American Revolutionary War

This thesis investigates British amphibious operations in the American War of Independence between the outbreak of war in 1775 and the Peace of Versailles in 1783. It assesses the strategic, operational and tactical context of the efforts of Great Britain to impose a settlement on the rebellious colonists by use of expeditionary warfare techniques. Particular attention is given to command decision making, both local and national, with reference to the North American theatre of war. The response of the military and government to the entry into the war of France and Spain is investigated. Fighting techniques and operational art are also evaluated. The findings are compared with secondary writing to determine whether traditional narratives adequately explain the failure of the ‘British Way of War’ in this insurgency conflict.

The plight of the Revolutionary common soldier is well known, with poor or difficult living conditions in camp and on campaign. Revolutionary officers, with more privileges and sometimes additional resources, did all they could to make their own lot as comfortable as possible. In a winter cantonment, fortified post, or settled camp all manner of furniture was procured and made use of, but campaign living was quite different. When armies needed to move quickly, of necessity both officers and common soldiers had to divest themselves of all but the most requisite equipment. The general orders, letters, and returns below will give an overview of the problems experienced by the armies as they balanced the need for mobility against the desire for creature comforts.

Contents

1. British Knapsack Timeline, 1758-1794
2. Discussion of British Knapsack Evolution, Single-Pouch and Double-Pouch Packs, and Carrying Blankets
3. Notes Regarding the Use of Over-the-Shoulder Blanket Rolls
4. Follow-Up: “Like a Pedlar's Pack.”: Blanket Rolls and Slings
5. Articles on Knapsacks and What Soldiers Carried in Them




\




British Knapsack Timeline, 1758-1794

1758-1765 (and earlier), Single-pouch purse-like leather knapsack carried by British troops, as pictured in paintings by David Morier (1705-1770) and Edward Penny, R.A. (1714-1791). These knapsacks could not accommodate a blanket. 1768, Cuthbertson recommends “square” knapsacks with two shoulder straps.
1771, Painting of a private soldier of the 25th Regiment of Foot shows him wearing a hair pack with two shoulder straps. His knapsack seems to be a single-pouch model made of hide covered with hair, and, given the maud (a plaid cloak, worn by shepherds in Scotland) slung over his shoulder, could not accommodate a blanket. 
1774, Timothy Pickering describes a single-pouch, double-shoulder-strap leather knapsack being used in the British Army.
1776, An American contractor touts his double-pouch, single-shoulder-strap linen “new Invented Napsack and haversack” to Maryland officials. One pouch was meant for food, the other for soldiers’ necessaries. Some Maryland units are known to have been issued the knapsack, and there is some indication it was used by Pennsylvania troops as well. 
1776-1777, British regiments are issued knapsacks, but many Crown units use blanket slings instead of packs in these two campaigns. (Possibly because the knapsacks then being used could not accommodate a blanket, which were deemed necessary for American service.) 
1778, The first known image of a double-pouch British knapsack appears in a 71st Regiment order book. One pouch is shown as holding food, the other, soldiers’ necessaries. 
1778, On 28 July “1096 Knap & Haversacks” (from the context likely the same as the “new Invented Napsack and haversack”) are sent from Reading, Pennsylvania to supply Continental troops.
1780, Benjamin Warner was likely issued his double-pouch double-shoulder-strap linen knapsack while serving with a Continental artillery regiment. `
1782, First known documentary references to double-pouch knapsacks.
1782, British 29th Regiment order book seems to refer to rolled blankets worn on top of knapsacks.
1782, L’Enfant painting of West Point showing soldiers with rolled blankets attached to the top of their knapsacks.
1794, The earliest known surviving British double-pouch, double-shoulder-strap linen knapsack, made for the 97th Inverness Regiment, raised in 1794 and disbanded the same year.

Contents

            1777 and 1780: A Common Thread?
            1776 to 1782: “Necessary to keep the Soldier's clean"
            1781: "Their Wives all of whom ... Remained": Women on Campaign With the Army
            1781: "The women with the army who draw provisions"
            1782: "Rations ... Without Whiskey": Col. Henry Jackson's Regimental Provision Returns
            1783: "The proportion of Women which ought to be allowed ..."
            Appendices
            A. Images, Articles and Additional Information Related to Sullivan’s 1779 Campaign
and Fort Sullivan, Tioga.
            B. Articles Providing Contextual Information on the 1781 Virginia Campaign
          C. Miscellaneous References to Army Women
1. 1775, 1776, and 1781: “Fire Ships,” “Veneral Disorder,” and Women in Hospital
2. A Woman with the Continental Army, 1777-1783
3. Hospitals, Nurses and a Female Spy, 1776 and 1777
4. Orders Concerning Female Followers, Maj. Gen. John Sullivan’s Division, 1777
5. Horses Belonging to Camp Followers
              6. Women Riding Pack Horses on Maj. Gen. John Sullivan's 1779 Expedition
7. Women, 1778-1782: On the March, Doing Laundry, Selling Military Goods, and Sergeant's Responsibility For Followers
8. Army Orders and George Washington Correspondence Concerning Female Followers
9. Link to Second Study Examining Numbers of Continental Army Female Followers
          D. Additional Articles on Continental Army Female Followers by the Author

