The current view of man on himself is characterized by a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, man a... more The current view of man on himself is characterized by a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, man attributes to himself the godlike power to generate artificial intelligence, artificial life or even consciousness. On the other hand, there is a deep pessimism coupled with human self-contempt. Post-humanism, in its more radical variants, ascribes itself to the abdication of humanity, which should best be dethroned by its own artificial offspring. In this paper, I examine the development of this ambivalence since modern times and trace it back to a vacillation between feelings of omnipotence and impotence, which is ultimately based on a collective narcissism. We try to compensate for an inner emptiness by creating an ideal self-image through the reflection of ourselves in anthropomorphic machines, in digital intelligence and in virtual images. In light of this development, I argue for a new humanism based on our embodiment, our intercorporeality with others, and our embeddedness in an ecological environment of the living.
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but a... more Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre- or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term coined by Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yet-consciousness usually unfolds spontaneously and without a plan; it is not expected or striven for, but rather emerges in consciousness in such a way that the subject is surprised by itself, so to speak. This gives rise to phenomena such as the conspicuous, the accidental, the new and the improvised, which are particularly important for understanding creative and therapeutic processes. The aim of this article is to develop a general phenomenological framework for understanding not-yet-conscious dynamics and their unfolding in different contexts. To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in the light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally located.
In Kontakt mit der Wirklichkeit. Die Perspektivität verkörperter Wahrnehmung, 2024
Was den gesunden Menschen vor Delirien und Halluzinationen bewahrt, ist nicht sein kritischer Gei... more Was den gesunden Menschen vor Delirien und Halluzinationen bewahrt, ist nicht sein kritischer Geist, sondern die Struktur seines Raumes: die Dinge bleiben vor ihm stehen, sie wahren Abstand und berühren ihn […] nur mit Respekt. Halluzinationen und Mythen hingegen entstehen aus einer Schrumpfung des Lebensraumes, einem Wurzelschlagen der Dinge in unserem Leib, einer schwindelerregenden Nähe der Gegenstände (Merleau-Ponty).
Stefano Micali gensätzliche Epochai möchte Blankenburg die Einstellungsflexibilität des Bewusstse... more Stefano Micali gensätzliche Epochai möchte Blankenburg die Einstellungsflexibilität des Bewusstseins hervorheben, das zahlreiche und verschiedenartige Perspektiven übernehmen kann. Die transzendentale Epoché im Sinne Husserls und die natürliche Einstellung im Sinne Schütz' bilden zwei Extreme »eines Spektrums möglicher Einstellungsweisen« (Blankenbrug 1979, 126).
Zusammenfassung. Wie kein anderes Lebewesen bedarf der Mensch seiner Artge nossen, um seine Anla ... more Zusammenfassung. Wie kein anderes Lebewesen bedarf der Mensch seiner Artge nossen, um seine Anla gen zu Fähigkeiten zu entfalten; dazu gehören insbesondere seine sozialen und kom munikativen Fähigkeiten. Ihre Entwicklung verläuft in enger Wechselwirkung von organischen Reifungsvorgängen im Gehirn und interaktiven Erfahrungen. Wich tige Stufen dieser Entwicklung sind 1. die von Geburt an mögliche Nachahmung von Gesten und Ausdrucksformen anderer; 2. der Erwerb von interaktiven Verhaltensmustern im Umgang mit den Bezugsper sonen in den ersten Lebensmonaten; 3. die Entwicklung der "gemeinsamen Aufmerksamkeit" auf äußere Objekte im 9. Lebensmonat; und schließlich 4. das Erlernen symbolischer Interaktionsfähigkeiten von der Zeigegeste bis hin zur Sprache im Verlauf des 2. Lebensjahres. Im Vortrag werden diese grundlegenden Schritte der menschlichen Sozialisation unter phänomenologischen, entwicklungspsychologischen und neurobiologischen Aspekten dargestellt.
