Opus postumum

Roland Barthes, Vita Nova. Santiago de Chile, Marginalia, 2018, 72 páginas Publicar un libro de ocho páginas es un gesto curioso. Publicar un libro de ocho páginas de Roland Barthes desde una joven editorial chilena es escribir un nuevo episodio de la historia del persistente barthesismo latinoamericano. Pero publicar, además, Vita Nova-el último proyecto del autor y del que llegó a escribir tan solo estas ocho páginas-es tensar el nudo de lo póstumo, es ir al corazón de esa condición.

This essay investigates the transformation of the faculty of understanding in Kant's Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics drafts found in Opus postumum. I argue that in fascicles X and XI Kant implicitly reverses the architectonic order of sensibility and understanding. Without an account of this reversal, Kant's critique of Isaac Newton's conception of phenomena and the so called Selbstsetzungslehre (doctrine of self-positing) in fascicle VII fall apart. I argue that what is at stake is a challenge Kant makes to his own presuppositions and a challenge to the Kantian philosopher who wishes to stay with a strictly 'critical' Kant.

In this article, I have a modest goal: (1) to sketch how Kant can avoid the charge of “subjective idealism” advanced against him by John McDowell and (2) to do so with reference to Kant’s last work, the so-called Opus Postumum. I am interested in defending Kant on this point because doing so not only (a) shows how we need not—at least not because of this point about idealism—jump ship from Kant to Hegel (as McDowell and others think), but also (b) suggests that the Opus Postumum is a text that ought to be explored more by Kantians and those interested in Kant. A subsidiary, implicit point is that (c) we need not shy away from McDowell’s reading of Kant in order to oppose McDowell’s criticism of Kant. In order to defend against McDowell’s charge, I focus on the argument of the Refutation of Idealism, showing how this argument evolves in Kant’s later works, especially the Opus Postumum.

This paper poses a dilemma for Kant’s conception of substance in the First Analogy of Experience from the first Critique. At times Kant seems to think that empirical objects may serve as substances, since they persist through the alteration of their properties (e.g. a leaf changing color). I will call these ‘substances.’ At other times, however, Kant seems to suggest that there is only one all-encompassing Substance whose quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. I will call this ‘Substance.’ If the schematized category of substance (persistence of the real in time), can denote only one of these conceptions, Kant faces a dilemma. If the schematized category of substance applies to Substance, then although this concept would capture that single backdrop by reference to which the subject experiences the simultaneity and succession of relatively enduring empirical objects in a common spatiotemporal framework, the subject could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. In contrast, if the schematized category of substance applies to substances, then although the subject could individuate substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a single backdrop by reference to which these substances could be experienced as either simultaneous with or successive to one another in a common spatiotemporal framework. This paper attempts to overcome the dilemma by examining the two different concepts of substance that develop in the first Critique and Kant’s final, unfinished work, the so-called Opus postumum.

"A publication on Kant's letters - written by Friedrich Theodor Rink - with Jeronimo de Bosch (Curator of the Leiden University) in autumn 1799 and the backgrounds of Dutch Kantianism in the 90s of the 18th Century.

Abstract: This paper presents the correspondence in the year 1799 between Jeronimo de Bosch, the curator of the university of Leiden, and Kant or rather F. Th. Rink, who obviously was writing on behalf of Kant. The correspondence was initiated by a letter that de Bosch sent on 6 July 1799 to Kant accompanied by a lengthy poem on Kant’s ethics. This paper presents two critically-edited, hitherto unknown letters by Rink to De Bosch and an autograph by Kant. These letters provide us with new materials pertaining to the development of and Kant’s
involvement in Rink’s edition of Mancherley zur Geschichte der metacritischen Invasion, the so-called „Gedächtniszettel“ and Kant’s activities in the summer of 1799 while editing
his so-called Opus postumum. It also sheds new light on the reception of Kant’s philosophy in Holland, mainly with respect to De Bosch’s Kantian sources.

Keywords: Jeronimo de Bosch, Friedrich Theodor Rink, Immanuel Gottlieb Huschke, Paulus van Hemert, Correspondence, Opus postumum, Early Dutch Kantianism"

Monografia jest pierwszym polskim opracowaniem w całości poświęconym ostatniej, nieukończonej rozprawie Immanuela Kanta pt. "Przejście od metafizycznych podstaw przyrodoznawstwa do fizyki" (znanej jako "Opus postumum").

Plik zawiera fragment monografii ("Spis treści" i "Wprowadzenie").

The monograph is the first Polish paper devoted entirely to Immanuel Kant’s last, unfinished dissertation entitled "Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics" (known as "Opus Postumum").