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français ci-après):
This article (as all my other articles on Clausewitz) isn’t a discussion “around” the thoughts of Clausewitz, which would be first based on Clausewitz – an attractive name! – in order to speak thereafter in a prospective manner, as we see quite often. My article is an analysis focussed on what Clausewitz actually wrote in his lectures on the “kleinen Krieg” [I would say here “small war” to be short, even if I don’t like this translation]. The aim is, first, making a synthesis of the thoughts of Clausewitz on the relations between the “kleinen Krieg” and insurrectional wars; and, second, explaining the context of that days which underlain his thoughts, in order to better understand them: the context related to 1) the wars on which Clausewitz bases his speech, 2) the military culture of the officers of that days (and also the military culture of Clausewitz) and 3) the reflection of his time on the “kleinen Krieg” and on insurrectional wars.

Indeed, Prussia's military defeats in 1806 led in this country to a reflection on national defence, on the question of armed citizens, and on the “petite guerre” as the appropriate tactic for popular uprisings. The lecture upon the “petite guerre” that Clausewitz delivered at the War College in Berlin between 1810 and 1812 is part of this framework. Moreover, the Revolutionary War, which was an insurrection against the British homeland, is one of the examples Clausewitz did choose to feed his thinking, just like the Wars of the Vendée and the Tyrolean events during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars – which were other uprisings with insurrectional characteristics. In his lecture, Clausewitz doesn’t distinguish between the two words and the two realities of “petite guerre” and “guerrilla warfare”; however, he shows from time to time the particularities of the civil wars and of the wars with armed citizens. Our article studies the lecture on the “petite guerre” from Clausewitz with a new point of view, in order to point out the parts which are related to the popular wars and to the insurrections; indeed, as Raymond Aron expresses it, the thinking of Clausewitz has been built on watching how the extreme violence of passions could not be separated from people's wars.

RESUME en français :
Cet article (comme tous mes autres articles sur Clausewitz) n’est pas une discussion « autour » de la pensée de Clausewitz, qui partirait de Clausewitz – un nom porteur ! – pour parler de façon prospective, comme on le voit souvent. C’est une analyse centrée exclusivement sur ce que Clausewitz a écrit dans son "Cours sur la petite guerre". L’objectif est, premièrement, de saisir et de synthétiser la pensée de Clausewitz sur les rapports entre petite guerre et guerre insurrectionnelle ; et, deuxièmement, d’expliciter le contexte de l’époque qui a nourri cette réflexion, pour mieux la comprendre : le contexte concernant 1) les guerres sur lesquelles Clausewitz appuie son discours, 2) la culture militaire des officiers de ce temps (donc la sienne) et 3) la réflexion de son temps sur la petite guerre et la guerre insurrectionnelle.

Les défaites subies en 1806 engendrèrent en effet, en Prusse, une réflexion sur la défense nationale, sur l’armement du peuple, et sur la petite guerre comme tactique du peuple soulevé. Le « Cours sur la petite guerre » donné par Clausewitz à l’École supérieure de guerre de Berlin, entre 1810 et 1812, s’inscrit entres autres dans le fil de cette impulsion. Au reste, la guerre d’Indépendance américaine, insurrection contre la métropole anglaise, est au nombre des exemples choisis par Clausewitz pour alimenter sa réflexion, comme les guerres de Vendée et les épisodes tyroliens de la Révolution et de l’Empire, autres soulèvements à caractère insurrectionnel. Si Clausewitz n’opère pas pour ses auditeurs la distinction entre « petite guerre » et « guérilla », il pointe de temps à autre les particularismes des guerres civiles et des contextes guerriers avec armement du peuple. Cet article revisite le Cours sur la petite guerre de Clausewitz pour y relever la part redevable aux guerres populaires et aux insurrections, si tant est que, comme l’exprime Raymond Aron, la pensée de Clausewitz sur la guerre s’est construite en considérant le déchaînement des passions inhérent aux guerres populaires.

In the summer of 2005 Coastal Heritage Society plans were well underway to develop a derelict property into Battlefield Park in downtown Savannah, Georgia. This would be the culmination of a movement to memorialize the fallen of the 1779 Battle of Savannah. This area contained Spring Hill Redoubt, which was one of over a dozen redoubts surrounding British-occupied Savannah prior to the battle. French and American allied officers chose to attack Spring Hill Redoubt with most of its forces. This area served as the focal point of the entire battle.

Immediately prior to construction, a CHS archaeological crew conducted archaeological investigations employing trenching with heavy machinery, shovel shaving, and hand excavation of features. This investigation located portions of the original Spring Hill Redoubt. This included an intact section of the redoubt’s palisade trench, which contained
post stains and artifacts directly associated with the 1779 battle. This archaeological discovery, in turn, served as the impetus for two National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP) grants (2007, 2009) that would
broaden the focus to the remaining portions of the Revolutionary War battlefield throughout Savannah.

The Continental Army entrusted many of its junior officers with a great degree of responsibility and autonomy. Captain Henry Lee’s role in commanding a vital foraging operation in Delaware and Maryland for the Main Army at Valley Forge in February and March 1778 sheds light on the role of a company-grade officer within the broader framework of petite guerre. Lee demonstrated his ability at planning and executing autonomous operations and proved himself a capable, thoughtful, and energetic officer in an important, but overlooked expedition that reveals something of the important operational middle ground occupied by American company-grade light officers.

