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Toby Betenson

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See tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Former philosophy lecturer. I spent ten years teaching pretty much everything in western philosophy at undergraduate and post-graduate level, covering ancient, early modern, and contemporary; logic, metaethics, metaphysics, political philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion; Socrates, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein… If it’s canonical in western philosophy, I’ve probably taught it. My areas of research interest are metaethics and the philosophy of religion, particularly where those intersect in issues such as the problem of evil. I have published mainly on that topic.

Now I work on a farm. I still believe that philosophy is the most important thing a person can do, if they are inclined that way (and not everyone is), but I have lost a level of faith in the modern university as a happy home for the subject. I have lost belief that I belong there, at least. Perhaps this will prove to be a passing thing.

I suppose I’m experimenting with philosophy as a way of life. I want to finish the work that theory started. For now, I am trying to vomit less grass and produce more wool.

I will leave whatever older work is here, but most of it is no longer representative.

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Books by Toby Betenson

The Rion: An Ancient Dialogue for Our Times

A satirical piece about popular philosophy. See also https://tobybetenson.com/2024/03/01/palinode... more

The Problem of Evil as an Ethical Problem

The problem of evil is and ought to be an ethical problem. This book tries to show that by saying... more The problem of evil is and ought to be an ethical problem. This book tries to show that by saying something else: I argue that theism is morally wrong. I introduce the logical problem of morally-impossible evil. This establishes an inconsistency between belief in the perfect goodness of God and a responsive recognition of moral necessity. When combined with the moral objections of anti-theodicy, this forces the theist to either deny that the morally impossible happens (which is clearly false) or else reject the meaningfulness of the concept (which is not reasonable). Since neither option comes without great moral cost, a consistent set of theistic beliefs must be seen to be morally problematic. But it doesn’t really matter whether this conclusion is true. This argument is not the purpose of the book; it’s only serving a purpose, as a provocation. What I hope is that the process of engaging with this argument will cause philosophers to attend to, and thus reflect on, important elements of the topic that might have been overlooked.

A dialogue on the problem of evil.

Think Well, Live Well: A Free Introduction to Philosophy

Volume One: Ancient Philosophy

Papers by Toby Betenson

Evaluative claims within the problem of evil

Religious Studies, 2014

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. The problem of evil contains some evaluative claims. R... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. The problem of evil contains some evaluative claims. Recognizing the fundamental role of the evaluative claims within the problem of evil presents two significant problems for the argument from evil. First, in order for the argument from evil to be successful, the normative assumptions that underlie the evaluative claims within the problem of evil must be deployed consistently both within the problem and between those who are discussing the problem. This level of normative agreement is likely to be difficult to achieve. Second, the argument from evil moves from evaluative premises to a non-evaluative conclusion, and thus commits the same error that J. L. Mackie identifies the moral argument for the existence of God as committing: it gets the direction of supervenience between facts and values back-to-front. Mackie's criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God ought to also apply to the moral argument against the existence of God. If my analysis is correct, and Mack...

Ivan Karamazov is a hopeless romantic

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Ivan Karamazov is frequently used, and misused, in dis... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Ivan Karamazov is frequently used, and misused, in discussions concerning the problem of evil. The purpose of this article is to correct some pervasive misinterpretations of Ivan’s statement, as found in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. I criticise some common misinterpretations, as exemplified in the theodical work of Marilyn Adams and John Hick, as well as the more nuanced interpretation of Stewart Sutherland. Though Sutherland’s interpretation is the strongest, it nevertheless misses the mark in identifying Ivan as a positivist. I argue that Ivan Karamazov is not a positivist, but a romantic, and a hopeless one at that. We should, therefore, not read Ivan as stating an argument for the non-existence of God, but instead see him as a representative of a very particular and robust form of non-cognitive atheism.

The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding

Religions

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil a... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases.

Recasting Anti-Theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

The problem of evil as a moral objection to theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral object... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the...

In Defence of Moralising Anti-Theodicy: A Reply to Snellman

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Bradley Monton. Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design. Broadview, 2009

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2011

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Philosophy Compass, 2016

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

The problem of evil as a moral objection to theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctivel... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctively moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.

Fairness and futility

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2015

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Ivan Karamazov is a Hopeless Romantic

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Evaluative Claims Within the Problem Of Evil

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Fairness & Futility

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortalit... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue that combining William Lane Craig’s arguments for the futility of life without God or immortality, together with a plausible amendment to his working definition of ‘futility’, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that life is futile if God does exist. Craig says that God must exist as a guarantor of ultimate justice, and that this ultimate ‘fairness’ is necessary for life to have meaning. I will argue that this ultimate ‘fairness’ entails that our lives are futile, since, given the existence of God, our actions are causally irrelevant to the achievement of the satisfaction of the ‘Good’. This discussion serves to pinpoint a major flaw in Craig’s reasoning: the claim that events of merely ‘relative’ significance do not have the potential to counter the futility of life.

Non-Cognitive Atheism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Thesis Introduction

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

The Problem of Evil as a Moral Objection to Theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctivel... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctively moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.

The Rion: An Ancient Dialogue for Our Times

A satirical piece about popular philosophy. See also https://tobybetenson.com/2024/03/01/palinode... more

The Problem of Evil as an Ethical Problem

The problem of evil is and ought to be an ethical problem. This book tries to show that by saying... more The problem of evil is and ought to be an ethical problem. This book tries to show that by saying something else: I argue that theism is morally wrong. I introduce the logical problem of morally-impossible evil. This establishes an inconsistency between belief in the perfect goodness of God and a responsive recognition of moral necessity. When combined with the moral objections of anti-theodicy, this forces the theist to either deny that the morally impossible happens (which is clearly false) or else reject the meaningfulness of the concept (which is not reasonable). Since neither option comes without great moral cost, a consistent set of theistic beliefs must be seen to be morally problematic. But it doesn’t really matter whether this conclusion is true. This argument is not the purpose of the book; it’s only serving a purpose, as a provocation. What I hope is that the process of engaging with this argument will cause philosophers to attend to, and thus reflect on, important elements of the topic that might have been overlooked.

