Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War.

Moscow, September 2014 valdaiclub.com RUSSIAN STRATEGIES IN THE ARCTIC: AVOIDING A NEW COLD WAR Valdai Discussion Club Grantees Report his report was prepared on the basis of the research within the framework of the Research Grants Program of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club. Authors: Lassi Heininen, Professor, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland, Finland Alexander Sergunin, Professor, Department of International Relations, School of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University Gleb Yarovoy, Associate professor, Department of International Relations, Petrozavodsk State University he views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or relect those of the Valdai Discussion Club, neither of any organizations the authors have been ailiated with or may be ailiated in future. ISBN 978–5-906757–05–0 Introduction 3 Russia and Territorial 49 Disputes in the Arctic he U.S.-Russian Dispute Analysis of the 8 he Russian-Norwegian Current Situation 55 Dispute on the Barents Sea Russian Claims on the Arctic Russian National Interests in 49 on the Bering Sea 9 61 Continental Shelf the Arctic Russia’s Arctic Doctrines Northern Sea Route 66 Climate Change and the 72 16 Environment Assessing the Russia’s Energy Policies 21 Problems of the 76 in the Arctic Russia’s Military Policies 79 in the Arctic Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples Policy 84 in the Arctic Russia’s Relations with 22 Major Arctic Players U.S.-Russia 22 Canada-Russia 25 Russia-Norway 36 Russia-Denmark 40 Russia’s Relations with 41 East Asian Countries Conclusions and Scenarios for the Future References NATO and Russia in the Arctic 43 EU, Russia and the Arctic 46 87 93 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War INTRODUCTION 3 0. Difering views of Russia’s Arctic policies. he is the development of the Russian Arctic Zone Russian Federation’s Arctic strategy is a vexed (RAZ), which is rich in natural resources and question both in the media and research lit- underdeveloped in terms of the local economy, erature. Russia’s decision to plant a titanium infrastructure, communication systems, social lag at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean on the institutions and culture. hey contend that North Pole in August 2007 and resume strategic Moscow is not pursuing a revisionist policy bomber patrols in the High North, as well as the in the Arctic; on the contrary, Russia wants publication of its Arctic strategy in 2008, has led to solve all disputes in the region by peaceful some Western experts to criticize Russia’s Arctic means, relying on international law and inter- policies as expansionist, aggressive, and an national organizations. example of “gunboat diplomacy” (Kraska 2009, here is also a noisy but marginal group of 1117; Schepp and Traufetter 2009; Willett 2009, anti-Western writers in Russia who are not 53). However, in contrast with the Cold War era, afraid to champion Russia as a revisionist, when Soviet behavior was driven by ideological expansionist or imperial state – and not only in or geopolitical factors, current Russian policies the Arctic (Dugin 1991, 1993 and 2002; Indzhiev in the Arctic are explained by Moscow’s prag- 2010). hey believe that Moscow’s Arctic policy matic interests such as competition for natural must be assertive and proactive to resist the resources and/or control of northern sea routes. Western ‘encroachment’ on ‘Russia’s Arctic’ and On the other hand, there are authors (mostly a multitude of anti-Russian conspiracies. hey Russian but also Western) who see Russia’s even criticize the Russian government for lack- intentions in the Arctic as innocent, inward- ing a sound and assertive strategy in the region, looking, purely defensive, and oriented toward or for making concessions to other interna- the protection of its legitimate interests (Alex- tional players (for example, the 2010 Russian- androv 2009; Belov 2012; Diev 2009; Grigoriev Norwegian treaty on delimitation of maritime 2010; Nenashev 2010; Oreshenkov 2009); or territories, or granting a number of non-Arctic who at least see Russia’s national intentions states with permanent observer status in the in the context of international Arctic coopera- Arctic Council). tion as comparable to other Arctic states (e.g. In the background, there are two well- Heininen 2011). his group of experts empha- deined and opposing discourses on Northern sizes the fact that Moscow’s primary interest geopolitics, which have shaped the ensuing 4 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War geopolitical discussion of the Arctic in the early to globalization, and should be seen beyond the 21st century. One discourse relects the rela- traditional aspects of power, conlict and coop- tive peace and stability in the region, which eration (Heininen 2012). While falling short of a is the result of the institutionalized interna- new Cold War in the Arctic region, potential na- tional cooperation pursued by the eight Arctic tional or nationalistic responses by Arctic states states following the end of the Cold War. he could securitize Arctic cooperation. other, ‘realist’ discourse argues that the race he vast majority of authors are either too for natural resources in the Arctic is giving rise anti-Russian or openly pro-Russian in their to regional conlicts rooted in claims of state analysis of Russia’s strategy and policies in the sovereignty, which is viewed as under threat by post-Cold War Arctic. But there are quite a few climate change, growing interest by extra-terri- works that try to objectively analyze Russian torial actors, and national (security and eco- interests, motivation, behavior and strategies nomic) interests (see Heininen 2014). According in the Arctic (Gorenburg 2011; Konyshev and to some Western and East Asian analysts, due to Sergunin 2011a; Heininen 2011; Konyshev and Russia’s economic weakness and technological Sergunin 2012; Laruelle 2014; Lasserre, Le Roy backwardness, it tends to emphasize coercive and Garon 2012; Voronkov 2012; Zagorsky 2011; military instruments to protect its national in- Yarovoy 2014). his report, based on the research terests in the Arctic, which will inevitably lead project “he Arctic – a Region of Strategies and to a regional arms race, remilitarization and Policies: Avoiding a New Cold War,” continues military conlicts in the High North (Borgerson this tradition and aims to provide a compre- 2008; Huebert 2010; Huebert et al. 2012; Macali- hensive picture and analysis of the current ster 2010; Smith and Giles 2007). situation in the Arctic, as well as a rigorous here are also fresh perspectives. For example, assessment of the interests and problems of the some commentators hold that the importance Russian Federation in the Arctic, particularly of the Arctic in world politics is increasing due the Russian Arctic. he scientiic team at the North Pole-39 drifting ice research station 5 Summer sun in the Arctic leads to snow-melting 6 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War RESEARCH AGENDA his paper seeks to determine whether Russia is really a revisionist power in the Arctic, or whether it is interested in regional stability and international cooperation in the High North. To answer this question, a number of smaller questions must be discussed: • What are Russia’s real interests in the Arctic, • How do diferent schools of thought on Rus- as opposed to its rhetoric regarding the region? • Governmental/oicial publications and ma- • Published interviews with oicials, politi- • Statistical information, yearbooks, guides, • Research literature: monographs, analytical • Media publications. terials (Russian and Western). cians, NGO leaders, and experts. and reference books. papers, and articles. As with any study of ‘hot’ political issues, sian foreign policy understand the problems it’s diicult to ind reliable data. Information posed by the Arctic? is often classiied, misleading, or not fully • What is the conceptual/doctrinal basis for reported. A scholar has to corroborate data Russia’s Arctic strategy? from numerous unconirmed media reports. • How does Russia build relations with major Research is further complicated by difer- Arctic and non-Arctic actors in the region? ences of opinion among experts on methods of • What is Moscow’s political approach to statistical analysis. Moreover, research tech- working within international organizations niques and terminology can vary. herefore, and fora that deal with Arctic issues? we have relied on our critical judgment and a How does Russia address major Arctic chal- careful comparison of sources in compiling the lenges such as climate change, environ- database for this research. Since it involves not mental degradation, territorial claims and only data collection but also data analysis, we division of the continental shelf, the use of relied on three main criteria for selecting and sea routes, etc.? interpreting sources: What are Russia’s real military policies and • • • plans in the Arctic? Do they pose a security threat to other Arctic players, or are Moscow’s limited military preparations and activities in keeping with the existing regional Validity: Data must represent the most important and characteristic trends rather than occasional or irregular developments. • military balance? Informativeness: Sources that provide valuable and timely information are given priority. • SOURCES Innovativeness: Preference is given to sources that ofer original data, fresh ideas, and untraditional approaches. hese research techniques are helpful in his paper is based on the following sources: overcoming the limitations of available sources • International documents (treaties, agree- and compiling substantial and suicient data ments, resolutions, etc.). for the study. 7 ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 8 1. Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE ARCTIC he Russian Federation is the largest of the known conventional petroleum resources ive littoral states of the Arctic Ocean. Accord- (cumulative production and remaining proved ing to its 2008 Arctic strategy, Russia seeks to reserves). And yet most of the Arctic, especially “maintain the role of a leading Arctic power” ofshore, remains essentially unexplored with (Medvedev 2008; also Heininen 2011, 69–70). respect to petroleum. Consequently, Russia has numerous, multi- he RAZ holds most of the Arctic’s hydrocar- dimensional national interests in the Arctic bon reserves. his region of Russia is the most region, and the entire North. Russia’s interests proliic producer of Russian gas (95%) and oil in the Arctic can be grouped into the following (about 70%) (Dobretsov and Pokhilenko 2010). categories: Russian geologists have discovered about 200 oil and gas deposits in the RAZ. here are 22 large shelf deposits in the Barents and Kara ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES seas, which are expected to be developed in the near future (Prirodnye Resursy Arktiki 2010). First and foremost, the Arctic is attractive to he RAZ is also abundant in mineral resourc- Russia for its vast natural resources. According es. Its mining industries produce primary and to the U.S. Geological Survey (2008), the mean placer diamond (99% of total Russian production), estimate of total undiscovered conventional oil platinum-group elements (PGE) (98%), nickel and and gas resources in the Arctic is approximately cobalt (over 80%), chromium and manganese 90 billion barrels of oil, 1.669 trillion cubic feet (90%), copper (60%), antimony, tin, tungsten, and of natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of natural rare metals (from 50 to 90%), and gold (about gas liquids. Arctic deposits total approximately 40%) (Dobretsov and Pokhilenko 2010). 240 billion barrels of oil and oil-equivalent natural gas, which is almost 10% of the world’s he development of Arctic and subarctic mineral resources is indispensable both for 9 Russia and the world. But this process is very RAZ is home to 46 towns with populations over diicult and requires a solid geological, ecologi- 5,000, as well as four cities with populations cal, and economic foundation as well as special over 100,000 – a record among Arctic coastal approaches (Kontorovich et al., 2010). states. With just 1% of the country’s popula- In addition to mineral reserves, the Arctic tion, it already accounts for 11% of Russian gross possesses abundant bio-resources. More than domestic product and 22% of its export revenue 150 ish species can be found in Arctic waters, (Kochemasov et al. 2009; Schepp and Traufet- including important varieties for Russian (and ter 2009). he Russian government and private international) commercial ishing, such as business intend to restore and further develop herring, cod, butterish, haddock and lat- the industries and infrastructure of the RAZ, ish. he RAZ produces 15% of Russia’s seafood with plans for hundreds of billions in Russian (Kochemasov et al. 2009). he region is also and foreign direct investment in important populated by some unique animal species such sectors of the regional economy, such as energy, as the polar bear, narwhal, walrus and white mining, transport infrastructure and commu- whale. nications (Medvedev 2008; Putin 2013). INDUSTRIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RAZ A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT TRANSPORT jUNCTION A major industrial base was created in the RAZ under the Soviet regime, and includes mining, Moreover, if Arctic ice continues to melt, Rus- oil and gas, pipeline systems, electric power sia stands to enjoy considerable economic stations, the Bilibin nuclear power plant, and gains from the development and exploitation extensive transport infrastructure (rail and mo- of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) – the short- tor roads, airields, river and sea ports, etc.). he est shipping route between European and East LOCATION MAP OF LARGE MINERAL AND HYDROCARBON DEPOSITS IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC AND SUBARCTIC AREAS oil fields Pt-Cu-Ni deposits (Norilsk, Kola Peninsula) Middle Timan bauxites gas fields Tomtor rare-metal deposit placer gold mineralization diamond deposits tin deposits Source: Dobretsov, N.L., Pokhilenko, N.P. Mineral resources and development in the Russian Arctic (2010) 10 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Asian ports, as well as an important domestic polluted or contaminated (Kochemasov et al. route connecting Siberian river ports as well 2009). as the European and Far Eastern parts of the Russia, along with other Arctic states, is country. concerned about nuclear safety in the Arctic Re- Circumpolar air routes between North gion, especially on Arctic seas. Northern Russia, America