Analytic Philosophy of Religion

Focusing on God's essential attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, being eternal and omnipresent , being a creator and sustainer, and being a person, I examine how far recent discussion has been able to provide for each of these divine attributes a consistent interpretation. I also consider briefly whether the attributes are compatible with each other.

Slade, Darren M. “The Logic of Intersubjectivity: Brian McLaren’s Philosophy of Christian Religion.” PhD diss., Liberty University, 2019.
https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3144&context=doctoral

To survey harsh criticisms against Brian Douglas McLaren (1956‒), readers gain the inaccurate impression that he is a heretical relativist who denies objective truth and logic.  While McLaren’s inflammatory and provocative writing style is partly to blame, this study also suspects that his critics base much of their analyses on only small portions of his overall corpus. The result becomes a caricature of McLaren’s actual philosophy of religion. The thesis of this dissertation is simple: McLaren is, in fact, a rationalist and empiricist, who utilizes irony, humor, generalization, and ridicule to disturb those expressions of faith common to mainstream, Western institutional Christianity (i.e. “conventional Christian paradigms”). The difference is that McLaren is an abductive rationalist and a phenomenological empiricist, who objects to the Enlightenment’s over emphasis on analytical rationalism because it overlooks ethereal elements such as intuition, mysticism, and personal experience. This “analytic” approach to religion has since created “notional” Christians who focus almost entirely on cerebral and abstract elements of faith while ignoring its real-world impact on daily living (cf. GO §13, 205; SMJ §4, 34). This study will show that what appear to be the musings of an unlearned and unnuanced writer are actually the tactics of a skilled rhetorician trying to expose the limitations (and even impropriety) of an overly analytic approach to faith. Indeed, McLaren’s goal is to establish a robust paradigm through which believers can acquire more than just knowledge; they can live in solidarity with creation and Creator, as well.

Obecně panuje názor, že (profesionální) filosofové se existencí ani povahou Boha už vlastně nezabývají. Zkušenost o rozšířenosti tohoto názoru jsem si odnesl ze svých rozmluv nejen s odborníky na zjevenou teologii, ale i s mnohými kolegy filosofy. 1 Jakkoli je však asi trefný pro kontinentální Evropu, nezachycuje stav filosofické teologie produkované v posledních padesáti letech v USA a Velké Británii. V tomto článku proto čtenáře postupně zpravím o rozmachu angloamerické filosofie náboženství od 60. let 20. století (1), o rozkvětu teismu v rámci tohoto rozmachu (2) a o klíčových dílech Alvina Plantingy (nar. 1932), jenž je nejvlivnější postavou řečeného rozkvětu (3). Stanovím většinové přístupy současné teistické filosofické teologie pěstované v USA a Velké Británii (4) a poskytnu souhrnný přehled jejích témat (5). Výsledkem by měla být základní, ale co možná nejvěrnější představa o genezi, obsahu a životaschopnosti veliké části současné filosofické teologie vůbec.

Modern secular-thought has detached modern religion from both human intellect and nature.  Secular evolution, they tell us, has transcended religion in a world driven by blind fate in which we are the derivative of animals.  The religion of the divine prophets (as explained by Maimonides) held that man (ie. Human) is distinct from animals by his intellect, which is inextricably linked to divine Providence.  In this chapter he discusses five theories on Providence.

He concludes by saying; “the theory that Divine Providence does not extend to man [with] no difference between man and other animals, implies very bad notions about God ; it disturbs all social order, removes and destroys all the moral and intellectual virtues of man.”

A few decades ago, there was a heated debate among Anglo-Saxon philosophers of religion and philosophical theologians over the quesRon whether, simply put, religion is supposed to represent an "independent transcendent reality" in one way or another-a posiRon commonly referred to as "religious realism"-or whether it is merely a lifestyle centered around some high values or ideals without any commitment to represenRng or claiming the existence of such a reality -a posiRon commonly referred to as "religious anR-realism". While this quesRon is less commonly discussed today, the debate is far from being seWled. Steven M. Cahn does not use this terminology in Religion Within Reason, but he offers a short, accessible, jargon-free, and theologically interesRng account of this debate. He also makes what I think is a philosophically unconvincing case for religious anR-realism, or as he puts it, for "the possibility of religion within a naturalisRc framework" (ix).