In the last decades, Kant researchers have developed an increasing interest in both Kant’s writings of the critical period outside of the three Critiques and for the post-critical development of his thought. Understanding the Opus Postumum – the last, unaccomplished project the Philosopher of Königsberg worked on during several years at the end of his life – plays an important role here, as it serves to identify both the foundational role of the three Critiques for other philosophical inquiries, as well as to understand the unity of a philosophical system that Kant had tried to establish. In this sense, the Opus Postumum can serve as a ground to identify the relation between Kant’s transcendental philosophy, his natural philosophy, practical philosophy, philosophy of religion, metaphysics and his broader epistemology.

The purpose of this workshop is to discuss the ways in which Kant adapts, transforms and integrates his previous ideas into a more comprehensive and unified outline of philosophy. We are interested in understanding Kant’s new approach to natural philosophy, his re-evaluation of the scope and limits of transcendental philosophy, the unity of his system, and the transformation of earlier ideas.

The conference aims at providing a space for fruitful exchanges between established scholars, junior researchers and PhD students. Presentation time – except keynote speakers – will be approx. 30 minutes + 20 minutes for discussion.

Pierwszy polski przekład fragmentów ostatniej, nieukończonej rozprawy Immanuela Kanta pt. "Przejście od metafizycznych podstaw przyrodoznawstwa do fizyki", znanej jako "Opus postumum".

Przekład ukazał się jako kontynuacja polskiego wydania "Dzieł zebranych" Immanuela Kanta.

Plik zawiera "Wprowadzenie" i "Notę edytorską".

In a September 1798 letter to Christian Garve (and a month later in a letter to Johann Kiesewetter), Kant claims that without a transition [Übergang] from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics there will be a ‘gap’ in the Critical philosophy. Kant does not make clear, however, exactly what this gap is or how the transition is supposed to fill the gap. The Übergang section of Kant’s Opus postumum (written between May and August of 1799) has received considerable attention of late due to the many drafts it contains of Kant’s Ether Deduction. Commentators have also hoped to find a solution there to the gap problem. Less attention has been paid, however, to Kant’s project in Convolut 10 of the Opus postumum which he began in August 1799 immediately after completing the Übergang section. Assuming that the Ether Deduction is sound and proves a priori the existence of a transcendental material condition for experience, Convolut 10 discusses what changes would have to be made to the transcendental formal conditions of experience (what the subject contributes to her experience of objects, viz. space, time, categories, and apperception) in their empirical function given the addition of this transcendental material condition. Kant claims in Convolut 10 that these changes are necessary to finally effect a transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics and, as I will argue, such a transition will be tantamount to bridging the gap in the Critical philosophy mentioned in the letters to Garve and Kiesewetter.

Reseña de: Thorndike, O., Kant's Transition Project and Late Philosophy. Connecting the Opus postumum and Metaphysics of Morals. London. Bloomsbury. 2018. pp. 280. ISBN: 9781350050310. Oliver Thorndike señala, en su último libro, el punto ciego de las investigaciones académicas sobre el sistema kantiano: "Hay muchos académicos interesados en la filosofía moral kantiana que no explican suficientemente cómo las consideraciones empíricas […] pueden jugar un papel sistemático. En una teoría que es decididamente a priori […]. Estos autores […] fracasan a la hora de explicar cómo las consideraciones empíricas estarían conectadas con el fundamento a priori de la moralidad, conectando, así, el principio a priori de la autonomía con la agencia empírica contingente. Sin embargo, para Kant la normatividad de las leyes particulares no puede ser contingente a su base" (p. XII). Éste es el problema crítico kantiano del que se hace cargo Oliver Thorndike, y que puede localizarse en la intersección entre las leyes metafísicas y las leyes empíricas particulares, un problema que afecta a la filosofía crítica kantiana, tanto en su dimensión teórica, como práctica. Thorndike se esfuerza por conectar ambos aspectos de la filosofía kantiana.

This essay explores the undervalued methodological elements underpinning Kant’s Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics in Opus postumum. I do this by drawing a line between the Architectonic of Pure Reason in Critique of Pure Reason and the Transition, although this line is problematized at various points. What emerges is the call for an explicitly architectonic understanding of the concept of transition in Opus postumum. According to the architectonic of Transition, instead of only devising the strict division of metaphysics and physics we must devise systematic ways of building bridges between them and finding their points of interconnection. When extended to the wider critical edifice this implies a radical departure from the Architectonic of Pure Reason as it was understood in Critique of Pure Reason and a complication of Kant’s theorization of metaphysics, physics, and physiology throughout his corpus.

