Use of force in international law and international relations

Cyber-attacks that cause physical consequences are considered to be in violation of the use of force prohibition should the effects reach a certain severity threshold. That premise does not extend to cyber-attacks that cause economic harm due to a dated distinction between kinetic and other effects.

This draft chapter on the application of jus contra bellum to issues of cybersecurity is divided in three main parts. The first part is devoted to the political context and institutional framework relevant to the emergence of debates on the issue of the hostile use of information and communication technologies (ICTs). The opposing approaches of some Western States and a group of States comprising, among others, China and Russia are exposed. This divide concerns not only the interpretation of international law as it stands (lex lata), but also the preferred policies designed to cope with the risks posed by computer network attacks (CNAs). In this regard, whereas Russia, despite huge challenges, champions the disarmament approach, the United States and other like-minded States express satisfaction with the law as it stands, even though important uncertainties subsist surrounding the precise modalities of application of jus contra bellum in the context of ICTs.

The second part deals with the notion of ‘force’ under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and its applicability to CNAs. While the text of the Charter leaves open the possibility to interpret the concept as encompassing coercive measures beyond purely military means, subsequent practice tends to support the view that this is not the case. Thus, measures of economic coercion—although prohibited by other rules and principles of international law—do not fall in the material scope of application of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As far as cyberattacks are concerned, the applicability of said provision is supported by a substantive body of verbal State practice and remains virtually unopposed. It seems therefore, that subsequent practice buttresses the idea that the prohibition of the use of force applies to cyber-attacks that have equivalent effects to that of more classic military operations. Caution is nevertheless called for in this regard, as no precedent has given raise to explicit invocations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter up to this day. CNAs directed against critical infrastructure, however, do not amount per se as uses of force if they do not cause damages comparable to conventional military operations.

In the orthodox understanding as it notably ensues from the case law of the International Court of Justice as well as State practice, the application of the right of self-defence—being the focus of attention of the third part of this draft chapter—, requires an ‘armed attack’ reaching a certain threshold of gravity. Although the United States of America reject this requirement, their view remains fairly isolated. It is certainly possible to conceive of CNAs that would reach such a threshold of gravity and some States have expressly affirmed this view. But here again, there is no decisive precedent to this date. The problems of the use of proxies and the technical difficulties in collecting evidence of attribution of CNAs to third States pose huge challenges. The conditions of necessity and proportionality of the reaction pose also some problems that are specific to the field of ICTs. It is submitted, in conclusion of this chapter that the abovementioned paralysis of the debate in the UN is caused by attempts, on behalf of the United States of America, to mention the right of self-defence without, at the same time, agreeing on the conditions and modalities of applications of such right. Major disagreements seem indeed to subsist concerning CNAs committed by non-State actors, the evidentiary thresholds as well as the temporal application of the right of self-defence—some States forcefully arguing for the permissibility of preventive self-defence.

“Power is war, the continuation of war by other means”: Foucault’s reversal of Clausewitz’s formula has become a staple of critical theory — but it remains highly problematic on a conceptual level. Elaborated during Foucault’s 1976 lectures (“Society Must Be Defended”), this work-hypothesis theorises “basic warfare” [la guerre fondamentale] as the teleological horizon of socio-political relations. Following Boulainvilliers, Foucault champions this polemological approach, conceived as a purely descriptive discourse on “real” politics and war, against the philosophico-juridical conceptuality attached to liberal society (Hobbes’s Leviathan being here the prime example).
However, in doing so, Foucault did not interrogate the conceptual validity of notions such as power and war, therefore interlinking them without questioning their ontological status. This problematic conflation was partly rectified in 1982, as Foucault proposed a more dynamic definition of power relations: “actions over potential actions”.
I argue, somewhat polemically, that Foucault’s hermeneutics of power still involves a teleological violence, dependent on a polemological representation of human relations as essentially instrumental: this resembles what Derrida names, in “Heidegger’s Ear”, an “anthropolemology”. However, I show that all conceptualisation of power implies its self-deconstruction. This self-deconstructive (or autoimmune) structure supposes an archi-originary unpower prior to power: power presupposes an excess within power, an excessive force, another violence making it both possible and impossible. There is something within power located “beyond the power principle” (Derrida). This (self-)excess signifies a limitless resistantiality co-extensive with power-relationality. It also allows the reversal of pólemos into its opposite, as unpower opens politics and warfare to the messianic call of a pre-political, pre-ontological disruption: the archi-originary force of différance. This force, unconditional, challenges Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, suggesting an originary performativity located before or beyond hermeneutics of power-knowledge, disrupting theoreticity as well as empiricity by pointing to their ontological complicity.
The bulk of this essay is dedicated to sketching the theoretical implications of this deconstructive reading of Foucault with respect to the methodology and conceptuality of political science and social theory.

