Blasko 2021

Journal of Strategic Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20
The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms:

contributing to China’s joint warfighting,
deterrence and MOOTW Posture
Dennis J. Blasko
To cite this article: Dennis J. Blasko (2021) The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms:
contributing to China’s joint warfighting, deterrence and MOOTW Posture, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 44:2, 149-183, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1701440
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1701440
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JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES
2021, VOL. 44, NO. 2, 149–183
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1701440
ARTICLE
The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms:

contributing to China’s joint warfighting, deterrence
and MOOTW Posture
Dennis J. Blasko*
Independent Analyst
ABSTRACT
After ‘below the neck’ reforms of operational units in 2017, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) Army remains the PLA’s largest service as China seeks to develop
forces with increased joint capabilities in the maritime, air, and space/cyber
domains. The Army is expanding its ‘new-type combat forces,’ such as Special
Operations, helicopter, long-range rocket, and electronic warfare units, to con-
tribute to maritime operations as well as to land missions. It has standardised the
structure of group armies and formed new combined arms brigades and batta-
lions. Reform has affected nearly every Army unit resulting in a short-term decline
in large-scale training and operational readiness as newly organised units focus
on individual and small unit functional training. Senior PLA leaders acknowledge
numerous shortcomings in Chinese military capabilities and are cautious about
initiating combat operations, preferring instead to achieve China’s objectives
through deterrence or actions below the threshold of lethal military force.
KEYWORDS Army; Organisation; Leadership; Training; Doctrine; Shortcomings; Problems
Introduction
In April 2017, after the national- and theatre-level ‘above the neck’ reforms
(‘脖子以上’改革) of the year before, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began
massive ‘below the neck’ reforms (‘脖子以下’) of its combat and border and
coastal defence units. This restructuring of units in all services was the most
extensive reorganisation since the 1950s. As a whole, these reforms seek to
improve the PLA’s capability for warfighting, deterrence, and military opera-
tions other than war (MOOTW).1
CONTACT Dennis J. Blasko [email protected] 2046 Marye Brant Loop S., Neptune Beach,
FL 32266, USA
*The Chinese government has not explained officially the details of the PLA Army’s structural reforms. This
essay is based on analysis of hundreds of articles from the official Chinese military media. Over time, as new
information becomes available, changes are inevitable. This essay updates and expands upon analysis in my
chapter ‘The Biggest Loser in Chinese Military Reforms: The PLA Army,’ in Phillip C. Saunders, Arthur S. Ding,
Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, and Joel Wuthnow, eds. Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese
Military Reforms, Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2019.
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
150 D. J. BLASKO
When this set of reforms is refined and completed in 2020, the PLA’s daily
operational readiness should be improved and its ability to conduct joint
operations enhanced. In the meantime, the forces are adjusting to the many
changes wrought by these reforms. Large-scale joint and combined arms
training has been reduced as most units have concentrated on building the
individual, small unit (分队), and headquarters staff functional proficiencies
necessary to prepare themselves to participate in larger operations.
However, 2020 is only the second milestone in the PLA’s multi-
generational, ‘three-step development strategy’ (‘三步走’的发展战略),
which in 2008 set the goal of completing the ‘modernization of national
defense and armed forces’ by mid-century (21世纪中叶基本实现国防和军
队现代化).2 More changes are sure to follow as the PLA continues to moder-
nise over the ensuing decades.
At the 19th National Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping modified the
‘three-step development strategy’ by moving the mid-century objective
of ‘modernization of national defense and armed forces’ forward to
a date that had never been mentioned before in official statements:
2035. By that time Xi has specifically directed the PLA to ‘comprehen-
sively enhance the modernization of military theory, organization, per-
sonnel, and weaponry and equipment.’ He further adjusted the final
objective to building the PLA into a ‘world-class military’ (把人民军队全
面建成世界一流军队), but left that term undefined.3
For the PLA Army, ‘below the neck’ reforms have focused on modernising
and transforming operational and tactical units, which include group armies
(集团军), divisions (师), brigades (旅), regiments (团), and battalions (营), so
that they are structured better to conduct joint operations, especially so that
1
Shou Xiaosong [寿晓松] (ed.), The Science of Military Strategy [战略学], 3rd ed., (Beijing: Military Science
Press [军事科学出版社] 2013), 100. Warfighting (作战/战争), military deterrence (军事威慑), and
MOOTW (非战争军事行动) are called the ‘three basic ways to use military power.’ Of the three,
‘warfighting is the core’ (战争为核心).
2
‘China’s National Defense in 2008’, Jan. 2009, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2017-04/11/content_
4778231.htm. The first milestone, 2010, was vaguely defined as laying ‘a solid foundation’ for
modernisation. On 1 August 2017, Xi Jinping declared that the 2020 milestone had been completed
when he stated, ‘The PLA has basically completed mechanization and is moving rapidly toward
“strong” informationized armed forces.’ See ‘China Focus: “Be ready to win wars,” China’s Xi orders
reshaped PLA’, PLA Daily, 2 Aug. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-08/02/content_
7699926.htm. Previously, the 2006 White Paper had defined the ‘three-step development strategy’
with the same set of dates: 2010, 2020, and mid-century, but the final goal was described as ‘building
informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st
century’ (到21世纪中叶基本实现建设信息化军队、打赢信息化战争的战略目标). The final goal
was refined in the 2008 White Paper.
3
‘决胜全面建成小康社会夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利’, PLA Daily, 19 Oct. 2017, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/19/content_189964.htm. The term ‘world-class military’ is vague
and open to interpretation. Certainly, the U.S. military currently is a world-class military and
a superpower, but it is arguable that, despite their sizes, the UK, German, and Israeli militaries are
‘world-class’ in the capabilities they have. The Russian military is a different subset of a ‘world-class
military’ because of the size of its nuclear arsenal and its recent efforts to rebuild, reform, and actually
use its forces.
THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 151
the Army may contribute to joint maritime campaigns beyond China’s shores.
These units have been called ‘mobile operational units’ (机动作战部队) and
were said to number 850,000 personnel in 2012.4 Recent reforms also
affected the Army’s border and coastal defence forces (边海防部队). Nearly
every unit in the Army has felt the impact of this round of reform. The many
changes underway have caused great disruption and anxiety throughout the
force.
As technologies continue to develop and new structures and equipment
are tested through experience in training, the ‘below the neck’ reforms will
not be the last changes the PLA will undergo. Some unit structures likely
will need to be adjusted after field testing and as additional new weapons
and technologies enter the force. Moreover, the recent alterations such as
personnel and unit transfers, equipment upgrades, unit transformations,
and increasingly realistic training, are much more expensive than previous
PLA practices. Accordingly, a smaller, more modern, more effective PLA will
not be a less expensive one.
This paper briefly outlines the national- and theatre-level reforms and
examines the reasons underlying this batch of reforms (based on the senior
PLA leadership’s evaluation of the military’s shortcomings), but focuses pri-
marily on the Theatre Command Army headquarters (战区陆军机关), provin-
cial Military Districts (省军区), as well as the group armies, divisions, brigades,
and battalions that make up the Army’s ‘mobile operational units’ and border
and coastal defence units.
A brief summary of ‘above the neck’ reforms

On the last day of 2015, the Central Military Commission (CMC) estab-
lished a new Army Headquarters (陆军领导机构) in Beijing; the
former Second Artillery Force was upgraded to a full-fledged service
and renamed the Rocket Force (火箭军); and a new Strategic Support
Force (战略支援部队) was created.5 Shortly thereafter, the four General
Departments (四总部) were abolished and a new, expanded CMC orga-
nisation (军委机关部门) consisting of 15 functional departments/commis-
sions/offices (7个部/厅, 3个委员会, 5个直属机构) was formed.6 The Army-
centric, former seven Military Regions (大军区) were replaced by five joint
Theatre Commands (战区), in protocol order: the Eastern, Southern,
4
Information Office of the State Council, ‘The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’, 16 Apr.
2013, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-07/13/content_7153397_2.htm.
5
‘China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force,’ PLA Daily, 1 January 2016, http://english.
chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/01/content_6839967.htm.
6
‘China’s New Central Military Commission organ established’, PLA Daily, 11 Jan. 2016, http://english.
chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/11/content_6852723.htm and ‘MND
Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle’, PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.
com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm.
152 D. J. BLASKO
Western, Northern, and Central.7 About 9 months later the Joint Logistics
Support Force (联勤保障部队) was established.8 The relationship between
these headquarters is described as ‘the CMC is in charge of the overall
administration of the Chinese armed forces, the Theaters are responsible
for operations, and the Services are responsible for construction’ (军委管
总, 战区主战, 军种主建).9
The first Army commander was General Li Zuocheng, the ex-commander of
the former Chengdu Military Region (MR). He shared responsibility with poli-
tical commissar (PC) Lieutenant General (now full General) Liu Lei, who pre-
viously had been PC of the former Lanzhou MR. After the previous Chief of the
CMC Joint Staff Department, General Fang Fenghui, was removed from office
in August 2017, Li was reassigned to take his place.10 Lieutenant General (now
full General) Han Weiguo then became Army commander, in a lateral transfer
from his assignment as the first commander of the Central Theatre Command.
The primary duty of the new Army Headquarters is to oversee the ‘con-
struction’ (建设) of all Army units. Construction tasks include the political
reliability, organisation, manning, training and education, and logistics and
equipment support for all personnel and units who wear the Army arm patch.
The Army Headquarters is at the same organisational level (grade, 职务等级)
as the other services and the Theatre Commands (TCs). Its first-level depart-
ments consist of the Army Discipline Inspection Commission (陆军纪委),
Army Staff Department (陆军参谋部), Army Political Work Department (陆
军政治工作部), Army Logistics Department (陆军后勤部), and Army
Equipment Department (陆军装备部), all of which have one or more bureaus
(局) to supervise their specific responsibilities. Since the Army Headquarters
was created, one of its main tasks has been to train its own personnel on how
to organise themselves and perform their daily tasks in peace and war.11 The
Army Headquarters advises and takes orders from the CMC and the latter’s
staff organisations, while coordinating laterally with the other services and
TCs and downward to the TC Army headquarters and their operational units.
The new CMC staff organisations expand a few previously existing CMC
organisations and incorporate the functions and many of the personnel from
the former four General Departments. The new CMC National Defence
Mobilisation Department takes over some of the responsibilities of the
7
‘President Xi Announces Establishment of PLA Theater Commands’, PLA Daily, 1 Feb. 2016, http://
english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-02/01/content_6884069.htm.
8
‘China Establishes Joint Logistic Support Force’, PLA Daily, 13 Sep. 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/
TopNews/2016-09/13/content_4730336.htm.
9
‘Xi urges Breakthroughs In Military Structural Reform’, Xinhua, 26 Nov. 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.
com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm.
10
Yang, Zi, ‘Restructure, Then Purge: How Sheriff Xi’s PLA Clean-Up Works’, Asia Times, 2 Sep. 2017, http://
www.atimes.com/article/restructure-purge-sheriff-xis-pla-clean-works/.
11
‘’陆军使命-2018ʹ专项集训提升首长机关指挥能力’ [‘Army Mission-2018ʹ Specialised Training
Enhances Headquarters Command Ability], PLA Daily, 29 Aug. 2018, http://www.81.cn/lj/2018-08/29/
content_9266548.htm.
Military Regions in commanding the provincial Military Districts (MD), except

