to test the offensive
side of its information security domain. The variety of measures
introduced by Moscow between 2013 and 2016 highlights the
“information/cyber revolution” that commenced in Russia within this
period.
During the first stage of the Ukraine crisis (November 2013–February

2014), Russian actions were mainly concerned with offensive
mechanisms of information-psychological confrontation that
included the creation of (dis)information outlets and the launch of

massive anti-Western/anti-Ukrainian propaganda. The second stage
(from March 2014 onward) witnessed warfare entering a qualitatively
new level. Using Ukraine as its “training ground,” Russia tested the
offensive side of its information and cyber capabilities by employing:
 an “information-psychological” element of information

warfare through (counter)propaganda, disinformation and
reflexive control techniques (leveled equally but with
different purpose against Ukraine and its Western allies); and
 an “information-technological” element, with cyberwarfare

and EW playing a decisive role (hacker attacks on various
governmental institutions, major enterprises, EW operations
against Ukrainian armed forces).
It is interesting to note that in the course of the Ukrainian events,

Russia ended up combining both elements, using the “cyber” and
“information” aspects of information warfare simultaneously.
Aside from the practical measures, the Russian government

intensified its discourse pertaining to the creation of a new
Information Doctrine (the first round of talks was initiated in 2013).
On October 1, 2014, President Putin and members of the Russian
Security Council discussed “problems related to counter-actions
against threats to Russia’s national security in the domain of
information security.”24 Moreover, the Military Doctrine of the
Russian Federation, adopted at the end of 2014, identified
“information” as an integral ingredient for achieving “military-
political objectives.”25
The external factor must also not be downplayed. In late April 2015,
the United States adopted a new Cyber Strategy, triggering an outcry
of discontent from Russia, where the document was construed as an
anti-Russian project.26 Additionally, ongoing Russian disinformation
enticed several prominent international media and investigative news

agencies (including Google NewsLab, Bellingcat, DigDeeper,
Eyewitness Media Hub, Emergent, Meedan, Reported.ly, Storyful and
Verification Junkie) to unite under the roof of a joint project dubbed
“First Draft News” (June 2015), which was subsequently supported by
Amnesty International, the American Press Institute, The New York
Times, The Washington Post, The Telegraph, Le Monde, CNN and Al
Jazeera. The purpose of this alliance was primarily concerned with
combating fake news and disinformation, which the Russian side
recognized as an open challenge and a direct threat to Moscow’s
titanic efforts in the domain of (counter)propaganda aimed at the
external audience.27 At the same time, however, Russia felt threatened
at the prospect of the European Union and the United State joining
their efforts in confronting/containing Russian
propaganda/disinformation, thus isolating Moscow and reducing its
target audience to only the domestic segment. These concerns were
reflected in the new “National Security Strategy” (December 2015),
which stated that “independent conduct of foreign and domestic
policy by the Russian Federation is causing counter-actions from the
side of the United States and its allies, aspiring to preserve their
dominant position in global affairs. Their policy of containment of
Russia envisages exertion of political, economic and informational
pressure.”28
It is also imperative to mention the broader context in which work on

the text of the new Information Doctrine was conducted. November
2016 witnessed renewed confrontation between Russia and the West
triggered by alleged Russian cyberattacks against analytical centers
and think tanks inside the United States, the broader US presidential
election campaign, as well as governmental institutions in the EU and
Ukraine. This caused a wave of alarm among European policymakers,
urging the European Parliament to adopt a resolution (November 23)
aiming to consolidate the European countries in countering
“propaganda by third parties” and naming Russia as one of the main
culprits.29 Although non-binding, the European Parliament’s
resolution nonetheless sparked a great deal of discontent in Moscow.

Commenting on this decision, Putin accused the EU of a “violation of
the rights and freedoms of Russian journalists working abroad”30 and
a visible sign of the “degradation of European democracy.”
Later, in his address to the Federation Council (the upper chamber of

the Russian Parliament), on December 1, 2016, Putin specifically
underscored the development of the domestic IT industry, the
elaboration of defensive IT mechanisms, and the boosting of
cybersecurity as Russia’s strategic objectives in the domain of
information security.31 Incidentally, information security (its
offensive element) became one of the main themes outlined in the
Russian government’s Foreign Policy Concept (adopted on December
1, 2016).32 At the same time, in the beginning of December 2016,
Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) “uncovered” a plot allegedly
staged by “foreign special services” that “were preparing massive
cyberattacks against the Russian financial system” by hacking the
webpages and official online portals of VTB Bank (element of
cyberwarfare) and by “sending provocative messages” (element of
information-psychological warfare), aiming to discredit the solvency
of the Russian financial credit system.33
Assessing Russia’s New Information Security Doctrine: Nuts and

Bolts
The new “Doctrine of Information Security” reflects Russian national

interests and official posture toward the goals and principles framing
its information security policy. The Doctrine specifically identifies
itself as a “document of strategic planning in the domain of Russia’s
national security,”34 thus its scope and meaning are much broader
than might appear on the surface. In comparison with previous
iterations, the latest Russian information security doctrine contains
numerous crucial distinctions.
New Concepts
First of all, it introduces a number of concepts (both brand new as well

as previously mentioned but repackaged) that have in many ways
reshaped Russian policies in the information security domain. For
instance, the Doctrine finally includes a discussion of the Internet
(absent previously), thus underscoring the growing number of
Internet users in Russia, rising technological progress, as well as the
increasingly critical role new media plays in terms of information
delivery, transmission and dissemination.
Six other crucial new concepts in the December 2016 Doctrine

include:
1. The information sphere (“informatsionnaya sfera”), which makes up

a broad spectrum of elements, including “information,
informatization objects, information systems and websites within the
information and telecommunications network of the Internet,
communications networks, information technologies.”35
2. The national interests (“natsionalnye interesy”) of the Russian

Federation in the information sphere/space.36 The notion encompasses
a broad range of topics and issues that reflect shifts and
transformations within Russian information security during 2010–
2016, such as:37
 IT and external influence. The document points to the use of

IT to preserve Russian cultural, historical and moral-spiritual
values (“dukhovno-nravstvennye tsennosti”) and traditions.38
As such, it links the “conservative turn” that promulgated in
Russia since the 2010s with the information security domain;
 Import substitution, upgrades to the level of protection of

Russian domestic IT infrastructure and common electric grid,
as well as an emphasis on the development of R&D;39
 Promotion of Russian national interests, domestically and

abroad. Referring to the necessity of developing counter-
propaganda as well as counter-containment techniques, tools
and measures, this segment stresses the vital importance of
defending the “sovereignty of the Russian Federation in the
information domain”40 and preserving “national security in
the domain of culture.”41
Perhaps, the most crucial element is the necessity to maintain the

“steady functioning of the Russian Federation’s information
infrastructure (primarily, critical information infrastructure) during
both peace and war time.”42 Based on previous evidence (in particular,
Russian activities during the Zapad 2013 strategic military exercises),
the inclusion of this aspect suggests Moscow is likely to intensify drills
and exercises aimed at preparing its information infrastructure for a
potential military conflict. This could be carried out under the guise
of various war games/military exercises. For instance, on September
10–12, 2017 (during Zapad 2017), Russian authorities practiced large-
scale evacuations of civilian objects and institutions in major cities
across the country43; such drills could certainly be linked with the
above-mentioned aspect of the Doctrine.
3. The threat (“ugroza”) to information security of the Russian

Federation, understood as factors/activities that can pose a danger to
Russia’s national interests in the information space.44
4. Information security (“informatsionnaya bezopasnost”) of the

Russian Federation that emphasizes “sovereignty, territorial integrity,
steady socio-economic growth […], defense and security of the
state.”45 In effect, this term was directly borrowed from the 2015
National Security Strategy document, which, in turn, undoubtedly
was heavily shaped by the “Arab Spring,” the EuroMaidan and

subsequent events in southeastern Ukraine.
5. The forces (“sily”), means (“sredstva”) and system (“system”) tasked

with ensuring the maintenance of information security (“obezpechenie
informatsionnoy bezopasnosti”) of the Russian Federation.46 Taken
together, these elements consist of:
 An inter-linked, coherent and mutually-supportive set of

measures (including forecasting, detection, containment,
forestalling and deflection, as well as dealing with the
consequences of “anti-Russian” information and
cyberattacks) aimed at coordinating and implementation
Russia’s information security policies;
 Forces (security forces, government bodies, local authorities)

tasked with control and supervision of these policies;
 Means (legal, organizational, technical) to be employed by

forces tasked with the supervision of the state’s information
security;
6. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) of the Russian Federation

(“Kriticheskaya informatsionnaya ifrastruktura”), which is defined as
a “a compendium of informatization objects, information systems,
Internet websites and communication networks located on the
territory of the Russian Federation as well as on territories under the
jurisdiction of the Russian Federation or used under international
treaties signed by the Russian Federation.”47 This notion is crucial
since it de jure renders certain specific foreign territories to be a part
of Russia’s domestic CII, which exponentially broadens the
geographic scope (from East-Central Europe to Central Asia and the
Middle East) to which this concept can theoretically be applied. It also
means that Russia gives itself the right to activate both defensive and
offensive mechanisms in response to dangers to its CII (even

regarding elements not physically present inside Russia’s
internationally recognized borders).
Information Security Domain Threats
Secondly, the Doctrine pays significant attention to threats faced by

the Russian Federation in the information security domain. At this
juncture, it is interesting to note that Russia views unrestricted trans-
border information exchange (“transgranichnyi oborot
informatsyi”)—that is, the free exchange of information across state
lines—as primarily associated with risks and threats to the state in
geopolitical, security and military-political domains. This is amplified
when important IT components are acquired from abroad, since they
could be used by opponents to undermine Russian information
security.
Analysis of the Doctrine reveals at least four perils Russia deems

crucial to defend against:
1. Information-technology threats posed by foreign countries. Those are

reflected in “the accretion by some foreign countries of capabilities
that can be used for the purpose of affecting the critical infrastructure
of the Russian Federation for achieving military objectives... [as well
as to carry out a] technical intelligence search against Russian state
institutions, scientific organizations, [and Russia’s] Military
Industrial Complex.”48 This is seen by Moscow as part of a broader
strategy pursued by “foreign countries” aspiring to employ
information technologies for “military-political purposes,” including
steps aimed at undermining “Russian sovereignty, territorial integrity
and political stability”;49
2. Information-psychological threats posed by special services of foreign

countries.50 Here, three main elements are emphasized. First, the role
of “special services of foreign states” and “religious, ethnic, human

rights and other NGOs [non-governmental organizations]” in
applying “information-psychological pressure aimed at the
destabilization of the political and social situation… [or to violate] the
territorial integrity of countries.” Second, activities performed by the
above-mentioned actors for the purpose of using the Russian
information space for their purposes. Third, exploitation of CII by
terrorist and extremist organizations51 “to influence individual, group
and public consciousness; instigate inter-ethnic and social tensions;
[spark] ethnic or religious hatred or hostility; [or to] spread extremist
ideology.” These aspects once again draw on Ukrainian events and the
“Arab Spring” (which Moscow ascribes to destructive Western
activities).
3. Technological inferiority of the Russian Federation in comparison

with leading global IT players. This stems from the low
competitiveness of most Russian IT products, insufficient levels of
integration of domestically produced products in Russia’s industry, as
well as inadequately low levels of R&D in the IT domain.52 Taken
together, these factors hamper Russia’s efforts to overcome its
dependency on foreign IT (elements, components, software). This
state of affairs enables “certain states” to, on the one hand, “use their
technological dominance for the purpose of achieving their
geopolitical objectives” (pointed out by Putin in 2011). And on the
other hand, as noted in the Doctrine, these factors contribute to
keeping “socio-economic development of the Russian Federation
under dependence of geopolitical ambitions of foreign countries”; this
is mainly as a result of economic sanctions imposed by the West in the
aftermath of Russian activities in Ukraine and Russia’s illegal
annexation of Crimea.
4. Jeopardy of Russian counter-propaganda efforts associated with

“open discrimination that Russian mass media and Russian
journalists are facing abroad.”53 Undoubtedly, the inclusion of this
aspect was motivated by measures taken by the EU and the US to
combat Russian propaganda and disinformation efforts. As

mentioned earlier, a combination of public diplomacy,54 think
tanks/non-governmental organizations, and “Russian societies”
operating abroad with the support of multi-lingual information
outlets constitute the main source of Russian “soft power” targeting
external audiences—an element that was first emphasized in the first
Doctrine (2000).
Areas of Strategic Importance
Thirdly, the document outlines areas of strategic importance that

consist of:
 National defense;
 State and social security;
 Economic sphere;
 Science, technology and education;
 Strategic stability and equitable strategic partnership.
The Doctrine underscores that all the above-mentioned areas face

numerous challenges stemming from both internal deficiencies and
external threats, which nevertheless have a common denominator—a
policy of containment pursued by the West. Therefore, current
policies of the Russian Federation in these areas (given their strategic
importance and technological-informational nature) are concerned
with minimizing risks and threats. This primarily means that reliance
on the Soviet experience (hedging from “external influence”) will be
increased. This is most visible in the national security and defense
domain. For instance, the creation of the National Defense Control
Center (NDCC), on December 1, 2014, claimed by Russian sources to
be superior in comparison with foreign analogues (including the

Pentagon), fully complies with this policy and should be seen as a de
facto incarnation of Russia´s most up-to-date “cyber” element of
information confrontation. The Center’s architecture is comprised of
73 federal and regional executive branch organs as well as 1,320 public
and private firms from the military industrial complex (MIC).55
Russian sources also claim the NDCC has a Supercomputer operating
at a speed of 16 petaflops that is virtually immune to any type of
cyberattack(s); reportedly, its hardware and software are capable of
modeling crisis situations inside Russia and “everywhere in the
world.” Putin underscored that the NDCC will “work for all members
of the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization—a Moscow-led
regional alliance],”56 thus reiterating key provisions related to CII,
engrained in the new Information Security Doctrine. Another notable
example of the same trend pertains to work on a “military internet”
and other types of communication designed for the Russian Armed
Forces in order to “autonomate” internal information exchanges and
minimize the threat of information being hacked/intercepted or
damaged/corrupted.
Strengthening Capabilities in Five Key Strategic Dimensions
Fourthly, the document presents five strategic dimensions where

Russia has to strengthen its capabilities:
1. In the field of national defense, strategic priority is “to protect the

vital interests of the individual, society and the state from both
internal and external threats related to the use of information
technologies for military and political purposes,” including “hostile
actions and acts of aggression that undermine sovereignty and
territorial integrity.”57
This goal is to be achieved by pursuing the following measures:58

 Strategic deterrence/containment and prevention of military

conflicts resulting from the use of information technologies
(defensive element);
 Beefing up capabilities in the area of information security of

the Russian Armed Forces (in particular, units/segments
related to information confrontation). Presumably, this task
will be primarily conferred to “research units,” “cyber troops”
and EW troops (including EW spetsnaz, created in Russia’s
Western Military District59). They will be charged with
forecasting, detection and analysis of information threats
faced by the Armed Forces (which adds an element of
strategic planning and boosts the Russian military’s defensive,
offensive, as well as counter-offensive capabilities);
 Protecting the interests of allies of the Russian Federation in

the domain of information security. The notion (“allies”) was
not explained. Yet, on the basis of other parts of the Doctrine,
it appears that the geographic scope of the concept is
extremely broad, including some members of the CSTO and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as well as
certain state actors in the Middle East. Additionally, this point
draws on Russia’s readiness to use offensive and counter-
offensive mechanisms of information confrontation on behalf
of third parties;
 Neutralizing information-psychological pressure “leveled

against historical and patriotic traditions concerned with the
defense of the Motherland.”60 In this regard, the so-called
“Youth Army” (Yunarmia)61—tasked with the “military-
patriotic upbringing” of Russian youth—should be allocated
particular attention. A lesser, but still important role is
ascribed to various military-patriotic groups and
organizations such as the AntiMaidan movement (emerged
in 2015) and the Cossack movement, whose geographical area

of activities has spread dramatically in the aftermath of the
Ukraine crisis beginning in 2014.
2. In the field of state and public security, the key objectives are the
need “to protect the sovereignty, maintain the political and social
stability, and [defend the] territorial integrity of the Russian
Federation” as well as “to protect the critical information
infrastructure” of the state.62
Realization of these objectives rests on implementation of counter-

measures in:63
 The information-psychological domain, where the effort

should be leveled against “extremist ideology, xenophobia,
and ideas of national exceptionalism for the purposes of
undermining sovereignty and political and social stability,
forcibly changing the constitutional order, and violating the
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”64 This sub-
section contains an implicit but important allusion to the
United States (“national exceptionalism”) and its European
allies such as Ukraine, Poland and the three Baltic States,
portrayed by Russian propaganda as Russophobic, far-right
and ruled by illegitimate regimes. Emphasis is once again
placed on the necessity to “neutralize the information impact
that aims to erode Russia’s traditional moral and spiritual
values”; 65
 The information-technology domain, where the most crucial

elements are protection of CII against activities of “foreign
states, special services and individuals,” as well as the
facilitation of a unified telecommunications network for the
Russian Federation;66
 The military-industrial domain, which emphasizes

“improving the methods and techniques of the
manufacturing and safe functioning of types of arms and
munitions and automatized systems of control.”67
3. In the field of economics, the main objective outlined in the Doctrine

boils down to the “minimization of negative factors stipulated by an
inadequate level of development of the domestic IT and electronics
industry,”68 which may, among other things, be related to the adverse
effect of economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West in 2014.
This target is expected to be reached by implementing the following

policies:
 Import-substitution and a drastic reduction of Russian

industry’s dependency on foreign IT products;
 Emphasis on innovative developments of IT and electronics,

with the prospect of increasing the overall share of this sector
in Russia’s GDP, and subsequent higher penetration of the
global market;
 Increase in the competitiveness of Russian companies by

creating proper conditions and a more favorable material
base.
The prioritization of this field was not only shaped by sanctions, but
clearly stemmed from Russian experience gained during the Ukraine
crisis. The success of Russian information-technology warfare in the
Ukrainian theater (leveled both against military and civilian targets)
was secured by Ukraine’s dependence on Russian-produced IT
products, Internet search tools (such as Yandex) and gadgets that
rendered Ukrainian information/cyber security susceptible to Russian
actions.
4. In the field of science, technology and education,69 the Doctrine puts

special emphasis on R&D in the information security sector,
simultaneously underscoring perhaps the most acute problem Russia
currently faces—the lack of qualified domestic IT experts and
specialists. Given the unattractiveness of labor condition at Russian
firms or for the government in comparison with leading international
IT players, this issue might constitute one of the most serious
challenges to meeting the goals outlined in the Doctrine. Most likely,
the “research units” (employing an element of head-hunting) created
under the umbrella of the Russian Armed Forces will be tasked with
coping with this issue (thus partly replicating Soviet-era practices).
The Doctrine also mentions the “formation of an individual culture of
information security,”70 but does not clarify what this means.
However, on the basis of supplementary research, this objective may
include (among other things) establishing a comprehensive grass-root
system for recruiting those with a high aptitude for specialization in
IT. Partly, this is reflected in Russian secondary school curriculums
(currently, on an experimental basis) that stipulate integrating courses
on the basics of cyber/information security.71 Finally, a rather unusual
phenomenon emerged in Russian in 2016—the so-called “Cossack
cyber regiments,” which were assembled and trained under the roof
of the K. G. Razumovsky Moscow State University of Technologies
and Management (the First Cossack University).72 This may have
represented a continuation of the same strategy.
5. In the field of strategic stability,73 the document underscores that the

primary objectives are ensuring the “sovereignty of the Russian
Federation in the information space” and “[promoting] the position
of the Russian Federation in international organizations”; to some
extent, these goals intersect with the previously mentioned points.
Most importantly, this section of the Doctrine points to the necessity
of “developing a national system for managing the Russian segment
of the Internet,”74 thus addressing the so-called Runet (Russian-
language segment of the Internet). Aside from confronting external

factors, this initiative should be seen as a crucial element in Russia’s
regional integration efforts via the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
Specifically, with Russia taking the major role in the EEU in terms of
information/cyber security, the Runet becomes the main tool for
increasing the international role of the Russian language within most
of the post-Soviet space.
Division of Responsibilities Among Government Agencies
Fifth, the Doctrine establishes a multi-dimensional hierarchical

framework that identifies the institutions and agencies responsible for
maintaining Russian information security, which is acknowledged as
an integral part of Russia’s broader national security.75 Notably, the
document states that the Russian president has the power to
“determine the entire structure of the information security system.”76
Thus, the Doctrine presents:
1. The upper (institutional) level consisting of:77
 The Council of the Federation (upper chamber of

parliament);
 The State Duma (lower chamber of parliament);
 The Government of the Russian Federation;
 The Security Council of the Russian Federation;
 Federal executive bodies;
 The Central Bank of the Russian Federation;

 The Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian

Federation;
 Inter-agency bodies established by the President and

Government of the Russian Federation;
 Executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian

Federation (oblasts, krais, republics, etc.);
 Local governments and judicial bodies involved in

information security activities.
2. The lower (participatory/auxiliary) level comprised of:
 Owners of critical information objects as well as

organizations operating such objects;
 Mass media and mass communications;
 Monetary, foreign currency, banking and other financial

institutions;
 Telecommunication operators;
 Information system operators;
 Organizations that create and operate information and

communications systems;
 Organizations that develop, produce and operate information

security tools;
 Organizations that provide information security services;

 Organizations that provide education services in this sphere;
 Public associations and other organizations and individuals

involved in information security.
It is worth noticing that the document does not clarify the role/status
of “cyber-squads” (kiberdryzhiny), an initiative launched in 2011
(which now involves 20,000 “volunteers” in 36 regions of the Russian
Federation).78 Nor does it address the Russian National Guard
(Rosgvardia), which has been given additional powers in the realm of
information security. For the rest, the Doctrine presents a
sophisticated and all-encompassing framework comprised of bodies,
institutions and agencies acting on a hierarchical principle. It also
argues for “maintaining a balance between citizens’ demands for the
free exchange of information and restrictions related to national
security.”79 In effect, this means that individual rights and freedoms
can (and will) be limited/abridged for the purpose of maintaining
information security.
The Doctrine also outlines the tasks and functions80 that the above-
mentioned institutions and agencies are expected to perform on a
routine basis. These include a broad range of responsibilities:
assessing the actual state of information security,
forecasting/detecting information threats, overcoming their adverse
effects, coordinating activities between various information security
forces (including legal, organizational, operative investigative,
intelligence, counter-intelligence, scientific and technical,
informational and analytical tasks), as well as calculating state-
sponsored support for non-state organizations operating in the
domain of information security.
In addition to these measures, the document outlines steps for

“developing and improving the information security system”81 that
the government bodies are to attain in the future.
In this regard, the following key areas are distinguished:
 The centralization and coordination of forces by establishing

“vertical management” consisting of federal, inter-regional,
regional and municipal levels (again, the Soviet tradition is
apparent here);
 Regular practical drills as a means to boost the level of

interaction between information security forces (an apparent
parallel with NATO policies could be drawn);
 Inter-institutional interconnections between governmental

(state institutions), local (local governance), collective (at the
level of various organizations) and individual (between
individuals) levels.
The document does not explicitly identify the time frame the above-
mentioned steps are to be implemented. Although, it is stated that “in
order to keep these documents updated, the Security Council of the
Russian Federation shall compile a list of medium-term priority areas
of information security.”82 However, given the pace of technological
progress in the domain of information security as well as worsening
political relations with Western counterparts, and the growing fear of
internal destabilization (which can be precipitated with the help of
new media), objectives set for a “mid-term” prospect might be
implemented within a short-term period. In this regard, it would be
worthwhile to study the quick progress attained by the EW segment
of Russia’s Armed Forces.
Impact of the Doctrine and Future of Russian Information

Security
The adoption of the new Information Security Doctrine had

surprisingly little impact on public or academic policy debates in
Russia. Moreover, many domestic specialists and experts (some of

them quite prominent) construed the Doctrine as either “dated”83 or
“unlikely to become a guide for practical steps.”84 However, Russian
military theorists seemed to evaluate the document’s content as much
more comprehensive and far-reaching. For instance, the editor-in-
chief of the military magazine Natsionalnaya Oborona, Igor
Korotchenko, claimed the document exemplifies Russia’s ability to
outpace its competitors. Reflecting on the new Doctrine and its
meaning, the expert stated, “Today, we can see that a number of
foreign states, primarily the United States and other members of
NATO, are actively developing their cyber operations capabilities for
achieving military objectives or to be able to destabilize the economic
and socio-political situation, including by exerting pressure on the
Russian Federation.” Korotchenko particularly emphasized that,
“under the auspices of NATO, specialized centers are created that are
tasked with waging cyberwarfare. These are the NATO Cooperative
Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, in Tallinn, and the Strategic
Communications Center of Excellence, in Riga. At this juncture, the
emergence of the Doctrine of Information Security represents a
tangible step forward for Russia, Korotchenko argued, because it
creates a powerful network that enables the Russian side to trace,
prevent and deal with the consequences of cyberattacks, as well as
helps to neutralize cyber threats.”85
Indeed, since the end of 2013, this viewpoint (though subjective and
containing questionable points) clearly reflects Russia’s official
posture on information security. The document contains a number of
general trends that offer insight into how the Russian information
domain will continue to develop over the next 3–5 years.
US/NATO-centric approach in Russian information policy. The