W pierwszym podrozdziale niniejszego opracowania zostaną przedstawione skutki interwencji zachodnich dla roli Rady Bezpieczeństwa oraz używanego przez nią instrumentarium w celu utrzymania światowego pokoju i bezpieczeństwa,
co obejmuje zarówno kwestię autoryzowania użycia siły, jak i wykorzystania operacji pokojowych. W tej części znajdują się głównie odniesienia do operacji w Iraku (1991 r.), Bośni i Hercegowinie oraz Libii, gdyż w ich przypadku państwa interweniujące jako podstawę prawną wskazywały na odpowiednią rezolucję RB autoryzującą użycie siły. Przywołane zostaną również interwencje w Kosowie oraz w Iraku (2003 r.) w charakterze przykładów operacji dokonanych bez jakiegokolwiek
upoważnienia ze strony RB. W drugim podrozdziale przedstawiona
zostanie ewolucja prawa do samoobrony pod wpływem praktyki państw zachodnich.
Poruszona będzie kwestia definicji ataku zbrojnego uruchamiającego prawo do samoobrony oraz ram czasowych tego prawa. W tym kontekście szczególna uwaga została zwrócona na interwencje w Iraku (2003 r.) oraz w Afganistanie, które właśnie koniecznością samoobrony były uzasadniane. Natomiast trzeci podrozdział dotyczy rozwinięcia przez państwa zachodnie prawa do interwencji humanitarnej oraz zbrojnego wymiaru odpowiedzialności za ochronę w stronę prawa do zmiany reżimu z autorytarnego na demokratyczny. Stąd też odwołania
przede wszystkim do operacji w Bośni i Hercegowinie, Kosowie oraz Libii, w przypadku których względy humanitarne miały główne znaczenie w uzasadnieniu legalności interwencji.

The aim of the article is to examine the legal position presented by the UK after the 2018 airstrikes in Syria, both from the perspective of the legality of humanitarian intervention as well as the criteria employed with regard to a humanitarian intervention in the doctrine of international law. The thesis underlying this paper is that humanitarian intervention is illegal under contemporary international law, since neither the UN Charter nor customary norms allow for a humanitarian intervention, and the UK's legal position and the reaction thereto do not change this state of the law. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part examines the UK's 2018 legal position in the light of international law, while the second part analyses the humanitarian intervention as invoked by the UK from the standpoint of two criteria of humanitarian intervention presented in the legal doctrine, that is, the reason behind the intervention and its goals.

After 2001, states have increasingly used the “unwilling or unable” formula when justifying military intervention against terrorist targets, such as the United States with respect to targeted killings outside declared theatres of conflict. Moreover, the closely related term “manifestly failing” serves as a key determinant triggering the international community’s responsibility for protecting vulnerable populations following the third pillar of the responsibility to protect (R2P). Since 2014, the “unwilling and unable” formula has also served as a legal justification for international air strikes against the Islamic State in Syria, despite the Syrian state having declared its willingness to cooperate. Given the formula’s apparent rising prominence, the paper will critically discuss the legal foundations and policy practice of the “unwilling and unable” standard and evaluate what this means for developments of state sovereignty. This examination will relate the formula to other legal justifications for intervening militarily, such as state consent, especially in the context of state disintegration.