Berühren und berührt werden. Zur Phänomenologie der Nähe, 2023
Der Tastsinn weist eine mehrfache Polarität auf, die ihn unter allen Sinnen als Sinn der Grenze, ... more Der Tastsinn weist eine mehrfache Polarität auf, die ihn unter allen Sinnen als Sinn der Grenze, des Kontakts und des Übergangs auszeichnet. Er ist zum einen rezeptiv (er reagiert auf Kontakt), zum anderen aktiv (er erkundet die Dinge durch Bewegung). Er ist einerseits selbstkonstituierend, nämlich durch die Erfahrung der Selbstberührung und der Selbsttätigkeit, andererseits realitätskonstituierend, nämlich durch die Erfahrung von Widerstand und Undurchdringlichkeit. Damit ermöglicht er dem leiblichen Subjekt Unterscheidung und Abgrenzung ebenso wie Kontakt und Kommunikation. In diesen ambivalenten Erfahrungen des Tastsinns manifestiert sich zunächst das charakteristische Verhältnis, welches das Lebewesen zu seiner Grenze hat. Für den Menschen sind sie darüber hinaus Ausdruck der sozialen Polarität zwischen Bezogenheit und Abgrenzung, die Empfindungen der intimen Nähe, aber auch der intrusiven Grenzüberschreitung beinhalten kann. Diese Polarität wird phänomenologisch entfaltet und abschließend auf die Bedeutung der Berührung in therapeutischen Kontexten bezogen.
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but a... more Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre- or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term of Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yet-conscious mostly unfolds spontaneously and without plan; it is not directly anticipated or aimed at, but rather comes to awareness in such a way that the subject is, as it were, surprised by itself. Thus it gives rise to phenomena such as the striking, the coincidental, the new, and the improvised, which are particularly important for understanding creative and therapeutic processes. The paper aims at providing a general phenomenological framework for the understanding of not-yet-conscious dynamics and their unfolding in different contexts. To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally to be located. I propose to describe the general structure of protenti...
This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological ps... more This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological psychopathology, Erwin W. Straus, concerning psychotic disorders of space and time (see attached Supplementary material). Written in June 1946, the manuscript is published for the first time as supplementary material to this paper. It is a clinical case-study of a patient with psychotic depression from Henry Phipps Clinic. It contains themes known from both Straus' earlier and later work on lived time and mental illness, in particular a critique of physicalism in psychology, a vindication of primary sensing, a description of the spatiotemporal unity of lived experience, and the notion of temporal becoming. However, it is the only work by Straus that explores in such detail a patient's case and shows how the lived experience is spatiotemporally structured and intrinsically related to affectivity, embodiment, and action. The manuscript is yet another piece of evidence of Straus' significance in developing the field of phenomenological psychiatry in both Germany and the United States.
Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 2023
Die gegenwärtige Sicht des Menschen auf sich selbst gekennzeichnet von einer tiefen Ambivalenz. E... more Die gegenwärtige Sicht des Menschen auf sich selbst gekennzeichnet von einer tiefen Ambivalenz. Einerseits misst sich der Mensch die gottgleiche Macht zu, künstliche Intelligenz, künstliches Leben oder sogar Bewusstsein zu erzeugen. Auf der anderen Seite steht ein tiefer Pessimismus, gepaart mit menschlicher Selbstverachtung. Der Posthumanismus in seinen radikaleren Varianten verschreibt sich der Abdankung der Menschheit, die am besten von ihrer eigenen künstlichen Nachkommenschaft entthront werden solle.
In meinem Aufsatz untersuche ich die Entwicklung dieser Ambivalenz seit der Neuzeit und führe sie auf ein Schwanken zwischen Allmachts- und Ohnmachtsgefühlen zurück, dem letztlich ein kollektiver Narzissmus zugrundeliegt. Wir versuchen, eine innere Leere zu kompensieren, indem wir durch die Spiegelung unserer selbst in anthropomorphen Maschinen, in digitaler Intelligenz und in virtuellen Bildern ein ideales Selbstbild erschaffen. Angesichts dieser Entwicklung plädiere ich für einen neuen Humanismus, der auf unserer Verkörperung, unserer Zwischenleiblichkeit mit anderen und unserer Einbettung in eine ökologische Umwelt des Lebendigen basiert.
This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological ps... more This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological psychopathology, Erwin W. Straus, concerning psychotic disorders of space and time (see attached Supplementary material). Written in June 1946, the manuscript is published for the first time as supplementary material to this paper. It is a clinical case-study of a patient with psychotic depression from Henry Phipps Clinic. It contains themes known from both Straus’ earlier and later work on lived time and mental illness, in particular a critique of physicalism in psychology, a vindication of primary sensing, a description of the spatiotemporal unity of lived experience, and the notion of temporal becoming. However, it is the only work by Straus that explores in such detail a patient’s case and shows how the lived experience is spatiotemporally structured and intrinsically related to affectivity, embodiment, and action. The manuscript is yet another piece of evidence of Straus’ significance in developing the field of phenomenological psychiatry in both Germany and the United States.