and Asia (with transit via Siberian particularly the Barents Sea area, has the largest airports) is another promising transport project. concentration of nuclear installations – both Circumpolar air traic is already growing four military and civilian – in the world. More than times faster than the global average (Kross- 80 nuclear submarines with over 200 nuclear Polyarny Express 2008). reactors were located there at one time (Ahunov 2000, 73). he operational risks of reactors at nuclear power plants in the RAZ (some are the ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS same RBMK model used at Chernobyl) also present a serious threat to the population and a large Moscow is deeply concerned about the envi- area of Russia and Europe. Spent nuclear fuel ronmental situation in the RAZ. As a result of and radioactive waste in Russia is also a wide- intensive industrial and military activities in spread and worrying problem (for more details the region, many Arctic areas are heavily pol- see Heininen and Segerståhl 2002). luted and pose serious health hazards. Russian he RAZ is extremely vulnerable to nuclear scientists identiied 27 so-called impact zones contamination. Tens of thousands of cubic me- RUSSIAN ARCTIC ZONE HOLDS MOST OF THE ARCTIC’S HYDROCARBON RESERVES where pollution has led to environmental deg- ters of highly radioactive nuclear waste have col- radation and increased morbidity among the lo- lected there. Radioactive material from nuclear cal population. he main impact zones include munitions factories in Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk, the Murmansk Region (10% of total pollutants Chelyabinsk used to loat down the great Sibe- in the 27 impact zones), Norilsk urban agglom- rian rivers and into the Arctic Ocean. From 1964 eration (more than 30%), West Siberian oil and to 1991, luid and solid radioactive waste was gas ields (more than 30%) and the Arkhangelsk dumped in the Barents and Kara seas. Accord- Region (around 5%) (Dushkova and Evseev 2011; ing to some reports, the Soviet Union dumped Ekologicheskoe Sostoyanie Impactnykh Raionov 13 nuclear reactors in the Kara Sea (including 2012). In sum, about 15% of the RAZ territory is 6 with nuclear fuel). hree reactors and a con- DISTRIBUTION OF THE UNDISCOVERED HYDROCARBON RESOURCES AMONG THE ARCTIC COASTAL STATES, % Oil Natural gas Russia 41 Russia 70 U.S. (Alaska) 28 U.S. (Alaska) 14 Greenland (Denmark) 18 Greenland (Denmark) 8 Canada 9 Canada 4 Norway 4 Norway 4 Source: http://sdo.rea.ru/cde/conference/3/file.php?fileId=54 11 THE MAP OF IMPACT ZONE IN THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC BARENTS SEA 1 Murmansk Vorkuta 2 6 NENETS AUTONOMOUS OKRUG Monchegorsk Kandalaksha 3 MURMANSK OBLAST Inta Pechora WHITE SEA 4 Arkhangelsk REPUBLIC OF KARELIA Ukhta KOMI REPUBLIC ARKHANGELSK OBLAST Syktyvkar 5 Petrozavodsk Kotlas 1. Western Kola 3. Khibinsky 5. Kotlassky 2. Central Kola 4. Arkhangelsky 6. Vorkutinsky Source: Ekologicheskoe sostoyanie impaktnikh rayonov sushi arkticheskoy zoni Rossiyskoy Federacii (2010) Severnash.ru tainer with nuclear waste from the ice-breaker peoples is listed among the strategic priorities of Lenin were also allegedly dumped in the sea. Ra- Russia’s 2008 Arctic strategy (Medvedev 2008), dioactive waste amounted to 319,000 curie in the and further elaborated on in a special document, Barents Sea and 2,419,000 curie in the Kara Sea the Concept for the Sustainable Development (Ekologicheskoe Sostoyanie Impactnykh Raionov of Small Indigenous Population Groups of the 2012; Gizewski, 1995: 25–41). Although Russia has North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian stopped dumping, the remaining nuclear waste Federation, which was released in February in the Arctic is still a serious problem for the 2009. he document, also called Concept-2009, country. With the help of Western partners (es- describes the measures taken by federal and re- pecially the Norwegians) Russia is implementing gional authorities in the preceding 15 years, such a number of nuclear waste treatment projects in as federal and regional targeted programs, legis- the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions. lation containing various forms of government support (e.g. incentives, subsidies, and quotas on the use of biological resources), and Russia’s ac- INDIGENOUS PEOPLE tive participation in the International Decade of the World’s Indigenous People (1995–2004) and Twenty seven indigenous ethnic groups, totaling the Second International Decade of the World’s about 200,000 people, live in the RAZ (Savel’eva Indigenous People (2005–2015). and Savel’ev 2010, 75). Improving the quality of life and economic opportunities for indigenous At the same time, Concept-2009 recognizes the serious social and economic problems fac12 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Polar bear at the Alexandra Land island. Franz josef Land archipelago 13 ing its indigenous peoples (the incompatibility zation, the Russian Association of Indigenous of their traditional way of life with current eco- Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East nomic conditions, low competitiveness of tradi- (RAIPON). RAIPON has called for support from tional economic activities, rising disease rates, a international organizations such as the UN and high infant mortality rate, alcoholism, etc.). he AC, blaming the Russian government for violat- unemployment rate among Russia’s indigenous ing the basic rights of the country’s indigenous people has been estimated at 30–60%, which is people. As a result of these eforts, RAIPON’s 3–4 time higher that among other RAZ resi- legal registration was suspended by the Rus- dents (Kochemasov et al. 2009). Life expectancy sian Ministry of justice in 2012, and the group is as low as 49 years, compared to over 60 years had to undergo the rather onerous procedure of on average throughout Russia. re-registering and “cleansing” its leadership of Concept-2009 stated that its implementation should foster favorable conditions for the sus- “disloyal elements.” his conlict has impeded the further implementation of Concept-2009. tainable development of the indigenous peoples, for example by raising the quality of life to the average in Russia and by halving the infant STRATEGIC-MILITARY IMPORTANCE mortality rate by 2025 compared to 2007 levels. However, implementation of Concept-2009 Russian perceptions of the Arctic are largely has fallen short of these goals, resulting in harsh based on security considerations. Russia contin- criticism by Russia’s main indigenous organi- ues to regard the Kola Peninsula and adjacent NORTHERN RUSSIA HAS THE LARGEST CONCENTRATION OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS – BOTH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN – IN THE WORLD. THE RAZ IS EXTREMELY VULNERABLE TO NUCLEAR CONTAMINATION he Evenki girl 14 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Large antisubmarine ship «North Sea» at the pier in the port of Severomorsk waters as a military area of particular impor- (especially Norway) want to undermine Rus- tance to national security. Several of the area’s sia’s position and reduce its presence in the features – such the direct access it provides to region by stepping up their own presence in the Atlantic Ocean and the Arctic, its relative the Arctic. hey stress that Russian conven- proximity to potential targets, and an array of tional and strategic forces in the North are still important defense industry and infrastructure facing NATO just across the border. NATO’s facilities located there – make it well suited for military exercises in the immediate proximity strategic naval operations. he strategic impor- of Russian borders, however small in scale, are tance of the North is above all connected to the watched with deep suspicion by the Russian sea-based nuclear forces deployed in the region. side, which also takes an alarmist attitude to- Russia’s nuclear deterrent remains not only ward the military modernization programs of a key element of its security policy and military other Arctic coastal states. strategy, but serves also as a symbol and guar- Russian strategists are also concerned about antee of Russia’s great power status (see Kony- future U.S./NATO plans in the Arctic (UPI 2009). shev and Sergunin, forthcoming). Maintaining If the Arctic becomes ice-free for at least part nuclear capabilities has, therefore, been given of the year in the near future, Russian military the highest priority in the modernization of analysts do not exclude the possibility that Russia’s defenses (Zysk 2008, 81). the United States could permanently deploy he bigger picture, however, is the Arctic a nuclear submarine leet and sea-based ABM states have made only limited eforts to mod- systems in the Arctic Ocean with the capabil- ernize, increase and/or change their equip- ity to intercept Russian ballistic missiles and ment, force levels and structure since the early launch a preventive strike. Recent U.S. mili- 21st century (Wezeman 2012). After the end tary strategy in the Arctic (U.S. Department of of the Cold War, the Arctic was consciously Defense 2013) validates Russian concerns about transformed from a military theatre to a zone Washington’s plans in this region. For these of cooperation and peace through the stability- reasons, many Russian strategists recommend building measures of the West, which ulti- the Kremlin not only to maintain its strategic mate sought to decrease military tension and forces at the present level but also to regularly increase mutual conidence. modernize them. Both Russian politicians and the Russian To conclude, Russia has substantial rea- military frequently allege that political and sons to seek a leading role in the Arctic. It has military pressure from the U.S. and NATO important economic, social, environmental in the High North has increased. hey argue and military-strategic interests in the region, that the U.S. and some other NATO countries which Russian oicials have vowed to defend. 15 RUSSIA’S ARCTIC DOCTRINES The Russian Federation was among the first STRATEGY-2008 Arctic states to formulate an Arctic strategy. Only Norway was ahead of Russia in shaping On September 18, 2008, President Medvedev its official High North Strategy in 2006, while approved the Foundations of the State Policy Denmark and Greenland launched a draft of the Russian Federation in the Arctic to 2020 version of their joint Strategy for Activities and Beyond (Medvedev 2008). he six-page in the Arctic Region in May 2008 (Heininen document enumerates Russian national inter- 2011, 17 and 35). As early as june 14, 2001, the ests in the region: developing the resources of Russian Cabinet had already approved a draft the Arctic; turning the Northern Sea Route into document titled Foundations of the State a uniied national transport corridor and line of Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic communication; and maintaining the region as (Government of the Russian Federation 2001) a zone of international cooperation. According which outlines Russia’s national interests to Russia’s plans for the multifaceted develop- and main strategies in the Arctic. But it took ment of its northern territories, somewhere another seven years (and another president) between 2016 and 2020 the Arctic is expected to develop a final version of Russia’s Arctic to become Russia’s “leading strategic resource strategy. base.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, foreground, speaks during the plenary session of the hird International Arctic Forum «he Arctic – Territory of Dialogue» held in Salekhard СЕВЕР РОССИИ ИМЕЕТ САМУЮ БОЛЬШУЮ КОНЦЕНТРАЦИЮ ЯДЕРНЫХ УСТАНОВОК В МИРЕ, КАК ВОЕННЫХ, ТАК И ГРАЖДАНСКИХ. АРКТИЧЕСКАЯ ЗОНА НАИБОЛЕЕ УЯЗВИМА В ОТНОШЕНИИ РАДИОАКТИВНОГО ЗАРАЖЕНИЯ 16 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Russia’s strategic security goal for the doctrinal/conceptual basis for the RAZ’s sus- region is defined as “ensuring a favorable tainable development, i.e. it is designed for do- operational regime in the Arctic zone of the mestic rather than international consumption. Reactions to Strategy-2013 have varied in the Russian Federation, including maintenance of the necessary combat capabilities of gener- Russian and international expert community. To its credit, Strategy-2013 is much more al-purpose troops (forces) of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other troops, realistic (even pessimistic in some cases) than military formations, and military agencies Strategy-2008. In fact, it acknowledges that the in this region.” This involves strengthening main objectives of the previous strategy were the Coastal Defense Service of the Federal not achieved in the irst phase of 2008–2010 Security Service and border controls in the and should be reformulated for the future. Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, and For instance, it tasks all actors involved with establishing technical control at straits and crafting a federal program for the sustainable river estuaries along the entire Northern Sea socioeconomic development of the RAZ and Route. Thus, the Arctic Group of Forces is completing all the preparatory work to launch charged not simply with defending territory it by 2015, not 2010 as the old strategy required. but also with protecting Russia’s economic Moreover, the document acknowledges that interests in the region. In turn, this could re- Russia lacks the necessary resources and tech- quire increasing the strike capabilities of the nologies to exploit the RAZ’s natural resources Northern Fleet. on its own and needs foreign investment and RUSSIA HAS SUBSTANTIAL REASONS TO SEEK A LEADING ROLE IN THE ARCTIC. IT HAS IMPORTANT ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND MILITARY-STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE REGION STRATEGY-2013 high-tech assistance to develop its Far North. he new strategy also relects the fact that Rus- On February 20, 2013, the Strategy for the sia was unable to complete geophysical research Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian on the external limits of Russia’s continental Federation (Putin 2013) was approved by Presi- shelf by 2010 (as required by Strategy-2008) and dent Vladimir Putin, which revised and updated sets the more realistic goal of completing this Strategy-2008. work by 2015. Strategy-2013 is naturally more detailed It should be noted that this document does not fully relect Russia’s Arctic doctrine, as than Strategy-2008, as it was explicitly de- it covers only the RAZ rather than the whole signed to elaborate and build on the earlier Arctic region. In this sense, it is comparable strategy. For example, it contains a crude SWOT to the Canadian and Norwegian strategies for analysis of the RAZ and a rather detailed list of the development of their northern territories. policy priorities, as well as a description of the Strategy-2013 has some international dimen- mechanisms and instruments to be used in the sions, including, for example, Moscow’s inten- course of executing the strategy. tion to legally delimit Russia’s continental shelf It also introduces the long-awaited idea of in the Arctic Ocean and ile a new application making the RAZ a separate federal entity with to the UN Commission on the Limits of the its own monitoring system, relecting the spe- Continental Shelf, as well as its emphasis on the ciics of the RAZ and the need to deal with the need for international cooperation in areas such region on an individual basis. as the exploration and exploitation of natural Unlike the previous document, Strategy-2013 resources, environmental protection, preserva- envisions an important role for regional and tion of indigenous people’s traditional economy local governments as well as private business and culture, etc. However, the main objective of (public-private partnerships). he document the document is, irst and foremost, to provide a describes in detail how to engage both regional 17 THE MELTING ARCTIC ICECAP September 2003 (minimal levels match previous years) September 2012 (all-time low for recorded observations) CANADA CANADA GREENLAND GREENLAND U.S. (DENMARK) (DENMARK) U.S. North Pole North Pole RUSSIA RUSSIA September 2013 Changing Arctic icecap area (mln sq. km) 14 13 CANADA 12 GREENLAND 11 (DENMARK) U.S. 10 9 8 North Pole 7 6 5 4 3 RUSSIA 2 Ice thickness >1 m Ice thickness <1 m Jun 2013 Jul 2012 1981–2000 Average Aug 2011 2010 Sep 2009 Oct 2008 ±2 Standard Deviations Sources: Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute, US National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) It is also noteworthy that Russia’s new RAZ and local governments and business in ambitious Arctic projects. Strategy-2013 also pays much more atten- strategy is much more open to international cooperation in the interests of solving the tion to environmental problems in the Arctic. numerous problems in the Arctic and ensuring he document establishes a set of priorities for the sustainable development of the region as a Russian environmental policies in the RAZ and whole. Like its predecessor, Strategy-2013 em- pledges a signiicant inancial contribution to phasizes Russia’s sovereignty over the RAZ and future environmental projects in the region. Northern Sea Route, and calls for the defense A clear advantage of the new strategy is of the country’s national interests in the area. its efort to introduce an indicator system of However, coupled with this rather traditional monitoring socioeconomic and security devel- stance is an impressive list of priority areas opments in the RAZ. he Strategy-2008 was for cooperation with potential international rather abstract and declaratory in nature, and partners. As a result, Strategy-2013 received a was essentially devoid of speciic parameters or more positive international reception than the indices. previous document. 18 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War But Strategy-2013 has also met with criticisms. To begin with, it does not clearly deine ing Arctic countries might be ofended by Russia’s word choice. the RAZ, which is unusual for this type of docu- In contrast with Strategy-2008, Strat- ment and stands in contrast to both Strat- egy-2013 does not describe Russia’s national egy-2008 and the draft of the new Russian RAZ interests in the RAZ. In light of the special Rus- strategy, which was originally designed by the sian Security Council meeting on protecting the expert organization North-Western Strategic national interests of the Russian Federation in Partnership (NWSP 2011). Whether the authors the Arctic (September 17, 2008), the new doc- of Strategy-2013 decided to skip the deinition trine was expected to improve and elaborate on because it was already introduced in the 2008 Strategy-2008’s section on national interests, version, or whether they did not deine the which was rather vague and fragmentary. How- RAZ’s domestic and international boundaries ever, Strategy-2013 only periodically invokes because they wanted a free hand in this delicate Russia’s national interests in the Arctic without sphere is open to debate. specifying or systemically describing them. he terminology is equally vague with regard As noted, the document begins with a crude to how Arctic actors are deined. he docu- SWOT analysis of the RAZ. However, in contrast ment uses the terms “priarkticheskie” (literally with the NWSP draft which contained a proper sub-Arctic) and “pribrezhnye” (coastal) states SWOT analysis in its inal version, Strategy-2013 to denote the key Arctic players. While there lists only RAZ’s weak points and risks rather is no confusion about the concept of a coastal than its competitive advantages. As a result, one state, “priarkticheskie” is less clear. Is it simply wonders whether the RAZ has any strong points synonymous with coastal states (as we learned at all. from Strategy-2008), or does it mean the eight Some priorities and speciic projects men- permanent members of the Arctic Council (ive tioned in Strategy-2013 are not in line with oth- coastal states + Finland, Iсeland and Sweden)? If er Arctic states’ policies. For example, Moscow’s only the Arctic-5 are meant, the three remain- intention to solve the RAZ’s energy problems by Projection of the lags of all countries that took part in the Olympic torch relay in the North Pole 19 A Russian scientist drills ice to obtain an ice sample at the Barneo Ice Station near the North Pole building a series of loating nuclear power sta- even irrelevant. For example, what is the beneit tions contradicts EU plans to move away from of counting the number of maritime research nuclear power and has alarmed environmental- expeditions in the RAZ or the share of modern ists concerned about fragile Arctic ecosystems. weaponry in the military equipment deployed It is unclear why Strategy-2013 classiies the in this area? Such a technocratic/instrumental- need to complete hydrographic work to deine ist approach is hardly helpful in developing an the RAZ’s external borders as a matter of mili- eicient monitoring system in the RAZ. tary security (clause 18e). Normally, such work is To conclude, Strategy-2013, while not a com- intended to designate the limits of an exclusive prehensive doctrine, is a good starting point for economic zone, not for military purposes. further discussions of Russia’s Arctic policies. he idea to introduce an indicator system to To become an efective national strategy for the monitor various aspects of the RAZ’s develop- region, it should be further clariied and instru- ment is a good one. But it lacks consistency and mentalized in a series of federal laws, regula- some of the indicators mentioned are strange or tions and programs. 20 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War ASSESSING THE PROBLEMS OF THE RUSSIAN ARCTIC 21 2. RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH MAjOR ARCTIC PLAYERS One of the strategic priorities of Russia’s 2008 sia to build a policy of cooperation with such policy in the Arctic is to strengthen bilateral inluential countries as the United States. Is relationships both within regional organizations, there any potential for such cooperation? Or is such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro- the U.S. focused on pursuing a unilateral course Arctic Council, and with other Arctic states, as well of action in the region? as the European Union. Russia’s bilateral relations with the main Arctic actors consist of four major What does the Arctic mean for the U.S.? he “circles” – (1) the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean Arctic coast of the United States is in Alaska, (the Arctic-5); (2) three sub-Arctic countries (the whose continental shelf contains about 31% of rest of the Arctic-8: Finland, Iceland and Sweden); the undiscovered oil reserves in the entire Arctic, (3) non-Arctic states (East Asian countries such or 27 billion barrels. Gas is also expected to be as China, japan and South Korea), and (4) inter- found there but in much smaller quantities (U.S. national organizations and forums dealing with Geological Survey 2008). Arctic issues (primarily the UN, AC, BEAC and Based on recent U.S. Arctic doctrine (Na- Nordic institutions). he analysis below addresses tional Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013; Russia’s policies towards key Arctic players, as U.S. Department of Defense 2013), American well as the most important supranational actors, interests in the region can be divided into NATO and the European Union. several groups. First, it has military-strategic interests, including missile defense and early warning systems; deployment of sea and air U.S. – RUSSIA systems for strategic sealift; strategic deterrence; maritime presence and maritime secu- With increased competition for the natural rity operations; and ensuring freedom of navi- resources of the Arctic, it is important for Rus- gation and overlight. Washington is prepared 22 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH THE MAIN ARCTIC ACTORS 1 Coastal states of the Arctic Ocean (the Arctic-5) U.S., Canada, Denmark, Norway 2 Sub-Arctic countries (the rest of the Arctic-8) Finland, Iceland and Sweden 3 non-Arctic states China, Japan, South Korea etc. 4 International organizations and fora dealing with the Arctic issues UN, AC, BEAC, Nordic institutions В В N GD ED UN IT SP AI KI N N А LAN O M А D А В В RE APO PO SING KOREA В А CAN A AR D NM RW EN DE ED А NO LA AN В EL А C N N SW IC FI В PA В JA А А А C A HIN А C В В В INDIA А TH А SOU А C C C А COUNTRIES GERMANY А В ‘CIRCLES’ № ES D AY TO N L IA V AT С IA LIT K С A HU FRA DA А U.S . NIA NCE ITALY А RUSSIA С А В А В NETHERLANDS А В А Arctic Council В Barents Euro-Arctic Council C Nordic Council Observers to act unilaterally if necessary in defense of rights in its exclusive economic zone and exer- these interests. cise “appropriate control” over the contiguous Second, the United States has a national waters; maintaining freedom of trans-Arctic security interest in preventing terrorist attacks overlights and freedom of navigation through- or other criminal acts that increase its vulner- out the Arctic – including the Northern Sea ability in the Arctic region. Route which passes by Russian territory – have hird, the United States has political and also been declared top national priorities. economic interests – above all, expanding its Many experts have noted how Washington’s presence and activity in the region to bolster its motivation in the Far North has changed. Dur- sea power. While remaining within the limits ing the Cold War, the Arctic was predominantly of its jurisdiction in the Arctic, Washington in- an area of military and strategic confrontation tends to do more than just protect its sovereign with the Soviet Union, whereas now economic 23 interests – access to oil and gas resources in the in the Arctic. According to experts, relations Arctic – are the primary goal. are based on the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the “Arctic ive” in May 2008, which recognizes Between rivalry and cooperation. here are the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 as both overt and concealed diferences between the legal basis for drawing borders, and states the United States and Russia on Arctic issues. that the parties intend to resolve problems Like many other countries, the United States through negotiations. In keeping with Barack seeks to deine the status of the Northern Sea Obama’s stated desire to reset relations with Route, running along the Arctic coast of Russia, Russia, there were statements, including by the as international. his would not only cost Russia president himself and the secretary of state, on signiicant revenue from the use of the route by U.S. intentions to cooperate with Russia in the other countries, it would increase Russia’s mili- Arctic. However, it is likely that cooperation will tary and strategic vulnerability from the north. be limited to those areas where the U.S. cannot Moscow and Washington also see the leading do without Russian participation, particularly regional organization, the Arctic Council, dif- search and rescue operations in the Arctic, ferently. Russia is interested in expanding the which was addressed in an international agree- power of the Council, while the U.S. considers it ment signed under the auspices of the Arctic only a forum for discussion and opposes grant- Council in May 2011. ing it the status of an international organization with the authority to make binding decisions. here are also plans for large-scale cooperation to develop the natural resources of the DURING THE COLD WAR, THE ARCTIC WAS PREDOMINANTLY AN AREA OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHEREAS NOW ECONOMIC INTERESTS – ACCESS TO OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN THE ARCTIC – ARE THE PRIMARY GOAL he United States also strongly supports RAZ. In April 2012 Russia’s Rosneft and the U.S. strengthening NATO’s presence in the Arctic in company Exxon-Mobil signed an agreement a bid to push out other international/regional on cooperation in the exploration and develop- organizations, such as the Arctic Council and ment of oil and gas deposits in the Kara Sea. the BEAC (in which the U.S. is not a member). Russia beneits from this arrangement by Given the current state of relations between attracting the necessary inancial resources Russia and NATO, this would have negative (Exxon-Mobil has a capitalization of $400 bil- consequences for Russia, which has no reliable lion) and modern technologies for exploration allies in the Arctic. and drilling in northern latitudes. Rosneft and Until the U.S. ratiies the UN Convention on ConocoPhillips, an American multinational the Law of the Sea, there remains the possibility energy corporation, are also developing the of worsening disputes with Russia over borders promising Ardalinskoye ield in the Nenets in Arctic seas and over the continental shelf Autonomous Area. boundary. he United States already opposes Rus- Another opportunity for bilateral coop- sia’s attempts to expand its zone of the shelf to eration is the development of circumpolar air the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges. Russia’s routes, which involves building and maintain- application to the UN Commission on the Limits ing communications infrastructure, as well as of the Continental Shelf was rejected in 2001 due upgrading existing airports in Russia and build- to State Department pressure. Russia has not ing new ones. ratiied the treaty with the U.S. on the Bering Sea boundary line (see section on territorial disputes). Despite these tensions, U.S.