I. O duplo conceito alternativo que representa esta figura é demonstrativo da controvérsia que gera, oscilando entre a carga negativa da expressão "assassinatos" e a relativamente neutra "ataques dirigidos". Num sentido ou noutro, ambas representam materialmente a mesma realidade, ou seja, as situações em que um Estado de forma deliberada usa a força armada diretamente contra uma pessoa específica com o objetivo de lhe tirar a vida. II. A confusão que gera não deixa de ser mais um efeito das significativas alterações que a chamada 'guerra contra o terrorismo' introduziu na esfera jurídica internacional. A distinção clara entre medidas bélicas e de manutenção da segurança deixou de existir, o tempo da guerra e o da paz mesclaram-se, a diferença entre o jus ad bellum e o jus in bello é muito menos intensa quando se invoca um conceito ancorado numa ideia 'aespacial' e atemporal do conflito armado contra entidades não estaduais, o que torna muito mais difícil identificar-se o estado do Direito Internacional nesta matéria. III. É verdade que antes do 11 de setembro, muitos Estados envolveram-se neste tipo de política de segurança, no entanto, ou faziam-no num quadro inequívoco de conflito armado, no qual as regras mais permissivas do Direito Internacional Humanitário são aplicáveis, atingindo os alvos militares permitidos, ou empreendiam operações clandestinas não reivindicadas de eliminação de pessoas. Foi isto, por exemplo, que Israel, promoveu particularmente depois dos atentados dos Jogos Olímpicos de 1972. E com os Estados Unidos que, por meio da Central Intelligence Agency, organizaram vários atentados contra líderes políticos nas décadas de sessenta e setenta. Continua, aparentemente, a fazer parte da política da Rússia em relação a dissidentes ao regime Putin, devendo-se, a este respeito, lembar-se do caso Litvinenko. Naturalmente, o impacto desse tipo de operação sobre o Direito Internacional é mínimo, atendendo a que é impassível de estabelecer as bases para a emergência de normas costumeiras permissivas.

Both the reality of police behavior and perceptions of their behavior are important concerns in American law enforcement. Past research has shown that race or ethnicity is a strong predictor of perceptions of police actions, with Blacks, and to a lesser degree, other minorities having more negative views than Whites. Little research, however, has attempted to assess the effects of actual personal encounters with police on persons' perceptions. The present study, a survey of U.S., New Jersey residents, assessed the relationships between race/ethnicity, gender, education level, police as family members, and political alignment with reports of actual encounters with police and their opinions about police. Results showed very strong effects of race/ethnicity on frequency of negative (but not positive) interactions with police and opinions about police; positive interactions associated with political stance; and level of education associated with negative opinions despite a lack of actual personal negative interactions. Although causal directions cannot be definitively established, the results are consistent with three likely effects: A: Being Black leads to more negative interactions with police, hence less-positive opinions. B: Political conservatism leads to reports of more positive encounters. C: Greater education leads to a poorer opinion of police, perhaps due to peer influences.

The absence of a sufficient legal framework for the less grave form of the use of force in the grey zone conflict causes the instability and insecurity in Bien Dong because of Chinese unilateral operations. The blurred distinction between the threat or use of force at sea and law enforcement has been well-taken advantages by China and becomes a great challenge to peace and security in Bien Dong.
Current security regime of Bien Dong is in need of amendment. The clues for this issue is to include in the negotiation for a substantive and effective COC the state responsibility whenever occurring a violation and the willingness of asking for judgement or arbitration in some specific situations.

En un principio la operación de la OTAN en Libia fue vista como la consolidación del principio de la Responsabilidad de Proteger (R2P) y el éxito material de este principio, al ser una misión de rápido despliegue y que logró poner fin a la represión del régimen contra las protestas, así como evitar cualquier matanza ante las amenazas de Gadafi de acabar con la oposición. Cuatro años después de esta intervención, la situación es mucho más compleja en términos humanitarios y políticos, con múltiples milicias involucradas, dos autoproclamados gobierno enemigos, y múltiples amenazas a la seguridad de otros Estados.

