Individuos políticamente descontentos con la democracia

Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022)–ISSN 0719-3769 • 61–86 Instituto de Estudios Internacionales–Universidad de Chile Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX Individuos políticamente descontentos con la democracia: evaluación de los determinantes del voto por VOX relacionados con el régimen Lisa Zanotti* José Rama** AbstrAct This paper aims to analyze the relationship between the populist radical right and support for democracy examining the case of VOX in Spain. The case of VOX is particularly puzzling since it does fit in the definition of PRRPs but in its discourse, radicalism is much stronger than populism. Moreover, the party presents idiosyncratic features that affect the determinants of its vote. Nationalism is often expressed through allusion to the pre-democratic period in Spain without explicitly adhering to Francoism. The main results of this study are two. First, evalua- * Postdoctoral Researcher at the Research Institute for Social Sciences at Diego Portales University and an Adjunct Researcher at COES in Santiago, Chile. She holds a joint PhD in Political Science from Diego Portales University (Chile) and in Humanities from Leiden University (the Netherlands). Zanotti acknowledges the support of the Fondo Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo Tecnológico (FONDECYT Proyecto 3210352) and the Centre for Social Conflict and Cohesion Studies – COES (ANID/FONDAP/15130009) [email protected]. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5515-3686. ** Lecturer in the Department of Political Science & International Relations at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM). PhD in Political Science from UAM. [email protected] . ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3990-1696. Recibido: 25 de septiembre de 2022. Aceptado: 2 de diciembre de 2022. 61 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile ting VOX discourse, especially its electoral manifesto, we found that its leaders recurrently allude to pre-democratic Spain both in terms of issues and symbols. Second, we show that those who display less support for the democratic regime are more likely to vote for VOX instead of other political forces in the last election. We also found that authoritarian values, political discontent and the romantic idea of a glorious past, interact with regime support and help explain the vote for VOX. Even if a comparative study is necessary to further assess this relationship, this article can give a first clue that building on their country's authoritarian past, some PRRPs are more successful in mobilizing those who are less committed to democracy. Keywords: VOX – Democracy – Past – Authoritarianism – Franco. rEsUMEN Este artículo analiza la relación existente entre derecha radical populista y apoyo a la democracia. Para ello, estudia el caso de VOX. En este sentido, la formación de Santiago Abascal, resulta particularmente interesante ya que encaja en la definición de derecha radical populista pero en su discurso, el radicalismo es mucho más fuerte que el populismo. Además, el partido presenta rasgos idiosincrásicos únicos y que juegan un papel fundamental a la hora de entender su voto. Así, por ejemplo, el nacionalismo se expresa a menudo mediante alusiones al período predemocrático en España sin adherirse explícitamente al franquismo. Dos son los principales resultados de este estudio. Por un lado, evaluando el discurso de VOX, especialmente su programa electoral, encontramos que sus líderes aluden recurrentemente a la España predemocrática tanto en temas concretos como en símbolos. En segundo lugar, mostramos que aquellos que expresan un menor apoyo al régimen democrático fueron más proclives a votar a VOX quea otras fuerzas políticas, al menos en las últimas elecciones generales de noviembre de 2019. Además, encontramos que los valores autoritarios, el descontento político y la idea romántica de un pasado glorioso, interactúan con el apoyo al régimen y ayudan a explicar el voto a VOX. Aunque sea necesario un estudio comparativo para evaluar más a fondo esta relación, este artículo puede dar una primera pista de que, haciendo hincapié en el pasado autoritario de su país, algunos partidos de la derecha 62 Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. radical populista consiguen éxito político movilizando a aquellos electores que están menos comprometidos con la democracia. Palabras clave: Vox – Democracia – Pasado – Autoritarismo – Franco. Introduction Both the decline of democracy and characterized by at least three ideological the emergence of populist and/or an- features: nativism, authoritarianism, and ti-establishment parties are on the rise populism (Mudde 2007). In short, natiin different regions of the world (Foa vism is an ideology that maintains that and Mounk 2016; Inglehart and Norris the state should be inhabited only by tho2016; Oliver and Rahn 2016; Gamboa se who belong to the nation, while