Hungarian Politics

The Three Seas Initiative (TSI) constitutes a project involving the cooperation of twelve European countries. Poland and Croatia, the founders of the TSI, are especially active in this respect. Even though Hungary seems the closest political ally of Poland, the state rarely participates in TSI actions. In addition, when pursuing its politics, Hungary remains in contradiction to the principles of the TSI – chiefly regarding energy policies. The paper aims to offer answers to questions concerning the significance of the TSI in Hungary’s foreign affairs policies and the state's perception of such a form of cooperation in Europe. D. Héjj, The Three Seas Initiative in the Foreign Affairs Policy of Hungary, „Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 17 (2019), z. 3, s. 115-135, DOI: 10.36874/ RIESW.2019.3.7 Rocznik Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej (Yearbook of the Institute of East-Central Europe) ISSN 1732-1395

Tárgyszavak / keywords: népszavazás, népi kezdeményezés, az Országgyűlés hatásköre, hatalommegosztás, közigazgatási referendum, Felcsút, stadion / referendum, popular initiative, the Parliament's competence, separation of powers, administrative referendum, Felcsút, stadium.

A kétharmados többség bűvkörében Magyarország társadalmi normarendszerének, politikai berendezkedésének és jogrendjének egyoldalú átalakítását megkísérlő jobboldali kormány a spanyol-belga-magyar elnökségi trió záró szereplőjeként töltötte be az Európai Unió soros elnöki tisztét. 2011 európai első szemeszterének értékelését három cél jegyében végeztük el. Tekintettel a közvéleményt elérő és a közbeszédet befolyásolni képes információ hiányával, mindenekelőtt sokoldalú és koherens helyzetképet kellett nyújtanunk azokról az integráció jelenét és jövőjét meghatározó szakpolitikai változásokról, ellentmondásokról és hiányosságokról, amelyek a magyar elnökség munkájához köthetőek. Másfelől, értékelnünk kellett a szerepvállalást a magyar érdekek és kilátások szempontjából. Harmadrészt, figyelembe véve az Orbán-kormány Magyarországon alkalmazott, gyakran tartalmi és formai szempontból is veszélyes területekre tévedő politikáját, megvizsgáltuk az európai szinten és hazai vonatkozásban képviselt álláspontok egymáshoz való viszonyát is.Az egyes bemutatott témákat három logikai egységre bontva rendszereztük. Az első részben a 2000-ben elfogadott Lisszaboni Stratégia utódjának tekintett Európa2020 program formálódása kapcsán a romaügy, a nyugdíjkérdés, az energiastratégia, a kohézió, valamint az oktatás területeit értékeltük. Külön fejezetet kapott a gazdasági kormányzás átalakítása, illetve az ebben játszott magyar szerep. A második fő fejezet a magyar elnökség által prioritásként kezelt ügyek közül Magyarország regionális helyzetét és ezen szerep változásait és összefüggéseit járja körül. Végül a harmadik egységben az elnökség politikai kommunikációs tevékenységét állítottuk a kritikai elemzés középpontjába.

Keywords: direct democracy, Hungary, Ignác Martinovics, Hungarian Jacobins, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, territorial plebiscite, Sopron plebiscite, political transformation, "Four-Yes Referendum", Constitutional Court, the relation of direct and representative democracy, Basic (Fundamental) Law of Hungary

Magyarország 2004-ben csatlakozott az Európai Unióhoz. Azóta sok gazdagsági, politikai és társadalmi változás történt Magyarországon, és nyilvánvalóan az ország politikai történései nem érthetők az Európai Unió nélkül. De mit jelent az Európai Unió? Kinek előnyös, és kinek hátrányos? Az Európai Unió Kanadai szemmel Mivel kanadai állampolgár vagyok, szeretnék egy-két dolgot írni az EU-Kanada kapcsolatról, ami az 1950-es évek óta létezik. Kanada a világ másódik legnagyobb országa, és emiatt hatalmas természeti kincsei vannak. Például kőolaj, földgáz, faanyag, mezőgazdasági termények és különbözö ásványok. Viszont a lakossága nagyon alacsonystatisztikailag csak 34 755 634 lakója van. 1 Az Európai Unió lakossága pedig 502 486 499, és a vilag hetedik legnagyobb politikai hatalma. 2 Nem csoda, hogy egyik a másikat fontosnak tartja. Az első hivatalos szerződés a két hatalom között 1976-ban kezdődött, amikor az Európai Gazdagsági Közösség és Kanada aláírta a gazdasági együttműködési megállapodást. Ugyanabban az évben megnyílt az első EGK delegáció Ottawaban. 3 Azóta számos gazdasági és kereskedelmi szerződéseket kötöttek, de emellet környezetvédelmi szerződéseket is. Miután NASA természettudós James Hansen 1987-ben felfedezte a globális felmelegedést, az Európai Unió és Kanada együttműködést alapítottak a felmelegedés ellenőrzése érdekében. Szerintem ez egy nagyon fontos cél, mivel a globális felmelegedés veszélyes kárt tud okozni mind a kettő 1 http://www.statcan.gc.ca/start-debut-eng.html 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union 3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada%E2%80%93European_Union_relations hatalomnak. 2007-ben az EU-Kanada csúcstalálkozónál alapították az úgynevezett "EU-Canada High-Level Dialogue on Energy" (EU-Kanada Hivatalos Energia Dialógus), ami minden évben egyszer találkozik, hogy megtárgyalják azokat az ügyeket, ami legfontosabb a két hatalomnak, illetve az energia biztonsága, az új hatékonyas energia technológia kihasználása, és együttműködés a fejlődő országokal. Az Európai Unió a multilateralizmus egyik fő támogatója, és látható, hogy kemény is volt az ENSZ éghajlat-változási keretegyezménye kötelezettségeivel. Az Európai Unió sikeressége a Kiotói jegyzőkönyvel példaképet ad a többi világnak, főleg Kanadának, ami szégyenlős eredménye adott Kiotó után.

