Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy

Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 2005

ABSTRACT: Although from the 2nd century BC to the 3rd AD the problems of determinism were discussed almost exclusively under the heading of fate, early Stoic determinism, as introduced by Zeno and elaborated by Chrysippus, was developed largely in Stoic writings on physics, independently of any specific "theory of fate ". Stoic determinism was firmly grounded in Stoic cosmology, and the Stoic notions of causes, as corporeal and responsible for both sustenance and change, and of effects as incorporeal and as predicates, are indispensable for a full understanding of the theory. Stoic determinism was originally not presented as causal determinism, but with a strong teleological element, in the context of a theory of natural motions, which makes use of a distinction between a global and an inner-worldly perspective on events. However, Chrysippus also employed his conception of causality in order to explicate his determinism, and can be shown to have maintained a universal causal determinism in the modern sense of the erm. The teleological and mechanical elements of early Stoic determinism were brought together in Chrysippus' conception of fate, which places elements of rationality in every cause.

Aestimatio: Critical Reviews in the History of Science

Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap, 2016

At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a posteriori, a world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity.

Ars Disputandi

Stoic philosophy has been charged with an inconsistency insofar as its deterministic worldview appears to conflict with its advocacy of various methods of self-discipline aiming at self-improvement. It is, some claim, self-contradictory to hold persons responsible for adhering to counsel regarding their behavior and attitude if forces beyond their control ultimately determine that their behavior and attitude will not conform to counsel. In this paper, I argue that this complaint is misguided. Though several Stoic philosophers attempted to reconcile their determinism with some conception of free will, I contend that the Stoics should have (or at least could have) rejected the doctrine of free will while defending Stoic counsel and its efficacy for producing a well-ordered mind, virtuous character, and a life of harmony with Nature.

The Stoic's were aware of the problem of reconciling a deterministic view of the universe with a preservation of the responsibility and freedom of an individual's will. Stoic philosophy does not adopt a traditional conception of libertarian freedom, where individuals can act freely with respect to multiple different actions in the world1. Instead, the individual is fated to act in a specific way, but is free to assent, or not assent, to the validity of impressions which are presented to the mind2. The Stoic doctrine of determinism states that the universe as a whole is God, and that the will of God determines the entirety of this universe. Reconciling the doctrine of a determined universe with the idea of free assent is imperative to the Stoic philosophy, but brings about significant problems. In this paper, I examine the concept of assent in Stoic philosophy. Assent is intended to help the Stoic reconcile determinism with individual freedom and responsibility. Specifically, I aim to critique Chrysippus' distinction between principal and auxiliary causes, and its implications on the relationship between the individual and God. I conclude that Chrysippus' notion of assent as an auxiliary cause does not avoid the problem of reconciling determinism and individual responsibility. Furthermore, the conception of the individual as free places the individual's volition outside of the will of God. Any attempt to reserve a space for individual freedom from fate, as is the case with the freedom to assent or dissent to given presentations, comes at the cost of the Stoic claim that the universe as a whole is 1 Also known as the principle of alternate possibilities, or PAP for short (O'Keefe, 11). 2 Different Stoics differ on the degree of freedom attributed to the mind. Chrysippus did not think the mind was as free to alter its own beliefs and desires as did the earlier Stoics. Instead, he aimed to reconcile the concepts of assent and causation with the deterministic nature of the world, including the mind (Hellenistic Philosophy, II-90.39).

Routledge Companion to Free Will, 2016

2015

This thesis offers a reconstruction and analysis of a debate about responsibility, and causation initiated by Plato, and continued by the Stoics. The pivotal moment of the discussion is a problem I call 'the greatest difficulty,' found in Plato's Parmenides. The debate, however, involves a complex network of arguments including subordinated or parallel discussions about ontology, method, ethics, and epistemology. Instead of isolating the main topic, I highlight the structure of the debate, and the interconnection between its parts, to show the complexity and sophistication of the argumentation in both Plato and the Stoics, and the depth of the Stoics' engagement with Plato's works. The motivation for doing this is to better understand many of the otherwise unexplained and odd starting points of the early Stoic philosophy. But since this requires a reconstruction of the dialectical background the Stoic texts assume, this means that the bulk During my PhD I benefited from participating in KCL's Greek seminar, Yale-KCL's Republic workshops, the Keeling masterclasses at UCL, and the writing groups in Cambridge organised by Dr Moira Faul. I am grateful to everybody who attended these events. I also wish to thank audiences in Fordham University, King's College London, UNAM, and Oxford for their invaluable feedback on different papers which later became part of the thesis.

In his A Treatise of Freewill, Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ‘up to us’ (ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν) and that these things are the product of our choice (προαίρεσις). These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim to be drawing on Stoic doctrine, Cudworth uses these terms with a meaning first articulated only later, by the Peripatetic commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias.

The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy, 2020

An overview of the Stoic philosophers and the main elements of their system. A chronological presentation of brief biographies of the Stoics with the most notable contributions of each individual is followed by a sketch of their philosophical system divided into the branches of logic, physics, and ethics. Logic includes topics in rhetoric, dialectic, and epistemology. Physics is the account of physical reality, including ontology, cosmology, and theology. The synopsis of ethics includes the Stoics’ version of naturalism, the doctrine of oikeiōsis, the virtues, emotions, the sage, moral progress, and cosmopolitanism.