Resurrection Beliefs in Christianity

In logical terms and philosophical concept of causality, the effect is not possible without something causing it to happen unless for some phenomenal and/or supernatural cases. In other words, if there is no real death then there would also be no point of resurrection because resurrection happens only to the dead person.

In the same way, there will be no sense of Christianity without the evidence of Christ’s resurrection. It is the resurrection event that fuels Christianity to exist.

In addition, the roman soldier would be terrified just like in Acts 16:27 if indeed Jesus' body was stolen.

In this article we will examine Old Testament and New Testament prophecies predicting the concurrence of the rapture with the second advent of Christ. The goal will be to achieve a time sequence understanding of the resurrection of the dead and events mentioned in the tribulation and wrath periods. Thirty-six different second advent passages will be examined with a focus of aligning repeated themes and elements to obtain the prize that awaits completion of this study.

Ethiopian Christianity constitutes an exceptional case for the analysis of beliefs related to the resurrection of the dead among Christians. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church is closely linked to Second Temple Judaism, as well as to early Christianity. This Church has roots in the early Church of Jerusalem and has played a vital role in the preservation of fundamental Judeo-Christian literature of the Second Temple Period. Central books, such as The Book of Enoch and The Book of Jubilees, were found for the first time in their entirety in Ethiopia, written in the Ge’ez language. In terms of faith and practices, the Jewish effect on Ethiopian Christianity, among other influences, has been and remains a very interesting case of comparative religious studies. We are assuming here that the idea of the resurrection of the dead is included within these faith and practices. However, as mentioned previously, Ethiopian Christianity is influenced not only by Judaism, but also by other cultural and religious sources.
This work seeks to explore the characteristics and development of the concepts related to the belief in the resurrection of the dead in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, especially during the Middle Ages. We will focus essentially on four different Ethiopian texts, dating from the period between the 14th and 16th century: The Kebra Negast or the “Glory of the Kings”, compiled and translated to the Ge´ez language in its complete form in the fourteenth century;  The Lefafa Sedek or the “Bandlet of Righteousness” written probably in the sixteenth century;  the “Christian Romance of Alexander the Great” from the fourteenth century;  and  “De Resurrectione Mortuorum” written in the fourteenth century.  All these texts were translated into English by Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, with the exception of “De resurrectione Mortuorum”, which was translated into Italian by Enrico Cerruli.

In this work, J. D. Atkins employs a combination of reception-history analysis and redaction criticism to challenge modern theories that Luke 24 and John 20 are apologetic responses to incipient docetism. He subjects second-century parallels used to support these theories to the same redaction-critical scrutiny as the Gospels and finds that the editorial and apologetic concerns of the evangelists differ fundamentally from those of antidocetic writers: neither Luke nor John aims to prove the physicality of the resurrection. Both instead draw attention to the fulfillment of prophecy. The author also argues that the apostles' doubt was not an apologetic device and that the bodily demonstrations of touching and eating predate docetism. Early docetists appeal to the Gospels as apostolic testimony but insist on a non-literal hermeneutic in which Christ performs physical actions "in appearance only."

Nella risposta alla domanda che alcuni sadducei, in presenza anche di farisei, gli avevano posto in ordine alla vita dopo la morte fisica, Gesù facendo riferimento a quanto dicono le Scritture chiarisce ad un tempo :
-  cosa sia la resurrezione che anche lui ha insegnato
-  come e cosa si debba vedere nella possibile, per lui, reincarnazione 
Queste sue parole, che i vangeli di Matteo, Marco e Luca ci riportano con straordinaria e quasi unica uniformità, e quindi altamente affidabili, sono forse le più ermetiche del suo sempre nascosto insegnamento, ma sono chiarissime una volta comprese.