A dialogue on the problem of evil.

Think Well, Live Well: A Free Introduction to Philosophy

Volume One: Ancient Philosophy

Evaluative claims within the problem of evil

Religious Studies, 2014

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. The problem of evil contains some evaluative claims. R... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. The problem of evil contains some evaluative claims. Recognizing the fundamental role of the evaluative claims within the problem of evil presents two significant problems for the argument from evil. First, in order for the argument from evil to be successful, the normative assumptions that underlie the evaluative claims within the problem of evil must be deployed consistently both within the problem and between those who are discussing the problem. This level of normative agreement is likely to be difficult to achieve. Second, the argument from evil moves from evaluative premises to a non-evaluative conclusion, and thus commits the same error that J. L. Mackie identifies the moral argument for the existence of God as committing: it gets the direction of supervenience between facts and values back-to-front. Mackie's criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God ought to also apply to the moral argument against the existence of God. If my analysis is correct, and Mack...

Ivan Karamazov is a hopeless romantic

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Ivan Karamazov is frequently used, and misused, in dis... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Ivan Karamazov is frequently used, and misused, in discussions concerning the problem of evil. The purpose of this article is to correct some pervasive misinterpretations of Ivan’s statement, as found in Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. I criticise some common misinterpretations, as exemplified in the theodical work of Marilyn Adams and John Hick, as well as the more nuanced interpretation of Stewart Sutherland. Though Sutherland’s interpretation is the strongest, it nevertheless misses the mark in identifying Ivan as a positivist. I argue that Ivan Karamazov is not a positivist, but a romantic, and a hopeless one at that. We should, therefore, not read Ivan as stating an argument for the non-existence of God, but instead see him as a representative of a very particular and robust form of non-cognitive atheism.

The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding

Religions

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil a... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases.

Recasting Anti-Theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

The problem of evil as a moral objection to theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral object... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the...

In Defence of Moralising Anti-Theodicy: A Reply to Snellman

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Bradley Monton. Seeking God in Science: An Atheist Defends Intelligent Design. Broadview, 2009

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2011

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Philosophy Compass, 2016

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

The problem of evil as a moral objection to theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctivel... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctively moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.

Fairness and futility

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2015

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Ivan Karamazov is a Hopeless Romantic

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Evaluative Claims Within the Problem Of Evil

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Fairness & Futility

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortalit... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. William Lane Craig argues that both God and immortality are required for life to have meaning; life is futile without either of the two. I argue that combining William Lane Craig’s arguments for the futility of life without God or immortality, together with a plausible amendment to his working definition of ‘futility’, entails the counterintuitive conclusion that life is futile if God does exist. Craig says that God must exist as a guarantor of ultimate justice, and that this ultimate ‘fairness’ is necessary for life to have meaning. I will argue that this ultimate ‘fairness’ entails that our lives are futile, since, given the existence of God, our actions are causally irrelevant to the achievement of the satisfaction of the ‘Good’. This discussion serves to pinpoint a major flaw in Craig’s reasoning: the claim that events of merely ‘relative’ significance do not have the potential to counter the futility of life.

Non-Cognitive Atheism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Thesis Introduction

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

The Problem of Evil as a Moral Objection to Theism

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctivel... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. I argue that the problem of evil can be a distinctively moral objection to theistic belief. The thesis has three broad sections, each establishing an element in this argument. Section one establishes the logically binding nature of the problem of evil: The problem of evil must be solved, if you are to believe in God. And yet, I borrow from J. L. Mackie’s criticisms of the moral argument for the existence of God, and argue that the fundamentally evaluative nature of the premises within the problem of evil entails that it cannot be used to argue for the non-existence of God. Section two establishes the moral objectionability of many responses to the problem of evil (theodicies). I discuss the work of the moral ‘anti-theodicists’, and support some of the key premises within their arguments via appeal to the moral philosophy of Raimond Gaita. I combine the claims of section one and section two, and conclude that theism inherits the moral objectionability of theodicy. In section three, I establish the plausibility of a morally motivated non-cognitive atheism, offering an example (Dostoevsky’s Ivan Karamazov), before finally distilling the central claims of this thesis into the form of a slogan: God lacks humanity.

The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Ethics and Theodicy: A Call for Consistency

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Certain theodical responses to the problem of evil exh... more Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work. Certain theodical responses to the problem of evil exhibit a profoundly consequentialist means-ends justification. These theodicies claim that it is permissible for God to allow some evil to occur if a ‘greater good’ will result. I label these theodicies ‘consequentialist theodicies’. Traditional theists are commonly not consequentialists; traditional theists do not commonly believe that consequentialism is true. I offer a brief empirical defence of this uncontroversial intuition. Yet, these consequentialist theodicies rely upon the truth of consequentialism. I offer an argument that provides logical support for the necessity of this implication. Therefore, the traditional theist that proposes a consequentialist theodicy whilst maintaining a non-consequentialist ethical belief system is maintaining an untenably inconsistent position.

Moral Anti-Theodicy

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.

Moral Anti-Theodicy and the Moral Philosophy of Raimond Gaita

Go to tobybetenson.com for my recent work.