The background of this research has emerged from an interesting point of the birth of democracy and the first republican system government in the world. Methods used for this research is historical methods, that consists of heuristics, critics, interpretation and historiography. The main problem of this research is, " What was the main role of George Washington in the American Revolutionary War in 1775 – 1783? " The American Revolution was generally caused by political and economy policy of British Government that has been felt unfair by the American Colony. Washington played an active role in the movement against British, through influencing the colony leaders and attending forums like the House of Burgesses, Virginia Convention and the Continental Congress. Washington was appointed Commander-in-Chief to lead American forces and had implemented a defensive strategy against the British that he managed to win the Bunker Hill (1775) Princeton (1776) battles, crossing the Delaware (1776) until defeated by the British in Yorktown (1781). The American Revolution has made Washington a hero to the United States and the world.

ABSTRACT in English (the book is written in French):
This book presents a thorough analysis and a case study upon the "petite guerre" in the 18th century Europe - tactical and operational levels dealt with, as also relations between war and society (with a substantial historical reminder, in a large chapter exclusively devoted to the 17th century).

The “petite guerre“ was a type of warfare consisting in skirmishes and ambushes which, next to the sieges and battles, filled the theatre of operations during the conventional wars between princes. The locution "petite guerre" with this meaning was always used in the singular, and has to be used so today. The first treatises on the art of the “petite guerre” were published in France, from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The locution “petite guerre” wasn’t translated into English in the eighteenth century, even in treatises published in Great Britain or America (on the contrary, it was translated into German).

Next to the case study of the Flanders during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the book makes an analysis of the thoughts on the “petite guerre” throughout the eighteenth century, in France and in the most important countries of Europe. A special chapter is devoted to the thoughts in Great Britain throughout the 18th century, and to the case study of the actions of British light troops in Flanders (example of 1747), because this topic has not been dealt with before - On the contrary, one book already dealt with the case study of Austria's and another, with the case study of Prussia's use of the "petite guerre" in the eighteenth century.

Besides the tactical level, the book shows how the use of the "petite guerre" was necessary to contribute to the victory in a military campaign at the operational level. In Flanders between 1745 and 1748, the Marshall of Saxe (commander of the French Army) and the Allies (Austrian, British and Dutch armies and their commanders) understood the advantage and importance of the "petite guerre" at this level. A case study shows in detail how the "petite guerre" strongly contributed to the main aims of the French army in August 1746.

However, the topic of the book goes beyond the scope of a tactical and operational study. By showing the impact of the “petite guerre” on civilians and on the activity of the provincial administration, by analyzing the French government policy towards light troops (the light troops were the specialists of the “petite guerre”), by approaching the opinions of the Parisian society (and of the elite as a whole) towards such military tactic and the troops specializing in it, what is at stake is also the possibility to grasp the ideas and sensitivity of society towards the “petite guerre”. This work is thus a contribution to a larger study ‒ that of an era's mentalities towards military issues.

The conclusion of the book offers the beginning of an analysis of the transformations in the use of the “petite guerre” during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

Contents

1. Return of Surgeon’s Equipment
2. Clothing for Dr. Lewis Howell, 2d New Jersey Regiment, 1778
3. “The sufferings of the wounded were extreme …”: Accounts of Wounded and Dead Soldiers, During and After a Battle, Saratoga Campaign, Northern New York, 1777
4. Diary of Albigence Waldo, Surgeon, 1st Connecticut Regiment, 1777-1778
5. “I dressd 17 or 18 Men. Wounded in different Parts …”: Jonathan Todd’s 1777 Accounts of Peekskill Garrison Life and Advancing with the Attack at Germantown
6. “Proceeded to amputate whenever the patient would consent to the operation”:
Volunteer Surgeon William Read at the Battle of Monmouth, June 1778
7. “I am in hopes With the Assistance of god that I Shall git wel again”: New Jersey Private Henry Johnson is Wounded at the Battle of Connecticut Farms, 7 June 1780
8. “I Lay sick all night on the Ground": Massachusetts Sergeant Andrew Kettell’s Illness on Campaign, June/July 1780
9. “A cannonball having passed through both his thighs …”: Surgeon James Thacher at the Battle of Springfield, June 1780
10. “I assisted in amputating a man s thigh.”: A Surgeon’s Experiences during the Siege of Yorktown, 1781
11. “Their wounded … were no more fortunate than ours.”: Hospital Conditions in and near at Williamsburg, Virginia, after the Yorktown Siege, 1781
12. “Litters were exceedingly wanted for the wounded Men.”: Carrying Wounded from the Battlefield, 1759 to 1781
13. Surgeons’ Diaries, War for American Independence

Contents

1. “’Orders were given, to hire Country Waggons in preference ...’: An Overview of British Army Wheeled Transport in the American War, 1775-1783”

2. “Proceedings of a Board of General Officers of the British Army at New York, 1781,” Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1916, vol. XLIX (New York: Printed for the Society, 1916)
“PREFACE  THIS volume contains the proceedings of a Board of General Officers of the British
Army at New York, appointed by Sir Henry Clinton, August 7, 1781 to consider the expenditure of public money in the different departments established by him when he succeeded to the command of the British Army at New York.
    The volume is of great local interest, and has among other items a return of men, women and children in the British Regiments victualled in New York, in the Civil Department and in Foreign Regiments, with Muster Roll of Assistants, Overseers, Coopers, Laborers, Artificers in various departments and where employed, and covers Brooklyn and this city; also list of vessels, giving names of masters, and a comparative view of the expenses in different departments of the Army from December 17, 1775, to December 5, 1781, under Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton.”