autho2017; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Althou- ritarism is the belief in a strictly ordered gh there seems to be at least of correla- society and that the infringements to this tion between these two phenomena the order should be harshly punished (Adorrelationship between democracy and po- no 1950). Last, populism is a thin-centered pulism is far from being settled. On the ideology that maintains that society is one hand, this is due to the fact that few divided into two opposing and homogestudies have empirically addressed the neous groups the “pure people” and the effect of populist parties on the levels of “corrupt elite”,and that politics should be democracy in a given country (Mudde the expression of the general will of the and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; Donovan people. In general terms we know that, at 2019; Rama and Casal Bértoa 2020). least in Europe, nativism, not populism is the core ideology of the populist radical On the other hand, the findings regar- right (Mudde 2007). ding the attitudes towards democracy of those individuals with high populist attiAt this point is worth underlining that tudes are still inconclusive (Meijers and with the aim of differentiate between raZaslove 2020; Rovira Kaltwasser and van dical and extreme parties Mudde (2007; Hauwaert 2020; Zanotti and Rama 2020). 2010) maintains that while the former do not reject democratic as a political This theoretical and empirical issue is regime the latter openly opposed to it. even more complicated by the fact that Even if the PRR does not oppose to dethe most numerous and electorally rele- mocracy it does not mean that they do vant populist family is the populist ra- not represent a threat to the regime If it dical right. The populist radical right is is true that PRR parties should not be 63 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile thought of as bluntly authoritarian forces system with alternation between the soit is also true that these actors who play cial democratic Partido Socialista Obrero by the democratic rules of the game to Español (PSOE) and the (conservative) gradually subvert the liberal democratic right-wing Partido Popular (PP). The laregime from within. By promoting illi- tter acted as a catch all party also attracberal ideas, the PRR can set in motion ting citizens that were previously loyal a process of democratic erosion that in to the pre-democratic regime. However, some cases might even lead to demo- in 2019 mainly as a result of the Catalan cratic breakdown (Meléndez and Rovira crisis the PRR VOX —that was formed Kaltwasser (2021: 949). Furthermore, even in 2013 but until then had obtained irreif radical parties are different form extre- levant electoral fortunes— gained more mist ones in the sense that the former than 10 percent and almost 16 percent in do not reject democracy as a political the snap election of April and November regime, both nativism—a combination (Turnbull-Dugarte, Rama and Santana of nationalism and xenophobia—and 2020; Rama et al. 2019). It is worth mentioauthoritarianism—intended as the belief ning that most of the votes cast for VOX in a strictly ordered society—can attract in 2019 came from the Partido Popular those who are less loyal to the democratic (Santana, Zanotti and Rama 2022). regime. In this sense it looks like radicalism could be a more pernicious trait for Besides nativism and authoritariademocracy than populism. nism and populism VOX displays a high level of nationalism (Heyne and ManucIn regard to the relationship between ci 2021), which is an idiosyncratic feature the PRR and democracy the case of VOX and not a core feature of PRRs. This is in Spain is particularly relevant. Spain is a relvant for at least two reasons. First narelatively young democracy in which the tionalism was one of the ideological corPRR had not taken root until 2018 (Alon- nerstones of the pre-democratic regime so and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2015). Together (Aguilar, 2001). Second, nationalism is diswith Portugal, Spain was defined an Eu- cursively expressed by the party through ropean exceptionalism since they were discursive shortcuts that remind of those the only two countries in western Euro- used by the Francoist regime. pe without a populist radical right party. Things changed in 2018 when VOX enteThis study tries to assess the relationsred the system first at the regional level in hip between support for democracy and Andalusia (Turnbull-Dugarte 2019) and the vote in a country with a relatively then in 2019 becoming the third party at recent authoritarian past. In more detail the national level. After the return to de- we are interested in assessing the determocracy the Spanish party system at the minants of the vote for a populist radical national level functioned as a two-party right that exploits some of the discursive 64 Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. repertoires of pre-democratic regimes in a young democracy. Vox as a