Earlier this year Discovery Channel aired the programme "The Lost Tomb Of Jesus" directed by James Cameron and largely based on some investigation made by the Israeli-born, Canadian-based film maker Simcha Jacobovici. In conjunction with the film came the companion book The Jesus Family Tomb. The Discovery, the Investigation and the Evidence That Could Change History written by Jacobovici and the paleobiologist Charles Pellegrino. What was claimed was astounding: a tomb discovered during some construction work in the Jerusalem suburb of East Talpiot in 1980 contained the ossuaries of Jesus and his family because they had inscriptions saying: Some of the ossuaries were found broken. Of those found intact five had inscriptions in Hebrew or Aramaic, one in Greek, and the last one was plain. The names in Hebrew and Aramaic were extremely common in Israel during the Second Temple period and the controversy swirled about the inscription in Greek saying 'Mariamene e Mara'. In his report A Tomb with Inscribed Ossuaries in East Talpiyot, Jerusalem Prof. Amos Kloner, then Jerusalem's District Archaeologist, explained that the Greek inscription 'Mariamene e Mara' referred to a Mariamene, a variant of the name Mariam, Maryam and Marya, while 'Mara' was a contraction of Martha, this name also being "common in the Jewish feminine onomasticon." The name 'Mariamene' was central to the programme because it was interpreted as referring to Mary Magdalene. "That's the ringo, that's what sets the whole film in motion", the producer said. The claim that the Talpiot tomb was the "Jesus family Tomb", and particularly that "Mariamene e Mara" meant "Mary Magdalene, the Master" provoked bitter contestation and indignant criticism. Overnight a number of people appeared on the scene proferring interpretations of the controversial inscription in Greek. The Jesuit scripture scholar Father Joseph A. Fitzmyer, who edited the Aramaic Tobit texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls found in Qumran, cave 4 and whose impeccable critical credentials are widely known, provided the best interpretation.

Christopher Buck, “Sapiential Theosis: A New Reading of Ephrem the Syrian’s Hymns on Paradise.” Journal of the Assyrian Academic Society 9.2 (1995): 80–125. 

ABSTRACT

A fresh reading of the Hymns on Paradise (HdP) discloses how Ephrem the Syrian reworked soteriological presuppositions and thought-forms current in fourth-century Syria to effect a transformation of the doctrine of theōsis (deification), freeing it from its substantive categories, to lay emphasis on divinization at the sapiential level. See, for instance, HdP XII.15, where Ephrem states that “the human person can become / the likeness of God, / endowed with immortal life [i.e. theōsis] / and wisdom [i.e. sapience] that does not err” (HdP XII.15, HyP 166). While the form of the doctrine with its anthropological considerations was kept intact, the manner of Ephrem’s affirmation of theōsis was tantamount to its sophistication, in what amounted to a reformulation of the doctrine itself. In Ephrem’s eschatological scheme—which exalts form over substance—body, soul and spirit are rarefied beyond physicality, while corporeality is maintained. Even the argument for the body’s afterlife existence—the instrumentality of the senses being required for the soul’s ability to perceive—is effectively undermined by the obviation or precluding of the senses in the soul’s immediate cognition of the delights of Paradise. This innovation lent Ephrem’s doctrine of theōsis a greater potential for realization, in which eschatological Paradise came to enjoy a more edifying immediacy among the faithful.

The Resurrection, therefore, in Ephrem’s conception of it, is not simply an “arising” in the sense of revivification. It is an “arising” in the sense of a spiritual ascent, in which the whole tripartite being of man is “raised” to new life and to new heights. In what manner may we conceive of this? In this present life, in what really amounts to a realized eschatology for Ephrem, “the mind ... is spiritual” and it is the mind in mystic transport, and, at the eschaton, something like the mind into which the resurrection body is transformed, that can attain the environs of Paradise and, by the blessing of its Creator, enter into its Garden. There is in fact the suggestion that the metaphors Ephrem employs for his portrayal of Paradise may be decoded. From HdP VI.6 and elsewhere, we may thus infer: Symbols of Paradise (Symbol = Referent): Bud = Heart; Produce = Rational Speech; Fruit = Words (Deeds, VI.11); Plants = Truth; Sweet Scents = Love; Blossoms = Chastity (VI.12); Beauty = Mind (VI.13); Flowers = Virtuous Life (VI.13); Garden = Free Will (VI.13); Earth = Human Thought (VI.13); Trees = “Victors” (VI.14); Treasure Store = Hidden Mysteries (VI.25).

