Collusion

A popular way of obtaining essential inputs is based on the establishment of an input production joint venture (IPJV) in the upstream (U) section of the vertical chain of production by firms competing and selling final goods downstream (D). Different governances may be designed for the management of an IPJV according to the ownership structure, the degree of delegation granted to the IPJV by parent firms and the extent of competition in the D market. Industry optimal arrangements with nonlinear pricing may be hard to implement and may be banned by regulators, mainly in the case of minimal delegation based on coordination (collusion) among the D firms. A handy and endurable governance turns out to be maximal delegation, i.e., an independent IPJV, seasoned with linear uniform pricing, even if this solution may contain some inefficiency.

The literature presents mixed findings regarding the economic conditions under which cartels form and collapse, and regarding how stable they are across firm-specific and industry-wide business cycles. The relationship between cartel life cycles and business cycles has been insufficiently analyzed to date. In this paper, we study in depth whether collusion is pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical. We analyze the relationship between cartel start-ups/break ups and economic cycles using a dataset of sanctioned cartels by the European Commission (EC) that were active between 1997 and 2018, after the leniency program had already been introduced. We also double check whether this relationship has changed with respect to the pre-leniency period from 1991 to 1996. Our results show that cartels are more likely to be formed when the business has evolved positively in the previous months, and cartels are less likely to collapse when the business has evolved positively, and managers expect prices t...

On the basis of information collected from all the published European Commission's decisions in cartel cases between 1962 and 2014, this paper identifies different stages in the supra‐nationalization of cartel policy at the European Union (EU) level. It analyzes major competition policy reforms, strategies and initiatives taken by the European Commission (EC), and its relationship and interaction with Member States’ resistance and other policy players’ positions, which offers a new in‐depth study on the history and political economy of a key pillar of EU integration. It also provides a forensic analysis of the sanctioned cartels at each stage. This study shows that the introduction of the leniency programme was a critical juncture that allowed cartel authorities to identify cartels more effectively and to provide evidence for sanctioning collusion much more easily than before. This success was a key determinant for deepening the EU integration in competition policy. The intended...

The Master of Business Administration (MBA) plays a significant role in developing managers in a plethora of global organizations. In most circles, it is considered a degree to develop corporate managers. With the leadership failures of organizations like pharmaceutical price collusion and price increase of 539% of Perrigo Pharmaceuticals, the fake account fraud practices at Wells Fargo, sexual harassment issues at Uber, the Equifax data breach, and the video of a forcible, bloody removal of a passenger on a United Airlines in the U.S., there has been increased criticism concerning the effectiveness of current MBA programs and leadership development in general. This qualitative research study explores how the curriculum of the MBA of the future should look.

Competition law, which governs the economic activities of entities operating in commercial and economic markets, is now facing a new challenge with the emergence of cryptocurrencies. While adhering to the philosophy of competition rules and the economic nature of these markets, it becomes necessary to conduct a legal analysis of the Bitcoin market from a competition perspective in order to identify various forms of anti-competitive behavior. In such cases, the application of competition rules and corresponding penalties needs to be tailored to the market structure. The occurrence of anti-competitive behaviors is possible in new formats, which should be taken into consideration when assessing market structure.One of the most significant forms of anti-competitive behavior is the abuse of dominance, which includes selfish strategies and the 51% attack. By manipulating the original blockchain and compromising the decentralized nature of Bitcoin, this behavior not only violates the principle of fair competition but also leads to market failure. A dominant position can also arise through mergers and monopolies involving dominant equipment. Additionally, algorithmic collusion, which involves altering the algorithm and creating a fork, represents a distinct form of cartel practice that enables the 51% attack. Attacks themselves constitute another form of collusion in this market, further complicating the competition landscape.Considering the self-regulatory nature and global structure of the Bitcoin market, competition rules and entities involved face the challenge of defining governance authority while accounting for the difficulties of imposing penalties due to anonymity criteria. Establishing an effective and productive relationship with developers is crucial for the safe application of competition rules in the market. Furthermore, it is possible to enforce competition law on registered agencies that operate as legal entities in compliance with local legal frameworks.

