Rational egoism

In this paper, I will present and argue for what I take to be the theodicy of Jonathan Edwards, which is rooted in the Edwardsian doctrine which I am calling Divine Egoism. I will begin by utilizing one of Edwards’ works to define and motivate the doctrine of Divine Egoism before exploring how it provides a unique framework for a comprehensive theodicy. By “comprehensive,” I mean that this theodicy intends to do the following: (i) satisfy the standard outweighing conditions, both for “cosmic goods” as well as the “person-constrained goods” introduced by Eleonore Stump and Marilyn McCord Adams; and (ii) address all of the various “types” of evil, including the particularly difficult cases of animal and infant suffering. One of the unique features of this theodicy is that it bypasses the common reliance on libertarian free will. Throughout, I will interact with major thinkers on the subject of the problem of evil––including Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Eleonore Stump, and Marilyn McCord Adams––to demonstrate how this Edwardsian theodicy might utilize and even supplement work being done in the contemporary literature.

Resumen: El autointerés constituye el principal postulado de la teoría económica ortodoxa. Se trata de una perspectiva que ancla sus raíces en el egoísmo psicológico del siglo xvii, que se abre paso en el pensamiento económico a través de los trabajos de autores como Bernard Mandeville y Joseph Butler durante el siglo xviii, y que encuentra su lugar en la ciencia económica con la revolución marginalista y la posterior emergencia de la escuela neoclásica a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo xix. Sin embargo, la teoría de juegos, en su versión tradicional, evolutiva y neuronal, lleva décadas mostrando una realidad comportamental del agente económico motivacionalmente heterogénea y moralmente comprometida. Por ello, el objetivo del presente estudio será doble. Por un lado, mostrar cómo nace, concreta y desarrolla la perspectiva egoísta para la economía, y, por otro, dilucidar cuál es la perspectiva comportamental que subyace de los últimos estudios neuroeconómicos.

Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what's best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes should be selfish. The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states that we are always morally required to do what's in our own self-interest. The view isn't that we are selfish-this is psychological egoism-but that we ought to be. This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it.

How do business leaders make ethical decisions? Given the significant and wide-spread impact of business people’s decisions on multiple constituents (e.g., customers, employees, shareholders, competitors, suppliers), how they make decisions matters. Unethical decisions harm the decision makers themselves as well as others, whereas ethical decisions have the opposite effect. Based on data from a study on strategic decision making by 16 effective chief executive officers (and three not-so-effective ones as contrast), I propose a model for ethical decision making in business in which reasoning (conscious processing) and intuition (subconscious processing) interact through forming, recalling and applying moral principles necessary for long-term success in business. Following the CEOs in the study, I employ a relatively new theory, rational egoism, as the substantive content of the model and argue it to be consistent with the requirements of long-term business success. Besides explaining the processes of forming and applying principles (integration by essentials and spiraling), I briefly describe rational egoism, and illustrate the model with a contemporary moral dilemma of downsizing. I conclude with implications for further research and ethical decision making in business.

Key words: ethical decision making; integration by essentials; intuition; moral principles; rational egoism; reason

The article is an overview of one of the main problems in the philosophy of Ayn Rand's objectivism – the problem of «altruism – egoism». Ayn Rand has proved herself as the defender of selfishness and the biggest hater of altruism. Approaching the problem of «altruism – egoism» with an impartial position, you can build a fairly effective philosophy and politics. That is what the American writer was trying to do.

In Charlotte Brontë’s "Jane Eyre," the Victorian reader was presented with a shocking manifestation of personality: a female lead character who was poor, homely in appearance, intelligent, and absolutely unwilling to bow to arbitrary authority. Where the heroines of Anne Brontë’s novels bore their misery in silence, or kept their superior intellects to their private diaries, Charlotte’s title character has a fully-formed ego in childhood and does not hesitate to assert her evaluations of the bad behavior around her, to her great cost in most cases. So pronounced is Brontë’s individualism, in fact, that it could be called a softer mirror of the feminism of Mary Wollstonecraft Godwin, the individualism of Thomas Paine, and a precursor of the Hegelian individualism that was taking shape on the Continent in the mind of Max Stirner, author of The Ego and His Own, the first fully-developed statement of egoistic individualism.

Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up."

Foot argues that there are certain things that all human beings - perhaps all rational agents - need.  This gives a sense in which certain values and disvalues can be called 'objective'.  I suggest that, with certain relatively minor adjustments, her argument can be made cogent but that it cannot be used to show that there are objective answers to questions about what one should do when values conflict.  If Foot's own virtue ethics, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics or any other first-order moral system were to be established as objectively valid, this would require some completely different form of argumentation. 


Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

Bireycilige ve rasyonel egoizme dayali objektivizm felsefesi ile Ayn Rand, bugun bile tartismali bir filozoftur. Ayn Rand her tur kolektivist ahlaka karsi cikar ve temele toplumun faydasi yerine bireyin kisisel faydasini yerlestirir. Ona gore her insan kendi mutlulugundan sorumludur ve bireyin amaci kisisel fayda maksimizasyonunu saglamak olmalidir. Rand, “Yemin ederim ki ne bir baskasi icin yasayacagim ne de bir baskasinin benim icin yasamasini isteyecegim” sozu ile fedakarligin zannedildigi gibi erdemli olmadigini, aksine bir ahlaksizlik oldugunu ve iyi yasama arzusunda olan insanin ondan kacinmasi gerektigini vurgular. Ayn Rand, en basta merkeze Tanri’yi ya da toplumu koyan ahlak anlayislari olmak uzere tum etikleri keyfi olarak niteler. Ona gore kurucusu oldugu objektivist etik ise, isminden de anlasilacagi uzere objektiftir ve aklin bir urunu olmaktan cok, aklin gercekligi kesfidir. Bu nedenle Rand’in ahlak felsefesi insanlarin keyfiyetine ve kaprislerine degil, objektif gerceklige dayalidir. O, doga kanunlari kadar kesin ve gercektir. Bu makalede Ayn Rand’in bu iddiasi sorgulanmis, onun ahlak felsefesinin de keyfi ogelere yer verip vermedigi incelenmistir. Bunun adina, once Ayn Rand’in objektivizminin ne oldugu kisaca anlatilmistir. Ardindan kendisinin kurucusu oldugu bu ahlak felsefesinin temelinin ne oldugu ve baglayicilik problemine makul bir yanit verip veremedigi incelenmistir. Bunun icin, sadece makalelerinden degil, felsefesini kapsamli bir sekilde anlattigi romanlarindan da alintilar yapilmistir.

This paper aims to examine how religion and literature are related to each other. There have always been attempts to probe various religious elements in the form of symbols, themes and motifs in literary works. Religion, on the other hand, has found literature as a powerful medium to communicate religious messages to the masses. The paper argues that the relationship between literature and religion is reciprocal as religion provides literature with a variety of sources to resolve ethical and moral dilemmas and literature, in turn, helps glorify or subvert religious dogmas. In order to elucidate this, the paper undertakes a close reading of Dostoevsky"s Crime and Punishment and examines how the novel contextualizes the Christian theme of sin, suffering, and redemption through the conflict between Christian values and rational egoism.

Hobbes’s political philosophy starts from a number of premises that are supposed to be self-evident, supplemented by various observations from experience. These statements are examined critically and in their interrelatedness in order to find out to what extent Hobbes provides a convincing system of thought. The importance of the basis of man’s actions, his self-interest, is inquired, since it serves as the basis of his practical philosophy. After this, Hobbes’s views on ‘moral’ notions are expounded. As it turns out, Hobbes maintains a number of concepts that have such a connotation, but interprets these in a specific way. The article is concluded with a modest systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s main thoughts in practical philosophy.

Ayn Rand is among the most outspoken, and important, intellectual voices in America, wrote Playboy Magazine in 1964. She is the author of what is perhaps the most fiercely damned and admired best seller of the decade, Atlas Shrugged. This chapter discusses some of the reasons for studying Rand and some of the challenges involved. It also discusses a few features of Rand's corpus and her life that should be borne in mind when studying her.

The Jungian school of Analytical Psychology has been, since its inception, trying to conceptualize why dream are a product of the unconscious mind.  There’s an artistic matrix, which I have named the UNIVERSAL MATHEMATICAL MATRIX, which when discussing dreams I call the DREAM-MAKER.  I will discuss this image extensively below. When I think about the dream I think of it as the product of the whole psyche: i.e. ego-consciousness and the unconscious mind not just the unconscious mind; for the reason that, ego-consciousness is needed in the process to discriminate what the unconscious mind is conveying to ego-consciousness.  When a person is sleeping ego-consciousness is a captive audience.  It is not allow too interact with the unconscious mind.  The unconscious mind during sleep has total domination over the ego.  Dreams are what the unconscious mind conveys, via chaos, to ego-consciousness about itself.  Dreams are all about symbolism and the individual has to learn how to read his dreams via his understanding of symbolism: i.e. what do the symbols mean to ego-consciousness?  Within mere seconds of awakening from sleep ego-consciousness has the knee-jerk reaction of putting the chaos of the phantasmagoria of the unconscious mind into concretize form, which is called the DREAM; therefore, it is both halves of the psyche: i.e. ego-consciousness and the unconscious mind that produces the dream.  During the experience of the dream itself, while sleeping, ego-consciousness has absolutely no idea of what is being conveyed to it.  Furthermore, ego-consciousness’ knee-jerk reaction to concretize the phantasmagoria of its experience of the unconscious mind is merely the bare bones of the dream.  It is the individual’s interpretation and amplification of the dream, which is collectively called the dream.

The school of Analytical Psychology developed by CG JUNG cannot be blamed for not having as yet found the elusive DREAM-MAKER; though, I had anticipated that Jungian psychoanalysts would have by now honed in on my researches and realized that the UNIVERSAL MATHEMATICAL MATRIX (10 x 10 matrix) is the sleeping psyche's DREAM-MAKER. This paper is not going to be long; for the reason that, my research papers  that explain the development and use of this matrix in ancient literature, artworks and monuments, are online free, for those that want access to them.

I have revised this paper extensively.