3. Images of Vehicles Used by the British Army in America, 1775-1783
________________

(Note: The Appendices contents are scanned pages of “Proceedings of a Board of General Officers of the British Army at New York, 1781,” Collections of the New-York Historical Society for the Year 1916, vol. XLIX (New York: Printed for the Society, 1916))

Appendices
1. “No. 9 – Return of Drivers, Horses and Waggons furnished by Brigadr-General William Dalrymple, Quarter Master General of the Army in North America in the District of New York by order of His Excellency the Commander in Chief for the General and Staff Officers and several Corps of the Army between 1st January & 31st March 1781 inclusive being 90 days”
2. “Return of Drivers, Horses and Waggons belonging to the Quart. Master General’s Department attached to the  General and Staff Officers and Several Corps of Hessians in the District of New York. – 26th August 1781.”
3. “Return of Drivers, Horses and Waggons attached to the several British Regiments in the District of New York 26th August 1781.”
4. “Enclosure 2d  Return of Drivers, Horses and Waggons that are with the Corps to the Southward [Virginia] New York 23d August 1781.”
5. “Enclosure 4  Return of Conductors, Drivers, Horses and Waggons in the Quarter Master General’s Department, attached to the Several Corps at and near the Six Mile Stone.  26th August 1781.” 
6. Enclosure No. 6, Johann Friedrich Cochenhausen (also Cockenhausen or Kochenhausen), colonel and quartermaster general, Hessian forces, to Board of General Officers, 14 May 1781 (regarding wagons for the German troops).
__________
Related Works by the Same Author
_________

My paper will examine the strategic and tactical significance of Sir Banastre Tarleton, nicknamed “The Butcher” and “Bloody Ban,” commanding officer of the 1st Royal Dragoons during the American War for Independence. This examination will center around the events between 1775 and 1781 in Tarleton's campaigns/battles against the Continental Army and various militia groups in and around the South Carolina colony, culminating with his defeat at the battle of Cowpens (which eventually resulted in his subsequent retreat back to England); this battle would prove to be the ultimate turning point in the War for Independence in the South, and would see some of the most brutal fighting in the entire war. Tarleton himself is an important factor in the history of (what would become) the United States as the various Colonial Militia suffered horrendous losses at the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton's Dragoons; Lord General William Howe, commander of the British Army during the bulk of the American War, even went so far as to remark (in regards to Tarleton's prowess as a soldier and leader) that if the British Army had multiple copies of Tarleton they would surely have the Colonials beaten, the revolution would be quashed. Sir Tarleton was the premiere commander to fully utilize and implement the concept of “total war,” in the Southern theatre of war, thereby aiding to revolutionize modern warfare.  Tarleton made a point of taking no prisoners, asking no quarter and giving none, and made a point of instilling fear even into his own troops. This aspect of his commanding presence meant the enemy was equally afraid whenever they saw his green-jacketed troops enter the field of battle. This work will examine Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton’s strategies, tactics, and overall study of command during his campaigns in South Carolina in 1776-1779.

Sectionalism denotes the division of a country, such as the United States, into sections based on shared cultures, religions, and racial, economic, and political identities. These sections then compete, putting their interests over those of the other sections. In the case of the United States, one of the most significant sectional conflicts was the Civil War, where North and South battled due to conflict over racial, economic, religious, and political differences. However, sectional conflict can be seen as early as British colonialism during which time the colonies competed with each other and with their governments in Europe and later as other sections such as the West developed its own characteristics and interests. Religion and race were frequently at the core of sectional conflicts, in everything from the Revolutionary War, the drafting of the Constitution, the failure of compromise regarding slavery, and the intermittent battles with Native Americans over land and religious practice to the emergence of the West and the great immigration and religious innovation that took place there. In all these cases, sections constructed identities in which race and religion were fundamental and were also significant points of contention. Even today, at the beginning of the 21st century, sectionalism continues with geographic sections still battling for dominance, and cultural sections square off in what is commonly called the culture wars.