When fixed, sunk investment costs are high, firms may not have sufficient incentive to enter the market unless future entry is constrained. In this case, the government faces a dilemma between a full commitment and noncommitment of restricted future entry. A way out is to consider a commitment conditional on the realization of the uncertain parameters, such as the trigger-point mechanism (TPM) that sets conditions on current production level, excess capacity, and demand growth under which future entry will be allowed. This article shows that the TPM facilitates the incumbents' collusion but may improve social welfare under certain circumstances. (JEL L13, L43, L50, H10, H54)

We describe a principal–supervisor–agent relationship in which agent and supervisor may collude. To prevent collusion, the principal may contract on a noisy signal which is correlated with the occurrence of collusion. When the signal is informative enough, the principal uses it and no collusion occurs in equilibrium. These contracts, however, are ex post inefficient and are only optimal if the principal can commit not to renegotiate. With renegotiation it is never optimal for the principal to prevent collusion and, at the same time, condition contracts on the signal. In fact, when the signal is informative enough collusion occurs in equilibrium.

In the textbook model of dynamic Bertrand competition, competing firms meet the same demand function every period. This is not a satisfactory model of the demand side if consumers can make intertemporal substitution between periods. Each period then leaves some residual demand to future periods, and consumers who observe price undercutting may correctly anticipate an ensuing price war and therefore postpone their purchases. Accordingly, the interaction between the firms no longer constitutes a repeated game, and hence falls outside the domain of the usual Folk theorems. We analyze collusive pricing in such situations, and study cases when consumers have perfect and imperfect foresight and varying degrees of patience. It turns out that collusion against patient and forward-looking consumers is easier to sustain than collusion in the textbook model.

We compare experimentally two contest designs. In the between-group design (BGD), cohorts compete with one another in stage 1 and a single cohort is then advance to stage 2. In stage 2, members of this cohort compete for a single prize. In the withingroup design (WGD), the order of the competition is reversed. Our findings support the theoretical conclusion that the WGD is superior to BGD in generating more expenditure. They also show that if the cohorts are fixed, small, and interact repeatedly over time, then tacit collusion in the WGD, but not the BGD, leads to suppression of expenditures.

With a view to reducing the consequences of corruption in public procurement, many governments have introduced debarment of suppliers found guilty of corruption and some other forms of crime. This paper explores the market effects of debarment on public procurement. Debarment is found to make little difference in markets with high competition, while in markets with low competition it may deter corruption as long as firms value public procurement contracts in the future and there is a certain risk of being detected in corruption. On the other hand, debarment-when it works-has an anti-competitive effect, and this effect will contribute to facilitate collusion between suppliers. Debarment may work as a tool against collusion, but only if targeting one firm at the time (such as a ringleader or the specific beneficiary when the collusion is detected)-and not all the members of a cartel. If designed with an understanding of the market mechanisms at play, debarment can deter both collusion and corruption, thus improving the results of public procurement. If so, most current debarment regimes need modification.

In jurisprudential terms, setting the price of goods by the government and ordering traders to sell goods at the same price is called pricing. According to iman Abu Hanifa, imam shafi, and imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, under normal circumstances. The government does not have the right to set the prices of goods. According to Iman Malik, it is permissible for the government to fix the prices of goods in the market to protect the people from harm. Hanfi jurists have allowed pricing with one condition. Such as  when there is artificial inflation in the market due to collusion of traders or hoarding and price is being doubled. Then it is permissible for the government to fix prices in order to protect the public from harm. According to our research this opinion is preferred. Nowadays while stockpiling and commericial monopolies are common in the market, it is important for the government to set prices in the public interest and to protect them  from harm.

We propose, in this paper, a countermeasure against the producer-consumer collusion attack in Named Data Networking (NDN). In this attack, malicious nodes act in collusion by generating content requests at high rate and thus changing content popularity. The goal of the attack is to reduce in-network caching efficiency by increasing the probability of legitimate consumers to retrieve contents directly from the producer. The proposed countermeasure, called Cache nFace, mitigates this attack by dividing the cache of a node into sub-caches. Each sub-cache only stores contents requested through one specific network interface. Our assumption is that malicious requests do not arrive simultaneously at all interfaces of a content router very often. Results show that cache nFace reduces up to 50% the effectiveness of the attack and outperforms another proposal found in the literature in all the analyzed scenarios.