Minden a kultúrában veszi kezdetét, rajta keresztül történik és oda is tér vissza. Aki a kultúra hegemóniáját felismeri és benne ki tudja alakítani a maga hegemóniáját, az végül mindent megnyer. Ez a könyv útmutató ahhoz, hogy miért, mivel és hogyan lehet a politika hátterében ható kulturális szférát meghódítani. Vagyis a kulturális hatalomért folytatott küzdelem elméletéről és gyakorlatáról szól, arról, hogy miként hozzunk létre kulturális hegemóniát.

Patrick Eser, Dr. des., wissenscha licher Mitarbeiter im Bereich Spanische Literaturwissenscha am Ins tut für Romanis k der Universität Kassel. Elisabeth Gauthier ist Direktorin von Espaces Marx sowie Mitglied des Vorstandes von transform! Europe und des Na onalkomitees der Französischen Kommunis schen Partei. Nikolai Huke, wissenscha licher Mitarbeiter im Bereich Europäische Integra on und Poli sche Ökonomie am Ins tut für Poli kwissenscha der Philipps-Universität Marburg. Magdalena Marsovszky, M.A., Lehrbeau ragte an der Fakultät für Sozialund Kulturwissenscha en der Hochschule Fulda und Vorstandsmitglied im Villigster Forschungsforum zu Na onalsozialismus, Rassismus und An semi smus e.V. Andreas Meyerhöfer, B.A., Student der Friedens-und Konfl ik orschung an der Philipps-Universität Marburg. Sein Interessenschwerpunkt liegt hauptsächlich im Bereich kri sche Migra onsforschung. Yves Müller, M.A., Mitarbeiter beim Zentrum für Demokra e Treptow-Köpenick (ZfD) in Berlin sowie freier Referent beim Verein für Demokra sche Kultur in Berlin e.V. (VDK) und in der poli schen und historischen Bildungsarbeit tä g. Aljoscha Pilger, Student der Poli kwissenscha und Friedens-und Konfl iktforschung an der Philipps-Universität Marburg, Mitglied der Forschungsgruppe Europäische Integra on. Oliver Römer, Dipl., promoviert an der Philipps-Universität Marburg zum Thema Fragmen erungen der Weltgesellscha . Perspek ven einer postnaonalen Soziologie. Anna-Franziska S ede, Dipl., promoviert in Berlin und Hamburg zum Thema Reproduk onsarbeit in der Krise. Haris Triandafi lidou, Dipl., promoviert an der Philipps-Universität Marburg zum Thema Widerstand auf na onalstaatlicher Ebene im Verhältnis zu transna onalisierter Staatlichkeit. Gerd Wiegel, Dr., Referent der Bundestagsfrak on DIE LINKE für die Themen Rechtsextremismus/An faschismus und Redakteur von Z. Zeitschri Marxis sche Erneuerung.

Ziel der Arbeit war es, die Anwendbarkeit des Cleavage-Konzepts von Lipset und Rokkan auf Ungarn zu prüfen und mögliche Erweiterungs- und Modifizierungsansätze zu diskutieren. In einem zweiten Schritt sollte die Relevanz tradierter gesellschaftlicher Konfliktlinein in der Posttransformationsphase in Ungarn geprüft werden.

Im Hinblick auf diese Anliegen wurden im ersten theoriegeleiteten Teil der Abhandlung die wissenschaftlichen Diskussionen über die Erklärungskraft des Modells auf die postkommunis-tischen Staaten skizziert und vor dem Hintergrund der Giddens´schen Funktionalismuskritik die Cleavage-Theorie kritisch hinterfragt. Dabei wurde gezeigt, dass die „klassischen“ soziostrukturellen Merkmale auf das ungarische Parteiensystem nicht anwendbar sind. Es ist notwendig, die Cleavage-Variablen zu historisieren und die methodische Dichotomisierung zu überwinden. Die historische Diskursanalyse hat deutlich gemacht, dass im Zeitraum von 1790 bis 1990 ungarnspezifische Konfliktstrukturen vorhanden sind, und dass diese von top-down-Prozessen gesteuert und kontrolliert werden, die sich schließlich auf die Allianzbildungen im Zentrum und in der Peripherie systematisch auswirken.