Paradise and paradigm:

Images and ideas are the twin hemispheres of the religious mind. The bicameral interaction of the imaginal and the abstract focus the believer on the archetypes of belief. To give a more complete description of any religious worldview, concepts should be complemented by conceits. In Ephrem, the Church is imagistically conceived of as Paradise. Since it is an extended metaphor, its imagery is extensible. Individually and collectively, paradise imagery can represent different facets of church life and experience. The phrase from the Lord’s Prayer—“on earth, as it is in Heaven”—perfectly expresses both imagistically and ideologically the Ephrem’s artifice at work in the HdP.

Ephrem’s Paradise is at once ecclesiastical and eschatological. Its imagery expresses a paradigm of purity. This is a purity that “cures.” It cleanses the soul of the “disease” of mortality. It restores primordial immortality. Life in Paradise, in both worlds, is for the pure. The pure in heart are Christians who are sexually pure and morally stainless. On this point, perhaps Ephrem and Bardaiṣan might agree. In a quote from Theodore bar Koni, Bardaiṣan, in one of his lost songs, taught: “And lo, the natures, all of them—with created things they hastened, to purify themselves and remove what was mingled with the nature of evil” (Segal 1970, 38). Although Ephrem rejects Bardaiṣan’s creation myth, the pursuit of ethical purity in both systems is, in nonascetic terms, comparable. In fine, Syriac Christianity’s response to Late Antiquity is the quest for purity, in which chrism, baptism, and the Eucharist become the ointment, fountain, and elixir of immortality, while the imagery of Paradise ennobles the sanctified soul.

PREVIEW ONLY - READ FULL ARTICLE HERE:
https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2020.vol2.no1.03
This article is a rebuttal to Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti's article, "Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: Problems with Craig's Inference to the Best Explanation," which argues that the Standard Model of current particle physics entails that non-physical things (like a supernatural God or a supernaturally resurrected body) can have no causal contact with the physical universe. As such, they argue that William Lane Craig's resurrection hypothesis is not only incompatible with the notion of Jesus physically appearing to the disciples, but the resurrection hypothesis is significantly limited in both its explanatory scope and explanatory power. This article seeks to demonstrate why their use of the Standard Model does not logically entail a rejection of the physical resurrection of Jesus when considering the scope and limitations of science itself.

Recently the walking, talking cross in the Gospel of Peter has been interpreted as a popular belief or a common apocalyptic motif, irrelevant for understanding the gospel’s christology. I argue that the animated cross should be understood as a manifestation of the resurrected Lord. This is demonstrated through a comparative study of epiphanies from Greek, Roman, and Jewish literature in which gods are identified and manifest by their unique signs, including talking trees. Since this cross appears simultaneously with the Lord’s enormous resurrected form, I conclude that the Gospel of Peter represents a polymorphic christology.

Gegenwärtig wird das gehende und sprechende Kreuz im EvPet gern als Element eines Volksglaubens oder als verbreitetes apokalyptisches Motiv gedeutet, das irrelevant für die Christologie des EvPet sei. Demgegenüber wird hier argumentiert, dass das belebte Kreuz als Manifestation des auferstandenen Herrn verstanden werden sollte. Dies wird an einem Vergleich von Erscheinungserzählungen aus griechischer, römischer und jüdischer Literatur gezeigt, in denen Götter anhand ihrer individuellen Zeichen, darunter als sprechende Bäume, identifziert werden. Da das Kreuz gleichzeitig mit der übergroßen Gestalt des Auferstandenen auftritt, wird geschlussfolgert, dass das EvPet eine polymorphe Christologie repräsentiert.