The distinction between the factual and the fictional, or between the real and the virtual, is a ... more The distinction between the factual and the fictional, or between the real and the virtual, is a fundamental capacity of the human mind. It allows us to suspend the force and validity of the immediate experience and to enter a parallel world of imagination, day-dreaming, hypothetical thought, fiction, pretence, role play or theater. All these in¬tentional acts which posit their object as counterfactual or non-existent may be summarized as the “as-if stance” or “as-if function”. However, it is also a complex and demanding capacity that may be disturbed in mental illnesses, in particular in schizophrenia. This becomes apparent for example in concretism, in disturbances of perspective-taking leading to transitivism (loss of ego-boundaries), or finally in delusion where the ‘as if’ is lost. An analysis of the as-if-function may help us to better understand a number of typical schizophrenic disturbances, whereas these may in turn offer an illustration of what the as-if-function normally provides us with.
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) create an increasing similarity between the performance ... more Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) create an increasing similarity between the performance of AI systems or AI-based robots and human communication. They raise the questions: whether it is possible to communicate with, understand, and even empathically perceive artificial agents; whether we should ascribe actual subjectivity and thus quasi-personal status to them beyond a certain level of simulation; what will be the impact of an increasing dissolution of the distinction between simulated and real encounters. (1) To answer these questions, the paper argues that the precondition for actually understanding others consists in the implicit assumption of the subjectivity of our counterpart, which makes shared feelings and a „we-intentionality” possible. This assumption is ultimately based on the presupposition of a shared form of life, conceived here as „conviviality.”(2) The possibility that future artificial agents could meet these preconditions is refuted on the basis of embodie...
Phenomenology may be considered the systematic science of subjective experience and its basic str... more Phenomenology may be considered the systematic science of subjective experience and its basic structures of intentionality, embodiment, temporality and intersubjectivity. Thus it is assigned the crucial task of defending subjective experience against reductionist claims raised by proponents of naturalism or physicalism. Nonetheless, phenomenology is far more than a mere science of consciousness which it maintains as an impregnable, but sterile citadel. On the contrary, as a science of embodied and extended subjectivity, it touches the fields of empirical sciences and enters with them into a productive dialogue. This is shown in three areas of science: (1) by the crucial role of phenomenology for the paradigm of embodied and extended mind in cognitive neuroscience; (2) by the phenomenological concept of primary social cognition as intercorporeality; and (3) by the phenomenological psychopathology of embodiment, in particular in schizophrenia.
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but a... more Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre-or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term of Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yetconscious mostly unfolds spontaneously and without plan; it is not directly anticipated or aimed at, but rather comes to awareness in such a way that the subject is, as it were, surprised by itself. Thus it gives rise to phenomena such as the striking, the coincidental, the new, and the improvised, which are particularly important for understanding creative and therapeutic processes. The paper aims at providing a general phenomenological framework for the understanding of not-yet-conscious dynamics and their unfolding in different contexts. To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally to be located. I propose to describe the general structure of protention as a future-directed horizon of graded probabilities, i.e., as a "protentional cone". This cone is fed by current experiences and bodily tendencies and is focused to varying degrees by attention. This results in either more focused or rather defocused states of anticipation, the latter giving space to the not-yet-conscious as a meaning "in statu nascendi". On this basis, selected manifestations of the not-yet-conscious are analyzed, including extemporaneous speech, artistic improvisation and creativity, bodily meaning implicates, decision-making, and meaningful coincidence.
The distinction of "understanding" and "explaining", formulated by Karl Jaspers in his "General P... more The distinction of "understanding" and "explaining", formulated by Karl Jaspers in his "General Psychopathology", has had a lasting effect on psychiatry. As a result, phenomenological, hermeneutic, or psychodynamic approaches have often been accorded only descriptive or epiphenomenal status, while the actual causes of mental illness have been sought in neurobiologically or genetically based explanations. In contrast, this paper defends the explanatory role of understanding and phenomenological approaches. To this end, two levels of explanation are distinguished and shown to be equally justified in principle, namely, motivational explanation at the macro-level and physical explanation at the micro-level. The actual causal role of motivational, i.e., understandable connections is then demonstrated by means of a conception of circular causality, which includes downward causality. Finally, the explanatory role of phenomenological analyses is also shown in psychotic disorders that refuse motivational understanding, using the example of schizophrenic delusion.