Die empirisch-analytische Längsschnittanalyse, bestehend aus der Analyse von historischen parteipolitischen Konfliktdiskursen und von wahlgeographischen Merkmalen auf das Wahlver-halten, erbrachte, dass es in Ungarn historische Kontinuitäten im regionalen Wahlverhalten entlang der ökonomischen und kulturellen Achse gibt, und dass die regionalen wahlgeographi-schen Daten mit den soziodemographischen Variablen funktional gleichwertig sind. Der Teil der Arbeit über die Prägekraft von historischen legacies im Sozialismus entkräftete die These, wonach die vorsozialistischen Konfliktstrukturen im Sozialismus eingefroren sind. Das hätte  zur Folge, dass nach dem Systemwechsel eine „Stunde-Null“ in der Parteiensystementwicklung eintrat. Dagegen konnte aufgezeigt werden, dass die historischen Konfliktstrukturen nicht nur auf der gesellschaftlichen Ebene weiter wirkten, sondern auch die Parteigründungen in der Spätphase des Sozialismus beeinflussten.

Die theoretischen Vorüberlegungen und die Ergebnisse der Diskursanalyse wie der empirischen Untersuchung erlaubten es, auf den Anwendungsfall Ungarn angepasste Cleavage-Dimensionen sowohl auf der ökonomischen (Urbanisten vs. Agrarpopulisten) wie auch der kulturellen Achse (Traditionalisten vs. Westernizer) zu bestimmen und die komitatsspezifischen wahlgeographischen Kontinuitäten von 1790 bis 1990 darzustellen. Die wahlgeographische Prüfung der rehistorisierten und angepassten Cleavage-Dimensionen anhand von ausgewählten Parlamentswahlen nach dem Systemwechsel ergab in der Mehrheit der untersuchten Komitate konstante regionale Muster im Abstimmungsverhalten der ungarischen Bevölkerung seit 1990, die über das hinausreichen. Die in der ungarischen Gesellschaft verankerten historischen Konfliktstrukturen sind für die derzeit dominanten Parteien insofern dienlich, als sie durch das wiederholte Reproduzieren der Konflikte die bestehenden Cleavages für ihre Macht-erhaltungszwecke instrumentalisieren. Zur Gefahr wird es, wenn im Zuge der für das Reprodu-zieren notwendigen Allianzbildungen die demokratischen  Strukturen ausgehöhlt werden.

This study explores the currents that have shaped the historical narrative of the Hungarian Holocaust. It examines scholarly perspectives about the history, as well as the underpinning myths and memories that encouraged a nation to pursue an alliance with Nazi Germany and sacrifice their Jewish citizens for Christian national interests. This case study demonstrates the way Hungarian populous movements usurped national and Christian ideals and manipulated society's collective memories.  It also explores the subsequent forces of national identity that often whitewash society’s responsibility and skew collective remembrances.  Additionally, the examination analyzes three films about the Hungarian Holocaust; Mr. Wallenberg (1990), Sunshine (1999), and Fateless (2005) as contemporary representations of collective memory.  This study argues that collective memories shaped by Christian Nationalism construct barriers that impede Hungarians from thoroughly confronting the history and meanings of the Hungarian Holocaust.  Since the post war period, Hungarians have failed to accept that Christian Nationalism contributed to Hungary’s devastating national history and equally important the Hungarian Holocaust.

Autocracy and soft power - for the past three decades they did not seem to go hand in hand. Nevertheless - the last decade has proven that populist and illiberal forces in the democratic West are prone to policies undertaken by illiberal autocratic states. In the eyes of Russian policy-makers - the demographic decline in Russia and the world possesses an existential threat to the current world order. An increase in civil rights for sexual and gender minorities would only reinforce this demographic trend - in their views. This research reveals that the Russian Federation has set up a well-thought soft power strategy regarding LGBTI-rights towards the democratic West. Via outsourcing their soft power to the already existing international anti-LGBTI movement, the Kremlin was able to create a network of (financial and ideological) support for possible cooperation between Russian and European policy-makers. This network seems to fit within the Kremlin’s broader foreign policy of undermining Western liberal democracies.
By taking a closer look to the Hungarian and Russian involvement within international anti-LGBTI organisations - like the World Congress of Families - the author of this research was able to prove close and structural ties between high- level Hungarian and Russian government officials and oligarchs. The Hungarian government increased the homo- and transphobic political discourse, enforced policies to foster traditional family values and vetoed every pro-LGBTI rights policy proposal in the Council of the European Union since its involvement in the international anti- LGBTI movement.

