Aviation Security Review

Aviation Security Review Introduction The three-volume set on Aviation Security Management (ASM) belongs on the bookshelves of every Aviation Security manager, researcher, policy maker, and academic. The set contains 32 chapters and covers every important aspect of Aviation Security policy and provides expert interpretations of relevant domestic and international Aviation Security legislation and their impact on the aviation industry. The primary Aviation Security countermeasures including passenger and baggage screening and anti-missile defense systems are also provided in this set; furthermore, new detection methods are also proposed by some of the authors. In addition, there is significant coverage of the history of Aviation Security incidents and legislation, and an in-depth examination of the nature of terrorism as it has evolved through the years. The human factor and the role of training are also discussed in the volumes. While some of the proposed changes to Aviation Security may be unorthodox and counter to common thinking within the industry, all of the authors provide readers with thought-provoking ideas and insights into this important topic. Themes that tend to recur throughout the set include the following: The aviation industry has been reactive not proactive in instituting adequate security measures. The human factor is important in assuring security at access points and within the aircraft; therefore, proper training and education is important. In particular, cabin crew training has been neglected and should be expanded. Terrorists are persistent and will continue to target aviation assets. ICAO, IATA, and other international organizations are limited in what they can do to regulate and assure international aviation security Though security has been upgraded since Sept. 11, 2001, important security gaps such as lack of screening for cargo on passenger aircraft and in-cabin security still exist and need to be addressed. Volume 1 – The Context of Aviation Security Management Chap. 1 authored by Gary Elphinstone offers an excellent historical perspective of aviation security and includes a comprehensive timeline of aviation security incidents and international/national actions from the inception of general aviation to 2001. The only anomaly is the inclusion of the WTC truck bombing under the category of a “defining event” in the timeline. While it may have been a precursor to the events of Sept. 11th, 2001, there was no aviation element connected to the bombing, so more explanation regarding this inclusion would have been helpful. Chap. 2 authored by John Harrison describes the various political threats facing aviation and categorizes them into three phases: the first phase involves the flight from persecution or prosecution; the second phase was primarily political; and the third phase, which is currently ongoing, uses aircraft as weapons or battlegrounds. Harrison then notes the importance of the human factor in addressing these threats. He argues that no countermeasure can compare to a security and police force that is highly prepared, aware, and alert at all times, and states that “the critical weakness remains the lack of qualified middle and senior managers able to provide managerial, let alone critical, leadership and strategic direction.” He makes the following recommendations to address education and training issues and gaps: Strategic recommendations A sustained research effort by the industry to understand the trends in transnational threats and how they will impact its operations Industry investment in nontechnical research in order to support technical security efforts Operational recommendations ICAO needs to establish basic standards for such items as cargo screening, document security, and other in-flight issues ICAO needs to have enforcement power, which can and should include economic incentives for meeting required standards and recommended practices ICAO and IATA should establish a joint intelligence and security center Tactical recommendations Develop and implement a more coherent tactical response Provide regular and realistic training Assist stakeholders in developing economically viable responses across the system Additionally, he states that security programs need to be economically viable and that the security training industry should lessen reliance on government by seeking nongovernmental sources of funding. Harrison’s point about funding is especially relevant in these tough economic times --government resources are at an all time low and the budget deficit is at an all time high. A reliance on governmental funding would not be in the best public interest. Chap. 3 is authored by R. Ray Gehani and G. Tom Gehani. They provide a description and history of transportation logistics and regulation, the deregulation that started in the aviation industry in 1970s and spread to other modes including road and rail. Gehani and Gehani discuss the attributes of each of the five competing modes of transportation – water, rail, pipeline, road, and air – and provide a ranking for them based on the attributes of speed, reliability, availability, capability, and frequency. The authors also propose a Supply Chain Performance Scorecard based on the following attributes: speed and time efficiency, cost per performance, reliability and flexibility, and scalability and responsiveness. While it is not clear as to why the attributes for the Scorecard differ from those