Doctrine (as an integral supplement to other strategic documents)
identifies the United States as the main source of threat to Russian
“information sovereignty.” Commenting on the Doctrine, member of
the ruling United Russia political party Sergei Zheleznyak blatantly
stated that this document is a response to “the US and its European

partners, which have launched genuine information warfare against
Russia, including [by attacking] its mass media and constantly
accusing [Moscow] of non-existent aggression.”86 At the same time, it
is difficult to overlook the presence of various elements (such as, for
example, the role of information technology in command and
control) that appear to have been influenced by the US experience. At
this juncture, Russia’s next move can be expected to officially
distinguish the “cyber” layer as a separate pillar within the
information security domain. Incidentally, the Russian Federation
Council’s original (beginning of 2014) resolution that formed the
backbone of the new “Information Security Doctrine” was entitled
“The Concept of a Cyber Security Strategy of the Russian
Federation.”87 But it seems that the word “cyber” was ultimately
dropped in favor of “information” because of Russian unfamiliarity
with the concept (and the Western etymology of the word) as well as
difficulties with formulating a “cyber doctrine’s” key principles.
Protection of information security as a basis for geopolitical influence

in its neighborhood. Having introduced the notion of CII, the Doctrine
explicitly empowers Russia to use its offensive and counter-offensive
potential in the information security domain while protecting the
interests of its allies. This is a crucial aspect. Given the fact that the
text of the document does not discuss the issue in-depth, retaining a
share of ambiguity, this leaves the Russian side useful room for
maneuver on the various ways that this point could be construed.
Here, it is worth recalling Russian legislation on protecting “Russian
compatriots abroad” as well as instances of Russian involvement in
the affairs of sovereign countries under this pretext (most notably,
Georgia and Ukraine). Given this element of the Doctrine, the next
step made by Russia could include the recognition of cyber threats as
tantamount to armed threats, thus creating a new foundation for
Russia’s potential involvement in the domestic affairs of other
countries.
“Militarization” of information. A thesis presented by Chief of the

General Staff Gerasimov that “information resources have become the
most effective weapon” and “an essential element of hybrid warfare”88
forms one of the most essential pillars of the Doctrine. The document
presents a clear delineation between two main parts (technological
and psychological) of a so-called “information confrontation.” And
each of them is deemed to be of crucial importance in terms of “new
type warfare.” Moreover, given Russian objectives during the so-
called “initial period of conflict”—gaining control over the
information space of an adversary via “information
blockade/dominance”—the issue of information security becomes a
critical factor for attaining complete and decisive success. Similarly,
EW capabilities (also seen as a part of information security) are viewed
as an integral part of Russia’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial strategy, as
tested in Kaliningrad Oblast.89 On top of that, given current trends in
Russian national security, there is every reason to believe that the EW
branch will assume the leading role in terms of information security
and its example is likely to be used by other branches of strategic
importance.
The Doctrine as a foundation for further actions. Despite some

assessments to the contrary, practical steps conducted by the Russian
side suggest that the document is likely to be used as the basis for
future legislation addressing the information security domain.
Indeed, speaking in late 2016, Nikolay Nikiforov, the head of the
Ministry of Telecom and Mass Communications of the Russian
Federation, noted that it will take time to understand the way the
Doctrine will be implemented and, if necessary, new laws will
complement the document.90 And already since then, Russia has
adopted the “Strategy for the Development of an Information Society
for 2017–2030,”91 the Law on “Security of Critical Infrastructure”92 (in
July 2017) as well as a number of less significant pieces of legislation.
Moreover, the Doctrine implies that some structural changes could
take place. Namely, point 38 reads, “The findings from monitoring of
the implementation of the Doctrine are to be reflected in the annual
report on national security presented by the Secretary of the Security

Council of the Russian Federation to the President of the Russian
Federation.” This shows that, despite the creation of an “information
management vertical,” the system will remain somewhat incomplete
without a central organ/agency managing Russia’s information
security domain on a routine basis.
Emphasis on the defensive side of the “cyber” aspect. Given significant

progress attained in the domain of information-psychological
operations and EW (both tested in Ukraine), the next area likely to
receive a boost may be the information-technological domain, with
clear priority given to a defensive side of “cyber security” (in the
Western reading of this notion). Following the example of the United
States (once again highlighting Russia’s fixation on the US
experience), the Russian side is likely to concentrate its efforts on
boosting the following elements:
 Protection Capabilities (including Computer Security and

Information Security);
 Detection Capabilities;
 Reaction Capabilities.
Conclusions
Throughout the course of its post-1917 history, the Soviet Union (and
contemporary Russia, although to a lesser extent) repeatedly
demonstrated high proficiency in tactical operations thanks to its
ability to effectively concentrate/divert and use the required resources
for specific goals/objectives. Yet, despite this string of successes, the
cumulative effect did not necessarily bring lasting victories.
By extensively relying on Soviet-era methods, the current Russian

leadership is likely to commit similar mistakes as its historical
predecessor. First, by prioritizing the military branch, the Russian side
may undermine civilian informational security needs, thus creating a
dichotomy in development, which was one of the most distinctive
traits of the Soviet period. Similarly, a visible lack of competition could
lead to a degradation in the commercial attractiveness of Russian IT
products (since their most advanced innovations will routinely be
restricted for military use). Incidentally, these were among the most
crucial factors preventing the Soviet Union from achieving a
breakthrough in the domain of information security and being able to
catch up with the US.93 At first glance, it might appear that the
contemporary Russian strategy has undergone visible changes.
However, those have been mainly cosmetic, largely preserving the
Soviet-legacy substance. The current “Information Security Doctrine”
explicitly argues for needed progress in upgrading the
competitiveness of Russia’s IT industry, via import-substitution and
autonomation of the Russian information space. While, partly logical,
this approach still looks flawed because of, as noted above, the
authorities’ Soviet-legacy inclination toward overemphasizing
military requirements and limiting commercial competition.
Second, though presenting a clear framework of which

agencies/institutions are responsible for aspects of Russian
information security, the Doctrine failed to differentiate the
separation of powers between these structures. Even more important,
however, is the issue of responsibility-sharing between the “military”
and “civilian” branches when it comes to ensuring Russian
information security, not to mention the question of the supervision
of their respective responsibilities. The current Doctrine ascribes
responsibility for domestic information security to every
agency/institution/organization/individual involved in this domain,
which seems rather dubious and probably not feasible in terms of
management and coordination.
Impressive as they may initially appear, Russian policies in the

domain of information security will likely be very effective in the short
to medium term, but perhaps less so over a longer period. Ambitious
projects undertaken in the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation
have one historically common feature: frequently effective in the
beginning, those initiatives ultimately tended to be diluted due to a
number of objective (lack of resources, red tape and excessive
bureaucratization) as well as subjective (changing posture of political
leadership on the issue and/or rivalries between institutions/agencies
in charge) factors. This has generally led to decreasing effectiveness of
the initiatives. On the basis of current trends visible in Russia—aging
political elites, growing corruption and an excessive tilt toward
militarization—the likelihood of implementing all the points of the
Doctrine in practical terms looks improbable. The most likely
scenario will be for Russia to choose the most essential aspects
(primarily related to the development of offensive capabilities in the
domain of information security) and prioritizing these over other,
“less important” elements.
Notes
1
For more information see: Igor Panarin, Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya
voyna. Razval SSSR, (Saint Petersburg: Piter, 2010).
2
The text is available here (in Russian): Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii ot
05.12.2016 № 646 “Ob utverzhdenii Doktriny informatsionnoy bezopasnosti
Rossiyskoy Federacii,” December 6, 2016, Moscow, Kremlin,
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201612060002.
3
Mariya Vasilyeva, “Informatsionnaya bezopasnost Rossii v usloviyah globalizatsii,”
Vestnik MGLU 25, 604 (2010): 31.
4
“Munkhenskaya rech Putina,” YouTube, accessed June 18, 2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bMnVVuoQiUo.
5
Incidentally, it was due to terrible performance of Russian media during this
conflict that made President Yeltsin to publicly (and for the first time in Russia’s
post-1991 history) admit that nuclear deterrence along with measures in terms of
information warfare were two prime tasks of Russian national security. For more
information see: Igor Panarin, “Sistema vneshnepoliticheskoy propagandy Rossii,”
Panarin.com, accessed November 17, 2017, http://panarin.com/info_voina/88-
sistema-vneshnepoliticheskoy-propagandy-rossii.html.
6
Yuliy Nisnevich, “Gosudarstvennaya informatsionnaya politika Rossii segodnya I
zavtra,” Informatsionnoe obshchestvo 2 (1999): 4-9,
http://emag.iis.ru/arc/infosoc/emag.nsf/BPA/8f09435324753a65c32568ba004420d3.
7
Lev Roytman, “Informatsionnaya bezopasnost: ne v krasote, a v polnote,” Radio
Svoboda, September 19, 2000, https://www.svoboda.org/a/24202675.html.
8
Doktrina informacionnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federacii (utverzhdennaya
Prezidentom RF September 9, 2000, N Pr-1895), For more information see:
http://base.garant.ru/182535/.
9
Ekaterina Mikhaylovskaya, “Besplatnoe RIA byvaet tolko…” Grani.ru, December
17, 2000, https://graniru.org/Society/Media/Freepress/m.2820.html.
10
“V Rossii sozdan propagandistskiy telekanal dlya inostrantsev,” Lenta.ru, June 7,
2005, https://lenta.ru/news/2005/06/07/channel/.
11
Igor Panarin, Informatsionnaya voyna i Rossiya, (Moscow: Mir bezopasnosti,
2000), 160.
12
L. Polskikh, “O primenenii globalnoy kompyuternoy seti internet v interesakh
informatsionnogo protivoborstva,” Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie, № 7 (2005).
13
A. Manoylo, A. Petrenko, D. Frolov, Gosudarstvennaya informatsionnaya politika
v usloviyakh informatsionno-psikhologicheskoy voyny, (Moscow: MIFI, 2003).
14
Andrey Manoylo, Gosudarstvennaya informatsionnaya politika v osobykh
usloviyakh, (Moscow: MIFI, 2003), 246.
15
Irina Vasilenko, “Informatsionnaya voyna kak faktor mirovoy politiki,”
Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba, № 3, (2009): 81.
16
For example, by 2014 the pool of Internet users in Russia reached 80 million
people, whereas Russia occupied 6th global position (and 1st in Europe) in terms of
number of active Internet users.
17
“Doktrina informatsionnoy bezopasnosti RF. Dosie,” TASS, December 6, 2016,
http://tass.ru/info/3845810.
18
Alexei Maruev, “Informatsionnaya bezopasnost Rossii i osnovy organizatsii
informatsionnogo protivoborstva,” Problemny Analiz i Gosudarstvenno-
Upravlencheskoe Proektirovanie, №1, Т.3 (2010): 49.
19
Ibid.
20
Evgeniy Kulikov, “Stikhiynye protsessy internet-kommunikatsy kak faktor ugrozy
informatsionnoy bezopasnosti Rossii,” Usloviya i perspektivy natsionalnoy
bezopasnosti sovremennoy Rossii, (Moscow, 2011): 132.
21
E. Andreev, V. Sergeev, “Problemy formirovaniya kulturnoy bezopasnosti v
sovremennykh usloviyakh sotsialnykh izmeneniy,” Usloviya i perspektivy
natsionalnoy bezopasnosti sovremennoy Rossii, (Moscow, 2011): 132.
22
Valeri Gerasimov, “Tsennost nauki v predvidenii,” Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier,
№ 8 (476), February 27, 2013, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.
23
Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia Playing Catch-Up in Cyber Security,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume: 13, Issue: 172, October 26, 2016,
https://jamestown.org/program/russia-playing-catch-cyber-security/.
24
“Putin zastupilsya za Internet,” Tvzvezda.ru, October 1, 2014,
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201410011040-fucn.htm.
25
“Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, Federalny vypusk
№6570 (298), paragraph 12, December 30, 2014, https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-
dok.html.
26
Elena Chernenko, “SSHA opredelilis s virtualnymi vragami,” Kommersant.ru,
April 30, 2015 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2720392.
27
“Rossiya zanyala pervoe mesto v mire po gosudarstvennym zatratam na
propaganda,” Pravda-tv.ru, September 14, 2013, http://www.pravda-
tv.ru/2013/09/14/26749/rossiya-zanyala-pervoe-mesto-v-mire-po-gosudarstvenny-
m-zatratam-na-propagandu.
28
“Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, December 31, 2015, № 683 “O strategii
natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” point 12, Rossiyskaya gazeta,
December 31, 2015, https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html.
29
“European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic
communication to counteract propaganda against it by third parties
(2016/2030(INI)),” EU strategic communication to counteract anti-EU propaganda
by third parties, (Brussels, November 23, 2016), accessed December 1, 2017,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-
0441&format=XML&language=EN.
30
“Putin o rezolyutsii Evroparlamenta: khochu pozdravit zhurnalistov RT i
Sputnik,” RIA novosti, November 23, 2016,
https://ria.ru/society/20161123/1482009865.html.
31
Poslanie Prezidenta Federalnomu Sobraniyu, December 1, 2016, Moscow, Kremlin.
Available at: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53379.
32
Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 30.11.2016 № 640 “Ob utverzhdenii
Kontsepcii vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” December 1, 2016, Moscow,
Kremlin. Available at:
33
Federalnaya Sluzhba bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Inostrannye spetssluzhby
gotovyat kiberataki, napravlennye na destabilizatsiyu finansovoy sistemy Rossii,
December 2, 2016,
http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/press/message/single.htm%21id%3D10438041%40fsbMessage
.html.
34
“Doktrina informatsionnoy bezopasnosti RF. Dosie,” TASS, December 6, 2016:
http://tass.ru/info/3845810.
35
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 1, December 5,
2016, Moscow, Kremlin, http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-
36
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 2, sub-point a.
37
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 8.
38
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point a.
39
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point c.
40
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point e.
41
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point d.
42
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point b.
43
“Pochemu v rossiyskikh gorodakh sutki – massovye evakuatsii (eto ne ucheniya),”
Ura.ru, September 12, 2017, https://ura.news/articles/1036272216?story_id=390.
44
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 2, sub-point b.
45
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 2, sub-point c.
46
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 2, sub-points d–
g.
47
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point h.
48
49
50
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, points 12–13.
51
In accordance with the “Yarovaya Package” (two pieces of legislation introduced
on July 6, 2016) the dividing line between such notions as “terrorism” and
“extremism,” as well as the way these concepts are construed in Russia, has been
blurred, leaving room for various readings and interpretations that could be used by
the state in a manner deemed appropriate.
52
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, points 17, 18, 19.
53
54
Best-known examples are: The “Russian World” Foundation (2007),
Rossotrudnichestvo (2008), The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund
(2010).
55
Alexei Zakvasin, Anastasiya Shlyakhtina,“Pentagon odoleli pentabaytami: kak
rabotaet noveyshaya rossiyskaya Sistema upravleniya oboronoy,” RT, December 1,
2016, https://russian.rt.com/russia/article/337564-armiya-oborona-upravlenie-
tehnologii.; “W natsionalnom tsentre upravleniya oboronoii proshlo rasshirennoje

zasedanije Kollegii Minoborony Rossii”, Ministerstvo Oborony Rossijskoj
Federatsii, December 22, 2016
56
“Natsionalny tsentr upravleniya oboronoy RF budet rabotat dlya vsekh stran
ODKB,” Tvzvezda.ru, December 23, 2015,
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201412232053-sdcf.htm.
57
58
59
Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia Introduces EW Spetsnaz to Western Military District,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 14, Issue: 143, November 7, 2017,
https://jamestown.org/program/russia-introduces-ew-spetsnaz-western-military-
district/.
60
61
Sergey Sukhankin, “Russia’s ‘Youth Army’: Sovietization, Militarization or
Radicalization?” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 13, Issue: 180, November 9, 2016,
https://jamestown.org/program/russias-youth-army-sovietization-militarization-
radicalization/.
62
63
64
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point a.
65
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-point j.
66
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, sub-points b–d.
67
68
69
70
71
“Master-klass po kiber-bezopasnosti proshel v shkole № 1770,” Nagatinsky zaton,
September 27, 2017, http://gazeta-nagatinsky-zaton.ru/2017/09/27/32936/.
72
“RBK-TV potrollil Yandex, Kaspersky Lab I kiber-druzhyny kazakov,” Roem.ru,
November 25, 2016, https://roem.ru/25-11-2016/237089/rbc-kazachiy-yandex/.
73
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, points 28–29.
74
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 29, sub-point e.
75
76
77
78
For more information see: “Kiberdruzhyna” Liga Bezopasngo Interneta, accessed
November 6, 2017, http://www.ligainternet.ru/liga/activity-cyber.php.
79
Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, point 34, sub-point c.
80
81
82
83
“Novaya doktrina informatsionnoy bezopasnosti RF: borba s vcherashnimi
ugrozami,” BBC, December 7, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/russian/features-
38225725.
84
“Putin ogorazhyvaetsya ot mira `informatsionnoy bezopasnostyu`,” Vestnik
CIVITAS, December 7, 2016, http://vestnikcivitas.ru/news/4024.
85
“Ekspert: Doktrina informbezopasnosti pomozhet uprezhdat kiberataki na
Rossiyu,” RIA novosti, December 6, 2016,
86
“V Gosdume rasskazali o preimushchestvah novoy doktriny,” RIA novosti,
December 6, 2016, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20161206/1482931915.html.
87
Sovet Federatsii, Kontseptsiya strategii kiberbezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii
(Proekt), accessed November 20, 2017,
http://council.gov.ru/media/files/41d4b3dfbdb25cea8a73.pdf.
88
Valeri Gerasimov, “Po opytu Sirii”, Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier № 9 (624),
March 9, 2016, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/29579.
89
See: Sergey Sukhankin, “From “Bridge of Cooperation” to A2/AD “Bubble”:
Dangerous Transformation of Kaliningrad Oblast,” The Journal of Slavic Military
Studies, Taylor & Francis. February 9, 2018, pp. 15–36,
https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/RBBXE9ajSWR9ZeEzdtTe/full.
90
Nikiforov: Doktrina informbezopasnosti potrebuet vnesti popravki v zakony, RIA
Novosti, December 6, 2016, https://ria.ru/politics/20161206/1482957170.html.
91
Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 09.05.2017 № 203 “O Strategii razvitiya
informatsionnogo obshchestva v Rossiyskoy Federatsii na 2017 - 2030 gody,” May 10,
2017, Moscow, Kremlin. Available at:
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201705100002?index=0&rang
eSize=1.
92
Federalny zakon ot 26.07.2017 № 187-ФЗ “O bezopasnosti kriticheskoy
informatsionnoy infrastruktury Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” July 26, 2017, Moscow,
Kremlin. Available at:
93
Henry R. Lieberman, “Soviet Devising a Computer Net for State Planning,” New
York Times, December 13, 1973,
http://www.nytimes.com/1973/12/13/archives/soviet-devising-a-computer-net-for-
state-planning-big-network-in-us.html.
Part III
Lessons Learned and
Domestic Implications
9. Deciphering the Lessons Learned by
the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine,
2014–2017
Roger N. McDermott
Introduction
The senior leadership of Russia’s Armed Forces has a long-established

tradition of studying the military’s involvement in conflicts and
identifying appropriate lessons. This offers for the high command a
deeper and more insightful understanding of the issues facing force
development, modernization and the use of strategy and tactics.1
Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in early 2014, annexing Crimea in
response to the Euro-Maidan revolution in Kyiv, and its subsequent
fomenting of instability in southeastern Ukraine resulted in the most
significant deterioration in US-Russia relations since the end of the
Cold War. The Russian Armed Forces have been involved at varying
levels of intensity in Donbas for almost four years. During this period,
Russia’s military high command has used the conflict in Ukraine to
experiment with new systems, deploying forces on a rotational basis
in the theater of operations, as well as training, equipping and
supplying the various separatist groups. Undoubtedly, as in its
previous experience of military conflict, the General Staff has
identified and drawn lessons from this intervention. However, much
345
of this is masked by the official Kremlin policy of denying Russia’s

involvement in Ukraine.
Indeed, reflecting on the Russian Armed Forces’ involvement in

conflicts since the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR) in 1991, the Russia-Georgia War in August 2008
yielded a vast deluge of information that made it possible to
extrapolate the details of what the General Staff might learn. This
helped to facilitate the reform of the Armed Forces that ensued shortly
afterward.2 The Ukraine conflict is entirely different. The fighting may
have exposed the need for some tactical revision, and the
experimentation could have offered deeper insights into existing and
prototype systems trialed in combat. However, the lessons identified
and learned officially remain shrouded in secrecy. That said, the
lessons from Donbas appear to be part of a larger picture that explains
Moscow’s interest in high-technology assets for modern warfare,
especially linked to force enablers and force multipliers.3
The following chapter seeks to unlock some of this by using extensive

reporting on the conflict to decipher the type of lessons that the
Russian General Staff may have drawn from the conflict to date. It
argues that these need to be understood in the context of the condition
and posture of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces on the eve of the
conflict in order to gauge the underlying reason for a subsequent shift
in the organization of the Ground Forces and modifications to
command and control (C2), especially over large forces.4 It concludes
that in terms of military basing closer to the Ukraine border,
reorganizing land power to include a small number of divisions and
reprioritizing the role of armor in combat operations, these were
drawn from the conflict experience, as well as the periods of force
build-up on the Ukraine border.5
Lessons Learned by Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine | 347
Russia’s Armed Forces on the Eve of the Conflict
While Russia’s conventional Armed Forces remain a pale shadow of

their Soviet predecessor, since the collapse of the USSR there were
numerous failed attempts to reform the military. Often such reform
efforts fell victim to institutional inertia, were consigned to limited
experiments, or simply failed to achieve any substantive progress
toward implementation. Yet, Russia’s experience of small wars, from
its first intervention in Chechnya (1994–1996) to the Five Day War
with Georgia in August 2008, all presented operational challenges for
the Soviet-legacy forces and impressed upon the political-military
leadership that these structures had struggled to cope with the
demands of such conflicts. On the eve of the Second Chechnya
Conflict in 1999, Vladimir Putin was shocked to learn that Russia
could only muster a maximum of 65,000 combat-ready forces.6
Russia’s military power was mitigated and hampered by preserving a
system designed to wage a large-scale war in Europe that never
happened. The decline in combat capability and combat readiness
seemed to contradict the high aspirations of the Russian security elite
and undermine claims to Russia’s great power status.7
Strands of the Cold War–era tendency to exaggerate the strength of

Russian military power remain apparent in contemporary analyses; a
trend boosted by the Ukraine crisis that emerged in early 2014. For
some states bordering Russia, any effort Moscow made to improve the
country’s military is treated with concern.8 Equally, for those with an
awareness of the past futile reform campaigns, there was skepticism as
to whether this fresh attempt might avoid the same fate. Nevertheless,
unlike previous bids to implement reform in Russia’s Armed Forces,
the plans first outlined by the political-military leadership in Moscow
in September and October 2008 to fundamentally transform and
modernize its conventional Armed Forces were, in fact, acted upon.
In essence, this removed the very heart of the Soviet legacy forces by
abandoning the mass-mobilization principle (still notionally in place
at the time) and its skeleton or cadre units, moving instead to
“permanent readiness” brigades fully staffed with well-trained officers

and soldiers. Achieving the structural reorganization appeared
relatively simple, particularly the transition from a division-based
system to a new brigade-centric structure. But deeper long-term
challenges in addressing issues of mentality and military culture,
including corruption and abuse of office in relation to the officer
corps, proved to be significantly more formidable for a defense
ministry with no previous experience of planning or conducting such
systemic reform.9
The ‘New Look’ Russian Army
Launching the reform so soon after the Five Day War in August 2008
certainly implied pre-planning, but does not testify to the quality of
such planning. Initial official statements outlining the reform
indicated broad designs and some specific aims, but it required a great
deal of piecing together to assemble a larger picture of what the
defense ministry intended. The then-president, Dmitry Medvedev,
attempted such an outline during his visit to the Donguz training
range, in Orenburg, on September 26, 2008. Medvedev had earlier
approved Perspektivny oblik Vooruzhennykh Sil RF i pervoocherednye
mery po ego formirovaniu na 2009–2020 gody (The Future Outlook of
the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation
in the period 2009–2020). However, the presidential summary of the
impending reform, which he linked to the war with Georgia, arguing
that future conflicts could erupt suddenly, was by no means a
complete statement. Medvedev told military district commanders that
the future capability of the Armed Forces would be determined by five
factors: improving the organizational structure by transforming the
divisions into brigades, abandoning the “mass mobilization” principle
and adopting instead “permanent readiness” status; enhancing C2,
including reducing the number of tiers to three (joint strategic
command/military district, army, brigade), thus cutting the number
of billets; reforming the system of personnel training as well as the
military education system; equipping the Armed Forces with the latest
high-technology weapons and equipment to promote air superiority,

delivering precision strikes against ground and maritime targets and
ensuring operational force deployment; and raising the social status
of military personnel by vastly increasing salaries and offering a
broader range of social support packages.10
More detail, though again only partial, was offered on October 14,
2008, by then–defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Following a
briefing delivered by the defense minister to a closed session of the
ministry’s collegium, Serdyukov discussed the reform with a select
group of journalists and spoke for a few minutes on Zvezda TV. He
characterized this initiative as giving the military a “new look,” which
he stated involved speeding up the reduction of the overall strength of
the Armed Forces to “one million,” decreasing officer posts from
355,000 to 150,000, expanding the number of junior officers, carrying
out major cuts in the defense ministry’s central administrative staff,
abolishing mass mobilization and divisions to form instead
permanent readiness brigades, moving to a three-tiered command
structure, drastically cutting the number of units, especially in the
Ground Forces, as well as reforming military education. The Strategic
Rocket Forces (Raketnyye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya—
RVSN) would be left largely unaffected, while some organizational
change was envisaged for the Airborne Forces (Vozdushno Desantnye
Voiska—VDV)—though they successfully preserved the division-
based system in the VDV.11
Official statements concerning the aims of the unfolding reform were

often at complete variance during the first three years of its
implementation. Thus, Medvedev’s explanation of the key features of
the reform differed depending on the target audience and the timing
of his speech. Medvedev’s original “five key tasks” were notably
different by March 11, 2011, suggesting these now included military
procurement targets (achieving 70 percent new weapons and
equipment by 2020), improved and joint C2, developing a unified
ballistic missile defense system, enhancing border security,
particularly in the Russian Far East (despite the ongoing border

security challenges stemming from Afghanistan-related issues), and
improving the officers corps.12
Army General Nikolai Makarov, then-chief of the General Staff, also

demonstrated signs of vacillation, particularly on the issues of
contract personnel and manpower. The then-commander-in-chief
(CINC) of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Aleksandr Postnikov,
suggested that downsizing the officer corps should not stop at 15
percent but continue to 9 percent, seemingly paying scant regard to
60,000 officers in the process. More remarkably, Serdyukov regularly
departed from any sense of rationality when it came to explaining his
reform aims. The defense minister at one point argued that no officers
would be sacked, only posts would be reduced, while later declaring
the downsizing complete and ahead of schedule. Serdyukov’s grasp of
whatever agenda may have existed was not only slippery, but he even
suggested to brigade commanders in December 2010 that their input
was required as it might prove to be necessary to “adjust the entire
program on military reform.”13
Some of these “adjustments” occurred after the defense leadership of