Reflecting on European colonialism in 1950 - at a time when discussions about what we now know as the European Union emerged in western Europe, Aimé Césaire wrote, . . . Europe is morally, spiritually indefensible. This idea is fairly commonplace in much of the post-colonial world and it has some purchase within certain academic and intellectual circles elsewhere. And yet, in the process of denouncing the widely noted presence of racism in Hungary, thirty-six leading Hungarian intellectuals have, in a recent public document, felt compelled to thank France, and through France, a generic, trans-historical notion of Europe, for what they saw as the latter's profound, longue-durée goodness. It is partly my concern for the economic hardship, political marginality, cultural discrimination, and social exclusion faced by the Romanies of eastern Europe and partly the precision with which the Letter articulates the topos of west European moral superiority - a central pattern of European identity discourse - that prompts me to raise the following initial questions: How is it possible to denounce racism by referring to Europe, especially western Europe, the main historic source and promoter of racism as we know it today? What purpose does the genre of the open letter serve and how does it function? How does the signatories' implicit project of geopolitical self-positioning relate to the theme of the West as an object to be emulated, long dominant in the modern history of east-central European ideas of emancipation?

The historic wave of refugees reaching Europe in 2015 was met with a volatile mixture of ethno-nationalist, anti-Muslim fearmongering and political infighting within the European Union (EU). Perhaps no one was more influential in promulgating fear and anti-refugee sentiment than Viktor Orbán, the Prime Minister of Hungary, whose inflammatory rhetoric and uncompromising, illiberal political stance helped escalate the refugee-crisis in a discursive battle of political wills, ideologies, and identity politics within the EU. This paper explores how Orbán employs political discourse practices and strategies to enact his right-wing populist (RWP) ideology and anti-immigrant ‘politics of fear’ ( Wodak 2015 ) vis-à-vis EU politicians’ pro-migration discourses. Adopting a broad critical discourse-analytic approach, we demonstrate Orbán’s iterative production of discourses of threat and defense underlying discourses of fear (law and order, cultural/religious difference), and discourses of oppositional political identities and ideologies through fractal recursion. We argue that recursive performance of RWP stances creates a recognizable political style characteristic of Orbán’s RWP political persona or type.

The Rusyn represents ethnic minorities, living in contemporary Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Serbia, and descendants of those emigrated from these countries in the late 19 c. reside in Australia, Canada, and The United States. The center of the best reputation for researches in Rusyn culture and history has formed around Prof. Paul Robert Magocsi, chair of Dept. Ukrainian Studies at Toronto University, and lately enriched by activities of the new generation of scholars as P. Krafcik. There are three universities in Europe with departments for Rusyn studies, in Preshov (Slovakia), Níregyháza (Hungary) and Novi Sad (Serbia).
Rusyns constitute officially recognized ethnic minorities in almost every European countries they live in, but not Ukraine. Though inhabitants in Western Ukraine, who identify themselves Rusyn, represent the largest part of The Rusyn worldwide, according to the Ukrainian laws, there no such ethnic minority exists.
The situation in neighboring Slovakia has become quite different since the collapse of the socialism. For the last two decades, Rusyns in Slovakia have elaborated their codified literary language (since it has been missing for centuries, thus Rusyn authors has written in Latin, Church Slavonic, then Russian, a few of them in Ukrainian, and the most in various vernaculars), they established a Department of Rusyn Studies (while in Hungary the Rusyn and Ukrainian Dept., founded by the pioneer scholar Istvan Udvari, has significantly reduced soon after the tragic death of the “founding father”), and, last but not least, a PhD program in Rusyn studies has been accredited at Preshov University (chaired by Prof. Anna Plishková), being the unique as such in the world.
The fear in Ukraine has rooted in the history of Transcarpathia: it had not been a part of Ukraine before it became a district of the Ukrainian Soviet Socilistic Republic in results of the World War II. Earlier it formed a part of the Hungarian Kingdom during centuries, and after the First World War it was attached (for two decades, as the history turned) to the newly then shaped Czechoslovakia.
Consequently, efforts by some right-wing political movements in Hungary, which endeavor to reconnect the Carpathian territories to Hungary, are nowadays of extreme risk. First, Ukraine has lost and is probably losing some territories in its south and west, where the state control is quite weak over those districts are still (and hopefully remain) parts of the country. The fear for territorial instability is certainly increasing. West part of Ukraine has been the traditionally strongest bases of the stability of the Ukrainian State. Thus destabilizing any part of West Ukraine, even Transcarpathia, may result some sharpening of the threat of a new Cold War. Therefore the Rusyn question must not been only regarded in the frameworks of ethnic minorities and their rights, but in a wider sense of the international diplomacy and peace building.

A 2010 óta berendezkedő endogén, azaz hazai fejlődésű, őshonos politikai rendszerrel szemben kezdettől fogva széles körű hazai és nemzetközi ellenséges magyarázatadás bontakozott ki. Ez a diskurzus hamisítatlanul magán viseli a gyarmatosító beszédkeret jeleit. A puha gyarmatosítás és a hibrid neokonizációkorában a függetlenségi harcot leginkább a kulturális csatatéren kell megvívnunk.

