Popular Constitutionalism

Reseña del libro "Por una Justicia Dialógica. El Poder Judicial como promotor de la deliberación democrática", volumen compilado por Roberto Gargarella y publicado en la colección de derecho y política de Siglo XXI Editores, dirigida por Paola Bergallo y el propio Gargarella.

Paper submitted to the Workshop ‘New constitutionalism? New forms of democracy and rule of law beyond liberalism’, International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati 12-13.7.2018

The term ‘populist constitutionalism’ usually refers to constitutional discourses and practices of populist movements, parties or leaders. A rather different conception of the term refers to a non-legalistic approach to constitutional law that rejects the idea that the constitution means (solely) what judicial elites say it means, and contends instead that the political branches of government, as well as political parties, social movements, and ultimately the people themselves have at least an equal say on constitutional meaning. This is closely related to the concepts of “popular” or “political constitutionalism”. The paper proposes that populist constitutionalism in the second sense (as a practice of constitutional law) may reduce the perils of populist constitutionalism in the first sense (as a practice of populists).

The paper focuses on the main conceptual issues (classifications, terminology, methodology) relating to the phenomenon of the degeneration of contemporary democracies that have attracted the attention of different social sciences in recent years. It begins with a reconstruction of the main cultural trends of democracy (classical, liberal, socialist, social, radical, and so on) then continues by exploring the current debate. The debate focuses on some leading categorizations: illiberal democracies, authoritarian constitutionalism and populist constitutionalism. Keywords: constitutional regression-illiberal democracies-authoritarian constitutionalism-populist constitutionalism-democracy. SOMMARIO: 1. Una questione di termini. 2. I diversi filoni culturali della democrazia. 2.1 La democrazia (di derivazione) liberale. 3. Il decadimento o degenerazione costituzionale come nuovo paradigma di studio. 3.1 La dottrina su costituzionalismo autoritario, costituzionalismo populista e democrazie illiberali. 4. Il cambio di impostazione: dalle democrazie incerte o imperfette alle democrazie illiberali? 5. Conclusioni (molto) provvisorie.  Professore ordinario di Diritto pubblico comparato, Università degli Studi di Milano. Citazione consigliata: A. Di Gregorio, I fenomeni di degenerazione delle democrazie contemporanee: qualche spunto di riflessione sullo sfondo delle contrapposizioni dottrinali, in Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie (NAD),

El objetivo del trabajo es discutir si, y en qué medida, el llamado constitucionalismo popular constituye una amenaza incompatible con el estado de derecho. La tensión entre los ideales del estado de derecho y de la democracia atraviesa la historia del constitucionalismo. El constitucionalismo popular pretende dejar en el pueblo las decisiones últimas sobre dilemas constitucionales, lo cual inclina la balanza sobre el segundo de los términos. Esta posición relativiza la visión tradicional del estado de derecho desde una perspectiva constitucional. La pregunta es hasta qué punto ambos ideales son compatibles. Para contestar, se estudiarán las distintas teorías que se han englobado en denominaciones tales como “constitucionalismo democrático”, “constitucionalismo populista” y “constitucionalismo popular”, analizándolas dialécticamente con la idea de estado de derecho

Paper submitted to IVR World Congress 2019, Dignity, Democracy, Diversity, The 29th World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy – Workshop on Alternatives to Liberal Constitutionalism: Popular, Political, Deliberative, University of Lucerne, 11-12 July 2019

In this paper I aim to assess three attempts to challenge orthodox constitutional thinking: "populist," "popular," and "political" constitutionalism. To do so, I briefly examine three seminal books-by Mark Tushnet, Larry Kramer, and Richard Bellamy, respectively-which best illustrate these alternative approaches. Then, I track down what all three approaches have in common and, significantly, what they are opposed to. After examining a case-study from the Greek experience, I conclude that, despite having failed to replace the dominant model of liberal constitutionalism, these alternative approaches are an invaluable enrichment of constitutional thinking, both descriptively, offering the vocabulary to discern and assess constitutional law made outside the courts, as well as normatively, proposing the advancement of democratic constitutionalism as an answer to the alleged demise of contemporary liberal constitutionalism.