Serdyukov and Makarov was replaced in November 2012 by Sergei
Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, respectively. The most notable changes
involved the gradual limited reintroduction of divisions and the Soviet
tradition of “snap inspections” of the Armed Forces.14 The reform as
such proved conceptually elusive, lacking coherence and reflecting at
times chaotic and poor planning. Still, it is possible to discern some
fundamental weaknesses related to manpower issues. Additionally,
there has been a consistent theme of improving C2 and especially
aiming to introduce a new unified automated C2 system as the state
seeks to develop network-centric approaches to warfare, while more
loosely trying to enhance combat capability (raising the quantity of
modern equipment and weapons to 70 percent by 2020) and combat
readiness (largely based on the readiness levels in the brigades).15
Command and Control
After much delay, the authorities announced the planned overhaul of

the existing six military districts (MD) in April 2010. And during the
operational-strategic exercise Vostok 2010, the replacement system
was tested. However, the process was not completed until December
1, 2014, with the introduction of the Northern (or Arctic) Joint
Strategic Command. The three-tiered simplified C2 structure was
trialed in June 2010, with a declared target of forming four new
military districts/joint strategic commands (obyedinennyye
strategicheskoye komandovanie—OSK) by December 1, 2010. The
new districts/commands were formed on four strategic axes: Western
(headquarters in St. Petersburg), Eastern (headquarters in
Khabarovsk), Central (Yekaterinburg) and Southern (Rostov-on-
Don). Western MD/OSK was based on the Moscow and Leningrad
MDs, and the Baltic and Northern Fleets. Eastern MD/OSK
comprised of the former Far East MD, the eastern part of Siberian MD
and the Pacific Fleet. Central MD/OSK included the western part of
the Siberian MD and the Volga-Urals MD, while Southern MD/OSK
merged the North Caucasus MD and the Black Sea Fleet and the
Caspian Flotilla.16
In peacetime, these commands would function as MDs and transition

to OSKs during military operations. Since their introduction, it
appears that the operational control of forces is conducted by the
OSKs and the day-to-day housekeeping activities is in the purview of
the MDs; simultaneously. High-command elements of the Ground
Forces, Air Force, Air Defense Forces as well as the Military-Maritime
Fleet (Voyenno-Мorskoy Flot—VMF) became structural subunits of
the General Staff, and the command process was simplified by
reducing the number of stages orders passed through from sixteen to
four. General Makarov noted that the OSK commanders would have
a much wider responsibility: “We shall be proposing to create, on the
basis of the six MDs, four OSKs whose commanders will be in charge
of all manpower and resources deployed in their areas, including the
navy, air force and air defense forces. Moreover, these forces would be
directly, not operationally, subordinate to the commanders.” Part of
the justification for this change was to place all military and security
formations on these territories under a single command; in theory,
during operations, such formations—extending to emergency and
interior ministries or the Federal Security Service (FSB)—would be
subordinate to the OSK. By September 2011 the operational-strategic
exercise Tsentr 2011 rehearsed and refined such inter-agency
coordination, though not without its peculiar problems, as these
structures often used widely differing communications systems.
Meanwhile, the VDV continued to be subordinate to the General
Staff. This theme intensified under Shoigu and Gerasimov, as defense
planners sought to improve C2.17
Overhauling and simplifying command structures formed part of the

more challenging reform of C2, which had not only been exposed as a
critical operational weakness in the Russia-Georgia War in August
2008, but time and again the political leadership and top brass had
promised to revolutionize the C2 system. This meant digitizing all
communications equipment and speeding up the work of introducing
a “unified” automated C2 system throughout the Armed Forces. The
strategy was also supported politically, and pressure was placed on the
defense industry to cooperate with commanders in completing the
design work and overcoming technical problems to facilitate the
introduction of the long-awaited automated C2 system: the Unified
System for Command and Control at the Tactical Level (Yedinaya
Sistema Upravleniya v Takticheskom Zvene—YeSU TZ).18
Curiously, the automated system was publicized as “unified” and

often presented by officials as a panacea that would guarantee
immediate improvement in the speed of decision making and
dramatically boost C2 while marking a significant milestone on the
long path to developing network-centric warfare capabilities.
Nonetheless, the VDV evidently had the makings of an alternative
system, integrating their existing Polet-K with an advanced
Andromeda-D automated C2 system. In 2011, the Andromeda-D was

introduced experimentally into the 76th Airborne Division, in Pskov,
with plans to eventually outfit the entire VDV by 2015.
The mobile/fixed automated C2 system is under development for the

VDV by the Communications and Command and Control Systems
NII (Scientific Research Institute). Its production facilities consist of
the Ryazan Radio Plant, Kaluga Telegraph Equipment Plant,
Elektroavtomatika OAO (Open Joint Stock Company) (Stavropol)
and Volgo NPO (Scientific Production Association) OAO. It is
mounted on the chassis of BTR-D airborne armored personnel
carriers, or BMD-2 and BMD-4 airborne fighting vehicles.
Andromeda-D can support a wide range of communications packages
to transmit information using traditional radio channels or high-
speed networks, and its designers say it also has a state-of-the-art
navigation system. Lieutenant General Nikolai Ignatov, the chief of
staff and first deputy commander of the VDV, believed this would
reduce the time involved in military decision making by up to 50
percent. Nevertheless, its designers reported that training programs
held in the VDV to train personnel in using the system required
around one year for ensuring sufficiently high standards; suggesting
there would be profound problems in integrating the Andromeda-D
and conscripts serving for only twelve months. The solution to this
was to drastically increase the proportion of kontraktniki serving in
the military.19
Defense ministry planners underestimated the extent to which

introducing such technology will compel further revision of the
manning structure. When the elite airborne forces are fully equipped
with their own automated C2 system, how would this work with
twelve-month serving conscripts? Would old and new C2 systems co-
exist? Equally, how successfully would the VDV’s system integrate
with the YeSU TZ?
Once the design issues in the YeSU TZ were finally resolved,

specialists estimate that the domestic defense industry had the
capacity to equip five brigades annually; thus, after six consecutive
years of introducing the automated C2 system, more than half the
existing brigades would remain non-automated.20 Many of these
issues were obviously unresolved in the transition to the new defense
leadership and were present in Russia’s Armed Forces on the eve of
conflict in Ukraine.
General Makarov, and other leading senior officers, consistently

promoted the automated C2 and the adoption of network-centric
warfare capabilities as central to the reform and modernization of
Russia’s Armed Forces. The future capability to conduct sixth-
generation or non-contact warfare utilizing command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) became a guiding principle among the
leading advocates of reform. The former CINC of the Ground Forces,
General Postnikov, introduced conferences on network-centric
warfare in the Combined-Arms Academy in Moscow and placed great
emphasis on the capacity of the YeSU TZ to revolutionize the speed
of the military decision-making process. Thus, this innovation would
enhance the algorithm of battle management and allow a brigade
commander to transmit his decisions in real time to his battalion
commander displayed on his personal computer. Resolving the design
flaws, largely linked to its lack of user-friendly graphics, has taken
time, resulting in recrimination between the defense ministry and
defense industry. By the fall of 2010, Dmitry Kandaurov, a Moscow-
based expert on automated C2, examined some of the design
problems related to the YeSU TZ in a series of articles in Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye. These observations noted that the critical
design challenge confronting the defense industry was the high-
intensity graphics in the software, but the author placed these
complexities in a broader context of improving the overall efficiency
of C2. Yet, by August 2011, Kandaurov questioned whether the
existing plans for introducing automated C2 would actually result in

any real improvement.21
Military Manpower
The over-emphasis upon structural reorganization and technology at

the expense of addressing issues concerning the future of military
manpower exposed perhaps one of the single greatest weaknesses in
the reform planning. These were key challenges facing the Shoigu-
Gerasimov defense tandem, and it is primarily the result of an
assessment of the Ukraine conflict that led to formulating answers.
Prior to launching the reform, there was no serious consideration of
whether the new brigade-based structures should be staffed by
entirely contract-based personnel or mixed-manning retaining
conscription, or indeed how to raise the standards of either personnel
type, which according to the General Staff were woefully inadequate.
This also permeated other central aspects of reform aims: was there a
vision for a reformed officer corps? How would officers be separated
from the notoriously high corruption levels? Would the defense
ministry and General Staff agree on a model for the future
development of non-commissioned officers (NCO)?
To begin with, given the inability of defense planners in Moscow to

break the cycle of discussion on the merits of conscription opposed to
a professional military manpower system, there was much evidence of
constant switching of priority in this area. Commanders and senior
officers openly admitted that the standards among conscripts were
very low, beset by ill-discipline and institutionalized hazing or
dedovshchina. This phenomenon seemed to perplex the defense
ministry leadership, who were unable to understand why it had
survived and grown even after reducing the length of conscript service
to twelve months by 2008; the expected dividends simply never
appeared. Equally, there was a consensus that standards among
contract personnel (kontraktniki) were anything but desirable,
reflecting the fact that many were bullied into signing contracts and
simply wished to leave the Armed Forces.22
In the period 2008–2011, the “vision” for the precise form of

“reformed” manpower in the new brigades went through constant
zigzagging. Sometimes, the possibility of adopting an all-volunteer
force and abandoning conscription was raised, then reversed or
denied; kontraktniki were derided for simply being inadequate, but no
plans were calibrated to redress this situation; advocates of the
conscription system demanded continued high numbers of
conscripts; consideration was given to increasing the maximum age to
draft citizens from 27 to 30 only to realize this might fuel corruption
and evasion. In an apparent policy vacuum, influential Russian
military experts close to the reform even advocated learning from and
adopting a variant of the Swiss militia system, without reference to
how this might work.23
It became apparent that these larger manpower issues would not

result in any clear policy direction on whether to pursue real
professionalizing of the force structure or to persevere a mixed-
manning system. However, the Shoigu-Gerasimov defense leadership
consistently continued wider efforts to raise the numbers of
kontraktniki serving in the Armed Forces without promising to ever
eliminate conscription, which remains the key recruitment pool for
the kontraktniki, despite efforts to recruit directly from the population
by using mobile recruitment centers. In this context, on the eve of
conflict in Ukraine, the General Staff had returned to relying on the
forming of battalion tactical groups (BTG), and these remain the
cornerstones of Russia’s land power.
Ignoring the large body of evidence concerning the impact of Russia’s

demographic crisis on a dwindling conscription pool during the early
stages of the reform, the authorities also exaggerated claims about the
size of the Armed Forces and failed to resolve how the “permanent
readiness brigades” could work in real terms with a mix of contract
personnel and twelve-month serving conscripts. During this policy

calamity, it was painfully obvious to officers that, with conscripts in
very large numbers serving for twelve months and leaving the brigades
twice annually (as the drafting process occurs in the spring and fall
each year), combat capability and readiness levels were not
particularly high. Moreover, the constant reference to “mobilization”
in recent Russian security documents seems to exaggerate the state’s
capacity to generate genuinely trained reservists in a time of an
escalating crisis.24
The Role of Russia’s Armed Forces in Ukraine: Lessons Identified

From Donbas
The Russian Armed Forces’ involvement in Ukraine, especially in the

latter country’s southeastern regions, provides a unique and highly
problematic experience for the military in terms of open discussion
on its possible lessons. Arguably, this was never the “type” of conflict
that would prove popular among the Russian officer corps. It has not
yielded opportunities for career advancement and offered fewer
challenges than the operations in Syria. Not coincidentally, of the five
commanders in charge of the OSKs, four have combat experience
gained in Syria. Of course, this is rooted in the policy of “plausible
deniability,” with the Russian government officially claiming non-
involvement in the crisis, or not officially recognizing the presence of
any Russian military personnel on the territory of Ukraine. While this
deniability has been openly decimated by international media
reporting and coverage by the analytical community, it does present
serious issues concerning the effort to establish the possible lessons
drawn from the conflict by Russia’s top brass.25 Unlike, for example,
professional Russian military experts or even serving officers offering
comment on the weaknesses exposed by the campaigns in Chechnya
or in Georgia in August 2008, the deniability barrier on Ukraine
means that the publicly available insights into how Russian officers
perceived various aspects of the conflict, what the lessons were, or
even to what extent the conflict is shaping Russian military thinking

prove elusive.26
This elusive nature of the Russian military’s lessons from Donbas is

complicated still further due to a number of perception issues. That is
to say, the entire conflict—possibly unlike Moscow’s involvement in
post-Soviet era conflicts—became highly politicized among
governments and analysts. This is reflected also within Russian
coverage, with reputable experts writing articles knowing full well that
the Russian military was active in Donbas, but having to couch their
analyses with great caution.27 An innate tendency also existed in
Western government and analytical circles to identify Russia’s “New
Generation Warfare” (dubbed by some as the “Gerasimov doctrine”)
or to seek to apply labels to better understand how Russian forces and
their proxies were conducting operations.28 At an early stage, many
commentators rushed to dub the Russian actions in Ukraine as
representing a breakthrough “Gerasimov doctrine,” which avoided
deeper analysis of what was actually taking place, misled governments,
and misrepresented Russian military science. This “hybrid” theme,
however, was never present within Russian specialist coverage and
remains entirely alien in its coverage.29
Equally, many Russian analysts were sheltered from the full extent to
which Moscow had interfered in Donbas. But the professional
military journals are also largely silent in assessing the numerous
challenges and experiments that emerged during the varied course of
the conflict. Considerable cross-fertilization is apparent between the
“lessons learned” approach based on the experience of Syria and
Ukraine: both are important, and the Syria operations have clearly
boosted both Russian combat readiness and, more importantly,
operational experience.30 Nonetheless, the experience drawn from
Ukraine has served to influence Russia’s force posture and the
organizational structure of the Ground Forces.
In many ways, attempting to decipher the “lessons learned” from

Russia’s military involvement in Donbas is like looking at shadows on
walls. Clearly, there is a much sharper and deeper picture of the
operational environment and the tactics applied in Donbas known
only to the Russian General Staff and within elite defense and security
circles in Moscow.31 Yet, despite these problems, some observations
can be made concerning the most likely lessons drawn from the
conflict, and the crossover into how operations were conducted in
Syria.
These lessons loosely divide into the following categories: direct

combat operations, combat support and service support, and
command-and-control issues stemming from force build-ups on
numerous occasions near Ukraine’s border. At a more strategic level,
the possible lessons divide into what worked, what has failed, and the
C2 issues at the border. The argument presented here is that the
conflict itself offers relatively little by way of failure to glean lessons
for future conflict; the real lessons lie in the problems with forming
temporary C2 during the periods of force build-up near the Ukrainian
border.32 This has resulted in some force reorganization, albeit on a
small scale, and creating military infrastructure closer to the
Ukrainian border, not only to resolve these issues but by way of
messaging that Moscow is determined to protect its long-term
strategic interests in Ukraine.
Since Russia’s military operation to seize Crimea did not result in

armed conflict, its study lies beyond the scope of this chapter, as the
“lessons learned” would most likely revolve around an assessment of
combat operations and the performance of the various support
structures.33 Therefore, the attempt to establish some of the lessons
Russia’s General Staff may have gleaned from the Ukraine conflict lies
in its experience of Donbas during 2014–2017. As of early 2019,
despite intense international diplomatic efforts to implement a lasting
peace, the conflict shows no sign of ending. As the conflict unfolded,
a number of different approaches to warfare were used, transitioning

through these in different “phases” of the conflict.34
These types of warfare involved political, unconventional, a brief

experimental use of hybrid (irregular and conventional) and limited
use of conventional warfare. The early stage of the conflict was marked
by political warfare, and by April 2014 armed rebellion in Donbas
denoted the beginning of a period of unconventional warfare. In May
to August 2014, Kyiv had renewed its Anti-Terrorist Operation
(ATO), and in response, rebel groups and Russian forces used hybrid
tactics that palpably failed as Russian conventional forces were
required to mount a combined-arms operation in August 2014 to
prevent Ukrainian forces from defeating the rebels; this operation
ended with the routing of Ukrainian forces at the Battle of Ilovaysk,
which precipitated the signing of the Minsk I agreement.35 From that
period to February 2015, Russia continued to fund, train and supply
the rebellion (as it continues to do), and once again resorted to a
combined-arms operation to achieve a fresh conventional success in
Debaltseve, overlapping the signing of the Minsk II agreement. Since
Minsk II, Moscow continues to arm, train and equip the rebel groups,
maintaining low levels of violence and keeping its options open
concerning conflict escalation in the future.
A number of factors also limit the value to Moscow of any potential

“lessons learned” from the conflict in Donbas. These stem from the
conflict’s unique operational environment and the extent to which the
Russian General Staff recognizes the uniqueness of each individual
conflict and thus tends to eschew conflict “models” and a one-size-
fits-all approach toward operational planning.36 In other words, most
of the lessons from the Donbas conflict will only really help to
improve future Russian operations in Ukraine, rather than assist the
further development of wider Russian military capabilities. A number
of factors in Ukraine serve, therefore, to single out the Donbas conflict
and Russia’s handling of its involvement as unique and not readily
exportable to other operational environments.37 These are briefly

outlined as:
 The presence within the political and economic system in

Ukraine of large-scale and endemic corruption, with a few
oligarchic individuals as its principal beneficiaries;
 The pre-existence of local networks Moscow could readily tap

into in order to foment instability;
 Cultural, historical and linguistic affinity between the local

population and Russia;
 Extensive and exploitable weaknesses within the Ukrainian

state military and security structures, marked by Russian
intelligence penetration, low combat readiness in the defense
ministry units, and limited professional loyalty to the state on
the part of local police (Kyiv’s official estimates indicate that
as many as 5,000 police officers in Donbas defected by August
2015 to join the separatists);
 Political and tactical errors by the interim government, which

heightened separatist sentiment in Donbas. These included
the move against the Russian language, actions against non-
armed protesters that inadvertently paved the way for armed
pro-Russian leaders to come to the fore, the disbanding of
Berkut (implicated in Maidan casualties/violence) resulting
in some of its members swelling separatist ranks, and action
against the armed rebels prior to adequately preparing and
training its defense ministry units for the task;
 The strategic context of the crisis: with a leadership coming to

power promising to take the country in an entirely different
economic direction, which Moscow judged to threaten its
own strategic interests.38
Moscow’s efforts to destabilize southeastern Ukraine met with only

limited success, as these complex operations and use of proxies also
exposed shortcomings. Russia’s much-advertised and feared
information warfare tools failed to inspire widespread support among
the local population for the concept of “Novorossiya,” which dropped
out of the official lexicon in 2014. Indeed, it could be argued that the
whole idea of Novorossiya taking root in Donbas and facilitating
wider rebel aims was the single greatest failing of Moscow’s Ukraine
policy. Equally important, was the absence of achieving the strategic
aim of federalizing Ukraine, which may explain the continued conflict
stalemate.39 However, these failings clearly lie more in the political
than the military domain. Yet, despite obvious advances and an
overall impressive performance in its Donbas involvement, the
Russian military also encountered some problematic issues.
Notably, Moscow struggled to establish complete control over its

proxy forces, which frequently caused problems as these groups would
prefer to pursue their own aims and retain some level of autonomy.
Even in the early stages of the Donbas instability, it was apparent that
Moscow struggled to control the political warfare it had ignited. An
additional failing stems from the brief “hybrid warfare” experiment,
which gave way to traditional combined-arms operations in order to
protect the separatists. At each point during the conflict when the
separatist movement encountered stiff resistance from Ukrainian
security forces, Moscow resorted to hard power, using its own units
in order to revive and protect the separatist movement. In fact, despite
fostering rebellion, investing in supplying the separatists with
weapons and sustaining them throughout the period, devising a train-
and-equip program and experimenting with lower levels of violence
to leverage its longer-term interests, Moscow could only secure Minsk
I and Minsk II ceasefire deals with Kyiv by using conventional
combined-arms operations (Ilovaysk in August 2014, and Debaltseve
in February 2015). Paradoxically, this may dissuade the Kremlin in the
future from recourse to such tactics in favor of more direct action,
such as is reflected in its operations in Syria.
After reviewing the available literature on the Ukraine conflict, it is

possible to conclude that Russia’s main military lessons may be as
follows:
 Combat operations
o Restore the traditional emphasis upon armor and its use

in combat operations, reversing the trend in recent years
to prioritize the development of the Aerospace Forces
(Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily—VKS) for example;
o Further improve targeting measures to facilitate the role
of artillery and conventional fires;
o Improve force protection by investing in strengthened
armor;
o Identify the strengths and weaknesses of C4ISR in order
to achieve further C4ISR integration into future combat
operations;
o Assess the results of experiments with modern weapons
and equipment and apply these lessons to future
operational planning;
o Assess and draw lessons from the use of proxy forces
during operations and the role of Russian officers
embedded in these units;
o Improve C2 at all levels.
 Combat support and service support
o Assess the level of progress in the use of force enablers

and force multipliers such as electronic warfare (EW)
specialists and assets to exploit the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS) as a warfare domain;
o Assess the performance of EW, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) and fire control in an integrated network;
o Improve the delivery of the train-and-equip program for

proxies and examine how to improve C2 over these
forces;
o Draw lessons from the delivery of the train-and-equip
program used in Syria to enhance the future effectiveness
of training for Russian proxies;
o Further integrate Russian commanders and proxy units
to conduct independent operations and in conjunctions
with Russian military units;
o Enhance the effectiveness of information warfare (IW) as
a tool to facilitate the achievement of strategic objectives;
o Improve the use of psychological operations (PSYOPS);
o Gain better control over serving military personnel using
social media.
 Command-and-control issues encountered near Ukraine’s

border
o Temporary commanding organizations were required to

establish working C2 over these forces during the force
buildup near the Ukrainian border;
o The resolution of these C2 issues reinforced the General
Staff perspective on the need to further vary the force
structure to include divisions in the Ground Forces and
not solely rely upon a brigade-based structure;
o Problems with moving and maintaining forces close to
the Ukraine border convinced the General Staff to form
divisions and move military infrastructure closer to the
Ukraine border.40
Among the more significant lessons drawn from the Ukraine conflict,
from Moscow’s perspective, are the return to armor or promoting the
interests of the Ground Forces in the ongoing military modernization
and the issue of structural reorganization in the Ground Forces, with
the formation of units closer to the Ukrainian border. Despite the
political rhetoric used by the Russian political-military leadership, this

on-the-ground shift appears driven not by reference to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but as a response to the C2
challenges identified during the numerous periods of force generation
on the Ukraine border.
Reorganizing Russia’s Ground Forces
In this wider context of defense reform and reorganization in recent

years, coupled with lessons drawn from combat in Ukraine, further
refinement of the order of battle (ORBAT) will take place in the
Ground Forces. According to Colonel General Oleg Salyukov, the
commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces, this process will continue
to 2021 to ensure the “self-sufficiency” of the Army in all strategic
directions. It corresponds to the effort to partly walk-back the
Serdyukov-era reforms to modify the brigade-based structure to
include some Ground Forces divisions. However, since the “walk-
back” was introduced under Shoigu, as already noted, what has
changed significantly in the ORBAT is that instead of BTGs being
temporary formations they have become permanent structures.41
In February 2016 Salyukov noted that all brigades and divisions in the
Ground Forces had formed BTGs. Chief of the General Staff
Gerasimov later clarified that 66 BTGs in the Ground Forces were
fully manned by kontraktniki, with a target set to achieve 125 BTGs by
2018.42 These units are now also referred to as “strike” forces, in
support of high-readiness formations such as the VDV; and more
pointedly they constitute the backbone of unit training and
evaluations.43
According to former VDV chief of reconnaissance Pavel Popovskikh,

modern warfare lacks a clear and prolonged front line. Consequently,
the importance of smaller units has increased in order to ensure the
capacity to conduct independent tactical actions, not only to move
over an extended front and depth but conducting combat operations
on a fragmented battlefield. This autonomy to conduct independent

action should be delegated from the “division-regiment” level down
to the “battalion-company-platoon” level.44
During the early phase of the Ukraine crisis, in March 2014, Russia’s
Armed Forces deployed comparatively large forces near the Ukrainian
border. This included ten brigades, four regiments, and several dozen
BTGs. After the bulk of these forces withdrew from these positions in
late April 2014, several BTGs from the MDs remained in place and
were rotated every three or four months.45 Interestingly, by way of
illustrating the manning problems encountered at this point, in late
2014 a BTG was formed, subordinate to the 5th Tank Brigade in the
36th Combined-Arms Army and exclusively manned by kontraktniki.
Yet, to achieve this, large parts of the manpower forming the BTG
were reportedly forced to sign contracts. The 5th Tank Brigade was
unable to secure enough professional troops from subordinate
battalions for the BTG and was required to secure sufficient personnel
and assets from the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade, a sister unit also
under the 36th Army.46
Moreover, media reports indicate that BTGs were earlier commanded

by brigade-command-level officers (colonels); while more recently,
BTGs are commanded by a battalion-level officer (lieutenant colonel
or major).47 Nevertheless, as noted in reference to the weaknesses
exposed by the conflict in Donbas, the Russian Armed Forces’ build-
up on the Ukraine border served to expose issues with C2. In the
course of building up this task force organization process, it was
necessary to establish temporary commanding organizations to place
these forces under C2. However, the 58th Army in the Southern MD
was unable to undertake the task, because its subordinate units
remained at their permanent bases. The Western MD’s 20th Army
experienced the same problem. To try to resolve this issue, the
assembled forces were placed under the two operational groups’
headquarters, consisting of the 58th Army and Southern MD staff as
well as the 20th Army and Western MD staff. Despite this workaround,
the planning and organization of headquarters tasks was actually

carried out at a considerably higher level, though not without
problems.48 Essentially, this stemmed from a shortage of HQ
personnel due to officer reductions under the former defense
minister.
One MD officer attached as a staff member to a unit sent to the

