Massacres

Qutayba ibn Muslim al-Bāhilī is one of the leading soldier-bureaucrats of the Umayyads period. During the time he served as the governor of Khurāsān, he consolidated the Umayyad’s rule in Tokharistan and Transoxiana provinces, and expanded the borders of the state to China by conquering the Kashgar region. His activities for conversion of the people of the conquered regions have great importance in the history of Islam since the intense relations of the Turkish people with Islam fell upon the time of his governorship. It is possible to argue that by introducing the religion to these people Qutayba had played an important role in their conversion to Islam. It is also known that he had sent a delegation to the emperor of China for the same purpose. However, despite all his achievements, it is seen that the academic studies about Qutayba in our country are very rare. Besides, some of the recent studies about him claim that he was a fraud, a trickster, and an untrustworthy person in his military activities; and had committed mass murders and massacres, persecuted innocent people, destroyed and burned the cities of conquered lands. In this article, it is examined that whether these claims and accusations have their justifications or not by consulting the main sources. In fact, what is expected from constructive criticism in this subject and every other area is to clarify the matter and make it more comprehensible of its context. However, it should not be forgotten that some conclusions over Qutayba in these studies might have been drawn to quickly in order to manipulate the conquest movements of the Umayyad period.Summary: The religious interaction and change taken place in the Arabian Peninsula with the emergence of Islam and with the political, military and cultural activities of the Muslims performed during the periods of Prophet Muhammad and the Rāshidūn (rightly guided) Caliphs had significant effects upon the lands of Iraq, Syria, Egypt and Khurāsān where the ancient civilizations located.

The success made by the Muslim-Arabs in such a short time is accepted of course as one of the important events of world history. The message of Islam spread rapidly with their extraordinary efforts, and reached quickly in the early days of Islam to the Amu Darya/Oxus River, which is considered to be the natural border between the Iranians and the Turks (Iran and Turan).

Although the Turks who had been struggling to dominate the region for centuries gained an opportunity with the disappearance of the Sasanian Empire from history, they could not take advantage of this new situation because of their lack of political unity and a strong state, and the power held by the regional Turkish Sultans were not enough to make their dominance happen. In this conjuncture, the Muslim-Arabs who appeared in the stage of history in a relatively late period but had the ideal of being a regional and a global power had rapidly realised their political and military activities called “conquest” in the Islamic historical sources.

When it comes to the period of Caliph ʿUthmān, it is seen that the conditions were very suitable for passing to the east of the Oxus River where the Turkish elements lived intensively. At the time, the absence of a strong Turkish state in the region, and China’s occupation with its own internal problems made an important contribution for the Muslim-Arab capture of the region. In this region, which is called as “Transoxiana” in the Arabic sources, it is seen that the Turks organized their political structures as city-states and regional sultanates. In the north-eastern parts of this region, there was a strong Turkish State called the Turgish State and it provided political and military support to the people of the region who rebelled occasionally the Umayyads.

After solving the internal problems of the state largely and suppressing some dangerous revolts, the Umayyad Caliph ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Marwān became capable of initiating military activities beyond the borders of the state. Nevertheless, the period when the actual conquests were made was the period of his son Walīd (86/705-96/715). It is seen that the conquests made in his time were permanent, and the people who lived in the conquered lands accepted Islam to a large extent.

The conquest made during Walīd’s time which extended from Kashgar to the Pyrenees, realised at an unprecedented pace. The most important name for the eastern side of the conquests is undoubtedly Al-Ḥajjāj ibn Yūsuf. Ḥajjāj (75/694-95/714) who acted as the supreme governor of Iraq for nearly twenty years, had achieved important successes in the regions of Transoxiana and Sindh located in the eastern part of the country by the hands of his appointed governors. However, many governors appointed by him to Khurāsān from 75/694 to 86/705 with the hope of reaching his goals in the east could not meet his expectations because of the political, social and economic problems that existed throughout the country, and because of the resulting rebellions in the regions that these problems caused.