for the Beijing Garrison (北京卫戍区) and the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs which
were placed under the ‘management’ of the new Army Headquarters.12 The
CMC staff organisations are manned by personnel from all services, making it
a joint headquarters.
Likewise, the five Theatre Commands are structured as joint headquarters
with commanders, PCs, and their deputies from services other than just the
Army, a joint staff from all services, and subordinate service component
commands, which, however, do not include a Rocket Force component.13
For many CMC and TC staff officers and NCOs, this is the first time they have
ever worked closely with personnel from the other services. In contrast to the
former Military Region system – - which required a mostly Army organisation
to transform into an ad hoc joint headquarters in the event of emergency or
war – the new permanent joint TC headquarters (if properly trained) should
be able to shift efficiently from their peacetime functions to a warfighting or
emergency mode.
Each TC has an Army headquarters and Air Force headquarters, while the
Eastern, Southern, and Northern TCs also have a Navy headquarters, which
have subsumed the East Sea Fleet, South Sea Fleet, and North Sea Fleet,
respectively. Each service component headquarters is a single-service orga-
nisation, which commands its service’s operational units in its area of respon-
sibility, and has a dual command structure up to its respective Theatre for
operations and to its service headquarters for day-to-day ‘construction’ func-
tions, such as manning, training, and equipping the forces. This system means
that in peacetime, operational units have a single chain of command only to
their TC service headquarters. In the years immediately after their establish-
ment, each TC service component headquarters focused on choosing care-
fully the officers on its staff and training them for their new responsibilities.
These national- and theatre-level headquarters reforms are a major ele-
ment of the 300,000-man reduction announced in 2015. An unknown num-
ber of officers and enlisted personnel from the former General Departments
and MR headquarters were retired (退役), reassigned to jobs outside the
military (转业), or demobilised (退伍). Some personnel and organisations
from the former General Departments were reassigned to the new CMC
organisations, Army Headquarters, and the Strategic Support Force. In
a similar manner, some personnel from the former MR headquarters were
12
‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle’, PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.
com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-01/12/content_6854444.htm; ‘北京卫戍区已由原
北京军区转隶陆军’, [Beijing Garrison Has Been Transferred from the Former Beijing MR to the
Army] The Paper, 16 Aug. 2016, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1514876.
13
Rocket Force launch brigades are organised into bases (基地), which report directly to Rocket Force
headquarters in Beijing. In time of war, conventional Rocket Force units are expected to be assigned
temporarily to TC headquarters to provide long-range fire support.
154 D. J. BLASKO
reassigned to the five TCs and the TC Army headquarters, whereas others
were dismissed from active duty.
Objectives of reforms
These reforms are intended to ‘guarantee the Party’s absolute leadership of
the military and the CMC’s centralized leadership, enable CMC organ[s] to
perform their duties of strategic planning and macro-management, and
enhance the oversight and supervision of the exercise of power.’14 Likewise,
a major objective is to rebalance the distribution of forces within the PLA to
make it more capable of executing joint campaigns beyond China’s borders.
As stated in the 2015 White Paper:
It is necessary for China to develop a modern maritime military force structure
commensurate with its national security and development interests, safeguard
its national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, protect the security
of strategic SLOCs [sea lines of communication] and overseas interests, and
participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic
support for building itself into a maritime power.15
These goals are directly related to the objective of breaking ‘Big Army’
thinking (‘大陆军’思维). Decades of army-dominance hitherto is understood
as hindering the development of the PLA’s joint operational capabilities,
especially in the maritime, air, and space/cyber domains. To move beyond
the ‘Big Army’ mentality, major changes in force structure, doctrine, person-
nel policy, professional military education, and training are required. As the
PLA reduces the influence of ‘Big Army’ thinking, the other services will rise in
both prominence and size relative to the Army. Already one senior Navy
officer, Yuan Yubai, has become the commander of the Southern TC (a first in
PLA history) and Air Force General Yi Xiaoguang has become commander of
the Central TC.16 In the future, more joint exercises and operations than in the
past are expected to be commanded by non-army officers and joint staffs.
The PLA further seeks to better balance the distribution of personnel
among its services and forces. After 2005, when the PLA completed
a 200,000-man reduction resulting in 2.3 million active-duty personnel,
approximately 73% of the remaining troops were allotted to the Army
and the former Second Artillery (which at the time was officially part of
the Army), 10% to the Navy, and 17% to the Air Force. As part of
14
‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle’, PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.
15
Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s Military Strategy’, May 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/
china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm.
16
‘China’s Three Naval Fleets Have New Commanders’, PLA Daily, 23 Jan. 2017, http://english.chinamil.
com.cn/view/2017-01/23/content_7464479.htm; ‘明星将领乙晓光空军上将转岗中部战区’ [Star
Air Force General Yi Xiaoguang Transferred to Central TC], Caixin, 20 Oct. 2017, http://china.caixin.
com/2017-10-20/101158984.html.
breaking the ‘Big Army’ mentality more recently, the number of Army
personnel has been reduced and the percentages of the other services
increased. To date, however, the number of personnel by service has not
been released officially. In July 2017, then-Army commander Li Zuocheng
stated, ‘The size of the ground force has been greatly reduced to account
for less than half of the armed forces’ while a second report indicated
that the number of troops in the Navy, Strategic Support Force, and
Rocket Force will be increased.17 For the Army to number less than
one million, it likely would be necessary for personnel who still wear
Army uniforms in the Strategic Support Force, Joint Logistics Support
Force, and probably the five TC headquarters not to be included on the
Army’s roster. One indicator that this method is being used to aggregate
personnel numbers is that Army personnel wear arm patches with
a generic Army patch and chest insignia, while those in the other
services, forces, and TC headquarters all have their own unique patches
and insignia.
Two major objectives of reforms in the Army’s operational units are to
increase its combat effectiveness to contribute to the PLA’s joint opera-
tions capabilities and to expand the percentage of ‘new-type combat
forces’ (新型作战力量).18 The senior PLA leadership seeks to achieve
these objectives through unit restructuring, improved personnel educa-
tion and training, and realistic unit training, although they remain cog-
nisant that numerous obstacles and deficiencies must be overcome to
achieve these objectives.
Indeed, for many years, the PLA media has referred – via a number of
slogans or formulas – to shortcomings in leadership, organisation, training,
equipment, logistics, and doctrine to point out systemic problems and
encourage the troops to continue on the difficult path of modernisation.
These formulas almost are always written in Chinese and only rarely are seen
in the PLA’s English-language publications. As such, they clearly are meant for
an internal audience within the PLA itself as well as the Communist Party
leadership.
Some of the most common self-assessments include:
● The ‘Two Incompatibles’ (两个不相适应) or ‘principal contradiction’ (重要

矛盾), which was first stated in 2006: the PLA’s ‘level of modernization (1)
does not meet the requirements of winning local war under informatized
17
‘Xi Reviews Troops in Field For First Time’, Xinhua, 30 Jul. 2017, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2017-07/
30/content_4787294.htm; ‘Reform to Downsize PLA Army, Boost Navy Numbers’, PLA Daily, 12 Jul.
2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-07/12/content_7672557.htm. Note that the number
of personnel in the Air Force was not included on the list to be increased.
18
‘推进新型作战力量融入联合作战’ [Promote the Integration of New-Type Combat Forces into Joint
Operations], PLA Daily, 31 Jul. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/31/content_152147.
htm.
156 D. J. BLASKO
conditions and (2) its military capability does not meet the requirements
of carrying out its historic missions at the new stage of the new century.’
● The ‘Two Big Gaps’ (两个差距很大), stated in 2013: ‘(1) currently, there are big
gaps between the level of our military modernization compared to the require-
ments for national security and (2) the level of the world’s advanced militaries.’19
● The ‘Three Whethers’ (三个能不能): (1) Whether our armed forces can con-
stantly maintain the party’s absolute leadership; (2) whether they can fight
victoriously when needed by the party and the people; and (3) whether
commanders at all levels are competent to lead forces and command in war.20
● The ‘Two Inabilities’ (两个能力不够): the PLA’s ability ‘(1) to fight
a modern war is not sufficient, (2) the ability of our cadres at all levels
to commandmodern war is insufficient.’21
● The ‘Five Incapables’ (五个不会), which began to be used in 2015: ‘some
cadres cannot (1) judge the situation, (2) understand the intention of higher
authorities, (3) make operational decisions, (4) deploy troops, and (5) deal with
unexpected situations.’22
Some operational commanders readily admit that they have not been properly
trained to command combined arms units and they ‘do not dare,’ are ‘not willing’ or
are ‘not able’ to use the new-type combat forces available to them.23 These types of
critiques apply not only to the Army, but to ‘some’ units and personnel across the services.
A major underlying theme in these criticisms is the necessity to improve the
capabilities of operational commanders and staff personnel, which requires
changes in organisation as well as in personnel, education, and training policies,
all of which are part of the current reforms underway. Without the impetus of
learning from actual combat operations, such change can take years or decades
for experimentation, implementation, and refinement. Moreover, the amount of
change underway in units over the past 2 years has had adverse effects on unit
operational effectiveness. It likely will take multiple additional training seasons to
prepare adequately both the personnel and units for their new tasks in the
19
‘学习习近平总书记关于强军目标的重要论述’ [Study General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Exposition on
the Goal of Strengthening the Military], People’s Daily, 22 Jul. 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/
2013/0722/c40531-22275029.html, which states, ‘目前,我军现代化水平与国家安全需求相比差距
还很大,与世界先进军事水平相比差距还很大’.
20
‘破解一支军队所向披靡的脉动密码’ [Crack an Army’s Password], PLA Daily, 28 Jul. 2014, http://www.81.cn/
2014-content_18620/2014-07/28/content_6173099.htm, which states ‘在党和人民需要的时候, 军队能不能
始终坚持党的绝对领导, 能不能拉得上去、打胜仗, 各级指挥员能不能带兵打仗、指挥打仗？’
21
‘学习习近平总书记关于强军目标的重要论述’ [Study General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Exposition on
the Goal of Strengthening the Military], People’s Daily, 22 Jul. 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/
2013/0722/c40531-22275029.html, which states ‘军队打现代化战争能力不够,各级干部指挥现代
战争能力不够’.
22
‘破解“五个不会”难题要从源头入手’ [Start with the Source to Crack the ‘Five Incapables’ Problem],
PLA Daily, 13 Oct. 2015,
23
‘推进新型作战力量融入联合作战’ [Promote the Integration of New-Type Combat Forces into Joint
Operations], PLA Daily, 31 Jul. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-07/31/content_152147.
htm, which states, ‘许多指挥员对新型作战力量往往“不敢用、不愿用、不会用”, “手中有宝不
当宝”, 把新型作战力量当作“配属部队支援兵种、保障力量” . . .’.
restructured PLA. For example, group armies and brigades recently have devel-
oped ‘three-year plans’ (三年规划) for transformation and construction (转型建
设) and personnel training (人才培养).24 These ‘three-year plans’ conform to the
2020 milestone in the PLA’s ‘three-step development strategy.’
Theatre Command army headquarters and military districts

The PLA Army has never before had an organisation like the five new TC Army
headquarters.25 As mentioned earlier, this organisation falls under the command of
both the regional TC headquarters where it is located and the national-level Army
Headquarters in Beijing. Therefore, it must be organised and manned to perform both
operational and construction functions. However, no Army personnel have ever been
assigned to such a permanent headquarters and thus they must learn how to interact
with both the headquarters above them and the operational units under their
command. In contrast, under the old Military Region system, the three Navy fleets
and seven Military Region Air Force headquarters had similar relationships with their
superior headquarters and subordinate units. Thus, it may take the TC Army head-
quarters longer to become fully functional vis-à-vis their counterparts in the Navy and
Air Force, who are accustomed to the dual command relationship.
The first batch of 10 new TC Army commanders and PCs probably were
considered important assignments. These deputy-theatre grade officers are
responsible for preparing both the TC Army headquarters to perform their peace-
time and wartime functions as well as overseeing the development of the units
subordinate to them. These leaders also are assigned as deputy commanders and
PCs in their respective TC headquarters, but likely have a relative degree of
independence since none of the TC Army headquarters are co-located with
their TC headquarters. Because of the turmoil in units created by the reforms
underway and the need to train their own staffs, it would seem logical that TC
Army commanders and PCs would have stayed in their positions for at least two
or more years in order to provide stability and consistency in leadership. However,
this has not been the case. Within 3 years after the creation of TC Army head-
quarters, at least nine of the first 10 commanders and PCs have been changed,
including two commanders from the Central TC Army (See Table 1).
Thus, out of the 12 commanders and PCs for the national-level Army
Headquarters and TC Army headquarters, 10 served for 3 years or less in
their new positions at a time when stable leadership would have been
preferred for the efficient training and functioning of these new organisations.
24
‘担当首任职责, 跑好手中第一棒’ [Take the First Responsibility, Running with the First Baton], PLA
Daily, 21 Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/21/content_188516.htm and ‘陆战新
锐乘风起航 – – 从陆军某空中突击旅看我军新质作战力量’ [New Winds Set Land War – See the
New Quality Combat Force from the Army’s Air Assault Brigade], PLA Daily, 2 Octo. 2017, http://www.
81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/02/content_189166.htm.
25
Something like a TC Army command probably would have been set up on a temporary basis when
a former MR transitioned to a Theatre headquarters in time of war or emergency.
158 D. J. BLASKO
Table 1. Theatre Command (TC) army leaders.