¿Le preocupa a la Suprema Corte el conflicto democrático en México? Todos los días nuestro tribunal constitucional recibe innumerables casos donde abogados, poderes de la unión y grupos de litigio de la sociedad civil intentan convencer sobre su visión particular de la Constitución. Temas tan polémicos como interrupción del embarazo, expresiones religiosas en espacios públicos, matrimonio igualitario, uso de drogas, entre otros, están en el escritorio del juez constitucional cada mañana. En una sociedad cada vez más polarizada y definida por sus desacuerdos, once jueces en toga se enfrentan al reto de ofrecer una respuesta a estos dilemas que dividen ideológicamente a nuestra nación. Este proceso de decisión y su impacto en la sociedad es el principal motivo de reflexión de este libro. Esta obra se inscribe en las investigaciones que se han preocupado por conciliar las tensiones entre democracia y constitucionalismo a través de un proceso de justicia dialógica.

Libro citado en los Salvamentos de Voto a las Sentencias C-285 de 2016 y C-332 de 2017 de la Corte Constitucional de Colombia - Book quoted by two dissenting opinions in the Colombian Constitutional Court:

http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2016/c-285-16.htm

http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/c-332-17.htm

Artigo de Roberto Gargarella, traduzido. Desde meados dos anos 1980, e até encontrar sua morte desgraçada, Carlos Nino desempenhou regularmente suas atividades de professor visitante da Universidade de Yale, nos Estados Unidos. Um dos tópicos sobre os quais trabalhou regularmente durante todo este tempo foi a questão sobre o controle jurisdicional de constitucionalidade – uma questão “inconclusa” em sua obra -, e sobre a qual sofreu constantes desenvolvimentos até seu último livro. Neste breve escrito, pretendo examinar as intuições de Carlos Nino a respeito disso, a luz do chamado “constitucionalismo popular”, uma corrente de pensamento bastante crítica sobre os enfoques mais conhecidos sobre o controle jurisdicional de constitucionalidade, que encontrou lugar e acolhida especial, justamente, na Universidade de Yale. Para levar esta análise adiante, na primeira parte deste trabalho, irei expor de maneira bastante sucinta a visão que Nino apresenta sobre o controle jurisdicional de constitucionalidade, em suas últimas obras. Logo, na segunda parte, resumirei algumas das principais linhas de análise características do “constitucionalismo popular” para, finalmente, em uma terceira e última seção, explorar acordos e desacordos possíveis entres ambas as cosmovisões.

Particular to the struggles of today is a renewed and increasingly networked politics of local democracy in opposition to global corporate power. With the five urgent essays in this symposium we bring these politics into a world-systems space, considering specific community conflicts with corporations over water and petro-carbon as part of larger translocal struggles, and taking up broader strategies for asserting democratic control over economic life. The included essays feature two of four terrains of struggle —the translocalization of local resistance and contests over sovereignty – that we see as significant in the contemporary dynamics of local democracy and corporate power. We identify additional examples of contests on each these terrains of struggle, as well as those terrains involving contestation of the corporation itself and of alternative global constitutionalisms, in mapping the dimensions of the developing period of community-corporate struggle. Our purpose is to set in motion further collaborations between academic and community-based scholars, with the goal of equipping communities with knowledge useful in expanding and deepening democracy.

O casuísmo e o ativismo das Cortes Constitucionais são problemas contemporâneos da maioria dos Estados Democráticos. As decisões das Cortes Constitucionais não são submetidos ao controle popular, mas de pessoas e organizações próximas ao núcleo do Poder Judiciário. Neste sentido, o povo não participa das decisões das Cortes Supremas. A influente minoria privilegiada, fragilizada pela perda deste espaço legislativo para a maioria popular, elegeu o Poder Judiciário como instrumento adequado para a conquista e/ou manutenção da hegemonia política perdida ou ameaçada nas urnas. A vontade do povo foi substituída pela do Poder Judiciário. Pretende-se neste artigo enfrentar a questão da expansão das competências das Cortes Constitucionais e sugerir o estabelecimento da Revisão e Controle Legislativo das Decisões da Suprema Corte, inserindo-o em um contexto de democracia deliberativa..

The paper focuses on the main conceptual issues (classifications, terminology, methodology) relating to the phenomenon of the degeneration of contemporary democracies that have attracted the attention of different social sciences in recent years. It begins with a reconstruction of the main cultural trends of democracy (classical, liberal, socialist, social, radical, and so on) then continues by exploring the current debate. The debate focuses on some leading categorizations: illiberal democracies, authoritarian constitutionalism and populist constitutionalism.