Zusammenfassung„Nichts ist, wie es scheint“, „nichts geschieht zufällig“, und „alles ist miteinan... more Zusammenfassung„Nichts ist, wie es scheint“, „nichts geschieht zufällig“, und „alles ist miteinander verbunden“ – diese drei Grundannahmen charakterisieren Verschwörungstheorien unterschiedlicher Provenienz. Damit zeigen sie eine deutliche Parallelität zur Struktur von paranoidem Bedeutungserleben und Wahn. Dem stehen jedoch wichtige Unterschiede gegenüber, etwa die Bildung ausgedehnter Gruppen von Verschwörungsgläubigen, denen keine paranoiden „Wahngemeinschaften“ entsprechen. Der Aufsatz untersucht zunächst beide Phänomene vergleichend und wendet sich dann der Frage zu, wie die Virtualisierung der Kommunikation in den sozialen Medien die Bildung von verschwörungstheoretischen Gemeinschaften begünstigt.
The current view of man on himself is characterized by a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, man a... more The current view of man on himself is characterized by a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, man attributes to himself the godlike power to generate artificial intelligence, artificial life or even consciousness. On the other hand, there is a deep pessimism coupled with human self-contempt. Post-humanism, in its more radical variants, ascribes itself to the abdication of humanity, which should best be dethroned by its own artificial offspring. In this paper, I examine the development of this ambivalence since modern times and trace it back to a vacillation between feelings of omnipotence and impotence, which is ultimately based on a collective narcissism. We try to compensate for an inner emptiness by creating an ideal self-image through the reflection of ourselves in anthropomorphic machines, in digital intelligence and in virtual images. In light of this development, I argue for a new humanism based on our embodiment, our intercorporeality with others, and our embeddedness in an ecological environment of the living.
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but a... more Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre- or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term coined by Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yet-consciousness usually unfolds spontaneously and without a plan; it is not expected or striven for, but rather emerges in consciousness in such a way that the subject is surprised by itself, so to speak. This gives rise to phenomena such as the conspicuous, the accidental, the new and the improvised, which are particularly important for understanding creative and therapeutic processes. The aim of this article is to develop a general phenomenological framework for understanding not-yet-conscious dynamics and their unfolding in different contexts. To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in the light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally located.
In Kontakt mit der Wirklichkeit. Die Perspektivität verkörperter Wahrnehmung, 2024
Was den gesunden Menschen vor Delirien und Halluzinationen bewahrt, ist nicht sein kritischer Gei... more Was den gesunden Menschen vor Delirien und Halluzinationen bewahrt, ist nicht sein kritischer Geist, sondern die Struktur seines Raumes: die Dinge bleiben vor ihm stehen, sie wahren Abstand und berühren ihn […] nur mit Respekt. Halluzinationen und Mythen hingegen entstehen aus einer Schrumpfung des Lebensraumes, einem Wurzelschlagen der Dinge in unserem Leib, einer schwindelerregenden Nähe der Gegenstände (Merleau-Ponty).
Stefano Micali gensätzliche Epochai möchte Blankenburg die Einstellungsflexibilität des Bewusstse... more Stefano Micali gensätzliche Epochai möchte Blankenburg die Einstellungsflexibilität des Bewusstseins hervorheben, das zahlreiche und verschiedenartige Perspektiven übernehmen kann. Die transzendentale Epoché im Sinne Husserls und die natürliche Einstellung im Sinne Schütz' bilden zwei Extreme »eines Spektrums möglicher Einstellungsweisen« (Blankenbrug 1979, 126).
Zusammenfassung. Wie kein anderes Lebewesen bedarf der Mensch seiner Artge nossen, um seine Anla ... more Zusammenfassung. Wie kein anderes Lebewesen bedarf der Mensch seiner Artge nossen, um seine Anla gen zu Fähigkeiten zu entfalten; dazu gehören insbesondere seine sozialen und kom munikativen Fähigkeiten. Ihre Entwicklung verläuft in enger Wechselwirkung von organischen Reifungsvorgängen im Gehirn und interaktiven Erfahrungen. Wich tige Stufen dieser Entwicklung sind 1. die von Geburt an mögliche Nachahmung von Gesten und Ausdrucksformen anderer; 2. der Erwerb von interaktiven Verhaltensmustern im Umgang mit den Bezugsper sonen in den ersten Lebensmonaten; 3. die Entwicklung der "gemeinsamen Aufmerksamkeit" auf äußere Objekte im 9. Lebensmonat; und schließlich 4. das Erlernen symbolischer Interaktionsfähigkeiten von der Zeigegeste bis hin zur Sprache im Verlauf des 2. Lebensjahres. Im Vortrag werden diese grundlegenden Schritte der menschlichen Sozialisation unter phänomenologischen, entwicklungspsychologischen und neurobiologischen Aspekten dargestellt.
