Russian Neo-imperialism

The Russian aggression against Ukraine supported by Belarus is causing a great damage to human lives, st te infrastructure and historical heritage. After long period of peace yet again we are facing war atrocities in Europe. The whole massive armed conflict was initiated by Russian dictator V. V. Putin, as part of his own imperial doctrine, which can only be labelled as war crime and attempt of genocide of Ukrainian nation. During the last thirty years of independence Ukraine has proved its peacefulness, desire for democracy and geopolitical ties with united Europe. All this was not acceptable for Putin’s primitive imperial worldview and he dragged whole region into the misery of the worst 20th Century war traditions.
Besides genocidal damage to human lives, the Ukrainian national heritage
is being damaged in an effort to enforce Russian national cultural dominance over common historical roots and to falsely rewrite the history of the entire region.
Such policy is totally inacceptable for the civilised Europe of the 21st Century and we condemn Putin’s imperial war.

Seemingly sensible proposals to Kyiv to partially satisfy Moscow’s demands in Eastern Ukraine are counterproductive. They ignore the record of compromising with Russian revanchism, and underestimate the unexplored potential of serious sanctions. They also do not take into account the political mood that has emerged in Ukraine since the start of the war in 2014.

Die aufgeführten Tatsachen und eine Reihe anderer aufschlussreicher Aspekte der denkwürdigen Ereignisse vom Februar-März 2014 sind in der Ukraine und unter Osteuropaexperten an Universitäten und Think-Tanks sowie bei Regierungen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen im Westen bekannt. Dennoch scheinen viele westliche Beobachter, die schnell mit Kommentaren über die Vergangenheit, Annexion und Zukunft der Krim bei der Hand sind, einige oder gar die meisten dieser Tatsachen nicht zu kennen beziehungsweise zu ignorieren. Stattdessen schenken etliche Kommentatoren dem apologetischen Narrativ des Kreml Glauben: Ein lediglich etwas holprig initiiertes Referendum hat jedenfalls zu einer Grenzverschiebung geführt, die angeblich von der übergroßen Mehrheit der Krimbewohner lange und entschieden gewollt worden war und vorgebliches historisches Unrecht wieder gut machte.

In 2018 Kant’s statue in Kaliningrad was vandalised by Russian hooligans, after Russian Vice-Admiral Igor Mukhametshin denounced Kant as a traitor calling for him to be rejected in a vote to rename Russia’s Kaliningrad airport. Additionally the Vide-Admiral accused Kant of having written “incomprehensible books that no one reads.’” In his Philosophical Sketch on Perpetual Peace, whose overall idea can be viewed as the forerunner of the modern notion of international law, Kant states that “No State shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another State,” and that “No state shall [either], during war, permit such acts of hostility which would make mutual confidence in the subsequent peace impossible.” And he further says: “The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states,” and “The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.” Seen the flagrant violation of international law carried out in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is little mystery in Vice-Admiral Igor Mukhametshin’s words. Kant’s books – and, one may infer, Kant’s thought – must be nothing short of “incomprehensible” for a Russian Christian Neo-Fascist мужик (muzhik, “male”), Russian Christian Neo-Fascism being the ideology of the political party United Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin.

The focus of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it outlines the geopolitical rationale behind contemporary Russian expansionism, as well as presents the asymmetric mechanisms utilized by Russia to solidify its authority in the post-communist space. The four commonly used theoretical frameworks explaining Russian expansionism were described and critically assessed. Apart from this, the Russian and foreign political philosophic thought of the 19-21 centuries was referred to, to trace the evolution of the Russian Byzantium-type governing tradition and national identity. On the other hand, the paper assesses the features of post-colonial Ukrainian political culture and unveils premises for the emergence of its statehood in the 1990s. The major differences between Russian and Ukrainian political cultures and identities are emphasized. Finally, the hypothesis tested is that a democratic Ukraine – strengthened by cooperation with its Western allies – will become an obstacle of Russian expansionism in the future.

In a recent pamplhet which Timothy Snyder has insightfully labelled as “Russia’s genocide handbook for its war on Ukraine,” Timofey Sergeytsev, a Russian political strategist affine to the Kremlin, argues thus: the Ukrainians are Nazis, their Nazism is there because it is not there, and the fact that it is not there actually proves that it is there. In other words, an elephant is a giraffe precisely because you cannot see a giraffe when you look at it, but an elephant – therefore it is a giraffe! This (if A, then B; ¬A, then B) is the Kremlin’s “logic” – a combination of paranoia and mysticism: paranoia because a suspected object ends up substituting the real object in a sort of ontic replacement (an elephant is a “giraffe”); mysticism because the only way to agree to that substitution is to believe in it beforehand as the symptom of a secret ontology (an elephant “is” a giraffe). Not only does the Kremlin’s ideology contreavent practical reason, as I have argued elsewhere: it also subverts rational logic as such.