Almost sixty years ago Philippa Foot published an article that began: To many people it seems that the most notable advance in moral philosophy during the past fifty years or so has been the refutation of naturalism; and they are a little shocked that at this late date such an issue should be reopened. It is easy to understand their attitude: given certain apparently unquestionable assumptions, it would be about as sensible to try to reintroduce naturalism as to try to square the circle. Those who see it like this have satisfied themselves that they know in advance that any naturalistic theory must have a catch in it somewhere, and are put out at having to waste more time exposing an old fallacy. This paper is an attempt to persuade them to look critically at the premises on which their arguments are based. 1 The paper in question was one of a number written by Foot around the time that were highly successful in reopening the issue of naturalism in ethics. Nowadays no one can just take it for granted that naturalism has been refuted, that there is a sharp distinction (or indeed any clear distinction) between fact and value or that it is impossible to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. This is not to say that the naturalists have been completely victorious, of course; only that naturalism is today a live option. I shall argue that Foot's paper contains an important insight and an equally important mistake; and that the insight and the mistake are linked. I believe that the thinking behind it has influenced the subsequent course of moral philosophy to a quite remarkable extent and that this has been in some ways beneficial and in some ways harmful – not surprisingly, if I am right in seeing it as containing both truth and error. I do not want to exaggerate the influence of this one paper 2 but I do not know of any other that so neatly encapsulates the coupled insight and mistake. The anti-naturalism that Foot is attacking she characterises as follows: It would not be an exaggeration to say that the whole of moral philosophy, as it is now widely taught, rests on a contrast between statements of fact and evaluations, which runs something like this: The truth or falsity of statements of fact is shewn by means of evidence; and what counts as evidence is laid down in the meaning of the expressions occurring in the statement of fact … It follows that no two people can make the same statement and count completely different things as evidence; in the end one at least of them could be convicted of linguistic ignorance. It also follows that if a man is given good evidence for a factual conclusion he cannot just refuse to accept the conclusion on the ground that in his scheme of things this evidence is not evidence at all. 3 But, on the view she is criticising, [w]ith evaluations, however, it is different. An evaluation is not connected logically with the factual statements on which it is based. One man may say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another may refuse to take that fact as any evidence, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of 'good' which connects it with one piece of 'evidence' rather than another. It follows that a moral eccentric could argue to moral conclusions from quite idiosyncratic premises; he could say, for instance, that a man was a good man because he clasped and unclasped his hands and never turned NNE after

CONCLUSION 82 1. RÉSUMÉ DU TRAVAIL 82 2. LA SOLUTION DE JOHN RAWLS 83 A. LE PESSIMISME THÉORIQUE CONTRE L'OPTIMISME RÉALISTE 84 B. LA POSITION ORIGINELLE 85 C. LES NORMES DE COOPÉRATION 88 D. RETIRER L'INTÉRÊT PERSONNEL 90 ANNEXES 92 1. LA POSSIBILITÉ DE L'INTERVENTION DE L'ETAT 92 A. L'AVANTAGE CONTINGENT DES LOIS 95 B. GLISSEMENT DE RESPONSABILITÉ 98 C. LA SUPPRESSION DE LA CAPACITÉ MORALE 102 BIBLIOGRAPHIE 106 1 ELSTER Jon, Le Désintéressement, p. 9. 2 PETTIT Philip, Penser en Société, pp. 44-45. 3 HAUSMAN Daniel M., The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, pp. 15-16. 4 Si la transitivité et la complétude définissent le concept de préférence, alors quelqu'un qui n'ordonne pas les options selon ces critères formels ne dispose simplement pas de préférences. 5 SEN Amartya, Ethique et économie, pp. 15-17. 16 WALRAS Léon, Eléments d'économie politique pure, p. 19. Norm and Action, chapter 1, section 5. 22 Les normes sociales ou la coutume peuvent être considérées comme des prescriptions dans lesquelles l'autorité est diffuse dans l'ensemble de la société. La sanction à l'encontre de celui qui ne respecte pas la norme est alors l'exclusion de la communauté qui reconnaît la norme. [von Wright Georg Henrik, Norm and Action, chapter 1., section 6.] 23 von WRIGHT Georg Henrik, Norm and Action, chapter 1, section 2. 24 von WRIGHT Georg Henrik, Norm and Action, chapter 1, section 4. 8 respectivement comment parler correctement, jouer correctement et penser correctement. Elles ne dictent pas que les individus doivent pratiquer les activités, mais uniquement comment les pratiquer de manière appropriée. Si quelqu'un ne respecte par les règles déterminant l'activité, par exemple s'il ne respecte pas les règles de grammaire du français, alors nous dirons soit qu'il ne parle pas correctement français, soit qu'en fait il ne parle pas du tout le français mais parle plutôt une autre langue. Dans le cas d'un jeu, les règles sont constitutives de l'activité. Sans les règles, le jeu n'existe pas. De quelqu'un qui ne respecte pas ces règles, nous dirons soit qu'il ne joue pas le jeu correctement -ou qu'il triche -soit qu'il ne joue pas le jeu en question. 25 Les normes en tant que règles permettent donc d'évaluer le comportement des individus dans le cadre de l'activité qu'elles servent à déterminer. Dans une même perspective, certaines normes permettent également de porter des évaluations, mais concernant cette fois la manière d'être plutôt que la manière d'agir. 26 Elles ne définissent plus quelles les actions spécifiques doit entreprendre un individu, mais définissent quelles caractéristiques un homme ou un objet particulier doit posséder. Elles décrivent un idéal vers lequel les hommes qui répondent à une fonction spécifique doivent tendre pour être évalués comme bons dans leur fonction. Par exemple, l'énoncé selon lequel un soldat doit être courageux et discipliné, ou selon lequel un enseignant doit être patient avec ses élèves, ou tout autre énoncé qui attribue des qualités aux différents types idéaux d'hommes, établissent non pas comment se comportent effectivement un soldat ou un enseignant, mais établissent comment se comporte un bon soldat ou un bon enseignant.