-Russian relations have signiicant potential for cooperation Cooperation between the United States and Russia in the ield of Arctic research and environment protection remains mutually beneicial. Obviously, any decisions relating to the eco24 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War nomic development of the Far North should be crisis has caused a general decline in U.S.-Rus- based on scientiic analysis of the vulnerability of sian bilateral relations and led the U.S. to unilat- northern ecosystems and the diicult weather, erally suspend cooperation with Russia in several social, domestic and other conditions. Russia has areas, including military-to-military contacts a leet of icebreakers to contribute and enormous and CSBMs development. Second, it will depend experience with Arctic expeditions. on the success of Russia’s economic policy in the In the military-political sphere, the two Arctic, which seeks to attract foreign investment parties should pursue conidence and security- and technology. Some positive steps have already building measures in the region. Such CSBMs been taken in this regard. hird, it will depend could include advance warning of deployments on whether the U.S. sticks to its present course of naval forces in “sensitive” zones, as well as of predominantly unilateral action in the region limiting the U.S. and Russian military presence (reiterated by recent U.S. doctrine), or opts for in the Arctic. multilateral cooperation instead. At present, it is diicult to predict how relations between the United States and Russia in the Arctic will evolve. his will depend, irst, on CANADA-RUSSIA the general mood in Russian-American relations, which is susceptible to change in the domestic Canada’s interests in the Arctic. he Canadian situation in one or both countries or interna- sector of the Arctic is the second largest (25%) af- tional crisis. For example, the ongoing Ukrainian ter the Russian sector (40%), and Canada is one RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE U.S. STICKS TO ITS PRESENT COURSE OF PREDOMINANTLY UNILATERAL ACTION IN THE REGION, OR OPTS FOR MULTILATERAL COOPERATION INSTEAD U.S.’s USS Normandy (CG-60) cruiser 25 of ive coastal Arctic states that – in accordance ice-free, it could theoretically ofer comparable with international law – have preferences in economic beneits as the Northern Sea Route economic activity on the Arctic shelf. around Russia’s Arctic coast, though in practice Canada’s main interest in the Arctic is to it is much more diicult and demanding to exploit its vast natural resources such as oil navigate. Compared to the Panama Canal, how- and gas. Along with conventional oil and gas ever, the NWP provides a signiicantly shorter deposits, the coastal area of the Canadian route from East Asia to Europe and the east Arctic has huge reserves of methane hydrate. coast of the United States and Canada. More- If commercial production is launched, these over, transit fees are not imposed. reserves would last for several hundred years. Ottawa’s policy priorities in the Arctic were Nevertheless, about a third of Canada’s proven outlined in a document titled Canada’s North- oil and gas reserves are not in use yet. Safe ern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our technologies have not yet been developed, and Future (2009). Canada does not conduct drilling on its Arctic shelf. he mechanism for insurance coverage in Territorial disputes. Along with Russia and the event of a major accident or a threat to the Denmark, Canada is seeking to extend the environment has not been worked out either. In limits of its shelf to the underwater Lomonosov addition to oil and gas resources, the Canadian Ridge by iling a request with the UN Commis- North has signiicant reserves of valuable min- sion on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at erals such as diamonds, copper, zinc, mercury, the end of 2013. In order to demonstrate that gold, rare earth metals and uranium. this ridge is an extension of the North American Another of Ottawa’s priorities in the Arctic continental shelf, a U.S.-Canadian shelf survey region is ensuring the sustainable socioeco- was conducted in 2008–2009 north of Alaska nomic and environmental development of the onto the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridge and eastward Canadian North. toward the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Russia Should polar ice continue to melt, the North- is preparing a similar request (the irst request, west Passage (NWP), over which Canada claims iled in 2001, was unsuccessful). So, Russia and control, will only grow. If the NWP becomes Canada are at odds on this issue. Construction of the Bovanenko-Ukhta gas mains system 26 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War he Lomonosov Ridge is not Ottawa’s only for twenty years. However, the purpose of territorial dispute with its Arctic neighbors. these ighters in the Arctic is unclear. he Canada is also challenging Denmark for owner- F-35 is designed to perform tactical missions ship of the 1.3 km2 uninhabited Hans Island, in support of ground operations, bombing and the borderline in the Lincoln Sea. Canada and close air combat. However, none of the is also in a dispute with the United States over Arctic players has plans to land troops in the the maritime border in the Beaufort Sea, which Canadian North, and a couple of old Russian potentially has oil and gas, as well as over the bombers conducting mostly training lights status of the Northwest Passage (Canada insists to Canada’s air border do not constitute a on its sovereign rights to this passage, while serious threat. According to experts from the the U.S. considers it international waters). Canadian Defense and Foreign Afairs Insti- However, these arguments are not considered tute, these purchases are more likely intended serious enough to prevent Russian cooperation as a security guarantee for the future than with these countries, including in the military- a response to current challenges. According political sphere. to diferent estimates, Canada must address other crucial tasks: patrol aircraft for coast Canada’s increased military activity in the monitoring and a robust naval capacity. hese Arctic. In an efort to catch up in the ield of and other initiatives have led to a doubling Arctic military security, Ottawa has in recent of Canada’s total military spending since late years set its sights on expanding its military 1990s (Blunden 2009, 127). THE MAjORITY OF CANADIANS SEE ASSERTING THE COUNTRY’S SOVEREIGN RIGHTS IN THE ARCTIC AS THE COUNTRY’S NUMBER ONE FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY presence in the region. For example, it plans to Since 2008, Canada has been conducting build a military training center on the banks of regular exercises of its armed forces in the the Northwest Passage in the town of Resolute Arctic, as well as joint exercises with other Bay (595 km from the North Pole) and maritime countries. he stated purpose is to protect infrastructure. To strengthen the capacity of Canadian sovereignty in the Far North. Canada the Coast Guard, the country plans to build has no plans to invite Russia to participate in deep-water berths (in the city of Nanisivik), a such exercises. Canada, the U.S. and Denmark new icebreaker named Diefenbaker, and three are not only conducting joint exercises in the patrol vessels capable of operating in ice. he Arctic, but are also performing patrol func- latest Canadian space satellite RADARSAT-2, the tions and practicing rescue operations on the joint Canadian-American system NORAD, and waters. the intelligence signals interceptor station in Nevertheless, Russian experts caution the town of Ehlert (Ellesmere Island, Canadian against overestimating the importance of these Arctic Archipelago) will all be used to moni- Canadian military preparations, which are tor Arctic territory. he forces of the Canadian more a demonstration of Canada’s readiness to Rangers were modernized and increased from defend its economic interests and respond to 4,000 (2007) to more than 5,000 people by the “unconventional” (non-military) challenges in end of 2013.1 hey are largely recruited from the the region than actual preparation for a large- local indigenous populations and expected to scale military conlict. he Canadians have monitor and carry out search and rescue opera- neither the desire for a large-scale military tions in the Arctic. conlict nor the logistical capabilities to execute In 2010, the Canadian government an- one. Ottawa intends to continue relying on the nounced the purchase of 65 new F-35 Light- United States for strategic defense, as this is the ning II ighters from the U.S. for a total of most beneicial arrangement both inancially $16 billion, including aircraft maintenance and functionally. 27 Herd of deer in Nenets Autonomous Area Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Oil rig in Rosneft’s ield, Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Area 30 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War in the Arctic Council in which Canada curhe inluence of domestic factors on Ot- rently presides. tawa’s Arctic policy. Unfortunately, Canada’s Northern Strategy is often held hostage to Prospects of Russian-Canadian coopera- domestic political wrangling. Politicians in ev- tion in the Arctic. Despite the fact that Russia ery camp know that the majority of Canadians and Canada are competitors in the process of see asserting the country’s sovereign rights in dividing the Arctic, they adhere to some general the Arctic as the country’s number one foreign principles that suggest that cooperation is pos- policy priority. According to opinion polls, 40% sible even in this problematic area. he legal basis for Russian-Canadian re- of Canadians support taking a “hard line” on this issue. Canadian conservatives most often lations includes the Political Agreement on play the “Arctic card” in elections. For example, Consent and Cooperation of june 19, 1992, and the campaign rhetoric of Conservative Party a series of economic agreements: Promotion leader and current Prime Minister of Canada and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1991); Stephen Harper is frequently anti-Russian and Trade and Commercial Relations (1992); Eco- pro-American. Naturally, this is not conducive nomic Cooperation (1993); Avoidance of Double to improving relations between Moscow and Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion Ottawa on Arctic issues. with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital he recent Ukrainian crisis (with some help (1995); Air Communication; Principles and Bases from the pro-Ukrainian lobby in Canada) has of Cooperation Between the Federal Districts of touched of a strong anti-Russian campaign the Russian Federation and the provinces and in Canada, especially in Canadian media. he territories of Canada (2000); Cooperation in the Canadian government was the irst to intro- Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (2007). duce sanctions against Russia, which had a here are a number of documents that spillover efect on Ottawa’s relations with Rus- directly address Arctic issues. For example, the sia in the Arctic region, temporarily freezing joint Russian-Canadian Statement on Coop- political dialogue between the two countries eration in the Arctic and the North, signed on A caravan escorted by icebreakers following along the Northern Sea Route 31 Despite the potential for conlict, Russia December 18, 2000, outlined the main aspects of bilateral cooperation in the region. In No- and Canada have numerous opportunities to vember 2007, during a visit to Canada, the Rus- establish Arctic cooperation in the following sian prime minister signed a number of sectoral areas. agreements on Russian-Canadian cooperation in the Arctic, the peaceful use of atomic energy, Trade and economic cooperation. he North- agriculture, isheries, veterinary and phytosani- ern Air Bridge project involves the creation of tary control, and in the inancial sphere. an integrated communications system in the Apart from the legal framework, the in- Arctic (for example, by launching satellites stitutional framework of Russian-Canadian into highly elliptical orbits and developing the relations is also growing stronger. In 1995, the necessary ground infrastructure) to ensure air Russia-Canada Intergovernmental Economic communication between the airports in Kras- Commission (IEC) was created. he IEC con- noyarsk and Winnipeg. Another project, Arctic sists of an industrial agriculture subcommit- Bridge, involves trans-polar shipping between tee and working groups on construction, fuel the ports of Murmansk and Churchill. and energy, mining, the Arctic and the North. he largest joint investment projects in the As of today, nine IEC meetings have been held. Russian Arctic are: he last regular meeting of the IEC was held on • 17 june 2013 in Moscow. In addition, the Russian-Canadian working group on cooperation in the ield of climate change has been operating since September October 2005. It includes working groups on Dvoynoe gold ields in Chukotka (Kinross Gold company); • 2002 (formally outside the IEC). he CanadaRussia Business Council (CRBC) was created in purchase and development of the Kupol and development of the Mangazeyskoe silverpolymetallic ield in Yakutia (Prognoz CjSC/ Silver Bear Resources); • design and supply of equipment for the third phase of the construction of the agriculture, mining, energy, information and Koryaga Oil Fields project in the Nenets telecommunications technology, transport, Autonomous Area (Globalstroy Engineering/ inance, and the forest industry. SNC LAVALIN); A model of the American ifth generation ighter jet F-35 Lightning-II developed by Lockheed Martin 32 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Russian President Vladimir Putin, left, and Prime Minister of Canada Stephen Harper • development of the Fedorova Tundra ield Environment. he IEC Arctic and North Work- (Murmansk Region); ing Group is implementing a range of projects • adopting Canadian “cold asphalt” technology under a program entitled “Conservation and in the construction of roads in the extreme Restoration of the Biological Diversity of North- climatic conditions of the Arctic (Yakutia); ern Territories and the Environmental Protec- • design and production of Arctic all-terrain tion, Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture and vehicles based on air-inlated caterpillars; Forestry.” • promoting the deployment of wind-diesel In 2011, the Russian government decided systems capable of operating in the Arctic to allocate in 2011–2013 €10 million for the conditions of the Nenets Autonomous Area, Project Support Instrument (PSI) being created etc. under the auspices of the Arctic Council. hus, a