Russian international relations

This Unique Academic paper is written by Peter Bannink.

The Soviet Union was one of the largest ideology-led providers of international
development aid in history. The collapse of the system in 1991 meant the end of its
contribution to developing countries as well. In fact, the major reincarnation of the Soviet
Union, the Russian Federation, found herself on the opposite side of the spectrum, and
became a receiver of foreign aid. Western experts campaigned for a shock therapy to make
the transition to market economy, and large sums of development assistance flows started
to reach Russia in the nineties.
Since the 2000s, the aid directionality has reversed once more. Under the
administration of President Vladimir Putin the Russian economy prospered and foreign debts
of the country were paid off; the last batch was paid off in 2006.
1 With the ambition to
belong to the major powers of the world again, a program for international development
assistance restarted and Russia started to re-emerge as a foreign aid donor. It is this latter
program and policy that is the core issue of this paper, an analysis of the shape, size, form
and ideology of Russia’s re-emerging foreign policy with regard to international
development assistance.
There is extensive literature on the concept of development assistance, mostly
focusing on the Western world as donor countries. With the rise of other economies, the
gravity of the development assistance also changed, which also did not go unnoticed in the
academic literature. What this paper presents, is a summary of the recent history of Russia’s
practice in international development assistance, and an analysis of what this means for
Russia’s position in the world and for the traditional model of international development
assistance. The research question is, why and in what ways did Russia reshape its
development assistance shape in the twenty-first century?
This paper studied three large regions as case studies for Russia’s practice of giving.
For the Commonwealth of Independent States, Russia is also not hesitant to proclaim its
desire to establish a ‘belt of good neighborliness,’ which perhaps is the most evident practice
carried over from the Soviet times and strongly manifesting. For this region, Russia has a
very strong tool in the form of pricing and subsidizing of gas deliveries to friendly nations -
these subsidies alone dwarf the official ODA figures.
The Southeast Asian region also has certain historical ties, although much looser as
with the CIS countries. The strategic interest is nonetheless large, as the membership of
international organizations like CSTO and the ties with ASEAN show. Russia mentions energy
security and development of good infrastructure – next to good neighbourship - as key
elements in its relations with Southeast Asia. In addition to this, the region represents the
strategic place where interests of Russia and China meet.
For Sub-Saharan Africa, Russia expressed its special position – as opposed to the
western donor partners – because it understands the struggle with resources. Africa is the traditional recipient of development assistance, and still there are many programs, both
bilateral and multilateral. Nonetheless, the lines between FDI and development assistance
have become much more blurred – less differentiation between private sector and
development essentially fits the SSC paradigm.
Having characteristics of both the traditional donor countries and the SSC countries,
Russia has a special position. It is the only non-establishment donor that is part of the ‘greater establishment’ itself, and member of the key international organizations. It is poised
to interact with the giants of international development in a way that no other country can.
Regardless of whom it chooses to interact with, Russia will therefore have an influence on
the future of international development assistance. Who it choose to interact with is, as it
has been, rooted in geopolitical considerations, it is a recognized instrument of soft power.
New confrontations between the Russia and the West, and the rise of China will influence
the international practice of giving and co-define how the future of the aid architecture will
look like. The world today offers enough challenges, refugees from North Africa and the Middle East, global health issues and natural disaster – to name a few. A rapid response of humanitarian assistance and a larger development strategy are most certainly in demand in upcoming years.