Theatre/ TC Army
Headquarters Headquarters Initial TC Army Commander/ Initial TC Army PC/
Location Location New Commander (if applicable) New PC (if applicable)
Eastern TC/Nanjing Fuzhou Qin Weijiang/Xu Qiling Liao Keduo
Southern TC/ Nanning Liu Xiaowu/Zhang Jian Bai Lu
Guangzhou
Western TC/Chengdu Lanzhou He Qingcheng/He Weidong Xu Zhongbo/Xu Deqing
Northern TC/ Jinan Li Qiaoming/Wang Yinfang Xu Yuanlin/Shi Xiao
Shenyang
Central TC/Beijing Shijiazhuang Shi Luze/Zhang Xudong/Fan Wu Shezhou/Zhou
Chengcai Wanzhu
TC Army headquarters have been assigned four main missions, serving as: 1)
a campaign headquarters (战役指挥部) for combat operations, 2) a component
of the theatre joint command post (战区联指的组成部分), 3) a construction
headquarters (建设指挥部) for routine leadership and management, and 4) an
emergency response headquarters (应急指挥部) for any of the MOOTW tasks
they must conduct.26 Though TC Army headquarters do not have a formal
command relationship with the majority of provincial Military District headquar-
ters, they probably have lines of communications and liaison to coordinate in
areas where their responsibilities overlap.
Under the old Military Region system, Military District headquarters were
subordinate to MR headquarters and performed multiple functions: oversight
of mobilisation, conscription, and demobilisation; promoting military-civilian
integration (军民融合) and national defence education; command of reserve
and militia units in their area; and, through the Military Sub-Districts/Garrisons (军
分区/警备区), command of border and coastal defence units. The Beijing
Garrison and the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs did all that, and controlled significant
combat forces (divisions and brigades) in their areas of responsibility. In the new
system, the CMC National Defence Mobilisation Department is responsible for
‘organizing and instructing the national defense mobilization and the construc-
tion of reserve forces’ (a term which includes both PLA reserve units and militia
forces) and leading 28 provincial MDs (excluding the Beijing Garrison and the
Tibet and Xinjiang MDs).27 Absent from that list of MD responsibilities is com-
mand of border and coastal defence units, which is now an Army function.28
26
‘强化战区陆军主战主建的创新意识’ [Strengthen the Theatre Army Operations and Construction
Innovative Consciousness], PLA Daily, 10 May 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/10/
content_144076.htm.
27
‘MND Holds Press Conference on CMC Organ Reshuffle,’ PLA Daily, 12 Jan. 2016, http://english.chinamil.
28
‘鸡西军分区边防部队官兵转隶交前倾情捐资助学(1/4)’ [Aid Donations Before the Officers and
Men of the Border Defence Units in the Jixi Military Sub-district Were Transferred (1/4)], Guangming
Pictorial, 28 Dec. 2016, http://pic.gmw.cn/channelplay/12052/5300867/0/0.html. This transfer of
responsibility is also seen in the manner by which border and coastal defence units are identified in
the Chinese military media: ‘战区陆军某边防旅’ or ‘战区陆军某海防旅,’ except in Xinjiang and
Tibet.
Army command of border and coastal defence units is performed through the
staff offices of the Army Headquarters Staff Department Border and Coastal
Defence Bureau (陆军参谋部边海防局) and the five TC Army Staff Border and
Coastal Defence Divisions (战区陆军参谋部边海防处), overseen by the CMC
National Defence Mobilisation Department Border Defence Bureau (国防动员
部边防局).
With the reduction in the scope of their responsibilities, the size of the
MD headquarters reportedly has been reduced considerably, aiding in the
300,000-man reduction.29 In addition, officers from other services may
now be assigned to MD leadership posts, which previously were occupied
by Army officers. The first non-Army MD commander identified was Air
Force Major General Zhou Li, commander of the Henan MD, in
April 2017.30 A few other non-Army officers have been assigned to
other MD leadership positions in the period since.
The Beijing Garrison and the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs are different
from the other provincial MDs in view of the sensitive regions they are
stationed in and the combat forces they command. They are deputy-
theatre grade organisations, one grade above the other corps-leader
grade MDs, but under ‘Army management.’31 The details of their com-
mand relationship with Army Headquarters in Beijing has not been
made clear officially, but it seems likely that these three headquarters
must simultaneously keep the Central TC Army and Western TC Army
headquarters informed of the situations in their areas of responsibility
as they report to Army Headquarters.
At present, the Beijing Garrison appears to command one combat
infantry division (composed of infantry, armoured, artillery, and anti-
aircraft regiments) and a guard division which provides security for
Beijing military installations and also performs military police functions
in the city. The Xinjiang MD commands four infantry divisions sup-
ported by artillery, air defence, army aviation, and special operations
forces (SOF) brigades. The Tibet MD commands three combined arms
brigades, along with other supporting units. None of these three head-
quarters command group armies.32
29
‘省軍區四變化削減領導職務,’ [Four Changes and Leadership Position Cuts in the Provincial Military
Districts], Takungpao, 24 Apri. 2017, http://news.takungpao.com.hk/paper/q/2017/0424/3443954.html.
30
‘空军少将周利调任河南省军区司令员, 接替卢长健少将’, [Air Force Major General Zhou Li
Transferred to be Henan Military District Commander Replace Major General Lu Changjian], The
Paper, 12 Apri. 2017, http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1660971.
31
As deputy-theatre grade organisations, these three headquarters normally could not be commanded
by other deputy-theatre grade organisations, such as the TC Army headquarters or the CMC National
Defence Mobilisation Department. Thus, they fall under the ‘Army’s management’ (北京卫戍区和新
疆军区、西藏军区一起划归陆军管理), see ‘北京卫戍区已由原北京军区转隶陆军,’ [Beijing
Garrison Has Been Transferred from the Former Beijing MR to the Army], The Paper, 16 Aug. 2016,
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1514876.
32
Author’s database derived from Chinese media reporting.
160 D. J. BLASKO
Group armies, divisions, brigades, and battalions

In April 2017, the CMC announced the creation of 13 new group armies (called
‘corps’ in the official Chinese announcement) to replace the previous 18 group
armies. The new group armies are numbered from 71 to 83 – designators (番号)
that had not been used previously for this level of organisation.33 Five group
army headquarters were eliminated, specifically the former 14th, 20th, 27th,
40th, and 47th Group Armies; it is noteworthy that none of these five group
armies commanded Army Aviation or SOF units, which probably was a major
reason for their demise. Though the headquarters for these five group armies
were disbanded, many of their subordinate units remained operational and
were transformed or adjusted in whole or part and assigned to the other new
group armies. Many personnel were retired, reassigned, or demobilised in the
process, again contributing to the 300,000-man reduction. Likewise, many, but
not all, old weapons and equipment would be withdrawn from active duty
units whereas remaining newer equipment redistributed among the forces.
Illustrative of the amount of change that occurred in the months following
April 2017:
(1) ‘Over 1,000 units at the regiment-level or above’ were disbanded;34

(2) ‘Over 100 brigade- and regiment-level units’ were transferred to new
locations;35 and
(3) ‘Over 90% of military officers from the original [18] group armies and
40% from combat brigades’ were transferred to different units.36
New commanders and PCs were assigned to all 13 new group armies when
they were formed. Of the 26 new leaders, 22 were transferred from outside
the TC’s area of responsibility. Of the 26 new leaders, at least eleven appear to
have been reassigned within 2 years of their posting. Although there was less
turmoil in the group armies’ leadership than in the Army Headquarters and
TC Army headquarters, leadership turnover of over 40% within 2 years does
not bode well for stability during a critical period in the new units’ efforts to
prepare themselves to accomplish their assigned missions under their new
organisational structure. The information above associates the 13 new group
armies with the old group armies upon which they roughly were formed and
33
‘Regular Press Conference of Ministry of National Defense on April 27’, PLA Daily, 28 Apr. 2017, http://
eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-04/28/content_7582014.htm. The English-language PLA Daily used
the term ‘combined corps’ in 2017, but in 2018 appears to have shifted to the term ‘group army.’
34
‘Facts and Figures on China’s military reform’, Xinhua, 19 Dec. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-12/19/c_136837189.htm.
35
‘中国陆军2017年大事记’ [Major Events in 2017 for the Chinese Army], Chinese Military Net 8–1
Television, 2 Jan. 2018, http://tv.81.cn/jlwyx/2018-01/02/content_7892906.htm.
36
‘PLA stresses combat readiness, reassigns officers based on battle requirements’, PLA Daily, 11 Dec.
2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-12/11/content_7861974.htm.
Table 2. New and old group army (GA) associations and leadershipa.
Initial Commander/ Initial Political
Theatre New/ New Commander Commissar/
Command Old GA (if applicable) New PC (if applicable)
Eastern TC 71st GA/ Wang Yinfang*/ Xu Deqing*/
12th GA Li Zhonglin Yin Hongxing
72nd GA/ Zhu Xiaohui*/ Wang Wenquan*
1st GA Zheng Shoudong
73rd GA/ Hu Zhongqiang* Yang Cheng*
31st GA
Southern TC 74th GA/ Xu Xianghua*/ Liu Hongjun*
42nd GA Hong Jiangqiang
75th GA/ Gong Maodong* Qin Shutong*/
41st GA Wei Wenbo
Western TC 76th GA/ Fan Chengcai/ Zhang Hongbing*
21st GA Yang Yi
77th GA/ Lin Huomao* Li Zehua*
13th GA
Northern TC 78th GA/ Wu Yanan Guo Xiaodong/
16th GA Zhao Lei
79th GA/ Xu Qiling*/ Yu Yonghong*
39th GA New commander unknown
80th GA/ Wang Xiubin* Zhu Yuwu
26th GA
Central TC 81st GA/ Huang Ming*/ Fang Yongxiang*#/
65th GA Wang Zhibin New PC unknown
82nd GA/ Lin Xiangyang* Zhang Mengbin*
38th GA
83rd GA/ Xie Zenggang* Lu Shaoping*/
54th GA Tang Xinghua
* Indicates officer transferred from outside his original Military Region/Theatre.
# Transferred to Veteran’s Affairs Ministry, Deputy Director.
Table 2 is derived from ‘13个新集团军主官人选均确定, 原有的集团军主官全部换岗,’ [Leaders of
the 13 New Group Armies Confirmed, All Former Group Army Leaders Changed Posts] The Paper,
16 August 2017, http://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1765430, and updated as changes have
emerged.
identifies the initial commanders and PCs and their replacements, if changes
had been effected (See Table 2).
Among the 18 former group armies, 16 were composed of different
combinations of manoeuvre and support units (due to multiple force reduc-
tions in previous decades and the introduction of new equipment into the
PLA) and only two were structured similarly. In general, the 13 new group
armies were formed based on, or adjusted from, their predecessor organisa-
tions, although overall, their structures have been standardised with new
units added (some from defunct group armies and others transferred across
former MR boundaries), with some subordinate units (such as the former
engineer regiments and chemical defence units) consolidated. Figure 1 pro-
vides a comparison of the structure of the former group armies with the
standardised post-April 2017 organisation.
Of the changes in the group army structure, perhaps the most important is
that group army headquarters now command only brigades. No divisions or
162 D. J. BLASKO
Group Army Structure, Pre-Reform, April Group Army Structure, Post-Reform, May
2017, (18 Group Armies) 2017 and after, (13 Group Armies)
Group Army Group Army
Headquarters Headquarters
Two to Five Infantry Six Combined Arms

Divisions/Brigades Brigades
One Armored
Division*/Brigade
Artillery Artillery
Brigade** Brigade
Air Defense Air Defense