of the mode ranking, the Scorecard is a useful starting point to examine the performance of the Supply Chain. In Chap. 4, Barry Prentice writes about the benefits of transportation security measures. The author does not attempt to quantify the benefits but does describe them in terms of the following: Tangible and Direct Tangible and Indirect Intangible and Direct Intangible and Indirect Prentice groups the security measures into Sovereign Protection, Terrorism Prevention, Interdiction of Illegal Activities, and Personal Security. While he defines Sovereign Protection in detail, he only touches upon the definition of terrorism. Prentice uses a broader definition of terrorism than most of us are accustomed to. For example, he includes commercial espionage in the definition. Because he does veer from the norm in his definition, a more comprehensive treatment of the topic would have been helpful to the reader. While he concludes with the thought that quantification of security benefits is quite difficult, this may mislead the reader into believing that the quantification of benefits should not be pursued at all. It is my opinion that any benefits that can be quantified should be and that any benefits that can be estimated should be in order to help agencies and relevant entities convince funding agencies of the need for and benefit of security measures and assist agencies in prioritizing the measures. In Chap. 5, Mohammad Karimbocus discusses the human element in aviation security. At the start of the Chapter, he provides an historical perspective of aviation security and makes the following interesting point about the pattern of aviation security: An event occurs. Hysteria ensues and a reaction in the form of more stringent measures occurs. Risks of recurrence decrease. The security system goes into “cruise” mode. The next occurrence delivers another jolt. He argues that the long-term sustainability of the aviation industry depends on breaking this cycle of enforcement and repression, and that the industry needs to take responsibility for the security of its aviation systems in a proactive manner. Karimbocus cites the importance of the human element in mitigating risk and the need to change the focus from technology to human since, he states, most security incidents have been caused by “inappropriate human behavior.” He further notes that automation has not eliminated risks but has brought about a new set of risks including complacency and boredom. He proposed ways in which human performance can be optimized and emphasizes the importance of training. I agree with the author’s statement that the aviation industry must be more proactive and cooperate with competitors and TSA to ensure the security of their passengers and cargo. However, I disagree with his argument that diminishes the role of technology in aviation security. Both technology and the human element are important in security provision --cost effective technology and continuous training of security personnel and relevant persons in the industry will ultimately enhance security to a greater extent than either technology or personnel by itself. In Chap. 6, Moses Aleman discusses the history of the International Civil Aviation Security Program and the serious incidents of aerial piracy that happened starting in the late 1960s. In Chap. 7, Stephen Atkins delineates how 9/11 hijackers sought to take advantage of weaknesses in U.S. aviation security. Atkins notes the numerous pre-9/11 security vulnerabilities at U.S. airports, describes the resistance of the aviation industry in implementing security measures and the eventual change in FAA’s stance from regulator to promoter of the industry. Atkins concludes that the 9/11 attacks were a result of the weak aviation security system, and notes that everyone in authority did everything possible to evade responsibility for the attacks. In Chap. 8, James Forest examines the motivations behind terrorism and why they consider aviation an attractive target. He also describes in detail the history of hijackings beginning in the 1960s, airline in-flight bombings, surface-to-air attacks, the use of airplanes as guided missiles, and attacks against airports. Forest describes the three reasons why aviation is still vulnerable: 1) the nature of terrorist organizations, 2) the modern aviation environment, and 3) the nature of our response to the threat. In Chap. 9, Mary Schiavo discusses aviation security and the legal environment. She initiates the discussion by stating that the aviation industry was responsible for security screening on Sept. 11, 2001; had the laws in place been correctly followed by the industry, the attacks would likely have been thwarted; and that numerous warnings had been issued by the federal government about the vulnerabilities of the screening system. With regards to post 9/11 legislation, Schiavo asserts that as responsibility for aviation security shifted from industry to the federal government, limitations on liability have been placed on victims of future attacks. Schiavo offers a detailed explanation of what each piece of security legislation has meant to the industry, its customers, the general public, and the government. The legislation covered in the chapter includes: The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001 The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 The international passenger prescreening program, passenger and baggage screening, the registered traveler