In recent years, democratization research has increasingly emphasized the role of constitutional courts in the transformation of formerly authoritarian countries towards democracy. Only rarely do these studies explore the question of what it means in a socio-political context for an institution to 'play a role'. In addition, the term 'role' is often used synonymously with 'function', even though both concepts originate from very different social science traditions. Based on the findings of a comparative study of Germany and Hungary, this talk aims to present the potential of role theory for democratization studies and comparative research on constitutional courts. Both judicial decisions and the ensuing debates on the right of courts to intervene into the democratic process can be empirically analyzed as processes of (self-) attribution of legitimacy. Courts act as the bearer of roles, communicating with different kinds of audiences (legal academia, politics, civil society, and international actors). Based on sociological role theory and historical-sociological institutionalism in the Weberian tradition, the talk develops an 'ideal type' framework of analysis intended to connect social science with legal discourses. This heuristic framework aims to establish empirical points of reference to assess whether and to what extent constitutional courts act as 'guardians' of predetermined constitutional rules, manage and decide social and political conflicts as 'umpires', or define the values of the legal-political community in the role of 'founder'.

„A magyarországi ellenzéki életnek a hagyományos körei mellett – ami visszanyúlik a népi mozgalomig, illetőleg a demokratikus ellenzéknek az előzményét képező értelmiségi baloldali csoportokig – tehát egy harmadik pólus is képződött a nyolcvanas években. Ez az ifjúsági bázison létrejövő mozgalom aztán nyári táborokat szervezett: a ’85-ös szarvasi után ’86–87-ben Kunfehértón, Fehérgyarmaton és Velemen, majd ’88 augusztus végén a legnagyobb rendezvényként a Szárszó ’88-as Találkozót szervezte meg.” Lapunkban a Közép-Európa Klubot, a Széchenyi István Szakkollégiumot és Bálványosi Szabadegyetemet megalapító Németh Zsoltot kérdeztük családi indíttatásról, ifjúsági klubmozgalmakról, nyári táborokról és a rendszerváltásról.

This paper deals with the change of political landscape in Central Europe. Since the spectacular vic- tory of Viktor Orbán and his party Fidesz in Hungary in 2010, conservative parties have become more popular. The conservative trends are present not only in Poland and Hungary, where the national conservative parties won the elections, but also in Slovakia and Czech Republic, with strong social democratic parties.

A XXI. századi "keresztény Magyarország" létezésének mítosza szociostatisztikai vetületben "Az Európai Unió alkotmányának preambuluma nem tartalmazza a kereszténységre vonatkozó kitételeket. Az egyház nem szenvedett ezáltal vereséget, hiszen az Európai Unió tiszteletben tartja a keresztény értékeket, csakúgy, mint az egyházak belső szabályait, ugyanis nem tagadja le azt, hogy Európa gyökerei a keresztény világnézetbe nyúlnak. (…) Az EU politikai akarata, gazdasági, pénzügyi, katonai együttműködése üres lenne a keresztény lelkiség nélkül. (…) Világunk, Európa, az egyház és a hívők választás előtt állnak: válaszfalakat építünk, vagy átfogó világrendet az igazság és az egyenlőség alapján. Az előbbiről számtalanszor bebizonyosodott, hogy a háború útja, míg utóbbi, ha a hitet megőrzik, a békéé." Lomniczi Zoltán, a Legfelsőbb Bíróság elnöke, 2005 1 "…[V]an egy európai ország, melynek egyes korábbi vezetőitől megszokta a világ, hogy együtt úsznak az árral. Ma viszont az uralkodó közfelfogással ellentétes irányba haladunk: nekünk az európai civilizációról és kultúráról más értelmezésünk, fölfogásunk van." […] "A magyar ügy nem véletlenül vált ki számos országban rokonszenvet. Arról van szó ugyanis, hogy mi lesz a nemzetállamok sorsa az Európai Unióban. Megmarad-e a szuverenitásuk lényegi kérdésekben? Engedi-e a brüsszeli bürokrácia a létezésüket? Most dől el, hogy kimaradhat-e egy ország a szekuláris, családellenes és a nemzetet meghaladottnak tekintő európai szellemi törekvések hatálya alól, építheti-e jövőjét az azokkal ellentétes értékekre? Építheti-e ezekre az alaptörvényét? Elvehetik-e tőle ennek jogát? " Orbán Viktor, miniszterelnök, 2011 2

In recent years, literature on nationalism has grown significantly, oftentimes focusing on nationalist discourses. However, one rarely comes across works that comparatively and comprehensively examine nationalist discourses of ruling centrist parties. This study offers a comparative perspective on two center-right political parties, Fidesz and the AK Party, that dominate the political arena by the electoral victories they won in their respective countries, which are quite different from each other in many respects.
How do the ruling parties construct their nationalist discourses, and why do they need these? How are national narratives rebuilt by the ruling parties and functionalized while shaping current politics? What are the distinctive or similar features of the nationalist discourse in the specific conditions of different countries? This book seeks answers to these and similar questions through two cases under study.