populist radical right party In general terms we can state that there is a consensus that VOX belongs to the populist radical right (see Norris, 2020; Vampa, 2020; Turnbull-Dugarte, 2019; Turnbull-Dugarte et al.,2020; Rama et al.,2021; Mudde, 2020; Rooduijn et al., 2019; Olivas-Osuna, 2021; Olivas-Osuna and Rama, 2021). As the literature on the populist radical right has pointed out, within this party family, the radical component is much stronger than the populist one (see Mudde 2007; Zaslove and Meijers 2021). Authoritarian features are also evident in VOX discourse. It is worth noting that with the term authoritarianism we do not refer to a preference for any political regime instead to the as the belief in a strictly ordered society and to that any infraction to this order should be sanctioned (Mudde 2007). Authoritarianism tends to translate in preference for stricter law and order policies (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017). Both VOX electoral manifesto and public As mentioned before, PRRPs share at discourse reflect the party favorable attileast three ideological features: nativism, tude towards strict law enforcement and authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde tougher actions against domestic crime 2007). At least concerning the populist (see Rama et al. 2021). While in the party radical right in Western Europe, nativism manifesto of 2019 the percentage of the doappears as the core ideology. Nativism, as cument dedicated to positive assessments a combination of xenophobia and natio- of law and order policies is 9.5. which is in nalism, is an ideology that maintains that line with other PRR in Europe and outsithe state should be inhabited only by na- de (see Rama et al. 2021: 61). tives (Mudde 2007). This usually results in a constant anti-immigration rhetoric as It is relevant to point out that as other well as in policy proposals that seek stric- PRR parties, VOX leaders discursively link ter immigration rules (Ivarsflaten 2008).In immigration with an (alleged rise) in crithis sense, VOX is not an exception (Vam- me rates 1. Furthermore, VOX’s ideologipa 2020). In fact, the party claims for the cal authoritarianism besides being ex“deportation of illegal immigrants to their pressed though preference for harsher countries of origin”,new requirements and public security measures, also calls for a barriers for nationality and establishing quotas based on linguistic and cultural 1 https://www.eldiario.es/desalambre/supuescriteria (VOX, 2019: 5–6). t o - vi n c u l o - i n m i g ra c i o n - d e l i n c u e ncia-vox_1_1270566.html 65 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile strictly order society by defending traditional moral values such as gender roles or heteronormative family. This point is quite interesting since the defence of traditional moral values is not a core ideological feature of the PRR at least in Europe. However, some PRRPs that have gained electoral relevance in the last years have showed this ideological trait, such as the Brothers of Italy, (Zanotti and Meléndez, 2022a). Moreover, other PRR parties and leaders outside of Europe heavily rely on these issues such as the Republican party in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (Rennó 2020; Zanotti et al. forthcoming) and José Antonio Kast in Chile (Zanotti and Roberts 2021). the the populist ones (see Mudde 2007; Marcos-Marne et al. 2021), it is also true that VOX does display a populist element. As we show in Figure 1, based on experts’ surveys, VOX level of populism is the same of other well-known populist parties both on the left and the right such as the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Progress Party (FrP) in Norway, or the Danish People’s Party (DF) but below the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands, Alternative for Germany (AfD), DF, the Finns (PS) and the Five Star Movement (Norris 2020). All in all, VOX fits well in the populist radical right party family featuring all three core ideological elements: nativism, Finally, VOX leaders display a popu- authoritarianism, and populism. Howelist discourse (Rama et al. 2021; Norris ver, as various scholars pointed out, the 2020). Even though as for other PRR in party has at least one decisive idiosyngeneral radical (nativist and authorita- cratic ideological feature: its nationalism rian) features are much stronger than (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017). As we 66 Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. Additionally, VOX expresses its show in the following sections, this is a feature that VOX shared with the Spani- ideological nationalism also relying sh pre-democratic regime (see Rama et on a strong centralism that contraal. 