Berühren und berührt werden. Zur Phänomenologie der Nähe, 2023
Der Tastsinn weist eine mehrfache Polarität auf, die ihn unter allen Sinnen als Sinn der Grenze, ... more Der Tastsinn weist eine mehrfache Polarität auf, die ihn unter allen Sinnen als Sinn der Grenze, des Kontakts und des Übergangs auszeichnet. Er ist zum einen rezeptiv (er reagiert auf Kontakt), zum anderen aktiv (er erkundet die Dinge durch Bewegung). Er ist einerseits selbstkonstituierend, nämlich durch die Erfahrung der Selbstberührung und der Selbsttätigkeit, andererseits realitätskonstituierend, nämlich durch die Erfahrung von Widerstand und Undurchdringlichkeit. Damit ermöglicht er dem leiblichen Subjekt Unterscheidung und Abgrenzung ebenso wie Kontakt und Kommunikation. In diesen ambivalenten Erfahrungen des Tastsinns manifestiert sich zunächst das charakteristische Verhältnis, welches das Lebewesen zu seiner Grenze hat. Für den Menschen sind sie darüber hinaus Ausdruck der sozialen Polarität zwischen Bezogenheit und Abgrenzung, die Empfindungen der intimen Nähe, aber auch der intrusiven Grenzüberschreitung beinhalten kann. Diese Polarität wird phänomenologisch entfaltet und abschließend auf die Bedeutung der Berührung in therapeutischen Kontexten bezogen.
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but a... more Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre- or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term of Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yet-conscious mostly unfolds spontaneously and without plan; it is not directly anticipated or aimed at, but rather comes to awareness in such a way that the subject is, as it were, surprised by itself. Thus it gives rise to phenomena such as the striking, the coincidental, the new, and the improvised, which are particularly important for understanding creative and therapeutic processes. The paper aims at providing a general phenomenological framework for the understanding of not-yet-conscious dynamics and their unfolding in different contexts. To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally to be located. I propose to describe the general structure of protenti...
This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological ps... more This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological psychopathology, Erwin W. Straus, concerning psychotic disorders of space and time (see attached Supplementary material). Written in June 1946, the manuscript is published for the first time as supplementary material to this paper. It is a clinical case-study of a patient with psychotic depression from Henry Phipps Clinic. It contains themes known from both Straus' earlier and later work on lived time and mental illness, in particular a critique of physicalism in psychology, a vindication of primary sensing, a description of the spatiotemporal unity of lived experience, and the notion of temporal becoming. However, it is the only work by Straus that explores in such detail a patient's case and shows how the lived experience is spatiotemporally structured and intrinsically related to affectivity, embodiment, and action. The manuscript is yet another piece of evidence of Straus' significance in developing the field of phenomenological psychiatry in both Germany and the United States.
Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 2023
Die gegenwärtige Sicht des Menschen auf sich selbst gekennzeichnet von einer tiefen Ambivalenz. E... more Die gegenwärtige Sicht des Menschen auf sich selbst gekennzeichnet von einer tiefen Ambivalenz. Einerseits misst sich der Mensch die gottgleiche Macht zu, künstliche Intelligenz, künstliches Leben oder sogar Bewusstsein zu erzeugen. Auf der anderen Seite steht ein tiefer Pessimismus, gepaart mit menschlicher Selbstverachtung. Der Posthumanismus in seinen radikaleren Varianten verschreibt sich der Abdankung der Menschheit, die am besten von ihrer eigenen künstlichen Nachkommenschaft entthront werden solle.
In meinem Aufsatz untersuche ich die Entwicklung dieser Ambivalenz seit der Neuzeit und führe sie auf ein Schwanken zwischen Allmachts- und Ohnmachtsgefühlen zurück, dem letztlich ein kollektiver Narzissmus zugrundeliegt. Wir versuchen, eine innere Leere zu kompensieren, indem wir durch die Spiegelung unserer selbst in anthropomorphen Maschinen, in digitaler Intelligenz und in virtuellen Bildern ein ideales Selbstbild erschaffen. Angesichts dieser Entwicklung plädiere ich für einen neuen Humanismus, der auf unserer Verkörperung, unserer Zwischenleiblichkeit mit anderen und unserer Einbettung in eine ökologische Umwelt des Lebendigen basiert.