My intention with this textbook is to present the three ‘legs’ on which the context of investigation is based when political culture is discussed and different political cultures are compared. My ‘triangular framework’ will show the major notions and points of reference to help students comprehend the complexity of political culture.
The book comprises two parts: both have four chapters. In Part I, we first set the scene for our ‘interpolar world’ and the major interconnecting processes and interconnected entities without which, in my view, no comparison of political cultures can be imagined. The emphasis will be laid on the local attributes and on how globalization can be seen and managed at the local levels. Chapters 3 and 4 will give an overview of the basic notions and their historic development, but even more of their
present-day potential usage. Many tangible examples are used to support the flow of explanation with a firm intention to include excerpts of useful texts and interpretations of leading scholars. These are provided for deeper analysis both as texts and as points of departure, because we believe that students want to find out more about the given issues. Chapter 5 presents some of the characteristics of Hungarian political culture, especially those which offer some room for more debate in the classroom and beyond. Part II is compiled as a Reader with four selected texts, each of them telling students more about various issues of political culture across the globe. First, we read about African political cultures and how much anthropological thinking can add to our deeper understanding of how these cultures may be constructed. Second, we look at a survey data analysis about Southeast Asian political cultures. This piece has also been chosen with the aim to provide students with an important methodological example not only for further research, but also for going beyond the macro perspective of related notions. Third, a useful summary of six major factors is offered so that we can understand more Latin American political cultures. Fourth, we again return to Central Europe and read about the central question of social justice with regard to political cultures in this post-Soviet region. This final text is also a fine example for showing how an introductory chapter of a book, or even a dissertation can be written. Therefore, from an academic writing point of view, it can be useful for students in their final year with who are just about to prepare their final thesis.
The textbook uses several info boxes, which provide either definitions or certain excerpts of academic works in direct connection with the topics of discussion. At the end of each chapter there is a list of review questions and suggested further readings, which are designed to help students develop a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of the interconnected concepts of the book. All the texts (or parts of
texts) and the papers in the Reader serve the purpose of fostering critical reading and thinking as well as sound argumentative discussion and interpretation.

Péter Márki-Zay, mayor of the former ruling-party stronghold Hódmezővásárhely, is the designated joint, prime ministerial candidate of the democratic opposition, and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s main challenger going into next April’s parliamentary elections.
Although international partners might be reassured by Márki-Zay’s pro-European and transatlantic orientation, they should be also aware of the short-term concerns orbiting around him. Márki-Zay, the joker in the pack of Hungarian politics, is raising the stakes both for Orbán and the united opposition. With him as leader, the democratic parties might have the best chance to win an election in a decade. Or to crash the ship on the rocks with no rescuer in sight.

Abstract This paper explores the domestic and international context of Hungary's emerging international development policy. Specifically, it looks at three factors that may influence how this policy operates: membership in the European Union (EU) and potential 'Europeanization', Hungary's wider foreign policy strategy, and the influence of domestic stakeholders.

In assessing the state of liberal democracy in contemporary Europe, significant scholarly and public attention has been paid to the role of leaders. Post-Communist countries in particular are often the focus of scholars who announce a "democratic backsliding" engineered by populist "strongmen". This article suggests that in consolidating EU democracies, such attention is disproportionate in reference to the actual de-democratising effect of the emerging "strongmen". It draws attention to the systemic conditions that allow such leaders to surface, and focuses on state capture (the extraction of private benefits from the state by incumbent officeholders) as a joint-venture practice that precedes and outlives individual political lives and acts as a brake on further democratisation.

The chapter investigates a hitherto unexamined case of central bank mission creep: that of the National Bank of Hungary (MNB) under the leadership of György Matolcsy after 2013. Based on the core ideas of the literature on institutional entrepreneurship and institutional change, a qualitative case study relying on elite interviews and document analysis is presented. This shows how and why the mission creep could stretch the Hungarian central bank’s policy portfolio beyond recognition in, inter alia, assuming development banking functions, buying commercial banks, purchasing real estate, creating research foundations and even university departments. These self-proclaimed ‘unorthodox’ measures reflected the long-held positions and institutional entrepreneurship of Matolcsy, a former minister for the economy. The case study offers new insights into the impact of institutional entrepreneurship on the medium-term evolution of economic policy institutions.