Contemporary scholarship mainly focuses on the crisis of political representation as the key facilitator behind the emergence of populism. If so, populism urges public law to revisit and rethink institutional designs. This article addresses two possible responses to populism. On one hand, an intuitive response could be to hamper popular participation by avoiding plebiscites, referendums or any other kind of public consultation. Alternatively, it is possible to respond to populism from a structural point of view. In my opinion, to resist populism public law should take into account the lack of responsiveness and accountability of representative systems. The article puts forward a proposal in that direction; it advances a response to populism consisting of new institutional systems that generate strong participatory mechanisms to incorporate 'the popular'. In doing so, the article uses the new Latin American Constitutionalism as an example of both the potentialities and difficulties of designing institutional systems in public law. In the wake of rising populism, it contributes to the existing debate by criticising populism and its constitutional expression, as well as developing arguments in favour of popular constitutionalism.

¿Es la Corte Suprema la intérprete final de la Constitución? Este trabajo argumenta que, en un sentido significativo, no lo es y no puede serlo: los grandes desacuerdos sociales subsisten por más que la Corte Suprema los resuelva con pretensiones de finalidad. Ellos desaparecen sólo en el marco de complejos procesos culturales en los que los tribunales intervienen de un modo relevante y trascendente, pero no definitivo o automático. Si esta hipótesis se sostiene, entonces esos desacuerdos permanecen y se expresan por distintos caminos que han sido explorados por el constitucionalismo popular o democrático. El trabajo plantea una mirada crítica sobre esas teorías, que tienden a idealizar los procesos existentes y a invisibilizar las limitaciones que ellos presentan y que son especialmente relevantes en el contexto de las democracias de América Latina. Finalmente, concluye que pensar más y mejores caminos para la expresión de nuestros desacuerdos normativos debería ser una parte fundamental de nuestra agenda constitucional.

SOMMARIO: 1. Alle origini del paradosso costituzionale americano.-2. We the People: disaccordo politico e trasformazioni costituzionali.-3. Il dissenso nell'epoca delle identity politics: da 'We' the People a 'Me' the People.-4. Dissenso costituzionale e divisione dei poteri.-V. Conclusioni.

Il contributo analizza i modelli di selezione giudiziaria nelle corti statali americane e le ripercussione sull'indipendenza giudiziaria a partire da alcune recenti proposte di riforma. L'analisi di alcuni noti casi giudiziali mostra chia-ramente la difficile compatibilità fra i modelli di selezione popolare dei giu-dici con i principi costituzionali, a partire dal generale principio contromag-gioritario positivizzato nell'art. V della Costituzione. The paper analyzes the models of judicial selection in the American state courts and the repercussions on judicial independence starting from some recent reform proposals. The analysis of some known judicial cases clearly shows the difficult compatibility between the models of popular selection of judges with the constitutional principles, starting from the general counter-majorityitarian principle positivized in the art. V of the Constitution. Parole chiave: Elezione popolare giudiziaria, indipendenza della magistratura, popular constitutionalism Key words: Popular judicial election, independence of the judiciary, popular constitutionalism SOMMARIO: 1. Introduzione.-2. Il sistema di selezione (e di conferma) dei giu-dici delle Corti Statali: quadro generale.-3. Judges as representatives? L'(in)dipen-denza dei giudici nel sistema costituzionale americano.-4. Il sistema di elezione po-polare nel popular constitutionalism: The People vs The Courts?.-4.1. Gli effetti: l'"accomodationist" approach delle corti elettive nei confronti delle leggi di iniziativa popolare. 1. Introduzione Recenti proposte di riforma del sistema di elezione dei giudici al

This contribution aims at discussing constitutional democracy in the age of populisms, by explaining how populist movements oppose liberal-democratic constitutionalism and by presenting the thesis of a so-called 'populist constitutionalism', as proposed by Mark Tushnet.
In the first section, a general and analytic exploration of populist phenomena will be drawn, by focusing on the so-called thesis of a 'populist' constitutionalism. In the second part, Tushnet's arguments for a populist constitutionalism will be presented, through the analysis of his two main contributions: "Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts", in which Tushnet develops his critique of legal constitutionalism and judicial review as an undemocratic power by unelected justices, and "Authoritarian Constitutionalism", a recent article in which a distinction between 'authoritarian' and 'populist' definitions of consti-tutionalism is drawn.
In conclusion, such arguments will be discussed by proposing a critical response to Tushnet's positions and presenting some risks of a majoritarian and populist constitutional democracy.