A number of Christian theologians and philosophers have been critical of overly moralizing approaches to the doctrine of sin, but nearly all Christian thinkers maintain that moral fault is necessary or sufficient for sin to obtain. Call this the “Moral Consensus.” I begin by clarifying the relevance of impurities to the biblical cataloguing of sins. I then present four extensional problems for the Moral Consensus on sin, based on the biblical catalogue of sins: (1) moral over-demandingness, (2) agential unfairness, (3) moral repugnance, and (4) moral atrocity. Next, I survey several partial solutions to these problems, suggested by the recent philosophical literature. Then I evaluate two largely unexplored solutions: (a) genuine sin dilemmas and (b) defeasible sinfulness. I argue that (a) creates more problems than it solves and that, while (b) is well-motivated and solves or eases each of the above problems, (b) leaves many biblical ordinances about sin morally misleading, creating (5) a pedagogical problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that (5) places hefty explanatory burdens on those who would appeal to (b) to resolve the four extensional problems discussed in this paper. So Christian thinkers may need to consider a more radical separation of sin and moral fault.

The ontological argument for the existence of God has enjoyed a recent renaissance among philosophers of religion. Alvin Plantinga's modal version is perhaps the most notable example. This essay critically examines Plantinga's rendition, uncovering both its strengths and weaknesses. The author concludes that while the argument is probably formally valid, it is ultimately unsound. Nonetheless, Plantinga's version has generated much interest and discussion. The author spends some time uncovering the reasons for the argument's powerful intuitive appeal. He concludes his essay by appraising Pruss's recent defence of Plantinga's argument.

What is this thing called Philosophy of Religion? grapples with the core topics studied on philosophy of religion undergraduate courses including:

The meaning of religious language, including 20th century developments
The nature of the Divine, including divine power, wisdom and action　
Arguments for the existence of the Divine
Challenges to belief in the Divine, including the problems of evil, divine hiddenness and religious diversity
Believing without arguments
Arguments for life after death, including reincarnation.

It explores the topics from the perspectives of the five main world religions, introducing students to the work of scholars from a variety of religious traditions and interpretations of belief.

A popular argument for the divinity of Jesus goes like this. Jesus claimed to be divine, but if his claim was false, then either he was insane (mad) or lying (bad), both of which are very unlikely; so, he was divine. I present two objections to this argument. The first, the dwindling probabilities objection, contends that even if we make generous probability assignments to the
relevant pieces of evidence for Jesus’ divinity, the probability calculus tell us to suspend judgement on the matter. The second, and more telling objection in my opinion, the merely
mistaken objection, contends that it is no less plausible to suppose that Jesus was neither mad nor bad but merely mistaken than that he was divine.

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the...

Design arguments are empirical arguments for God’s existence.  These arguments typically, though not always, proceed by identifying various empirical features of the world that constitute evidence of intelligent design and inferring God’s existence as the best explanation for these features.  This article explains and evaluates a number of classic and contemporary versions of the argument: (1) Aquinas’s “fifth way’; (2) the argument from simple analogy; (3) Paley’s watchmaker argument; (4) the argument from guided evolution; (5) the argument from irreducible biochemical complexity; (6) the argument from biological information; and (7) the fine-tuning argument.

A dead man is popularly believed to be capable of experiencing both good and ill fortune-honor and dishonor, and prosperity and the loss of it among his children and descendants generally-in exactly the same way if he were alive but unaware or unobservant of what is happening. 1 -Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Non fui; fui; non sum; non curo. 2 (I was not; I was; I am not; I do not care.) --Roman epitaph You have been keeping a diary most of your life. You become famous. You decide that despite public interest in your personal relationships and creative process, you do not want your diaries to be widely read. You leave instructions for your diaries to be destroyed upon your death.