This article examines the tendencies to define the scope of application of jus ad bellum negatively in relation to the scope of application of jus in bello and demonstrates their neutralising effect on the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. It argues that individual acts of use of force during an international armed conflict regulated by jus in bello, whether in combat, in restricting the freedom of enemy nationals or in maintaining an occupation, are equally regulated by jus ad bellum. It clarifies the concept of ‘separation’ between jus ad bellum and jus in bello as the insulation between the results of their respective application, not the differentiation between their respective temporal, material and normative scopes of application. It also addresses the practical concerns raised by this conception of ‘separation’ between jus ad bellum and jus in bello.

The use of force is heavily deprecated by states. This view of deprecation can be found in many sources of law, primarily treaty and customary law. This doctrine of the use of force is chiefly cited and discussed within the UN Charter and correspondingly through customary or case law decided by the International Court of Justice as seen in their judgement between Nicaragua vs United States, which serves as a merits case in contemporary society that answers many questions about the use of force and other international law questions.
Conversely, the principle of the use of force or threat of the use of force is highly controversial, especially given the circumstances which allows States to use or have the right to such force even when it is highly condemned by the global community.
Moreover, the circumstance that allows states to use such force against one another are - the less controversial or well established exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force; self-defense i.e. collective or individual self-defense and collective security which is established in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the exceedingly contentious and debated are; humanitarian intervention, rescue of nationals abroad and intervention by invitation. All of these exception to the prohibition of the use of force may lead to such force.

International relations scholars generally argue that norm-building requires a number of successful cases. This essay, however, is about three concrete examples when virtually everyone—except for the state citing it—disputes the legitimacy of applying the emerging norm of the responsibility-to-protect (R2P). Misrepresentations of humanitarian intentions can be disingenuous and geopolitically driven, as was the case for the US and UK war in Iraq and the Russian claim to protect South Ossetians, or disinterested but wrong, as was the French invocation of R2P for Burma. These cases suggest that misuses can advance norms through contestation and conceptual clarification. Because contestation prompts debates, denial, and tactical concessions on the norm in question, it is insightful to compare and contrast R2P's development against the early stages of two theoretical models that deal most explicitly with contestation: the “spiral” of human rights change and the “cascade” of norm development.

Les opérations militaires menées par la France contre Daech bousculent les normes du jus contra bellum. Le consentement donné par l’Irak assure certes la légalité des bombardements des positions djihadistes sur le territoire de cet Etat. Mais seule une conception de la légitime défense en décalage avec la lex lata permet de fonder juridiquement les frappes françaises en Syrie. La résolution 2249 adoptée par le Conseil de sécurité après les attentats du 13 novembre 2015 constitue un petit monstre normatif inapte à leur fournir une base juridique autonome ; elle entérine en revanche un rabaissement des fonctions du Conseil de sécurité dans l’utilisation de la force contre le terrorisme.

ABSTRACT

The military operations conducted by France against ISIS blur the rules of jus contra bellum. The legality of French strikes on the territory of Iraq is covered by the consent of that State. But only an extended interpretation of self-defence can justify the bombing in Syria. Security Council resolution 2249 adopted after the events of 13 November 2015 is a normative little monster incapable of providing an autonomous legal basis for the strikes. Instead, it acknowledges the downgrading of the Security Council’s role in the use of force to fight terrorism.

Author briefing (English version) provided to participants in OPERATION REGIONAL COOPERATION 01. Briefing described the Rules of Engagement/Rules for the Use of Force applicable under the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) in UN Peacekeeping/Peacemaking missions. Operation Regional Cooperation 2001 (also referred to as CENTRASBAT 2001), was a command post exercise held at U.S. training facilities at Ramstein Airbase, Germany with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and the United States participating.

Published in November 2009, represents the only work of this type which sets out to explain in a practical way the complex procedures and methodology governing the development and implementation of Rules of Engagement. It has been translated into the 6 official languages of the United Nations as well as Bosnian, Hungarian and Thai.