Putin’s Russia suffered a bitter defeat in the first weeks of the Russian-Ukrainian war. However, the Kremlin will keep on trying to place Ukraine into its orbit, as well as project its influence further into the Western world. Unceasing and dynamic aggrandizement under strong leadership is one of the most functional approaches to statecraft in Russia, tested by history and implemented today. In this light, Ukraine has become the vanguard of the Western world. No European nation should feel safe, as there are no limits to the Kremlin’s appetites.

Russian military aggression and diplomatic pressure against Ukraine stems from the neo-imperial thinking of Russian elites and ordinary citizens. This thinking requires a reproduction of expansionist patterns that once led Russia to its “historical greatness”: construction of a territorially large state, rich in resources and demographically diverse, with its own distinct voice in international relations. The human cost for “making Russia forever great,” however, has rarely been seriously considered.

The article outlines the geopolitical rationale behind contemporary Russian expansionism, as well as presents the asymmetric and “hybrid” mechanisms utilized by the Kremlin to solidify its authority in the post-communist space. To do this, the article refers to the findings of American, British, Polish and Ukrainian intellectuals on the nature of the Russian political identity. The four commonly used theoretical frameworks explaining contemporary Russian expansionism are described and critically assessed (imperial, diversionary, divergent identities and “angry guy”). Apart from this, the Russian and foreign political philosophic thought of the XIX-XXI centuries is referred to. The latter was done to trace the evolution of the Russian Byzantium-type governing tradition and national identity. The article puts forward the hypothesis that Russian expansionism, alongside the Russian sentiment towards an imperialist worldview, are tested by historical patterns of national policy-making which bring the state to its civilizational glory. In this light, it will be futile to expect that Russia can fully democratize, build a Western type of a nation-state and start conducting open policies.

The EU should revert back to its pre-Minsk approach to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. The main raft of sanctions were introduced before both of the Minsk Agreements were negotiated. Back then, the lifting of sanctions had been linked to a full restoration of, at least, mainland Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Only later was the prolongation of the sanctions tied to the implementation of the Minsk Agreements – including those parts that concern Ukrainian domestic affairs.

While the situation looks grim, not all hope is lost. A principal difference between the current situation and those before Moscow’s attacks on Georgia and Ukraine is that Russia’s socioeconomic outlook is today bleak. In principle, the Russian people do not want war with Ukraine, and they may be less inclined toward foreign adventures during times of economic stagnation. If Russia and the West keep cool heads and demonstrate enough resolve, a new war may be avoided.

This book first proves that the rationale behind Russia’s aggressive actions in its neighborhood resides in its goal of achieving certain geostrategic objectives which are largely predefined by the state’s imperial traditions, memories, and fears that the Kremlin may irretrievably lose control over lands which were once Russian. In other words, Russia constantly remains an expansion-oriented and centralized state regardless of epochs and political regimes ruling over it. That is its geopolitical modus operandi successfully tested throughout history. This book also scrutinizes Ukraine as a young post-colonial and post-communist state which, unlike Russia, is more prone to democratize and decentralize. To understand the logics of the ongoing Ukrainian transformation, its domestic and international developments are assessed in their connection to the Soviet political tradition and the medieval legacy of the Cossack statehood (15–18 centuries). This book outlines differences between the political cultures of Ukrainian and Russian nations. This envisages scrutiny of historical experiences and their impacts on the Ukrainian and Russian state-building, institutional structures, national identity, religious issues, and other features of sovereignty. Based on these discoveries, a structure of symbolic thinking which predefines indigenous understandings of justice and order has been constructed for Ukrainians and Russians.

Большая часть политологических объяснений на мезо-уровне выросшего при Путине российского авторитаризма, антизападничества и ирредентизма является политэкономической. Здесь представленное альтернативное толкование на среднем уровне представляет собой своего рода спектрально-аналитическую интерпретацию российского идеологического ландшафта. Оно находится между биографическими микроисследованиями отдельных решающих персонажей, с одной стороны, и историософской мета-политологии о «судьбе России», с другой. Радикализация сегодняшнего российского режима может быть объяснена не только экономическими интересами правящих элит, биографиями Путина и его сподвижников или некими глубокими закономерностями российской истории. Явный сдвиг вправо постсоветского политического режима при Путине происходил на фоне параллельного восхода революционного империализма как отдельного распознаваемого нового политического лагеря, который представленный, в первую очередь, ЛДПР Владимира Жириновского и МЕД Александра Дугина. Правда, сам путинский режим остается реакционным и не становится революционным, а его внешняя политика стремится к частичному возрождению, а не к полному новорождению российской империи. Тем не менее, новый официальный идеологический спектр России при Путине включает в себя некоторых революционных империалистов как явно допущенных и даже, видимо, частично поддерживаемых режимом участников, которые своим демонстративным присутствием, как на телеканалах, конференциях, книжных лавках и т.д., так и в государственных органах, переформатируют всю структуру полуоткрытого публичного дискурса и тем самым имеют опосредованное влияние на внешнюю политику сегодняшней России.