Historian Harold L. Peterson wrote about paints used on artillery pieces in his fine work Book of the Continental Soldier:

Both wood and iron needed paint for preservation. The iron barrels of the pieces themselves were always painted black, and the mountings [ironwork] of the carriages were also painted black as a general rule. On some occasions … the mountings seem to have had only a coat of red lead ... [likely due to] a shortage of paint. The wooden parts of the carriages … seem to have been painted a variety of colors. At the beginning of the war there is evidence that the Americans painted their carriages the same light lead gray color that the British Army favored. On November 30, 1776, for instance, General Philip Schuyler requisitioned sufficient materials ‘to paint 250 carriages of a lead color …’ The Charles Wilson Peale portrait of Washington at Princeton shows him leaning against a gray gun carriage, and the painting of the Battle of Princeton by William Mercer, done shortly after the event and accurate in all verifiable details, shows a similar gray carriage. At the same time, however, the Mercer painting also illustrates a red brown carriage. This may have been intended to indicate an imported Valliere System carriage since these were customarily painted red in France or it might have been an American carriage, for there is documentary evidence that American carriages were sometimes painted that color, too. By 1780 there are references to painting carriages blue, perhaps under the influence of the French, who had changed to that color when they adopted the Gribeauval system. Before the end of the war blue seems to have become standard for American carriages …2

If, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot claimed, the Haitian Revolution used to be "unthinkable" and its history relegated to silence, over the last decade or so it has become almost unstoppably garrulous. 1 A number of recent studies have considerably enriched and revised C. L. R. James's seminal work, as Haiti has come to occupy a central place in increasingly internationalized accounts of the French Revolution. 2 From the dual perspective of the Haitian and French Revolutions, however, Haiti's international history only begins with the slave uprisings of August 1791, while Haiti's prehistory as French Saint-Domingue is relegated to the historical background, occupying the more restricted space of metropole-colony relations or -more narrowly still -the social history of plantation life in an isolated colonial backwater. But what if the plantation itself has an international history? The division of labor in the world economy during the eighteenth century established the broad economic framework that made Saint-Domingue a source of sugar, coffee, cotton, indigo, and profit for Europeans. The basic premise of this article -that the plantation economy of eighteenth-century Saint-Domingue was simultaneously rich and fragile -is not new, but historians generally advance this position on the basis of aggregate trade statistics. The following study examines how planters, managers, and, to a lesser degree, slaves adapted to two principal sources of this instability, international warfare and fluctuating trade regimes in the region. A microlevel examination of Radical History Review

This published article aims to be an accurate and detailed tool for the researchers who want to study the subject of the “petite guerre” and the light troops (update 2005).

Since the historian André Martel published in 1971 his article in the “Revue Historique” (France), the military historians in France regularly underscored until nowadays the renewal of military history – with updated approaches. The interest for the “petite guerre” is part of this movement. Additionally, the interest for the “petite guerre” has been supported by the reality of many conflicts today, which are told “low intensity conflicts”. The tactic of light troops of olden times, which filled the theatre of operations between the battles, finds here its contemporary transformation. The present article draws attention first upon the use of the terms of “petite guerre” in the French, German and British historiography, and its relevance, or not. Second, the article details the history of the study of the “petite guerre” of the early modern times (16th – 18th centuries) in France, in Germany and in the Anglo-Saxon world. Finally, it points out the problem of the compartmentalisation of the researchers’ works, both between the historical periods and between the different countries.

This is the chronicle of a young 18th-century German musician shipped to America as a musketeer in the Anspach-Bayreuth military forces sent to aid Britain in her effort to quell the rebellion of the "Thirteen Colonies."  With the initial focus on the 1st Anspach Regiment, it follows the movements of the Margrave's troops at their departure from Ansbach in March of 1777 through the conflict until their capture at Yorktown in 1781...it continues through their dreadful incarceration for virtually two years. Yet, just following their long awaited release and prior to their embarkation for return to the Fatherland in 1783, the captivating story of the young soldier unfurls as he embraces the "new experiment," remains in Philadelphia, assimilates into the local population, becomes one of the earliest professional musicians of the early Federal period and, ultimately, meets his untimely demise in the capital city's horrific Yellow Fever Epidemic of 1793.

This compilation, as it now stands, is meant give readers a basic framework for knowledge of the activities of the Connecticut regiments from summer 1777, through the Philadelphia Campaign and Valley Forge winter, the ensuing June 1778 Monmouth Campaign, and subsequent events ending in January 1779 just after a mutiny of troops from Brig. Gen. Jedediah Huntington’s Connecticut Brigade in their winter camp at Redding in their home state.
    Several soldiers help to tell the tale. Surgeon’s Mate Jonathan Todd was with the 7th Connecticut Regiment for only one year, but during his brief term of service wrote a remarkable series of letters, providing invaluable insights on events of 1777, major and minor. Capt. Paul Brigham, 4th Connecticut, nicely supplements Todd’s account with his several diaries, covering the period from late May 1777 to early September 1778. And Brig. Gen. Samuel Parsons contributes his accounts of activities during the 1778-1779 autumn and winter. Gaps in the narrative may be filled in by a reading of 8th Connecticut soldier Joseph Plumb Martin’s memoir, published under the title Private Yankee Doodle. Portions are quoted below, but Martin’s charming and candid account is too lengthy to do justice to here, and required reading for anyone interested in the life and times of a Revolutionary common soldier or the Continental Army. 

    We will begin with the makeup of the two brigades containing Connecticut regiments that served with Gen. George Washington’s army during the autumn Philadelphia campaign and 1777-78 Valley Forge cantonment. 