collective fund, which will be used to elimi- Scientiic and technological cooperation. nate sources of environmental pollution and According to the joint Russian-Canadian State- environmental “hot spots” in the Arctic, was ment on Cooperation in Science, Technology launched. A legally binding document on pre- and Innovation, signed on june 2, 2011, the venting and responding to oil spills in the Arctic parties prioritize joint eforts in the areas of region is being drafted under the Arctic Council. energy and energy eiciency, nanotechnology, Among the Council’s major new projects for the biomedical technology, climate research and upcoming period is creating mechanisms for the Arctic. Given its lack of ice-breakers, spe- ecosystem management in the Arctic, integrat- cial vessels for research in sea ice and reliable ed assessment of multilateral factors of changes space-based communications systems, Canada occurring in the region, and trends in human is interested in partnering with Russia to con- development in a changing Arctic. duct joint research in the region. he numerous scientiic and educational projects of Russia and Indigenous peoples. In accordance with the Canada include cooperation between Canadian Russian-Canadian Declaration of Cooperation universities and the Northern (Arctic) Federal in the Arctic (2000), several programs aimed University in Arkhangelsk. at creating favorable living conditions for the 33 indigenous peoples of the North are being program was conducted in the Yamal-Nenets implemented. One such program, Exchange of Autonomous Area, the Khanty-Mansi Autono- Experience in Managing Northern Territories, mous Area, and the Khabarovsk Territory. Pro- launched in 2011, is being carried out with the moting natural resource exploitation and small participation of the Plenipotentiary Represen- business are among the program’s primarily tative of the Russian President in the Siberian humanitarian cooperation projects. Russia and Canada, through the IEC Arctic Federal District and the Canadian Department of Indian Afairs and Northern Development. and North Working Group, are implementing he Institute of Economics and Industrial numerous projects to create for indigenous mi- Engineering (Siberian Branch of the Russian norities a model territory of traditional nature Academy of Sciences) is providing the necessary management, develop traditional local sports, scientiic support. and set up cultural exchanges between the in- From 2006 to 2009, a Russian-Canadian cooperation program for the development of the digenous peoples of the Russian and Canadian North. North was implemented with the participation Under the Arctic Council, Russia is working of the Canadian International Development to establish a public Internet archive of data Agency, the Ministry of Regional Development about the development and culture of the Arctic of the Russian Federation, and a number of (“Electronic Arctic Memory”), supporting young Russian agencies. It addressed issues concern- reindeer breeders of the North, and working ing indigenous minorities in the North. he with organizations of indigenous peoples to DESPITE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, RUSSIA AND CANADA HAVE NUMEROUS OPPORTUNITIES TO ESTABLISH ARCTIC COOPERATION Fiftieth Anniversary of Victory nuclear powered icebreaker 34 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Children of Vainuto family, at their camp in the Nadym District, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area clear the area of sources of environmental pol- Canada are in favor of consolidating the status lution, among other initiatives. of transit sea routes in the Arctic (Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage) as internal wa- Resolving territorial disputes. he prospects ters, which would yield considerable economic for resolution of the existing territorial conlicts beneits to the two countries. are quite promising because the two countries share some common political and legal prin- Cooperation within the Arctic Council. Both ciples. First, the two countries support resolving countries assign a special role to the Arctic disputes through negotiations and on the basis Council, created at Canada’s initiative in 1996. of international law. hat is how Moscow and he main goal of the two countries is to main- Ottawa plan to solve their dispute over the un- tain the Arctic Council as the primary and most derwater Lomonosov Ridge, which is promising important forum for Arctic cooperation and for oil and gas exploration. Secondly, both coun- strengthen the cooperation within the Council. tries support in principle dividing the Arctic on According to Moscow and Ottawa, the Arctic the basis of sectors (drawing direct longitudinal Council is a body where all the major problems lines from the North Pole). he sector method of the Arctic region should be addressed – is more favorable to both countries than the so- from environmental and transport security to called median line method, which would create protecting the rights of the indigenous Arctic regions proportional to each country’s coastline. minorities and cultural cooperation. Applying the sector method would signiicantly Russia and Canada proposed for many years increase the area of the Arctic controlled by that the Arctic Council better deine the status Russia and Canada. However, by signing the of permanent observers for non-Arctic states 2010 Norwegian-Russian agreement on mari- and international organizations. his would time delimitation in the Barents Sea, Moscow both set clear limits on non-Arctic states and has, in fact, acknowledged that the median international organizations in the Arctic, while principle is acceptable as well. hird, Russia and also conirming the priority of the ive Arctic 35 states. his is beneicial both for Russia and for However, despite the current tensions Canada, which have the longest borders in the caused by the Ukrainian crisis, there are Arctic. A document to this efect was drawn grounds to expect Russia and Canada to in- up and signed at the Arctic Council Ministe- tensify mutually beneicial cooperation in the rial Meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, in May 2011, Arctic. helping to streamline the process of granting permanent observer status to non-Arctic states and organizations. he Kiruna Arctic Council RUSSIA-NORWAY Ministerial Meeting (May 15, 2013) decided to grant permanent observer status to six non- As Russia and Norway are both littoral states Arctic states. of the Arctic Ocean and direct neighbors in the European Arctic, they have many overlapping Security. Moscow and Ottawa have taken some interests and goals, as the Norwegian 2006 High steps toward greater cooperation in this sphere. North Strategy shows (Heininen 2011, 39–40). An interdepartmental memorandum on mili- Norwegian-Russian relations were long com- tary cooperation has been in efect since 1994, plicated, however, by the disagreement over which involves visits between high-ranking their maritime border, until in 2010 Norway and military oicials of the two countries. Since Russia signed a treaty on the delimitation of the 2002, Canada has participated in the Global maritime territories in the Barents Sea (see the Partnership program, which resulted in the section on territorial disputes), thus removing signing in 2004 of a Russia-Canada intergov- the most serious obstacle to bilateral cooperation. ernmental agreement on cooperation in the de- his Russian-Norwegian Treaty on the Bar- struction of chemical weapons, dismantlement ents Sea did not, however, settle the question of of nuclear submarines decommissioned from Svalbard, which presents speciic legal prob- the Navy, and accounting, control and physical lems, including the huge diference in taxation protection of nuclear materials and radioactive levels between Norway and the archipelago. substances. Canada announced it was allocat- Russian companies accessing the Svalbard con- ing one billion Canadian dollars over ten years tinental shelf should enjoy the same rights as ($100 million Canadian dollars annually) for this the Norwegian companies, which would trans- purpose. Most of these projects are being imple- late to taxes of less than 1% of the cost of the mented in the Russian Subarctic. hydrocarbons produced. But as Russian lawyer Building on Ottawa’s policy of demilitariz- Alexander Oreshenkov explained, “If a deposit ing the Arctic, Russia should consider Canada’s beginning within the limits of the archipelago’s initiative to ban nuclear weapons in the region. territory extends beyond its territorial waters, Russia has responded positively to this initiative the Russian companies will be expected to ob- (Moscow raised a similar idea under Mikhail serve the norms of Norway’s continental main- Gorbachev), but has questions about the geo- land petroleum legislation, whereby 78% of the graphical scope of such a zone. Russia supports earnings from hydrocarbons produced outside making the Arctic a nuclear-free zone, provided Norway’s territorial waters will go to the Nor- this would not afect the stationing of troops wegian treasury as tax payments” (Oreshenkov and the activities of the Russian Northern Fleet, 2010). hese inancial stakes are bound to be at two-thirds of which consists of nuclear-armed the core of future negotiations. strategic submarines. In recent years, Russian-Canadian coop- he Russian presence on Spitsbergen remains a cause for conlict. Plans to build a eration has been growing in the ield of “soft ish-processing plant, which would compete security” (new threats and challenges posed by with Norwegian irms, were not well received. climate change and expanding economic activ- In recent months, the Norwegian governor of ity in the Arctic). Issues such as maritime safety, Spitsbergen has taken a whole series of re- pollution, illegal migration, transnational strictive measures: he has expanded nature organized crime and terrorism are increasingly conservation zones to which access by Russian taking center stage. scientists and tourists is restricted or pro- It should be noted, that Canadian-Russian hibited, he has required helicopters to obtain security cooperation has been suspended as a advance permission before landing, and has result of the crisis in Ukraine. introduced regulations for all scientiic projects 36 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War ARCTIC COUNCIL The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic. Established in 1996. Permanent Participants Member States Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) Denmark Iceland Canada Norway Russia U.S.A. Finland Sweden Aleut International Association (AIA) Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) Saami Council Gwich'in Council International (GCI) Working Groups Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) Expert Groups Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) Task Forces Observers United Kingdom Republic of India Italian Republic The Netherlands Republic of Singapore Republic of Korea Germany Spain People's Republic of China Poland France State of Japan Intergovernmental and Inter-Parliamentary Organizations Non-government organizations International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) Advisory Committee on Protection of the Seas (ACOPS) International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Arctic Cultural Gateway Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) Association of World Reindeer Herders (AWRH) Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO) Circumpolar Conservation Union (CCU) North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA) of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH) United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Northern Forum (NF) United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) University of the Arctic (UArctic) World Wide Fund for Nature-Global Arctic Program (WWF) Source: www.arctic-council.org to be registered in a speciic database. When trawlers by the Norwegian navy have become the Russian side responded to these measures more frequent. As Russia does not recognize by denying Norwegian scientists investigating the aforementioned decision by Norway and biological resources in the Barents Sea access to considers this area open to international the Russian economic zone, this was viewed as economic activity, in 2004 Russia’s Northern a discriminatory act. Fleet started regular patrols of the waters Norway continues to object to Russian around Spitsbergen. Norway particularly ishing around Spitsbergen. Since Norway objected to this move, viewing it as a sign of introduced a 200-mile economic zone around Russian imperial ambitions and of Moscow’s the archipelago, it has regarded such ish- unwillingness to cooperate with Oslo to settle ing as poaching. Forcible arrests of Russian territorial and economic disputes. Norway also 37 Franz josef Land in the Arctic Ocean Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War RUSSIA-DENMARK has claims to part of the Arctic shelf, but these claims are much more modest than those of other states. As leading energy suppliers in Europe, Considered a coastal state due to Greenland, Denmark has high stakes in the Arctic. In its there is a good foundation for a strategic part- 2011 Arctic strategy the Kingdom of Denmark, nership between Russia and Norway in the including Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe exploration and production of oil and gas. he Islands, (Ministry of Foreign Afairs of Denmark irst step in this direction was made in 2008, 2011) pursues the following priorities: when Russia’s Gazprom, Norway’s Statoil, and • France’s Total signed an agreement which set ensuring that the Artic remains peaceful, secure and safe (supremacy of international up the Shtokman Development AG company law, strengthening of maritime safety, exer- to develop the Shtokman gas-condensate ield. cise of sovereign rights); Unfortunately, the inal investment decision on this project has been postponed for the • indeinite future. achieving self-sustained growth and development (using the highest standards in mining, renewable energy sources, sustain- he agreement signed on May 5, 2012 able exploitation of biological resources, between Rosneft and Statoil on cooperation knowledge-based growth and development, in the joint development of parts of the Rus- active involvement in international trade); sian shelf of the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk can also be regarded as a promising • promoting development while at the same time preserving the Arctic climate, environ- AS LEADING ENERGY SUPPLIERS IN EUROPE, THERE IS A GOOD FOUNDATION FOR A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NORWAY IN THE EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION OF OIL AND GAS development in Russian-Norwegian economic ment and nature (extensive research of the relations in the Arctic. Of particular impor- consequences of climate change, protection tance is the fact that the agreement opens of the environment and biodiversity); up the possibility of Rosneft participating in the development of the Norwegian continen- • fostering international cooperation with foreign partners (searching for global solu- tal shelf areas of the Barents Sea and shows tions to global challenges, enhanced regional the intention of the Norwegian side to place cooperation, safeguarding national interests orders with Russian shipyards for the con- on a bilateral basis). struction of ice-class vessels and drilling plat- Unfortunately, the Danish Arctic strategy forms. his agreement may be regarded as a envisages only rather limited possibilities for conirmation of the economic beneits Russia cooperation with Russia. For example, it is gained by resolving the maritime delimitation suggested, under the auspices of the Danish- issue with Norway. Russian governing council, to cooperate more As a major supplier of mineral raw materi- closely on strengthening navigation safety in als, especially in the Asia-Paciic region, Nor- Arctic waters. Additionally, enhanced coopera- way is objectively interested in expanding the tion with Russia could incorporate scientiic possibilities of such exports through cheaper collaboration, for example, on the continental routes. his creates prerequisites for coopera- shelf. It could also include the exchange of tion in maritime transport and in using the indings on economically, socially and environ- Northern Sea Route as the shortest sea route mentally sustainable development, as well as between Europe and the Asia-Paciic region. conidence building and studies on potential However, this may lead to an element of com- cooperation between the Danish and Russian petition, since Norway is equally interested in defense, particularly in the maritime area. having its ports in the North used for the trafic low, whose volume is expected to grow. It should be noted that Copenhagen takes the hardest line against Russia in term of de40 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War limiting the Arctic shelf. Denmark lays claim and logistics. hen there are geopolitical inter- to part of the Arctic shelf and is trying to prove ests closely linked with military and strategic that the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of spheres; and inally there are environmental, the Greenland Plate. After the Russian expedi- climatic and other scientiic and research inter- tion of 2007, Denmark (with the United States) ests, both from theoretical academic viewpoints hastened to send its own expedition to the and for application purposes (for more detail, Arctic to search for evidence in its favor. he see he Arctic Yearbook 2012, Section I: Arctic general view, however, is that Denmark intends Strategies, 46–109). to solve all territorial disputes on the basis of East Asian countries’ interest in the Arc- the Ilulissat Declaration, i.e. using peaceful tic’s natural resources can be explained by at methods (Koptelov 2012). least two reasons – the relative deicit of such resources in these countries and by the abundance of the Arctic’s natural resources. RUSSIA’S RELATIONS WITH EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES he importance of the East Asian countries’ transportation and logistics interests in the Arctic is steadily growing with the increase of East Asian countries interests in the Arctic are the export potential of their economies and complex and involve certain economic aspects China’s recent ranking as the top exporting that should be emphasized above all. hese are state of the world (2010). East Asian leaders interests in natural resources, transportation clearly understand the beneits of commercial DANISH ARCTIC STRATEGY ENVISAGES ONLY RATHER LIMITED POSSIBILITIES FOR COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA White-coat seal 41 TERRITORIAL CLAIMS OF RUSSIA, DENMARK AND CANADA ON LOMONOSOV RIDGE Boundaries of territorial sea and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) Lomonosov Ridge CANADA RUSSIA Agreed borders Median line North Pole Continental shelf beyond EEZ claimed by Russia Potential Danish claim Potential Canadian claim GREENLAND (DENMARK) Source: barentsobserver.com/en/node/21695 transportation via the Arctic seas. he North- Arctic countries, but also by their active poli- west Passage is the shortest route from the cies within sub-regional institutions such as Atlantic to the Paciic, and the Northern Sea the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Route, which goes all along the Arctic coast of Council. Russia, can almost halve the distance between East Asian countries and Western Europe. Moreover, the exploration of strategically important resources and the development of Russia has difered with East Asian countries on issues such: • he internationalization of the Arctic. Moscow has opposed the leitmotif of East Asian new sea routes in the Arctic are not only of in- countries’ Arctic policies that the North is disputable commercial and economic value for part of the commons, or a “human treasure” East Asian countries, but also hold geopolitical which should be exploited and preserved and military and strategic importance. together; Climate change and environment degradation are also priority issues for East Asian countries. • he internationalization of the Northern Sea Route, granting East Asian countries (espe- hey have speciically drawn the attention of the cially China, as Russia’s “strategic partner”) global community to these issues, stating that some special rights (or bypassing the exist- “the Arctic is the main region responsible for the weather in the Northern hemisphere, including the territory of China”, that there might be a rela- ing routes due to ice melt-down); • tion between the natural disasters in China and Upgrading East Asian countries’ status in the Arctic Council by granting them permanent observer status (POS). that the “stable increase in global temperatures and the melting of the Arctic ice play a critical role in this process” (Karlusov 2012). he latter issue has become topical because East Asian countries and some other non-Arctic states have been putting pressure on the AC East Asian countries’ Arctic policies and member states to consider their applications for Russia. Given their signiicant interests in POS. Russian (and Canadian) concerns in this the Arctic, East Asian countries pursue quite regard were explained as follows: aggressive strategies in the region. his has • been shown not only by the growth of bilateral contacts between East Asian countries and East Asian countries have not suiciently contributed to regional/ sub-regional cooperation, as required by the AC rules; 42 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War • heir future roles in and potential contribu- of the environmentally friendly maritime fuel; tion to the AC’s activities were unclear; support for Arctic environment-related re- • heir upgraded status could legitimize East search; cooperation in the AC’s working groups Asian countries’ demands on their ‘share of (Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and the Arctic pie’ (natural resources); Response; Arctic Monitoring and Assessment • An expanded AC may be even less efective Program Working Group; Circumpolar Biodiver- than the current AC; sity Monitoring Program of the Conservation of • Granting POS to even one applicant will Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group; Arctic inevitably result in the displeasure of others Ocean Review Project of the Protection of the and unhealthy competition among them. Arctic Marine Environment Working Group) and expert groups (the Ecosystem-Based Man- However, with time, Russian opposition to agement Expert Group). It should be noted that granting East Asian countries POS has waned in its relations with East Asian countries Mos- because these countries promised big invest- cow faces an uneasy choice between the need to ments in the Russia Arctic Zone. here was also maintain cooperative relations with China, its the possibility that, if neglected, East Asian key “strategic partner”, and protect its national countries could align with other rejected coun- interests in the Arctic. tries to establish an alternative organization that could undermine the AC’s efectiveness. As a result, at the Kiruna ministerial meeting of NATO AND RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC the Arctic Council, China, japan, South Korea, India and Singapore, together with Italy, were Since 2008 NATO has tried to redeine its granted the status of (permanent) observers. place in international Arctic cooperation and Potential areas for cooperation between East expand its activity in the entire High North. Asian countries and Russia could be investment he alliance’s most prominent representa- in the RAZ mining, oil and gas industries; de- tives have made a series of statements on the velopment of NSR infrastructure; introduction Arctic; meetings and expert seminars have On Spitsbergen Island 43 addressed the key issues. NATO clearly deined not have sole jurisdiction over the use of the its priorities in the region at a conference on region’s energy resources. To justify the alli- security prospects in the High North held in ance’s military presence, Schefer observed that Reykjavik at the end of january 2009. In formal certain states were expanding their military terms, NATO will focus on “soft” security – the potential and activity in the Arctic. his state- ecological consequences of global warming ment may refer only to Russia, although he did and of human activity in the Arctic, the risks of not say so directly. ecological and manmade disasters, and so on. For example, the exercises conducted in his focus does not, however, exclude a purely Norway on March 13–26, 2009, under the code military component of NATO policy, as relect- name Cold Response, show that Schefer’s ed in a series of exercises conducted under the statements and NATO’s involvement are aimed alliance’s aegis. precisely at Russia. According to the scenario In fact, NATO has declared a new priority of Cold Response, “he large non-democratic area: the global competition for resources. As state ‘Nordland’ has declared its rights to an oil envisioned by NATO leaders, the main factors deposit located in the territorial waters of the inluencing the alliance’s military potential and small democratic state ‘Midland.’” However, development are “the political conditions in the the entry of Midland’s allies into the war leads world community, the operational and strate- to victory. Russian experts believe that the gic situation, and the reserves of resources and exercises were conducted to ascertain Norway/ their distribution at the global level.” his view NATO positions in the Arctic. According to Veg- EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES’ INTEREST IN THE ARCTIC’S NATURAL RESOURCES CAN BE EXPLAINED BY TWO REASONS – THE RELATIVE DEFICIT OF SUCH RESOURCES IN THESE COUNTRIES AND BY THE ABUNDANCE OF THE ARCTIC’S NATURAL RESOURCES is conirmed by statements made by former ard Finberg, a representative of the Norwegian NATO Secretary General jaap de Hoop Schef- Defense Ministry, the authors of the scenario fer to the efect that “NATO is set the task of had in mind not only Spitsbergen but any other consolidating its grip on regions that contain territory where a dispute could arise (Diatlikov- existing and prospective deposits of energy ich and Grebtsov 2009). resources and routes of their transportation” he experts disagree over the reasons and (Schefer 2009). In this regard, Schefer has motives underlying NATO’s involvement in declared that NATO has a strategic interest the High North. According to one view, NATO, in the Arctic. he alliance’s Arctic states (the sensing challenges from other international United States, Canada, Norway, Denmark and organizations dealing with European, trans- Iceland), however, disagree over where to draw Atlantic, and global security (the UN, the EU, the 200-mile boundary and the shelf boundar- the Organization for Security and Cooperation ies; these disputes can be viewed as justiication in Europe, the Council of the Baltic Sea States, for broadening the Exclusive Economic Zones the BEAC, the African Union, the Collective (EEZs). Schefer proposed turning NATO into a Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai forum in which these ive countries could dis- Cooperation Organization, etc.), is trying to cuss their diferences: “We must ensure that, as uphold its role as chief guarantor of regional we look today at the High North, and perhaps in and global security and thereby prove that it is the future at other regions, we do not get drawn needed and efective in a changing world. his down the path of regionalization – because claim has become increasingly questionable. that is the path to fragmentation. And that is a NATO is trying to demonstrate that, while it path we must avoid at all costs” (Schefer 2009). still has the potential to deter any military he implication is that the Arctic states should threat, it is actively transforming itself into 44 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War an organization with new peacekeeping tasks: interest in the region. Norwegian oicials and dealing with the consequences of natural and independent experts point out that on its own, manmade disasters, search and rescue, the Oslo cannot defend its economic and military- ight against illegal migration and drug traf- strategic interests in the Arctic or create the icking, and other challenges to “soft” security. necessary military potential. NATO plans to focus on precisely such problems in the Arctic. his interpretation paints NATO as an Similar considerations also guide some of the other NATO member states in the unfolding “battle” for the Arctic – Canada and Den- instrument by which individual states strive mark, for example. Like Norway, they are not in to advance their own interests in the Arctic, a position to stand up to more powerful rivals rather than the vehicle of a united policy for on their own. On the one hand, they hope that the Western community. For example, Norway, NATO will defend their interests in the face of which assigns the High North a leading place in Russia’s growing strength in the region; on the its domestic and foreign policy, has long called other hand, they hope that NATO will arbitrate for strengthening NATO’s role in the Arctic. disputes over Arctic issues among its member- Speaking at the Oslo Military Society in janu- states and restrain increasing pressure from ary 2009, Norway’s defense minister spoke of the United States, which has lagged behind his country’s intention to call NATO’s attention other countries in joining the contest for Arctic to questions of the High North and observed resources. he United States, conversely, hopes that the alliance is now showing heightened to use its authority in NATO to exert pressure THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE, WHICH GOES ALL ALONG THE ARCTIC COAST OF RUSSIA, CAN ALMOST HALVE THE DISTANCE BETWEEN EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AND WESTERN EUROPE NATO logo sculpture outside the Brussels headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 45 on its competitors within the alliance. On the Arctic sea passages, and over ecological ‘’hot whole, there are many oicials and experts who spots’’ in the region. expect that NATO will continue to expand its At irst, the European Union mostly limited activity in the Arctic. his may have some nega- its activities in the Arctic to within the frame- tive implications for Russia. work of the Northern Dimension (for more Opponents of this view believe that NATO details see Heininen 2001). In the early 2000s, is unlikely to conduct an efective policy in the the idea of an “Arctic window” grew popular in region. First, it has limited scope and resources the EU and was relected in the new concept for rapidly creating the necessary infrastructure of the ND adopted in November 2006. he EU (especially amid the global economic crisis). actively cooperated with three regional orga- Second, the alliance is itself driven by internal nizations concerned with Arctic issues – the discord on matters concerning the Arctic. A AC, BEAC and the Nordic Council of Ministers number of NATO member-states have their own (NCM). In October 2007, the European Commis- ambitions and claims on this region, which has sion adopted the Action Plan for an Integrated led to U.S.