Ключевые слова: Россия, империализм, фашизм, идеология, политический спектр.

The current Belarusian transformation could be leading to results similar to those of the 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia rather than of the 2013-2014 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine. Yet, the pathological relationship of Moscow’s imperialism towards Russia’s Eastern Slavic “brother nations,” may mean that Belarus’s future will be more similar to Ukraine’s rather than Armenia's present.

The recent conflicts in the post-communist space prove that the Russian brand stands behind every of them. Russia arrives as mediator, peacemaker, or peacekeeper with the Kremlin always denying its part in provoking and fueling of the conflict.

Poland’s energy security in the context of Russia’s neo-imperial policy as well as European and transatlantic cooperation: Poland as a gas hub

Russia’s neo-imperial policy, treating energy carriers as an instrument of influence and dependence of states, and to rebuild its international position. In line with the geopolitical approach, limiting the energy dependence of Central and Eastern Europe on Russia has not only a purely economic dimension, but concerns the geostrategic future of the European continent and the type of international order to be developed in Europe and in the transatlantic area. Poland’s gas strategy is a case study. Poland decided to finish the contract for the purchase of natural gas from Russia by December 31, 2022. Poland, striving to meet the growing needs for natural gas, undertakes actions aimed at diversifying sources and directions of supplies. Particular emphasis is placed on the concept of Poland as a gas hub developed within the framework of the Three Seas Initiative and a desire to prevent Russia and Germany from building the Nord Stream II pipeline, a project, which is in Poland’s opinion, contradictory with the aim to ensure Europe’s energy security.

Review of my book "Ukraine and Russian Neo-Imperialism: The Divergent Break" by Margaryta Khvostova. The review was published in New Eastern Europe (http://neweasterneurope.eu/2018/11/05/fresh-look-political-culture-russia-ukraine/) on November 5, 2018.

Nach dem unweigerlichen Zusammenbruch des so genannten „Putinsystems“ wird Russland nach einer Wiederaufnahme seines vorputinschen Kurses enger Beziehungen zum Westen streben. Dann wird sich eine neue Chance ergeben, eine schrittweise Integration Russlands in westliche Strukturen ökonomischer Zusammenarbeit und internationaler Sicherheit zu beginnen.

Thе аrtіclе аіms tо uncоvеr thе nаturе аnd dіstіnctіvе fеаturеs оf thе cоntеmpоrаry mеssіаnіc nаrrаtіоns іn thе Russіаn publіc dіscоursе, аs wеll аs еstіmаtе thеіr іmpаct оn thе аctuаl pоlіcy-mаkіng. Fоr thіs rеаsоn, thе аrtіclе scrutіnіzеs thе pоlіtіcаl agendas оf the prominent contemporary Russian political and religious philosophers. Thеіr mаjоr mеssаgеs аrе cоntrаstеd аnd cоmpаrеd tо а vаrіеty оf rеcеnt dеvеlоpmеnts іn Russіа’s dоmеstіc аnd fоrеіgn pоlіcіеs. Thе hypоthеsіs іs put fоrwаrd thаt thе mеssіаnіc nаrrаtіоns аrе furtіvе, thоugh unаlіеnаblе fаctоrs whіch prоpеl аnd justіfy Russіаn dоmеstіc аnd fоrеіgn pоlіcіеs. Thеrеfоrе, іt іs аlwаys wоrth cоnsіdеrіng Russіаn pоlіcy-mаkіng thrоugh thе prіsm оf thе nаtіоn-wіdе rеlіgіоus sеlf-іdеntіfіcаtіоn, аs wеll аs аcknоwlеdgіng а numbеr оf ‘еschаtоlоgіcаl dutіеs’ whіch dеrіvе frоm thіs sеlf-іdеntіfіcаtіоn. Fіnаlly, thе аrtіclе prоvіdеs аn оvеrvіеw tо thе Wеstеrn schоlаrly pеrspеctіvеs оn Russіаn mеssіаnіsm wіth а spеcіfіc еmphаsіs оn Brіtіsh аnd US cоntrіbutоrs.