This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological ps... more This paper presents and discusses a manuscript by one of the core founders of phenomenological psychopathology, Erwin W. Straus, concerning psychotic disorders of space and time (see attached Supplementary material). Written in June 1946, the manuscript is published for the first time as supplementary material to this paper. It is a clinical case-study of a patient with psychotic depression from Henry Phipps Clinic. It contains themes known from both Straus’ earlier and later work on lived time and mental illness, in particular a critique of physicalism in psychology, a vindication of primary sensing, a description of the spatiotemporal unity of lived experience, and the notion of temporal becoming. However, it is the only work by Straus that explores in such detail a patient’s case and shows how the lived experience is spatiotemporally structured and intrinsically related to affectivity, embodiment, and action. The manuscript is yet another piece of evidence of Straus’ significance in developing the field of phenomenological psychiatry in both Germany and the United States.
The distinction between the factual and the fictional, or between the real and the virtual, is a ... more The distinction between the factual and the fictional, or between the real and the virtual, is a fundamental capacity of the human mind. It allows us to suspend the force and validity of the immediate experience and to enter a parallel world of imagination, day-dreaming, hypothetical thought, fiction, pretence, role play or theater. All these in¬tentional acts which posit their object as counterfactual or non-existent may be summarized as the “as-if stance” or “as-if function”. However, it is also a complex and demanding capacity that may be disturbed in mental illnesses, in particular in schizophrenia. This becomes apparent for example in concretism, in disturbances of perspective-taking leading to transitivism (loss of ego-boundaries), or finally in delusion where the ‘as if’ is lost. An analysis of the as-if-function may help us to better understand a number of typical schizophrenic disturbances, whereas these may in turn offer an illustration of what the as-if-function normally provides us with.
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) create an increasing similarity between the performance ... more Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) create an increasing similarity between the performance of AI systems or AI-based robots and human communication. They raise the questions: whether it is possible to communicate with, understand, and even empathically perceive artificial agents; whether we should ascribe actual subjectivity and thus quasi-personal status to them beyond a certain level of simulation; what will be the impact of an increasing dissolution of the distinction between simulated and real encounters. (1) To answer these questions, the paper argues that the precondition for actually understanding others consists in the implicit assumption of the subjectivity of our counterpart, which makes shared feelings and a „we-intentionality” possible. This assumption is ultimately based on the presupposition of a shared form of life, conceived here as „conviviality.”(2) The possibility that future artificial agents could meet these preconditions is refuted on the basis of embodie...
Phenomenology may be considered the systematic science of subjective experience and its basic str... more Phenomenology may be considered the systematic science of subjective experience and its basic structures of intentionality, embodiment, temporality and intersubjectivity. Thus it is assigned the crucial task of defending subjective experience against reductionist claims raised by proponents of naturalism or physicalism. Nonetheless, phenomenology is far more than a mere science of consciousness which it maintains as an impregnable, but sterile citadel. On the contrary, as a science of embodied and extended subjectivity, it touches the fields of empirical sciences and enters with them into a productive dialogue. This is shown in three areas of science: (1) by the crucial role of phenomenology for the paradigm of embodied and extended mind in cognitive neuroscience; (2) by the phenomenological concept of primary social cognition as intercorporeality; and (3) by the phenomenological psychopathology of embodiment, in particular in schizophrenia.
Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but a... more Not only our conscious expectations, wishes and intentions are directed towards the future, but also pre-or unconscious tendencies, hunches and anticipations. Using a term of Ernst Bloch, they can be summarized as the not-yet-conscious. This not-yetconscious mostly unfolds spontaneously and without plan; it is not directly anticipated or aimed at, but rather comes to awareness in such a way that the subject is, as it were, surprised by itself. Thus it gives rise to phenomena such as the striking, the coincidental, the new, and the improvised, which are particularly important for understanding creative and therapeutic processes. The paper aims at providing a general phenomenological framework for the understanding of not-yet-conscious dynamics and their unfolding in different contexts. To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally to be located. I propose to describe the general structure of protention as a future-directed horizon of graded probabilities, i.e., as a "protentional cone". This cone is fed by current experiences and bodily tendencies and is focused to varying degrees by attention. This results in either more focused or rather defocused states of anticipation, the latter giving space to the not-yet-conscious as a meaning "in statu nascendi". On this basis, selected manifestations of the not-yet-conscious are analyzed, including extemporaneous speech, artistic improvisation and creativity, bodily meaning implicates, decision-making, and meaningful coincidence.