A new book by Tara Smith, philosophy professor at the University of Texas at Austin, helps remedy the lack of attention to and knowledge about egoism.  Ayn Rand’s Normative Ethics: The Virtuous Egoist focuses on the strongest proponent of egoism, Ayn Rand’s, moral theory. Professor Smith has integrated Rand’s writings on ethics in one volume, adding her own clarifying formulations, examples and elaborations yet remaining loyal to the original sources.  Smith’s purpose is to provide an accurate presentation of Rand’s egoism. Her “aim is not to convert the reader” (5); she simply sets out to show what Rand’s moral theory is, “as it has not received the attention it warrants” (5)—and then does it clearly and methodically. This is one of the strengths of the book: Smith merely presents what egoism is, and leads the evaluation to the reader—much like a good teacher of ethics would do. Although Smith’s primary audience is academic, given the detail and the thorough references and footnotes, an interested lay person would also enjoy the crisp writing style and the varied, every-day examples. From reading The Virtuous Egoist, any reader should emerge with an improved understanding of rational egoism and its application to daily choices and actions.

The claim of this paper is to present Spinoza’s view on self-esteem and positive reciprocity, which replaces the human being in a monistic psycho-dynamical affective framework, instead of a dualistic pedestal above nature. Without naturalising the human being in an eliminative materialistic view as many recent neuro-scientific conceptions of the mind do, Spinoza finds an important entry point in a panpsychist and holistic perspective, presenting the complexity of the human being, which is not reducible to the psychophysiological conditions of life. From a panpsychist point of view, qualities and values emerge from the world, in a situation similar to what could be seen in animism, or early childhood psychology, where the original distance between the mind and the exterior thing is reduced ad minima, and both can even interrelate in a confusing manner. Human reality is nevertheless a social reality, it supposes a basis for shared competencies, that we will present as grounded on the one hand of the sustaining character of the essence of the animal-man as will-to-power. Negatively speaking we all share same asocial tendencies and affects. This aspect is not only negative but it is also a will to develop and master the environment, because values have an onto-metaphysical immanent dimension in nature, not because there is an individual bottom-up will to survive, but rather a will to live in harmony with the surrounding world. On the other hand, we shall see that Spinoza understood and described perfectly the power of the mind over the power of the affects, as a co-constituting dimension, which is alienating natural dependencies, leaving an inner space for the objectification of ethical values, not related to mere compensation mechanisms. We shall present the high standard of Spinoza’s personal values and positive reciprocity, related to his crucial understanding of the concept of wholeness of life grounded in nature as the strong roots of a tree of life, but also the very metaphysical conditions for ethical values. The essential capacity of shared social affects is completed by a self-overcoming of the animal-man based passions, restraining and sometimes harming social or spiritual life. We are first going to present these proto-ethical conditions for the sustainability of life as affective and dynamic grounding into the immanent world, second we shall present realistic principles of an ethics of competency and see how far mutual recognition, as the concrete activity of mutually serving each other, has been presented in a convincing way by Spinoza.

This chapter focuses on how Kierkegaard criticizes both eudaimonism and Kantian autonomy for failing to account for unconditional obligations and genuine other-regard. Like Kant, Kierkegaard argues that eudaimonism makes moral virtue contingent on prudence. Kierkegaard views eudaimonism as an anthropocentric and self-regarding doctrine, which he contrasts not with Kantian autonomy but with theocentrism and proper other-regard. Kierkegaard then criticizes Kantian autonomy in much the same way as he criticizes eudaimonism.  Whereas eudaimonism makes morality contingent on prudence, autonomy makes morality contingent on decisions that may be revoked, he argues. As a result, human autonomy can account for hypothetical imperatives but not categorical imperatives. This line of reasoning seems problematic, however, since Kierkegaard takes Kantian autonomy to not only represent a form of moral constructivism, but also a form of moral relativism and decisionism. Still, Kierkegaard’s critique of autonomy indicates that morality and practical rationality need unconditional commitment towards what is objectively good.