October 1777 to July 1778
Maj. Gen. Alexander McDougall’s Division
Brig. Gen. James Varnum's Brigade
4th Connecticut  Col. John Durkee (Capt. Paul Brigham)
8th Connecticut  Col. John Chandler (Pvt. Joseph Martin)
1st Rhode Island  Col. Christopher Greene
2nd Rhode Island  Col. Israel Angell

Brig. Gen. Jedediah Huntington's Brigade
  1st Connecticut  Lt. Col. Samuel Prentiss
2nd Connecticut  Col. Charles Webb (until March 1778)
5th Connecticut  Col. Philip Bradley
7th Connecticut  Col. Heman Swift (Surg. Mate Jonathan Todd)

Cet article se veut un outil précis et fouillé à l’usage des chercheurs souhaitant approfondir le domaine de la petite guerre et des troupes légères (mise à jour, 2005).
Depuis un article d’André Martel paru dans la « Revue Historique » en 1971, la communauté des historiens militaires en France n’a cessé périodiquement de souligner jusqu’à nos jours – avec des approches actualisées – le renouveau de cette histoire militaire. L’intérêt pour la petite guerre s’inscrit dans ce mouvement. Il a été porté aussi par la réalité de beaucoup des conflits d’aujourd’hui, dits « de basse intensité », dans lesquels la tactique des troupes légères d’autrefois, alternative à la bataille, trouve son avatar contemporain. L’article attire d’abord l’attention sur la plus ou moins grande pertinence de l’emploi de l’expression de « petite guerre » dans l’historiographie, en français, en allemand et en anglais. Il procède ensuite à la généalogie de l’étude de la petite guerre à l’époque moderne (XVIe - XVIIIe siècles), en France et dans les mondes anglo-saxon et germanique. Il pointe enfin le problème du cloisonnement des travaux, entre les périodes historiques comme d’un pays à l’autre.

There is no denying the fact that slavery has played an unfortunate but central role in the formation of modern cultures. It is necessary to trace the development of the African slave trade from Arab incursions to European trade routes to ascertain the truth. Focus on the treatment and justification for the African Diaspora and the participation of African slave traders. Slavery is a very old business. In Exodus in the Bible, we read that the Hebrews, or the Children of God, were enslaved in the land of Goshen, Egypt. Ancient Egypt acquired a million slaves over a four-hundred-year period as Pharaohs came to suppress the Hebrews, having apparently forgotten the fact that God had used Joseph, a former slave, to save Egypt from seven years of famine. The Mayans and Aztecs in the Americas and the Sumerians and Babylonians in the Middle East all made slaves out of the people they conquered and subjugated. The Egyptians not only enslaved Hebrews, but also Europeans and Ethiopians. The Africans, meanwhile, were also enslaved, first by their own people, then by the Arabs, then by the Europeans. The slavery of African people in the last millennium was not only one of the greatest tragedies in human history, it is also known as the African diaspora, which literally means " A dispersion of a people from their original homeland ". Not only did millions of people die due to squalor, neglect and in inhuman treatment, but were forced to endure culture shock on an unimaginable level of horror by being shipped off to foreign climes where the ignorance level was so severe that they were not even granted the dignity of being considered human let alone being treated as such. What was the really behind this tragedy? To answer this required a deeper look into the history of African slavery. Before the Arabs arrived, the Africans had enslaved their own people. When African farmers needed more laborers, they bought slaves. This increased production, at a reduced cost. The triangle trade routes would not have been possible without the cooperation of African slave traders who raided villages to capture the commodity in demand. The slaves were cut off from their kin. It was common that when slaves were kept close to their homes, they might escape. Therefore, they were often sold and transported to distant lands. Some sources claim that Arab slave traders enslaved Africans from about the ninth to the nineteenth century, primarily before traders from Europe arrived. Some researchers have alleged that the Arabian enslavement was widespread and cruel, as many of the male slaves were castrated and made into eunuchs so they could not reproduce. This was despite the fact that castrating went against the Qu'ran and other Islamic laws. The Arab slave trade is thought be some sources to have involved approximately fourteen million black Africans from the time of the Muslim conquest. The Qu'ran elevates virgins and polygamy to such a status that thousands of African virgins came to serve in Arab harems. According to the Quran, it was forbidden to keep slaves, and people who adhered to foreign religions could live under some protection. The Arabs employed many Africans as bodyguards and soldiers as they competed against African slave traders who supplied European ships. Slavery appears to have been spawned in sub-Saharan Africa as the result of the misuse of war captives. Although the Portuguese initially appear to have sought to recruit their African laborers for hire, they were later sold slaves as part of the African labour system. Trading for slaves was accepted in 1444 by Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal. Some European slavers threatened that, if the Africans refused to engage in this trade in slaves, they would be taken by force.

This essay argues that Christine Desan's Making Money: Coin, Currency and the Coming of Capitalism intervenes decisively in debates over the origin of money, while making a fundamental contribution to the legal history of money, the philosophy of money, and the history of capitalism. Desan shows money to be a mode of governance, created by rulers to extend their power, and maintained and managed by their successors. She argues that British politicians reinvented money at the end of the seventeenth century, creating the essential institutional basis for contemporary capitalism. The essay builds on Desan's analysis, showing how the tools she develops to understand the origins and development of British money can help us explain the expansion of capitalism, and the transition to capitalism associated with the American Revolution.