The distinction of "understanding" and "explaining", formulated by Karl Jaspers in his "General P... more The distinction of "understanding" and "explaining", formulated by Karl Jaspers in his "General Psychopathology", has had a lasting effect on psychiatry. As a result, phenomenological, hermeneutic, or psychodynamic approaches have often been accorded only descriptive or epiphenomenal status, while the actual causes of mental illness have been sought in neurobiologically or genetically based explanations. In contrast, this paper defends the explanatory role of understanding and phenomenological approaches. To this end, two levels of explanation are distinguished and shown to be equally justified in principle, namely, motivational explanation at the macro-level and physical explanation at the micro-level. The actual causal role of motivational, i.e., understandable connections is then demonstrated by means of a conception of circular causality, which includes downward causality. Finally, the explanatory role of phenomenological analyses is also shown in psychotic disorders that refuse motivational understanding, using the example of schizophrenic delusion.
Zusammenfassung„Nichts ist, wie es scheint“, „nichts geschieht zufällig“, und „alles ist miteinan... more Zusammenfassung„Nichts ist, wie es scheint“, „nichts geschieht zufällig“, und „alles ist miteinander verbunden“ – diese drei Grundannahmen charakterisieren Verschwörungstheorien unterschiedlicher Provenienz. Damit zeigen sie eine deutliche Parallelität zur Struktur von paranoidem Bedeutungserleben und Wahn. Dem stehen jedoch wichtige Unterschiede gegenüber, etwa die Bildung ausgedehnter Gruppen von Verschwörungsgläubigen, denen keine paranoiden „Wahngemeinschaften“ entsprechen. Der Aufsatz untersucht zunächst beide Phänomene vergleichend und wendet sich dann der Frage zu, wie die Virtualisierung der Kommunikation in den sozialen Medien die Bildung von verschwörungstheoretischen Gemeinschaften begünstigt.
With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduct... more With the progress of artificial intelligence, the digitalization of the lifeworld, and the reduction of the mind to neuronal processes, the human being appears more and more as a product of data and algorithms. Thus, we conceive ourselves "in the image of our machines," and conversely, we elevate our machines and our brains to new subjects. At the same time, demands for an enhancement of human nature culminate in transhumanist visions of taking human evolution to a new stage. Against this self-reification of the human being, this book defends a humanism of embodiment: our corporeality, aliveness, and embodied freedom are the foundations of a selfdetermined existence, which uses the new technologies only as means instead of submitting to them. For students and academics, In Defense of the Human Being will be of interest to those studying digitalization and artificial intelligence, transhumanism and enhancement, virtual reality and embodiment, neuroscience, psychiatry, and cultural developments.
Present day neuroscience places the brain at the centre of study. But what if researchers viewed ... more Present day neuroscience places the brain at the centre of study. But what if researchers viewed the brain not as the foundation of life, rather as a mediating organ? Ecology of the Brain addresses this very question. It considers the human body as a collective, a living being which uses the brain to mediate interactions. Those interactions may be both within the human body and between the human body and its environment. Within this framework, the mind is seen not as a product of the brain but as an activity of the living being; an activity which integrates the brain within the everyday functions of the human body. Going further, Fuchs reformulates the traditional mind-brain problem, presenting it as a dual aspect of the living being: the lived body and the subjective body - the living body and the objective body. The processes of living and experiencing life, Fuchs argues, are in fact inextricably linked; it is not the brain, but the human being who feels, thinks and acts. For students and academics, Ecology of the Brain will be of interest to those studying or researching theory of mind, social and cultural interaction, psychiatry, and psychotherapy.
Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that th... more Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that they have a unique epistemic and emotional perspective on the experienced objects and situations. The same object can be seen from many different points of view, an event can awaken different emotional reactions in different individuals, and our position-takings can in part be mediated by our belonging to some social or cultural groups. All these phenomena can be described by referring to the metaphor of perspective. Assuming that there are different, and irreducible, perspectives we can take on the experienced world, and on others as experiencing the same world, the phenomenon of mutual understanding can consistently be understood in terms of perspectival flexibility. This edited volume investigates the different processes in which perspectival flexibility occurs in social life and particularly focuses on the constitutive role of imagination in such processes. It includes original works in philosophy and psychopathology showing how perspectival flexibility and social cognition are grounded on the interplay of direct perception and imagination.