2021). Moreover, some of the rhetoric poses a “Spanish identity” to regional shortcuts employed by the party’s leaders especially Basque, Catalonian, and Gareminds of the discourse of pre-demo- lician. With respect to policy proposals, VOX advocates for the dissolution of cratic elites. Spain’s Communities and the establishment of a centralized state governContext-related elements in VOX ment. This policy position is strongly discourse connected with the authoritarian reAs mentioned before, PRRPs share, gime and to its strong centralism. In at least, three ideological traits: nati- fact, “one of the main aims of Franvism, authoritarianism, and populism. coism was to annihilate the signs of However, different PRR also displays national identity especially in Cataother ideologies. This for example, lonia and the Basque country” (Pérez holds true for the economic positions Navedo 1997 p.79) through a simultaof PRR: while some of them adopted neous exaltation of the "Spanishness". welfare chauvinism (Enneser-Jedenas- Thus, at the beginning of the 1936 Civil tick 2018; Greve 2019 Rovira Kaltwas- War, the so-called Hispanidad ideology ser and Zanotti 2021; Stefanoni 2021) became a political weapon against the others’ stances are neoliberal. With secular, secularising and liberal Repurespect to VOX previous studies have blic, against Freemasonry, the Marxist pointed out that the party leaders’ dis- threat and foreign heterodoxy. The course strongly relies on nationalism. If Francoist band presented the military we look at the party manifesto of 2019 uprising and the rebel cause as the we observe that positive references to defence of a supposedly true natiothe national way of life occupies more nal base, threatened by the Republic. than 10 per cent of VOX manifesto2 With Hispanidad converted into an picking up all the “favourable mentions instrument of combat, the appeal to of the manifesto country’s nation, his- Santiago, patron saint of Spain and tory and general appeals for established a prominent figure in the Hispanic national ideas, general appeals to the pantheon, signified the need to fight pride of citizens appeal to patriotism, against the new heretics: communists, nationalism, and support to some free- Masons, secularists, liberals, republidoms to protect the state against sub- cans... all branded as "anti-Spanish" version” (MARPOR, Handbook; Rama (Marcilhacy 2014, p. 73-102). et al. 2021 pp. 44-45). 2 Per 601.1. 67 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile Nationalism and authoritarian legacies These nationalist elements and this division of Spain in two opposite groups by pre-democratic elites, remind to the categorization of VOX in two antagonistic and opposed groups, the Spain alive and the Anti-Spain (Casals, 2020). Another element that VOX emphasizes is the defence of traditional moral values. In more detail, VOX leaders often refer the current “Social-Communist” Government, which allegedly has boosted the separatism and the feminist ideology, against the traditional Spanish values. In this sense, this aspect of VOX ideology also reminds of the Francoist regimen which was characterized by the fusion of revolutionary fascism with conservative, traditional, and monarchist parties that supported the Nationalist side in the 1936 Civil War. In this sense, VOX somehow re-interprets its ideological authoritarianism (intended as the belief in a strictly ordered society), through claims to protect the belief in the protection of the "natural and traditional family". In order to do so VOX proposed to reform abortion laws, trying to make it more difficult. In 2019 Santiago Abascal, in an interview, expressed his view on abortion, maintaining that “there are women who claim that they own their bodies but what is inside [i.e., the fetus] is not theirs”. Also, on several occasions VOX manifested the desire to reform the gender violence protection laws. In particular 68 it is anti-feminism that VOX seem to have inherited from the authoritarian regime. As Ortega López and Felez Castañé (2019: 4) pointed out “during the Franco dictatorship, these openly antifeminist ideas were transmitted across Spain through the Sección Femenina, the women’s branch of the Falange political movement, and the Patronato de Protección a la Mujer, a public foundation established to ensure moral order, as a control mechanism”. The rejection of feminism as a legit ideology is clearly expressed in the manifesto that VOX wrote and presented on the occasion of International Women's Day in March 2020 (see Rama et al. 2021). Lastly, although VOX has defended the Spanish Crown on some occasions, mainly as a symbol of the traditional Spain, it is also true its leaders displayed an ambivalent position regarding the state model. Thus, Abascal publicly claimed, "I am Spanish. Neither monarchical nor republican. […] Spain, its sovereignty and its unity are above the monarchy, the republic, the Constitution and democracy" (Casals 2020, p. 28). In this sense, it can be inferred from this that VOX is potentially disruptive, as it considers itself legitimated to explore non-democratic political forms that preserve Spain as a nation if it judges that it is in danger. Although we maintain that PRPPs are not per se against democracy and, as a consequence, we do not expect Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. an explicit anti-democratic discour- so that it was a clear indication of the se from VOX leaders, as we mentio- political division of the country and as ned before, the party repurposes some a prelude to the upcoming war (Garof the ideological strongholds of the cía-Santos 1980). in respect to this, it Francoist regime. Also, it presents a is worth noting that VOX manifesto romanticized image of pre-democratic for the November 2019 election is catimes, with constant allusions to a bet- lled “100 Medidas para la España Viva" ter past as well as to a nostalgia of other ("100 measures for the Living Spain"). allegedly glorious times.