These unwanted conditions continued to be seen in the region until he appointed Qutayba ibn Muslim as the governor of Khurāsān (86 / 705-96 / 715) who was one of the young commanders and administrators educated by Ḥajjāj personally. Qutayba known as having a close relationship with Ḥajjāj and consulting him when taking important decisions acted in this direction throughout the time he stayed in this position.

It is known that the internal conflicts in the region continued during the time when Qutayba was appointed as the governor of Khurāsān. However, he had brought together northern and southern Arabian tribes living in the region with religious, political and economical suggestions and had succeeded in persuading them for military activities that he decided to operate beyond the Oxus. For the Umayyads, these military operations were justified, because the regional sultans who ruled in the western and eastern sides of the Oxus repeatedly violated the agreements they had made before. The tendency of the people of Turkic, Iranian, and Tajik origin who were the real owner of these lands and lived in both sides of the rich Oxus basin for many centuries to violate these agreements was in fact result of a great concern. They now realized that the Muslim-Arabs who followed a systematic settlement policy in the region came to their lands this time without any intention of going back. Even though Qutayba followed a fair and reasonable policy towards them, they violated their agreements with him, formed alliances among themselves and waged military campaigns against Qutayba not to be the subjects of any change in their religion, worldview, and perception of existence.

Qutayba, who is believed to have spent his its utmost efforts to make the religion of Islam and the Umayyad political cause permanent in the region under these unfavourable conditions, has been recently criticized by some researchers. The criticisms intensify around the claims that he persecuted people, committed massacres, and behaved unfaithfully by breaking his promises that he made with people. From the perspective of our own times, it is possible to think that sometimes he had taken extreme measures in punishing the sultans and the persons who raised armed struggles against him and caused riots by violating the agreements. However, when the period is compared with the others, it can be easily said that the Umayyads showed in these and other remote areas a considerable amount of tolerance that they had never shown it in their internal conflicts. It is a known fact that he generally clashed with the ones who disrupted agreements, sought help from external forces, established alliances against them, and refused to pay taxes. Based on historical sources, it does not seem to be possible to say that while doing these activities in the region, Qutabya did not behave entirely in a way that his behaviour could be classified as massacres committed against innocent civilians. 

On the contrary, it is known that Qutayba had given many chances to the people of the region in administrative and military affairs. As a matter of fact, he ruled the city of Bukhara for 20 years with a Turkish ruler whom he appointed and supported, and he included in his army a union of twenty thousand cosmopolitan soldiers assembled from the people of Bukhara, Baykend, Chach and Samarkand and paid a regular salary to them.

The fact that his grave known as the “Imam Shaykh Qutayba Tomb” was turned later into a shrine and visited by the people even today despite the passage of long centuries after his death shows that he has been loved by the people of the region and that they have always considered him as a conqueror-bureaucrat who spent his life for the ideals of his religion.

The Revolution of 1964 and its aftermath (1964–1975) constitute a central episode in the history of Zanzibar, one that shapes contemporary representations of belonging and the nation. Several initiatives attest to the beginning of a new era since the mid-1990s, characterized by the dissemination in the public space of collective memories formerly transmitted privately, and associated with the rewriting of the history of the revolutionary period, which contests the official version long imposed by the state. In the context of past repression, occlusion, and the silencing of a murky past, today's remembering of the 1964 violence and the subsequent years of repression triggers memory disputes, which are expressed along political and community lines. Instead of leading to a pacified memory and social reconciliation, the resurfacing and politicization of collective memories in contemporary Zanzibar reactivate shifting perceptions of autochthony and allochthony, of belonging and citizenship. 05_Dark Years (113).indd 113 9/17/12 11:06 PM