program, civil rights issues, and cargo security are some of the other topics that are described in this chapter. Schiavo concludes by stating that air cargo security is unacceptable, but the TSA screener program while imperfect is a step in the right direction. She also emphasizes the importance of accountability in terms of the ability of the public to seek judicial redress for security failures; she notes that currently this type of accountability which generally enhances performance is lacking. In Chap. 10, Mary Schiavo offers a comprehensive chronology of aviation attacks starting in 1930 and ending in August, 2007. Any reader who sees this chronology for the first time will be surprised to note the many hijackings that had occurred prior to Sept. 11, 2001 and the noticeable decline in security incidents after this date. Volume 2 – The Elements of Aviation Security Management In Chap. 1, the authors, Cletus Coughlin, Jeffrey Cohen, and Sarosh Kahn, contend that the airports and airlines do not have the best interest of the public in mind because of their profit motive. They argue that public security and safety may have been compromised pre-9/11 due to the industry’s desire to cut costs and therefore the post-9/11 federal government takeover of security and safety responsibilities was likely appropriate despite the problems that TSA has been facing with its screening process. At the same time, the authors mention that there is a possibility that the federal government takeover may result in an oversupply of security since its performance is judged primarily on preventing attacks and not on cost control. In Chap. 2 Anne Marie Scarisbrick-Hauser and William Hauser describe various types of convergence including passengers assembling prior to boarding a plane and response activities after a plane crash. The authors do not explain whether a particular type of convergence is more important than others, and yet devote most of the chapter on post-disaster convergence and the role of the community in post-disaster events. The reader needs to assume that the authors do believe that post-disaster convergence was the most important topic and therefore decided to focus their efforts on it. In the conclusion, the authors note that prior to Sept. 11, 2001, planes were rarely hijacked. This is inaccurate because there were many hijackings prior to 9/11; the frequency of hijackings immediately declined after 9/11 due to increased security and vigilance both by aviation security personnel and the passengers themselves. In Chap. 3, Kathleen Sweet discusses Aviation Security and passenger rights, focusing on the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. constitution. The Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires probable cause to issue a warrant. There are exceptions to this Amendment. The administrative search exception allows searches that serve a societal purpose other than criminal law enforcement. Airport security managers need to balance the intrusiveness of searches with the security interest (e.g., perceived threat level). Another exception is the stop and frisk exception. This exception is warranted when there is reasonable suspicion that another person is a threat. Sweet provides information about specific types of this exception. The consent exception is another form of exception in which searches are allowed when passengers give consent to a security search. The issues of reasonableness and probable cause are also discussed in this chapter. The author provides details of key cases related to the topics covered in this chapter. In Chap. 4 on Aviation Security and response management, Kathleen Sweet discusses the more stringent security measures that have been put in place in the aviation passenger screening process and the strain on the passenger handling capacity they have created. Ideally, Sweet states, international screening standards, new detection technologies, and the establishment of a completely “sterile” airport would address security needs in an efficient and effective way that is also amenable to travelers. In Chap. 5, James Carafano talks about general Aviation Security challenges and responses. He proposes refinements and changes to current security procedures and policies to prevent post-disaster shutdowns of general aviation services. Carafano notes that the post-9/11 suspension of aviation services hurt not only millions of travelers and resulted in huge economic losses for the nation but also impeded the response effort since specialized responders could not be flown into the disaster areas. In Chap. 6, David Jarach and Fulvio Fassone discuss the European perspective with regards to the impact of new security measures on airport retail businesses. The authors start the chapter with a discussion of the value of airports to regional economies and in generating wealth. The authors assert that airport retailers have experienced a significant decline in sales of wines, perfumes, and other goods due to new security measures, especially the restriction on liquids and gels. They discuss the use of tamper-evident bags to facilitate traveler purchase of these retail items at airports and the need for retailers to have a voice in the development of security measures. In Chap. 7, Mark Salter focuses on passenger screening. Salter notes that Aviation Security has been reactive, and the two models of passenger screening being used are 1) differentiating travelers according to risk or