The crime of aggression has been a mainstay of international criminal law since Nuremberg, considering that an act of aggression does not only entail State responsibility
but also individual criminal responsibility. In 2010, after more than fifty years since the end of Second World War and the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, a definition of the crime of aggression has been approved at the Review Conference of the International Criminal Court, but the inclusion of the crime of aggression in the Rome Statute by way of amendment is extremely problematic. The definition of this crime contained in the new Article 8-bis is a remarkable attempt to set forth the terms of prosecution and punishment of individuals by a truly international criminal tribunal, thus expanding the ICC subject-matter jurisdiction, but it is a compromise definition. If and when such an amendment enters into force, it will introduce a convoluted jurisdictional regime, due to the fact that the penalization of the individual conduct needs a necessary reference to the act of aggression committed by a State. Inevitably, the reference to State aggression allows the Security Council to interfere with the decision-making of the nternational Criminal Court, and this is cause for concern as regards the amendment’s scope and effect, especially on the standards of independence and integrity of the Office of the Prosecutor.
The article argues that although there is a parallel between the two regimes of State and individual responsibility in International law, there are also structural differences that make the definition of State aggression contained in General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) too undetermined
to be used to evaluate individual criminal responsibility for the corresponding crime. Indeed, the reference to the commission of an act of aggression in manifest violation of the UN Charter makes the threshold for criminal punishment considerably
high, rising doubts on the likelihood of an effective prosecution for this «supreme crime» in the near future.

This is a review of the book by Tom Ruys, Olivier Corten, and Alexandra Hofer, The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-Based Approach. Oxford University Press, 2018, 948, xi, pp; index. It was published in The Chinese Journal of International Law here: https://academic.oup.com/chinesejil/advance-article/doi/10.1093/chinesejil/jmy027/5156199

During 2015 and 2016, students on university campuses across South Africa embarked on large-scale, disruptive protests calling for systemic changes to how universities operate and approach education, as well as how academic curricula are structured. Government, university administrators, police and private security often responded to these protests with force in an attempt to shut them down. Universities approached the courts to obtain interdicts preventing students from protesting on campuses. The police used tear gas, stun grenades, water cannons and rubber bullets against protesting students in often disproportionate and unlawful uses of force. This user-friendly resource guide explains students’ rights to protest, as well as students’ rights when they are arrested, detained or charged with a crime during a protest. It aims to create awareness of the rights and obligations of those involved in student protests to encourage university administrators, police and private security officials to respect human rights and mitigate the disproportionate and unlawful use of force. The guide was written by Michael Clark and Tim Fish Hodgson.

This article explores the role of the League of Nations in state formation in Third World or peripheral states and its legacy for contemporary understandings of Third World sovereignty. It examines Iraq under British Mandate, and UN and Coalition of the Willing interventions. This research was prompted by the international law community's outrage when the Coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003. While the invasion was seen by many as an affront to international law, there was also something familiar about the Coalition's reasoning for the invasion. This feeling of deja vu escalated once regime change was followed by lengthy nation-building. The idea of recreating Iraq was not a new one. The British were tasked with something similar under the League of Nations Mandate System. UN interventions into failed states also attempt comparable transformations. Indeed, the more one contemplates international law's interventions in Iraq, the less shocking the Coalition's invasion becomes. It starts seeming foreseeable and even inevitable.

British discourse during the Suez Crisis of 1956 was wide-ranging and deeply divided. Public discourse emerged in late July 1956, following Colonel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. It reached a climax following the Anglo-French invasion and occupation of the Canal Zone at the end of October 1956 and eventually petered out by January 1957, by which time the first UN 'peacekeeping' force (UNEF) had replaced British and French troops. Though the Crisis was concerned with whether or not Britain could use force to protest its economic interests in the Canal and its operation, the apparent collusion between Britain, France, and Israel in precipitating the conditions for invasion became a late feature of the crisis debate, particularly at the international level. The British government sought to justify its actions in international law throughout. However, there was widespread international distrust of British motivations and its behaviour at the UN. The invasion occurred at precisely the same time as the Soviet Union quelled a popular uprising in Hungary. This action provoked comparisons with Anglo-French action in Egypt, which served to further de-legitimize British Prime Minister Eden's claims to be acting in the interests of international peace and security. The comparison and distrust of British actions led to widespread challenge to 'naked' British imperialism. By mapping the policy and public discourses that emerged during the Crisis, this chapter provides a rich, empirical account of international law's role in domestic politics, and contextualizes the theory on the politics of justification.