Des Harakat à la guerre du Liban (1975-90) La notion de massacre et ses représentations chez les chrétiens et les druzes du sud du Mont-Liban Dima de Clerck » Par l'étude du massacre, l'historien poursuit l'ambition d'établir des césures dans un passé unifié : il assume ainsi la vocation critique de sa discipline . « David El Kenz (2005, p. 23) Dans le but de sonder les mémoires collectives communautaires relatives à la guerre de la Montagne 1 (1982-84), un épisode particulièrement sanglant et douloureux de la guerre du Liban (1975-90), plus d'une centaine d'entretiens individuels et de groupe ont été menés entre 2004 et 2010, avec des druzes et des chrétiens, civils ou anciens combattants originaires du sud du Mont-Liban, une région de cohabitation druzo-chrétienne communément appelée al-Jabal (la Montagne). Ces hommes et femmes sont âgés de plus de trente ans en 2004, et ils ont donc le souvenir de la guerre de la Montagne. En parlant de celle-ci, la plupart ont évoqué spontanément les événements de 1860. Pour eux, la guerre de la Montagne en est une réédition. Il fut intéressant de constater que pour nommer la période 1840-60, que les historiens ont coutume d'appeler Harakat (agitations, mouvements), les chrétiens et les druzes utilisent des registres différents : les chrétiens emploient quasi systématiquement des termes se rapportant au massacre, tandis que les druzes qui évoquent spontanément 1860 (en général des intellectuels, des dignitaires religieux et des notabilités aristocratiques et bourgeoises) ont recours au vocabulaire ayant trait à la guerre. Partant du constat de cette dichotomie, je me suis interrogée sur la place qu'accordent aujourd'hui chrétiens et druzes à cette période (notamment le moment 1860), sur les sens que revêt pour eux le massacre (ou tuerie de masse), et par conséquent sur les modalités d'écrire l'histoire de telles violences. Ma réflexion s'alimente des travaux d'historiens et de sociologues des violences de masse qui me paraissent entrer en résonance avec les récits et informations que j'ai pu récolter sur 1840-60. Dans un contexte de bouleversements géopolitiques et sociaux au sein de l'Empire ottoman, des affrontements intercommunautaires ont lieu entre 1840 et 1860 dans la moitié sud de l'espace libanais actuel. Au XVII e siècle, pour cultiver leurs vastes terres, les druzes, grands propriétaires terriens et guerriers de métier, ouvrent le Jabal druze à une main d'oeuvre chrétienne venue du nord du Mont-Liban et de Syrie (actuelle). Après la proclamation des Tanzimat, les rapports entre druzes, jusqu'ici dominants, et chrétiens, en plein essor 1 La guerre de la Montagne débuta avec l'occupation israélienne (juin 1982) et atteint son apogée en septembre 1983, dans la foulée du retrait israélien de cette région du Liban. Elle opposa les miliciens chrétiens des Forces libanaises aux druzes partisans de Walid Joumblatt, soutenus par leurs alliés palestiniens et la Syrie. Le bilan humain en est encore mal connu. Selon le travail effectué dans le cadre de mes recherches doctorales et basé sur des documents du Front libanais et des archives du Parti socialiste progressiste (PSP), les tueries qui eurent lieu se soldèrent par plus de 1 500 victimes civiles chrétiennes, et plus de 200 victimes civiles druzes. Plus de 163 000 chrétiens furent contraints d'abandonner la région. 70 000 autres quittèrent le Chouf côtier en 1985. 1 démographique, socioéconomique et culturel depuis le début du XIX e siècle, se redéfinissent dans la violence 2 . Le sentiment de perte de terrain sociopolitique devant les chrétiens, surtout les maronites, qui s'insurgent contre les abus des grands propriétaires terriens (eux-mêmes chrétiens) dans le Kesrouane en 1858 et aspirent à une égalité sociale, pousse les druzes qui craignent la contagion dans leur région à l'action militaire pour préserver l'ordre social hiérarchique. La guerre qui éclate entre druzes et maronites en mai 1860 tourne aussitôt à l'avantage des druzes. Durant les trois Harakat de 1841, 1845 et 1860, des tueries de chrétiens sont rendues possibles par la passivité complaisante des autorités ottomanes locales. Celles de 1860 coûtent la vie à plus de 12 000 chrétiens (grecs-catholiques, orthodoxes et maronites) dans le sud du Mont-Liban et de la Bekaa, soit un peu moins de 20 % des chrétiens de cette région 3 . L'effet de contagion atteint Damas où 5 000 à 11 000 chrétiens sont tués en moins de cinq jours. Ce n'est qu'après l'envoi d'une expédition française que le ministre ottoman des Affaires étrangères intervient pour restaurer l'ordre, punir les coupables et limiter ainsi l'ingérence des Européens qui se disent indignés et réclament un règlement politique. En 1861 est officialisé le système de la Moutasarrifiyya. La province du Mont-Liban, réunissant les deux précédents districts, est dès lors administrée par un fonctionnaire ottoman chrétien non libanais, nommé par la Sublime Porte. L'éloignement dans le temps de ces violences de masse qui constituent un moment fondateur de l'histoire contemporaine du Liban n'en a vraisemblablement pas effacé le souvenir. La guerre du Liban en a ravivé les plaies. Mal digérées à la fois par les chrétiens, dont les ancêtres furent les principales victimes, et par les druzes, dont elles précipitèrent le déclin sociopolitique, elles participèrent du zèle des uns et des autres à prendre les armes en 1975 ( DE CLERCK 2004 et 2010).