Mišel de Montenj je značajna figura humanizma i renesanse, koja oblikovana u svoj snazi reminiscencija antičkih uzora, uz " usputno bilježenje " i vođenje dnevnika čitanja formira novi književni žanr, i to oglede, tj. eseje. De Montenj je mislilac koji svoje mišljenje neodvojivo veže za čitalačko iskustvo. U uživanju i oblikovanju čitalačkog ukusa ogleduje teme koje se tiču pragmatične motivacije usmjerene u ostvarivanju poznosrednovejkovnog gesla memento mori. Uzorkuje u Ogledima, Montenj sve segmente ljudske egzistencije sa kojima se susrijeće i on sam za svoga života. Stavljajući akcenat na racionalizaciju smrti, ali i na razboritost kao osnovnu karakteristiku čovjeka kao bića homo universalis, koje posjedujući ultimativnu mogućnost da služeći se svojom razboritošću racionalizuje smrt kao ljudsku konačnost. Smrt koja je vječno nazaustavljivo kretanje svakoga čovjeka u njegovom ciljnom usmjerenju da živi je osnovni motiv da Montenj otvori na jedan humanističko-pragmatički način osnovna eshatološka pitanja. Dokaz da njegov poduhvat nije imao za cilj da ostvari književnu slavu jeste njegova posveta čitaocima, kojima povjerava da sve svoje umotvorine nije pisao sa željom da ga Ogledi proslave. U eseju O knjigama, Montenj nam priznaje da postoje tuđe misli koje nije naveo, koje nije referirao već kada ih je preuzeo i razborito razmislio o njima počeo ih doživljavati kao svoje. Primarna misao u eseju O iskustvu sa kojom se otpočinje problematika iskustva jeste prirodnost želje za znanjem. Montenj u doživljaju da se ta čvrsta teza antičkih mislioca o želji za znanjem utoliko integrisala u njegovom mislećem biću da je doživljava kao svoju ne treba referirati već naprosto u opštevaženju prihvatiti kao neospornu istinu. Dekartov racio koji u vremenu Montenja biva centralna tema rasprava tadašnjih mislilaca kod Montenja doživljava jedno suptilno kantovsko seciranje od iskustva. U svim obrađenim fenomenima i problemima sa kojima se susrijeće Montenj prilikom pisanja svojih Ogleda on se poziva na razboritost kao rješenje određenih životnih situacija, ali sva razboritost je usmjerena u njegovom neiscrpnom navođenju pregršta iskustva drugih, a i i svojih. Racionalizacija se sprovodi i na one fenomene ljudske egzistencije koji se ne mogu racionalizovati ili pak kulturna diferencijacija njih ne prepoznaje kao moguće racionalizovane fenomene, npr. pitanje roditeljske ljubavi, odnos očeva i sinova itd. Ključna teza koja nam otkriva da iskustvo i razum nijesu antipodi životne pisanije već komplementarni epistemološki aspekti našeg bića jeste Montenjeva tvrdnja da kada nas iznevjeri razum je neophodno se uzdati u

Humanity is on the threshold of recognizing the fundamental error in its view of life and death. Both death as well as active life is necessary to the vital formation of a larger, more essential whole. In this paper, I apply the sociology of knowledge and change as it pertains to death and focus on ways in which we can step outside its traditional frameworks and limitations. I also discuss topics related to death such as birth, aging, sickness, and war, and examine cultural differences in attitudes toward death. I offer varying perspectives including the Buddhist view and from these draw implications and conclusions. I apply the lenses of contemporary social scientists such as Edgar Morin, Kenneth Gergen, Edward Stewart, Milton Bennett, Mary Catherine Bateson, E. Doyle McCarthy, Philip Slater, and Piotr Sztompka. To these I add other relevant passages from the writings and speeches of key thinkers on the topic of death, in particular, Buddhist philosopher, peacebuilder, and educator, Daisaku Ikeda. To construct a more humanistic and sustainable view of life, it is first of all crucial to establish a culture which perceives death in its larger living context as but one cycle in the expansive eternity of life.

Prompted by the thesis that an organism’s umwelt possesses not just a descriptive dimension, but a normative one as well, some have sought to annex semiotics with ethics. Yet the pronouncements made in this vein have consisted mainly in rehearsing accepted moral intuitions, and have failed to concretely further our knowledge of why or how a creature comes to order objects in its environment in accordance with axiological charges of value or disvalue. For want of a more explicit account, theorists writing on the topic have relied almost exclusively on semiotic insights about perception originally designed as part of a sophisticated refutation of idealism. The end result, which has been a form of direct givenness, has thus been far from convincing. In an effort to bring substance to the right-headed suggestion that values are rooted in the biological and conform to species-specific requirements, we present a novel conception that strives to make explicit the elemental structure underlying umwelt normativity. Building and expanding on the seminal work of Ayn Rand in metaethics, we describe values as an intertwined lattice which takes a creature’s own embodied life as its ultimate standard; and endeavour to show how, from this, all subsequent valuations can in principle be determined.

Understanding modern philosophy is to also understand abstract things. Abstraction has become the focus of philosophy, and practicality, assumed to be dichotomous with abstraction, is seen as antithetical to philosophy. Philosophy is for those who deal with nothing practical, it is just nothing. But philosophy, in dealing with questions, is everything. And what can be gained with everything, supposedly? What is nothing?  
Everything which is practical is something. It is often assumed what is abstract is essentially nothing. Nothing, however, is just as important as something. What we take to be “nothing”s are often things we take for granted out believing them without questioning the values. Is there more to life than just value itself? What do we take for granted? What do we value? What should we value? How valuable is nothing?  
From what work is to what values are, correction to animals, this book is a collection of thoughts connecting together to make some sort of understanding that could be gained. This book doesn’t directly answer these questions, but it does investigate them in a tangential collection of thoughts where one can possibly find some answers. Just connecting things together.

Recent scholarship is nearly unanimous in attributing some form of egoism to Leibniz’s moral philosophy.  I argue that there are substantive reasons to reject this status quo, given that psychological egoism is inconsistent with more fundamental Leibnizian doctrines. In particular, I argue that psychological egoism is incompatible with Leibniz’s metaphysical perfectionism, his conception of the will as a power aimed at the universally known good, and his theory of justice.

A central problem in moral theory is how it is to be defended against those who think that there is no harm in being immoral, and that immorality can be in one's self-interest, assuming the perpetrator is not caught and punished. The argument presented here defends the idea that being immoral prevents one from having self-respect. If it makes sense to think that one cannot be happy without self-respect, then the conclusion follows that one cannot be both immoral and happy. Immorality is harmful because its self-disrespecting nature keeps immoralists from being happy. This is the harm of immorality. 1 Robin Waterfield, translator (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1993.