In the wake of the publication of the Chilcot Inquiry the chapter is an important reminder of the striking similarities between the Iraq War and Suez Crisis.

Prawo do użycia siły jest obecnie regulowane przede wszystkim przez Kartę Narodów Zjednoczonych, przyjętą 26 czerwca 1945 r. na konferencji w San Francisco, oraz prawo zwyczajowe, do którego Karta się odwołuje. Wszelkie inne normy dotyczące użycia siły, przyjmowane w konwencjach dwu-i wielostronnych, powinny być zgodne z KNZ. Dotyczy to norm obowiązujących zarówno członków ONZ, jak i państwa niebędące członkami ONZ. Wynika to w pierwszym przypadku z art. 103 KNZ, który podkreśla, że dla członków ONZ pierwszeństwo mają obowiązki wynikające z KNZ, a w drugim z art. 2 pkt 6 KNZ, w którym stwierdza się, że w razie potrzeby ONZ zmusi państwa niebędące członkami tej organizacji do postępowania zgodnie z jej zasadami, jeśli jest to niezbędne dla utrzymania międzynarodowego pokoju i bezpieczeństwa.

The article presents main stages of development of the just war theory from the ancient times to the modern ones in terms of a right to use force (ius ad bellum). This analysis is indispensable to answer the question whether opinions of the greatest lawyers and philosophers of past times justify a return from the distinction on a bellum legale and a bellum illegale to a bellum iustum and a bellum iniustum.
The problem is increasingly serious because references to justness are nowadays more and more frequent especially when there is a need to justify armed operations.
Furthermore a general revival of the just war argumentation can be observed in recent publications which inclines to a deeper meaning, historical reflection.
The article starts with a few remarks on the Greek attitude towards the war and a Roman ius fetiale which are usually considered as roots of the just war theory. It describes also an impact of the Christian thought on perceiving the war with great emphasis on the achievements of the Middle Ages thinkers. Reflections on the modern times start with description of ideas represented by the Spanish lawyers
like Vitoria or Suarez who are often perceived as continuators of mediaeval thinkers.
Then there is a part devoted to representatives of the modern times like Machiavelli, Bodin or Gentili who redefined the just war theory and used it to justify an unrestricted right to use force by a sovereign. The article presents also a period of general rejection of the just war theory by lawyers like Zouche, Pufendorf, Rachel, Textor or Bynkershoek with significant exceptions of Grotius, Wolff or Vattel who is perceived as the last supporter of the just war theory.

A legal analysis of the Russian action taken in annexing Crimea. Considers how far the Russian action is an intervention and or a use of force, before going on to consider legal justifications for the action taken. The concluding chapter of the essay considers the action from the standpoint of the Definition of Aggression and how the type of force used by Russia may have impacted upon Ukraine's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The international law discipline engaged in vigorous debate over the legality of the 2003 Iraq invasion. However, once the furor over the invasion died down, and attention turned to management of the ongoing reality of Coalition occupation of Iraq, the legality debate risked seeming redundant. While the mainstream debate answers questions as to whether the invasion was legal, its usefulness is limited if it does not answer other important legal questions. What role has international law played in the Iraq invasion and its aftermath? What role will the invasion play in the evolution of international law? Taking a Third World approach to the Iraq invasion can help better answer these questions and shed light on legal aspects of the war that were ignored or obscured by the mainstream debate. The first and larger part of this paper will discuss some of these issues. The latter part of this paper will consider the potential limits of Third World approaches as a critical methodology.