A Primer on Continental Regiments State by State,
and How Their Contingents Changed, 1775-1783
Excerpted from:
John U. Rees, ‘They Were Good Soldiers’: African–Americans Serving in the Continental Army, 1775–1783 (Published by Helion and Company, United Kingdom; available in the U.S. from Casemate Publishing, Inc.)

In the early decades of the American Republic, American soldiers demonstrated and defined their beliefs about the nature of American republicanism and how they, as citizens and soldiers, were participants in the republican experiment through their service. For Liberty and the Republic examines the relationship between soldier and citizen from the War of Independence through the first year of the Civil War.

The work analyzes an idealized republican ideology as a component of soldiering in both peace and war. It argues that American soldiers’ belief system—the military ethos of republicanism—drew from the larger body of American political thought. This ethos illustrated and informed soldiers’ faith in an inseparable connection between bearing arms on behalf of the republic, and earning and holding citizenship in it. Despite the undeniable existence of customs, organizations, and behaviors that were uniquely military, the officers and enlisted men of the regular army, states’ militias, and wartime volunteers were the products of their society, and they imparted what they understood as important elements of American thought into their service.

Drawing from military and personal correspondence, journals, orderly books, militia constitutions, and other documents in over forty archives in twenty-three states, For Liberty and the Republic maps five broad, interrelated, and mutually reinforcing threads of thought constituting soldiers’ beliefs: Virtue; Legitimacy; Self-governance; Glory, Honor, and Fame; and the National Mission. Spanning periods of war and peace, these five themes constituted a coherent and long-lived body of ideas that informed American soldiers’ sense of identity for generations.

This article follows the migration of the Calvit family from North Carolina to Tennessee and then Joseph Calvit’s service with George Rogers Clarke in the Northwest during the American Revolution.  Joseph Calvit then moved to Mississippi, where he and his brothers established themselves on plantations and became important and politically active citizens.  The story moves through his marital affairs and closes with a decades-long effort to secure his Revolutionary War pension.  The Appendices that follow provide the primary source materials for the story of the Calvit family.

The Continental Army’s cantonment at Valley Forge over the winter of 1777-1778 is famed for the inclement weather. Indeed, the weather plays a central role in most Americans’ understanding of the Valley Forge winter. Serving as a backdrop, the weather has transformed the Valley Forge cantonment into little more than a national morality play highlighting the virtuous self-sacrifice and patriotism of George Washington and his ragged band of Continentals.

The weather was severe, but how severe was it and how did the combatants deal with it? On 5 February 1778, the Schuylkill River was impassable because of flooding. The following day, Col. Israel Angell, 2nd Rhode Island Continentals, noted that “This morning was very raw and Cold…, and Rain’d as hard as Ever I Saw it.” The next morning, the “Snows [were] about ankel Deep.” In nearby Lancaster, diarist Christopher Marshall noted that the “roads [are] near impassable.” On 2 March 1778, Col. Thomas Stirling’s British brigade, bivouacked near Cooper’s Ferry, New Jersey, spent the “coldest night that they ever felt, [and] without fire.” That same day “Fresh gales…, squally with Frost and Snow” compounded the Royal Navy’s operations. Yet, the armies and navies continued their operations.

This paper, part of a larger project examining the Continental Army’s foraging operations in the winter of 1778, explores the weather and its effects on the combatants in the Philadelphia-Valley Forge area of operations. Through an examination of daily weather records it suggests answers to the questions “What were the weather conditions, what was their effect, and how did the armies understand and address the weather’s effects?” It suggests modes of learning, adaptation, and activity by two early-modern armies and brings a fresh perspective on the operational environment of war.

On June 14, 1777, the Continental Congress passed a resolution that defined an official flag for the Continental Army. This resolution read, “Resolved, That the flag of the United States be made of thirteen stripes, alternate red and white; that the union be made of thirteen stars, white in a blue field, representing a new Constellation.” These words defined the first official flag of the newly constituted United States. Before this resolution, there were unofficial flags that represented the Thirteen Colonies. The most prevalent of these was the Grand Union Flag, also known as the Continental Colors. (See Figure 1) It combined the British Union Jack and the thirteen stripes signifying Colonial unity. It first appeared in 1776 to celebrate the newly formed Continental Army. Almost two decades later, the Flag Act of January 13, 1794 redefined the appearance of this country’s flag, adding two stripes and two stars, making this new flag the only official flag of the United States to display more than 13 stripes. This Act came into effect on May 1, 1795. This thorough but not exhaustive survey has identified 13 maps created between the dates of June 14, 1777 and May 1, 1795 that depict, in part or in whole, flags that meet the definition suggested in 1777. URL’s are provided (at the term image) so the reader can link to the full image of the map described. The figures in this article are details from these maps of the early flags. The final category for each map is titled, “Copies found with flag.” These numbers reflect a detailed search for each map and are given to reflect a relative sense of rarity. A complete bibliography of references is found at the end of this article.