Brigade Brigade
Special Operations Special Operations

Brigade/Regiment*** Brigade
Army Aviation Army Aviation

Brigade/Regiment*** Brigade
Reconnaissance
Battalion
Engineer Engineer and Chemical

Regiment Defense Brigade
Chemical Defense
Regiment/Battalion
Communications
Regiment****
Logistics/Armament Service Support

Units Brigade
* The 38th Group Army had an armored division.
** 1st/42nd GAs also had a Long-Range Rocket Brigade.
*** SOF/Army Aviation units in some group armies.
**** A few group armies were also assigned an electronic
countermeasures brigade (ECM) or regiment.
Figure 1. Comparison of group army structures (old and new).
regiments are directly subordinate to any new group army. All divisions
previously assigned to group armies, except one, have been transformed
into two brigades. Former combat brigades (infantry and armoured) have
been transformed into three types of combined armed brigades (合成旅),
heavy brigades (重型合成旅) with tracked armoured vehicles, medium bri-

gades (中型合成旅) with wheeled armoured vehicles, and light brigades (轻
型合成旅) with trucks and/or Mengshi (猛士) high-mobility, wheeled vehicles.
Prior to the ‘below the neck’ reforms, the Army order-of-battle included
approximately 20 infantry divisions and one armoured division. Most divi-
sions were assigned to group armies, but as mentioned earlier, the Xinjiang
MD commanded four independent infantry divisions and the Beijing Garrison
commanded one combat infantry division and a guard division. After the
reforms, other than the divisions based in Xinjiang and in the Beijing Garrison,
only one other division remains operational: the former 112th Mechanised
Infantry Division of the former 38th Group Army. This division apparently
reports directly to the Central TC Army (‘中部战区陆军某师’) and was seen at
the 2017 Zhurihe parade on static display opposite the reviewing stand after
having conducted an exercise with army aviation units prior to the parade.37
Each infantry division remaining in service probably consists of about
10,000 personnel assigned to three manoeuvre regiments (infantry and
armour) with supporting artillery, air defence, engineer and chemical defence
regiments, as well as a reconnaissance battalion and other support units.
The other approximately 15 former divisions each have been transformed,
adapted/reorganised (转型 or 改编), or split (拆成了) into two brigades. The
transformation of divisions into brigades is a complex process. Generally,
a division’s former armoured regiment and one of its two infantry regiments
formed the basis for the two new brigades. These regiments were then
augmented with a variety of units, some of which may have come from
other elements of the original division, while yet other units may have been
assigned from units previously under the now disbanded (or other) group
armies. In many cases, newer weapons and equipment have been issued to
newly reorganised units. Many individuals and small units (battalion and
below) have been required to change their functional specialities to fill
gaps in the new brigades and were reassigned to new locations. Of these,
a few former division commanders and PCs have stayed on as leaders of new
brigades, some regiment commanders and PCs have been promoted to
brigade leaders, while some leaders from outside units have also been
transferred to head these new brigades. It is likely that alongside these
changes, many staff personnel of the former divisional headquarters and
regiment headquarters have been retired, reassigned, or demobilised.
A similar process was used to transform old-style brigades into new com-
bined arms or other types of brigades.
Some of the newly formed brigades have remained in their original group
army but moved (移防) to new barracks in different locations, while others
37
‘数字化雄师决胜沙场’ [Digitised Heroic Division is Decisive on the Battlefield], Xinhua, 27 Aug. 2017,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-08/27/c_1121548720.htm.
164 D. J. BLASKO
were transferred out of their old group army to new ones, even across former
Military Regions. The transfer of up to three 77th Group Army combined arms
brigades into Tibet appears to be a unique element of ‘below the neck’
reforms.38 These three brigades are in addition to the three combined arms
brigades previously assigned to the Tibet MD. It is not clear how or when
these 77th Group Army assets will coordinate or operate in conjunction with
Tibet MD headquarters and forces, and this development deserves further
scrutiny and analysis.
At present, each group army commands a total of six combined armed
brigades and six additional brigades of varying types: an artillery brigade (炮
兵旅), air defence brigade (防空旅), Army Aviation brigade (陆航旅)/air
assault brigade (空中突击旅/空突旅), SOF brigade (特战旅), engineer and
chemical defence brigade (工程防化旅) which may include a pontoon batta-
lion, and service support brigade (勤务支援旅), which includes communica-
tions, electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), logistics, and repair
and maintenance battalions or companies. Several former group army units,
such as the separate engineer regiment and chemical defence regiment, were
consolidated into new brigades thereby allowing for excess leadership, staff
personnel, and soldiers to be retired, reassigned, or demobilised, and for
a few selected regimental leaders to be promoted to become brigade leaders.
Two Army Aviation brigades – one in the 75th GA and one in the 83rd GA –
have been designated as air assault brigades, distinguished from Army
Aviation brigades with each having two or three infantry battalions perma-
nently assigned to them. New group armies are estimated to command
between 50,000 and 60,000 personnel each depending of the type of units
and equipment assigned.39
Based on analyses of reporting in the PLA media, combined arms brigades
command four combined arms battalions (合成营) numbered 1 through 4, an
artillery battalion (旅炮兵营), an air defence battalion (旅防空营),
a reconnaissance battalion (旅侦察营), a combat support battalion (作战支援
营) and a service support battalion (勤务保障营). Depending on the type of
equipment in a brigade, such as the number of tracked- versus wheeled-
vehicles, the composition of the support battalions may vary. In order to create
these new-type brigades, many battalions and companies of the various
branches necessary to make a combined arms unit were transferred from
their previous headquarters to new units. Combined arms brigades are esti-
mated to command about 5,000 to 6,000 personnel depending on the types of
38
‘“半边天”深情励丈夫’ [‘Half the Sky’ Deeply Affectionate Husband,] PLA Daily, 23 Feb. 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/23/content_200125.htm; ‘借土培苗, 争当“老西藏精神”新传
人’ [Borrowing Soil Training Seedlings, Strive to Become the New Descendants of the ‘Old Tibetan
Spirit’], PLA Daily, 16 Apri. 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2019-04/16/content_231744.htm.
39
China has not provided official information of the number of personnel assigned to the newly
structured group armies, brigades, and battalions, so all personnel numbers included in this discussion
are the author’s estimates.
unit (heavy, medium, or light) and equipment assigned; whereas supporting

brigades probably range from approximately 2,000 to 3,000 personnel. Table 3
summarises the distribution of divisions and brigades in the respective Group
Armies, the Beijing Garrison, and the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs.
The growth of Army Aviation and SOF units is worthy of further examina-
tion (see Table 4 for a summary of pre- and post-reform orders of battles for
these units). The Army Aviation Corps was created in 1986 and a decade later,
the force was equipped with about 135 aircraft spanning six or seven differ-
ent types (mostly transport, but no dedicated attack helicopters) to support
a 2.2 million-strong Army.40 In 2008, the director of the Army Aviation
Table 3. PLA army operational units, beginning in mid-April/May 2017.

Theatre/ Divisions/ Air Army Engineer Service
New/Old Group Combined Artillery Defence SOF Aviation Chemical Defence Support
Army Arms Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
Eastern TC
71st GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
12th GA
72nd GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
1st GA
73rd GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
31st GA
Southern TC
74th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
42nd GA
75th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
41st GA
Western TC
76th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
21st GA
77th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
13th GA
Northern TC
78th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
16th GA
79th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
39th GA
80th GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
26th GA
Central TC 1 Division
81st GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
65th GA
82nd GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
38th GA
83rd GA/ 6 1 1 1 1 1 1
54th GA
Beijing Garrison 1 Division
Xinjiang MD 4 Divisions 1 1 1 1
Tibet MD 3 1 1 1 1 1
Hong Kong 1
Total 6 Divisions/ 15 15 15 15 14 13
82 Brigades
40
The Military Balance 1996/97 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1996), 180.
166 D. J. BLASKO
Table 4. Pre/post-April 2017 army aviation and SOF order of battle.

Army Aviation Army SOF
Theatre/ Brigade Aviation Brigade SOF
New/Old Military or Regiment Brigade or Regiment Brigade
Group Army Region (April 2017) (March 2018) (April 2017) (March 2018)
71st GA/ Eastern/ Brigade Brigade Brigade
12th GA Nanjing
72nd GA/ Eastern/ Brigade Brigade Brigade
1st GA Nanjing
73rd GA/ Eastern/ Regiment Brigade Brigade Brigade
31st GA Nanjing
Disbanded Southern/
14th GA Chengdu
74th GA/ Southern/ Regiment Brigade Brigade
41st GA Guangzhou
75th GA/ Southern/ Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
42nd GA Guangzhou (Air Assault)
76th GA/ Western/ Brigade Brigade Brigade
21st GA Lanzhou
77th GA/ Western/ Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
13th GA Chengdu
Disbanded Western/
47th GA Lanzhou
78th GA/ Northern/ Brigade Brigade Brigade
16th GA Shenyang
79th GA/ Northern/ Brigade Brigade Regiment Brigade
39th GA Shenyang
80th GA/ Northern/ Regiment Brigade Brigade Brigade
26th GA Jinan
Disbanded Northern/
40th GA Shenyang
81st GA/ Central/ Brigade Brigade
65th GA Beijing (Former GSD Brigade)
82nd GA/ Central/ Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
38th GA Beijing
83rd GA/ Central/ Regiment Brigade Brigade
54th GA Jinan (Air Assault)
Disbanded Central/
20th GA Jinan
Disbanded Central/
27th GA Beijing
Beijing Central GSD Brigade
Garrison Beijing (to 81st GA)
Tibet MD Western/ Regiment Brigade Regiment Brigade
Chengdu
Xinjiang MD Western/ Brigade Brigade Brigade Brigade
Lanzhou
Total 7 Brigades/ 15 Brigades 9 Brigades/ 15 Brigades
5 Regiments 2 Regiments
Department told foreign military attachés that there were nearly 500 heli-
copters in over 10 units.41 Over the next 10 years, the number of helicopters
doubled, with the thousandth helicopter entering the force in 2016. Prior to
41
‘中国将军向外国武官披露陆军航空兵家底’ [Chinese General Discloses the Army Aviation Family
Home to Foreign Military Attachés], ChinaNews.com, 4 Jul. 2008, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/
2008/07-04/1302838.shtml.
the reforms in 2017, the Army helicopter operational inventory was distrib-
uted among five Army Aviation regiments and seven brigades; following the
reforms, all 13 group armies and the Xinjiang and Tibet MDs both have an
army aviation (or air assault) brigade and an SOF brigade.42 In order to create
or expand regiments into brigade size, it appears that helicopters from some
existing units were redistributed to new brigades; however, as they grow to
full strength, it is likely several brigades do not yet have a full complement of
helicopters, pilots, and crew.
A full-strength Army Aviation brigade appears to have roughly 70 to 80
helicopters including both transport (Z-8, Z-9, and Mi-17-series) and attack
(WZ-10 and WZ-19) helicopters, assigned to perhaps six battalions of about
12 aircraft each. Though multiple types of transport helicopters previously
had been outfitted with machine guns and rockets, the PLA’s first dedicated
attack helicopters – the WZ-10 and WZ-19 – only entered the force in 2012.
Currently, The Military Balance counts 150 WZ-10 and 120 WZ-19 attack
helicopters and approximately 800 light and medium transport helicopters
(consisting of multiple variants of the Mi-17-series from Russia, domestically
produced Z-8s and Z-9s, and S-70C Blackhawks acquired from the U.S. in the
mid-1980s, as well as two types of light helicopters for training) for a total of
about 1,070 rotary-wing aircraft.43 In addition to its rotary-wing assets, the
Army Aviation Corps also commands a small number of light and medium
fixed-wing aircraft. Transport capabilities are increasing with the addition of
the Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter (similar to the UH-60 Blackhawk).44 Due
to the small size of the helicopter force, until the past few years, training
undertaken by infantry units in air mobile operations was relatively infre-
quent, with a motorised infantry brigade acting as a test bed.45 Army Aviation
units, however, train much more often with the SOF units in their regions. Yet,
despite its growth, the PLA’s Army Aviation faces numerous constraints and
China recognises it will take another 20 to 30 years to fully develop the force’s
operational capabilities.46
The PLA formed its first Special Operations unit a few years after the Army
Aviation Corps was created. Over the following decade, SOF units were
established in each Military Region and were expanded gradually in the
new century. The force grew from seven groups (estimated to consist of up
to 1,000 personnel each) in the late 1990s to two regiments (estimated to be
42
Order of battle information in this chapter updates initial analysis found at Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Recent
Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force’, Jamestown Foundation China Brief, 9 Jun. 2017,
https://jamestown.org/program/recent-developments-chinese-armys-helicopter-force/.
43
The Military Balance 2019, (London: Routledge for International Institute for Strategic Studies 2019),
258. By comparison, the U.S. Army operates over 3,800 helicopters, The Military Balance 2019, 50.
44
‘How about the performance of China’s Z-20 medium-lift utility helicopter?’ PLA Daily, 24 Feb. 2018,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-02/24/content_7950952.htm.
45
Blasko, ‘Recent Developments in the Chinese Army’s Helicopter Force.’
46
从空中打赢地面战争 [Winning Ground Wars From the Air], PLA Daily, 12 Jul. 2018, http://www.81.
cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-07/12/content_210771.htm.
168 D. J. BLASKO
1,000 to 2,000 personnel each) and nine brigades (estimated at 2,000 to