[iii] In this re- Even during the electoral campaign gard, since voters are assumed to vote for the April 2019 general election, the for parties with ideological platforms slogan of the party was "it is time for close to their views, for Spaniards with the Living Spain" ("Es la hora de la low attachment to democracy, a popu- España Viva”). Moreover, during the list radical right party is probably the rally in Madrid's Colón Square that best option in the system (see Zanotti closed the electoral campaign for the and Meléndez 2022b). April elections of 2019, the party leader Santiago Abascal claimed: In this sense, it is essential to note that the authoritarian Spanish regime “On April 28th, we will not see usual was characterized by a strong natioelections. On the 28th, we decide nalistic rhetoric as well as an organic what matters the most: a patrioanti-liberal conception of democracy tic alternative or an agreement of (Ribera Payá and Díaz Martínez 2020). betrayal. Either the disaggregation Also, the pre-democratic corporate goor the historical continuity of our vernment sought to assemble the 'lihomeland. Either socialist misery ving forces' of the nation around a or the prosperity of our children common goal: restoring Spain's granand grandchildren. Either the prodeur (Ribera Payá and Díaz Martínez gressive dictatorship or freedom 2020). All these elements are present in for the Spaniards. Furthermore, the discourse of VOX. Especially the remore clearly, on the [election of ferences to the “Living Spain” (España April 2019] 28th, we choose, either Viva) in opposition to the “Anti Spain” the anti-Spain or the living Spain” (Anti España) are present both in the (Colón 2019). electoral manifesto and in the public speeches of the party’s leaders (CaNowadays, according to VOX, those sals 2020). In this sense, it is essential who oppose to the Living Spain allying to note that the opposition between with the anti-Spain, are, in general ter"the real Spain" and "the Anti-Spain" ms, the “leftist" media [El País, la SER, became especially frequent on the oc- La Sexta], radical left formations, Cacasion of the general elections of 1936, talan independentists, LGBTQ+ and 69 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile feminist movements (among others). Mainstream media are characterized as a ‘lying machine’ that ‘craft fake news from bureaus of radios and televisions which uphold the ‘progressive dictatorship’ (Ribera Payá and Díaz Martinez 2020: 15). Another example of this recurrent use of the Living Spain discourse was just one day before the Andalusian regional elections, on the occasion of the rally for the “Unity of Spain” organized by DENAES (Fundación para la Defensa de Nación Española), Santiago Abascal claimed: “Spain is alive and claims the inheritance that our parents have given us. Spain is alive and is fighting for the future and the freedom we have to give our children. Spain is alive and is much stronger than its enemies. Spain is alive and is much stronger than what its enemies thought Spain was”. In sum, discursively, VOX leaders do not express themselves against the democratic regime, at least coherently and explicitly. However, they adopted many of the positions of the Francoist regime in terms of the defense of traditional moral values and the exaltation of the alleged past grandeur of Spain. Indeed, although VOX does not explicitly assume an ideological affiliation with the dictatorship, it is also true that the recurrent hints to the authoritarian Spanish legacy might attract former voters of far-right parties or those with 70 low levels of attachment to democracy who previously had the only option of voting for the mainstream right. With respect to the attitudes towards democracy and the vote for the PRR, the comparative literature poses that "people who are more dissatisfied with democracy are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties" (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002, p.353). In this sense, Donavan (2019) posits that dissatisfaction with democracy may also capture authoritarian attitudes, which have been documented to foster the vote for the far right. However, we know less about the relationship between the individual level of support for democracy and the vote for PRRPs in young