Belief in demons can be justified only if demonic activity is the best explanation for the stories about, or one's own experience of, demonic activity. In this paper I employ the method of abduction (inference to the best explanation) to show why "demons did it" will never be the best explanation for any such phenomena.  Along the way I debunk many famous stories about supposed demonic activity, explain why a preponderance of such stories is not a good reason to think at least one is true, and show why continuing to believe in the demonic (despite the fact that such belief is not justified) is dangerous and immoral.

I present and discuss recent work in analytic philosophy of religion on apophaticism and divine ineffability. I focus on three questions: how can we call God ineffable without contradicting ourselves? How can we refer to an ineffable God? What is the point of talking about an ineffable God?

In Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism, the probability thesis claims that the probability of cognitive reliability is low given naturalism and evolution.  Using a general mathematical model for a naturalistic universe (assuming little more than physical laws, time, and physical conditions) one can prove a set of theorems showing that mental states are causally irrelevant in such a universe in a way that strongly supports the probability thesis when epistemic probability is used.  To help avoid bias towards our own species, the deductive argument for the epistemic probability thesis focuses initially not on us but aliens for which naturalism and evolution obtain, the theorems being used to argue that it is more likely that the aliens are effectively living in dreamworld rather than possessing reliable cognitive faculties.  Using the theorems and an epistemic probability approach, one can circumvent a number of challenges to the probability thesis such as noncontingent theism and conceptual constraints.  The theorems can also be used to construct a new scientific argument against naturalism.

In this paper, I aim to show that Hume’s argument against miracles may contain problematic flaws which lessen the plausibility of his argument. The debate about miracles is as hotly contested and controversial today as it was back in the 18th and 19th century. So, I would like to compare the potential relevance of Hume’s arguments about miracles within the Early Modern period to present day testimony of miracles. In order to demonstrate where some of the potential weaknesses in Hume’s argument lie, I shall utilise the direct criticisms of a fellow influential Scottish philosopher, Lady Mary Shepherd. In her essay VIII (published 1827 but possibly written much earlier) ‘That Human Testimony is of Sufficient Force to Establish the Credibility of Miracles’ she combs through and critically assesses Hume’s argument about miracles in section 10 of his ‘Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ (first published 1748). 

Therefore, in this paper, first, I shall unpack Hume’s essay in section 10 of his Enquiry (1748) in order to do a close textual examination and interpretation of his argument against miracles. Second, I shall select some of Shepherd’s key counterarguments (1827, essay VIII) against Hume’s views (1748) about miracles where she identifies potential flaws in his argument. My focus will be on their differing definitions of a miracle and their views on the laws of nature. I aim to show why Shepherd’s counterarguments consist of compelling, plausible claims against Hume’s views on miracles. Third, I will consider if Hume could have nevertheless defended his view of miracles as it stands, or whether he would have had to adjust his concepts to attempt to remain plausible. I will also go on to assess Hume’s views on miracles by applying them to modern examples of miracles in order to evaluate the applicability of his respective arguments to recent instances within modern life. In both sections two and three, I will also analyse Hume and Shepherd’s criteria for credible testimony. Finally, I shall conclude by suggesting that if Hume had needed to defend his views against Shepherd’s criticisms, I think he may have struggled to retain the claims he outlines in his essay in section 10 of his Enquiry (1748).

The problem of evil is typically thought to be a problem for theism, the view that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, and essentially good God. The existence of horrendous evils stands out as particularly problematic for the theist: surely if an all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good God existed, we would not find ourselves in a world in which horrendous evils obtain. The following paper, while not a theodicy, takes the reality of horrendous evils as its point of departure. I argue that, if the problem of horrendous evils were sound, and God did not exist, then justice would fall to us and no one else. But there is a disproportion between the justice we are able to enact in this life, and the kind of justice we in our heart of hearts desire: justice for every person to ever live and to ever have lived. This desire for a unique order of justice, unconditioned and absolute – what I call 'cosmic justice' – can only obtain if God exists, and so the very argument intended to show an incompatibility between the existence of God and the existence of horrendous evils fails, so far as only if God exists can there in principle be justice for every sufferer of horrendous evils. This conclusion gives rise to two arguments for the existence of God, one metaphysical – an argument from our desire for cosmic justice to its corresponding source, namely God – and one pragmatic – a Pascalian argument from our desire for cosmic justice to the existence of God as the most rational doxastic commitment.