In a previous essay, I argued that the Eastern Church fathers hold in common the view that all creatures, including “immaterial” spirits, are hylomorphic, or matter-form composites, and I went on to defend this position. In this essay, I expand this insight to address two rather thorny issues surrounding the problem of evil. The first issue centers on the most common staple of Christian replies to the problem, namely, the free will defense. According to this defense, because free choice entails moral self-determination, not even God can unilaterally determine a will that is free. One significant challenge to the free will defense, however, is the commitment in historical Christian orthodoxy to the twin claims that God is free but God is also incorruptible (i.e., void of the very possibility of decay, both ontological or moral). This theological commitment seems to contradict the equally common commitment that free choice necessitates the possibility of evil. For, if God is free but morally determined, why is it not possible for creatures to be free but morally determined?
The second difficulty is closely related to the first. If an answer can be provided for why creatures cannot be morally determined and yet free, we must ask how this answer affects the Christian hope that believers are no longer capable of sin after the resurrection. Granting that those raised to life are still free in the world to come, we once again face a challenge to the free will defense. To wit, if God can remake man confirmed in righteousness and yet free, why can God not make man so from the start? One could, of course, abandon the Christian commitments to either divine incorruptibility or hope of an incorruptible future world, but if one retains both commitments alongside the free will defense, an answer must be given for how such commitments are compatible with one another.
In this essay, I will look at how the Eastern patristic view that all creatures are, of metaphysical necessity, hylomorphic (henceforth “Hylomorphic Creationism,” or HC) provides a solution to the first of the above difficulties. I will begin by laying bare the rationale for HC among the Eastern fathers, and then show that the hylomorphic nature of creatures, as contrasted with the immateriality of God, clarifies how divine freedom with moral determination is compatible with creaturely freedom that excludes moral determination (section 1). The solution HC supplies only heightens the second of the difficulties noted above, however. That is, how is it that creatures can hope to be confirmed in righteousness, given the metaphysical necessities of their composition? For, the solution to the first difficulty gives reason to think that creatures must remain forever corruptible. Here we will transition from the Eastern patristic understanding of creaturely composition to their soteriology. In specific, we will examine the doctrine of deification, or the view that creatures can participate in the operative powers (energeiai) of God through union with Christ and the indwelling Holy Spirit. We will see how this feature of Eastern patristic soteriology supplies the centerpiece of their hope that the believer can put off corruption and put on incorruption (section 2).

Muerte, duelo y nueva vida en el cuarto evangelio aborda los relatos de la resucitación de Lázaro y la unción en Betania (Jn 11,1-12,11) desde una perspectiva muy particular: las consecuencias sociales de la muerte en el mundo antiguo y la conducta ritual desencadenada ante ella.

Se trata de un trabajo de carácter interdisciplinar que utiliza las herramientas propias de la interpretación bíblica y también de áreas de ciencias sociales como la historia, la antropología social y cultural y la sociología. La obra hace una propuesta de reconstrucción de procesos sociales del pasado, que acontecieron en un grupo de seguidores de Jesús del siglo I, pero, a su vez, proporciona claves para reflexionar sobre temas que siguen siendo de actualidad, como es el de la muerte. Uno de los temas que aborda es el protagonismo de las mujeres en el duelo.

http://www.verbodivino.es/libro/4846/muerte,-duelo-y-nueva-vida-en-el-cuarto-evangelio

Paul enigmatically describes humanity’s universal sinfulness in Rom. 3.23 as a lack of ‘the glory of God’. Interpreters have tried to situate the lack of this glory in various contexts: ancient honour discourse, ancient Jewish Adam traditions, and Paul’s ethical discourse. To interpret this passage, this article utilizes the literary context of glory language throughout the letter. From this we find that glory denotes not only elevated honour, but also incorruption. Thus, the lack of glory in 3.23 refers to mortality and shame as the result of sin. In addition, this study of glory has implications for the burgeoning interest into the question of theosis with regard to Pauline theology.

What happens when we die is a subject that has many answers. Even among those of the Christian faith the theories of life after death's form abound.  The biblical record is clear on the subject. The afterlife is a two part experience. At death the soul rest for a period with the Father and at the end of time is raised BODILY at the resurrection

The discussion/debate on Romans 6 has always centered on the meaning of our death to sin, but commentators have forgotten that this was only half of what Paul said because he said that we were raised with him. In this chapter, which is Chapter 8 of my book, Dead Men Rising: The Death of Sin and the Rise of Grace, I explore Paul's teaching that we are to "reckon ourselves" alive to God. In the previous chapter, we looked at what it means to "reckon ourselves dead to sin." But now Paul takes it a step further and moves toward the completion of his magnificent thoughts in Romans 6.

As with previous papers, the page numbering begins on "1", but the footnote numbering begins where the previous chapter ended. Thus, the first footnote in this chapter begins with "207."

For those who have not followed the train of thought in these papers, I recommend that you explore the following papers.