behavior, or 2) the same screening regardless of individual characteristics, focusing on the detection of prohibited items. He argues that 2) is based on the Prohibited Items List which keeps changing according to incidents and threats. Salter asserts that “any PIL will always be incomplete and lacking in imagination.” He is more in favor of 1) and describes behavioral and risk profiling which is beginning to take hold in passenger screening. He notes that a global identity management system will be complex and difficult to implement and therefore risk profiling in which known (low-risk) and unknown (high-risk) travelers are screened differently may be a good solution. I believe that over-reliance on any one screening method is not a good idea since no method is 100% foolproof in preventing an attack and terrorists are persistent and will attempt to find ways to circumvent the method – having multiple screening methods in place will make it more difficult for them to do so. Salter concludes with a summary of technologies being used and developed for detection, tracking, data management, and human resources. In Chap. 8, the authors, Adrian Lee, et al, describe the various operations research applications in Aviation Security systems. They note the importance of performance measures as they may be incorporated into operations research problems in passenger screening such as discrete optimization models, applied probability models, cost/benefit analyses, and risk assessments. The authors state that the measure, probability of a threat, is an “obvious and appropriate measure of aviation security system performance”. However, the authors’ definition of this measure is confusing – they define it as “the observed number of alarms and clears that occur during day-to-day operations, and is dependent on the device and procedure settings designated by the level of threat believed to be present in the environment”. The connection between the probability of threat and number of alarms and clears is not made clear by the authors. If the latter is a result of the equipment settings and if most (practically all) alarms are false positives or innocuous true positives then the connection cannot be made. The authors make the point that passenger screening systems have primarily focused on reducing the false clear rate while improving passenger throughput would necessitate a decrease in the false alarm rate. While the authors propose other performance measures as well, they did not mention innocuous true alarms such as a traveler carrying nitroglycerin. Quantifying the number and effects of innocuous true alarms is important since there are many more innocuous true alarms than there are malicious true alarms. They discuss the uses of probability models in the evaluation of screening procedures, and passenger and baggage screening systems. The authors caution that selective screening systems are prone to manipulation of passenger information and are difficult to accurately assess. They conclude by describing modeling and simulation efforts underway by researchers and the federal government. In Chap. 9, Erik Hoffer discusses air cargo security from the perspective of the air cargo industry; while he does not explicitly make this statement, it is clear that most of his arguments fall on the side of private carriers and shippers. He notes that most air cargo is screened at the destination not at the shipment site or during transfers and that it is easy to hide threat material in packages and bulk freight. Also, multiple companies handle the cargo. He asserts secure packaging, sealing, and cargo inspection are essential since the generic packaging of cargo makes it difficult to distinguish one item from another. However, he argues that law enforcement has been ignoring cargo theft which makes cargo more vulnerable to terrorism and, at the same time, noting that the executive order mandating the 100% inspection of air cargo is doomed to failure because it is infeasible operationally. Hoffer believes that the industry has not implemented un-mandated security measures because future mandates may necessitate different measures. While the reactive nature of the industry in terms of security may be largely due to its profit motive, this issue is not raised by the author; in fact, Hoffer states several times that the government has not provided clear mandates and direction to the industry. In Chap. 10, Diana Hardmeier and Adrian Schwaninger discuss the Selection and Preemployment Assessment of Aviation Security Screeners. They describe how job and task analysis can provide a detailed analysis of the many tasks involved at airport security checkpoints. The authors propose the use of X-Ray ORT as a preemployment assessment tool since testing proved that there is little difference between novice and trained screeners and performance is linked to the visual abilities of screeners. A follow-up study found that adaptive computer-based training can enhance screener performance. In Chap. 11, Ross Harley concludes the volume with a photo essay of the airport terminal. Volume 3 – Perspectives on Aviation Security Management In Chap. 1, Ruwantissa Abeyratne describes the efforts of the ICAO in ensuring a security culture, provides an overview of the history of aviation security incidents , and the pressing need to address portable surface-to-air missiles such as MANPADs (some of which are being manufactured by terrorist groups). In addition to providing