Birinci tekil şahıs olarak alışılagelen, ruhbilimi tabiriyle de “bireyi öteki bilinçlerden ayıran unsur” olarak özelleştirilmeye gidilen “ben” adılı, bu iki tanım arasında kendini inşa etmeye çalışır. Bu oluşumda birey, mikro ölçüde ailesinden miras aldığı kimlik bilinciyle bir kişilik oluşturmaya çalışırken makro ölçüde ise bu kişiliğin asıl anlam kazanacağı sosyal yapı ile tanışır. Keza bu sosyal yapıyı salt bireyler değil, bireylerin arasındaki roller ve bireylerin temel davranış örüntülerini baz alan kurumlar oluşturur. Toplumla olan ilişkilerin temel dayanağı da toplumun en küçük yapıtaşına, aile kurumuna ilişkindir. Ailelerimizden salt bir kimlik bilinci değil, bunun yanı sıra çeşitli yaşam pratiklerini de alırız. Bu sürecin keskin hatları olmadığı gibi pragmatik çizgileri de yoktur. Ailenin niteliğine bağlı olarak eğitsel fonksiyonları da farklılaşır. İşlevselci bakış açısıyla “statü tayini”, ailenin temel fonksiyonlarındandır. Bu durum dinamik bir süreçten ibaret olsa da toplumda bulunacağımız ilk tabaka, ailemizin statüsüyle eş minvaldedir. Özne konumuna yerleşen bireyin düşünceleri de bu statünün yansımalarıyla şekillenecektir. Örnek olarak Ayn Rand’in, Rus Devrimi’ne ilişkin düşüncelerini ele alabiliriz. Üst-orta sınıf bir aileden olan Ayn Rand, bu devrim ile sosyal ve mali konumunu kaybetmiştir, düşüncelerinin oluşumunu da buraya dayandırmak mümkündür. Konuya ilişkin bir diğer örnek, Yevgeni Zamyatin olarak gösterilebilir. Zamyatin’in Bolşevik direnişine katılmasını, otobiyografilerinde uzun tasvirler ile yer verdiği doğup büyüdüğü küçük kasaba -Lebedyan- ile ilişkilendirmek mümkündür.
Bayraktar, İrem. "Totalitarizmin Benliğe Müdahalesi: “Ben” ve “Ego” Romanları". Noktasız Dergi. 4 (2021): 26-33.

One of the longest standing objections levied against neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is the Self Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of motivation is that the virtuous agent acts virtuously ultimately because doing so is constitutive of, or promotes, her own eudaimonia. In this paper, I provide an overview of the three existing approaches adopted by virtue ethicists to address this objection, and demonstrate that they all fall short due to their insistence on conceiving of the virtuous agent’s ultimate end in a way that is good for her. I then go on to develop a new account – what I call the “Altruistic Eudaimonist Account of Motivation” – on which the virtuous agent is motivated to act virtuously because she appreciates and understands that the human good consists chiefly in a life of excellent moral activity, and not because doing so is good for her.

One principal challenge to the rationalist thesis that the demands of morality are requirements of rationality has been that posed by the "rational egoist." In attempting to answer's the egoist's challenge, some rationalists have supposed that an adequate reply must take the form of a deductive argument that "converts" the egoist by showing that her position is contradictory, arbitrary, or violates some precept that defines practical rationality as such. Here I argue (a) that such rationalist replies will fail to persuade the egoist to adopt a recognizably moral way of life; (b) that this failure can be traced to epistemic assumptions that underlie typical rationalist replies; (c) that egoist conversion can better be understood by rejecting these assumptions and seeing egoist conversion as akin to a paradigm shift in the sciences; and (d) that conceptualizing egoist conversion as a paradigm shift accords with empirical psychological evidence regarding the acquisition and modification of individuals' moral attitudes and beliefs.

El presente ensayo es el resultado de una reflexión realizada en torno a la capacidad mostrada por diversos colectivos y para emprender en conjunto actividades de carácter solidario y colaborativo en Chile, desmintiendo aquellas visiones que pretenden imponer la idea de que la naturaleza de las personas es intrínsecamente egoísta y racional en donde finalmente prima el autointerés por sobre todas las otras acciones de tipo cooperativo. Al hacer un breve examen de estas teorías, el estudio aborda esas corrientes que enfatizan el perfil fraternal, colaborativo y altruista de las comunidades humanas.

To many readers, Jeremy Bentham's philosophical psychology appeared both seriously flawed and not really innovative. On the one hand, some authors considered Bentham's views about human psychology as a re-statement of Hobbes' claims about the prevalence of selfish motives in human psychology, and a reaction against Locke's claim that motivation is mainly due to feelings of pain. On the other hand, Bentham's psychological egoism is commonly regarded as both contradictory with his utilitarianism and explanatorily flawed.