democracies. In the case of Spain it can be plausible that a relevant portion of those individuals with low attachment to democracy had voted for the PP before the emergence of VOX. In fact, many studies found that the center-right and right voters are more prone to support non-democratic regimes alternatives (Torcal and Medina 2002; Torcal 2008). In addition to this, it may also be the case that VOX discourse and its references to the pre-democratic period mainly functioned as cognitive shortcuts activating authoritarian attitudes in those who have presented only authoritarian predispositions (Stenner 2005). Assuming this, we expect: Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. Hypothesis 1: The stronger the preferences for a political system alternative to democracy (even authoritarian), the higher the probability to vote for VOX instead of other political forces in the 2019 November general elections. Data and Methods behavior. Thus, we include indicators of age (continuous)); a dichotomous indicator of sex (1 = female); a categorical measure of income (1 = 900€ or less, 2 = from 901€ to 1,800€, and 3 = more than 1,800€); a measure of the education level (1 = low, 2 = medium, and 3 = high); the size of place of residence (1 = rural, 0 = urban); given the relevance of religious cleavage among left and right voters, the variable Catholic churchgoer (1 = catholic who attends religious services once a week or more, 0 = not religious, not catholic or less frequent attendant), political interest (1 = high political involvement, 0 We modeled the electoral support = low), a binary indicator of political for VOX using a binary logistic regres- apathy, political discontent (1 = politision in which the dependent variable cal situation bad, 0 = political situation is vote recall (1 = voted for VOX, 0 = neutral/good) and the respondent’s voted for any other party). We reco- ideological positions on the left-right ded abstainers, null, and blank votes dimension (1 = left to 10 = right, scale). as missing3. Regarding the control Additionally, as specific controls for variables, we selected indicators that commonly capture the main dri- the case of VOX, we include in the stavers of support for PRRPs, as well as tistical model a variable that acts as a other social and demographic factors proxy of nationalism: the self-reported usually employed to explain electoral identification with the national identity of Spain (1 = identifies mainly or exclu3 Additionally, we test the effect of the same sively as Spanish, 0 = plurinational idenvariables upon the likelihood to vote for tity). In the same vein, and to assess the To test our hypothesis, we employed a dataset by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), the Spanish national public institution responsible for survey data collection at the national level. The dataset is based on a nationally representative sample. The sample consisted of 4,804 individuals (5,000 planned interviews) among the people with the right to vote in the 2019 November general elections and who were residing in Spain (seventeen Autonomous Communities plus the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in Africa) at the time. VOX (codified as 1) and other parties, not vote, vote null or black (codified as 0). See Model 2 Figure 2. 71 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile impact of the Catalan secessionist crisis4 on the vote for VOX, we employ a variable that measures the extent to which voters went to the polls due to the Catalan conflict (1 = yes, the Catalan conflict pushed me to go to the polls; 0 = No, the Catalan conflict did not influence my vote), and a variable that measures the nativist nature on VOX, immigration as a most important problem (MIP) of the country (1= immigration is the most important problem in Spain; 0= immigration is not the most important problem in Spain). Trying to measure the relevance of Francoist nostalgia we include a variable that accounts for the relevance of the measure adopted by the socialist government and implemented on October the 24th, 2019, wich exhumated the rests of the Dictator Francisco Franco (1= the exhumation of Francisco Franco’s rests matters in my decision to vote; 0= the exhumation of Francisco Franco’s rests does not matter in my decision of voted). This variable allows us to account for the relevance of the past in the VOX voting. Finally, and in order to test our hypothesis, we analyze the impact of political system preferences (1= democracy is always preferable; 0 = the political system is indifferent/ sometimes an authoritarian option is preferable) upon the probability to cast a vote for VOX instead of other 4 political parties in the last November 2019 Spanish elections. Table A1 in the Online Appendix displays the descriptive of the main variables5. In the last column, the VIF (Variance Inflation Factor) confirms that we can introduce all these variables simultaneously, as the highest VIF is 1.71 (Education), a value considerably lower than the