This study examines the social significance of extreme processing and performative violence at the massacre site Sacred Ridge in the North American Southwest. The analysis of the skeletal remains demonstrates that all of the victims were similarly processed and that processing of the body did not vary based on the age or sex of the victims. The similar processing indicates that this entire group of victims was viewed as the dehumanized other. This othering led to a lack of empathy among the perpetrators for the victims, leading to their ability to perform the massacre. The psychological and emotional factors affecting the different groups (victims, perpetrators, and witnesses) are explored and highlight how these dynamics can impact power relations.

Du 5 au 15 mars 2018, Jean-Philippe Belleau, membre du réseau des experts du GITPA a réalisé une mission d'information dans les camps de réfugiés Rohingyas au Bengladesh. Cette mission pour le GITPA a pu être menée grâce à l'ONG Health and Education for All (HAEFA)-Haefa.org et au College of Liberal Arts de l'Université du Massachusetts à Boston.  Ce rapport est le premier par une organisation spécialisée dans les droits autochtones. Il reproduit verbatim les récits de réfugiés rohingya interviewés en mars 2017. Les données recueillies lors de cette enquête contredisent les conclusions des rapports de plusieurs ONG de droits de l'homme. 1. La crise de 2017 ne doit pas être isolée mais placée dans une longue durée de conflits qui durent depuis les années 40.

On April 18, 2007, a package containing over twenty digital videos arrived at the NBC building in New York city. Within a short time the material had been publicly broadcast, and images of Seung Hui Cho soon appeared on Youtube. Two days earlier the twenty-three year-old university student had been responsible for what has been claimed to be the worst mass shooting in the United States. Just days after the mass shooting, the Governor of Virginia, Timothy M. Kaine convened a review panel that was comprised of nine "nationally recognized individuals" across the disciplines of "law enforcement, security, governmental management, mental health, emergency care, victims' services, the Virginia court system, and higher education" (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007, p. viii). Six months later the panel released the comprehensive Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007: Report of the Review Panel (Virginia Tech Review Panel, 2007). Together with detailed psychological analysis of Cho, the report issued recommendations for threat assessment in higher education institutions. Almost twelve months after the shootings, the Government of Virginia instituted four new laws: 'Policies addressing suicidal students'; 'Institutional crisis and emergency management plan: review required'; 'Violence prevention committee, threat assessment team'; and 'First warning and emergency notification system required' §23-9.2:9.9,10,11; 2008, p. 28). Attending to key recommendations made in Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech (2007), the new laws included the mandate that all public higher education institutions in the State of Virginia establish threat assessment teams.

Chapter 8 discusses the impact of the Khmer Rouge regime on the people of Cambodia and the importance of documenting the evidence of violence. This study focuses on the important work being done at the Choeung Ek Genocidal Center analyzing the skeletal remains of the victims. In particular, a recent study performed on a sample of Khmer Rouge victims is discussed and, through analysis of the perimortem trauma, confirms eyewitness accounts that blunt force trauma to the base of the skull was often utilized to execute the victims.