Ukraine border in 2014 explained that army corps or division HQ was
used as a temporary command organization for C2 over large
numbers of forces including brigades, regiments, and BTGs. This
seemed to reinforce the idea that the divisional HQ, as an upper
echelon C2, could prove useful as a coordinating and supporting
organization in such circumstances.49
The Ukraine crisis inadvertently served to strengthen the case of those

senior Russian officers advocating the benefits of the divisional
structure and its utility in certain situations for C2. For example,
General Salyukov noted that previously, as soon as senior officers had
graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff or
completed their terms as brigade commanders, they were assigned as
(deputy) commanders or chiefs of staff of armies, though lacking
appropriate knowledge and experience. However, a restored
divisional structure allows senior officers to broaden their experiences
prior to their postings.50 The brigade-based structure in the Ground
Forces has been corrected to reintroduce a divisional element, which
was ultimately driven by the Russian military’s experience in the
Ukraine conflict. The new Ground Forces divisions are located closer
to the Ukraine border, and despite Moscow’s political rhetoric this is
not really calibrated as a “response” to NATO.
Russia’s Ground Forces, moving away from the reform-inspired

reliance on a brigade-based structure, reintroduced a small number of
divisions in Western and Southern joint strategic commands, or
OSKs, in order to address the aforementioned C2 issues and provide
for controlling larger force groupings in the future as the need arises.
This involves establishing three divisions in western Russia, with two

being constituted in the Western OSK/MD and one in the Southern
OSK/MD. This was cast as a response to the United States’ and
NATO’s posture toward Russia. However, its underlying driver seems
to be a desire to back away from the reforms initiated by Serdyukov;
the decision addresses the C2 issues that were identified during the
force buildup periods near the Ukraine border.51 On January 12, 2016,
Defense Minister Shoigu addressed the top brass during a video
conference at the National Defense Management Center
(Natsional’nyy Tsentr Upravleniya Oboronoy—NTsUO), in Moscow.
He outlined a series of plans to “counteract” NATO. This reflected
measures already in place: forming the 1st Tank Army in the Western
MD from units of the 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) as well as
conducting a limited reorganization from brigades to divisions.52
Russian General Staff sources suggest the 1st Tank Army and the
20th CAA in the Western MD upgraded to divisional status would
contain four maneuver regiments like their earlier Soviet versions.
The new divisions in the Western MD will be headquartered in Yelnya
and Boguchar. Two Motorized Rifle Divisions (MRD) will form the
basis of the 20th CAA by the end of 2016: these are located in Smolensk
and Vorenezh, each MRD will have a personnel strength of 10,000.
“Now, as it was in Soviet times, each tank division will have three tank
regiments, a motorized rifle regiment, a self-propelled artillery
regiment and an anti-aircraft missile regiment; and each motorized
rifle division includes three motorized rifle regiments, a tank
regiment, a self-propelled artillery regiment and an anti-aircraft
missile regiment,” noted a General Staff source. The division will
include supporting units: intelligence, communications, logistics,
electronic warfare, nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) units, and
others. These formations will be the first in the Ground Forces to
procure T-14 Armata platforms and new Kurganets combat vehicles.53
Similar restructuring occurred in the Southern MD, to deploy a new

MRD headquartered in Rostov. Also with 10,000 personnel and
reflecting the structures formed in the Western MD, the defense

ministry plans to build supporting infrastructure. Southern MD staff
described the new MRD as “full-blooded” and estimated the initial
costs for building its facilities at 5 billion rubles ($73 million).54 In
February 2018, the defense ministry initiated additional changes to
the 58th Army in the Southern MD to strengthen the nucleus of
general-purpose forces. This involves recreating two divisions based
upon the 19th and 136th Motorized Rifle Brigades. These will be fully
established by the end of 2018 by reinforcing these structures with
additional battalions and regiments and arming them with BMP-3
infantry fighting vehicles and T-72B3 tanks. Viktor Murakhovskiy,
the editor-in-chief of the journal Arsenal Otechestva, explained that
these forces are aimed at deterring NATO on Russia’s Western and
Southern flanks: “The experience of combat operations and exercises
has shown that the division is a more self-sufficient formation
[soyedineniye] than the brigade. The latter usually requires
reinforcement by combat and logistic support assets and weapons
assets. The division is more adapted to the physical geographic
features of the European part of Russia, where there are large expanses
and a considerable length of lines of contact and of fronts.”55
General Salyukov also explains these changes in reference to the result

of assessments of the “snap inspections” and tests of combat readiness.
Salyukov sees this reintroduction of some divisions as a correction to
the Serdyukov reforms but does not stress the Ukraine element in its
evolution. While noting the new divisions were formed on the basis
of existing brigades, Salyukov adds that this aims to add to their
firepower, strike force capabilities and the need to perform tasks along
a “much wider battlefront.” The General Staff wants to establish a
variety of differing formations, from divisions to brigades and BTGs,
to shape its responses to various potential theaters of conflict.
Salyukov said the Ground Forces’ command conducted a detailed
study in 2014–2015 on the formation, support and use of tactical
groups of forces in the Soviet Union, Russia and leading militaries to
create an “optimal composition for the BTG formations of the
Ground Forces.” These appear to have emerged as permanent

structures, not originally planned in the reforms of 2008–2009, and
they are manned exclusively by kontraktniki; the main effort is to
prepare each BTG for action on any axis in “complex conditions” and
in “unfamiliar terrain.”56
Conclusion
The lessons identified and learned from Russia’s military experience

gained during its operations and support for separatist groups in
Donbas is known for certain only to the select few in the General Staff.
This study has sought to explain some of the possible lessons drawn
by the General Staff by recourse to what the military is doing on-the-
ground rather than placing too much emphasis upon political
rhetoric.57
The main “lessons” from the conflict are the rediscovery of the
importance of armor and the likely higher priority for re-equipping
the Ground Forces in the continuing military modernization. The
reorganization of some elements of the Ground Forces, including
developing a divisional capability and creating supporting
infrastructure near the Ukraine border, is less in response to NATO
than it is rooted in aspects of the Ukraine conflict.58 While the
discussion concerning the need for divisions as well as brigades since
the reform of 2008 was largely theoretical, the force build-up periods
assembling tens of thousands of troops revealed in practical terms that
the divisional C2 can prove to be quite useful. Moreover, the BTGs
were a familiar feature of the Russian military in conducting its
operations; and now many of these are permanent structures.59
The Ukraine conflict, above all, provided a real-time testing ground

for Russia’s approaches to modern warfare, training experience for its
forces and the chance to experiment with new or existing systems, as
well as supplying experience of conducting a train-and-equip
program during a conflict. The success of this effort, combined with
using an integrated approach to EW, UAVs, and targeting of fires,

allowed Moscow to avoid deploying larger numbers of its military
personnel in Donbas.60 Russia’s Armed Forces encountered a broader
range of opportunities to train and experiment in Syria in more
“open” conflict; and the lessons drawn from these campaigns will
shape the organization and priorities of Russia’s Armed Forces for
many years ahead.
Notes
1
See: Mikhail Barabanov, Novaya Armiya Rossii. Moscow, Tsentr analiza strategiy i
tekhnologiy, 2010; B. Nygren, R. McDermott and C. Pallin (editors), The Russian
Armed Forces in Transition: economic, geopolitical and institutional uncertainties,
Routledge, 2012.
2
D. R. Herspring, “Is Military Reform in Russia for ‘Real’? Yes, But...,” in S. Blank
and R. Weitz (eds) The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow: Essays in Memory of
Mary Fitzgerald, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
2010; V. Shlykov, “Tainy blitskriga Serdiukova,” Rossiya v globalnoy politike, No 6,
December 2009; V. Shamanov, Interview in Bratishka magazine for Russian special
forces, Moscow, May 2009.
3
“Shoygu anonsiroval stroitel’stvo 1740 voyennykh ob’yektov v 2018–2025 godakh,”
Moskovskiy Komsomolets, April 21, 2017.
4
Mikhail Ivanov, Amaliya Zatari, “Mest v armii stanovitsya vse men’she,” Gazeta.ru,
April 21, 2017, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2017/04/21/shoygu-anonsiroval-
stroitelstvo-1740-voennykh-obektov-v-20182025-godakh.html.
5
Aleksey Ramm, “Proverka Ukrainoy,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, April 29,
2015, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/25027.
6
Carolina Vendil-Pallin, Fredrik Westerlund, “Russia’s War in Georgia: Lessons
and Consequences,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, Volume 20, Issue 2, 2009, pp. 400–
424.
7
Oleg Vladykin, “1848 Hours and You are a Soldier,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, July 1, 2011, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2011-07-01/1_soldier.html; Richard
Weitz, “The State of the Russian Military,” RIA Novosti, May 27, 2011.
8
See: Soviet Military Power, US Department of Defense, Washington, 1983. The
tendency to exaggerate Russian military power resurfaced in a report issued by
Finland’s National Defense University in September 2011, entitled: “Russian
Politico-Military Development and Finland.”
9
For further detail see: Roger N. McDermott, The Reform of Russia’s Conventional
Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications, Washington: The
Jamestown Foundation, 2011; Dr. Lester W. Grau. Charles K. Bartles,
The Russian Way of War. Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of
the Russian Ground Forces, Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016,
http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/Russia/2017-
07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau-Bartles.pdf.
10
Viktor Baranets, “The Army Will Be Getting the Latest Weapons and Lodgings
and Will Be Rid of Hazing: Dmitry Medvedev Has Formulated Five Principles of
Development of the Armed Forces,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 1, 2008;
Nikolay Poroskov, “Military Arrangements,” Vremya Novostey, October 8, 2008.
11
“Russian Defense Minister Announces Overhaul of the Armed Forces Structure,”
Zvezda Television, 14 October, 2008.
12
“Expanded Meeting of the Defense Ministry Board,” Kremlin.ru, March 18, 2011.
13
”Transcript of Meeting With Participants in the Assembly of Officers
Commanding Force Groupings of the Armed Forces,” Presidential website,
November 25, 2010, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/9609.
14
”V VDV staklo na tri desantno-shturmovykh brigad bolshe,” Ministry of Defense,
October 21, 2013,
15
These dilemmas were also reflected in updated versions of Russia’s security
documents, see: Zatsepin, V. ‘On a new version of the national security strategy of
the Russian Federation’, Russian Economic Developments, No. 2, 2016, pp. 82–85.
16
Grigoriy Maslov, ‘They Will Divide the Russian Armed Forces by the Compass,’
www.infox.ru, April, 30, 2010.
17
”Russian Army to Form Four Strategic Commands,” Interfax, April 29, 2010;
Viktor Litovkin, ”Parade of Reforms Shows No Sign of Breaking: Russian Army
Proceeds to New Stage of Modernization,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye,
May 14, 2010, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2010-05-14/1_parad.html; ”Organization of
Russia’s New Operational-Strategic Commands will be Over in 2010,” Interfax, June

11, 2010.
18
Victor Litovkin, ‘The Examination for the Seven Test Sites,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, September 23, 2011, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2011-09-
23/1_exam.html.
19
Interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Ignatov, Ekho Moskvy, July 30, 2011.
20
Roger N. McDermott, ”Is Anybody There? Russian Military Command and
Control,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 8, Issue 182, October 4, 2011.
21
Roger N. McDermott, ‘Russian Military Command and Control: A Giant Leap of
Faith?’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 8, Issue 158, August 16, 2011; Dmitry
Kandaurov, ”Tanks Do Not Wash,” Zavtra, August 3, 2011,
http://www.zavtra.ru/cgi/veil/data/zavtra/11/924/print41.html; Dmitry Litovkin,
”Defense Programme Failed the Internet War,” August 1, 2011,
http://www.izvestia.ru/news/496152Izvstia.
22
”Medvedev Opens Discussion on Conscription Changes,” July 23, 2010,
http://kremlin.ru/news/8404; Valery Astanin, ”New Look Soldiers,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 21, 2011 http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2011-01-
21/3_new_face.html.
23
Vitaliy Shlykov, “Conscript, Contractor or Citizen in the Form,” Voyenno
Promyshlennyy Kuryer, December 1, 2010, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6964;
Aleksandr Belkin, “And Still an Unsolved Problem. Who Could Protect the Country
From Military Attack: Conscript or Contractor?” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer,
November 10, 2010, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6919.
24
“Doktrina informatsionnoi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Information
seurity doctrine of the Russian Federation],”
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/6/5.html; “Kontseptsiia obshchestvennoi
bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Concept for the security of the society of the
Russian Federation],” http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/16/117.html; “Voennaia
doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Military doctrine of the Russian Federation],”
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/18/-129.html.
25
“NATO: Russian Troops Dying In ‘Large Numbers’ In Eastern Ukraine,” RFE/RL,
March 5, 2015, http://www.rferl.org/content/nato-russian-troops-dying-large-
numbers-ukraine/26884296.html; James Kanter, Martin Fackler, “NATO Says
Russia Pulled Some Troops From Ukraine,” New York Times, September 24, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/europe/ukraine-russia-nato-
withdrawal.html?_r=0; Author interviews with SMEs and officials, Rome,
September 8, 2014.
26
“Lidery Ukrainskikh opolchentsev vychislili donskikh kazakov-predatelei,
planirovavshikh sdat Lugansk natsgvardii,” Bloknot News Agency, Rostov na-Donu,
June 10, 2014, http://bloknot-rostov.ru/news/more/lidery-ukrainskih-opolchencev-
zapodozrila-donskih-kazakov-pod-predvoditelstvom-atamana-kozicyna-v-
predatelstve-20140610; “Control of Donbas,” The Economist, October 1, 2014,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/10/daily-chart; “Aleksej
Zhuravlyov: Ukrainu nuzhno osvobodit ot fashizma i razgula rusofobii,” Rodina
Party Website, February 5, 2014, http://rodina.ru/novosti/aleksej-zhuravlyov-
ukrainu-nuzhno-osvobodit-ot-fashizma-i-razgula-rusofobii; Vladimir Mukhin,
“Rossia gotovitsa k mashtabnoi mirotvorcheskoi operatsii,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta,
August 25, 2014, http://www.ng.ru/armies/2014-08-25/1_peacemakers.html.
27
Rimma Akhmirova, “Kto iz Rossii voyuyet protiv Kieva ha yugo-vostoke
Ukrainy,” Sobessednik.ru, July 16, 2014,
http://sobesednik.ru/rassledovanie/20140716-kto-iz-rossii-i-pochemu-voyuet-
protiv-kieva-na-yugo-vostoke; Ilya Barabanov, “Samovooruzhennaia respublika,”
Kommersant Vlast, June 2, 2014; Oleg Falichev, “Spetsnaz byl i ostaetsa elitoi,”
Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 26, 2014, http://vpk-
news.ru/articles/19280.
28
Valeriy Gerasimov, “Tsennost’ nauki v predvidenii,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy
Kuryer, February 26, 2013, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632; For a detailed
examination of some of the historical antecedents of the Gerasimov article see:
Steven J. Main, “You Cannot Generate Ideas by Orders: The Continuing
Importance of Studying Soviet Military History—G. S. Isserson and Russia’s
Current Geo-Political Stance,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1,
2016, pp. 48–72; Jacob Kipp, The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in
Soviet Military Affairs (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Soviet Army Studies Office, 1988),
http://www.dtic. mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a196677.pdf; and N. V. Ogarkov, Ed.,
Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1983, p. 585.
29
See: Aleksandr Golts, Heidi Reisinger, “Russia’s Hybrid Warfare: Waging War
Below the Radar of Traditional Collective Defense,” Research Paper, NATO Defense
College, Rome, November 2014; Marc Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and
Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows Blog, July 6, 2014,
http://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-
russian-non-linear-war/; US Government, State Department, White House,
Department of Defense, CRS, Director of National Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), 2014 Essential Guide to the Ukraine and the Crisis with Russia.
published by Progressive Management, 2014. Wilson, Andrew, Ukraine Crisis:
What It Means for the West. Yale University Press, 2014; John Mearsheimer, “The
Liberal Delusions that Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014;
Michael McFaul, Stephen Sestanovick, John Mearsheimer, “Faulty Powers: Who
Started the Ukraine Crisis?” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014.
30
Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Rossiya gotovitsya k masshtabnoy mirotvorcheskoy operatsii,’
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, August 25, 2014,
http://www.ng.ru/armies/2014-08-25/1_peacemakers.html; For an excellent Russian
analysis of the course of the conflict in Ukraine see: Mikhail Barabanov,
‘Prinuzhdeniye k miru-2: blizhayshaya perspektiva Rossii na Ukraine,’ Odnako,
December 2014–January 2015, http://periscope2.ru/2015/01/19/8298/.
31
Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Where Threats to Peace Come From,” Kraznaya Zvezda,
May 27, 2014, http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/newspaper/item/16298-otkuda-
iskhodyat-ugrozy-miru; Yury Gavrilov, “Games With Zero Outcome,” Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, May 26, 2014, www.rg.ru/2014/05/23/konferenciya-site.html; “Veroyatnoye
budushcheye voyny za Novorossiyu,” Voyennoye Obozreniye, August 29, 2014,
http://topwar.ru/57093-veroyatnoe-buduschee-voyny-za-novorossiyu.html; Oleg
Odnokolenko, “Vostochno-ukrainskiy front snova v ogne,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, January 30, 2015, http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2015-01-
30/1_front.html.
32
See section three below.
33
Anton Lavrov, “Russian Again: The Military Operation for Crimea,” Colby
Howard and Ruslan Pukhov, eds. Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in
Ukraine, (East View Press, 2014), pp. 157–186.
34
Claire Bigg, “Vostok Battalion, A Powerful New Player in Eastern Ukraine,”
RFE/RL, May 30, 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/vostok-battalion-a-powerful-
new-player-in-eastern-ukraine/25404785.html; Konstantin Bogdanov, “Russia May
Consider Establishing Private Military Companies,” RIA News Agency, April 13,
2012, http://en.ria.ru/analysis/20120413/172789099.html; Enerud, Per (2013) “Can
the Kremlin Control the Cossacks?” RUFS Briefing No. 18, Swedish Defence
Research Agency, March 2013,
http://www.foi.se/Global/V%c3%a5r%20kunskap/S%c3%a4kerhetspolitiska%20stud
ier/Ryssland/%c3%96vriga%20filer/RUFS%20Briefing%20No.%2018%20.pdf.
35
“V SNBO razyasnili pravovoj status rossiyan, prinimayuschich uchastie v
konflikte ha Donbasse,” Inforesist, September 8, 2014, http://inforesist.org/v-snbo-
razyasnili-pravovoj-status-rossiyan-prinimayushhix-uchastie-v-konflikte-na-
donbasse/; Irek Murtazin, “Ustav. Otpravilis v otpusk,” Novaya Gazeta, September
8, 2014, http://www.novayagazeta.ru/comments/65137.html.
36
Kofman, Michael, and Matthew Rojansky, “A Closer Look at Russia’s ‘Hybrid
War,’ ” KennanCable, No.7, Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, April 2015,
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7-KENNAN%20CABLE-
ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf, Korotchenko, Igor, “Nachalos Formirovaniye
Otradov Armi Samoobrony Yugo-Vostochnoy Ukrainy,” LiveJournal.com, March
23, 2014, http://i-korotchenko.livejournal.com/844693.html.
37
Aleksei Ramm, “Pervyye pobedy rossiyskikh instruktorov — chast’ I,” Voyenno
Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 3, 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/28995; Aleksei
Ramm, “Pervyye pobedy rossiyskikh instruktorov — chast’ II,” Voyenno
Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 17, 2016, http://vpknews.ru/articles/29213.
38
Based on a review of Russian and Western analyses of the conflict and discussions
with defense specialists.
39
See: T. Thomas, “Russia’s military strategy and Ukraine. Indirect, asymmetric and
Putin led,” The Journal of Slavic Military Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2015; F. Westerlund
and J. Norberg, “Military means for non-military measures: the Russian approach to
the use of armed force as seen in Ukraine,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
Volume 29, Issue 4, 2016; A. Rácz, “Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine: breaking the
enemy’s ability to resist,” FIIA Report 43, The Finnish Institute of International
Affairs.
40
41
Oleg Salyukov, “Ratniki idut,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 22, 2017,
http://vpk-news.ru/articles/35285; Aleksandr Tikhonov, “S pritselom na
budushcheye,” Krasnaya Zvezda, , January 24, 2016,
http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/27444-s-pritselom-na-
budushchee.
42
Oleg Salyukov, Oleg Falichev, “Vozvrashcheniye diviziy,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy
Kuryer, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/29096, February 10, 2016; “Chislo batal’onnykh
grupp, sostoyashchikh iz kontraktnikov, v rossiyskoy armii cherez dva goda
dostignet 125 – nachal’nik Genshtaba VS RF,” Interfax-AVN,
http://www.militarynews.ru/story.asp?rid=1&nid=425709, September 14, 2016.
43
“V Vozdushno-desantnykh voyskakh poyavilis’ podrazdeleniya so statusom
udarnyye,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, May 19, 2017,
44
Olga Shilova, Pavel Popovskikh, “Razvedka VDV na smene epokh,”
Natsional’naya Oborona, December 1, 2010,
http://old.nationaldefense.ru/284/112/index.shtml?id=3618.
45
Aleksey Ramm, “Proverka Ukrainoy,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, April 29,
2015, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/25027; Aleksey Chuykov, “Severnyye mechty
Minoborony,” Argumenty Nedeli, September 27, 2012,
http://argumenti.ru/army/n358/204451.
46
“My vse znali, na chto idem i chto mozhet byt,” Novaya Gazeta, March 2, 2015,
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/society/67490.html.
47
“My vse znali, na chto idem i chto mozhet byt,” Op. Cit; Yuriy Belousov, “Matritsa
dlya lichnogo sostava,” Krasnaya Zvezda, September 1, 2015,
http://www.redstar.ru/index.php/component/k2/item/25548-matritsa-dlya-
lichnogo-sostava.
48
“Proverka Ukrainoy,” Op. Cit.
49
Igor Popov, “Divizii protiv brigad, brigady protiv diviziy,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, July 12, 2013,
http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/34809412.
50
“S pritselom na budushcheye,” Op. Cit; “Vozvrashcheniye diviziy,” Op. Cit.
51
Vladimir Gundarov, “Pyat milliardov dlya novoy divizii,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, April 1, 2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/nvoevents/2016-04-
01/2_mlrd.html.
52
“Shoygu: Minoborony RF v 2016 godu sformiruyet tri novyye divizii na zapadnom
napravlenii,” TASS, January 12, 2016, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/2579480.
53
“Istochnik: divizii 1-y tankovoy i 20-y armiy na zapade Rossii budut imet’ po
shest’ polkov,” TASS, April 1, 2016, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/3169104.
54
Vladimir Gundarov, “Pyat milliardov dlya novoy divizii,” Nezavisimoye
Voyennoye Obozreniye, April 1, 2016, http://nvo.ng.ru/nvoevents/2016-04-
01/2_mlrd.html.
55
Nikolay Surkov, Aleksey Ramm, and Yevgeniy Andreyev, “Severnyy Kavkaz
ukrepili diviziyami,” Izvestia, February 16, 2018, https://iz.ru/705714/nikolai-
surkov-aleksei-ramm-evgenii-andreev/severnyi-kavkaz-ukrepili-diviziiami.
56
Oleg Salyukov, Oleg Falichev, “Vospreshcheniye diviziy,” Voyenno Promyshlennyy
Kuryer, February 8, 2016, https://vpk-news.ru/articles/29096.
57
Aleksei Ramm, “Pervyye pobedy rossiyskikh instruktorov — chast’ I,” Voyenno
Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 3, 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/28995; Aleksei
Ramm, “Pervyye pobedy rossiyskikh instruktorov — chast’ II,” Voyenno
Promyshlennyy Kuryer, February 17, 2016, http://vpknews.ru/articles/29213.
58
“S pritselom na budushcheye,” Op. Cit; “Vozvrashcheniye diviziy,” Op. Cit;
“Istochnik: divizii 1-y tankovoy i 20-y armiy,” Op. Cit.
59
Salyukov, “Vospreshcheniye diviziy,” Op. Cit.
60
10. Russian Lessons Learned From the
Operation in Syria: A Preliminary
Assessment
Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky
Introduction
This chapter deals with the lessons that the Russian strategic
community and Russian experts have distilled from the operation in
Syria and that can be traced to Russian sources. The main interest is
in the lessons that will impact the three main components of
prospective Russian military innovations: transforming the concept of
operations, force buildup and organization structures.
This research contends with two major limitations to. First, it is still
too early to talk about specific lessons, since the Russian experts
themselves are in the process of exploring their own experience.
Knowledge development, which started only recently, is an ongoing
process, and will generate refined and deep insights only in the
coming months and years. As of now, not even enough time has
passed for the Russian strategic community to come out with anything
beyond preliminary lessons. Moreover, while this chapter is based on
open sources, the major portion of Russia’s lesson-learning process is
classified. The reliability of available sources is questionable, and their
number is still too limited to offer any definite arguments. It will take
379
time until the open commentaries, exercises, and actual military

modernization programs in the realms of weapon procurement,
doctrine and organizational transformations reflect the takeaways
from the Syrian operation.
Consequently, this chapter offers a preliminary outline of the major

themes and trends that Russian sources emphasize over others when
debating the Syrian experience. It aims to highlight the main topics of
interest and prioritization of the Russian military brass, theoreticians
and experts, but does not seek to outline specific resolutions in each
field. Nonetheless, it contributes by highlighting those themes that the
Russian professional discourse has prioritized in terms of intellectual
energy; and where possible, it speculates on linkages to force buildup
and procurement tendencies. The chapter does not hypothesize about
the lessons regarding strategy and operational art, which Russian
practitioners are likely to deduce, but which, at this stage, are not
reflected in the primary sources. These important insights are beyond
the scope of this chapter and is worth exploring in a follow-up work.
The chapter consists of three sections. The first outlines the innovative
conceptual climate, which fosters the lesson-learning process. The
second section focuses on the reconnaissance-strike complex and its
segments (intelligence, command and strike capabilities), which is the
main leitmotif and frame of reference in the Russian process of
learning. The third part covers other issues pertaining to operational
art and strategy that already loom large in Russian knowledge
development. Presumably, this way of addressing the subject matter
reflects the Russian holistic mentality and complex approach to
conceptualizing military innovations and the changing character of
war.
Innovative Conceptual Climate
Without idealizing the contemporary Russian approach to military

innovations, it seems that prior to, during and following the operation
Russian Lessons From the Operation in Syria | 381
in Syria, the Russian strategic community has been functioning as a

learning machine. Since 2008, from Georgia and then through the
operations in Crimea, eastern Ukraine and Syria, one can identify a
recurring pattern of innovation: first, the professional discourse
explores a cloud of doctrinal ideas related to the changing character
of war; exercises and snap inspections then refine the insights
developed by theoretical discussions and introduce them into
practice; these postulates then receive a reality check in actual military
operations; finally, the energetic lesson-learning process during and
following the operation again distills the conceptual takeaways from
the experience and injects them into the theoretical debate, which
further reactivates the above cycle of learning.
Some Western scholars have already admitted that in recent conflicts,