Remplace une version précédente du même numéro / Replaces a previous version of the same DR LEO number Cette version remplace celle du / This replaces the previous version dated : XX/XX/XXXX Titre précédent / A previous version was titled : "Remplacer par l'ancien titre" A paraitre dans / Forthcoming in : Nom du journal, vol, numéro, pages Paru dans /

On the Difficulty of Collusion bitte auf den kommenden ungeraden Seiten und Guillaume Cheikbossian and Philippe Mahenc auf den geraden Seiten als Seitentitel setzen. We study the ability of several identical firms to collude in the presence of a more efficient firm, which does not take part in their collusive agreement. The cartel firms adopt stick-and-carrot strategies, while the efficient firm plays its one-period best-response function, regardless of the history of play. We characterize the most collusive symmetric punishment, which maximizes the scope for collusion. We then find that either a lower cost disadvantage or a smaller cartel size facilitates collusion. Finally, we compare our results with those obtained in the standard setup where all firms participate in the collusive agreement.

In the coming decades, new technologies will change our lives and the way in which we perceive them in hitherto unimaginable ways.Future Design is acreative collusion of science, technology and art– an experimental laboratory for new art forms and perspectives on the social impact of technologies within Europe.Future Design explores the future of digital technology from atoms to bits and from bits back to atoms again, highlighting the ways in which these technologies are adapted in different cultural contexts. The chief objective is to attract widespread attention to these technologies, to generate debates and interest in their use among independent artists and otherwise under-represented groups.Future Design provides new and critical views on imagination and new insights into reality.In view of the risks and possible collateral damage connected to these new technologies, scientist and artist must make a stand for their values, and do so by openly discussing the potential and risks,...

Based on 2019 procurement data composed of almost 1.5 million observations, this study employs Latent Class Analysis (LCA) to investigate how latent profiles are defined to represent behavior in the Price Registration minutes based on a set of selected variables. LCA approach brought the possibility of identifying some characteristics that can suggest or direct the efforts of the control bodies in identifying illegal cases. From the seventeen-profile model with binary variables, we identified a latent class (N=2589) that could be the object of a more detailed analysis by the control bodies. From the LCA with binary and continuous variables, the seven- class solution provided the optimal fit for our data, with the lowest BIC value and a high entropy value. The seven relevant factors that increase the risks of renting price registration drafts are the: (i) number of Non-participant Bodies (NPB) per tender; (ii) relative item value; (iii) amount of NPB per supplier per tender; (iv) distribution of winners; (v) proportion of approved quantities per item for NPB per tender; and (vi) tender with only Managing Body (MB) and NPB. The latent class with a high NPB presence with few suppliers (N=749) was the most salient to be more favorable for the sale of price registration minutes, intended to be carried out in future studies. Our results highlight that such an organization-centered approach can provide insights not apparent in the more common variable-centered practice. Although our goal was to unpack further insights within Price Registration System, future work may wish to include more of the measures from the models in the clustering routine.

Tradable development rights (TDR) are discussed as a means of containing urban sprawl in numerous countries. Despite its theoretical superiority in ensuring an efficient redistribution of planning rights, its applicability is concerned with several open questions and potential problems. Introducing a novel experimental setting, we simulate a cap & trade TDR scheme and investigate the effects of communication, an aspect typically assumed to be irrelevant by theory. We consider communication among individual participants competing in a TDR system and team decision-making facilitated by face-to-face communication. We find the system to be quite efficient, despite overshooting certificate prices particularly in the beginning for both initial issuance in auctions and the secondary market. Communication significantly reduces auction prices, leading to substantially less income redistribution from participants to the auctioneer. This effect is explained by participants' improved understanding of the cap & trade system when communicating; despite participants' attempts, they fail to establish collusion. Team decision-making is not only shown to reduce overshooting prices; moreover, it also improves the system's efficiency. These results are interpreted as emphasizing the efficiency and political feasibility of TDR schemes when including communication among its participants.

Digital traces left by a user of an on-line social networking service can be abused by a malicious party to compromise the person's privacy. This is exacerbated by the increasing overlap in user-bases among various services. To demonstrate the feasibility of abuse and raise public awareness of this issue, I propose an algorithm, Seed and Grow, to identify users from an anonymized social graph based solely on graph structure. The algorithm first identifies a seed sub-graph either planted by an attacker or divulged by collusion of a small group of users, and then grows the seed larger based on the attacker's existing knowledge of the users' social relations. This work identifies and relaxes implicit assumptions taken by previous works, eliminates arbitrary parameters, and improves identification effectiveness and accuracy. Experiment results on real-world collected datasets further corroborate my expectation and claim.