Romans 6:1-3 – Shall We Continue in Sin?

Romans 6:1-10 – How Dead is Dead to Sin?

Romans 6:1-10 – Christ’s Death and Ours in Romans 6

Romans 6:6 – The Old Man of Romans 6

Romans 6:6b – Your Body of Sin Was Destroyed

Romans 6:6cd-7 – No Longer Slaves

Romans 6:11 – Consider Yourselves Dead to Sin

Nella "Depositio martyrum" (354) si ricorda il 14 ottobre come il "dies natalis" di papa Callisto I, ucciso molto probabilmente – secondo vari studiosi – in un tumulto popolare a Trastevere. Il testo latino dell’orazione colletta della messa del 14 ottobre, nella terza edizione tipica del "Missale Romanum" è incentrata sulla verità di fede della risurrezione dai morti. Il presente articolo ne mette in evidenza il profondo contenuto teologico-biblico, specialmente attraverso il riferimento al testo paolino della 1Cor 15.

В своем трактате о религии Кант утверждал, что христианский догмат о воскресении во плоти якобы не может быть частью моральной религии разума, поскольку в буквальном его понимании предполагает несовместимый с нею психологический материализм. Однако анализ критики догматической психологии в «Критике чистого разума» показывает, что для кантианца одинаково неприемлемы догматические претензии как материалиста, так и спиритуалиста в науке о душе, и неприятие доктрины первого не означает согласия со вторым. Критическое же самоограничение разума у Канта впервые открывает возможность его моральной надежды и веры в бессмертие в царстве этических целей; эта вера принципиально независима от психологических доктрин, но обосновывается только на чистой этике. Корректно (по правилам этой чистой этики) обоснованную этикотеологию бессмертия в философии религии Канта нет серьезных оснований считать несовместимой с верой в воскресение из мертвых во плоти. С другой стороны, вера в воскресение, как ее раскрывали евангелисты, апостолы и отцы Церкви, отнюдь не разделяет предпосылок, определяемых Кантом как «психологический материализм». Материалистическая в смысле Канта вера в бессмертие была свойственна лишь некоторым христианским философам, например Н.Ф.Федорову.

In the Pauline discussion regarding the nature of the resurrection body in 1 Cor 15:35-49, he employs the metaphor of the sowing of the natural (or earthly) body and the raising of the spiritual (or heavenly) body. Both kinds of bodies differ in glory and are fit for different habitats. In order to demonstrate this, in 1 Cor 15:39-42 Paul enumerates a list of the creatures who inhabit the earth followed by those who inhabit the heavens, the resurrection body being likened to the later. Scholars have generally understood the background of this list to be found in the creatures from Genesis 1, even though they do not follow the same order (as recognized by Fitzmyer, Ciampa, Rosner, etc.). Other scholars have put forth reasons for this discrepancy by suggesting that the list evokes the cosmology of popular Greek philosophy (i.e. Martin). This paper seeks to propose an alternate answer to this problem. The list of earthly and heavenly creatures here in 1 Cor 15:39-42 follows the same order of creatures as enumerated in the aniconic discourse of Deut 4:15-19. If this is in fact the text Paul is alluding to, he is more than likely participating in an exegetical tradition in the Second Temple period which reads Deut 4:15-19 as part of a wider Deuteronomic scriptural matrix employed to describe the nature of the cosmos as constructed and administered by God, appointing the celestial bodies as the gods or angels in his cosmic polis as attested in Philo, Spec. Laws 1.13-19. Reading the present text within this scriptural matrix not only supplies a strong argument for this particular enumeration of creatures, but also provides a more robust reading of the passage in its wider context, connecting the language of the abolishing of the principalities and powers in 1 Cor 15:24 with the earlier discussion in 1 Cor 6:2-3 regarding the judgment of the cosmos and the angels.

Croire que Jésus est ressuscité n'est pas chose facile. Même dans le cas où cela a bel et bien eu lieu, il n'est pas facile pour tous d'y croire, d'y croire vraiment. Pourquoi ? C'est ce que ce texte se propose d'élucider. Pour ce faire, nous avons convoqué trois approches en philosophie de la connaissance : l'évidentialisme, le présuppositionalisme, et l'épistémologie des vertus de R. Pouivet.