Moscow demonstrated an aptitude for learning, transformation and
scale of improvisation that are rather unorthodox for the post-Soviet
Russian military. Indeed the learning process seems be tolerant of
failure and has demonstrated conceptual flexibility and dynamism,
new knowledge development by trial and error, constant
experimentation, adjustments, and cycles of strategic-operational
adaptation.1 Russian Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Valery
Gerasimov’s statement in 2017 clearly illustrates this modus operandi
of the Russian strategic community. According to him, “from the first
day of the Syrian campaign, the GS [General Staff] thoroughly
explored the combat experience,” and among other things
disseminated the lessons learned to the forces that were about to rotate
to Syria. Moreover, the GS conducted several conferences on the
subject of the lessons learned and issued several manuals
summarizing the operational experience.2 It was also a process of
learning by friction, or what Western scholars would qualify as
wartime adaptation,3 when insights about the enemy’s modus
operandi generated adjustments (korrektivy) and transformation of
the Russian concept of operations, organizational structures and force
buildup trends.4
Moreover, from a relatively early stage, the GS turned the Syrian

operation into an incubator of training and innovation. It sought to
provide with combat experience (“obkatat’ v Sirii”) the highest
possible number of commanders from all the services and branches of
the military. Eventually, in two years of the operation, 48,000 troops
rotated through the Syrian theater in three-month deployments. All
the commanders of the military districts, who one after another
commanded the grouping of forces in Syria, and the commanders of
the General Purpose (obschevoiskvoye), Air (vozdushnye) and Air
Defense (PVO) armies went through Syria. They arrived with their
chiefs of staff and with organic staffs from the military districts. Thus,
all the staff apparatus, including staff officers from operations,
intelligence, communications and rear departments, as well as the
main branches of the Ground Forces—or in general, 90 percent of
Russian commanders and more than 50 percent of regimental and
brigade commanders—rotated through Syria.5
All these commanders acquired experience in combined arms warfare

and inter-service cooperation, as well as “complex employment of
intelligence, C2 [command and control] and fire destruction means”
of their forces functioning in the form of a reconnaissance-strike
complex.6 Also, the crews of ships and submarines employing
precision-guided weapons, along with almost the entire order of battle
of the operational-tactical aviation, including the maritime aviation of
the Northern Fleet, acquired combat experience.7 Moreover, the
Syrian baptism by fire was not confined only to the chain of
command. The GS and Ministry of Defense (MoD) ensured the
“uninterrupted military scientific-technological escort of the troops
and weapons employment.” Engineers, designers and scientists from
the military design bureaus, scientific institutes and military industry
were dispatched to Syria to accompany their products, to learn
lessons, as well as to calibrate their products technologically and
conceptually based on the hands-on experience on the ground. This
applied, according to the CGS, to every type of weaponry.8
Reconnaissance-Strike Complex: The Leitmotif of the Innovation
A recurrent theme in the reflections of Russian experts and

commentators on the operation in Syria is its definition as the first
occasion on which a reformed Russian military eventually fought
along the lines of the Information Technology Revolution in Military
Affairs (IT-RMA) and materialized the principles of operational art
associated with it. This notion, which was developed by Soviet military
theoreticians during the 1980s under the titles MTR and RMA, and
was known in the West as the Ogarkov Doctrine (after the then-Soviet
CGS, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov), has been popularized since the
1990s by Andrew Marshall and experts from the Office of Net
Assessment in the Pentagon. The IT-RMA school of thought made a
straightforward argument about the changing character of war: the
overall tendency of military establishments in the information era
would be to transform their armed forces into reconnaissance-strike
complexes that link together intelligence capabilities, C2 systems and
precision stand-off fire into an ecosystem of networked combined
arms, uninterruptedly executing “sensor-shooter loops.” The Soviet
military lexicon defined this phenomenon at the strategic-operational
level of war as a reconnaissance-strike (razvedovatel’no-udarnyi) and
at the operational-tactical level as a reconnaissance-fire
(razvedovatl’no-ogenvoi) complex. The very same notion in the
Western military lexicon was given the title of network-centric
warfare (NCW). The term also applies to the doctrine, organizational
structures and weaponry that are associated with informational- (in
contrast to industrial-) age warfare and was the driving force behind
the US and NATO defense transformations in the late 20th– early 21st
centuries.9
The Soviet Union, a pioneer in conceptualizing the changing

character of war in the information era, never materialized this
innovative notion. But following the post-Soviet collapse times of
trouble, as Russia began rising from its geopolitical knees, defense
modernization sought to head in this direction. It was only starting
from 2008, however, that military reform with tangible changes began
gathering momentum. The main flaws of the Russian military, which
the war in Georgia highlighted, were in fact the pivots of the IT-RMA:
the deficit of the PGMs and standoff weapons; an inability to wage
NCW operations due to the low level of command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (C4ISR); and the low quality of ground forces,
incapable of waging combined-arms warfare or functioning as
reconnaissance-strike complexes. The main aim of the subsequent
force modernization was to rebuild the conventional military after
almost 20 years of decay, specifically focusing on the above three
components, and thus to advance it as close as possible toward the
ideal type of reconnaissance-strike complex. Modernizations
implemented towards the operation in Crimea, then in Donbas but
especially in Syria demonstrated a slow but steady improvement in
this regard.
Russian experts argue that Syria represents the first instance that the
Russian military has put into practice the ideas outlined by Marshall
Ogarkov and fielded reconnaissance-strike complexes on the ground.
The GS saw the operation in Syria as a testing ground for almost all
types of modern Russian weaponry from each of the branches and
services of the Armed Forces, and specifically the systemic use of ISR,
C2 and fire systems integrated into unified reconnaissance-strike
complexes.10 Unsurprisingly, the Russian professional discourses and
the lexicon of the senior officials with regard to the Syrian operation
are saturated with the terms “reconnaissance-strike complex” (RSC)
and “reconnaissance-fire complex” (RFC). Gerasimov’s euphemism
“Russia realized in Syria the principle of ‘one target, one bomb’ ” is the
most laconic expression of the IT-RMA warfare era—to be seen is to
be shot, and to be shot is to be killed.11 Accordingly, the following
three sections focus on the lessons learned about the three main
components of the complex—ISR, C2 and Strike—and what lies
between them. This division is quite general and is mainly for the
purpose of organizing the available material, as many topics easily fit

into several categories.
ISR Segment of the Complex
A strong emphasis on precision-guided munitions (PGM), on which

more below, demands a bank of targets prepared in advance as well as
the ability to generate a bank of real-time intelligence. Russia’s Special
Operation Forces (KSO) Command, fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV) and the GLONASS satellite guidance system constellation, all
of which contributed to these two missions, so far have received the
most significant attention from Russian commentators discussing the
ISR segment of the reconnaissance-strike complex. And all three
elements of the ISR segment have been novel to Russian military
practice.
For the KSO, a new branch in the Russian military, Syria became a
period of professional and organizational establishment. The KSO
forces in the theater of operations interchangeably took responsibility
over the ISR, C2 and Strike elements of the RSC. When functioning as
the ISR segment, the KSO played the most central role in the
acquisition and designation of targets of strategic operational
importance, such as leadership and C2 centers, for a strike by the
artillery and air force (navedenie I korrektsia udarov).12 Given the
Syrian experience, it seems that the ISR responsibilities of the KSO as
an organic part of the reconnaissance-strike (RS) and reconnaissance-
fire (RF) complexes will continue to increase and become
institutionalized.
Since 2012, the Russian Armed Forces have taken a huge leap forward
in the quality and quantity of the UAV fleet. As part of the
modernization in this field, the military established 38 new UAV units
and detachments, which together operated more than 1,800 drones of
various types. The aim was to improve the ability of the forces to
conduct ISR missions to a tactical-operational depth of up to 500
kilometers, and to deploy them for the sake of so-called “Radio-

Electronic Struggle (REB)13, C2 and strike missions, in frames of the
various RS and RF complexes; and to significantly increase the combat
capabilities and effectiveness of the general-purpose forces, artillery
and operational-tactical aviation.14 The operation in Syria employed
an unprecedented, in terms of types and numbers, fleet of UAVs. On
average, at any given moment, 60–70 reconnaissance, strike and
radio-electronic suppression UAVs have flown over the theater of
operations. All branches have been using UAVs extensively in Syria
in order to create reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire
contours on the operational and tactical levels. As of this writing, in
the midst of the lesson-learning process, the Russian high command
does not envision future combat activities for any of the services that
would not involve use of UAVs.15
All the ISR missions of the UAV fleet in Syria, as well as the
subsequent feeding of the targets bank to precision weapons systems,
sea and air cruise and ground ballistic missiles, as well as precision-
guided bombs and the C2 architecture, were based on the GLONASS
system. In 2011, the Russian MoD received for trial this satellite
constellation, which provides navigation services, PGM satellite
guidance and automated C2. In the subsequent years it entered
service, both the space and ground segments of the system have been
constantly improved. However, despite persistent upgrades and
investments, it still falls short of satisfying “the most demanding
applications, from mapping to high-precision weapons.” In Syria,
Russia field-tested all three abovementioned functions of the system.
Despite losing several satellites in failed launches throughout the
Syrian campaign, Russia had between 21 and 27 satellites in orbit. This
was sufficient to provide 95 percent of the system’s global availability
to conduct its three main missions for most of the time.16
The main users of GLONASS included Su24M, Su25SM, Su27SM3,

Su30, Su34 and Su35 jets, naval aviation aircraft, and Tu22M3
long-range bombers equipped with targeting and navigation stations.
Moreover, satellite navigation technologies made it possible to

radically improve the accuracy of the massive strikes with free-falling
unguided bombs from the GLONASS-guided strategic bombers.
According to a Russian expert, “the bombers can now automatically
follow a preset course, and drop unguided munitions at a precise point
in their flight.”17 The exact proportion of the PGMs used in the
Russian operation in Syria is still unclear. According to expert on the
Russian military Michael Kofman, less than 10 percent of the strikes
conducted in Syria utilized PGMs. And in the case of precision strikes,
Russian forces faced the greatest difficulty hitting small, maneuvering
targets, which demanded the ability to rapidly close sensor-to-shooter
loops and/or a fleet of strike-capable UAVs.18 Russian sources
mention around 200 air, sea and underwater missiles that were
launched. All of these munitions, however, were GLONASS-capable
and supported by C4ISR.19
According to Russian experts, GLONASS enabled the Russian Air

Force to operate in the unfamiliar desert-mountain-urban terrain and
to pinpoint well-disguised targets there. Seeking accuracy and caution
in the densely populated areas was probably less of a demand for the
Russian operators than for their Western or Israeli counterparts
dealing with the same missions. Nonetheless, it was in fact much more
important than the majority of Western commentators have tended
to argue, frequently describing Russian aerial attacks as little more
than indiscriminate carpet bombings.20 The accuracy of the
GLONASS-based PGM strikes in Syria, on which Russian sources
report, suggests that Russia probably deployed ground correction
stations in the theater of operations. The effectiveness of such strikes
without this supporting system in the current state of affairs would
probably drop significantly. The Russians are aware of this limitation
and will probably, as one of the possible lessons from Syria, work
intensively to improve in this regard in order to be able to further
refine their ability to wage network-centric warfare and utilize the
technologies supporting this ecosystem.21
C2 Segment of the Complex
The Syrian operation was a baptism by fire for the National Defense
Management Center (NTsUO), which, in the words of the CGS and
the MoD, fundamentally changed the Russian approach to the
command, control and management of the armed forces and
operations, and which is today the “key link in the system of state
military management.”22 The establishment of the center in 2013 was
probably one of the pivotal events in the realm of Russian C2
architecture and modus operandi. The NTsUO merges into one
unified interagency system analogous centers at all the levels of
management and in all the federal entities involved in national
security—158 federal and regional state organs, and 1,320 state
corporations and companies of the military-industrial complex. The
intra-net, which supports the NTsUO, established a unified
informational space for all the entities at all the levels. The daily
combat duty shift of the NTsUO with representatives on the strategic,
operational and tactical levels consists of 10,000 officers. It covers the
entire range of subjects, from early warning on nuclear-missile attack,
nuclear retaliation, air and missile defense, to managing actual combat
activities in a given theater of operation.23
The center made it possible to establish during the operation in Syria

a unique C2 architecture and procedures from the strategic level in
Moscow to the tactical-operational level on the ground. It was tailor-
made for the Syrian operation, but this novel architecture and the
systems supporting it reflected the reforms aimed at improving the C2
in NCW operations since 2008.24 Russian generals see the effective C2
segment as a pledge for the operation’s overall success. Following the
decision to intervene, a tri-level C2 architecture emerged. The
highest-level operator was the Group of Combat Management within
the NTsUO. The Command Post of the Grouping of Forces within the
Khmeimim airbase was the second layer of C2, and Operational
Groups of Advisors on all the tactical-operational directions was the
lowest expression of this architecture.25
The Group of Combat Management consisted of around-the-clock

shifts, which included representatives from all organs of military
management. The tasks of the group included collection, analysis and
assessment of the combat situation, of decisions made by the
Command of the Grouping of Forces, and of the planned subsequent
operational activities. The duty shifts provided regular situational
updates on these issues to the MoD and the CGS. This constant
situational awareness made it possible to rapidly adapt to the changing
trends and situation on the ground. The Group coordinated with
representatives of the United States, Turkey, the Special United
Nations Envoys in Geneva and Damascus, the Cease Fire Monitoring
center in Geneva, and also all Russian representatives interacting with
the involved actors within international organizations. As such, it was
responsible for the uninterrupted staff work on the military-political
issues involving combat, diplomatic and humanitarian activities
related to Syria.26
The Command Post of the Grouping of Forces, located in Khmeimim,

ensured the coordination of activities of the Russian Forces in Syria
with the Syrian Army, Republican Guard, and local and foreign
militias. It consisted of representatives of all organs, services and
military districts involved in the operation. The Post was also
responsible for the coordination of combat activities and
informational exchange in order to avoid accidents with the US
operational centers in Jordan and Qatar, and with the Turkish and
Israeli air force Command Centers. Operational Groups of Advisers—
the lowest level of C2—coordinated on the tactical level through the
C2 centers established within the Syrian Army Corps with the militias
of all types supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The number
of these groups varied according to the operational demands; during
the most active phases of the operation, there were 15 groups of this
kind.27
The NTsUO, which benefited from all the types of communication

and data collection and analysis, became a hybrid of the traditional
Russian wartime supreme command (Stavka) and the GS. The CGS
and MoD observed in real time all activities on the ground, including
air, artillery, missile and long-range PGM strikes. The Command Post
in Khmeimim waged the operation and did the staff work supporting
it; however, it was fully and uninterruptedly accessible to the supreme
military leadership in Moscow.28 One may, thus, consider it the
tactical-operational equivalents of the Stavka representatives during
the war.
During the several years preceding the Syrian operation, special

attention was paid to producing and deploying mobile automatic field
C2 posts on the tactical-operational level, aimed at enabling effective
and reliable combat management. When the Syrian operation started
the development of an automatic C2 system of troops and weaponry
on the tactical level was accomplished. It enables automatic collection
and analysis of the information for the sake of the situation estimate,
planning of combat activity, sending orders and combat missions, fire
management, and logistical-rear support of the forces. The system was
tested during the strategic exercises Kavkaz 2016 and Zapad 2017.
From 2018, the equipment of this unified tactical-level C2 system,
which the Syria war made possible to test and refine, will start arriving
to the general-purpose forces.29 GLONASS supported all tiers of these
automated C2 systems, from the tactical to strategic levels. “The new
Strelets reconnaissance, target designation and communication
systems, which are part of the tactical automated C2 tier, are used to
acquire target coordinates on the ground. The HQ of the Russian
forces in Syria has been able to successfully coordinate the deployment
of the different branches and services of the armed forces, as well as to
coordinate strikes from the ground, sea and air. At the sub-strategic
level, all the data on the coordinates of the battlefield assets and targets
is fed to the National Defense Management Center.”30
In support of the above C2 architecture, Russia deployed a

communications system, which included cell, radio and video
communication capabilities. Russian forces introduced full
communication capacity into the non-equipped theater of operations

and provided all segments of the tactical-operational level of C2 with
a full spectrum of secured tele-, video and document connections.
This facilitated rapid decision-making and execution as well as
effective strikes. The equipment made possible a constant data flow
for the UAV and other ISR sources on collective usage screens, which
enabled better bomb damage assessment (BDA) and adjustments for
the next rounds of fire and sorties. The system afforded
interoperability of the communications system of the Grouping with
the secured and closed telephony and intra-net and informational-
telecommunication network of the MoD. The system was self-
sufficient and deployed stationary and mobile complexes on the
ground that maintained these secured tele-, video and radio
communications. Data produced by the UAVs was transmitted to the
collective usage displays in the Syrian theater of operations and in
Moscow. All components of this triple architecture, including the
operational C2 groups on the tactical level deployed within the C2
centers of the Syrian army, were interconnected. All the above enabled
uninterrupted and effective command and control of the operation
from Moscow.31 In keeping with the canonical principles of Russian
operational art, this C2 architecture linked all tactical activities in all
directions with a unified operational plot (edinyi operativnyi zamysel)
of the theater of operations, and orchestrated them all from the
command post in Khmeimim.32
Probably due to the Syrian experience, new C2 structures were

introduced and adjusted in one Ground Forces army and in the
Northern Fleet.33 According to Russian commentators, during 2017,
the unified tactical-level C2 system, following training and
adjustments, reduced the time needed for organizing combat activity
by 20–30 percent, and accelerated the combat management tempo by
1.5–3 times.34 Given the favorable assessment of its effectiveness and
modus operandi, this C2 architecture is likely to be preserved in future
practice.
Strike Segment of the Complex
In Russian military terminology, reconnaissance-strike complex, or

RSC, refers to the strategic-operational combat activities and
reconnaissance-fire complex, or RFC, to the operational-tactical ones,
although there is not much consistency—commanders and
commentators often use these terms interchangeably. In any case, the
General Staff divided its strike capabilities according to concentric
zones: for the far zone of destruction (a radius of 4,000 km), it used
sea- (Kalibr) and air-based (Kh-101) cruise missiles and Tu-22M3
strategic bombers; in the medium zone of destruction (up to 500 km),
it employed Su-24s and Su-33s, capable of conducting precision
strikes thanks to a special targeting and guidance system; even in the
near zone of destruction, it saw its activities as a “reconnaissance-
strike contour,” based on the C4ISR Strelets system and Su-24Ms.
During the operation, the GS formatted and tested RS and RF
complexes for the needs of the Missile Forces and Artillery (RViA),
which enabled the destruction of the adversary in close to real time.35
Gerasimov’s reflections on the Syrian operation clearly demonstrate

an intent to wage modern warfare and a perception of the forces as RS
and RF complexes. Also, the GS tested for the first time a massive sea-
based and air-based precision-guided missile strike and their joint use
in a coordinated salvo. It positively assessed the results of these three
types of PGM usage.36 In addition to the favorable estimate of air-
based precision strikes launched from strategic aviation systems and
from nonstrategic Su-34 bombers armed with KAB-500 bombs and
laser-guided Kh-29L missiles, the GS was also satisfied with the use of
unguided bombs by operational-tactical aviation. This was possible
mainly thanks to the GLONASS-based SVP-24 Gefest aiming and
navigation system, which enables nonstrategic platforms such as the
Su-24M and Su-25SM to conduct strikes with unguided munitions,
making their effectiveness comparable to that of the precision-guided
strikes.37
The employment of main missile and artillery pieces, mortars and

howitzers, as well as thermobaric weapons within the RviA arsenal—
the non-precision weapons—also received a most favorable
assessment. Some of these were modern systems and some several-
decades-old pieces of weaponry. The overall estimate of these general-
purpose forces is most positive.38 Probably what ensures the high
satisfaction with these systems are the conditions provided by the ISR
and C2 segments, which enable maximum effectiveness of what may
seem at first glance to be relatively dated systems. Similarly, the KSO,
in addition to target acquisition and designation, was also involved in
missions of leadership decapitation, and the destruction of critically
important material, C2 and supply infrastructure objects in the
operational and strategic rear.39 As such, it functioned as an element
in the Strike segment of the RSC.
Syria provided ample training and experience in combined-arms

warfare and especially close air support (CAS). On the tactical level,
forces on the ground closed sensor-shooter loops in real time using
available ISR and striking jets. These ground units then conducted
BDA by using the UAVs for another “observe, orient, decide, and act”
(OODA) loop and self-synchronization.40
The ground forces’ bid to enable their commanders to turn the forces
under their command into RS and RF complexes is not novel. For
example, in 2014, this was exactly the message of the RviA branch
commander.41 However, as the commander of the Russian Airborne
Troop (VDV) forces put it in 2017, the Syrian experience enabled his
and other branches of the general-purpose forces to train
commanders to have under their authority and to employ the entire
spectrum of ISR and fire capabilities. This sounds like the main
takeaway from the Syrian operation and one of the main emphases
that his branch and other services received from the CGS and MoD
during a recent gathering of the Armed Forces high command. He did
not envision this as a given skill, but as something that commanders
should learn to employ.42 Indeed, the annual gathering of the high
command in July 2017 used the Syrian experience as the basis for
further military modernization. That gathering, along with several
military exercises that followed, emphasized, among other topics, the
employment of RS and RF complexes.43 The expectation of the
Ground Forces from the State Armaments Program (GPV) is
similar—to sustain highly mobile and self-sufficient brigades, capable
of functioning as mini-RFCs thanks to their fire, ISR and C2
capabilities.44
Other Themes Pertaining to Operational Art
In addition to the lessons learned about the segments of the RSC,

Russian sources have covered several other themes related to general
questions of strategy, operational art and tactics. These insights relate
directly to the lessons learned about RSCs but still form a separate
category. Specifically, within the Russian professional discourse, the
issues that have so far loomed large pertain to the state armaments
program, strategic mobility, Radio-Electronic Struggle, exercises and
the curriculum of military institutions, as well as qualities of modern
commanders.
Self-Sufficient Groupings of Forces and State Armaments Program
The use of PGMs in Syria was a fruit of the incremental rearmament

reform aimed at producing self-sufficient groupings of forces armed
with precision-guided capabilities in strategically important theaters
of operation. According to Gerasimov, by 2017, the accumulated
arsenal of PGM capabilities, with an emphasis on Kalibr cruise
missiles, Bastion shore-to-sea missiles and S-400 AD systems, made it
possible to produce groupings of forces and deploy them in the Baltic,
Barents, Black and Mediterranean Seas,45 corresponding with the logic
epitomized in the Western terminology of anti-access and area denial
(A2/AD) bubbles.46 Presumably, the Syrian experience will inject
further conceptual and financial energy into promoting this trend.
From now on, the high command envisions massive use of PGMs as
part and parcel of all operations of the Russian Armed Forces.47 With
regard to the navy, according to the deputy chief of the General Staff,
the effectiveness of the strike potentially enables long blue-water raids
and patrols and affords the ability to conduct autonomous or joint
strikes according to operational needs.48
Syria became the testing ground for new weapons and technologies in
general as well as for cruise missiles, PGMs and UAVs in particular.
Thus, just as the lessons from Georgia shaped the force buildup and
modernization, Russian experts expect the lessons learned from Syria
to leave an even more significant imprint on the State Armaments
Program and force buildup.49 Russian military experts Roger N.
McDermott and Dmitry Gorenburg assumed that, in light of the
Syrian lessons, the next GPV and military modernization plans will
emphasize high-technology C4ISR assets and stand-off strike
capabilities.50 Indeed, one of the top priorities of the Russian force
buildup is to produce a “new-generation military”; another is to create
“self-sufficient, effective groupings of forces on the key directions for
state security.”51 Providing guidance toward the new GPV, President
Vladimir Putin urged that special emphasis be placed on equipping
forces with sea-, air- and land-based PGMs, reconnaissance-strike
UAVs, modern C4ISR and REB capabilities, as well as individual
equipment for soldiers, such as Ratnik.52 The next GPV, based on the
lessons learned from Syria, pays special attention to the quality and
quantity of the PGM arsenal and the C4ISR systems supporting it,
including UAVs and space satellites as its main enablers in all the
branches.53 Russian officials and experts commenting on the next
GPV see this as the strongest emphasis of the program, second only
to the modernization of the nuclear triad.54
Further promotion of robotics is another takeaway from the Syrian

experience; Moscow sees it as a force substitute and multiplier. It also
resonates well with Putin’s remark on the strategic competitive
advantage that the control and skillful use of artificial intelligence (AI)
provides, and corresponds with the initial emphasis on the subject
that gave birth to the Fund of Prospective Research (the Russian

equivalent of DARPA) in 2010. Presumably, at this stage at least,
references made to “combat robots” relate less to developing a new
generation of systems, and mainly to upgrading existing firepower
through its informationalization and intellectualization. One of the
main directions of procurement stemming directly from the Syrian
experience will be an emphasis on automatic digital guidance and fire
control of the artillery systems, which suggests that the introduction
of robotics is about organically merging fire and C4ISR capabilities.55
Strategic Mobility
The Syrian campaign also offered rich experience in conducting a

massive expeditionary operation. Never before had post-Soviet Russia
deployed and sustained an expeditionary force so far from its borders,
for such a long time and with such intensity. The reform in military
logistics (material’no-tekhnicheskoe obespechenie— MTO), ongoing
since 2010, made it possible to sustain stable lines of maritime and
aerial supply, which enabled uninterrupted combat activities.
Exercises and snap inspections in the years preceding the operation
trained long-range forces in redeployment (perebroska) by using air,
sea and railway transport. These laid the ground for the successful
rapid and clandestine deployment of the forces.56 Building the
infrastructure to support strategic mobility, including improvements
in the MTO system, started under Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. But
the Syrian operation made it possible to test and refine them. The
prioritization of this segment is likely to remain intact.57 Snap
inspections, which have taken place since 2013, were, in fact, generally
pre-announced; and they often turned into a pokazukha (an event
staged for show), for personal and institutional reasons. That said,
they still constituted a genuine effort to diagnose actual combat
readiness problems and improve performance according to the
findings. Operational effectiveness in Crimea and in the Syrian
operation, which Russian commentators mention, attests to this.58
Russian experts reflecting on the Syrian experience concluded that