Digital traces left by a user of an on-line social networking service can be abused by a malicious party to compromise the person's privacy. This is exacerbated by the increasing overlap in user-bases among various services. To demonstrate the feasibility of abuse and raise public awareness of this issue, I propose an algorithm, Seed and Grow, to identify users from an anonymized social graph based solely on graph structure. The algorithm first identifies a seed sub-graph either planted by an attacker or divulged by collusion of a small group of users, and then grows the seed larger based on the attacker's existing knowledge of the users' social relations. This work identifies and relaxes implicit assumptions taken by previous works, eliminates arbitrary parameters, and improves identification effectiveness and accuracy. Experiment results on real-world collected datasets further corroborate my expectation and claim.

We review microeconomic research on corruption from the last thirty years. We start by analyzing the seminal models of corruption built on three-tier, delegation models. Then, go into more details of the context of corrupt deals, and discuss the main economic factors that affect corruption. We discuss incentives and compensation in bureaucracies, and the interplay of market and bureaucratic structure. Competition and contract design will also be reviewed in relation to procurement under corruptible agents. After reviewing the theoretical contributions, we turn to the empirical evidence. We begin discussing measurement issues, and then move to the analysis of the empirical evidence relative to the theoretical models discussed in previous sections. Finally, we cover several anti-corruption mechanisms proposed in the literature and discuss their relative merits as devices to control or eliminate illegal activities.

Digital watermarking is known as the most suitable solution to protect 3D videos. Hence, proposing a watermarking technique robust against malicious attacks and especially against collusion becomes a crucial challenge for many researchers. In fact, collusion is usually not considered in the assessment of anaglyph 3D video watermarking schemes. In this paper, an invisible and robust watermarking method dedicated to anaglyph 3D videos is proposed. It embeds a signature in the selected mosaics generated from different groups of frames forming the original video. The choice of the mosaic as an embedding target guarantees robustness against collusion which considered as the most dangerous attack for any video watermarking technique. First, several mosaic images are generated from every set of 25 frames of the original video and they are compared using a similarity measure. In order to obtain a high level of invisibility, the signature will not be embedded in all mosaics but only in the ones which are not similar. Second, the signature is inserted on each selected mosaic image using a hybrid embedding scheme based on the least significant bit and the discrete wavelet transform. Finally, all the marked frames are restored from the marked mosaic images and they are recombined to the unmarked ones to reconstruct the marked anaglyph video. To prove the robustness of the suggested method, different manipulations are applied to various anaglyph videos and several metrics are calculated. Obtained results confirm its robustness against the image processing attacks, the enhancement attacks, and the framebased attacks, in addition to dangerous video attacks such as MPEG-4 and H264-AVC compression and collusion attacks.

3D video watermarking is far from the maturity of watermarking algorithms dedicated to audio, image or 2D video. In fact, little work has been proposed for anaglyph 3D videos. Such methods have not been robust against malicious attacks such as compression and collusion. The latter one is a very dangerous attack that can be applied on video content and can easily remove an embedded signature to obtain original content. This paper proposes an efficient approach for anaglyph 3D videos which can resist this malicious attack thanks to the use of a static multi-sprite generated from the different sets of frames which compose the original video. First, a sprite is generated for every set of 25 frames. Then every sprite is marked using a hybrid scheme: the discrete wavelet transform based algorithm and the middle significant bit technique, which improve signature invisibility and enhance robustness. Finally, a marked anaglyph 3D video is generated from every marked sprite. The use of multi-sprites as an embedding target provides robustness against collusion attacks and a high quality of marked video reconstruction compared with static mosaics. The experimental results show good robustness against collusion, compression and other attacks such as geometric manipulation and temporal attacks. Besides, the proposed technique presents a high level of invisibility.

Video watermarking technique aims at resolving insecurity problems. Recently, many approaches have been proposed in order to satisfy the new constraints of video applications such as robustness to collusion attacks, high level of security and signature invisibility. In this paper, a new video watermarking approach based on feature regions is proposed. The originality of this approach is to use crowdsourcing technique in order to detect feature regions. First, video summary is generated. This summary is then used to detect the first type of feature regions based on crowdsourcing technique. On the other hand, mosaic is generated from original video to detect the second type of feature region browsed by the moving objects. Finally, the signature is embedded into the mosaic generated after merging these two types of feature regions using multi-frequential watermarking scheme. Experimental results have shown a high level of invisibility thanks to the efficient choice of the embedded target. Moreover, the proposed approach is robust against several attacks especially to collusion attacks.