Kant's position on the problem of God is radicalized under the influence of transcendental philosophy's evolving project. The weakening position of physico-theology and the growing importance of moral theology are possible ways of describing the shift in perspective between the pre-critical period writings and the critical period writings. The separation of the area of cognition and action excludes the possibility of formulating theodicy in a classical form. God, as only a conceived idea, and its meaning is firmly grounded in practical philosophy, in which the presentation of the law is a sufficient condition for moral behaviour. In such a model, God is only an idea, but a fully functional one. This could be noticed mostly in the Opus postumum, where in analogy to God's practical idea, Kant deduces the transcendental ether's existence. Ether is not just a hypothesis for Kant; it is not just a 'temporary' or 'contingent' assumption made ad hoc to explain a particular experience. Still, it is a fundamental and indelible condition, a conditio sine qua non of experience in general. The non-hypothetical matter of heat (ether) is the transcendental condition of all experience, though it does not cease to be an 'intelligible thing', an 'idea'. The status of this idea is entirely 'non-theoretical'. Kant writes about the ether similarly as he writes about the idea of God, which is only conceivable but at the same time it maintains a strong 'non-theo-retical' status. The Kantian idea of God is strongly objectified. It is not a 'product' of reason, but rather something 'perceived' by reason, a strictly theistic idea (as Erich Adickes claims).
* Niniejszy artykuł jest poszerzoną wersją referatu o tym samym tytule, wygłoszonego na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim Jana Pawła II, podczas XI Polskiego Zjazdu Filozoficznego (Lublin, 9-14 września 2019 roku).

Reseña de: Thorndike, O., Kant's Transition Project and Late Philosophy. Connecting the Opus postumum and Metaphysics of Morals. London. Bloomsbury. 2018. pp. 280. ISBN: 9781350050310.
Oliver Thorndike señala, en su último libro, el punto ciego de las investigaciones académicas sobre el sistema kantiano: "Hay muchos académicos interesados en la filosofía moral kantiana que no explican suficientemente cómo las consideraciones empíricas […] pueden jugar un papel sistemático. En una teoría que es decididamente a priori […]. Estos autores […] fracasan a la hora de explicar cómo las consideraciones empíricas estarían conectadas con el fundamento a priori de la moralidad, conectando, así, el principio a priori de la autonomía con la agencia empírica contingente. Sin embargo, para Kant la normatividad de las leyes particulares no puede ser contingente a su base" (p. XII). Éste es el problema crítico kantiano del que se hace cargo Oliver Thorndike, y que puede localizarse en la intersección entre las leyes metafísicas y las leyes empíricas particulares, un problema que afecta a la filosofía crítica kantiana, tanto en su dimensión teórica, como práctica. Thorndike se esfuerza por conectar ambos aspectos de la filosofía kantiana.

This is the second of a series of two articles examining Kant’s attitude toward mystical experiences and the relation between his interest in these and his interest in constructing a Critical System of metaphysics. “The Critical Mysticism” explores the extent to which Kant’s writings prior to his Opus Postumum (and not including Dreams of a Spirit Seer) contain a more developed theory of mystical experience. Traditionally Kant has been regarded as against all brands of mysticism. This arises partly from his narrow use of “mystical,” but primarily from a misunderstanding by commentators of his statements concerning the possibility of supersensible experience. The latter misunderstanding can be easily corrected by clearly distinguishing between “immediate experience” and experience in Kant’s technical sense of “empirical knowledge.” Kant never denies the possibility of an immediate ex-perience of supersensible reality, but only the supposition that such experiences can establish empirical knowledge. The character of his Critical mysticism can be discerned, even without examining Kant’s Opus Postumum (which was to describe fully his Critical mysticism). For on numerous occasions he explains the two respects in which an immediate supersensible experience is not only acceptable, but supports and is supported by his Critical System. The mysteries of nature and the moral law provide the two sides of Kant’s mystical coin, both in theory and in the discipline of his own life.

Reseña de: Thorndike, O., Kant's Transition Project and Late Philosophy. Connecting the Opus postumum and Metaphysics of Morals. London. Bloomsbury. 2018. pp. 280. ISBN: 9781350050310. Oliver Thorndike señala, en su último libro, el punto ciego de las investigaciones académicas sobre el sistema kantiano: "Hay muchos académicos interesados en la filosofía moral kantiana que no explican suficientemente cómo las consideraciones empíricas […] pueden jugar un papel sistemático. En una teoría que es decididamente a priori […]. Estos autores […] fracasan a la hora de explicar cómo las consideraciones empíricas estarían conectadas con el fundamento a priori de la moralidad, conectando, así, el principio a priori de la autonomía con la agencia empírica contingente. Sin embargo, para Kant la normatividad de las leyes particulares no puede ser contingente a su base" (p. XII). Éste es el problema crítico kantiano del que se hace cargo Oliver Thorndike, y que puede localizarse en la intersección entre las leyes metafísicas y las leyes empíricas particulares, un problema que afecta a la filosofía crítica kantiana, tanto en su dimensión teórica, como práctica. Thorndike se esfuerza por conectar ambos aspectos de la filosofía kantiana.

In Kants theoretical philosophy substance is not only constitutive for objects as one of the categories of pure reason, but also functions as a substrate for the unity of time. Result of these different functions is an ambiguity in the meaning of Kants notion of substance. Is there only one or are there many individual substances?

This paper traces the ways in which Kant uses substance not only in the CPR, but also in the the draft „Transition 1-14“ of the Opus postumum to find a solution for this problem.