Időről időre visszatér a magyar közgondolkodásban vagy éppen a szellemtörténetben a kérdés, hogy vajon a két világháború közötti magyar szélsőjobboldali gondolkodás mennyit, hogyan és milyen mértékben merített a nemzetközi mozgalmakból vagy eszmerendszerekből. 1 A kérdéskör -amely talán elsőre egyszerűnek tűnik -önmagában is többrétegű, következésképpen nem lehet rá egy, vagy ha úgy tetszik "a" választ megadni. Tény, hogy a második világháború utáni történelemszemlélet -számos más hibája mellett -túlzottan leegyszerűsítette a két világháború közötti korszak megítélését és értékelését. Ez a megállapítás értelemszerűen igaz volt a két világháború közti szélsőjobboldali mozgalmakra vagy éppen néhány politikus közéleti pályaképének megrajzolására is. Vagyis ezek lényegében nem voltak mások, mint az olasz és német pártok/mozgalmak magyar klónjai, nemkülönben politikusaik is. Ez a fajta igen erőteljes leegyszerűsítés két komoly veszélyt rejtett. Egyik, hogy ekkor elmaradt egyfajta múlttal való reális szembenézés és a következtetések levonása, hogy a magyar szélsőjobboldal magyar gyökerei igen mélyek, és azok a magyar gazdaság sajátos fejlődésében, az első világháborús vereségben éppúgy gyökerez-1

Hungary is commonly portrayed as one of the most Eurosceptic countries in the European Union. Paradoxically, however, the Hungarian public has by and large a positive image of the EU. How can this be explained? And how is the current refugee crisis affecting the EU-Hungarian relations?

The United States of America is the largest power in the world, which was right defeating the forces of communism and fascism. Its history is positive even if it has committed many " crimes " against its own peoples (Indians, Blacks, the Southerners) and overseas, such as (the Vietnamese). However, in Europe, especially in Eastern and Central Europe the American model cannot be followed and it is senseless. The ideas of the consumer society and low-grade mass culture which are represented and spread by America in Europe and in the rest of the world are unsustainably wasting, they destroy the environment and the soul (…) The real power of the US is represented by the large banks, the multinational mammoth companies and the gun producing lobbies which can bring the president down at any time. Hungary and Europe should not become an American colony with regard to both its culture and civilization. If this is anti-Americanism then yes – MIEP stands against the American form of life, the American way because it is impassable. (Political Agenda, Hungarian Justice and Life Party)