victory depended in equal measure on combat activities, on
maintaining a proper level of MTO, and on expeditionary capabilities
(vozmozhnosti operativnoi perebroski voisk).59 Gerasimov views an
effective MTO system as one of the main factors of success in the
Syrian operation that made it possible to project power and then
sustain the forces on the ground with uninterrupted provision of
armaments, spare parts and supplies. This resulted in uninterrupted
combat activities—one of the main principles of Russian operational
art.60 Naturally, another of Putin’s top-priority elements for the next
GPV was an increase in force mobility and power projection
capabilities. This relates to the “organization of logistics,
transportation and supply of forces, their ability to rapidly deploy and
act,” in remote theaters of operation.61 The strategic exercises Kavkaz
2016 and Zapad 2017 elaborated on the best and the worst practices
from Syria and further refined operational and logistical procedures
to ensure speed and effectiveness in transportation, supply, repair and
technological maintenance.62 The redeployment of forces in the
framework of six snap inspections, which took place only during 2017,
further refined strategic mobility skills. This experience of operational
mobility is immediately relevant for Russia itself, in terms of
deploying and redeploying forces in the hinterland.63 Putin’s guidance
to the military for the strategic exercise Vostok 2018 urged it to test
the ability to transport a large combined-arms expeditionary force to
a distance of several thousand kilometers and deploy it in a faraway
theater of operations as a self-sufficient grouping of forces.64
Experience related to strategic mobility acquired in Syria will be

learned, refined and incorporated.65 The implementation of some
lessons is already evident. In 2017, probably influenced by the impact
of the Syrian operation, the VKS established a new military-
transportation air division (voenno-transportnaia aviatsionnaia
diviziia) and a special-purpose air division (aviatsionnaia diviziia
osobogo naznacheniia).66 Also, the strengths and weaknesses of
intensive maritime Syrian operations prompted Russian experts to
recommend turning production of the landing ships into one of the

main priorities of military-technical policy for the next decade. This
refers to both the numbers and types, including a recommendation to
produce bigger ships than those of Projects 775 and 1171. The lessons
learned as regards the auxiliary fleet (vspomogatel’nyi flot), especially
from the shortages of vessels which resulted in a crash program of
hiring and purchasing old transport vessels even from Turkey,
highlight the need to equip the VMF with its own, specialized naval
transportation segment, which will have its own capacity to upload
and offload various military cargo, including technique and
armaments, in a self-sufficient manner.67
Radio-Electronic Struggle
A significant portion of the Russian discourse deals with the lessons

related to Radio-Electronic Struggle (REB). As for other systems, Syria
became a testing ground for REB assets of all types, both old and
modern. Experts assume that the lessons from there are about to shape
the next rounds of modernization in the field.68 In the years preceding
the Syrian operation, the MoD invested significantly in force buildup,
concept of operations, and organization of the REB forces operating
in the ground, aerial and naval domains. Since 2012, 19 new REB
systems arrived to the forces, more than 2,000 pieces in total, which
brought the overall share of modern types of REB equipment in the
Russian military to 79 percent. The main trends were to expand the
types of targets the REB systems can effectively engage, extend their
ranges in terms of intelligence, defense and suppression missions, and
enable their maximum compatibility with PGM systems and UAVs.69
It seems that the constantly growing employment of REB systems for
defensive, offensive and intelligence missions in recent conflicts, in
Syria in particular, coupled with previous theoretical discussions,
stimulated the REB senior commanders to claim broader
organizational responsibilities. In 2017, they urged that the current
status of REB be changed from being a supporting corps of the
Ground Forces into a fifth branch, alongside Armor, Mechanized
Infantry, Missile Forces and Artillery, and Air Defense. Moreover,

they claimed that this branch should be assigned the leading part in
contemporary operations, which would imply a revision of the
traditional roles of the branches, transforming REB into one of the
main tools of victory in modern operations—a role, until recently,
reserved for mechanized infantry and armor. Effectively, the REB
branch would become the first among the four equals. Although
discussions are still underway, the dominant role of the REB in ISR,
C2 disorganization and anti-PGM defense in combined arms
operations is already evident and is likely to continue growing. The
same increasing role of the REB branch, according to the Russian
sources, might be expected across the board in other services of the
Russian Armed Forces in the coming years.70
Exercises and Curriculum of Military Institutions
In keeping with the innovation and transformation pattern described

above, exercises, drills, maneuvers and adjustments in the curriculum
of military institutions have already contributed to testing, training,
refining and disseminating the Syrian experience. According to
Gerasimov, the Armed Forces should constantly adjust and refine
their field manuals and force training methods based on the Syrian
combat experience, lessons from other military conflicts, and the
analysis of the changing character of war.71 In particular, his emphasis
was on testing new forms of long-range and stand-off strike
capabilities, and on the use of RS and RF complexes.72 For example,
the strategic annual exercise Zapad 2017 clearly underscored the main
operational-tactical takeaway from the Syrian operation: training and
disseminating across the brigades actual RSC and RFC skills saturated
with precision-guided capabilities both in the theater of operations
and at longer ranges.73 Similarly, methods used in Syria were easily
identifiable in the deployment of A2/AD bubbles during the Zapad
exercise.74 The Syrian experience featured in other training activities
of the Western Military District (MD) during 2017. Armor, artillery,
special forces, engineer and helicopter units train in combined-arms
operations, adjusting to the reality of fighting against asymmetrical

threats, training to use their own C4ISR and combined warfare.75
According to a district commander, who until recently headed the

Grouping of Forces in Syria, the plan of operational and combat
readiness activities for the Western MD in 2018, based on lessons both
from Syria and from Zapad 2017, will further emphasize training
forces to employ RS and RF complexes. Additional emphases of the
training activities resonate with the dictum of the CGS and MoD
about the qualities of commanders that Syria highlighted:
competitiveness, self-education, learning, and a willingness to depart
from the template and to express “reasonable initiative.”76 Similar
activities, based on the lessons learned from Syria, took place in other
military districts during 2017. For example, the artillery of the light
combined-arms brigade of the Central MD tested fire support for new
light brigades operating against “hybrid” actors in “mountain-desert
terrain.” The aim of the exercise was to destroy a maneuverable
asymmetrical enemy (groupings of jihad-mobiles and shahid-
mobiles) by combining air and artillery fire support with the fire
capabilities of the light brigade’s motorized infantry. The idea was to
provide training in conducting nontraditional, not massive but
surgical strikes to support maneuvering forces.77
In terms of operational-tactical themes, Russian sources have focused

on waging combined-arms operations in urban, mountain and desert
combat environments, as well as mining and demining operations,
both standalone and as part of urban warfare.78 Interestingly, next to
relatively obvious tactical-op issues, they emphasize maskirovka,
deception and military cunning, as well as the maintenance of a
proper moral-psychological climate for the forces; they stress these as
constant factors enabling operational success against this type of
hybrid enemy.79 As Russian military commanders continue to distill
lessons from the Syrian experience, the annual strategic exercise
Vostok 2018 will likely become the best opportunity to systematically
test and refine all the experience that has been accumulated thus far.
In parallel, related activities have been evident within the sphere of

professional military education. For example, the Moscow Highest
School of All-Forces Commanders, the main educational institution
of the Ground Forces, rotated almost half of its officers-professors
from the Tactics Faculty on internship tours to Syria in order to adjust
their theoretical insights and educational programs based on the
insights from combat practice. In addition to participating in
preparing the new Field Manual of the Ground Forces (especially the
section on the employment of tactical battalion groups), based on the
lessons learned, they incorporated their insights in the curriculum. In
addition to insights about urban warfare and managing combined-
arms warfare of small tactical groups using artillery, close air support
and UAVs, special emphasis is laid upon cultivating among the future
commanders creative tactical thinking and the ability to form a
general picture of the dynamic and constantly changing combat
situation and the organizing logic of the adversary, to foresee trends
in its further development, as well as rapidly make decisions and
formulate orders and missions for soldiers and units.80
Conclusion: Professional Qualities of Contemporary Commanders
According to Gerasimov, snap inspections and other training

activities linked to commanders’ skills and qualities have incorporated
lessons learned from modern conflicts. They are aimed at cultivating
commanders’ abilities to rapidly assess the situation, foresee its
development, make non-standard decisions, employ military
cunning, act unexpectedly and surprise the adversary, opt for
calculated risk, as well as capture and preserve the initiative.81 Reform
of the Armed Forces during the last decade has sought to cultivate
these qualities, and Gerasimov further underscored them in reference
to the training of commanders based on lessons learned from Syria.
According to him, contemporary warfare demands uninterrupted
deception and disinformation of the adversary; enemy forces should
be surprised, disorganized and then destroyed; commanders should
be creative, energetic, prone to initiative, not think by the book and
employ military ingenuity (voennaia smekalka). “Template and blind

sticking to the field manuals are not acceptable.” Gerasimov sees the
Syrian experience as invaluable for many reasons, inter alia because it
highlighted talented commanders blessed with non-standard,
ingenious and creative thinking. These qualities, more than anything
else, will promise promotion according to Gerasimov.82
Importantly, such flexible and innovative qualities perfectly

correspond with the skills needed for the effective creation and
employment of RS and RF complexes.83 Shoigu, during the meeting
with the high command that looked at, among other things, the
lessons from the Syrian campaign and commanders’ ability to deploy
and employ ROKs and RUKs, emphasized the need to think outside
the box (nestandartnoe myshlenie)—that is, to develop the ability to
find and realize new forms of waging operations.84 This dictum
corresponds with one of the main postulates of Soviet/Russian
operational art—operational creativity (operativenoe tvorchestvo)—
and resonates with Putin’s references to a theory of victory based on
qualitative and not quantitative superiority, on higher operational
skills and strategic ingenuity.85 During the last several years, the
growing number of war games and sport-military competitions, in
addition to patriotic pokazukha, indeed cultivated these skills.86 In
parallel, the Russian military brass has begun to intensively cultivate
the principle of competitiveness among the troops (printsip
soztiazatel’nosti) and incorporate it in all levels of command.87 This
principle makes it possible to further refine the qualities that the high
command seeks to nurture and promote.
Notes
1
For example, see: Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, “From Moscow with Coercion:
Russian Deterrence Theory and Strategic Culture,” Journal of Strategic Studies 41,
no. 1, 2018.
2
Viktor Baranets, “Mi Slomali Khrebet Udarnym Silam Terrorizma,” KZ, December
29, 2017.
3
See: Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky and Kejell Inge Bjerga, Contemporary Military
Innovation: Between Anticipation and Adaptation (London” Routledge, 2013).
4
Viktor Baranets, “Mi Slomali Khrebet Udarnym Silam Terrorizma.”
5
Viktor Baranets and Iurii Avdeev, “Piatiletka Preobrazovanii,” KZ, October 31,
2017; Editorial, “Itogi Spetsial’noi Operatsii v Sirii,” KZ, December 24, 2017;
“Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii
Kollegii MO Rossii,” MO RF, Mil.ru, November 7, 2017.
6
Kollegii MO Rossi;” “Voennaia priemka. Aviatsiia v Sirii. Samolety. Chast’ 2,” TV
Zvezda, August 14, 2017.
7
Ibid.
8
Viktor Baranets and Iurii Avdeev, “Piatiletka; Editorial, “Itogi Spetsial’noi
Operatsii v Sirii”; “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF Valeriia Gerasimova na
Otkrytom Zasedanii.”
9
See discussion: Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: IT-RMA in
Russia, the US and Israel (Pale Alto: Stanford UP, 2010).
10
Kollegii MO Rossii.”
11
Editorial, “Genshtab: Rossiia v Sirii realizovala printsip odna tsel – odna bomba,”
RIA Novosti, November 7, 2017.
12
Sergei Rudstkoi, “Osnovnye Etapy Operatsii VS RF v SAR i Osobennosti
Organizatsii Sistemy Upravlenija,” Arsenal Otechestva, no. 5(31), 2017, p. 25. Viktor
Baranets Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin; Also see: Aleksandr Tikhonov,
“Siriiskaia Proverka Boem,” KZ, August 27, 2017.
13
Generally known in the Western military professional lexicon as “Electronic
Warfare” (EW).
14
The work underway aims to provide the ability to conduct the entire range of
missions to a depth of up to 3,000 km. “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF
Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii,” MO RF, Mil.ru,

November 7, 2017.
15
Viktor Baranets, “Mi Slomali Khrebet Udarnym Silam Terrorizma.”
16
Anton Lavrov, “Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation,” Moscow Defense Brief,
no. 4, 2017.
17
Ibid.
18
Paul Iddon, “For the Russian Military in Syria, Old Habits Die Hard,” War Is
Boring Blog, December 9, 2017.
19
Anton Lavrov, “Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation.”
20
Ibid.
21
Also, the work is underway to develop satellite-guided shells for RViA; Ibid.
22
Viktor Baranets, “Doklad pervogo zamestitelia MO RF Ruslana Tsalikova na
Otrkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii,” MO RF, mil.ru, November 7, 2017.
23
Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin, “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF
Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii,” MO RF, Mil.ru,
November 7, 2017. In that way, it further turned the GS and MoD into primus inter
pares within the strategic community on matters of national security. See Golts, pp.
184–185.
24
For the logic and essence of the reforms, see: Alexander Golts, Military Reform
and Militarism in Russia (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2017).
25
Sergei Rudstkoi, “Osnovnye Etapy Operatsii VS RF v SAR i Osobennosti
Organizatsii Sistemy Upravlenija.”
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Viktor Baranets, “Doklad pervogo zamestitelia MO RF Ruslana Tsalikova na
Otrkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii.”
29
30
Anton Lavrov, “Russia’s GLONASS Satellite Constellation.”
31
Also, for the first time ever Russian forces used a new method of secured and
secret communication, utilizing the capacities of the local foreign operators’
networks. Rudskoi, p. 26; Khalil Arsalanov, “Osobennosti Organizatsi Sviazi v
Khode Boevykh Desitvii v SAR,” Arsenal Otechestva, no. 5(31), 2017, pp. 27–30.
32
Baranets.
33
Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin; “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF
Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii.”
34
Ibid.
35
36
Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Siriiskaia Proverka Boem,” KZ, September 12, 2017. Also
see: Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid. For additional discussion of the artillery systems, see: Iurii Liamin and Vitalii
Moiseev, “Siriiskie Bogi Voiny,” Arsenal Otechestva 31, no. 5, 2017; Leonid Kariakin,
“Proverennye Boem,” Arsenal Otechestva 30, no. 4, 2017.
39
Rudstkoi, p. 25; Baranets; Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin, “Vystuplenie
Nachialnika GSh VS RF Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO
Rossii.”
40
Nikolai Surkov, “Siriiskaia shkola sovremennnoi voiny,” Izvestia, December 29,
2017.
41
Viktor Khudoleev, “Kursom k Razvedovatel’no-Ognevoi Sisteme,” KZ, November
20, 2014.
42
Editorial, “Udarnye i razvedpodrazdelenija VDV objedeniat pod odnim
komandovaniem,” TASS, July 31, 2017.
43
Khairemdinov. The ability of the C2 organs to plan and conduct a joint combined
arms ground operation was another major emphasis. “MO Sergei Shoigu v ramkakh
sbora rukovodiashego sostava VS proveril gotovnost’ organov voennogo upravleniia
k boevomu primeneniju,” MO RF, milru, July 19. 2017; “MO v ramkakh
operativnogo sbora rukovodiashcego sostava VS pribyl vo Vladimirskuju oblast,”
MO RF, mil.ru, July 20, 2017.
44
45
46
For example, see: Morgan Paglia, “The Role of Access-Denial in Coercive
Diplomacy,” Asia Focus, no. 55, IRIS, December 2017.
47
48
Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Siriiskaia Proverka Boem,” KZ, September 12, 2017. Also
see: Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin; “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF
Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii.” The jury is still
out regarding the lessons related to the Russian air carrier Kuznetsov. Available
comments by Russian experts suggest that the main directions for further
modernization might be enhancement of the PGM and REB capabilities, and the
ability to integrate itself into the RSC operating in the theater of operations by
improvements of its own C4ISR capabilities. This would also further improve its
ability to function as a self-sufficient RSC. Editorial, “Siriiskii opyt Kuznetsova,”
TASS, February 8, 2017. Also see: Roger McDermott, “Shoigu Promotes Russia’s
Effective Army Plans to 2025,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 54, April
25, 2017.
49
M. Iu. Shepovalenko, Siriiskeii Rubezh (Moscow: CAST, 2016), pp. 119–120.
50
Roger McDermott, “High Technology Set to Dominate Russia’s Rearmament
Program,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 154, November 29, 2017;
Dmitry Gorenburg, “Russia’s Military Modernization Plans: 2018–2027,” PONARIS,
no. 495, November 2017.
51
52
Given the very high estimate of the Ratnik individual equipment kit and frequent
references to it by the Russian political and military leaders, it seems that massive
acquisition is likely to turn into one of the main procurement trends. This is more
than just a tactical issue; according to the Ground Forces commander, “the units
equipped with this third-generation individual equipment will be autonomous and
self-sufficient for the wide range of combat activities and capable of integrating
themselves into RSCs.” Gavrilenko, Tikhonov, and Biriulin. As the KSO experience
suggests, the integration equally relates to the ISR, C2 and Strikes components of the
complexes.
53
Avdeev.
54
Editorial, “Iadernye sily – glavnyi element sderzhivaniia,” NVO, December 8,
2017.
55
McDermott, “High Technology.” Western scholars question, however, the move
in this direction due to the potential obstacles from the military-industrial complex
entities driven by parochial considerations. For example, see: John Grady, “Experts:
Syrian War Prompting Russians to Expand Unmanned Systems,” The US Naval
Institute, October 9, 2017.
56
Baranets. In the Gerasimov-Shoigu reforms, VDV troops have been developed as
the basis of the rapid reaction forces, capable of swiftly regrouping, deploying and
employing their battalion tactical groups in any strategic direction; “Vystuplenie
Rossii.”
57
“Doklad pervogo zamestitelia MO RF Ruslana Tsalikova na Otrkrytom Zasedanii
Kollegii MO Rossii,” MO RF, mil.ru, 7 November 2017. For Serdiukov-Shoigu
reforms see Golts, pp.185-194.
58
See Golts, pp.185–194. “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF Valeriia Gerasimova
na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii,” MO RF, Mil.ru, November 7, 2017;
Surkov.
59
Ibid.
60
Kollegii MO Rossii.” Khmeimim was launching around 100 sorties daily.
61
62
For detailed discussion of the MTO and primary sources on the subject, see: Roger
McDermott, “Zapad 2017: Myth and Reality,” Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume 14,
Issue 126, The Jamestown Foundation October 10, 2017.
63
64
Surkov.
65
Baranets.
66
67
Shepovalenko, p. 129–131. Also see: M.L. Abramov, “Commentary,” in
Shepovalenko, p. 132.
68
Sergey Sukhanin, “Syrian Lessons and Russia’s Asymmetric Response to the US,”
EDM 14, no. 118, September 26, 2017.
69
70
Iu.I. Lastochkin Iu.L. Koziratskii, Iu.E. Donskov, A.L. Moraresku, “Boevoe
primenenie voisk REB kak sostavnaia chast’ operativnogo iskusstva ob’edeneniia
SV,” Voennaia Mysl’, no. 9, 2017, pp. 18–26; Editorial, “Russia’s upgraded Mig-29
fighter jets to test new aircraft armament in Syria,” TASS, December 7, 2017.
71
72
Ibid.
73
Michael Kofman, “What Actually Happened During Zapad 2017,” Russian
Military Analysis Blog, December 22, 2017.
74
Roger McDermott, “Zapad 2017 and the Initial Period of War,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 14, Issue 115, September 20, 2017.
75
Andrei Khokhlov, “V Voiska Vnedriaetsia pobednyi Siriiskii opyt,” Vecherniaia
Moskva, December 13, 2017.
76
Andrei Kartapalov, “Okrug Udarnykh Zadach,” KZ, December 6, 2017.
77
Andrei Bondarenko, “Pod pritselom – dzhihad mobili,” KZ, July 9, 2017.
78
Surkov.
79
Solomatin, page 32. Among the counterintuitive tactical insights that have
emerged so far is the notion that tanks in this type of operations were not used in
the canonical massive manner, maneuvering while supported by aviation and
artillery deep into the operational depth to encircle, along the lines of 20th century
tactics, but rather as standalone pieces of the offensive and defensive fire support
and as multipliers of tactical effectiveness of the limited forces. It seems that in the
course of a hundred years, the armor has come full circle and reacquired its early
historical responsibility of providing support to the infantry. Iurii Liamin and Vitalii
Moiseev, “Ural’skie tanki v Sirii,” Arsenal Otechestva 27, no. 1, 2017.
80
Nikolai Moiseenko, “Glavnaia Auditoriia – Poligon,” KZ, December 14, 2017;
Editorial, “MosVOKU vzialo na vooruzhenie Siriiskii opyt,” Voennoe Obozrenie,
December 15, 2017.
81
82
Editorial, “General Gerasimov: Siriiskii Opyt – Bestsennaia shkola dlia Rossiiskikh
voisk,” POLITROSSIA, 5 Febraury 2017; “V Voennoi akademii GSh VS RF proshlo
ocherednoe zaniatie kursa Armiia I Obschestvo,” MO RF, mil.ru, Febraury 3, 2017;
83
Despite the very important contribution of the VKS to the victory, eventually,
according to Gerasimov, it was forged on the ground. This, in his view, further
underscores the importance of the general-purpose ground commanders. Editorial,
“General Gerasimov: Siriiskii Opyt – Bestsennaia shkola dlia Rossiiskikh voisk.”
84
Leonid Khairemdinov, “Siriiskii Opyt Kak Osnova,” KZ, July 18, 2017.
85
Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii”; This strongly
corresponds with his emphasis in previous years on the asymmetrical competitive
strategies that Russia should adopt.
86
Golts, pp. 180–182.
87
Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii”; “Vystuplenie

Rossii”; “Vystuplenie Nachialnika GSh VS RF Valeriia Gerasimova na Otkrytom
Zasedanii Kollegii MO Rossii.” The honorary title “udarnyi,” frequently used by
Gerasimov and which is granted today to the units that have won in specific
competitions, seems like a reincarnation of the old Soviet term with the similar
meaning of a highly effective and productive “shock” or “strike” worker, who
displays exemplary performance in labor (udarnik). By the end of 2017, the MoD
granted the honorary term “udarnyi” to 265 military units.
11. The Concept of Mass Mobilization
Returns1
Aleksandr Golts
Introduction
Attempts to modernize the Russian military machine during the post-

Soviet period can be observed in the attitude of Russian authorities to
the concept of mass mobilization, which has had a decisive influence
on the domestic military culture and military planning over the last
three hundred years. Since Peter the Great created the Russian regular
army, the Armed Forces were formed on the basis of conscription, at
the expense of volunteer recruitment. The Russian system of
compulsory military service was, in fact, borrowed from Sweden,
Russia’s main opponent in the Great Northern War (1700–1721). But
within the Russian Empire, conscription took on a fundamentally
different quality. As historian William C. Fuller observes in his book,
Strategy and Power in Russia: 1600–1914,
Russian backwardness could be the font of tremendous military

power. The very things that made Russia backward and
underdeveloped by comparison with Western Europe—
autocracy, serfdom, poverty—could paradoxically translate into
armed might. The ruthless application of autocratic power could
mobilize the Russian economy for war. The result may not have
been a cornucopia of foodstuffs and goods, but it was just enough
411
to sustain protracted war. Similarly, because rural Russia was so

unfree it could be tapped for money and, most important, for
men. It did not matter that the recruits were raw, that rations were
short, that equipment was missing. The peasant conscripts were
already inured to hardship, and there were more where they came
from.2
By the end of Peter I’s reign, the Russian army was 210,000 strong;3
yet, more than 50 drafts were conducted between 1705 and 1725,
which together gave the Armed Forces a reserve of 400,000 men4—in
effect, it was mass mobilization. A steady adherence to this concept
provided Russian tsars and generals with the ultimate weapon—
constant numerical superiority over the enemy in an era when,
according to Napoleon Bonaparte, God was “on the side of the big
battalions.” During the 1870s, Russian War Minister Dmitry Milyutin
completed his reforms, which radically changed the system of
staffing—from one based on recruitment to a conscript service. As
such, the government transformed Russia’s high birth rate—which
was typical for a peasant country—into a renewable resource of
military power. Decades later, the ability to carry out a mass
mobilization and to throw millions of poorly trained men into battle
was key to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) winning the
Second World War.
Mobilization as Foundation for Soviet Strategic Thinking
By the mid-20th century, the USSR wielded almost an “ideal system”

of mass mobilization, allowing the Soviet leadership to rely on
prodigious numerical superiority over the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), its main global opponent. In peacetime, the
Soviet Union was able to keep a five-million-strong military force,
which annually replenished a giant mobilization reserve. This
permitted the Soviet General Staff to call up 6 million–8 million
reservists5 in the so-called “period of threat,” when war seemed
imminent. A significant portion of the Soviet Armed Forces consisted
The Concept of Mass Mobilization Returns | 413
of skeleton divisions. These were made up of only 500 officers and 200
regular privates; the vast majority of remaining open positions were
to be filled by incoming reservists. In war time, once a skeleton
division accepted reservists, it was to be deployed to the battlefield,
where the bulk of the troops were—according to the main military
concept—likely to die in the opening exchange with the enemy. Soviet
military planning was guided by the country’s experience in the
Second World War, in which a brigade would generally “fade” within
three days. So these destroyed divisions had to be constantly replaced
by fresh units made up of new reservists.
Not only people, but also military equipment—ships, tanks, planes,

artillery systems, etc.—was deemed consumable in this way.
Therefore, in the “period of threat,” all industrial facilities had to
immediately begin producing weapons and military equipment. To be
ready to switch their production lines, all factories were obligated to,
even in peacetime, maintain so-called mobilization capacities
dedicated to military production. Arms production, rather than the
manufacture of civilian and consumer goods, was the main goal of
Soviet industry. Thus, the cost of the maintenance of these
mobilization capacities was included in the value of civilian goods.
This negatively affected both their price and quality. Such production
could not be economically rational.
Almost every Soviet enterprise had a mobzadenie (mobilization task),

that is, the preplanned production of components for weapons and
military equipment. To support this planning, massive reserves of raw
materials and huge idle production capacities were created. Final
assembly took place at plants that formally belonged to the famous
devyatka (nine defense-industry ministries: Aviation Industry,
Defense Industry, General Machine Building, Radio Industry,
Medium Machine Building, Shipbuilding Industry, Chemical
Industry, Electronic Industry, and Electrical Industry). As a result of
this mobilization set up, it was absolutely impossible to separate the
“military” from the “civilian” sectors of the Soviet economy.
According to Vitaly Shlykov, perhaps the foremost researcher on the

