Marginalism

This paper traces the intellectual trajectories of the first stand-alone theories of action, understood as both axiologically neutral and quasi-scientific from a methodological point of view. I argue that the rise of action theory of this kind corresponds to a particular moment of dissatisfaction within Western thought, and as such, it tells us far more about the history of philosophy than the subject itself. I conclude by explaining why subsequent failures to provide an acceptable theory of action are not accidental. On the contrary, such failures owe themselves probably to the fact that formulating a theory of action is neither propitious nor useful. Thus, the most valuable lesson we can learn from philosophical desires for a theory of action is that we should take co-action as the starting point in our normative investigations, rather than positing action simpliciter as a problem to solve. That is, instead of postulating a theory of action, we should think of a paradigm shift, whereby we move away from a representational paradigm in philosophy towards a co-actional one.

... Their differing judgments reflected divergent political outlooks that placed varying emphasis on the proper role of government as an ameliorative social force. ... Washington, DC: NationalCommunication Association. ... America's Struggle Against Poverty 1900-1994. ...

In the circumstances, I think it is Marshall's theory that should be discarded' (Sraffa 1930: 93). With these words Piero Sraffa concluded his contribution to the Symposium on Increasing returns and the Representative Firm published in March 1930 by the Economic Journal-a contribution defined by Keynes in the introduction as 'negative and destructive'. And indeed the effects of Sraffa's attack on Marshallian orthodoxy left deep marks on the economists of a Cambridge where, until shortly before, the doctrine had been that 'It is all in Marshall', and where Keynes liked to repeat that all one needed to be a good economist was a thorough knowledge of the Principles and careful daily reading of The Times (Harrod 1951: 324). As Austin Robinson recalled in one of his many memoirs, the Symposium, with Sraffa's sharp call to abandon Marshallian theory, marked the end of a process that had begun with Sraffa's 'painful hesitation' (Robinson 1990: 3) about revealing a few cracks in Marshallian orthodoxy. At the same time it marked the opening of a profound divergence between the new and old generations of Cambridge economists on the issue of allegiance to Marshall. The Marshallian old guard, represented in the Symposium by Dennis Robertson and Gerald Shove, emerged from the clash confused and disconcerted: while unwilling to repudiate Marshall, they could not produce adequate counter-arguments on the ground where Sraffa centred his attack-that of logical consistency and the empirical relevance of static analysis. Nor could they shift their defence to another plane-that of the richness of Marshall's approach even if it did not lend itself to representation in graphs or formulas. The younger generation to which Austin Robinson himself belonged, together with his wife, Joan, and Richard Kahn, felt free to explore alternative paths, and just a few months later all three launched the first of the Cambridge 'revolutions' of the 1930s-the theory of imperfect competition-fuelling that 'orgy of analytic geometry' (to use the happy expression coined by Becattini, 1985: 51) which Pigou had begun, and which was to keep all of them busy for several years. While there can be no doubt about the role Sraffa played in fostering reappraisal of Marshallian theory, albeit with probably not quite the results he would have liked, it is far less easy to follow the individual line taken by Sraffa that led him to the drastic conclusions of the Symposium. His sharp, trenchant tone here seems a long way from the cautious attitude he

Eleonora Poli provides a coherent and comprehensive explanation of the diffusion of liberal and neo-liberal competition policies in the USA, Europe, Japan and the BRICS from an international political economy perspective. She investigates whether, how and why these countries have progressively changed their respective interpretations of market competition in light of major economic crises or political and economic issues, giving rise to the current neo-liberal era. More specifically, she analyses whether they responded to each downturn or pressure from the international arena through the enforcement of antitrust regimes and, if so, how and why specific institutional changes were implemented. In doing so, she focuses on whether policy diffusion mechanisms favoured the adoption of similar antitrust policies.

The scientific methodology of classical physics has been a constant influence in the development of orthodox economics. Clear signs of this can be found in the works of many classical economists such as Smith, Say, Cairnes  and Mill. The physics influence became more apparent with the emergence of marginalism. The economic thought of F. Y. Edgeworth, however, is the peak of the influence of classical physics to economics. In Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics, the identification of maximum energy in physics with that of the maximum pleasure in economic calculus, is central in his thought. In the same manner, I. Fisher, the founder of marginalism in the US, promoted a classical physics based economic methodology. The close analogy of physics and economics concepts and the application of tools from hydrodynamics to economic theory, are basic characteristics of his work. These views eventually dominated orthodox economic methodology. The paper argues that, apart from establishing the  physics scientific ideal in economics, both of these authors provided the methodological justification for its adoption in economics. It also  examines their subsequent influence on the formation of the current methodological approach in orthodox economics. In particular, it discusses  their influence on key components of current mainstream economics such as: extensive use of  mathematics, aversion to methodological discourse and anti-psychologism.