1. WHEN A CRIMINAL PAST IS OVER  Almost twenty years ago, when after the collapse of communism the first symposium on the issue had been organised in Hungary, I interventioned on a rather sceptical note, aware of that it is a potential catastrophe to administer justice in the aftermath of such political changes. At the same time, it would be likewise disastrous to eliminate its availability after criminal periods of history. We are clearly on the horns of a dilemma here. Our choice is that between the Devil and the deep sea.
For it was clear right at the time that it is a sine qua non of any such process to grant, at least in principle, a minimal redress to the victims, and also to make certain that the related measures have a preventive effect. It is likewise necessary to denounce the negative developments in history, at least symbolically, by ruling out communism (whose ingrained practices still appear to linger) as an acceptable political alternative.
Back at the time when the trust in the honest feasibility of a justitia-programme was still unbroken and all this seemed just to be a function of proper formulation justifiable for both sides, the rather modest and defensible target the governing party had on its agenda only ascertained that the victims are entitled to (1) a recognition by the National Assembly in representation of the whole nation, to (2) a judicial procedure through which those once victimising deeds and perpetrators are qualifiedly named, and to (3) a comprehensive documentation with the official clarification of all those relevant facts, accompanied by (4) some cultivation, funded from guaranteed state resources, of the continued historiography of the past.
Within half a year, the Prime Minister commissioned a Committee for the Investigation of Unlawful Benefits, to which each member submitted a background paper to clarify respective positions. There and then, I formulated as a preliminary question: What is the consequence if the state does use its prerogative for fulfilling its punitive responsibility exclusively as a perspective for avoiding fulfilment? What if the state itself is the perpetrator? What if its politics are backed only by committed crimes and rewarded state criminals?
An example from World War II Central European history may best illustrate the underlying conditions. At incidences of rape, the commanders of the Soviet occupying forces when official notice was made, reacted abruptly under military law, by shooting the offender. It could only be established subsequently that nevertheless this was the exception. The average practice was to expose those making complaint to immediate brutal, often murderous destiny. In any case, the only secure way was not to take cognisance of the crime committed. Is it then reasonable, fitting within the morality of the Rule of Law, that those transgressing any law and order would be the first beneficiary of the protection extended by a new law and order? That the new Rule of Law is tested and corrupted from the beginning by granting unpunishability for state-organised murderers? And all this simply because they held on long enough so that their self-granted statutory limitation could expire? With regard to the issue’s pending constitutional adjudication, also a call was formulated, emphasising that not even the declaration of the limitation period passed could be without problems. For once the routine is questioned, the insistence on routine is just as much a function of choosing for a genuinely creative, responsible/responsive decision as deciding upon substantive argumentation. Eventually, any of them is only justified by a political position.
The issue had been reconsidered five weeks before the Constitutional Court was to take its decision. As to the alternatives, it was concluded that qualifying such arguments as legally irrelevant is the same stating that, in a legal sense, there is no difference whatsoever between an unmarried mother committing infanticide and the murders committed by and for the sake of, and subsequently openly rewarded by, a party state, with chances of prosecution systematically blocked—only provided that the time prescribed passed. As opposed to the claim that all it could only stand for witch hunt political justice, I also added: If we state that the regime was based not on guaranteeing human rights but on neglecting them, this is only an institutional statement. It is as party-neutral as if we stated: rain also falls in socialism. Anything could have in fact prevented the state from exercising its punitive power, without altering the problem’s characteristics one bit.
Later on, the alert was also formulated that it would be a rather cynical solution impairing our future prospects if we agreed to grant impunity (let alone anonymity) to criminal state deeds. Not even the most ancient and primitive laws would allow anyone to gain by his sin. Any temporal limitation of criminal persecution can be enforced only if the state’s obligation to fight against crime was observed, if its agencies were ready to meet it. Otherwise no starting date can be attached to statutory limitation. For any other response would signal our disrespect for the law’s moral foundations and could only encourage would-be dictators.
2. RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL  As to the underlying legal aspects, a number of theoretical stands are analysed with regard to excuses as raised and refuted by NINO, as contrasted/complemented to by GOTI, MILLÁN, ORENTLICHER, SHKLAR, the French doctrine and international practice.
By now, there is a new awareness of substantive values to be implemented through legal mediation, i.e., of the priority of practical problem-solving that can be the result of careful pondering and balancing, convinced that resolution is not simply to side with any limiting position in conflicts of values/interests without own sober assessment. This is the awareness of the fact that the law’s instrumentality is by far richer than any particular formula usually applied in everyday routine.
Or, law is a complex (and never fully exploited) aggregate of instrumental values, working principles and ways of establishing coherences and inferences which we, by formally confronting available kinds of reasoning and argumentation in substantiation of a canonisable final decision, both serve and reproduce.
Accordingly, practical challenge and conceivable legal response are not simply meant to qualify (by judging, criticising or even destroying) one another. Discourses in law are to strengthen them in dialogue and encounter within the formally perfected but never exhaustively actualised bounds of social acceptability and legal justifiability, to be re-conventionalised in socio-legal continuity, taken—instead of merely strict formalism—in a widened macro-sociological (cultural and civilisational) sense.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTER-REVOLUTION  The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s political role in the transition process and its 11/1992 decision is monographically treated, covering both SÓLYOM’s “invisible constitution” and SZABÓ’s “constitutional criminal law”—contrasted to the criticism by DUPRÉ, SADURSKI and TEITEL—which were to formalise the notion of the Rule of Law reducing it to a morally emptied legal foreseeability.
4. SIGNS FOR A LIVEABLE PERSPECTIVE  A decade ago, the criteria were set at an international level according to which “a legacy of grave and systematic violations generates obligations that the state owes to the victims and to society. They are in fact distinct duties, each one of which must be complied with to the best of the government’s abilities (1) to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators – a right of the victim to see justice done; (2) to disclose to the victims, their families, and society all that can be reliably established about those events – a right to know the truth; (3) to offer the victims adequate reparations – an entitlement to compensation and also to nonmonetary forms of restitution; and (4) to separate known perpetrators from law enforcement bodies and other positions of authority – a right to new, reorganized, and accountable institutions.” (MÉNDEZ)
Drawing a balance of implementation hitherto actualised, it can be ascertained that none of them has been fulfilled in Hungary during the two decades labelled as “change of regimes” but resulting rather in “a regime re-instated” instead. The question may arise: What would be the answer of our Rule of Law, if state terrorism in devastation of humans swept over our people again? Whatever shameful it may be, but: silence, incompetence, and impotence. For the last word said is the same unique constitutional decision, with the legality of the self-prescription by the predecessor regime overwriting the chances of any successor regime. For no justices sensed any difference in whether or not criminal prosecution failed despite efforts legally required or had from the beginning been intimidated or deterred from having a start; that is, whether legal normality or abnormality of criminal terror over citizens and state machinery had operated the period of statutory prescription to be expired. For, from that time on, neighbouring states in Central Europe have already edified from our inability by edicting specific laws with the prospective effect that dictatorial annihilation of law shall never be recognised by the Rule of Law, for fear that self-legalisation of terrorism can end in its re-legitimation, and can also incite states in trouble to test it anew.

This publication is a comprehensive overview of developments, events and trends in Hungary in 2018, and an outlook on which topics we expect to dominate Hungarian politics in 2019, the year of both European and Local Elections. It focuses on five broad areas. In the first section we review the year from the perspective of the Hungarian government, with a special emphasis on the main reasons behind the re-election of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party and the policy priorities of the fourth Orbán government. In the second section we look at the opposition parties, their state and prospects. The third section focuses on foreign affairs, in particular Orbán’s battles at the European scene, and Hungary’s foreign policy in a global context. In the fourth section, we take a detailed look at how Fidesz's policies have shaped the economy, and special attention is paid to the controversial “slave law”. Finally, some key developments of the Hungarian society – changes in the media landscape, culture war, the Stop Soros bill and CEU’s departure – are discussed. All of the sections conclude with a brief analysis of the issues which may come to the fore in 2019.