Within a literary ontology, YHWH in the Hebrew Bible is technically also a fictional entity or object. In Hebrew Bible scholarship, a variety of philosophical issues surrounding fiction have received sustained and in-depth attention. However, the mainstream research on these matters tends to focus on the philosophical foundations of or backgrounds to a particular literary theory, rather than on metaphysical puzzles as encountered in the philosophy of fiction proper. To fill this gap, the present article seeks to provide a meta-theoretical overview of the main contemporary philosophical perspectives on the metaphysics of fictional objects. Three views (and their sub-currents) are discussed, namely possibilism, (neo-)Meinongianism and (literary) creationism. Each view’s theory is introduced and critically appropriated with reference to what is implied to be an answer to the question of what exactly the biblical character YHWH can meaningfully be said to be in the context of the metaphysics of fictional objects. In this way, the present study also goes beyond the traditional concern with the nature of God in Old Testament theology.

In this paper, I shall look at Aristotle's four causes and Maimonides' adaptation of it to show how this links in with and influenced Spinoza's own thinking about teleology. Aristotle's four causes account offers a logical explanation of why things are as they are when used to analyse the natural world and intentional human behaviour. This gives rise to a system of thought that can be used as a tool for understanding ourselves, other people and the world around us by deducing conclusions from axioms. Spinoza also developed an axiom-based philosophical system of analysis, especially in his Ethics, which also contains many deductions about humans and nature. However, Spinoza explicitly rejects both Aristotelian-style and Medieval-style final causes explanations (Appendix to E I and Preface to E IV). I shall compare and contrast the ways in which Spinoza selectively agrees and disagrees with Maimonides about other notions surrounding final causes, such as true worship. Teleology has important implications for and impact on Spinoza's discussion of superstition and worship because when humans view the world as existing in a way that is useful to them, they go on to suppose that God set it out for them. This leads to appeasing God in a superstitious way in order that the world functions in a way that is useful to them and favours them rather than incurring divine retribution. Maimonides' Medieval-style teleology is distinct in style in that it is wider in scope and outlines specific teleological arguments for a monotheistic God, unlike Aristotelian teleology. Spinoza, however, views teleology as limiting God to being anthropomorphic-like so refutes all types of linear, final cause style explanations in favour of an account of God's non-linear eternity, existence and omnipotence that isn't restricted to specific goals to explain intentional human behaviour and the natural world around us. Therefore, I base my approach on Spinoza's Preface to E IV when he writes that God is eternal and so does not act in terms of final causes but rather via necessity. In this way, Spinoza argues that, since there is no telos to God's actions or existence, final causes are invented by humans because they desire to understand what is useful to them and how things happen and why. So, I suggest that Spinoza not only provides an alternative account to a medieval one but also, in some ways, anticipates the structure of Darwin's views. For, both Spinoza and Darwin claim that there are observable laws of nature to study but humans and things in the world strive, adapt and change in a way that neither entails a fixed, static purpose they are suited to nor an end goal or telos. Therefore, I shall advocate that Spinoza attempts to circumvent the need for explanations in terms of final causes by firstly, providing differently reasoned answers to questions about humans and the world, secondly, by his type of axiomatic argumentation and thirdly, by substituting the linear, futuristic, goal orientated final cause account with his interrelated accounts of eternity, God, nature, necessity, human desire, superstition, the intellect and the passions.

The philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz famously asked: “Why is there something rather than nothing?” His answer was that God Himself is a necessary being that could not have failed to exist. Every physical object exists because of some external explanation, but God is necessarily existent and He has no explanation for his existence other than the fact that He must exist in order for anything else to possibly exist. Why we have a world that is seemingly contingent or unnecessary (since it could have not existed) is explained by God’s just decree. For Leibniz, the world had an explanation of its existence, and because of this he advocated a principle of sufficient reason for any fact whatsoever. In this paper I examine Leibniz’s account of the principle of sufficient reason in relation to his understanding of divine and human free will and I will particularly examine an objection that accuses Leibniz’s system of being essentially fatalistic. I will concede this objection and I will argue against Leibniz’s account of the principle of sufficient reason, arguing that a weaker principle is essential for one not to devolve into theological fatalism. As a result, I will describe an account of free will as given by philosophers that is not bound by the stricter principle but by the weaker principle and I will describe the theological benefits that such a view of free will shall bestow upon the philosophical theologian who, like Leibniz, desires to know more about God’s necessary and contingent properties.

Lee Strobel, Hani Tanrı Ölmüştü? adlı eserinde inanmayan bir insanın ahlâk anlayışını tasvir ederken şöyle söylemektedir: “Tanrısız yaşam, bana göre, ‘sadece kendin için yaşa’ demekti. Bir gün yaptıklarımdan hesaba çekileceğimi düşünmeden, neye mal olursa olsun, şahsi zevklerimin peşinden gidebilecektim.”
Acaba, bir dini inanca sahip olmayan insanlar gerçekten böyle mi düşünmektedirler? Yoksa onların da tâbi oldukları ahlâk kuralları var mıdır? Varsa bunları nasıl temellendirmektedirler? Ahlâklı olmak için, bir Tanrı’ya inanmak zorunlu mudur? Yoksa bir Tanrı’ya inanmadan da iyi olabilir miyiz? Ahlâk ilkelerini geçerli kılacak bir harici kaynak yoksa her şey mübah mıdır?

The Author proposes to describe the possible foundations of a Trinitarian theism that may be a philosophically adequate translation of the Johannine declaration: " God is love " , introduced by some contemporary thinkers as a key to resolving some aporias within classic theism. This is done by way of analysis of Trinitarian ontology and relational ontology, for which there is an attempt to provide a shareable phenomenological basis. The paper then goes on to questions of epistemology (hyperphatic theology) linked to the ability of human reason and human language to express the categories introduced in this analysis, categories that are nothing else but a renewed philosophical appreciation of the terminology proper to Trinitarian speculation.

Sommario: L'autore si propone di descrivere i possibili fondamenti di un teismo trinitario che sia una traduzione filosoficamente adeguata dell'affermazione giovannea " Dio è amore " , introdotta da alcuni pensatori contemporanei come chiave di volta per risolvere alcune aporie interne al teismo classico. Il percorso descritto passa attraverso l'analisi dell'ontologia trinitaria e dell'ontologia relazionale, alle quali si tenta di fornire una base fenomenologica condivisibile. Per poi spostarsi su questioni di epistemologia (teologia iperfatica) legate alla capacità della nostra ragione e del nostro linguaggio di esprimere le categorie introdotte nell'analisi, le quali non sono altro che la rivalutazione filosofica della terminologia propria della speculazione trinitaria.

Modern philosophical ethics has often tried to show how ethics can be independent of theology-with limited success. John Hare is a Christian philosopher, currently holding the Noah Porter chair of Philosophical Theology at Yale, who has devoted much of his career to exploring these limits. This book continues the exploration by presenting a history of philosophical ethics focusing on four main figures, Aristotle (384-322), Duns Scotus (1265-1308), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and R. M. Hare , the author's father, as representatives of four types of ethical theory (virtue theory, divine command theory, deontology and consequentialism) with special attention to their original theological context. The author argues that these four types of theory are not so radically opposed as they typically appear to be in most modern presentations, for when their theological presuppositions are retained there is an intelligible unity between the different roles that God plays in each: a kind of magnet of desire in Aristotle, a gracious lover in Scotus, a sovereign ruler in Kant, and a ideal model of moral reasoning in R. M. Hare. There four roles can be combined in one coherent conception of God, thus raising the possibility that the four types of ethical theory could also be combined--not something one would have considered possible on the basis of most modern presentations, which tend to neglect or downplay the theological component.