Στο κείμενο που ακολουθεί θα προσπαθήσω να παρουσιάσω συνοπτικά, και κάπως σχηματικά, αυτό που έχει αποκληθεί λαϊκιστικός ή λαϊκός ή πολιτικός συνταγματισμός. Πρόκειται για μια προσέγγιση που αντιτίθεται στην κρατούσα νομική (ή νομικίστικη) προσέγγιση του συντάγματος, θέτοντάς το όχι εκτός και υπεράνω,
αλλά εντός της πολιτικής. Μια βασική θέση που τη διατρέχει –και η οποία φαίνεται να επιβεβαιώνεται στα χρόνια της κρίσης στη χώρα μας, αλλά και αλλού– είναι πως, όσο καλύτερα λειτουργεί η δημοκρατία, τόσο καλύτερα προστατεύονται τα δικαιώματα. Επομένως, η επίθεση που υφίστανται τα δικαιώματα στην τρέχουσα περίοδο μάλλον συνιστά και μιαν ένδειξη για την υποχώρηση της δημοκρατίας.

Constitutional democracies claim themselves to be constructed upon the will of the people. As the agency gap between the rulers and the ruled widens, people are increasingly more frustrated and compelled to actively take a stand. Advances of technology and social mobilization give increasing opportunities for the people to directly express their will and call for accountability from their representatives. Against this backdrop, this paper engages in a comparative analysis of people’s movements that happened and are continuing to take place in South Korea, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Algeria. Based on the analysis, the paper maps out the common weaknesses in the constitutional and political structures of each of these countries and thereby, highlights the distinctive features of these people’s movements. The paper conceptualizes constitutional movements of people as a specific instance of popular constitutionalism wherein people challenge their representatives and directly assert the constitutional principles. These people’s movements, while being formidable, faces complicated dilemmas in their quest to establish constitutional norms in their countries.

To download, please go to  https://ssrn.com/abstract=3302988
This short talk focuses on three aspects of Robert Cover's brand of legal pluralism: First, Cover’s account of legal pluralism went beyond the simple recognition of non-state legal orders; just as important for him was the claim that non-state communities could generate and defend distinct readings of the state’s own legal order. Second, Cover's jurisprudence assigned a central role to state violence and non-state communities' resistance. Violence and resistance were vital to his account not only because they are the way of the world but because they help render legal pluralism real. Third, Cover's well-known focus on the narrative dimension of the law was intertwined with his famous image of the law as a bridge between the present world and the ideal. Both the real and the ideal are narratives – stories – and that law is, in a sense, the feat of engineering that connects these two separated narratives.

"The democracy movement that formed in the United States in the 1990s and whose maturing influence we witness today is politically significant as a uniter of the divided political tradition of the U.S. Left and a challenger to corporate capitalism. This movement is also significant as an object and an instrument of study through which researchers may learn new things about social change. Democracy movement studies, and the study of the U.S. democracy movement in particular, may offer opportunities for collective action that otherwise we would miss."

Popular constitutionalism rarely arises in authoritarian polities. In the absence of genuine elections and referenda, aggrieved and disenfranchised citizens are more likely to resort to extraconstitutional action to defend themselves, to which the regime may respond with decisive suppression. Systemic popular constitutionalism did emerge in Hong Kong, currently under Chinese sovereignty, however. Through coordinated mass resistance based on shared constitutional understandings, large numbers of residents have succeeded in restraining the appointed Hong Kong chief executive from deploying his full range of powers, obliged China to make concessions on electoral reform it would not have made otherwise, and enabled the Basic Law, an imposed constitution, to remain relevant. This article specifies three preconditions under which the residents of Hong Kong have, in the teeth of authoritarianism, managed to adjudge the constitutionality of the acts of the ruling elite with their feet. These preconditions, nevertheless, are idiosyncratic, and may not endure the recent mounting tensions between Hong Kong and China.