3,000 personnel each) by early 2017. SOF brigades are now assigned to
each group army and the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs. Smaller SOF units (batta-
lions or companies) also are assigned to some combat divisions and brigades.
Assigning SOF units to group armies and important MDs underscores the
operational- and tactical-level missions the PLA foresees its SOF units under-
taking in the near- to medium-term, as opposed to Theatre- or national-level
missions. PLA SOF units are made up of a large number of two-year conscripts
and new lieutenants, as well as a core of more experienced officers and NCOs.
They are organised into squads and platoons to perform commando- and
Ranger-style tasks of raids, patrolling, reconnaissance, sniper, and hostage
rescue missions relatively close to the front line of their parent unit, often
after being inserted by conventional Army Aviation units. To date, the PLA
has not established a national-level SOF headquarters and none of its services
have any long-range fixed-wing and helicopter support, along with a vast
array of other operational support, necessary to operate routinely far behind
enemy lines in support of national-level missions.47 While it is possible that
SOF task forces were established to perform sensitive missions deep in enemy
territory, the bulk of PLA SOF training focuses on shorter duration opera-
tional- and tactical-level missions. As the force matures and new technologies
and especially longer-range aerial and sea delivery means become available,
as a ‘new-type combat force,’ PLA SOF units will become more capable and
more likely see their mission list expand to protect and support Chinese
national interests across the globe.
Finally, after a decade of experimentation, the PLA has committed to
making combined arms battalions (合成营) the ‘basic combat unit’ (基础战
术单元) capable of independent actions on the battlefield.48 In order to do so,
the senior PLA leadership understood that it is necessary to assign a number
of staff officers and NCOs to assist the battalion commanders, political
instructors, and their deputies to plan for and to command and control
operations. Recent reportage indicates that battalions are adding
a battalion master sergeant (营士官长), chief of staff (营参谋长, more
recently referred to as 首席参谋), and four staff officers or non-
commissioned officers (参谋) to perform the functions of operations and
reconnaissance (作侦参谋), artillery/firepower and engineering (炮工参谋/
火力参谋), information and communications (信息通信/通信参谋), and
47
Dennis J. Blasko, ‘PLA Special Operations Forces: Organizations, Missions, and Training’, Jamestown
Foundation China Brief, 1 May 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/pla-special-operations-forces-
organizations-missions-and-training/#.VUZJ7kvd4Ts.
48
‘营将作为解放军基础战术单元独立执行作战任务’ [Battalion Will Become the PLA’s Basic Tactical
Unit Capable of Performing Independent Combat Missions], Xinhua, 25 Apr. 2008, and ‘合成营由“接
受指令型”向“独立作战型”转变’ [Combined Arms Battalions Transform from ‘Taking Orders’ to
‘Independent Operations’ Style], PLA Daily, 9 Sep. 2016, http://www.81.cn/lj/2016-09/09/content_
7249484.htm.
support (战勤参谋).49 The changes described above are enhanced by

advanced communications, computers, and geo-positioning systems being
issued to units at all levels.
Newly formed combined arms battalions are composed of companies and
platoons from multiple branches, such as tank, infantry, artillery, air defence,
engineer, and repair/service support units. Combined arms battalions are
believed to command four manoeuvre companies (infantry, mechanised
infantry, tank, and assault gun), a firepower company (火力连), and
a service support company (支援保障连). Within combined arms battalions,
some tank companies are in the process of increasing the number of tanks
per platoon from three to four.50 Combined arms battalions are estimated to
consist of approximately 700 to 800 personnel depending on their type and
equipment assigned.
New and more modern equipment and capabilities appear more evenly
distributed among the new group armies and the Xinjiang and Tibet MDs. For
example, long-range rocket battalions (远程火箭炮营) equipped with
300 mm PHL03 multiple rocket launch systems have been reported or identi-
fied in nearly all GA artillery brigades as well as in the Xinjiang and Tibet MDs.
The PHL03 is one of the longest-range weapons available to the PLA Army,
with a range of 150 km when using improved munitions.51 Small units of
UAVs (无人机), composed of medium and small drones, are assigned to
combined arms, artillery, SOF, and service support brigades, used mostly for
reconnaissance and surveillance. Tactical electronic countermeasures (电子对
抗) units are also assigned to combined arms and service support brigades.
‘Electronic air defense battalions’ (电子防空营) in group army air defence
brigades combine anti-aircraft artillery and electronic countermeasures into
a single unit.52 While more modern tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and
artillery (both towed and self-propelled) make up a larger proportion of the
force than in previous years, a number of units are still equipped with
upgraded legacy equipment such as Type-59D tanks and decades-old, Soviet-
designed 122 mm and 152 mm towed artillery.
In addition to the ‘mobile operational units’ in the group armies and the
Beijing Garrison and the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs, a number of new
49
‘合成步兵营有了“中军帐”’ [Combined Infantry Battalion as a ‘Command Tent’], PLA Daily,
27 May 2015, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-05/27/content_6508696.htm; for the new chief of staff
terminology, see ‘一场对抗演习“打痛”指挥机构’ [Confrontation Exercise ‘Pains’ Leadership
Structure], PLA Daily, 20 Apr. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-04/20/content_204240.
htm.
50
‘Military Report’, CCTV-7, 1 Jun. 2018, http://tv.cctv.com/2018/06/01/VIDE7b6fxYqvaGdsx5Q1wlTJ180601.
shtml. If this simple structural change occurs in all tank units, it will affect small unit leadership, personnel
manning and equipment levels, doctrine, training, and logistics.
51
‘China’s PHL03, Advanced Multiple Launch Rocket System,’ PLA Daily, 7 Sept. 2015, http://eng.chinamil.
52
‘“跨界新锐”打响转型突围战’ [‘Cutting Edge Cross-Border’ Starts Transformation Breakout], PLA
Daily, 5 Oct. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-10/05/content_189220.htm.
170 D. J. BLASKO
operational support units subordinate to the five TC Army headquarters have

been formed. These include approximately five information support brigades
(信息保障旅), intelligence and reconnaissance brigades (情报侦察旅), and
electronic countermeasures brigades (电子对抗旅), plus an equipment sup-
port brigade (装备保障旅), as well as two pontoon brigades and one regi-
ment (舟桥旅/团) . The exact combination of these units appears to vary
across the Theatre Commands and underscores the PLA’s focus on increasing
capabilities for information operations, cyber and electronic warfare, and
reconnaissance at the operational level of war.
One Army brigade, the former 77th Motorised Infantry Brigade of the 26th
GA based in northern Shandong has been transformed into a new PLA Navy
Marine brigade, adding to the two previously existing Marine brigades.53
Additionally, at least two Army coastal defence units have been transformed
into three new Marine brigades. On Shandong’s southern coast, a second
new marine brigade appears to have been transformed from a coastal
defence regiment stationed near Qingdao.54 Likewise, an Army coastal
defence division stationed around Jinjiang (Fujian) apparently served as the
basis for a third new brigade (that continues to be stationed in the same area)
and also possibly a fourth Marine brigade that recently moved to Jieyang
(Guangdong) just across the provincial border.55 These transfers from the
Army to the Navy probably amounted to about 24,000 personnel. The Marine
Corps has been expanded further by incorporating the Navy’s existing SOF
Regiment into a new Marine SOF Brigade and transforming part of a naval
Aviation Regiment into a Marine Shipborne Aviation (helicopter) Brigade.56
The addition of the former Army units and the transformation of existing
Navy units into the Marine Corps structure has probably increased the Marine
Corps strength from between 10,000 and 12,000 to a current total of around
45,000 personnel.
The Army’s two former amphibious infantry divisions, the 1st Amphibious
Mechanised Infantry Division in the Nanjing MR and the 124th in the
Guangdong MR, were both transformed into two combined arms brigades,
respectively, while maintaining their amphibious weapons and capabilities.
53
‘身边榜样助力新兵成长进步’ [Role Models Help New Soldiers Advance], PLA Daily, 30 Sep. 2017,
http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/30/content_189134.htm.
54
Untitled television report, Qingdao Television-1, broadcast in February 2018, http://web.qtvnews.com/
qddst_html/qd/115957.shtml.
55
‘走访慰问部队武警官兵’ [Visit to Units and Armed Police], Anxi, Fujian Government website, 1 Aug.
2017, http://www.fjax.gov.cn/szyw/27985.jhtml; ‘我市组织开展’八一”建军节拥军优属慰问活动”
[The City Organises ‘Army Day’ Congratulations Activities], Jieyang News, 17 Aug. 2018, http://www.
jynews.net/contents/8/2018/07/28/19944.html.
56
‘揭秘中国海军陆战队“蛟龙突击队” 队员均具四栖作战和海上反恐能力’ [The Secret Chinese
Navy Marine ‘Dragon Commando’ Personnel Have Amphibious and Maritime Anti-Terrorist
Capabilities], China Central Television, 12 Dec. 2017, http://m.news.cctv.com/2017/12/20/
ARTIln7zgYcODwIAyosJZEup171220.shtml; Weibo, 27 Jan. 2018, https://www.weibo.com/
1740979351/G0lq8wYI2?from=embedded_weibo&type=comment#_rnd1534689727432.
The former amphibious armoured brigade located in Fujian also was con-
verted into a new Army combined arms brigade. By retaining its amphibious
assault capability, the Army maintains a primary role in deterring Taiwan
independence. At the same time, the expansion of the Marine Corps indicates
that China’s political leadership foresees it – not the Army – as the country’s
main expeditionary force in the future to man overseas bases and perform
other missions on distant shores.
It is clear that the entire PLA Army is in a major state of flux. As a result,
many officers and enlisted personnel are undergoing significant stress and
discomfort, so much so that many units are conducting psychological coun-
selling (心理咨询) sessions to help their personnel cope with the situation.57
Due to new unit structures, unit transfers across different locations, along
with personnel and leadership changes, senior PLA leaders apparently antici-
pated that many units’ operational readiness would be degraded until the
new teams learn to work together and develop their functional proficiencies.
Just as the ‘mobile operational units’ are undergoing major changes, so too
are the PLA Army’s border and coastal defence units.
Border and coastal defence units