This article presents and explains Alvin Plantinga’s objections against the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity, with a special focus on the objection based on the incompatibility between divine simplicity and the free character of the act of creation. The article analyses and weighs different responses to this objection coming from the Classical Theistic perspective of Thomas Aquinas: a) the rejection of possible worlds semantics; b) the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity; c) the denial of God’s trans-world identity; d) the extrinsic character of God’s relational properties. A nuanced version of this last response is proposed and defended.

The “argument from love” challenges the “traditional Christian doctrine on which there are some people in hell who are suffering and others in heaven who are not suffering” (Hassoun, “Eternally Separated Lovers,” p. 1) on the grounds that no lover in heaven could be perfectly happy if he were aware that his beloved was suffering in hell. Love requires a concern for the good of one’s beloved, rendering heavenly bliss impossible for those who love an unreformed sinner. It is difficult to find a genuinely satisfying response to this problem, as opposed to a mere technical solution. The conflict can be technically eliminated by suggesting mysteries of various sorts, but such solutions do not address the apparent infidelity and indifference of those who could be perfectly happy while their dearest ones are suffering terribly. I first consider two technical solutions which follow traditional lines of thought in Christian apologetics. Then I develop a conception of the afterlife that responds more meaningfully to the argument from love. In short, I claim that if suffering has both objective and phenomenological components, then the souls of the damned may “objectively suffer” even while they do not experience suffering. A soul in heaven could then rejoice both in the justice of his beloved’s damnation and also in his beloved’s experience of contentment. In that way, I reject the unwelcome conclusion of the argument from love that there cannot be both happy souls in heaven and suffering souls in hell, while I acknowledge that the possibility of love between the blessed and the damned generates significant prima facie tension for traditional accounts of heaven and hell. My solution not only addresses that tension more convincingly than traditional solutions; it is also consistent with souls in heaven retaining much of their personal identity. My account of the suffering in hell thus does a great deal of work toward supporting a desirable conception of heaven.

Two theses are defended: First, that realism is a semantic thesis; second, that religious language ought to be interpreted realistically. The first part from chapter 1 to 4 is concerned with the first thesis, the second part from chapter 5 to 6 with the second. I first give an overview on the subject of realism and antirealism explaining the core problem of the debate that any satisfying interpretation of realism should be able to solve. Then I develop a solution based on Dummetts theory of semantic realism, so that metaphysical problems can be translated into semantic ones. Subsequently I discuss several arguments against this theory and develop my own, improved theory of semantic realism, which is able to resist the critique. Finally, I present and refute two arguments by Dummett intended to show that the semantic interpretation of realism already shows realism to be inconsistent. Having developed these semantic tools, I show how debates in philosophy of religion may be described and classified and how semantic criteria may be used to determine which theory is antirealist and which is not. Finally, I analyse and discuss the arguments in the current debate on religious antirealism and present a few new arguments based on the semantic interpretation of realism, to show the inconsistency of religious antirealism.

The paper argues that given the defining features of the God of "perfect being" theology, God would not create any contingently existing things. To do so would introduce a kind of gratuitous metaphysical imperfection in an otherwise metaphysically perfect universe. Given that in fact there are contingent things, it follows that the God of perfect being theism does not exist.

Les arguments cosmologiques visent à prouver l'existence de Dieu à partir de l'existence de l'univers. C'est ce point de départ qui permet de distinguer les arguments cosmologiques des autres types d'arguments classiques. Les arguments ontologiques, par exemple, s'appuient sur l'idée même de Dieu pour en déduire son existence. Si les arguments téléologiques s'appuient aussi sur l'univers, ce sont des caractéristiques plus précises, telles que son ordre ou sa finalité, qui les intéressent. Les arguments cosmologiques, eux, considèrent simplement le fait que l'univers existe.