–Canadian and Danish–Canadian con- Maritime Policy, which touched on issues such licts over speciic Arctic policy issues (deinition as the division of the continental shelf and the of EEZs, division of the continental shelf, etc.). exploitation of sea routes in the Arctic. All in all, the North Atlantic Treaty Organi- In March 2008 the European Commission zation has been transformed from a transatlan- and the High Representative of the EU drafted tic military organization for collective defence a joint document titled “Climate Change and NATO WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND ITS ACTIVITY IN THE ARCTIC. THIS MAY HAVE SOME NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA into more global political organization, as its International Security” (Commission of the activities in Afghanistan show. Part of the price European Communities 2008a) which focused for this is that NATO has not so far been able to largely on ecological problems. In particular, redeine its mission in the Arctic, though there the following issues were highlighted: the have been some eforts in the early 21st century destruction of the established ecosystem as a to do so (Heininen, forthcoming). If, however, result of the melting polar ice; the negative con- NATO succeeds to expand its activity in the sequences of economic activity in connection Arctic, particularly in the European Arctic, there with the development of the region’s natural is a risk that NATO could try to sideline Rus- resources and the increasing number of inter- sia in the emerging Arctic security system, as national trade routes; and intensiied competi- it does, for example, in Europe. Some NATO tion among Arctic powers for the use of natural member states, such as Norway and Denmark, resources and sea straits in the Arctic. will continue to use the alliance to strengthen To prevent dangerous developments, it was their positions in the region vis-à-vis Russia. In proposed: any case, Russia has therefore to prepare itself • to intensify the activity of regional organiza- • to work out an EU Arctic strategy with spe- for an uneasy dialogue with NATO so as to ind acceptable forms of cooperation in the Arctic. tions under the aegis of the renewed ND; cial emphasis on ensuring equal access for various countries to the natural resources EU, RUSSIA AND THE ARCTIC Since the late 1990s, the European Union has and trade routes of the region; • to establish a dialogue with Arctic countries that do not belong to the EU on how global shown an active interest in the Arctic, justifying climate change might afect international this by its concern over the competition be- security. tween various powers for the natural resources Non-EU (Russian, Norwegian, Icelandic, of the High North, over territorial disputes and U.S. and Canadian) experts have viewed this the claims of several countries to control the document as a strong attempt by the European 46 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Iceberg Union to claim a role in Arctic afairs. It has also tion with regional organizations. In particular, been noted that much of the impetus pushing it identiies the three main priorities for the the EU toward a more aggressive Arctic policy European Union’s future policy in the region: has come from three Arctic member-states – • protecting the Arctic environment and in- • ensuring the stable development of the Denmark, Sweden, and, in particular, Finland (Heininen 2011, 26 and 29), that feel excluded from Arctic afairs despite heavily impacting and having signiicant interests in the region. In November 2008 the European Commission released a communication on “he Europe- digenous peoples; region and the rational use of its natural resources; • developing a mechanism for multilateral cooperation in the Arctic. an Union and the Arctic Region,” (Commission of the European Communities 2008b) designed his last point deserves special attention. to outline the key points of the EU’s Arctic he press release issued by the European Com- strategy. he document sets goals and makes mission on the adoption of the communica- recommendations for the organization of Arctic tion states: “Enhancing the European Union’s research and working with indigenous peoples, contribution to Arctic cooperation will open ishing, the extraction of hydrocarbons, naviga- new perspectives in our relations with the tion, political and legal structures, and interac- Arctic states. he EU is ready to work with 47 them to increase stability, to enhance Arctic Representative for CFSP submitted a prog- multilateral governance through the existing ress report and an evaluation of the EU Arctic legal frameworks as well as to keep the right Policy (European Commission and EU High balance between the priority goal of preserving Representative 2012). hese documents may seem ambitious only the environment and the need for sustainable use of natural resources, including hydrocar- if one does not take into account the above bons” (he Arctic Merits the European Union’s mentioned limited political instruments avail- Attention 2008). he document notes the need able to the EU. In practice it all boils down to for broad dialogue on questions of Arctic policy monitoring, research and discussions, many on the basis of the UN Convention on the Law of which are designed to persuade the Arctic of the Sea, and the key roles played by the countries of the need to maintain higher en- Northern Dimension and the Arctic Council vironmental standards, even to the detriment (in whose work Russia takes an active part) in of their economic activity. It is not surprising cooperation in the Arctic. that a few of the non-EU countries of the Arctic Despite such “multilateralist” rhetoric, these region are not overly enthusiastic about these documents hardly mentioned Russia and the claims although they perceive them as reason- BEAC, which are considered important regional able and do not refuse to participate in dialogue players indispensable for the success of regional initiated by the European Union. cooperation in the Arctic. One year later, in 2009, the EU Council It is possible to conclude that for the foreseeable future the European Union will attempt of Ministers of Foreign Afairs approved the to strengthen its presence in the region with Commission’s communication. In january increasing vigor and uphold its claims for the 2011, the European Parliament called for a Arctic more resolutely. However, unlike NATO more active EU Arctic policy, but its voice in or the United States, the EU will do this without such matters is merely advisory. Finally, in any particular emphasis on military power, pre- july 2012, the Commission and the EU’s High ferring to use diplomatic and economic methods. 48 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War RUSSIA AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE ARCTIC he Arctic region has inherited a number of ment and sustainable development. For exam- territorial disputes from the Cold War era, and ple, Russia’s case, the ishing industry directly Russia was, and still is, a party to them. Some of employs over 100,000 people and around one these conlicts were successfully settled, while million indirectly (Laruelle 2014, 157). Further- others remain in need of resolution. hree cases more, the Bering Sea catch is important not are analyzed below – the U.S.-Soviet/Russian only for the U.S. and Russian domestic seafood dispute in the Bering Sea, the Norwegian-Rus- consumption, but also for the two ishing in- sian dispute in the Barents Sea and the Russian dustries’ expansion on the East Asian markets. claim on the extension of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. It should be noted that, along with the legal market, a fast growing black market of Alaska pollock and Bering crab exists in the region. his involves not only the Russian Far East, but THE U.S.-RUSSIAN DISPUTE IN THE also China, japan and South Korea. It is esti- BERING SEA mated that the ish caught in Russian waters exceeds the oicial quota by at least 150% (he Named after the Danish-born Russian explorer International Bering Sea Forum 2006). his is Vitus Bering, the Bering Sea is an 885,000 nau- because poaching is rife and Russian organized tical mile2 (2,292,150 km2) extension of the Pa- crime is heavily involved in the ish trade. ciic Ocean that lies between Russia and Alaska. he Russian “ish, crab and caviar maias” are It is bordered to the South by the Aleutian Is- not only seeking to expand their commercial lands, and the northern Bering Strait separates activities and sideline their foreign rivals, but it from the Arctic Ocean. he combination of its also to establish control over the regional gov- natural characteristics, such as shallow con- ernments and federal agencies in the Russian tinental shelves and seasonal ice, has created Far East. one of the richest isheries in the world. he sea Overishing creates numerous ecological is connected to the Arctic Ocean by the Bering problems in the region. According to some ac- Strait, which separates Asia from North Amer- counts, as a result of intensive trawling, species ica and is believed to have been a land bridge such as crab and perch are in serious decline in during the Ice Age that enabled migration from the entire Bering Sea, while the stocks of pol- Asia to North America. lock luctuate unpredictably from year to year. he once-plentiful pollock has seen an espe- he sources of the dispute. here were three cially dramatic decline on the Western (Russian) major causes of the conlict: side of the Bering Sea because of illegal ish- he Bering Sea constitutes a strategically ing. In the Eastern (U.S.) Bering Sea, harvests of important area for both the U.S. and Russian snow crab have declined by 85% since 1999 (he ishing industries. It supplies a third of Russia’s International Bering Sea Forum 2006). Conse- and a half of the United States’ total annual quently, the ecological issues serve as another catch (Conley and Kraut 2010). On the Russian source of U.S.-Russia tensions as they increase side, commercial isheries catch approximately competition between American and Russian $600 million worth of seafood annually, while ishermen and lead to mutual accusations of the U.S. Bering Sea catches are worth approxi- inability to regulate commercial isheries in the mately $1 billion each year (he International region efectively. Bering Sea Forum 2006). Fishery is important he “hydrocarbon factor” also plays a role in both for the Alaskan and Russian Far East’s re- keeping the dispute alive. Oil and gas deposits gional economies in terms of revenue, employ- have been discovered in both the ofshore and 49 onshore territories near the Bering Sea. But the According to the decree, the Western boundary main “apple of discord” is not the Bering Sea of the Soviet sector was deined as the meridian itself but the adjacent Chukchi and East Sibe- 168°49’ 30» W. long. from Greenwich, bisecting rian Seas (parts of the Arctic Ocean) where the the strait and separating the Ratmanov and boundaries of the U.S. and Russian maritime Kruzenstern Islands, of the Diomede group in and continental shelves are not settled. Accord- the Bering Sea (he Central Executive Commit- ing to the recent U.S. Minerals Management tee of the Soviet Union 1964). Service’s estimates, the potential oil and gas re- As some U.S. legal experts believe, in practi- serves in the Bering and Chukchi Seas comprise cal terms, this decree led to establishing Soviet some 24 billion barrels of oil and 126 trillion control not only over the ive islands in the cubic feet of natural gas (Kaczynski 2007, 2). Arctic Ocean, but also over Copper Island (with Moreover, the Bering Sea is an important Sea Lion Rock and Sea Otter Rock) which they transport junction between the Russian Far believe should belong to the U.S. under the 1867 East and East Asia, on the one hand, and Alaska, Convention (Olson et al. 1998). However, as on the other. Additionally, with the growing the U.S. State Department’s oicial document importance of the Northern Sea Route and the emphasizes, none of the islands or rocks above Northwest Passage, the Bering Sea (and espe- were included in the U.S. purchase of Alaska cially the Bering Strait) constitutes an impor- from Russia in 1867, and they have never been tant transit area for future traic from East Asia claimed by the U.S., although Americans were to Europe and North America (and back). involved in the discovery and exploration of THE MAIN ‘APPLE OF DISCORD’ IS NOT THE BERING SEA ITSELF BUT THE ADjACENT CHUKCHI AND EAST SIBERIAN SEAS WHERE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN MARITIME AND CONTINENTAL SHELVES ARE NOT SETTLED he history of the conlict. he roots of the some of these areas (U.S. Department of State dispute can be detected as early as in the Russo- 2009). American accord on the cession of Alaska. he Over time, and in particular when in 1976 Convention of 1867 determined two geographi- both the USSR and U.S. decided to deine the cal lines – one in the Bering Sea and the second limits of their EEZs in this economically impor- one in the Arctic Ocean – to delimit American tant region, the 1867 Convention line in the Ber- and Russian territories. However, in the case ing Sea became a contentious marine boundary of the Bering Sea, the 1867 Agreement actually between the two countries. In 1977, the U.S. and only applied to maritime territories and was USSR exchanged diplomatic notes indicating not intended for the delimitation of the EEZ or their intent “to respect the line set forth in the continental shelf, concepts that did not exist at 1867 Convention” as the limit to each countries’ the time. isheries jurisdiction where the 200 nautical Concerned about the possible discovery of mile boundaries overlapped. However, the dif- unknown lands by Western countries in the ferences in each country’s interpretation of the Arctic Ocean and repeated U.S. claims on some 1867 Convention became apparent very soon, islands in this ocean (such as the Wrangell, Her- making an area of nearly 15,000 nautical miles2 ald, Bennett, jeannette and Henrietta Islands), the subject of a dispute. While the two coun- Bolshevik Russia tried to consolidate its control tries agreed to continue respecting each other’s over the remote northern territories. On April interpretation of the Alaska purchase agree- 15, 1926, the Central Executive Committee of ment as an interim measure, U.S.