Dans ce papier, nous proposons deux nouvelles approches de tatouage vidéo robustes et invisibles basées sur les régions d'intérêt. La première insère la signature dans la mosaïque alors que la deuxième l'insère au niveau des objets en mouvement. Le choix de la mosaïque et des objets en mouvement est basé sur leur robustesse face aux attaques vidéo les plus importantes telles que la collusion et la compression MPEG-4. En plus, pour maximiser l'invisibilité, nous proposons, pour chacune de ces deux approches, différentes variantes en fonction des régions d'intérêt choisies. Les expérimentations ont montré que les variantes où l'insertion s'effectue au niveau des objets en mouvement permettent d'obtenir le meilleur compromis robustesse-invisibilité.

The Brazilian Antitrust Law established the Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) as the body responsible for investigating and imposing sanctions for acts that violate the economic order, as well as for supervising acts of economic concentration. The field of game theory is concerned with the actions of decision-makers who are aware that their decisions affect one another. The objective of the proposed article is to analyse the legal framework of the Leniency Programme implemented by Brazil's Administrative Council for Economic Defence (CADE) using the tools provided by game theory, in particular sequential games with perfect information. The methodology employed is classified as theoretical research, utilising the deductive method with the objective of enhancing the proposed theme. In order to achieve this, two game models will be developed. Initially, it was observed that the benefits offered by the current Brazilian leniency programme are insufficient to persuade a potential cartel member to propose a leniency agreement. Conversely, in a second step, the introduction of immunity for applicants from civil damages caused by the cartel resulted in the conclusion that the Brazilian antitrust leniency programme becomes an important tool for deterring and combating cartels.

This article centres on some of the dilemmas contained within victim positioning. Such dilemmas are often overlooked by the authorities involved with people subjected to relational aggression. 2 For example, when teachers rule out cases of bullying because the victim has ‘participated in’ or ‘laughed at’ some of the bullies’ initiatives, or when a rape victim’s status as a victim is questioned because, in the lead up to the assault, she was supposedly friendly to the rapist. In these cases, it could be useful to explore the reason for the bullying victim’s apparent collusion or to better understand the premises for the rape victim’s positioning options in relation to the perpetrator. In other words, it could be fruitful to explore the dynamics and dilemmas of the victim position. In this article, I aim to reflect on the motivational conditions of the victim phenomenon. These reflections are based on an analysis of qualitative data produced through interviews with school children as ...

The detection of transmitted data collusion among sensing nodes needs to be resolved at data link layer. It takes a lot algorithm calculation effort and time constraint. A new method to sense the performance of cognitive radio (CR) by avoiding interference based on new master node (MN) algorithm. Interference could be reduced significantly by using only PHY (physical) information of the cognitive radio network. It saves a lot computational on above layer and detect the collusion of transmitted data as early as possible. By using a novel MN algorithm at PHY layer, it reduces the cost of computation and time to detect and avoid collusion of transmitted data.

Thème-Communication et codage : Cryptage et tatouage (Traçage de documents marqués) Problème traité-Identifier les utilisateurs malhonnêtes ayant participéà la création d'une copie pirate d'un document numérique. Originalité-Utilisation d'un algorithme itératif et de nouvelles fonctions pour la partie accusation du code de Tardos. Résultats-Amélioration de la phase d'accusation qui permet de réduire la taille du code. 1 Contexte Nous parlons dans cet article de fingerprinting, désigné aussi sous les noms de traitor tracing, ou transactional watermarking. Le problème est le suivant : un distributeur de données numériques (images, audio, vidéo,...) distribue des copies d'un contenuà n utilisateurs. Quelques uns de ces utilisateurs sont malhonnêtes, aussi appelés colluders, et mélangent leurs contenus pour créer une copie pirate qui est redistribuée illégalement. On souhaite retrouver leur identité en analysant la copie pirate. Pour cela, on associe une technique de marquage robuste avec un code anti-collusion, partieétudiée ici. 2 Code de Tardos En 2003, G. Tardos a présenté une famille de codes de fingerprinting probabilistes très efficaces [2]. Leur intérêt réside surtout dans leur taille réduite et dans la facilité de génération des mots de code. B. Skoric et al ont proposé un décodage symétrique de ces codes, ainsi qu'une version pour alphabet q-aire [3]. Ces articles utilisent des fonctions d'accusations qui sont les mêmes pour tous les types d'attaques. En 2008, Furon et al [1] ont montré que ces fonctionsétaient bien les meilleures qu'on pouvait utiliser dans un contexte général, mais qu'elles pouvaientêtre optimisées si la stratégie des colluders est connue. Commençons par rappeler en quoi consistent les codes de Tardos pour un alphabet binaire [3]. Soit n le nombre d'utilisateurs et m la longueur du code. Soit X la matrice contenant l'ensemble des mots du code. On désigne par X j = (X j1 , X j2 ,. .. , X jm) le mot de code de l'utilisateur j. On tire m valeurs p i ∈ [0, 1] indépendantes et identiquement distribuées suivant la pdf f (p) =