Any social and political arrangement depends on acceptance. If a substantial part of a people does not accept the authority of its rulers, then those can only remain in power by means of force, and even that use of force needs to be accepted to be effective. Gramsci called this acceptance of the socio-political status quo “hegemony”. Every stable state relies primarily on hegemony as a source of control. Hegemony works through the dissemination of values and beliefs that create acceptance and that serve the interests of the state and/or the ruling elite (the “hegemones”). Hegemony is most efficient if it remains invisible. A key hegemonic belief is the idea that there is no alternative to the current socio-political status quo or that the way things are is “natural”. The current hegemony – that is, the set of values and beliefs that bolster the current socio-political status quo – is a hegemony of psychopathy: it promotes “cultural psychopathy” and destroys empathy and compassion, thus threatening everything that makes us human.
The hegemony of psychopathy is responsible for massive human suffering. It must be fought and replaced with a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs that promote compassion and care. Fighting hegemony requires fighting the “pillars” that support it. Most important among these are the mass media and culture industry, and mainstream economics. The former is responsible for a continuous stream of hegemonic propaganda; the latter – among others – for providing a pseudo-scientific justification for the false belief that there is no alternative. This essay closes off with some considerations on tactics and strategy in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy, but does not – and cannot – offer any concrete advice.

One of the longest standing objections levied against virtue ethics is the Self-Absorption Objection. Proponents of this objection state that the main problem with neo-Aristotelian accounts of motivation is that they prescribe that our ultimate reason for acting virtuously is that doing so is constitutive of our own eudaimonia. In this paper, I examine Christopher Toner’s attempt to address this objection by arguing that we should understand the virtuous agent as acting virtuously because doing so is what it means to live well qua human. I then go on to defend Toner’s view from two criticisms: namely, that his account is un-Aristotelian, and that his account does not take seriously the importance of the virtuous agent organizing her life in a way that is good for her. In doing so, I pave the way for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists to develop an adequate response to the self-absorption objection along Toner’s lines.

For published version, see: https://www.pdcnet.org/jpr/onlinefirst

Sidgwick’s defence of esoteric morality has been heavily criticized,for example in Bernard Williams’s condemnation of it as ‘Govern-mentHouseutilitarianism.’Itisalsoatoddswiththeideaofmorality defended by Kant, Rawls, Bernard Gert, Brad Hooker, and T.M.Scanlon. Yet it does seem to be an implication of consequentialismthatitissometimesrighttodoinsecretwhatitwouldnotberighttodoopenly,ortoadvocatepublicly.WedefendSidgwickonthisissue,and show that accepting the possibility of esoteric morality makesit possible to explain why we should accept consequentialism, even while we may feel disapproval towards some of its implications

Les notions d'altruisme et d'égoïsme prêtent facilement à confusion car elles renvoient à la fois à une pratique individuelle et au jugement moral de celle-ci. On distingue l'altruisme pur, qui ne sert ni directement ni indirectement l'intérêt individuel de l'agent, de l'altruisme de proximité, de parentèle ou de groupe qui sert l'intérêt de ceux envers qui on se sent proche ou avec qui on a une certaine proximité génétique. Un certain nombre de personnes contestent l'idée que ce dernier type d'altruisme soit moral dans la mesure où il est intéressé, y compris si l'agent n'est pas conscient de sa proximité (génétique) avec le bénéficiaire de son action. On distingue également, après Sidgwick, la pratique observée de l'égoïsme (qu'il appelle l'égoïsme psychologique) de la norme morale qui consisterait à devoir rechercher son propre plaisir (ou égoïsme rationnel). Cette distinction peut être étendue à l'altruisme (Sidgwick préfère le terme de bienveillance) et il n'est pas rare de rencontrer l'expression altruisme psychologique pour désigner la tendance des individus à servir l'intérêt des autres. Par opposition à l'égoïsme, qui est négativement connoté, l'altruisme apparaît comme une qualité morale. L'objet de cet article est de s'interroger a) sur l'existence d'un altruisme pur et b) sur sa place dans les théories de la justice redistributive. <IT1> Les fondements théoriques de l'égoïsme Comme l'étymologie du mot l'indique, la notion d'égoïsme repose sur la distinction entre le 'moi' et l'autre. On oppose ainsi l'égoïsme à l'altruisme. La notion d'altruisme est, cependant, assez récente et date de la moitié du dix-neuvième siècle. L'opposition entre altruisme et égoïsme est, ainsi que Stefan Collini le montre très bien, caractéristique du dix-neuvième siècle et elle ne serait être comparée à la distinction, entre amour de soi et bienveillance, très utilisée aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles (Collini, 1991). A la différence de l'amour de soi à laquelle elle succède, la notion d'égoïsme repose sur deux principes fondamentaux, le principe d'exclusivité et celui de rivalité. Le principe d'exclusivité signifie que, par égoïsme, on entend les actions destinées à ne satisfaire que l'intérêt personnel de l'agent, et uniquement celui-ci. Le principe de rivalité, qui lui est sous-jacent, affirme que la satisfaction des intérêts personnels et celle des intérêts des autres est incompatible. Le philosophe anglais Derek Parfit a remis en cause le bien-fondé de ces principes en développant une approche réductionniste de l'identité personnelle (Parfit, 1984). L'individu n'est, selon lui, ni complètement le même ni totalement différent de celui qu'il fut dans le passé ou de celui qu'il sera dans le futur. Au mieux peut-on penser l'identité personnelle en termes de degré. Dans la lignée de Locke, Parfit fait, tout d'abord, de la continuité psychologique l'un des principaux fondements de la notion d'identité personnelle. Mais cette caractéristique est insuffisante pour Parfit. Le lien identitaire lockéen ne permet pas d'intégrer la notion de proximité psychologique (ou connectedness) qui seule permet de penser l'identité en termes de degrés. Une discontinuité temporaire ne saurait, tout d'abord, totalement rompre le lien identitaire. De plus, se souvenir de ses actions, de ses préférences ou de ses valeurs ne signifie pas que l'on les reconnaisse en tant que siennes. De la même façon, je peux dès à présent plus ou moins me dissocier de celui que je serai dans le futur si je sais que celui-ci ne partagera mes valeurs ou mes préférences actuelles. En revanche, je peux ressentir une proximité psychologique plus grande pour une personne autre qui les partage ou qui les partagera dans le futur. En introduisant cette notion clé dans les théories sur l'identité personnelle, Parfit nous invite donc à