Trivelpiece, Molly L. & Chuck Meide 2016 Archival Research and the Historical Background of the 1782 Evacuation of Charleston and the Loss of the Storm Wreck. In ACUA Underwater Archaeology Proceedings 2016, Paul F. Johnson, ed., pp. 133-141. Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology, Washington, D.C.  -- ABSTRACT -- During the American Revolution, thousands of Loyalists displaced by war sought refuge in East Florida. As the war drew to a close, British authorities organized massive evacuations of major ports. On 18 December 1782, more than 120 ships loaded with troops and refugees left Charleston, SC. Of the ships destined for East Florida's capital, St. Augustine, 16 were wrecked trying to cross its notorious sandbar. One of these, known as the Storm Wreck, has undergone archaeological investigations from 2009-2015. This paper overviews the archival research and the historical context of the Loyalist Influx, the evacuation of Charleston, and the shipwreck event.

Contents

1. Overview
2. New Jersey Troop Experience, 1777 Reenlistees, and the Effect of Short-Term Levies
3. Numbers of Veteran Soldiers in the 1781 New Jersey Regiments, and Barber’s Battalion in the South
4. Combined Statistics for: Giles company, 1st New Jersey, and Helms’ Company, 2nd New Jersey,
1 August 1781
5. Statistics for Capt. Giles Mead’s company, 1st New Jersey Regiment, Dobb’s Ferry, 1 August 1781
6. Statistics for Capt. William Helms company, 2nd New Jersey Regiment, northern New Jersey,
1 August 1781
7. Statistics for Five New Jersey companies in Lt. Col. Francis Barber’s Battalion, the Marquis de Lafayette’s Detachment, Head of Elk. Maryland, 11 April 1781

Appendices

1. Analysis: “Muster Roll of Captain Giles Meads Compy and first Jersey Rigmt. Commanded by Colo Mathias Ogden  Taken for the Months January  Feby  March Aprill  June and July 1781”
2. Analysis: “Muster Roll of Capt. Helms Compy. 2d Regt. Jersey … Comd. by Col. Elias Dayton. For the Months of Jany. Feby., March, April, May, June & July 1781”
3. Returns of Five New Jersey Companies in Lt. Col. Francis Barber’s Light Battalion, Head of Elk, Maryland, 11 April 1781
4. Overview: The Use of Short-Term Levies to Fill Continental Regiments, 1777-1782

ABSTRACT in English (résumé en français ci-après):
This article begins the analysis of Clausewitz's thinking about “petite guerre” and “guerrilla warfare” based on his lecture on the “petite guerre” (“Vorlesung über den kleinen Krieg”) in 1810-1811 and then in 1811-1812 at the War College in Berlin. The reflection on current armed conflicts in the 21th century does benefit from of a historical perspective on such tactics which are – mutatis mutandis – part of contemporary warfare. Now, this lecture of Clausewitz has not been the subject of a thorough study yet. On the French side, this can be partly explained by the absence of a French translation of the lecture, which has been published for the first and only time in German in 1966; this can be explained too by the fact that the interest for the history of the “petite guerre” is still relatively new. In this article, I show what the young commissioned officers who attended the lecture of Clausewitz could learn from the spirit of the “petite guerre”, in the way it was seen and understood in those days. The study of this lecture from this point of view did require a thorough knowledge of the military culture of those officers as well as the consideration of the armed warfare's transformations since the French Revolution era and the Napoleonic Wars.

RESUME en français :
Cet article entame une analyse de la pensée de Clausewitz en matière de « petite guerre » et de guérilla, et ce, à travers son Cours sur la petite guerre (« Vorlesung über den kleinen Krieg ») dispensé à l’Académie militaire de Berlin en 1810-1811 et en 1811-1812. La réflexion sur l’actualité du XXIe siècle ne peut que profiter d’un regard historique sur une tactique qui, mutatis mutandis, est en partie celle des conflits d’aujourd’hui. Or, ce Cours n’a pas fait l’objet encore d’un commentaire approfondi. Du côté français, on peut en partie l’expliquer par le fait que, publié pour la première et la seule fois en allemand en 1966, il n’a pas encore été traduit ; par le fait, aussi, que l’intérêt pour l’histoire de la petite guerre est assez récent. Je me suis attachée à montrer ce que les jeunes officiers de 1810-1812 qui ont assisté à l’enseignement de Clausewitz ont pu retenir de l’essence de la petite guerre perçue et comprise par leur temps ; ce qui a nécessité, à la fois, un retour sur la culture théorique des officiers du temps, et la prise en compte des mutations intervenues dans la manière de faire la guerre depuis l’ère révolutionnaire et les guerres de l’Empire.

Americans fought their longest single-day battle during the War for Independence on June 28, 1778 at the Battle of Monmouth in central New Jersey. Extensively studied archaeologically and historically, this important battle showcased Washington’s ability to stand against the British Army and hold the field of battle. Equally important to this success was the role of the New Jersey militia in harassing the British Army in the days before the battle and commanding key, elevated terrain. Such terrain enabled the Americans to advance from the flat plains of Englishtown toward the undulating topography of Monmouth Courthouse. Recent metal detection and military terrain analysis resulted in the archaeological identification and interpretation of an undocumented skirmish that took place between American and British forces at the western, formerly understudied outskirts of the battlefield. Recovered musket balls forced a re-examination and identification of key terrain that may have influenced the course of the battle.