The general objective of this dissertation is to argue that religions and religious arguments have a place in the discussion of the definition of good and justice to society and to human development. So it makes it necessary to discuss the relationship of philosophical theories the Utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, the Justice as Fairness of John Rawls and the Capability Approach of Amartya Sen with religions. It is also necessary to repel the arguments that these philosophies have that religions do not participate in the discussion of the common good, justice and human development. Finally will be presented the Human Development Index of Religions (HDI-R), which follows the same methodology used by the United Nations Development to compose the HDI in its human development reports, and seek to explain the reasons for variations HDI-R among different religions.

Autor: Daniel Lahoud

Español

El marginalismo fue un fenómeno que transformó la economía y de ser una simple metafísica que iba entre la filosofía moral y la historia, terminó por convertirse en una ciencia propiamente dicha. Este movimiento vincula el origen del valor al uso del objeto para el individuo. Esta nueva visión tuvo tres interpretaciones que son independientes la una de la otra, de hecho el presente ensayo es el intento de resumir las tres visiones del marginalismo que le dieron origen a las tres escuelas la inglesa (de Cambridge) que al final fue tomada por la figura dominante de Marshall, la de Lausanne y la de Austria.

Palabras clave: Marginalismo, Utilidad, Valor, Jevons, Walras, Menger

English

Marginalism was a phenomenon that transformed the economy and from being a simple metaphysics that was between moral philosophy and history, it ended up becoming a science proper. This movement links the origin of the value to the use of the object for the individual. This new vision had three interpretations that are independent of the other, in fact the present was the attempt to summarize the three views of marginalism that gave rise to the three schools of the English (Cambridge) that was ultimately taken by the figure dominant of Marshall, Laussanne and Austria.

Keywords: Marginalism, Utility, Value, Jevons, Walras, Mengerm

Value without Fetish presents the first in-depth English-language study of the influential Japanese economist Uno Kōzō‘s (1897-1977) theory of ‘pure capitalism’ in the light of the method and object of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy. A close analysis of the theories of value, production and reproduction, and crisis in Uno’s central texts from the 1930s to the 1970s reveals his departure from Marx’s central insights about the fetish character of the capitalist mode of production – a departure that Lange shows can be traced back to the failed epistemology of value developed in Uno’s earliest writings. By disavowing the complex relation between value and fetish that structures Marx’s critique, Uno adopts the paradigms of neoclassical theories to present an apology rather than a critique of capitalism.

Phillip Wicksteed's ideas played an important role in the history of economic methodology. This is because of two reasons: The first was that his views represent the starting point of the deliberate attempt to expel normative issues from marginalist economic analysis. The second reason was that his ideas influenced his disciple L. Robbins, who was one of the first theorists to set the methodological basis for an allegedly value-free economic science. The paper examines Wicksteed's conception of a positive economic science and the role of normative aspects. In the same context, his views on the nature and the role of economic man, and his analysis of selfish and altruistic behaviour are also discussed. Finally, the work combines the above with Wicksteed's economic methodology in order to asses his overall role and influence on the development of the trend towards a value-free economic theory.

‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’: teoria elaborata da Massimo Morigi afferente al ‘Repubblicanesimo Geopolitico’, al ‘Repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Neo-repubblicanesimo’, al ‘Marxismo’ e al ‘Neo-marxismo’. Pur condividendo la critica di Karl Marx all’individualismo metodologico dell’economia classica (in specie la critica ad Adam Smith e David Ricardo, individualismo metodologico che poi sarà in seguito trasmesso anche all’economia neoclassica o marginalismo), la ‘Teoria della Distruzione del Valore’ rovescia la teoria del plusvalore di Karl Marx, affermando che il rapporto sociale che va sotto il nome di ‘capitalismo’ non opera una sottrazione del valore del lavoro erogato dal lavoratore a vantaggio del capitale ma, invece, una distruzione del valore di questo lavoro, distruzione del valore che si evidenzia sul “libero mercato” dove s’incontrano – entrambi formalmente liberi – gli operai (decisori omega-strategici), che apportano su questo mercato un lavoro svalutato (distrutto quindi nel suo valore) originatosi proprio dalla libertà di questo mercato (ossia dalla sua mancanza di regole) e i datori di lavoro capitalisti (decisori alfa-strategici) che così possono avvalersi di questo valore-lavoro effettivamente svalutato (o, meglio, distrutto).