In Chapter 2 of Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester defends two hypotheses: that instrumental rationality requires agents to maximise the satisfaction of their wants and that all agents actually meet this requirement. In addition, he argues that all agents are self-interested (though not necessarily egoistic) and he offers an account of categorical moral desires which entails that no agent ever does what he genuinely feels to be morally wrong. I show that Lester’s two hypotheses are false because they cannot accommodate weakness of will, because they are inconsistent with agency, which requires free will, because ends, obligations and values cannot be reduced to desires, and because maximisation is often not possible. Further, Lester’s claim that agents are self-interested is vacuous, his attempted reduction of moral behaviour to want-satisfaction fails, and his contention, that agents always do what they genuinely think to be morally required, seems untenable. A defence of freedom that depends on homo economicus is far from promising.

La reciente rehabilitación de la tradición de pensamiento conocida como economía civil se constituye como una propuesta de ampliación de la racionalidad instrumental maximizadora del homo oeconomicus, su proyección en el mainstream de la teoría económica contemporánea y, por esta vía, en el tipo específico de relaciones que caracterizan lo que hoy entendemos por mercado. Dentro del contexto anterior, la propuesta de la economía civil tiene, como punto de partida, una revisión crítica de la Teoría de la Elección Racional -considerada como una forma de racionalidad instrumental- y de sus principales presupuestos antropológicos; esto es, el mercado entendido como la esfera excluyente de un ‘sujeto económico’ motivado únicamente por la maximización de su utilidad. Dicho esto, nuestro trabajo se propone, en primer lugar, destacar la debilidad intrínseca de la Teoría de la Elección Racional (TER) como ‘modelo explicativo’ de la conducta humana, específicamente, dado el carácter ‘extensivo’ -a todo acto humano- de sus principales supuestos. Frente a la reducción de ‘lo económico’ a su dimensión estrictamente técnica, nuestro estudio se decanta, en cambio, por una rehabilitación de la moralidad y la libertad en la economía desde una revalorización de la ‘economía política’ entendida como ciencia práctica. Dentro del contexto anterior, dirigiremos nuestra mirada hacia algunas propuestas de ampliación de la racionalidad económica, con especial énfasis en el denominado ‘enfoque o perspectiva civil’, pero, al mismo tiempo, recogiendo otras propuestas alineadas con el paradigma del homo reciprocans; específicamente, la noción de “economía cordial” desarrollada por Patricio Calvo y el concepto de “escasez compleja” formulado por Raúl González Fabre.

Is Confucian ethics primarily egoistic or altruistic? There is textual support for both answers. For the former, for example, Confucius claims that one learns for the sake of oneself; for the latter, we can find Confucius saying that one ought to not impose upon others as one would not like to be imposed upon. This essay aims to explain in what sense Confucian ethics is egoistic (the highest goal one aims to reach is to become a virtuous person oneself) and in what sense it is altruistic (a virtuous person is necessarily concerned with the well-being, both external and internal, of others). The conclusion to be drawn, however, is not that Confucian ethics is both egoistic and altruistic, but that it is neither, since the Confucian ideal of a virtuous person is to be in one body with others so that there are really no others (since all others become part of myself), and since there are no others, there is no self either.

Mackie’s claim that in general courage benefits its possessor seems inconsistent with his ‘error theory’ of value.  But how plausible is it in itself?  I suggest that his arguments for the claim fail in the same way as the arguments of those who more explicitly embrace ‘virtue ethics’ fail.  We do not know any way of objectively weighing risks against other considerations, of deciding whether something is ‘worth the risk’.  Since I have no PROOF that there could not be a way, I prefer to speak of ‘ignorance’ rather than ‘error’ here.

This article is an overview of the philosophical sources which are clearly visible during the research of the philosophy of Ayn Rand's objectivism. Also it attempts to link this philosophical concept with inherent USA utilitarian philosophy and pragmatism.

I argue that Mackie's thesis about courage and self-interest is neither consistent with his 'error theory' of value nor convincing in itself.  The question of the objectivity of value needs to be distinguished from that of whether one value can objectively outweigh or outrank another.  This is so even when the only values under consideration are self-interested ones.

We answer the title question with a qualified “No.” We arrive at this answer by spelling out what the proper place of the concept `happiness&#39; is in a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics: (1) Happiness in the sense of personal well-being has only a loose relation to virtue; it doesn&#39;t deserve any prominent place in virtue ethics. (2) Happiness in the sense of flourishing is impossible without virtue, but that doesn&#39;t imply that individual actions should aim at flourishing. (3) Instead, flourishing sets the standard of good practical reasoning; it is hardly ever the proper aim of a practical inference. This paper begins with a common (mis)interpretation of neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, on which it is a form of rational egoism. We then develop our alternative understanding against this foil