Human bodies are similar all over the world, but their habits, postures and comportment are to a ... more Human bodies are similar all over the world, but their habits, postures and comportment are to a large extent shaped by culture. Cultures preordain and suggest certain ways of sitting, standing, walking, gazing, eating, praying, hugging, washing, and so on. In so doing, they induce certain dispositions and frames of mind associated with these bodily states and behaviors: for example, attitudes of dominance and submission, approximation and distance, appreciation and devaluation, benevolence or resentment, and the like. Cultural practices, rituals, roles and rules shape the individual's techniques of the body, as Mauss (1935) termed them, and the resulting way the body moves and comports itself is one of the main carriers of cultural tradition. As Bourdieu notes, cultures are thus "treating the body as memory; they entrust to it in abbreviated and practical, i.e., mnemonic, form the fundamental principles of culture. The principles embodied in this way are placed beyond the grasp of consciousness" (Bourdieu 1977, 94). The main period for the transmission of these influences is of course early childhood and upbringing, which consists to a large extent of an "implicit pedagogy, capable of instilling a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysic, a political philosophy, through injunctions as insignificant as 'stand up straight' or 'don't hold your knife in your left hand'" (ibid.).
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Papers by Thomas Fuchs
structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in the light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally located.
In meinem Aufsatz untersuche ich die Entwicklung dieser Ambivalenz seit der Neuzeit und führe sie auf ein Schwanken zwischen Allmachts- und Ohnmachtsgefühlen zurück, dem letztlich ein kollektiver Narzissmus zugrundeliegt. Wir versuchen, eine innere Leere zu kompensieren, indem wir durch die Spiegelung unserer selbst in anthropomorphen Maschinen, in digitaler Intelligenz und in virtuellen Bildern ein ideales Selbstbild erschaffen. Angesichts dieser Entwicklung plädiere ich für einen neuen Humanismus, der auf unserer Verkörperung, unserer Zwischenleiblichkeit mit anderen und unserer Einbettung in eine ökologische Umwelt des Lebendigen basiert.
To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally to be located. I propose to describe the general structure of protention as a future-directed horizon of graded probabilities, i.e., as a "protentional cone". This cone is fed by current experiences and bodily tendencies and is focused to varying degrees by attention. This results in either more focused or rather defocused states of anticipation, the latter giving space to the not-yet-conscious as a meaning "in statu nascendi". On this basis, selected manifestations of the not-yet-conscious are analyzed, including extemporaneous speech, artistic improvisation and creativity, bodily meaning implicates, decision-making, and meaningful coincidence.
structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in the light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally located.
In meinem Aufsatz untersuche ich die Entwicklung dieser Ambivalenz seit der Neuzeit und führe sie auf ein Schwanken zwischen Allmachts- und Ohnmachtsgefühlen zurück, dem letztlich ein kollektiver Narzissmus zugrundeliegt. Wir versuchen, eine innere Leere zu kompensieren, indem wir durch die Spiegelung unserer selbst in anthropomorphen Maschinen, in digitaler Intelligenz und in virtuellen Bildern ein ideales Selbstbild erschaffen. Angesichts dieser Entwicklung plädiere ich für einen neuen Humanismus, der auf unserer Verkörperung, unserer Zwischenleiblichkeit mit anderen und unserer Einbettung in eine ökologische Umwelt des Lebendigen basiert.
To this end, the structure of the not-yet-conscious is examined in light of protention, in which the phenomenon is fundamentally to be located. I propose to describe the general structure of protention as a future-directed horizon of graded probabilities, i.e., as a "protentional cone". This cone is fed by current experiences and bodily tendencies and is focused to varying degrees by attention. This results in either more focused or rather defocused states of anticipation, the latter giving space to the not-yet-conscious as a meaning "in statu nascendi". On this basis, selected manifestations of the not-yet-conscious are analyzed, including extemporaneous speech, artistic improvisation and creativity, bodily meaning implicates, decision-making, and meaningful coincidence.
Ecology of the Brain addresses this very question. It considers the human body as a collective, a living being which uses the brain to mediate interactions. Those interactions may be both within the human body and between the human body and its environment.
Within this framework, the mind is seen not as a product of the brain but as an activity of the living being; an activity which integrates the brain within the everyday functions of the human body. Going further, Fuchs reformulates the traditional mind-brain problem, presenting it as a dual aspect of the living being: the lived body and the subjective body - the living body and the objective body. The processes of living and experiencing life, Fuchs argues, are in fact inextricably linked; it is not the brain, but the human being who feels, thinks and acts.
For students and academics, Ecology of the Brain will be of interest to those studying or researching theory of mind, social and cultural interaction, psychiatry, and psychotherapy.