G.R. No. 135882June 27, 2001MARQUEZ VS.

DESIERTOFACTS: Petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of thePhilippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where she is the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involvedin a case pending with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. AmadoLagdameo, et al.The basis of the Ombudsman ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail managers checkspurchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsmanby virtue of its power to investigate and to require the production and inspection of records and documentsgranted to it by RA No.6770.The Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to accounts inissue in line of her persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsman's order which they sais as an unjustified, andis merely intended to delay the investigation of the case; constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawfulorder issued by this office punishable as Indirect under R.A. 6770.Petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition andinjunctions 8 with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman.The lower court denied petitioner's petition.On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB).Petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the ground thatcompliance with the Ombudsmans orders would be in violation of RA. No. 1405.But petitioners motion for reconsideration was dismissed. Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an exception to the law onsecrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405) HELD: The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsmanagainst Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint VentureAgreement between the Public Estates Authority and AMARI.We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subjectmatter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the accountholder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the accountidentified in the pending case. In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. Whats existing is an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to dois to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly,there was no pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws likethe Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act , and the Intellectual Property Code.

BLAS F. OPLE v. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDITFacts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople

prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, arecharged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining orderenjoining its implementation. Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity of A.O. No. 308 Ruling: YES Rationale: As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. 4 As taxpayer and member of the Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on itsface. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, therespondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for themanufacture of the National Identification (ID) card. Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announcedthat representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identificationsystem.All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait forthe formality of the rules to pass judgment on its constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that wetighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an importantconstitutional principle and a fundamental right. ABS- CBN vs. COMELEC, GR 133486, Jan 28, 2000 This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 98-1419 . Petitioner asserts that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any other group from conducting exit polls during the May 11 elections. The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. ISSUE: Is the moot and academic principle a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case? RULING: The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.

In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."7 Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,8 when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,9 when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,10 or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.

SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED and KAMAHALAN PUBLISHINGCORPORATION, doing business as MANILA STANDARD, petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.Facts: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS) is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section 5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. No similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. They contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys, which are relatively objective. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous

and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only require timeliness. Issue: whether or not Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression and the press? Held: Based on the above reasons (petitioner), yes, it constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the press. To summarize, the Supreme Court held that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of expression. Section 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days before a local election. Because of tile preferred status of tile constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy Presumption against its constitutional validity. The Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint. Nor may it be argued that because of Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, which gives the COMELEC supervisory power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of franchise for the operation of media of communication, no presumption of invalidity attaches to a measure like 5.4. For as we have pointed out in sustaining tile ban on media political advertisements, the grant of power to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply" as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN dissents. He rejects as inappropriate the test of clear and present danger for determining the validity of 5.4. Hence, while it may be useful for determining the validity of laws dealing with inciting to sedition or incendiary speech, it may notbe adequate for such regulations as the one in question. For such a test is concerned with questions of the gravity and imminence of the danger as basis for curtailing free speech, which is not the case of 5.4 and similar regulations. Instead, MR JUSTICE KAPUNAN purports to engage in a form of balancing by "weighing and balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights". The dissenting opinion simply

concludes that the objectives of Section 5.4 are valid. It may be seen that its limiting impact on the rights of free speech and of the press is not unduly repressive or unreasonable. The dissent does not, however, show why, on balance, these considerations should outweigh the value of freedom of expression. As already stated, the purpose of Art. IX-C, 4 is to "ensure equal opportunity, time, and space and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefore for public information campaigns and forums among candidates". Hence the validity of the ban on media advertising. It is noteworthy that R.A. No. 9006, 14 has lifted the ban and now allows candidates to advertise their candidacies in print and broadcast media. Indeed, to sustain the ban on the publication of survey results would sanction the censorship of all speaking by candidates in an election on the ground that the usual bombasts and hyperbolic claims made during the campaigns can confuse voters and thus debase the electoral process. In sum, the dissent has engaged only in a balancing at the margin. This form of ad hoc balancing predictably results in sustaining the challenged legislation and leaves freedom of speech, expression, and the press, with little protection. Nor can the ban on election surveys be justified on the ground that there are other countries - 78, according to the Solicitor General, while the dissent cites 28 - which similarly impose restrictions on the publication of election surveys. At best this survey is inconclusive. In some countries, of which are no older nor more mature than the Philippines in political development, they do not restrict the publication of election survey results. The O 'Brien test could then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4. The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. O 'Brien: [A] Government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if such governmental interest is "not unrelated to the Expression of free expression." Moreover, even if the purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental purpose in question. First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." The prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of

expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts,rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibited GRANTED and 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636, March 1, 2001, are declared unconstitutional.

IGLESIA NI KRISTO vs. CA GR 119673 Facts: Petitioner Iglesiani Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television program entitled "AngIglesiani Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." Is a prior submission to MTRCB a case of prior restraint? Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. 19 It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground. Finally, it is also opined by Mr. Justice Kapunan that ". . . the determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." He submits that a "system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies. "The same submission is made by Mr. Justice Mendoza.

Ang Dating Daan host Eliseo S. Soriano uttered the following statements in his TV program against Michael Sandoval (Iglesia ni Cristos minister and regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan): Lehitimong anak ng demonyo[!] Sinungaling [!] Gago ka talaga[,] Michael[!] [M]asahol ka pa sa putang babae[,] o di ba[?] []Yung putang babae[,] ang gumagana lang doon[,] []yung ibaba, dito kay Michael[,] ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba? O, masahol pa sa putang babae []yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito. As a result, The MTRCB initially slapped Sorianos Ang Dating Daan, which was earlier given a G rating for general viewership, with a 20-day preventive suspension after a preliminary conference. Later, in a decision, it found him liable for his utterances, and was imposed a three-month suspension from his TV program Ang Dating Daan. Soriano challenged the order of the MTRCB. HELD: The SC ruled that Sorianos statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the show, and the G rating of the show, which are all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the context that they were used. The SC also said that the suspension is not a prior restraint, but rather a form of permissible administrative sanction or subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. visit fellester.blogspot.com The Court said that the suspension is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB, rather, it was a sanction for the indecent contents of his utterances in a G rated TV program. (Soriano v. Laguardia; GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009)