The doctrine of God as “Subsistent Being itself” (Ipsum Esse Subsistens) was for many years considered the heart of Aquinas’ thought. In this paper (i) I set out Aquinas’s arguments in favour of the thesis of God as Subsistent Being itself usually conceived in terms of “esse tantum”; (ii) I set out the arguments against it; and (iii) I propose a fresh reading of that thesis that takes into account both Thomistic doctrine and the criticisms of it. I show that there is in Aquinas’s writings an Aristotelian conception of being as “the actuality of every form”, as “actus secundus”, and consequently of God as his Being (suum esse), that is different from the Platonic one, that of God as “esse tantum”. It is a conception that can integrate the notion of event, which has been rightly called upon in contemporary philosophy, both analytic and continental.

️ ️ Can Muslimness be defended in the modern world? If the answer is positive, which I think it is, how? This question has long occupied my mind. I have recently tried to propose a model for the philosophical defense of Muslimness that is neither proof-oriented nor fideistic. The article, entitled "Why I Am Muslim," was recently published in Rowman & Littlefield Handbook of Philosophy and Religion.                    از مسلمانی در جهان جدید آیا می‌توان دفاع کرد؟ اگر بله، چه‌گونه؟ این پرسشی است که ذهن صاحب این صفحه‌کلید را به خود مشغول داشته. اخیراً کوشیدم مدلی غیر اثبات‌محور در دفاع فلسفی از مسلمانی پیش‌نهاد کنم که در عین حال ایمان‌گرایانه نیست. این مقاله با عنوان «چرا مسلمان هستم» اخیراً در دست‌نامه‌ای در فلسفه‌ی دین منتشر شده است.

Whether Trinitarianism is coherent depends not only on whether some account of the Trinity is coherent, but on which accounts of the Trinity count as "Trinitarian." After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of the Trinity, but neither counts as Trinitarian (which is why defenses of Arianism or Modalism don’t count as defenses of Trinitarianism). This raises the question, if not just any account of the Trinity counts as Trinitarian, which do? Dale Tuggy is one of very few philosophers to give explicit definitions of Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But they are no mere formalities. They are essential to his central criticisms of both historical and contemporary forms of Trinitarianism. In this paper, I offer my own definitions of Trinitarian and Unitarian theology, contrast them with Tuggy’s, and argue for the superiority of my definitions to Tuggy’s. If Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are what Tuggy says they are, the outlook for Trinitarianism is bleak indeed. If they are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection to Trinitarianism fails. To show what is at stake in these pairs of definitions, I examine a doctrine much neglected in Analytic Theology, but central to Nicene Trinitarianism—the Monarchy of the Father.

The Tilde fallacy is the mistaken inference that, because an argument contains a Tilde it can be called the Null hypothesis, and therefore does not need to be positively defended. I show how this argument is used to defend Logical Positivism, Libertarianism and Atheism. It is also used to defend a position I call Mortalism, which uses it to set the burden of proof on those who believe in some form of personal immortality. In some cases the argument is actually self-contradictory, in others it is only  an illegitimate use of Occam's Razor. In Mortalism's case, there is a contradiction, but it is phenomenological,  not logical

This paper tackles the question “Is God Being itself?”, which is back at the center of the stage of philosophical investigation.
Aquinas offered an argument to the effect that God is Being itself. Aquinas’ argument relies partly on the authority of the Bible and partly on a purely rational line of reasoning. However, recent research has shown that, somehow surprisingly, the thesis that God is Being itself has been defended by pagan philosophers as well.
On the other hand, Anthony Kenny has put forward arguments against the thesis that God is Being itself. Such arguments rely on other work by Gottlob Frege, Aristotle and even Aquinas himself.
In my respondeo I develop the aristotelian-thomistic theory of being as “second act” and I put forward a new view about the meaning of the claim that God is Being.