Under the previous system, provincial Military Districts and their subordinate
Military Sub-Districts commanded scores of border and coastal defence units.
These units were organised mostly into regiments and battalions along
China’s periphery, except for one or two coastal defence divisions and
about three coastal defence brigades opposite Taiwan. In addition to infantry
and coastal defence artillery units, about 10 transport craft groups (船运大
队), each with about 10 to 12 small amphibious craft, were stationed along
the coast to support troops stationed on islands and conduct reconnaissance
missions. Border patrol craft groups (边防巡逻艇大队) were also stationed in
interior provinces such as Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia and Tibet to
monitor rivers and large lakes. These waterborne units appear to remain
active and constitute part of the new border and coastal defence structure.58
With the new set of reforms, everywhere in China – except for Xinjiang,
Tibet, and parts of Inner Mongolia – border and coastal defence regiments
and battalions have been consolidated into new brigades, with some bri-
gades’ areas of responsibility extending over multiple provinces. By getting
57
‘图片’ [Photo], PLA Daily, 13 Aug. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/13/content_
185391.htm.
58
‘驰骋千里海疆, 他们却身着陆军军装’ [Riding the Sea, They Wear Army Uniforms], PLA Daily, 1 Mar.
2017, http://www.81.cn/jwsj/2017-03/01/content_7509024.htm; ‘锻造国家灾害应急救援突击队’
[Forging a National Disaster Emergency Rescue Commando], PLA Daily, 13 Apr. 2017, http://www.81.
cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-04/13/content_174831.htm. At least one transport craft unit is assigned to
the Wuxi Joint Logistic Support Centre of the Joint Logistics Support Force and a transport craft unit for
amphibious operations training likely remains stationed on Dongshan Island.
172 D. J. BLASKO
rid of multiple regimental headquarters to form a single brigade headquar-

ters, the number of staff personnel can be reduced to facilitate the 300,000-
man reduction. Moreover, new units have been added to border and coastal
defence units, such as an Eastern TC Army coastal defence brigade augmen-
ted with a long-range rocket PHL03 unit (‘东部战区陆军某海防旅远火分队’)
and a 155 mm self-propelled howitzer unit, a mechanised infantry battalion in
a Southern TC Army coastal defence brigade (‘南部战区某海防旅机步营’),
and a mechanised infantry battalion in a Tibet MD border defence regiment
(‘西藏军区某边防团机步营’).59 Additionally, personnel from a former air
defence brigade (probably from the disbanded 14th GA) have been trans-
ferred to a border defence brigade in the Southern TC Army.60
Both peacetime and wartime operations are probably coordinated by
staff officers in the TC Army headquarters border and coastal defence
divisions, who communicate with the regional TC headquarters and the
Army Staff Department Border and Coastal Defence Bureau in Beijing.
However, in Xinjiang and Tibet, border defence units continue to be
organised in regiments and battalions under the command of Military
Sub-Districts.61 It is not clear how the Military Sub-Districts interface with
the regional TC Army headquarters, although technically, such commu-
nication should not be difficult. Moreover, a recent visit by an inspection
team from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan to the Jixi
Military Sub-District (鸡西军分区) in Heilongjiang added confusion to
the border defence command structure. This joint inspection team was
one of several that ‘inspect each other’s border defense forces stationed
within 100 km along each side of the border.’62 However, because of the
consolidation of border units in the Northern TC into brigades, the Jixi
Military Sub-District ought no longer be in the chain of command for the
reorganised units. Had this team inspected border units in Xinjiang,
where Military Sub-Districts continue to command border defence units,
a visit to this level of headquarters would be expected. This event high-
lights the need for the PLA to explain more clearly and in greater detail
how the command relationship for border and coastal defence units is
59
‘副营长何东明的奋进之路,’ [Deputy Battalion Commander He Dongming’s Endeavour], PLA Daily, 22
Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/22/content_188582.htm; ‘基层官兵办事不再
“走弯路”’ [Grassroots Officers and Men No Longer ‘Take Detours’], PLA Daily, 28 June 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-06/28/content_209626.htm; ‘Military Report’, CCTV-7, 20 Aug. 2018,
http://tv.cctv.com/2018/08/20/VIDEFzwEfBZnnzcG0t7z651S180820.shtml.
60
‘到位三周, 转隶官兵胜任边防执勤’, [In Three Weeks, Officers and Men Qualified to Serve on the
Border], PLA Daily, 6 Aug. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/06/content_184060.htm.
61
‘300公里160道弯, 通向“雪海孤岛”的路这么难’, [300 Kilometres, 160 Turns, the Road to ‘Snow
Island’ is So Difficult], PLA Daily, 27 May 2017, http://www.81.cn/lj/2017-05/27/content_7620987.htm
and ‘边防探亲: 千里万里我追寻着你’, [Relatives Visiting the Border, A Thousand Miles I Look for
You], PLA Daily, 4 Sep. 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/04/content_187180.htm.
62
‘China Starts Border Disarmament Inspections With Four Neighbor Countries’, PLA Daily, 31 Aug. 2018,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/31/content_9268832.htm.
distributed among Army Headquarters, TCs, TC Armies, Military Districts,

and Military Sub-Districts.
The Military Balance 2019 counts 35 border and coastal defence brigades,
and 15 border defence regiments.63 With approximately 5,000 personnel per
brigade and 2,000 per regiment, the total number of personnel in Army border
and coastal defence units could theoretically be made up of 205,000 personnel.
Recent training
Three years of reforms have resulted in serious disruptions to prior training
patterns for the PLA Army. From 2016 to 2019, the entire PLA focused on
command and staff training for its newly formed headquarters and individual
and small unit training (battalion-level and below) in the Army’s ‘mobile opera-
tional units,’ independent divisions and brigades, and border and coastal defence
units. The number of marque events such as trans-regional base training exer-
cises (跨区基地化训练), in which divisions and brigades travelled across regional
boundaries to unfamiliar locales to conduct force-on-force, often joint, training,
was reduced precipitously. At the same time, the PLA stepped up its participation
in military competitions both internally and externally with other militaries, as
well as its participation in exercises with foreign forces.
The ‘above the neck’ reforms of 2016 did not affect operational units directly,
but rather, forced the staff elements in the new Army Headquarters, TC, and TC
Army headquarters to concentrate on training their newly assigned personnel to
perform their tasks in a new environment. This emphasis on staff training was
both rational and consistent with the PLA’s long-standing training guidance to
‘train generals/officers before training troops’ (练兵先练将 or 练兵先练官).64
After the ‘below the neck’ reforms of 2017, newly formed operational units
began training as soon as possible to familiarise themselves with their own new
organisations and that of their higher headquarters and to establish individual
and small unit (battalion and below) proficiencies. Given the radical changes to
many combat and combat support units, developing individual and small unit
skill sets likely will take multiple annual training cycles. Many commanders, PCs,
and soldiers were unaccustomed to working with personnel and units of
different branches65, but the formation of combined arms brigades and batta-
lions made such coordination a daily requirement. While some combined arms
and joint training was conducted above the battalion-level, analysis of Chinese
63
The Military Balance 2019, 257. One border group is also listed.
64
‘强军先强将练兵先练官’ [For a Strong Army First Train Generals, In Training Soldiers First Train
Officers], PLA Daily, 17 Jan. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-01/17/content_135485.htm;
‘紧盯打胜仗练兵先练将’ [Concentrate on Winning Battles Training Soldiers First Train Generals], PLA
Daily, 30 Jun. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-06/30/content_209742.htm.
65
‘合成营长上岗先考 “资格证”’ [Before Taking up Post Combined Arms Battalion Commander Must
Obtain ‘Certificate of Qualification’], PLA Daily, 27 Sep. 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-
09/27/content_157597.htm.
174 D. J. BLASKO
media reporting suggests that the majority of training during the 2017 and
2018 training cycles was focused on establishing individual expertise and small
unit level competencies so that eventually the newly organised platoons,
companies, and battalions can contribute to larger, more complex combined
arms and joint operations and exercises in the future.
The emphasis on individual, crew, and small unit functional training is
clearly evident in Chinese media reports of Army training for the 2018
training season. Usually by July in a normal training cycle, multiple brigades
and divisions would be involved in large-scale combined arms and joint
exercises both near where they are stationed and also outside their home
region. However, throughout the summer of 2018, PLA media reported on
brigades and divisions conducting field training for subordinate units, often
after having travelled long distances (across regional boundaries) to engage
in live-fire and functional proficiency training in units up to battalion size, but
with little emphasis on larger force-on-force or joint training exercises.66 In
comparison, by late August in previous years, many larger-scale combined
arms and joint exercises already were underway and many details of the
training were publicised widely in both the Chinese and English-language
media.67 A year after major changes to their organisational structure, it is
logical that most Army units concentrated on the basics so that in future
training cycles they will be prepared to participate in larger, more complex
operations.
The most obvious change in Army training after the recent reforms was
evident in the reduction in the number of high-profile, trans-regional exer-
cises that took place from 2016 to 2018. The PLA began experimentation with
multi-week, trans-regional exercises in 2006 and over the following decade
executed a total of some 80 to 90 iterations of this type of training event. In
September 2018, the PLA Daily characterised trans-regional exercises as an
66
Ten brief descriptions of elements of brigades and divisions conducting training to build individual unit
functional proficiencies in the summer of 2018 are found at ‘陆军部队积极练兵备战加速推进转型
建设’ [Army Units Actively Train and Prepare for War Accelerating Transformation and Construction],
PLA Daily, 2 Sep. 2018, http://www.81.cn/lj/2018-09/02/content_9270015.htm. Other reports of the
similar training include ‘Attack Helicopters Fire Missiles At Aerial Targets’, PLA Daily, 29 August 2018,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/29/content_9266501.htm; ‘Multi-Type Helicopters
Participate In Flight Training’, PLA Daily, 29 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/
29/content_9266494_3.htm; ‘Multiple Rocket Launchers Fire Rockets’, PLA Daily, 28 August 2018,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/28/content_9265103.htm; ‘Armored Recovery Vehicle
Tows Damaged Type-88 MBT During Training’, PLA Daily, 23 August 2018, http://english.chinamil.
com.cn/view/2018-08/23/content_9261771.htm; ‘Live-Fire Test Near Kunlun Mountains’, PLA Daily, 20
Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/20/content_9257724.htm; ‘Armored Vehicles
Wade Ashore From Landing Ships At Beachhead’, PLA Daily, 17 Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.
cn/view/2018-08/17/content_9256144.htm.
67
A few examples include ‘“Joint Action-2015 C” military exercise enters real confrontation phase’, PLA
Daily, 24 Aug. 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/2015-08/24/content_6646339.htm;
‘A live-fire military drill kicks off in E. China’, PLA Daily, 11 Aug. 2015, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/
news-channels/2015-08/11/content_6625393.htm; ‘Stride-2009’, PLA Daily, undated, http://eng.mod.
gov.cn/SpecialReports/node_40395.htm.
important element in eliminating bad peacetime practices (剔除和平积弊) by