La presente monografía argumenta en varios aspectos la necesidad de proponer un modelo de uso de la fuerza para los procedimientos de control social que debe efectuar la Policía Nacional en Colombia, el cual esta contextualizado en el marco jurídico del país, contemplando las diversas normas y recomendaciones que actualmente rigen este tipo de procesos en el entorno internacional, la propuesta surge del mismo interior de la Institución y de la necesidad manifiesta por los hombres y mujeres que diariamente en su gestión policial deben afrontar diversas situaciones que ameritan una acción que depende del juicio de este funcionario bien sea de forma activa, resistencia activa o pasiva, donde la percepción de los hechos puede llegar a cuestionar sus reacciones tanto por omisión del servicio o por el exceso de fuerza, que puede desarrollar una acción jurídica en contra suya, por tal motivo este hecho ha comenzado a fortalecer un modelo que enmarque, condense y presente el tipo de actitudes a seguir, las cuales deben estar soportadas y respaldadas por los articulados jurídicos pertinentes, teniendo en cuenta que en el actual sistema jurídico colombiano , existen algunos vacios que han dificultado una adecuada labor y crea conceptos ambiguos que al no ser interpretados y llevados a cabo de forma efectiva, generan contra sentidos que son fácilmente utilizados para colocar en tela de juicio el accionar de los policiales que en algún momento deben efectuar un procedimiento de control público; o por otro lado se presentan situaciones en donde el uso excesivo de la fuerza pasa los limites de la funcion policial.

This draft chapter on the use of force in the context of peacekeeping operations is divided in three main parts. In the first part, the paper provides a survey of the historical origins of the concept of peacekeeping in the 1950s and some of its immediate precursors in the League of Nations era, shedding light on the broader political and institutional context of the emergence of this innovative technique. The evolution of the institution of UN peacekeeping in the 1960s and 1970s is retraced, including the hiatus of the late 1970s to late 1980s resulting from the tensions of the Cold War, resulting in the emergence of non-UN peacekeeping operations. Close attention is then devoted to the new developments following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the East-West opposition in the 1990s up to present days, including the increasingly frequent creation of operations tasked with multiple functions and entrusted with an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The second part focuses on the institutional framework of peacekeeping. The respective competencies of the UN Security Council and of the UN General Assembly in the field of peacekeeping are discussed, particularly in the context of the creation of UNEF I and ONUC and the ensuing dispute regarding the funding and constitutional basis of peacekeeping operations. This section includes a thorough discussion of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses case. The role and the limits of the competence of the UN Secretary-General is also examined, special attention being paid to the meaning of the principle of neutrality and impartiality of peacekeeping operations. The various roles of UN member States, whether as host State, troop contributing State or participant to so-called ‘peace support’ operations authorized by the UN Security Council is assessed. The legal significance of the requirement of host State consent is assessed in the light of the law on military assistance on request. The third part deals more specifically with the principle of non-use of force except in self-defence. After establishing a clear distinction between individual self-defence and defence of the force, the progressive expansion of the notion under the heading of defence or fulfilment of the mandate is critically analyzed in the light of its practical application, first in the context of ‘classical peacekeeping’—especially in the cases of UNEF I, ONUC, UNFICYP and UNIFIL—and then in the context of the more recent evolution towards so-called ‘robust peacekeeping’, first in the mid 1990s with UNOSOM II, UNPROFOR and UNAMIR and then with the practice of robust mandates that followed the adoption of the Brahimi Report in 2000. Finally, a critical assessment of the most recent experiments in peace enforcement, as with the establishment of the MINUSCA, the creation of the ‘Intervention Brigade’ inside MONUSCO and MINUSMA. In conclusion, the paper submits that the institution of peacekeeping, despite its potential efficacy for the stabilization of post-conflict situations, is undergoing a denaturation turning it into a tool for State building and peace enforcement. The lack of doctrinal clarity accompanying these major changes threatens to deprive the whole peacekeeping endeavour of its primary purpose.

This article in the Max Planck Encyclopedia examines the history, the doctrinal and legal aspects, and the main challenges facing United Nations-mandated peace operations. It also explores how the practice of peacekeeping and peace enforcement has gradually merged while remaining doctrinally and legally distinct.

This paper deals with the background, role players, sequence of events, geopolitical considerations and history of the Angolan War which took place from 1975 to 1990 between the Soviet Union and its allies & proxies on the one hand, and the Republic of South Africa and its allies on the other. It also has a section presenting a rebuttal of previously published material on this subject, and a section on disinformation techniques used in and by the Soviet Union.