Soviet military-industrial complex, the USSR’s commodities sector
and basic industry were monstrously hypertrophied. They produced
much more oil, metals and chemical products than were required for
domestic industrial production. All these surplus stockpiles were
intended to be released for weapons production, but only during
wartime. “The whole economy was based on the fact that, in
peacetime, such resources that were not required for war, were
pumped into the civilian sector to maintain some of its balance,”6
Shlykov insisted during seminars organized, in 2005, by the
Liberalnaya Missiya foundation. Essentially, in this system, the
civilian sector existed only to ensure military production could start
on day one of a war; whereas, in peacetime, the goal was to consume
the excessive, unnecessary economic resources. That arrangement
was one of the main reasons for the overall inefficiency of the Soviet
economy. For example, according to Shlykov, the Soviet General Staff
planned that the Soviet industry should reach peak production of
30,000 aircraft per year within 3–6 months after the start of the war.
To reach those aviation production goals, the USSR generated 4.5
million tons of aluminum per year, but the domestic economy could
not use it all. Only 10–11 percent of this was consumed by military
and civil aircraft production.7 The rest—except for a portion used to
make spoons and bowls (the Soviet Union was probably the only
country in the world producing aluminum utensils)—had to be
stockpiled without any practical use. The same types of arrangements
dictated annual production of titanium, coal and rolled metal
products.
As a consequence of this mass mobilization system of industrial

production, the State Planning Committee (Gosplan), which
artificially balanced prices on military and civilian goods, was vital to
the overall Soviet economy. In preparing for global war, the Soviet
Union created massive weapons stockpiles, producing and storing
away, for example, more than 60,000 tanks between 1945 and 1991.8
However, this system could only exist under conditions of severe
isolation and autarky (that is, a regime of economic self-sufficiency,

which minimizes external commodity turnover). Eighty years of
steady growth of military production in conditions of economic crisis
contributed greatly to the collapse of the Soviet Union: the system was
doomed to collapse as soon as the goal of the state became something
other than preparing the country for war.
A Concept That Broke the Army
Post-Soviet Russia inherited all elements of this mobilization system,

which proved itself more enduring than Communist ideology. The
military top brass, together with the military-industry leadership,
firmly held on to the concept of mass mobilization: first, because it
was a perfect “black hole,” allowing for the extraction of additional
income and sustaining a top-heavy officers corps, and second, because
they just did not know a different system for preparation for war.9
However, their attempts to save the Soviet mass mobilization military
under the new political-economic conditions led to a substantial
degradation of the Armed Forces in the 1990s.
The most important factors of social life and the economy on which
the system of mass mobilization was based simply disappeared as the
USSR fell apart. First of all, mass mobilization required a steady
growth in the population: the population needed to be sufficient not
only for the formation of a multi-million-strong military force, but
also to provide the Armed Forces with weapons, equipment and all
necessary resources. However, today’s Russian Federation is heading
into a demographic slump: in the year 2017, 570,000 young men were
estimated to reach the age of 18, in 2018—600,000. And in 2019,
568,000 will reach conscription age.10 As such, Russia will find it
impossible to fully fill the ranks of a one-million-strong military,
which will require a draft of around 700,000 people each year.
Despite the sharp deterioration of post-Soviet Russia’s demographic

situation during the 1990s, 80 percent of its military formations were
retained as skeleton units. As a result, although it frequently boasted

of having a 1.5-million-man army, Russia fielded almost no combat-
ready units. All this became clear during the Second Chechen War,
which broke out in August 1999. Years later, in a 2006 address to the
Federal Assembly (upper chamber of the Russian parliament),
President Vladimir Putin noted,
When the need arose to counter a large-scale attack by

international terrorists in the North Caucasus in 1999, the
problems in the Armed Forces became painfully evident. I
remember very clearly a conversation I had with the chief of the
General Staff at that time. […] In order to effectively repel the
terrorists, we needed to put together a group of at least 65,000
men, but the combat-ready units in the entire army came to only
55,000 men, and they were scattered throughout the entire
country. Our Armed Forces came to a total of 1,400,000 men, but
there were not enough men to fight. This is how kids who had
never seen combat before were sent in to fight.11
Besides these manning problems, a large part of the Soviet industry

died during the 1990s. Those enterprises that managed to survive were
redeveloped to produce different products. The current owners of
these restructured companies no longer need to rely on defense
orders. And any attempts to preserve their mobilization capacities will
inevitably make their main products more expensive and, thus, less
competitive. It is, therefore, no coincidence that, from time to time,
the government floats suggestions of forcing private business to fulfill
defense contracts under the threat of criminal prosecution.12
At the same time, those Russian commercial entities where industrial

preparation for mass mobilization was preserved became a new
opportunity for corruption. The Federal Tax Service and the Ministry
of Finance regularly discovered massive levels of abuse in this sphere.
The government was even forced to compensate factories for
maintaining their mobilization capacities through tax incentives.
According to information leaked to the press in 2012, Russia annually

lost about 1 billion–1.5 billion rubles (around $16 million–$24
million) of tax income from each of the 2,000 economic enterprises
involved in the country’s mobilization preparedness program.13
Rejection of Mobilization in the Name of Efficiency
The degradation of the Russian military during the nearly two decades
following the collapse of the Soviet Union was further demonstrated
during the war with Georgia, in August 2008. Military equipment that
had been stockpiled for years in order to be used in war suffered from
critically substandard quality. According to General Vladimir
Shamanov, half of the tanks and armored vehicles of the 19th
Motorized Rifle Division broke during the march on Georgia and did
not reach Tskhinvali. The officer corps to lead Russia’s various
skeleton units was not ready either. “When those commanders were
given troops and equipment, they were just confused, and some even
refused to carry out their orders,” the former chief of the General Staff,
Nikolai Makarov, reflected in December 2008.14
Hence, it is no coincidence that the most radical Russian military

reform in 140 years was started immediately after the war against
Georgia. At the heart of the reforms was the rejection of the concept
of mass mobilization. Russia’s defense minister at the time (2007–
2012), Anatoly Serdyukov, decisively eliminated all skeleton units. As
a result, the number of divisions, brigades and regiments in the
Russian Ground Forces decreased from 1,890 to 172.15 He also
abolished 115,000 officers’ positions (in theory these commanders
were needed to lead the regiments and battalions of reservists). While
explaining the essence of the painful reforms, the aforementioned
General Shamanov, who led the Main Combat Training Directorate
of the defense ministry, noted that “regiments and divisions that had
to accept mobilization resources and then deploy during a threat
period have become a costly anachronism.”16 After a long period of
hesitation, Russia’s military reformers stated that the ultimate goal
would be to fully staff the Armed Forces with volunteer contract

soldiers (in Russian, so-called kontraktniki). As a result of the deep
restructuring of the Armed Forces, the military command had at its
disposal several dozen formations able to deploy within a few hours
of receiving their orders.
Naturally, the “Serdyukov reforms,” which dismissed tens of

thousands of officers, were vehemently opposed by the “military
community.” Critics of the reforms concentrated in particular on the
most important element of the changes being carried out—the
rejection of mass mobilization. According to the detractors, Russia
risked losing the main instrument of its defense—the ability to arm
and send into combat millions of reservists. Then chairperson of the
State Duma (lower chamber of parliament) defense committee,
Admiral Vladimir Komoyedov, insisted that “contract” (volunteer)
Armed Forces were a “bubble that [would] immediately burst.”17 The
admiral firmly asserted that only a mass mobilization army could
protect Russia.
Opponents of the reform had considerable administrative influence.

In 2010, as skeleton units were being massively slashed based on
Serdyukov’s recommendations, the president signed a new Military
Doctrine, which had been prepared by the Security Council. In that
document, mass mobilization was notably mentioned more than a
dozen times as a key element of the country’s national defense. The
2010 Military Doctrine demanded that officials “ensure a rational
correlation of formations and military units of permanent readiness
and formations and military units designed for mobilization and
deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops.”18
The reformers tried to answer the criticism. They insisted that future
military conflicts would be short-term wars, which is why a multi-
million-man mobilization reserve was simply not needed. After a
closed meeting of the then-chief of the General Staff, Nikolai
Makarov, with members of the State Duma, it became known that in
wartime, the Armed Forces would increase from 1 million troops to

only 1.7 million.19 This meant that even in war time, Russia would be
mobilizing not millions but only 700,000 reservists.
Useless Experiments
Nevertheless, because of the strong resistance of conservative

hardliners in the General Staff, a new reserve mobilization system was
not officially established in Russia until 2013. Still, the new system
looked revolutionary compared to traditional Russian military
culture, which considers almost the entirety of the male population of
the country to be a “mobilization resource.” With adoption of the new
approach to manning, after completion of conscript or active contract
service, troops would now be able to voluntarily sign a contract to
serve in the reserves. They would even receive a modest monthly
compensation for their service—officers were to be paid
approximately $120 and privates about $70 per month. To maintain
this status, a reservist would have to be able to regularly pass training
in special reserve units, which were to be created in each of the
military districts. The new minister of defense, Sergei Shoigu,
promised that four reserve armies would be formed. But the 2013
budget lacked the money for this project’s implementation. It was not
until July 2015 that President Putin signed a decree to carry out this
“experiment.” The number of reservists currently participating in this
new system is unknown. But back in 2013, reports alleged that the
number should be 9,000.20
Franz Klintsevich (at the time, a member of the Duma Committee on

Defense) revealed in September 2015 that financial problems forced a
postponement of the formation of the new reserve system until 2016.21
Nonetheless, eventually reserve commands were established in each
military district. These are charged with calling up reservists, forming
units, and maintaining the weapons and military equipment intended
for the reservists. Bases for storage and repair as well as military
commissariats are subordinated to these commands. Nonetheless, this
rational approach to the formation of a military reserve is still

considered “experimental.” Moreover, the insignificant number of
reservists currently on call, as well as the minor sums of money spent
on the organization of the reserve system, have allowed the opponents
of this approach to easily manipulate the results of this “experiment.”
Indeed, also in 2013, the Kremlin proposed an entirely different

method to fill Russia’s mobilization reserve. In his address to the
Federal Assembly, President Putin announced his intention to carry
out a true revolution in the organization of the military:
We have to think [about] how to create highly trained reserve

forces. There is another suggestion in this regard: keeping
[conscription] deferrals for students and changing the very
system of military training offered by institutions of higher
education. This will enable all students to study [and
simultaneously] receive military training for their next military
assignment and a particular area of military specialization. This
mechanism will allow us to train the right number of reservists for
the most needed, primarily technical military specializations,
while not drafting them into the Armed Forces.22
According to this proposed initiative, university students would

devote one day a week to military education over the course of one
and a half to two years. Upon completion of the course, they would
need to pass a three-month summer boot camp. At that point, they
would be signed up within the reserves as privates or sergeants and
avoid having to spend a year in the active conscript service. The idea
was strongly supported by the Russian defense minister. “We really
want you to think of this as a good opportunity for easy learning
without interrupting your educational process,” Shoigu earnestly
tried to convince students in 2013. He added,
And for this purpose we will create worthy training centers. You
will spend one day a week on theoretical education—it is not that
hard. After the theoretical course, you will have to pass a three-
month-long training regimen. We have enough units, training
grounds and equipment to do this. And believe me, we will try to
do all this under humane conditions. But, of course, we will
require complete output. We expect to recruit 80,000–100,000
people a year into the reserves.23
From the beginning, Shoigu was particularly interested in the success

of this new reserve training program for university students. If this
initiative became implemented as designed, he would have a chance
to formally comply with Putin’s order to raise the number of the
Armed Forces personnel back up to one million servicemen. Under
Russia’s current demographic situation, this demand is only possible
to meet through bureaucratic manipulation. Indeed, one such
possibility would be for the defense ministry to record all of the
country’s male university students (approximately 2.3 million) as
members of the Armed Forces. The size of the Armed Forces presently
tops out at around 700,000–800,000 troops, so the rest of Putin’s one-
million-man army would have to be members of a paper “student
army.”
Predictably, the military top brass did not like this idea. Specifically,
the enrollment of all students with military training into a
mobilization reserve force would deprive supporters of a mass
mobilization army of their main argument that only universal
conscription is able to provide the Armed Forces with sufficient
reserves. The Russian military annually calls up (with great difficulty)
about 280,000–300,000 conscripts. And 10–15 percent of these
draftees are university graduates; thus, the military did not want to
lose them to a newly structured reserve force. As a result, the
presidential initiative from 2013 was obstructed and delayed by the
military leadership tasked with carrying it out. According to initial
plans then announced by Shoigu, military training was supposed to be
mandatory for all male students in the country by 2016. But that year,
only 22,000 students were permitted to participate in the training
program. The representative of the defense ministry’s Main

Directorate for Personnel, Colonel Ruslan Milyaev, offered a
fundamentally different approach to military training for students
than the one that Shoigu announced three years ago: “It all depends
on the defense ministry’s needs for specific specialists in particular
regions; and of course it may not be for everyone. Besides, there is an
issue of the cost for the state.”24 From this, one can conclude that all
attempts to develop a new model for the formation of mobilization
reserves have, to date, been sabotaged by conservative generals. As a
result, mobilization planning today is an usual mixture of modern and
old-fashioned approaches. This is evidenced by the results of strategic
maneuvers held in 2016–2017, described below.
Mobilization Training
In 2016, Russia carried out mysterious snap military exercises from

June 14 to 22. Although they were publicized in the media, the
number of participants as well as the units involved were not
mentioned. Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced this snap
inspection on the same day it began; the exercise was meant to “check
the troops’ combat and mobilization readiness.” The minister further
stressed that, “along with the troops’ training for their missions in
armed conflicts of varying intensity and in crisis situations, it is
necessary to pay special attention to the mobilization component of
the Armed Forces, the status of the troops’ reserve components [as
well as] weapons and military equipment stock.”25
The scenario of various annual Russian strategic maneuvers regularly

involves the mobilization of several hundred reservists from each
military district. Such drills are designed to demonstrate readiness
levels for the implementation of a partial mobilization in case of a local
conflict. For example, about 1,000 reservists were mobilized in the
Central Military District (MD) during Tsentr (Center) 2015
maneuvers. But exercises held in June 2016 looked totally different.
For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, mobilization
stood as the main goal of the exercise. The snap exercise was held
across all Russian military districts—that is, throughout the entire
country. Within the framework of the exercise, mobile command
centers were deployed in all districts. This, most likely, means that the
inspection itself was rehearsing a so-called “threat period,” during
which time a war against a global adversary appears inevitable.
The fact that such specific exercises were held in the form of a snap
inspection—and not as maneuvers announced in advance—was, of
course, provocative. Russia announced a mobilization on the territory
of the whole country and did not mention the number of participating
reservists. It is appropriate to recall that the First World War started
after opposing powers began mobilizing to scare and intimidate one
another. Moreover, a “snap inspection” of troops announced by
President Vladimir Putin on February 26, 2014, ended with the
annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the “secret war” in the
eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas. But as for the June 2016 snap
inspection, the Russian Ministry of Defense considered it sufficient to
only inform foreign military attachés present in Moscow—and only
after it already started. The director of the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Department of European Cooperation, Andrey Kelin, tried to
legitimize the snap exercise by noting: “[Such a] drill is not found in
documents relating to confidence-building measures and arms
control. Well, this is actually a new form [of exercise] and nothing
more. There is absolutely no violation of existing agreements here.”26
Though the June snap inspection was carried out in all four military
districts and professed to cover the whole of Russian territory, it was
in fact a bit more limited. According to defense ministry statements,
only units located in Leningrad and Omsk oblasts as well as Primorsky
and Krasnodar krais took part. A unit of the Western MD artillery
brigade, manned with reserve servicemen, practiced firing Msta-B
152-milimeter howitzers at the Luga range, Leningrad oblast. In the
Southern MD, a signal company formed from reservists received
equipment at their base and then marched 200 kilometers to Molkino,
in Krasnodar krai. Reservists making up part of a regular infantry

fighting vehicle (IFV) unit participated in tactical and shooting
exercises in Omsk oblast. And reportedly, the mobile command
center of the Eastern MD was deployed under field conditions and
practiced dealing with a simulated chemical attack.
Defense ministry statements suggested that the reservists called up to

take part in the June 2016 snap exercises were incorporated into pre-
existing brigades and battalions. This contradicts years of statements
by military officials insisting that all Russian units are fully manned at
all times. As such, this means that a functioning system of reserves in
the Armed Forces did not exist.
The Russian General Staff clearly rehearsed a scenario of global

conventional conflict during the summer of 2016. Following the June
snap inspection mobilization drills, three military districts and the
Northern Fleet were involved in additional snap exercises in late
August. Then, on September 5–10, Russia held the strategic military
exercise Kavkaz 2016, in the southwestern territory of the country.
The chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, said that
during these exercises, the Armed Forces for the first time tested
mobilizing reservists to fill territorial defense units. The Ministry of
Defense, meanwhile, revealed that a division of territorial defense
troops, manned by reservists, was created in Crimea, and a battalion
of this unit took part in the Kavkaz 2016 drills. This formation is
specifically designed to protect strategic facilities and infrastructure
from saboteurs during wartime. However, the overall size of the
mobilization during the exercises has been rather modest so far.
Ahead of Kavkaz 2016, only one new battalion of 400 reservists was
formed, on the basis of the Novosibirsk military school. In addition,
they formed two companies and one platoon. Reportedly, however,
around 4,000 reservists were called up in total. This means that most
of the reservists were called up under the old rules—that is, not to
establish new units, but to fill in existing ones.
Mobilization preparations in 2017 were developed in a particularly

specific way. Zapad 2017 military exercises (September 14–20) were
the main event of the Armed Forces training that year. The drills
provoked a sharply negative reaction from nearby NATO member
states, which have been particularly concerned by any Russian
military activities since the annexation of Crimea and secret war in
Donbas.
At first, Moscow repeatedly argued that the scale of Zapad 2017 was
restricted to only 12,700 regular Russian troops, and no mention was
ever officially made about practicing for a mass mobilization of
reservists. However, two months later, in November 2017, President
Putin suddenly revealed during a meeting with leaders of the Armed
Forces and chiefs the defense industry that one of the main goals of
that year’s Zapad drills was to check “our mobilization readiness and
ability to use local resources to meet troop requirements.” He added,
“Reservists were called up for this exercise, and we also tested the
ability of civilian companies to transfer their vehicles and equipment
to the armed forces and provide technical protection to transport
communications.”27
This aspect of the Zapad 2017 strategic exercise had only been
featured occasionally, in fragmentary reports. Local press reported
about mobilization being done in complete secrecy in the Kaliningrad
region—reservists had to sign a non-disclosure agreement. Some hazy
reporting on “mobilization actions” in Kursk region also appeared.
The call-up of reservists was supposed to replace the need to transfer
troops from elsewhere in the country. However, while addressing the
defense ministry, Putin additionally noted that these mobilization
activities during the 2017 Zapad exercise were unsuccessful and will
need to be corrected.
New Units That Weaken Russia
All these contradictions in approaches to mobilization can be

explained by the changes to the chief goals and priorities in Russian
military planning. Based on the country’s strengths, national interests,
demographic situation and economy, Serdyukov and his team
specifically created military forces capable of winning in a local
conflict inside the post-Soviet space. But because of the Kremlin’s
current policies, Russia has locked itself into a conflict with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is superior to the
Russian Federation across all quantitative indicators—economic
strength, all types of weapons and numbers of personnel. The only
logical military response for Moscow in this situation, therefore, is to
return to the ineffective and extremely cumbersome mass
mobilization army. Indeed, this is happening now, as highlighted by
the defense ministry’s promise to create new military units.
Based on statements of representatives of the Ministry of Defense, the

Russian Armed Forces created at least 50 new units between 2015 and
2017.28 But the total number of Armed Forces personnel increased by
only 10,000 troops in 2016. This can only mean that Russia has again
begun creating Soviet-style “paper” skeleton divisions, to be staffed by
heretofore non-existent reservists—in other words, the types of
formations explicitly abandoned by Serdyukov. This would signify a
return to the discredited Soviet concept of mass mobilization. As a
result, the dispersed forces of existing brigades can be expected to lose
their combat capabilities over time.
Another sign of the return of the concept of mass mobilization is a

sudden shortage of officers. At a special session of top officials in
charge of personnel matters, the chief of the Main Directorate for
Personnel in the Russian Ministry of Defense, Colonel General Viktor
Goremykin, stated that, in 2016, the Armed Forces found 11,000
officers for positions that otherwise would have gone empty.29 In his
words, the military used “non-standard” methods to fill these staffing
gaps. In particular, reserve officers who left the Armed Forces were
recruited again. It is worth noting that, on February 22, 2017, while
speaking before the State Duma, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu
clarified that due to shortages of personnel in 2015, 15,000 troops
previously dismissed had been returned to service.30 Obviously this
practice continued in 2016 and 2017.
Similarly, according to the Russian media, provincial newspapers

increasingly feature advertisements publicizing the fact that one or
another military unit is accepting previously retired Armed Forces
personnel. Moreover, the commander of the Eastern Military District
reportedly sent special recruiters to 22 Russian regions to persuade
reserve officers to return to active service. In addition to such rapid
replenishment strategies, Russia has also reduced the training period
for officers at military academies from five years to four. Finally, the
chiefs of personnel meeting in early February 2017 were particularly
proud of the creation of special short-term courses for privates and
sergeants that award the passing graduate an officer’s star. Such a
system directly recalls the Soviet experience in World War II.
The situation of Russia’s military pilots is particularly critical. Defense

Minister Shoigu revealed to the Duma lawmakers that the deficit had
reached 1,300 pilots. To resolve this massive shortfall, the professional
lifespan of pilots in the Armed Forces has been extended by five years.
In addition, according to Colonel General Goremykin, “For the first
time, a [shortened] 1.5-year pilot training course was organized for
highly educated technical staff officers. Last year [2016], the first 49
such pilots graduated. Today, training was completed by another 50
troops.”31
At first glance, blame for these chronic shortages in the officer corps
might be attributed to former minister of defense Anatoly Serdyukov.
As part of his important package of military reforms, Serdyukov had
ordered a halt to any new cadets being accepted to military academies
during 2009–2011. However, it should be recalled that his decision
was triggered by the fact that, three years earlier, the Armed Forces
were overwhelmed by a tremendous surplus of officers. At that time,
open positions for lieutenants were virtually nonexistent, while
graduates of military schools were appointed to positions usually
occupied by sergeants. But suddenly, today, a monstrous deficit has
appeared. Consequently, the number of uncommitted officers waiting
for either dismissal or appointment has decreased by almost 20 times
compared to those years. In 2012, Serdyukov’s subordinates believed
that an annual output of at 8,500 new lieutenants would thoroughly
cover the military’s staffing needs.32 Now defense ministry leaders
insist they need 16,000 new graduates each year. In contrast, the
number of Russian troops has not doubled. Therefore, the only
eхplanation for this sudden need to recruit twice as many officers is
the excess number of lieutenants required to fill out the Russian
military’s new skeleton units. In fact, the staff of these divisions
consists mostly of officers. These types of divisions are appropriate if
one’s goal is to report to the president about the increasing power of
the Russian army. To establish such new “paper” divisions, one needs
only several thousand officers, not hundreds of thousands of
additional privates.
Staffing Problems
The controversial situation with the staffing of the Armed Forces in

peace time also hints at the return of the mass mobilization concept.
Periodically, Vladimir Putin makes populist statements promising to
“move gradually away from the draft.”33 But at the same time, it is clear
from official reports that the process of transition to an entirely
contract-based service is frozen at the level from 2016. At the end of
2016, Defense Minister Shoigu said that there were already 384,000
kontraktniki in the military34; he repeated the same figure at the end
of 2017.35 Whereas, according to the Plan of Activities of the Defense
Ministry for 2013–2020, there should be 425,000 contract soldiers
under arms in 2017. Moreover, it is quite possible that the number of
professional service members in positions of privates and sergeants
has not been growing but is, in fact, shrinking. At an October 2017
meeting of the Public Council under the Ministry of Defense, Colonel
General Michael Mizintsev mentioned a sensational figure: according
to him, the number of Russian contract soldiers that year amounted
to 354,000.36 Mizintsev, as the chief of Russia’s National Defense
Management Center, is reportedly privy, in real time, to all possible
data on the status of the Armed Forces, which adds credence to his
cited lower number of contract soldiers.
With 250,000 conscripts, 354,000 kontraktniki, 220,000 officers, and