exposing many problems in doctrine, equipment, training methods, and
support that remain unaddressed.68
Every trans-regional exercise consists of a slightly different set of tasks,
including some joint operations, particularly air support and transport. Most
have been Army-centric, though a few were commanded by Air Force and Navy
headquarters.69 Initially, infantry and armoured divisions and brigades acted as
the ‘Red’ forces travelling to fight a ‘Blue’ force enemy in numerous series of
exercises, such as Joint (联合), Sharpening Troops (砺兵), Mission Action (使命
行动) and Stride (跨越). These exercises took place throughout the country
including at the Zhurihe, Taonan, Sanjie, and Queshan training bases.70 From
2014 to 2017, artillery and air defence brigades undertook similar training in the
Firepower (火力) series held in the Korla, Shandan, and Qingtongxia training
areas.71 The Stride and Firepower series were cut from a high total of 29
exercises in 2015 prior to the reforms, to 10 in 2016, and then nine in 2017.72
Significantly, responsibility for organising the exercises held in 2017 was
reportedly shared between the TCs and Army Headquarters, with five orga-
nised by TC Army headquarters and four by Army Headquarters in Beijing.73
Despite the reduction in exercises, an important new element was added in
2017: for the first time, two SOF brigades, one from the Eastern TC Army and
another from the Central TC Army, engaged in a force-on-force, trans-regional
exercise called ‘Sharp Blade-2017 Queshan’ (利刃-2017·确山).74 Furthermore, in
68
‘在转型中积极破解跨区演习难题’ [During Transformation Actively Solve Transregional Exercises’
Difficult Problems], PLA Daily, 6 Sep. 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-09/06/content_
215252.htm.
69
Dennis J. Blasko, ‘Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area Commands’, Journal of
Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (1 August 2016).
70
‘习主席和中央军委领导推进军队战斗力建设’ [Chairman Xi and CMC Leaders Promote Building
Unit Combat Effectiveness], PLA Daily, 25 Sept. 2016, http://www.81.cn/sydbt/2016-09/25/content_
7275504_3.htm; ‘今日阅兵, 为何选择朱日和？’ [Today’s Parade, Why Select Zhurihe?], CCTV, 30 Jul.
2017, http://tv.cctv.com/2017/07/30/ARTIxlECtLJLnCv4bth2nUx0170730.shtml.
71
‘探秘陆军库尔勒某合同训练基地’ [Exploring the Army’s Korla Combined Training Base], Xinhua, 5
Aug. 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-08/05/c_129926749.htm; ‘“火力 – 2015·青铜峡”系
列演习凸显六大亮点’ [Six Highlights of the ‘Firepower-2015 Qingtongxia Exercise Series’], People’s
Daily, 18 Sept. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0918/c1011-27602415.html.
72
The 29 exercises in 2015 consisted of 15 Stride exercises for infantry and armoured brigades and seven
Firepower exercises each for artillery and air defence brigades. Units from every MR participated at
roughly equal levels. See ‘解放军今年重大实战化演习一场接一场’ [This Year’s PLA Major Large
Live Training Exercises], People’s Daily, 30 Dec. 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2015/1230/
c1011-27995904.html; ‘中国陆军怎样走过“军改元年”’ [How the Chinese Army Went Through the
‘First Year of Reform’], Xinhua, 5 Jan. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-01/05/c_129433633.
htm; ‘2017年陆军部队基地化训练拉开战幕’ [2017 Army Base Training Begins], PLA Daily, 24 Aug.
2017, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-08/24/content_7730097.htm. Even though initial reporting
spoke of nine trans-regional exercises, the author could find media descriptions of only five such
exercises in 2017.
73
‘PLA Army Starts Annual Base Training Exercise’, PLA Daily, 25 Aug. 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.
cn/view/2017-08/25/content_7730977.htm.
74
‘利刃 – 2017·确山丨渗透破袭红蓝特种兵部队短兵相接’ [Sharp Blade-2017 Queshan, Short-term
Infiltration of Red and Blue Special Operations Units], PLA Daily, 20 Sep. 2017, http://tv.81.cn/jshjj/
2017-09/20/content_7763701.htm.
176 D. J. BLASKO
the fall of 2017 during what was probably not a trans-regional exercise, the
Southern TC Army organised an exercise in which the proportion of Navy and
Air Force units were larger than that of the Army. Reportedly, the exercise did
not follow the pattern that ‘the Navy would take care of enemies at sea’ and
instead a conventional Rocket Force unit took the lead because it had a longer,
more powerful ‘arm.’75 Though the type of unit involved was not specified, the
description appears to refer to either an anti-ship-capable DF-21D or DF-26 unit
in what may well be the first instance of the integration of an anti-ship ballistic
missile unit into a live exercise (although the article did not indicate whether
a missile actually was fired). Despite these important developments, however,
the report concluded that without solving ‘jointness’ at the tactical level, it will
be difficult for joint training to be realistic.
In a major change from recent training cycles, in 2018 only a few force-on-
force, trans-regional exercises were announced. ‘Quenching Luoyang 2018A’
(淬火·洛阳-2018A) held in May involved the 83rd GA Air Defence Brigade
travelling to a Strategic Support Force base to train in a complex electro-
magnetic environment.76 In August a single ‘Stride-2018’ exercise was held at
Zhurihe (‘跨越-2018·朱日和’) in which a combined arms brigade from the
81st Group Army as the ‘Red’ force faced off against a second 81st Group
Army combined arms brigade, Zhurihe’s professional ‘Blue’ force. ‘Stride-
2018’ was labelled a ‘research exercise’ (研究性演习) in which ‘Army
[Headquarters] conducted overall planning, the TC Army provided concrete
guidance, while the group army and base monitored and evaluated’
a demonstration of a ‘heavy’ combined arms brigade’s ‘comprehensive
operational capabilities.’77 Initial reporting from the 2019 large unit training
season suggests that the pre-reform pace and scope of trans-regional joint
and combined arms training has not yet resumed.78
Post-reforms, the Army continued the trend of participating in bilateral and
multilateral training with foreign militaries. Since the PLA first began training with
other militaries in 2002, the number of events held annually has gradually
increased. Most are bilateral exercises, but many others are multilateral con-
ducted under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or
countries in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).79 Most involve
75
‘联战联训, 我们该如何发力’ [Joint Warfare, Joint Training, How We Can Exert Force], Renmin Haijun,
12 Jan. 2018, p 3.
76
‘“淬火·洛阳-2018A”演练电磁战场红蓝双方激烈对抗’ [‘Quenching Luoyang 2018A’ Red–Blue
Electromagnetic Confrontation Exercise], CCTV-13, 15 May 2018, http://tv.cctv.com/2018/05/15/
VIDEheJJzk4C6ynaOgeupyps180515.shtml.
77
‘战塞北砺精兵’ [Battle North of the Great Wall Hones Elite Soldiers], PLA Daily, 16 Aug. 2016, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-08/16/content_213558.htm.
78
As of early June 2019, none of the previously named trans-regional exercises have been announced
officially.
79
Dennis J. Blasko, ‘People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises With Foreign
Forces, 2002–2009’, in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai (eds.), The PLA at Home and Abroad (Andrew
Scobell, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College June 2010).
relatively small units, with Chinese participation ranging from a squad to

a battalion, the majority of which were focused on anti-terrorist and other non-
traditional security tasks. The largest was the first ‘Peace Mission-2005’ exercise in
which about 8,000 PLA troops from the three services trained with Russian forces
in Shandong. In 2017, Xinhua reported that the Army participated in ‘over 30 joint
exercises, training, or competitions with foreign nations.’80
In 2018, the PLA sent 743 personnel composed of a mechanised
company, an artillery battery, a logistics company, and SOF unit to the
seventh SCO-organised, multilateral, anti-terrorist ‘Peace Mission-2018’
exercise in Russia.81 This amounted to roughly a battalion-size formation.
As ‘Peace Mission-2018’ was underway, China announced that it also
would send a joint PLA contingent of 3,200 personnel from the
Northern TC to the Russian ‘East −2018’ (or ‘Vostok-2018’) mega-
exercise reportedly involving 300,000 troops and 1,000 aircraft.82 PLA
forces included elements of a combined arms brigade and an engineer
and chemical defence brigade from the 78th Group Army, supported by
24 helicopters from the 79th GA Army Aviation Brigade, and six JH-7
fighter-bombers from the PLA Air Force.83 Unlike most other foreign
training, ‘Vostok-2018’ shifted focus from anti-terrorism to more conven-
tional military operations. According to a PLA spokesman, it involves
‘mechanized defense, fire strikes, counterattacks and other training . . . .
[but] does not target any third party, nor is it related to any regional
situation.’84 PLA participation is emblematic of an improving Chinese-
Russian ‘comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination’ that could
expand the bilateral relationship beyond the parameters that have
evolved since the normalisation of diplomatic relations in 1989. While
the exercise was a strategic propaganda victory for China during a period
of deteriorating relations with the United States, it also provided the PLA
with an opportunity to observe the functioning of a large joint head-
quarters and learn tactical techniques and procedures from a military
with recent combat experience.
80
‘中国军队２０１７: 打造实战化训练“升级版”’ [China’s Military in 2017: Building an ‘Upgrade’ of
Realistic Combat Training], Xinhua, 27 Dec. 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/27/c_
1122176158.htm.
81
‘About 700 Chinese troops, 100 weapon systems to take part in Peace Mission-2018 drills,’ PLA Daily, 17
Aug. 2018, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/17/content_9256158.htm.
82
‘Chinese Troops To Take Part In “Vostok-2018” Strategic Drills in Russia,’ PLA Daily, 21 Aug. 2018, http://
english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-08/21/content_9259467.htm; ‘Putin to visit Vostok-2018 military
drills,’ Tass, 6 Sep. 2018, http://tass.com/politics/1020161. A smaller force from Mongolia also
participated.
83
‘鏖战楚戈尔, “东方-2018”战略演习进入高潮’ [The Battle of Tsugol, ‘East-2018’ Strategic Exercise
Enters Climactic Phase], Ministry of National Defence, 14 Sep. 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/action/
2018-09/14/content_4824917.htm.
84
‘Sino-Russian drill Set To Guard Regional Peace’, PLA Daily, 31 Aug. 2018, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/
view/2018-08/31/content_9268304.htm.
178 D. J. BLASKO
Although small elements of the PLA had engaged in international military

competitions prior to the recent reforms, since 2016 they have increased their
participation levels by dispatching dozens of teams to the ‘International Army
Games’ from 2016 to 2019, as well as other events held outside and within
China.85 The PLA also conducted many internal competitions among its
soldiers and small units in specific functional specialities over the past 3
years. This trend continued in 2018 and 2019 with the series of ‘Ingenious
Soldiers’ competitions (‘奇兵’系列新型力量比武竞赛) focusing on ‘new-type
combat forces’ skills (such as reconnaissance and intelligence, special opera-
tions, information support, electronic countermeasures, and air assault) while
the Eastern TC Army also held its first competition among electronic counter-
measures units (电子对抗比武).86
The recent emphasis on competitions and international exchanges
probably was aimed at shielding individual soldiers and teams from the
disruptions of reform as they prepared for participation in these events.
PLA involvement in military competitions is good for internal morale and
external propaganda purposes by diverting foreign eyes from the uphea-
vals that have occurred in nearly every Army operational unit since 2016.
Furthermore, the reduction in large unit exercises in 2018 likely is
related to the mid-September announcement that recruit training (新兵
训练) has been extended from three to 6 months. In addition to basic
induction training, which since 2013 has begun in September and ended
in late November, new recruits also will receive standardised professional
training (专业技能训练) in their job skills instead of relying on individual
units to perform that function before they are assigned to units in
March.87 This change seeks to fully prepare new soldiers to perform
their duties immediately upon arrival in their units, thus allowing for
commanders to spend more time on building squad, crew, and pla-
toon/company-level skills and proficiencies. The slowdown in large unit
training during the summer/fall of the 2018 training cycle, as the new
cohort of recruits was inducted and two-year conscripts were
85
‘17 PLA Army Teams to Int’l Army Games 2016 Arrive In Competition Areas’, PLA Daily, 25 Jul. 2016,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-07/25/content_7172707.
htm; ‘International Army Games China 2017’ webpage, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2017special/97384.
htm; ‘International Army Games China 2018’ available at: http://english.chinamil.com.cn/International
%20Army%20Games2018/102191.htm.
86
‘PLA Army holds “Ingenious Soldiers” military skills competition’, PLA Daily, 9 Jul. 2018, http://english.
chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-07/09/content_8084257.htm; ‘战斗又双叒打响！东部战区陆军首次
电子对抗比武鸣锣开战！’ [The Battle Starts Again! The Eastern TC Army’s First Electronic
Countermeasures Competition Begins], Renmin Qianxian, 26 Aug. 2018, http://m.lnnew.com/15871/
20180826A0WRJM00.html, for a video of the competition see http://tv.81.cn/jlwyx/2018-07/17/con
tent_8091589.htm.
87
‘30余年探索今定锤！陆军新兵训练时间由3个月延长至6个月’ [30 Years of Exploration Fixes the
Hammer! Army New Solider Training Time Extended from 3 to 6 Months], PLA Daily, 13 Sep. 2018,
http://www.81.cn/lj/2018-09/13/content_9280979.htm.
Table 5. Army operational manoeuvre units (infantry, armoured, SOF, and helicopter).
Unit 1997 2012 2016 2017
Group armies 24 18 18 13
Infantry divisions 90 26 20 6
(mechanised, motorised)
Armoured divisions 12 5 1 0
Infantry brigades (mechanised, motorised, 7 33 48 82 combined arms
mountain) brigades
Armoured brigades 13 13 17 (included above)
SOF groups/regiments/brigades 7/0/0 3/1/5 0/2/9 15 brigades
Army Aviation regiments/brigades 7/0 7/4 5/7 15 brigades
demobilised, might have been intended to allow time for units to make
the adjustments necessary in preparation for the 2019 training season.
Conclusion
A smaller, more modernised PLA Army adds to China’s overall deterrence pos-
ture, especially in preventing an invasion of the country by land or from the sea.
The Army’s current force structure is much smaller than at the end of the 1990s,
but is now more capable and flexible (see Table 5 for the reduction in the number
of group armies and divisions from 20 years ago and the concurrent growth of
brigades). Although several divisions still remain, the ‘brigadization’ of the force is
almost accomplished. Additionally, the number of supporting brigades (such as
artillery, air defence etc.) now surpasses the number of combined arms brigades.
Of particular importance is the roughly four-fold growth of Army Aviation and
SOF units in terms of the number of personnel and equipment over the same
period. Likewise, Army electronic warfare and information support and cyber
capabilities have increased significantly – all of which are considered ‘new-type
combat forces.’
No matter its actual personnel size – whether or not it numbers less than
a million – the PLA Army remains the largest single service in the Chinese
military. Increasing the personnel numbers of the other services and forces
helps to better balance the Army with those other elements of the PLA. But as
long as China shares land borders with 14 countries, it is likely that the Army
will retain significant clout. Still, with the reduction in the Army’s size and the
increase in non-Army personnel assigned to senior leadership positions
comes a lessening of the Army’s organisational and doctrinal influence on
the PLA. Together, these factors contribute towards breaking the PLA’s ‘Big
Army’ mentality and increasing its ‘jointness.’
Nonetheless, as the Army becomes smaller and technologically advanced,
it has also developed greater mobility and improved on its capabilities than it
did in previous decades. As PLA doctrine and force structure become more
oriented towards maritime and aerospace campaigns, the Army’s ‘new-type
180 D. J. BLASKO
combat forces’ can contribute to operations beyond China’s coastline out to