Believing Jesus is resurrected isn't easy. Even if it did happen, it's not easy for everyone to believe, to truly believe it. Why is that ? That is the problem I hope to elucidate in this essay. To do so, I used three different approaches one can find in philosophy of knowledge : evidentialism, presuppositionalism, and R. Pouivet's virtue epistemology.

Muchos ateos y religiosos que no son cristianos (budistas, hinduistas, musulmanes, shintoistas, etc.) les molesta que los cristianos se jacten de ser las únicas personas que Dios aceptará en el cielo y digan que las demás irán al infierno aunque sean buenas. Por esto muchas de ellas no quieren saber del Cristo Jesús ni del cristianismo ni de los cristianos. Que buenas personas vayan al infierno por no creer en Jesús es algo injusto y cruel. Es una creencia que atenta contra el sentido común y el sentido moral, y por ello ofende. La misma no puede provenir de la verdad contenida en la Biblia, sino de una mala interpretación de la misma. Los cristianos que creen que el cielo es para ellos y el infierno es para los demás, son los que creen que el cielo y el infierno son los únicos destinos finales de los seres humanos. No se han dado cuenta que la Biblia no habla de dos destinos finales, sino de tres: la Nueva Jerusalén, las naciones del mundo, y el lago de fuego. A la Nueva Jerusalén irán solamente los cristianos que Dios apruebe; a las naciones del mundo irán los no cristianos que sean aprobados por Dios; y al lago de fuego irán quienes no sean aprobados por Dios, sean cristianos o no. Dios traerá su ciudad (La Nueva Jerusalén) a este mundo, y desde ella el Cristo Jesús y los cristianos reinarán sobre las naciones del mundo. Los cristianos no serán los únicos que se salvarán de ir al lago de fuego, pero ellos serán los únicos seres humanos que vivirán en la Nueva Jerusalén. Dios juzgará a los cristianos y a los no cristianos según sus obras, pero lo hará por separado. Primero a los cristianos y luego a los no cristianos. Por esto es que habrá dos resurrecciones; una antes de cada juicio. Dios primero resucitará a los cristianos y los juzgará según sus obras, no por su fe en Jesús. Su fe en Jesús lo que determinará será en cual resurrección y en cual juicio ellos participarán y dónde irán a vivir eternamente. Ellos participarán en la primera resurrección y en el primer juicio por creer que Jesús es el Hijo de Dios; y si son aprobados por Dios por sus obras, vivirán para siempre en la Nueva Jerusalén. Los cristianos que estén vivos en ese momento, también participarán en ese juicio. Los no cristianos que hayan muerto serán resucitados y juzgados según sus obras junto con los no cristianos que estén vivos en ese momento. Los que sean aprobados por Dios por sus obras, vivirán en las naciones del mundo; no irán al lago de fuego, pero tampoco vivirán en la Nueva Jerusalén. Los que no sean aprobados por Dios, irán al lago de fuego. Esto ni es injusto ni ofensivo, y es lo que enseña la Biblia.

From the very beginning of our youth (and even to this very day), we have been taught the belief of going to heaven after death for being a good person who believes in God, as opposed to going to Hell for being an unbelieving bad person. This heavenly-minded concept has been taught in Sunday schools throughout the world.  We have been taught that bad people go to Hell and good people will go to heaven.  In the evangelical community, especially, it is widely accepted that if you turn your life over to Jesus Christ, and accept Him as Lord and Savior, you will not go to Hell, regardless of being a bad person, because Jesus paid the price for all of our sins.  Consequently, the believer has been saved by grace and stands to inherit entry to the Kingdom of God and ultimately goes up to heaven.  There is much truth to this belief, to say the least.  But are believers truly destined to spend any time up in heaven, much less an eternity?  Is heaven the final resting place of the Christian? The answer is yes and no.  The answer is yes, in the sense that God is presently in heaven (wherever its exact location may be) and our ultimate desire is to be reunited with Him. But, the author believes the scriptures say that the answer is no, in the sense that believers do not ever go up to that heavenly dwelling (after death or at so-called Rapture); but rather, that heavenly dwelling comes to earth, for eternity!  Read the following scripture that proves this contention.