a good background and policy perspective, the author also provides some interesting technical information about the surface-to-air missiles, and defense systems. He concludes the chapter by stating that all 190 ICAO member states must adopt a culture that makes security violations socially and morally unacceptable. In Chap. 2, Charles Bumstead provides comprehensive information about the ICAO – its history, programs, current initiatives, and short-comings that need to be addressed. The IATA and its role in Aviation Security and its creation of security management systems for air transport operators are also discussed. Bumstead asserts that security gaps still exist and proposed the establishment of Aviation Security crisis management teams. The teams would be involved in every aspect of international incidents and would make recommendations to improve existing regulations and procedures. The teams would also conduct threat assessments for each contracting state. Bumstead concludes the chapter by discussing the need for professional training for security specialists. In Chap. 3, Anthony Chin focuses on the security lapses that are the result of criminal acts. He suggests that the decision to commit crime is a rational choice, and the increased probability of detection can help deter crime. Chin proposes the use of SCAN or scientific content analysis that analyzes linguistic structure and content. The results of an experiment revealed problematic features of the method and that it is far from ideal. Much more testing and refinements to the method need to be performed before it can be considered as a possible tool for crime detection. In Chap. 4, Terry Sheridan proposes the theory of emotive profiling and develops the emotional energy model based on three dimensions – connection, appreciation, and trust. He describes how the traveler’s emotional state might be evaluated in order to identify terrorists. Because the concept of emotive profiling is still new and potentially controversial, the method still needs to be solidified, tested under varying conditions and with various subjects, and validated. In Chap. 5, Adrian Schwaninger, Saskia Koller, and Anton Bolfing discuss the principles and requirements for evaluating Aviation Security screeners with a focus on X-ray image interpretation competency. Details on how reliable, valid, and standardized measurements can be achieved are provided by the authors who also emphasize the importance of screener testing, certification, and training. In Chap. 6, Chien-tsung Lu describes and assesses FAA’s system safety philosophy, and develops an Aviation Security Management Model. The Model contains 9 major steps – data collection, threat identification, data analysis, threat matrix calculation and response, system safety tolls implementation and regulatory compliance, reports and feedback, results monitoring, information distribution, and problem-solving meetings. In Chap. 7, Jeffrey Ross writes about the post 9/11 Aviation Security measures, TSA’s role and responsibilities, and TSA’s “growing pains” along with the problems and challenges being faced by its airport screening system for passengers and luggage. I disagree with one of his observations, that treating an 80-year old woman or quadriplegic as would-be terrorists is “ridiculous”. If for instance Caucasian females over the age of 50 are allowed to board a plane with minimal screening, terrorists would immediately start to recruit Caucasian females over the age of 50 to help carry out their nefarious missions. Ross also notes the two key security gaps: point-to-point baggage checking and lack of screening of cargo carried by passenger aircraft. In Chap. 8, David Forbes describes in-cabin security issues, and provides an interesting contrast between the regulatory cultures of safety and security. He notes that the culture for safety (audits, inspections) is more stringent, predictable, and consistent. Forbes describes the vulnerabilities of the cabin crew and more needs to be done to ensure their security including additional training and education. In Chap. 9, Michael Tunnecliffe focuses on the cabin crew and flight attendants and their roles in Aviation Security and Safety. He notes the many stresses they face on a daily basis due to the increased responsibilities in safety and security they have been charged with, especially post 9/11. In Chap. 10, Clinton Oster, Jr., and John Strong talk about federal Aviation Security funding, DHS appropriations, transportation security fees, and funding options. With respect to costs, the authors describe the costs borne by airports, costs borne by airlines, the cost to domestic travelers, and the financial impacts of security improvements. In Chap. 11, Mark Salter discusses the future of Aviation Security and the three axes of change – technology, governance, and public norms. Salter argues that security technologies should be “fast, cheap, and out of control” rather than centralized and complex. He believes that simple, standalone technologies are the most reliable ones. This thinking is in direct contradiction to that of many security experts who believe that an integrated system that is able to analyze information from various sources and automatically alert security personnel and take immediate action to thwart an attack is the ideal system. However, Salter’s perspective is certainly different and refreshing, even if it does not gain widespread acceptance within the industry.