My main claim is then that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor-or, to put it more descriptively,we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin were vastly more evil than our political leaders, but in terms of killing and harming people they never came anywhere near causing 18 million deaths per year.

Success in law enforcement of cartel cases hinges on solid investigation procedures and effective punishment. However, the existing legal framework provides guidance on computing fines based on sales revenue, even though it mentions such fines must be no lower than cartel gains. Using data from a real case in Brazil, this paper has two aims: (i) reviewing the difficulties associated with computing cartel overcharges and (ii) checking whether the fines levied on convicted firms are in line with these overcharges. We employ three methodologies to compute these overcharges. We find cartel overcharges estimates might be quite sensitive to its assumptions, but apart from differences in differences models with quadratic and cubic trends the fines are in the middle of the range of cartel overcharge estimates. This indicates that the fines are in line with cartel overcharges, but it is recommended to use a set of estimates produced by different methods to ensure their adequacy.

We present a public procurement model in which contractual flexibility and political tolerance for contractual deviations determine renegotiations. In the model, contractual flexibility allows for adaptation without formal renegotiation, while political tolerance for deviations decreases with political competition. We then compare renegotiation rates of procurement contracts in which the procurer is either a public administration or a private corporation. We find robust evidence consistent with the model predictions: public-to-private contracts are renegotiated more often than comparable private-to-private contracts, and that this pattern is more salient in politically contestable jurisdictions. The frequent renegotiation of public contracts results from their inherent rigidity and provides a relational quality of adaptability to contingencies in politically contestable environments. (JEL D23, D72, D73, D78, H57).

Roughly a decade ago, the Chinese government implemented a green credit policy aimed at lowering emissions from highly polluting corporations through improving information disclosure quality during the loan process. According to policy guidelines, banks may provide financial support only for new projects that passed an environmental assessment or were explicitly designed to decrease pollution. This paper used panel data from 320 companies in heavy polluting industries listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2016 and adopted a fixed effects regression model to examine whether collusion between local governments and Chinese listed companies has prevented the green credit policy from achieving its target. The results show that there is no significant positive correlation between CEID and corporate green financing, which means that the environmental information disclosure system does not send valuable signals to the market and has failed to become a decision-making tool for b...

Purpose - This paper aims to explore the problems in developing the halal food industry in the tourismm area, and then find solutions to overcome these issues. One of the popular tourismm areas in Indonesia is Bangka Belitung. Design/methodology/approach –The respondents in this study are practitioners and academics who have knowledge of the halal food industry in Bangka Belitung. Then, the analytic network process is used as a tool to analyze priority problems and solutions. Findings - The analysis reveals that there are three priority issues: 1. Lack of understanding and commitment from companies to excel the halal products, 2. Lack of company understanding related to the halal supply chain, 3. Declining performance of the tourism industry sector. Then, the priority solution in this finding is to increase and improve professions, academics, and supporting institutions. Research limitations/implications - This study only examines the problem of developing the halal food industry in the tourism area. This study contributes to the literature by exploring problems and discussing solutions. Practical implications –This study highlights the priority problems and discusses the solutions to become a reference in making policies and strategies in the development of the halal food industry in the tourism area, especially in the Bangka Belitung Islands, Indonesia. Originality/value – Although there are several studies in this field, to the best of the author's knowledge, there has been no research analysis about the problems of the halal food industry in tourismm areas. Therefore, the analysis is presented using the pioneering method which considers sustainability and innovation as the priorities.