The 2016 Arbitration Award of the PCA has set out the maritime legal questions in the South China Sea in great detail. This paper takes the Award as a starting point, but rather than focussing on maritime legal issues, it uses the South China Sea as a paradigm for the challenges that face not only international law as a normative order, but also international legal scholarship. First, the conflict in the South China Sea has weighty implications for the law of the sea, which, historically, has primarily served the interests of (Western) sea-faring nations. More importantly, the conflict in the South China Sea threatens the safeguarding of peace as one of the main tasks of international law, setting the United States against China in a reiteration of previous historical conflicts. These developments should serve as a cautionary contrast to the prevailing narrative of international law as a progressively successful normative order. The paper will analyse two aspects of that narrative: the gradual deterritorialisation and the advancing constitutionalisation of international law. It will be argued that while such concepts have their merits, the South China Sea exposes the (considerable) limitations that they are still subject to.

The status of ‘international law’ is examined critically. In the first section, the basis of (national) legislation is described. This consists of an inquiry into a credible meaning of ‘natural law’. It is focused on the question whether universal principles exist and, if so, of what kind. Section 2 deals with the issue of enforcement. National legislation invariably realizes this, but this is not obvious at the international level. Section 3 deals with human rights. It is discussed whether their presence points to the existence of ‘international law’. To this end, a possible reason for these rights to have developed is expounded.

The emergence of cyber espionage, as well as the ability to leak gathered sensitive information, has exacerbated the complexity of determining the legality of espionage under international law. Cyber espionage, just like other cyber operations, offers a highly sophisticated, relatively inexpensive, and accessible medium to achieve certain informational, political, and operational goals. The indeterminacy of cyber espionage in international law has given rise to various arguments as to which international norms and principles are applicable to cyber espionage. Divergent positions, however, focus only on certain aspects of cyber espionage. For this reason, the scope of legal treatment of cyber espionage is limited and lacks context. The purpose of this article is to reject this dichotomous approach and propose a more nuanced framework for addressing cyber espionage in international law. Cyber operations should be analyzed on a continuum that triggers different norms depending on the context and consequences. The contextual † This article may be cited as approach focuses on the effects of a cyber operation and the context in which it occurs to determine the relevant set of norms applicable to it.

Western analysis perceives Russian approaches to issues of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as running counter to western-inspired international norms. This debate has surfaced with some vigour over Russia's policy in the Syria conflict where, in order to protect its strategic interests in Syria, an obstructionist Moscow has been accused of ignoring humanitarian considerations and allowing time for the Assad regime to crush the opposition by vetoing a resolution threatening to impose sanctions. While Russian approaches are undoubtedly explained by a desire to maximize its growing political influence and trade advantages to serve its legitimate foreign policy interests, and while Moscow's attitudes to intervention and R2P exhibit important differences from those of the major western liberal democracies, its arguments are in fact framed within a largely rational argument rooted in ‘traditional’ state-centred international law. This article first highlights key arguments in the scholarly literature on intervention and R2P before going on to examine the evolution of Russian views on these issues. The analysis then focuses on the extent to which Moscow's arguments impact on international legal debates on the Libya and Syria conflicts. The article then seeks to explore how Russian approaches to intervention/R2P reflect fundamental trends in its foreign policy thinking and its quest for legitimacy in a negotiated international order. Finally, it attempts to raise some important questions regarding Russia's role in the future direction of the intervention/R2P debates.

The Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition, also known as the Jessup Moot, is the oldest and largest international moot competition in the world, attracting participants from almost 700 law schools in more than 90 countries in recent years (100 countries took part in 2018). The competition has been described as the most prestigious moot court competition in the world by a large number of organizations and universities internationally, and is one of the grand slam or major moots.

The competition is a simulation of a fictional dispute between countries before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). It is named after Philip Jessup, who once served on the ICJ, and is organized by the International Law Students Association.

My argument concerned Use of Force under International Law (Article 42 of UN Charter) and Self-Defense under International Law ( Article 51 of UN Charter)