levels regarded as problematic. Results Concerning VOX voters, before moving to multivariate analysis, we first provide a descriptive overview of the electors that cast a vote for VOX in the general elections of November 2019 and those who voted for other parties, regarding their distribution in three categories of the variable regime preference: 1) "A democratic system is always preferable"; 2) "the political system is indifferent"; 3) "sometimes an authoritarian regime is necessary." Figure 2 displays the average levels of support for each one of these categories. The results indicate that the third category (sometimes an authoritarian regime is necessary) is more common among VOX voters than among those who voted for other political forces. Notably, looking at VOX In October 2017, a coalition of the Catalan separatist parties in government in Catalonia called for an Independence Referendum without the authorization of the Spanish Government (Barrio and Field 2018). 72 5 Additionally, Figures A1, A2 and A3 follow the same idea of Figure 1 showing, by political party, the description of three main independent variables: the impact of Franco’s exhumation on my decision to vote, immigration as a most important problem in the country, and the Catalan conflict. dum without the authorization of the Spanish Government (Barrio and Field 2018). Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the November 2019 CIS post-electoral survey Note: 1) "A democratic system is always preferable"; 2) "the political system is indifferent"; 3) "sometimes an authoritarian regime is necessary. 73 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile voters in the last general election, for variable of two categories. Model 3 in 5.7 percent of respondents the type of both Table A2 and Figure 3 allows us regime is irrelevant while 21.7 percent to test the effect of regime preferences considers that an authoritarian regime upon the probability to vote for VOX is sometimes preferable. This means that (1) instead of the PP (0) – as we assume a proportion of 1 over four (27.35 per- that rightist critical voters with the pocent) has preferences that do not expli- litical system were previously mobilized citly endorse democracy as a necessarily by the PP (see Torcal and Medina 2002). desirable regime type. If we compare The results keep statistically significant the graph of VOX displayed in Figure and with the expected sign. 2 with the one representing the whole electorate (labeled "Total"), the distribuIn general terms, Models 1 and 2, tion clearly illustrates that, whereas the show that VOX voters tend to be men, third category is residual for the Spanish from the younger cohorts, with a meelectorate as a whole, for VOX is quite dium level of education, from the urthe contrary. ban areas, with a high income, rightist, to a certain extent, politically interested, Figure 3 shows the AMEs carried with a negative perception of politics, out after logistic regressions to test our and affected by the Catalan crisis. main hypothesis. With the AMEs we can isolate the effect of each one of the inConcerning our expectations, all the dependent variables (controlling by all models confirm our hypothesis, to the the rest) upon the likelihood to vote for point that those who support democraVOX. Results could be directly interpre- cy exhibit a higher probability to vote table as are expressed in percentages. Ta- for other parties instead of VOX. More ble A2 in the Online Appendix displays importantly, AMEs show that the most the logistic regressions, allowing us to relevant variable to understand VOX suconsult the coefficient, standard errors pport, apart from ideology (the variables (in brackets) and levels of statistical sig- was divided by 10, in order to move from nificance for each one of the included 0.1 to 1), is political regime preference, variables. Figure 3 only displays the re- to the point that the likelihood to vote sults for the political variables, avoiding for VOX instead of not vote, vote blank showing results for the social and demo- or null or abstain, increase in a 9.8 pergraphic controls. The three panels of Fi- cent among those electors who consider gure 3 represent three alternative depen- thar the political regime is indifferent dent variables. Additionally, Model 4 in or, sometimes, an authoritarian regime Table A2, show that, with an alternative is necessary. The percentage decrease in main independent variable, regime pre- 2.6 points when the dependent variaferences in three categories, the results ble is VOX vs other parties (from 9.8 to are the same that with an independent 7.6). As expected, the Catalan crisis and 74 Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. considering immigration as the most important problem of the country (MIP: immigration) stand out as two main factors to explain VOX support. Figure 3. Average marginal effects on the probabilities to vote for VOX, general elections November 2019 Who are those undemocratic voters? The role of