30,000 cadets at military academies, the total number of Russian
military men at arms equals about 850,000. But the president’s last
decree set the number of troops in the Armed Forces at 1.013 million.
Because of the demographic situation, it is physically impossible to
achieve this goal. The gap of 160,000 troops between the nominal and
real numbers will inevitably lead to decreased combat readiness. The
only way to resolve this problem, thus, seems to be to boost reserve
numbers with individuals who completed military service earlier. This
is the reason to maintain the draft.
The Ministry of Defense intends to solve the military’s manning

problems via so-called short-term contracts. In 2016, the ministry
received permission to conclude service contracts for a period of six
months to a year. Contracts can be signed not only with individuals
in the reserves, but also with conscripts a month away from
completing their mandatory service. According to the draft law, these
short-term contracts apply only during extraordinary circumstances,
such as for dealing with a natural disaster or other emergency, when
additional forces are needed to restore the constitutional order, or to
maintain or restore peace and security abroad. Considering that
Russian men are not rushing to sign long-term contracts, it is difficult
to believe they would sign short-term contracts in “case of
emergency.” The only practical reason to offer such short-term
contracts appears to be to essentially legalize the mercenaries that the
government is rushing to send into Ukraine and Syria.
The Best Way to Destroy an Economy
The fact that the Kremlin is seriously considering a return to mass

mobilization is underscored by official statements about the need to
prepare the industry for a transfer to a war footing. Such statements
appeared for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union
during the military’s summer 2016 exercises. The call-up of reservists
was accompanied by a test of the readiness of industrial enterprises
“to perform mobilization tasks.” A year later, on November 22, 2017,
speaking at a meeting of defense ministry leaders and the heads of
defense-sector firms, President Putin focused on the theme of
“mobilization preparations.” “I want to say that the economic ability
to increase the production of defense products and services quickly is
a vital element of military security. All strategic and simply large
companies, regardless of the type of ownership, must be able to do
this,”37 he declared.
If Putin is not bluffing, these statements show that he and his military
advisers are ignoring reality. The domestic defense industry arguably
cannot cope with the tasks set by the Kremlin due to evident
difficulties with the mass production of weapons. In attempting to
realize these tasks, the authorities risk further damaging the Russian
economy. Nevertheless, to try to achieve the mobilization
benchmarks, the government will likely first resort to “administrative”
methods: using threats of criminal punishment to try to force
businesses to produce military products. But participation in military
production does not bring profits. And because of US sanctions, the
participation in military production could destroy the civilian part of
the business. Thus, if threats fail to increase military production, the
Russian government might try to nationalize the industry—which
could easily spiral into general autarky and systemic shortages,
including of food. The idea of mobilizing industry contradicts Putin’s
remarks that the government would be moving away from a conscript
army. After all, if the number of reservists is to be significantly
reduced, such large-scale serial production of military equipment

makes little sense.
Conclusion
The government’s contradictory statements and policies pertaining to

issues such as conscription and the civilian industry role in war time
suggests a fierce, behind-the-scenes struggle in the top echelons of
power over whether or not to adopt all key aspects of the mass-
mobilization model of defense. Today, it is still unclear which side will
prevail. Former defense minister Serdyukov’s reforms were designed
for a scenario in which Russia’s conventional forces could win a local
conflict within several days. But in the midst of today’s new “cold war”
against the West, the Russian General Staff is under pressure to
explain exactly how the country intends to counter NATO, whose
military surpasses Russia’s by nearly every measure aside from nuclear
weapons. In this case, a return to the idea of general mobilization is at
least logical, which is why Moscow is evidently again embracing a
defense organizational system that had already proved its inefficiency.
Everything related to Russia’s mobilization programs is kept secret,

and the public receives only fragmentary information. Moreover,
turning the country into a besieged fortress helped create the
necessary background for the re-election of President Putin. It is also
clear that convincing everyone Russia is preparing for war is seen as
an important element of military deterrence against the United States.
Consequently, there is every reason to believe that the Kremlin is not
going to back down from pushing the country on to a permanent war
footing.
Notes
1
This chapter draws heavily on some of the author’s previously published articles
(between 2016 and 2017) in The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor,
namely: “New Divisions May Reduce Russian Army’s Combat Readiness” (Volume
13, Issue: 97), “Implementing Reserve System an Uphill Battle for Russia” (Volume
13, Issue 115), “Russia Returning to Concept of Mass Mobilization (Volume 13,
Issue 157), “Short-Term Personnel Contracts Negate Goals of Russia’s Military
Reforms” (Volume 13, Issue 180), “The Russian Army Suffers Deficit in Officers”
(Volume 14, Issue 25), “How Many Soldiers Does Russia Have?” (Volume 14, Issue
144), “Russian Military Mass Mobilization: Fact or Bluff?” (Volume 14, Issue 158).
All are available on www.jamestown.org.
2
William C. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia: 1600–1914, (Free Press: New
York, 1992), p. 89.
3
Gosudarstvennaia oborona Rossii, Imperativy russkoi voennoi klassiki, (Russkii
put/Voennyi universitet), 2002, p. 490.
4
Istoriia Voyennoi strategii Rossii, (Kuchkovo pole), 2000, p. 47.
5
Ibid., p. 528.
6
Aleksandr Golts, “Rossiskiyi militarism – prepyatstvie modernizatsyii starany”
(“Militarism in Russia as obstacle to modernization”), Liberalnaya missiya, 2005
p.45.
7
Ibid., p. 46.
8
Viktor Litovkin, “Genshtab menyaet vzglyady na sovremennye i budushchie
vojny” (“The General Staff Is Changing Views on Modern Warfare”), Nezavisimoe
Voennoe Obozrenie, July 10, 2009.
9
“General’skii demarsh” (“General's Demarche”), Nezavisimaia Gazeta. July 5,
2011.
10
Problemyi i praktika perehoda voennoy organizatsii Rossii na novuyu sistemu
komplektovaniya (Problems and practice of transition of military organization of
Russia to new recruitment system) Nauchnyye trudy № 75. M.: Institut ekonomiki
perekhodnogo perioda. 2004. S. 238.
11
Vladimir Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly,” May 10, 2006,
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23577.
12
“Administrativnaya otvetstvennost' za narushenie polozhenij Federal'nogo zakona
ot 29.12.2012 N 275-FZ ‘O gosudarstvennom oboronnom zakaze,’ ” “Administrative
responsibility for violation of provisions of the Federal law of 29.12.2012 N 275-FZ

‘About the state defense order,’ ”
прогосзаказ.рф/uploads/2018/05/Административная%20ответственность%20по
%20Закону%20%20№%20275-ФЗ-315.pdf.
13
Ekaterina Karacheva, “FNS vyyavila khishcheniya milliardov pod predlogom
podgotovki k voyne,” Izvestia, July 30, 2012.
14
Interfax, December 30, 2008.
15
Rossiiskaya Gazeta, May 12, 2009.
16
Vladimir Shamanov, “Neobkhodimost reform podtverdila voyna,” Krasnaya
Zvezda, February 11, 2009.
17
Vladimir Voloshin. Ot Shoygu trebuyut uvelichit srok sluzhby v armii do polutora
let. Izvestiya. November 22, 2012
18
“Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation,” Kremlin.ru, February 5, 2010,
http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/461.
19
D. Telmanov, “V sleduyushchem godu zarplata leytenantov sostavit 50 tysyach
rubley,” Gazeta, November 14 2008, № 217.
20
Yuri Gavrilov, “8 tysyach – ‘partizanu’ ” (“8 thousands to ‘partisan’ ”), Rossiyskaya
Gazeta, March 22, 2013.
21
“Sozdaniye mobilizatsionnogo lyudskogo rezerva Vooruzhonnykh sil RF
nachnotsya na sistemnoy osnove v 2016 godu, soobshchayut v Gosdume,” Interfax-
AVN, September 11, 2015,
http://www.militarynews.ru/Story.asp?rid=1&nid=388772.
22
Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, December 12, 2013,
23
Aleksandr Tikhonov, “Studencheskiy prizyv – v nogu so vremenem,” Krasnaya
Zvezda, December 19, 2013.
24
“Khod uchebno-polevykh sborov so studentami vuzov po programmam voyennoy
podgotovki serzhantov i soldat zapasa,” Ekho Moskvy, July 16, 2016,
https://echo.msk.ru/programs/voensovet/1802316-echo/.
25
“Surprise combat readiness check begins in Russia,” TASS, June 14, 2016,
http://tass.com/defense/881746.
26
Liza Dubrovskaya, “MID otvetil genseku NATO: obvinivshemu Rossiyu v
nepredskazuyemosti,” Moskovsky Komsomolets, June 15, 2016.
27
“Meeting with Defence Ministry and defence industry senior officials and heads of
ministries and regions,” Kremlin.ru, November 22, 2017,
28
Nikolay Poroskov, “Nekolokolnyye interesy Rossii,” Nezavisimoye Voyennoye
Obozreniye, February 19, 2016,
29
Marina Eliseyeva, “S pritselom na perspektivu,” Krasnaya Zvezda, February 5,
2017.
30
“Shoygu: defitsit voyennykh letchikov v VKS v 2016 g. sostavlyal 1300 chelovek,”
TASS, February 22, 2017, http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4045193.
31
“V Moskve proshel spetsial’nyy sbor nachal’nikov kadrovykh organov
Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossii,” Mil.ru, February 2, 2017,
32
“V Minoborony rasskazali, skol'ko vypusknikov voyennykh vuzov nuzhno armii,”
RIA Novosti, March 23, 2012,
33
“Rossiya postepenno ukhodit ot sluzhby po prizyvu. zayavil Putin,” RIA Novosti,
October 24, 2017, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20171024/1507463335.html.
34
“V ystupleniye Ministra oborony Rossi yskoy Federatsii generala armii Sergeya
Shoygu na rasshirennom zasedanii Kollegii Minoborony Rossii,” Mil.ru, December
22, 2016, https://function.mil.ru/files/morf/2016-12-
22_MoD_board_extended_session_RUS.pdf.
35
“Verkhovnyy Glavnokomanduyushchiy Vooruzhennymi Silami Rossii Vladimir
Putin prinyal uchastiye v rabote rasshirennogo zasedaniya Kollegii Minoborony,”
Mil.ru, December 22, 2017,
36
“Sokrashcheniye kolichestva voyennosluzhashchikh po prizyvu pozvolyayet
uluchshit’ kachestvo ikh otbora,” Mil.ru, October 20, 2017,
37
“Meeting with Defence Ministry and defence industry senior officials and heads of
ministries and regions,” Kremlin.ru, November 22, 2017,
436
Contributors’ Biographies
Dmitry Adamsky
Prof. Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky is a Head of the BA Honors Track in

Strategy and Decision Making at the School of Government,
Diplomacy and Strategy at the IDC Herzliya, Israel. His research
interests include international security, cultural approach to IR,
modern military thought, and American, Russian and Israeli national
security policy. He has published on these topics in Foreign Affairs,
Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Intelligence and National
Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, and Journal of Cold War
History. His books Operation Kavkaz and The Culture of Military
Innovation (Stanford UP) earned the annual (2006 and 2012) prizes
for the best academic works on Israeli security. His recent book,
Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy (Stanford UP, 2019) explores the nexus of
religion and strategy in Russia.
Pavel K. Baev
Pavel Baev is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo

(PRIO) and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Center on the United
States and Europe at Brookings. He specializes in Russian military
reform, Russia’s conflict management in the Caucasus and Central
Asia, and energy interests in Russia’s foreign and security policies, as
well as Russia’s relations with Europe and NATO.
Baev graduated from the Moscow State University in 1979 with a

master’s degree in political geography, and worked in a research
institute in the former USSR Ministry of Defense. After receiving a
doctorate in international relations from the Institute for the U.S. and
Canadian Studies, Moscow in 1988, he worked with the Institute of
Contributors’ Biographies | 437
Europe in Moscow until October 1992, when he joined PRIO. From

1995 to 2001 he was a co-editor of Security Dialogue, a quarterly
policy-oriented journal produced at PRIO. From 2000 to 2004, Pavel
was the head of the Foreign and Security Policies program. He held
the NATO Democratic Institutions Fellowship from 1994 to 1996.
Baev’s articles on the Russian military posture, Russian-European

relations, and peacekeeping and conflict management in Europe have
appeared in Armed Forces & Society, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, Contemporary Security Policy, European
Security, International Peacekeeping, Jane’s Intelligence Review, The
Journal of Peace Research, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies,
Problems of Post-Communism, Security Dialogue, Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, and The World Today. He also has a weekly column
published in The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor and
is the author of the blog, Arctic Politics and Russia’s Ambitions.
Jānis Bērziņš
Dr. Jānis Bērziņš is the director of the Center for Security and Strategic
Research at the National Defense Academy of Latvia. Previously
Bērziņš was a senior fellow at the Potomac Foundation and has
worked as Managing Director and Chief Economist at Lux Sit. He has
held teaching positions at Riga Strandins University and the
Universidade do Extremo Sul Catarinesese. He has authored more
than 70 publications and has advised the United Kingdom House of
Commons’ Defence Select Committee as well as the governments of
Sweden, Poland and Singopre. He has also provided expertise on
strategic issues to the private sector. Dr. Bērziņš completed his PhD in
Political Science at Latvijas Universitāte.
Stephen Blank
Dr. Stephen Blank is an internationally recognized expert on Russian

foreign and defense policies and international relations across the
former Soviet Union. He is also a leading expert on European and
Asian security, including energy issues. Since 2013, he has been a
Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council, in
Washington. From 1989 until 2013, he was a Professor of Russian
National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US
Army War College in Pennsylvania. Dr. Blank has been Professor of
National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989.
In 1998–2001, he was Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at
the War College. Dr. Blank’s MA and PhD are in Russian History
from the University of Chicago. His BA is in History from the
University of Pennsylvania.
Philip M. Breedlove
Gen. Philip M. Breedlove (Ret.) served as the Commander, US

European Command, as well as the 17th Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) of NATO Allied Command Operations, from May
2013 until May 4, 2016.
General Breedlove was raised in Forest Park, Ga., and was

commissioned in 1977 as a distinguished graduate of Georgia Tech’s
ROTC program. He served in numerous operational, command and
staff positions, and completed nine overseas tours, including two
remote tours. He commanded a fighter squadron, an operations
group, three fighter wings, and a Numbered Air Force. Additionally,
he served as Vice Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, Washington, DC;
Operations Officer in the Pacific Command Division on the Joint
Staff; Executive Officer to the Commander of Headquarters Air
Combat Command; the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of
the Air Force; and Vice Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the
Joint Staff.
Prior to becoming SACEUR, General Breedlove served as the

Commander, US Air Forces in Europe; Commander, US Air Forces
Africa; Commander, Air Component Command, Ramstein; and
Director, Joint Air Power Competence Centre, Kalkar, Germany. He
was responsible for Air Forces activities, conducted through 3rd Air
Force, in an area of operations covering more than 19 million square
miles. This area included 105 countries in Europe, Africa, Asia and
the Middle East, and the Arctic and Atlantic oceans. As Vice Chief,
he presided over the Air Staff and served as a member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Requirements Oversight Council and Deputy Advisory
Working Group. He assisted the Chief of Staff with organizing,
training, and equipping of 680,000 active-duty, Guard, Reserve and
civilian forces serving in the United States and overseas. General
Breedlove flew combat missions in Operation Joint Forge/Joint
Guardian. He was a command pilot with 3,500 flying hours, primarily
in the F-16.
Breedlove currently serves on the Georgia Tech Advisory Board, as a

Distinguished Professor in the Sam Nunn School of International
Affairs at Georgia Tech, as a Senior Advisor to Culpeper National
Security Solutions, and on the Board of Directors of the Atlantic
Council.
Matthew Czekaj
Matthew Czekaj is the Senior Program Associate for Europe and

Eurasia at The Jamestown Foundation and also serves as the Editor-
in-Chief of Jamestown’s Eurasia Daily Monitor publication, focused
on the post-Soviet space. He has edited and prepared for publication
numerous books and reports published by Jamestown, including
Russia’s Zapad 2013 Military Exercise: Lessons for Baltic Regional
Security, and his writings have appeared in EDM, Central Europe
Digest as well as the Atlanticist blog. Prior to joining Jamestown, Mr.

Czekaj was a Research Associate at the Atlantic Council, where he
worked on issues of European Enlargement. Before that, he was a
Research Assistant at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA)
Energy Security Program. Mr. Czekaj holds a Master’s degree in
Russian and East European Studies from Georgetown University’s
School of Foreign Service, and a Bachelor’s degree in International
Relations with a concentration in European Studies from The Johns
Hopkins University. His research interests include Polish foreign and
defense policy, Baltic Sea regional security, European enlargement, as
well as pipeline politics and energy security.
Jörgen Elfving
Jörgen Elfving is a former Swedish army and general staff officer.

During his military career, he mainly served in staff positions
handling the Soviet Union/Russia. He has also previously been posted
as a military attaché to the Baltic States. After retiring from the
Swedish armed forces, Elfving has worked for a number of Swedish
government agencies as a consultant and pursues a research project at
the Swedish National Defense University regarding the development
of Russia’s military capabilities. In addition, he has been active as a
translator and written a number of articles about the Russian military
as well as a book about the reformation of the Russian armed forces.
Pavel Felgenhauer
Dr. Pavel E. Felgenhauer is a Moscow-based defense analyst and

columnist for Novaya Gazeta as well as a Non-Resident Senior Fellow
at The Jamestown Foundation. He served as senior research officer in
the Soviet Academy of Sciences, from where he received his Ph.D. Dr.
Felgenhauer has published widely on Russian foreign and defense
policies, military doctrine, arms trade and the military-industrial
complex. He comments regularly in local and international media on

Russia’s defense-related problems. Dr. Felgenhauer is also a weekly
contributor to The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Stefan Forss
Dr. Stefan Forss is a senior scientist and highly experienced defense

researcher, at present working as an Adjunct Professor at the Finnish
National Defence University. Professor Forss joined the Technical
Research Centre of Finland (VTT), where he eventually became Chief
Scientist. In 2005, he moved to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs’ Policy and Research Unit, attached to the National Defence
University, where he advised on arms control, particularly nuclear
issues and the security policy implications of new weapons and
weapon systems.
After retiring from government service in 2012, he has continued to

publish on defense and security topics, including a series of high-
profile reports on the implications for the Nordic States of a newly
resurgent Russia. Professor Forss holds a Ph.D. in physics from
Helsinki University.
Aleksandr Golts
Aleksandr Golts was born in 1955. In 1978, he received an MA in

journalism from the Department of Journalism at the Moscow State
Lomonosov University. From 1980 until 1996, he worked with the
Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) editorial board, a Soviet and then Russian
military daily based in Moscow. In 1996–2001, Mr. Golts served as
military editor of Itogi (Moscow), a premier Russian news magazine.
In 2001–2004, he worked for the Moscow-based magazine
“Yezhenedelnyi Journal” (“Weekly”) as deputy editor-in-chief. He
currently works as a deputy editor for the website EJ.ru and is a regular
contributor to The Jamestown Foundation’s Eurasia Daily Monitor,
where he writes on Russian military reform and defense issues.
Glen E. Howard
Glen Howard is the President of The Jamestown Foundation, a

research and analysis institution based in Washington, DC. He is
fluent in Russian and proficient in Azerbaijani and Arabic, and is a
regional expert on the Caucasus and Central Asia. He was formerly an
Analyst at the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)
Strategic Assessment Center. His articles have appeared in The Wall
Street Journal, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, and Jane’s Defense
Weekly. Mr. Howard has served as a consultant to private sector and
governmental agencies, including the US Department of Defense, the
National Intelligence Council and major oil companies operating in
Central Asia and the Middle East.
Ihor Kabanenko
Ihor Kabanenko is a retired admiral with the Ukrainian Navy. From

1983 to 1990, he served in the Soviet Navy in various positions up to
Commander of the ship and Chief of Staff of Missile Ships Division.
Since 1993, he served in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. He was
appointed to the positions of Chief of Operations and Chief of Staff of
the Ukrainian Navy, the Military Representative of Ukraine to NATO,
Chief of Operations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the First
Deputy Chief of Defense. He retired in 2013, with the rank of Admiral.
From May to August 2014, Admiral Kabanenko served as the
Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense, and from August to October
2014—as Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine for European
Integration. Currently, he is the president of UA.RPA (Ukrainian
Advanced Research Project Agency), which focuses on high-tech

solutions and products for defense.
Roger N. McDermott
Roger N. McDermott is Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies at

The Jamestown Foundation, in Washington, DC. He is also a Visiting
Senior Research Fellow at the Department of War Studies in King’s
College, London, as well as a Research Associate at the Institute of
Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), at the
University of St. Andrews, Scotland. McDermott is on the editorial
boards of Russian Law & Politics, Central Asia and the Caucasus and
the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet
Societies and assistant editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
He specializes in Eurasian defense and security issues. His interests in
Russia’s defense and security developments are mainly in the areas of
defense reform, force structure, training, strategic exercises, military
theory, perspectives on future warfare, planning and combat
capability and readiness, as well as strategic and operational analysis.
Sergey Sukhankin
Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation and

an Associate Expert at the International Center for Policy Studies
(Kyiv). He received his PhD in Contemporary Political and Social
History from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), with
his thesis discussing the transformation of Kaliningrad Oblast after
the collapse of the USSR. His areas of scientific interest primarily
concern Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea region, Russian information
and cyber security, A2/AD and its interpretation in Russia, as well as
the development of Russia Private Military Companies (PMC) after
the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Dr. Sukhankin’s academic articles,
expert opinions and commentaries, as well as policy-oriented analyses
have appeared in leading international think tanks and research

institutions, including The Jamestown Foundation, ECFR, CIDOB,
Diplomaatia, RIAC, New Eastern Europe, Kyiv Post, The New
Republic, Business Insider, Rzeczpospolita, El Mundo, El Periodico and
El Confidencial. He was a Visiting Fellow (2016–2017) and
subsequently taught a course entitled “Foreign and Security Policy of
the Russian Federation” at The Institut Barcelona d’Estudis
Internacionals (IBEI). He is based in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
RUSSIA’S
HOWARD AND CZEKAJ

RUSSIA’S MILITARY
MILITARY STRATEGY
AND DOCTRINE STRATEGY
Russia’s Military Strategy and Doctrine is designed to educate Russia watchers,
AND DOCTRINE
RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

policymakers, military leaders, and the broader foreign policy community about the Russian
Armed Forces and security apparatus across the full spectrum of geographic, doctrinal
and domain areas. Each chapter addresses a different strategic-level issue related to the
Russian military, ranging from “hybrid” warfare doctrine, to the role nuclear weapons play
in its strategy, to cyber and electromagnetic warfare, to Moscow’s posture in the Arctic or
the Black Sea, to the lessons its Armed Forces have learned from their ongoing operations
in Syria and eastern Ukraine. And each section of the book is written by one of the world’s
foremost experts on that theme of Russia’s military development.

■ ■ ■
The key questions emphasized by this book include “how Russia fights wars” and “how its
experiences with modern conflicts are shaping the evolution of Russia’s military strategy,
capabilities and doctrine.” The book’s value comes not only from a piecemeal look at
granular Russian strategies in each of the theaters and domains where its Armed Forces
may act, but more importantly this study seeks to present a unifying description of Russia’s
military strategy as a declining but still formidable global power. Russia’s Military Strategy
and Doctrine will be an essential reference for US national security thinkers, NATO defense
planners and policymakers the world over who must deal with the potential military and
security challenges posed by Moscow.

■ ■ ■
“This book is a major addition to the field of Russian military studies and should Glen E. Howard and
be required reading by many of our senior civilian and military policymakers. Its
insights on Russian military strategy in key regions of the world are of great
value and will last for years to come. Jamestown is always a pivotal source of
information and a resource I greatly value, both now and since I left the US Army.” Foreword by
—LTG (ret.) Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of US Army Europe, Former NATO SACEUR
and Pershing Chair at the Center for European Policy Analysis

$24.95
ISBN 978-0-9986660-1-3
52495>
9 780998 666013
Cover design: Peggy Archambault/archdesign1.com

Photo: Shutterstock
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RUSSIA’S

HOWARD AND CZEKAJ

RUSSIA’S MILITARY STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

and Pershing Chair at the Center for European Policy Analysis

Cover design: Peggy Archambault/archdesign1.com

Russias Military Strategy and Doctrine4.indd 1 1/6/19 12:09 PM

Glen E. Howard and

Published in the United States by

Copyright © 2019 The Jamestown Foundation

For more information on this book of The Jamestown Foundation, email

Cover art provided by Peggy Archambault of Peggy Archambault Design.

The Jamestown Foundation’s mission is to inform and educate policy

Founded in 1984 by William Geimer, The Jamestown Foundation

William Geimer worked with Arkady Shevchenko, the highest-

The Jamestown Foundation has emerged as a leading provider of

By drawing on our ever-growing global network of experts,

Part I: The Geographic Vectors of Russia’s Strategy

1. The Russian Strategic Offensive in the Middle East

2. Strategy in the Black Sea and Mediterranean

3. Russia’s Arctic and Far East Strategies

4. Baltic Sea Strategy

Part II: Non-Conventional Elements of Strategy and Doctrine

5. Not ‘Hybrid’ but New Generation Warfare

Cont. next page…

…Contents, cont. from last page

6. Russian Nuclear Policy, Doctrine and Strategy

7. Putin’s ‘Asymmetric Strategy’: Nuclear and New-Type

8. Russia’s Offensive and Defensive Use of Information Security

Part III: Lessons Learned and Domestic Implications

9. Deciphering the Lessons Learned by the Russian Armed

10. Russian Lessons Learned From the Operation in Syria: A

11. The Concept of Mass Mobilization Returns

As one of the premier research and analysis organizations in

Moreover, we wish to thank the former Supreme Allied Commander

The Russian invasion of Crimea in February 2014 was a turning point in

This book comes at a critical time in US-Russian relations. Based upon

The present rancorous political climate in Washington, however,

Importantly, Russia represents a multi-domain challenge: Moscow

From a policymaker’s perspective, we have dropped our focus on great

General Philip M. Breedlove, former NATO SACEUR

In the early morning of November 25, 2018, four Ukrainian naval

Within 15 minutes, the Ukrainian ships found themselves surrounded

At 1:42 p.m., Russia dramatically escalated the situation by hauling a

Having received stern warnings from Russian authorities that passage

Some analysts have focused on the ad hoc nature of Russia’s reaction

represented a culmination of related, regional activities Moscow had

Russia’s reaction to the approach of the three Ukrainian vessels to the

The concept of limited war often defined inter-state conflict in Early

the board of Jamestown, famously noted that, “without Ukraine,

To alter the balance of power throughout Europe’s East, Putin’s Russia

With each irredentist move in the post-Soviet space, Putin has

battlefields of Crimea, Donbas, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Relatedly, limited war was a hallmark of Soviet behavior. During the

Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, has proven to be a master at

Putin’s long-term goal in this approach is to show that NATO is

which led to the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine. In each case, these

Within the post-Soviet space, Putin is applying a boa constrictor

Against this setting, a major objective of this book is to outline and

light on why Russia has been so successful recently in resorting to

First of all, Russian strategists understand that the American