Why exactly did Moscow send an as sophisticated and high-flying missile as the Buk missile to Ukraine when such a weapon was not necessary to shoot down lower flying Ukrainian military planes? What is so far missing in Western debates of the incident is proper consideration of the predominant explanation proposed by various more or less competent Russian and Ukrainian researchers of the incident. Many East European investigators of the circumstances of the shooting believe that the only full explanation for the arrival of the Russian BUK in the Donbas in July 2014 was that Moscow indeed wanted to shoot down a high-flying passenger plane. Yet, the Kremlin wanted to shoot not a Malaysian airliner, but a Russian one. The responsibility for the shooting of a Russian passenger plane over Eastern Ukraine would have been ascribed to the Ukrainian armed forces, with reference to Ukraine’s accidental shooting of a Russian passenger plane, Siberian Airlines 1812, in October 2001. The horrible incident and blaming of Kyiv in July 2014 would have provided Moscow with a casus belli to implement its "Novorossiia” (New Russia) project – i.e. the annexation of Russophone Eastern and Southern mainland Ukraine via an invasion of regular Russian military forces.

Каждое из четырех исследований, рассмотренных здесь, является важным вкладом в изучение постсоветского российского правого экстремизма. Хотя некоторые интерпретации, представленные в этих исследованиях, могут быть оспорены, все они исключительно богаты эмпирическими деталями, занимаются тщательными реконструкциями событий и познавательными сравнениями.

Das vom Kreml propagierte und in weiten Teilen der westlichen Öffentlichkeit akzeptierte Narrativ einer vorgeblich nahezu einhelligen Unterstützung unter den Bewohnern der Krim und angeblichen historischen Rechtfertigung für Russlands Annexion der ukrainischen Halbinsel ist irreführend.

In view of the security assurances that the United States gave Ukraine under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, a move by Washington to appease Moscow would be another crack in the splintering international nuclear nonproliferation regime. Acquiescence to Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine would further undermine the already-shattered 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the world’s most important multilateral agreements.

Минский компромисс не может и дальше рассматриваться как результат осмотрительного и сбалансированного принятия во внимание некоторых особенностей Донбасса, якобы выразившихся в возникновении местного т.н. ополчения в 2014-м. Скорее, будущий особый статус ныне оккупированных территорий, предусмотренный Минскими соглашениями, выглядит после публикации "пленок Глазьева" как вознаграждение за частичный успех России в разжигании до того слабых сепаратистских тенденций в Восточной Украине после победы Евромайдана. Еще в августе 2016 г. Генеральный прокурор Украины обнародовал видеозапись, содержащую иллюстрированные и аннотированные аудиозаписи ряда бесед между Сергеем Глазьевым, советником президента России (что является официальным постом в АП РФ) с несколькими российскими и украинскими прокремлевскими активистами, проживающими или находящимися в Южной и Восточной Украине. Эти диалоги были записаны в конце февраля — начале марта 2014 г. Они предоставляют эмпирическое доказательство поддержки Москвой антиправительственных протестов в русскоязычных регионах Украины после победы Революции достоинства 21 февраля 2014 г. Пленки раскрывают участие либо самого российского государства или формально неправительственной российской группы под руководством Кремля в инициировании, координации и финансировании сепаратистских митингов, демонстраций, пикетов и других подобных мероприятий в Крыму, а также в различных региональных центрах материковой Восточной и Южной Украины. Прошло более двух месяцев, но информация так и не стала объектом внимания западных изданий изданий и аналитических центров. Пленки стали предметом жарких дискуссий в украинских СМИ, вызвали гневную реакцию в Москве но лишь мимоходом были упомянуты в некоторых статьях об Украине европейских и американских журналистов и исследователей. Несмотря на то, что они были быстро переведены с русского на английский язык и аннотированы дополнительной информацией украинским аналитическим порталом "UA Position", лишь незначительное число иностранных наблюдателей сделало содержимое этих пленок темой своих дискуссий и исследований начала российской гибридной войны против Украины. Это может быть отчасти связано с тем, что украинская Генеральная прокуратура до сих пор не опубликовала необработанные записи, из которых были составлены аннотированные пленки для общественности. Некоторые из экспертов по Украине, возможно, подозревают, что опубликованные документы были подделаны, или/и что они дают неполную историю событий. Однако маловероятно, что эти записи являются поддельными. Опубликованные разговоры — интерактивны и велись собеседниками, чьи голоса могут быть легко идентифицированы на основании разных видеозаявлений этих лиц в других роликах. Кроме того, Кремль бы уже давно опроверг пленки и опубликовал бы доказательства каких-либо манипуляций, если бы они имели место.