several hundred miles through its long-range rocket, helicopter and SOF, air
defence, and electronic warfare capabilities. Army units also must be inte-
grated into peacetime surveillance and monitoring of the situation beyond
China’s shores – functions that are mainly conducted by the Navy, Air Force,
and Strategic Support Force.
The PLA is realistic in its evaluations of its capabilities relative to those of
other advanced militaries. It understands that many militaries have decades
more experience in training and in combat in conducting combined arms
operations at battalion level; joint operations at battalion level and above;
close air support, large-scale airmobile (helicopter), and integrated fire sup-
port; and long-range battlefield reconnaissance and surveillance operations.
It is undergoing training now to improve capabilities in those areas, and is at
present particularly emphasising reconnaissance operations across all its
units. Integrating Army assets into maritime and aerospace operations,
potentially those commanded by non-Army officers and joint staffs, will likely
become another major training objective in the coming years.
The ongoing ‘below the neck’ reforms will take several years to refine and
perfect. In the meantime, there will likely be a decrease in combat readiness
and effectiveness as the new organisations and leaders learn to work
together and share responsibilities among the new headquarters. Despite
that new headquarters and units immediately began to train once they had
been formed, the pace of joint, larger unit, trans-regional training has slowed
down compared to the pre-reform period. The 2020 goal for completion thus
is realistic for this phase of modernisation, as seen in the various ‘three-year’
plans already promulgated.
More than three decades remain in the ‘three-step development strategy’
to turn the PLA into a ‘world-class military.’ As new weapons and technology
are introduced into the force and as the international situation changes,
doctrine and force structure will likely have to be changed yet again. PLA
modernisation is still a long way from completion and over the next five to 10
years it cannot be assumed that senior military commanders will have suffi-
cient confidence in their forces’ capabilities to prevail in battle to encourage
China’s political leadership to initiate hostilities.
If the Army is to deploy successfully far beyond China’s maritime borders
over oceans, it is dependent on a still relatively small contingent of Navy
amphibious and transport ships and long-range, heavy-lift Air Force transport
aircraft (such as the Y-20) entering service. Navy and Air Force long-range
delivery assets must be augmented by civilian ships (including roll-on/roll-off
ships, several of which have been built to military specifications) and civilian
transport aircraft, which frequently are employed in trans-regional exercises
and the overseas deployments of PLA forces such as in UN peacekeeping.
Thus, for the Army to be involved in force projection across the seas, it must
be integrated into a much larger joint force, complemented by civilian

support.
However, tripling the size of the PLA Navy-Marine Corps indicates that
they are intended to be China’s principal expeditionary force to undertake
immediate, near-term, distant missions beyond China’s borders. Conversely,
the Army on the other hand will continue to focus on its role closer to
Chinese borders in preventing Taiwanese independence and defending
China’s landmass from invasion as well as from terrorist and extremist
threats.
While there is little chance of a major invasion over China’s land borders or
an amphibious assault on its shores by a foreign military, there is a greater
likelihood of instability occurring in a neighbouring country or a major ter-
rorist attack within China or an adjacent county. Consequently, the PLA must
prepare for a number of different scenarios in every region of the country.
One possibility that may necessitate action by its Army would be war, chaos,
or dissolution of the government in North Korea. Depending on the circum-
stances of such a crisis, Army units in the Northern TC, along with the People’s
Armed Police (PAP) units in the region, could be tasked to secure and stabilise
the border and potentially establish a buffer zone inside North Korea.
Specialised PLA and government forces could further be deployed to secure
North Korean nuclear weapons-related or missile sites. Based on the missions
assigned, a North Korean scenario could involve units from multiple group
armies, perhaps reinforced by out-of-region units. Such an incursion into
North Korea runs the risk of conflict with North Korean forces or potential
confrontation, or perhaps cooperation, with South Korean, U.S., or Russian
forces that could be operating in the area.
Fewer but still a significant number of Army units could be tasked to
react to a major terrorist attack in western China or in one’s of Beijing’s
fellow SCO neighbours. While PAP units would likely be the first responders
to a terrorist incident inside China, PLA units in the area could be involved if
the attack were of a sufficient magnitude and sophistication to require
a larger, conventional military response. If a major terrorist attack occurred
in an SCO country on the other hand, China could provide forces in support
of a friendly government as envisioned in many ‘Peace Mission’ exercise
scenarios. There probably is a greater chance that a terrorist attack would
generate a unilateral Chinese or multilateral response from SCO countries
than a major PLA conventional campaign conducted against the forces of
a neighbouring state.
Likewise, what appears to be the transfer of up to three 77th Group Army
combined arms brigades into Tibet and the assignment of at least one
mechanised infantry battalion to strengthen Tibet MD border forces indicate
Beijing’s concern about the situation along its border with India. These three
brigades significantly augment the PLA’s defensive posture in the region, but
182 D. J. BLASKO
would be insufficient to mount a major offensive through the Himalayas into

India. The permanent presence of the 77th Group Army brigades in the
region highlights the need for additional out-of-area forces to defend the
harsh terrain along China’s southern border as well as to go on the offensive,
should such a requirement arise. Foreign strategic surveillance assets and
local social media make it unlikely that the PLA would be able to rapidly
transport large numbers of military reinforcement into Tibet without the loss
of strategic surprise. Nonetheless, these deployments likely indicate higher
levels of routine PLA activity in this sensitive border region than in previous
years.
As can be seen in the numerous self-assessments of PLA military capabil-
ities – especially regarding the quality of its combat leaders published in
official Chinese media – China’s senior leadership is well aware of the pro-
blems that must be overcome in the course of military modernisation. In that
regard, the 2035 and 2049 dates are reasonable targets before the PLA will
begin to have the capability to project major joint land, air, and sea forces
beyond China’s borders and its three near seas. Until that time, it is likely that
senior PLA leaders will remain cautious about initiating combat operations;
rather, they are more likely to advise their civilian leaders to continue to
pursue the nation’s objectives through deterrence or actions below the
threshold of lethal military force. If political and military leaders perceive
China’s sovereignty to be threatened by imminent attack; however, PLA
doctrine would still allow for pre-emptive as well as reactive actions to defend
China’s national interests.88
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Dennis J. Blasko, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army (retired), served 23 years as a
militarintelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China. Mr Blasko
88
‘Active defence,’ based on the precept of ‘striking only after the enemy has struck,’ is a fundamental
tenet of PLA doctrine. However, as explained in The Science of Military Strategy: ‘Under high-tech
conditions, for the defensive side, the strategy to gain mastery by striking only after the enemy has
struck does not mean waiting passively for the enemy . . . The strategy holds up the principle of “not
firing the first shot.” It does not mean giving up the ‘advantageous chances in campaign or tactical
operations, for “the first shot” on the plane of politics and strategy must be differentiated from “the first
shot” on the plane of tactics . . . If any country or organisation violates the other country’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to “fire the first shot” on the plane of tactics.
The military counterattacks may be taken by the following options: to drive the invaders out of the
territory; or to launch the same attacks on the enemy’s homeland; or to attack the enemy’s foreign
military bases, targets at sea or in the air.’ Emphasis added. See Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds.),
The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House 2001) (Chinese edition), 2005
(English edition), 426.
was an army attaché in Beijing from 1992 to 1995 and in Hong Kong from 1995
to 1996. He also served in infantry units in Germany, Italy, and Korea and in
Washington at the Defense Intelligence Agency, Headquarters Department of the
Army (Office of Special Operations), and the National Defense University War
Gaming and Simulation Center. Mr Blasko is a graduate of the United States
Military Academy and the Naval Postgraduate School. He has written numerous
articles and chapters on the Chinese military and defense industries and is the
author of The Chinese Army To day: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st
Century (2nd edn, Routledge, 2012). Email: [email protected]
Bibliography
Blasko, Dennis J., ‘Integrating the Services and Harnessing the Military Area
Commands’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (October 2016), 685–708.
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Hackett, James (ed.), The Military Balance 2019 (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies 2019).
Information Office of the State Council, ‘China’s National Defense in 2008’, Jan. 2009.
Information Office of the State Council, ‘The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed
Forces’, 16 Apr. 2013.
Kamphausen, Roy, et al. (eds.), The PLA at Home and Abroad (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College June 2010).
Peng, Guangqian and Yao Youzhi (eds.), The Science of Military Strategy (Beijing:
Military Science Publishing House 2001). [Chinese edition], 2005 [English edition]).
Saunders, Phillip C., et al. (eds.), Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese
Military Reforms (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press 2019).
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Military Science Press [军事科学出版社] 2013).

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Journal of Strategic Studies

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The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms:

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The PLA army after ‘below the neck’ reforms:

KEYWORDS Army; Organisation; Leadership; Training; Doctrine; Shortcomings; Problems

A brief summary of ‘above the neck’ reforms

Military Regions in commanding the provincial Military Districts (MD), except

● The ‘Two Incompatibles’ (两个不相适应) or ‘principal contradiction’ (重要

Theatre Command army headquarters and military districts

Table 1. Theatre Command (TC) army leaders.

Group armies, divisions, brigades, and battalions

(1) ‘Over 1,000 units at the regiment-level or above’ were disbanded;34

Two to Five Infantry Six Combined Arms

Air Defense Air Defense

Special Operations Special Operations

Army Aviation Army Aviation

Engineer Engineer and Chemical

Logistics/Armament Service Support

* The 38th Group Army had an armored division.

** 1st/42nd GAs also had a Long-Range Rocket Brigade.

*** SOF/Army Aviation units in some group armies.

**** A few group armies were also assigned an electronic

countermeasures brigade (ECM) or regiment.

Figure 1. Comparison of group army structures (old and new).

heavy brigades (重型合成旅) with tracked armoured vehicles, medium bri-

unit (heavy, medium, or light) and equipment assigned; whereas supporting

Table 3. PLA army operational units, beginning in mid-April/May 2017.

Table 4. Pre/post-April 2017 army aviation and SOF order of battle.

1,000 to 2,000 personnel each) and nine brigades (estimated at 2,000 to

support (战勤参谋).49 The changes described above are enhanced by

operational support units subordinate to the ﬁve TC Army headquarters have

Border and coastal defence units

rid of multiple regimental headquarters to form a single brigade headquar-

distributed among Army Headquarters, TCs, TC Armies, Military Districts,

important element in eliminating bad peacetime practices (剔除和平积弊) by

relatively small units, with Chinese participation ranging from a squad to

Although small elements of the PLA had engaged in international military

combat forces’ can contribute to operations beyond China’s coastline out to

be integrated into a much larger joint force, complemented by civilian

would be insuﬃcient to mount a major oﬀensive through the Himalayas into

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