nostalgia and political discontent Trying to understand these findings, regime preferences are higher among Figure 4, displays a cross-tabulate in VOX voters, compared with the electowhich we can see if the authoritarian rates of the rest of the political parties, Figure 4. Relationship between Franco exhumation variable and regime support a,b 75 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile Source: Own elaboration based on post electoral survey data, CIS, November 2019. a VOX stands out for being the party, whose voters are the ones with a greater percentage of preferences for a non-democratic (even authoritarian) regime and having been affected on their voting decision by the measure of the Spanish socialist government to exhume Dictator Franco. b VOX stands out for being the party, whose voters are the ones with a greater percentage of preferences for a non-democratic (even authoritarian) regime and for being politically discontent. among those which vote was affected by the Dictator Franco's (panel A) exhumation and the ones more politically discontent (panel B). Results reveal that both variables display a more significant role for VOX voters than for the rest of the electorate. Additionally, based on Model 5 Table A2, Figure 5 shows that, when we try to understand the vote for VOX just controlling by social and demographic factors, we find that the likelihood to vote for the party of Santiago Abascal is, respectively, 8.1, 10 and 76 Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. 15 percent higher among those voters politically discontent, those who have been affected by the exhumation of the rests of the Dictator Francisco Franco and those who consider that, in some occasions, an authoritarian regime is necessary. Conclusion Analyzing the case of VOX in Spain, this study is one of the first attempts to assess the relationship between support for democracy and the vote for a populist radical right party in a country with a recent authoritarian past. The case of VOX is particularly relevant since it displays a discursive rhetoric that engage with pre-democratic times both reproposing ideological tenets and some metaphors discursively employed by non-democratic 77 elites. With respect to the ideological tenets VOX was able to politicize both the defense of the traditional moral values and the centrality of the state against regional autonomies and as an exaltation of the Spanish identity. We believe that both these ideological commonalities and the figures of speech—such as “the Living Spain vs. the Anti Spain”—play a role in attracting those who are less loyal to democracy. In fact, our results show Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile that those individuals who exhibit less support for democracy were more prone to vote for VOX instead of other parties in the last November 2019 general elections. Confirming findings of previous research, we also found that among those who are politically discontent and less supportive of democracy the probability to vote for VOX increases in a significant manner. These findings are of note for various reasons. On the one hand, previous studies have not found a positive and statistically significant relationship between support for the democratic regime and the vote, at least for the main Western European PRRPs. This goes in line with the conceptualization and distinction between extreme and radical right parties: supporters of the radical right are not necessarily anti-democratic. However, VOX flirtation with a romanticized image of pre-transition Spain, consciously or not, attracts the support of those voters who do not fully endorse democracy. 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Surviving But Not Thriving: VOX and Spain in Times of COVID-19. Government and Opposition, 1-20. doi:10.1017/ gov.2022.7 Zaslove, A. & Meijers, M. (2021) Populist Democrats? Unpacking the Relationship Between Populism and (liberal) Democracy at the Citizen Level. SocArXiv. October 14. doi:10.31235/osf.io/4f6wh. Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. Appendix Table A1. Description of variables Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the November 2019 CIS post electoral survey 83 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile Table A2. Probability to vote for Vox instead other political parties, instead other political parties vote blank, null or abstain and Vox versus PP, November 2019 Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: Elaboration of the authors based on the November 2019 CIS post electoral survey 84 Lisa Zanotti & José Rama Not fond of democracy and politically discontent individuals: Assessing regime-related determinants of the vote for VOX. Figure A1. Bar chart of Franco exhumation matters on my vote decision Figure A2. Bar chart of immigration as the main important problem in the country 85 Estudios Internacionales 203 (2022) • Universidad de Chile Figure A3 Bar charts of the variable “the Catalan conflict” mobilize me to vote 86