-Soviet talks the Soviet Union issued a decree entitled “On began in the early 1980s to resolve the difering the Proclamation of Lands and Islands Located interpretations. Unfortunately, the language of in the Arctic Ocean as Territory of the USSR.” the 1867 Convention was silent on the type of 50 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Seagulls lying over a ishing boat in the Chukchi Sea line, map projection and horizontal datum used hoped that agreement with Washington could to describe this boundary. Moreover, neither help the USSR accelerate its talks with Norway Moscow nor Washington has produced the au- on their maritime boundary in the Barents thenticated maps used during the negotiations Sea. Other reports suggested that Washington to resolve the issue. promised an annual quota of some 150,000 It should be noted that cartographers metric tons of pollock in compensation from the normally use two types of lines to demarcate U.S. side of the Bering Sea if Moscow signed and marine boundaries, rhomb lines and geodetic ratiied the treaty. Such practice actually existed lines, also known as great circle arcs (Kaczynski in the late 1970s, but the U.S. ended it as part of 2007, 2). Both lines are used on two common the economic sanctions taken against the USSR map projections, Mercator and conical. De- after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. pending on the type of line and map projection Finally, some experts have speculated that Soviet used, lines will be either straight or curved. For Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze simply instance, a rhomb line will appear as a straight exceeded his authority by signing the maritime line on a Mercator projection, whereas a geodet- boundary agreement with his U.S. counterpart ic line will be a curved one. Because both Wash- james Baker (Kaczynski 2007, 4). However, Rus- ington and Moscow interpreted the 1867 line as sian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov repudiated a straight line, the USSR deined the Bering Sea these speculations in 2005, stating that the draft marine boundary as a rhomb line on a Mercator of the treaty was endorsed by the Soviet govern- projection, while the U.S. opted for a geodetic ment (Palamar’ 2009). line on a conical projection. As a result of these he agreement signed on june 1, 1990 diferences each country’s claim included a (Agreement between the United States of maximal part of the disputed maritime area. America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- It took nine years of negotiations to conclude publics 1990), split the diference between the an agreement on a new U.S.-Soviet maritime US geodetic line claim and the Soviet rhomb boundary in the Bering Sea. According to some line claim as shown on a Mercator projection. speculations, Soviet negotiators may have ceded he section between the Russian and U.S. sec- territory in the Bering Sea to the U.S. in return tors, which lies 200 miles out from the coast- for U.S. acceptance of Soviet proposals to divide lines of both countries, is known as the “Donut the territory north of the Bering Strait (in the Hole,” and is considered international waters, Arctic Ocean). Furthermore, Moscow probably or a global commons. his comprises 10% of the 51 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE BERING SEA U.S.-RUSSIAN MARINE BOUNDARY OF 1867 USING RHOMB AND GEODETIC LINES ON A MERCATOR PROJECTION 1 EAST SIBERIAN SEA Wrangel Island CHUKCHI SEA Bering Strait RUSSIA UNITED STATES (ALASKA) 2 3 Anadyr Cape Chukotsky 4 St. Lawrence Island 5 Great circle line 6 Nunivak Island Rhomb line Pribilov Islands Bering Island 7 Medny Island BERING SEA Unimak Island Komandorskiye Islands Unalaska Islands 8 Attu Island Umnak Island Atka Island Kiska Island PACIFIC OCEAN Adak Island Aleutian Islands 9 Current border (determined in 1987) 5 62°59.4’N 175°00'W Proposed border 6 60°33.5’N 180°W 1 Starting Point of Convention line 72°00’N; 168°58’22.587”W 7 57°28.0’N 175°00'W 2 Initial Turning Point 65°30.0’N 168°58'22.587W 8 Midpoint between Medny Island and Attu Island 3 Point Hope 65°04.2’N 170°00'W 4 Turning Point #2 64°12.3’N 172°00'W 53°45.0’N 170°16.0'W 9 End Point of Convention line 50°36.4’N; 167°00’E Source: Vlad M. Kaczynski. Russian Analytical Digest, No.20, 2007 Bering Sea. he 1990 Agreement also created rights and jurisdiction in the western special several “special areas.” Special areas were areas area to Moscow. on either country’s respective side of the 1867 he same day (june 1), in a separate exchange line but beyond 200 nautical miles from the of diplomatic notes, the two countries agreed baseline. here were three such areas on the to a provisional application of the agreement U.S. side of the marine boundary, called “eastern (State Department Watch 2009). his agreement special areas,” and one on the Soviet side, called took efect on june 15, 1990. Being an executive the “western special area.” he USSR ceded all agreement, it can be rescinded at any time by claims to sovereign rights and jurisdiction in either party unilaterally. the eastern special areas to the U.S. and, respec- Although both countries ceded territory tively, Washington ceded all claims to sovereign from their previous claims, the US still con52 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War American opponents of the 1990 treaty claim trolled a far greater amount of area in the Bering Sea than if the new agreement had been that it was concluded violating numerous U.S. based on the equidistant line principle normally legal procedures. For example, it was prepared used in international boundary disputes. It was in secret, without consulting U.S. Congress. quickly ratiied by the U.S. Senate (on September hey also note that the U.S.-Soviet executive 16, 1991), which was eager to keep control on agreement on the provisional implementation an area so rich in ish and to begin the sale of of the delimitation treaty was not disclosed in ofshore oil and gas leases. any public news release when it was signed on june 1, 1990. Neither was it mentioned in Presi- Criticism of the 1990 Agreement. he 1990 dent George Bush’s transmittal of the proposed Agreement evoked heavy criticism in both the treaty to the Senate, nor at the Senate com- Soviet and the Russian parliaments for the mittee hearings or in the full house debate in Gorbachev-Shevardnadze tandem rushing the September 1991 (Olson et al. 1998). deal and for ceding Russian ishing rights and It should be noted, however, that in con- other maritime beneits. Many Russian politi- trast with the Russian opponents to the 1990 cians and analysts called for a renegotiation of Agreement, their American “counterparts” are the agreement. marginal and unable to get signiicant support he opponents to ratiication have put forward multiple arguments. According to one le- at federal level (neither in Congress, nor in the President’s Administration). gal expert, the Baker-Shevardnadze line (which was mainly based on the 1867 Convention line) Current status of the dispute. Given the Rus- brought 70% of the disputed areas of the Bering sian dissatisfaction with the 1990 treaty, talks Sea under American jurisdiction. If instead the began between the U.S. State Department and median line principle had been used, it could Russian Foreign Ministry under the Clinton ad- have provided the USSR with an additional ministration in an attempt to resolve the issue. 25,000 km2 of sea (Vylegzhanin 2010). Accord- here was even an ofer to concede some ish ing to the State Duma’s (Russian legislature) quotas to Russia as an incentive for ratiication resolution of july 14, 2002, as a result of the in 1997, but it was since withdrawn by the U.S. 1990 Agreement, Moscow lost two sectors of the side without explanation (Kaczynski 2007, 5). Soviet EEZ in the Bering Sea (23,700 km2 and 7,700 km2) and 43,600 km2 of its continental Washington maintains its irm position that the 1990 treaty is binding and the Baker- shelf in the central part of the Bering Sea (be- Shevardnadze line constitutes the maritime yond the 200 nautical mile EEZ). Russia also lost boundary between the two countries. U.S. policy between 1.6 and 1.9 million metric tons of ish is to provide evidence of a continued “general in the 1990s (State Duma of the Russian Fed- state practice” that the boundary delineated by eration 2002). he Navarinsk and Aleut ields, the 1990 Agreement is the actual marine border which are potentially rich in hydrocarbons, between the U.S. and Russia. Such evidence as were also ceded to the U.S. well as “opinio juris” – a sense of obligation he opponents of the treaty have also to comply with the practice – are required by questioned the legal status of the Baker-She- customary international law to legitimize an vardnadze executive agreement because Soviet international agreement that did not fully come treaty law did not allow “provisional implemen- into force. tation” of an international agreement (Palamar’ 2009). In response to the criticism above, irst the As some experts believe, Russia cannot legally undermine the 1990 treaty, even if it refuses to ratify it (Laruelle 2014, 104). Mos- Soviet Supreme Soviet, and then the Russian cow has observed the Baker-Shevardnadze State Duma, postponed the ratiication of the line for more than 20 years and thus helped 1990 treaty indeinitely. Washington to provide both the evidence of a here are also U.S. critics of the 1990 Agree- continued “general state practice” and “opinio ment. hey believe that the treaty legitimized juris.” As some Russian international law Russia’s control over eight islands in the Arctic experts suggest, it is not in Moscow’s interest Ocean and the Bering Sea, as well as deprived to question the legitimacy of the 1990 treaty Alaska of a maritime area rich in ish and – po- because, irstly, such a negative policy could tentially – oil and gas. undermine Russia’s reputation as a responsi53 THE U.S.-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY AS OF 1990 AGREEMENT EAST SIBERIAN SEA Wrangel Island CHUKCHI SEA Bering Strait RUSSIA UNITED STATES (ALASKA) Anadyr Cape Chukotsky St. Lawrence Island Nunivak Island Pribilov Islands Bering Island Medny Island BERING SEA Unimak Island Komandorskiye Islands Unalaska Islands Attu Island Umnak Island Atka Island PACIFIC OCEAN Kiska Island Adak Island Aleutian Islands The U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary Source: www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/128740.htm ble international actor, and secondly, the 1867 104; Palamar’ 2009). his park could be based line (on which the 1990 document is based) on the experience of the existing ethno-natural can be both mutually beneicial and helpful park with the same name on the Russian side of for reaching a U.S.-Russian compromise on the Bering Strait (est. in 1993).2 he two countries acknowledge the positive the division of the Arctic maritime territories (Vylegzhanin 2010, 9). As far as Russia’s future policies on the 1990 experience gained from the implementation of “he Convention on the Conservation and Man- treaty are concerned, Moscow can, at best, hope agement of Pollock Resources in the Central to negotiate some new, more favorable, ish- Bering Sea,” which was signed in 1994 by China, ing rules to compensate the losses incurred in South Korea, Russia, the U.S., japan and Poland ishing as a result of the Agreement and create and was designed to regulate ishing in the new bilateral mechanisms to open U.S. ishing “Donut Hole.” On a formal level, the U.S. and Russia regu- zones up to Russian ishermen. here are also some plans to create a U.S.-Russian natural park larly hold discussions on Bering Sea issues, for the protection of biodiversity in the Bering particularly issues related to isheries manage- Strait region, provisionally named Beringia, and ment, but, as the American side emphasizes, thus settle the issue amicably (Laruelle 2014, these discussions do not afect the placement 54 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN THE BARENTS SEA BARENTS SEA Shtockmanovskoye Fedinsky High KARA SEA Novaya Zemlya Amderma Prirazlomnoye Kirkenes Murmansk Varandeyskoye Varandey Naryan Mar Oil and gas fields The agreed Russian-Norwegian border Source: barentsobserver.com/ru/news/zarubezhneft-gotova-vzyatsya-za-fedinskoe-mestorozhdenie he Barents Sea is rich in various natural re- of the U.S.-Russia boundary, the jurisdiction over any territory or the sovereignty of any sources. First, due to the North Atlantic Drift, its territory. he United States has no intention biological production is high compared to other of reopening discussion of the 1990 Maritime seas and oceans of similar latitude. he isheries Boundary Agreement. of the Barents Sea, in particular the cod isheries, are of great importance for both Norway and Russia. THE RUSSIAN-NORWEGIAN DISPUTE IN THE BARENTS SEA Second, according to some accounts, the Barents Sea may hold vast hydrocarbon resources. A recent assessment by the U.S. Geological Survey he sources of the dispute. he Barents Sea is estimated the mean undiscovered, convention- part of the Arctic Ocean. Named after the Dutch al, technically recoverable petroleum resources explorer Willem Barents, it is bounded by the in the Barents Sea Shelf include 11 billion bar- Norwegian and northwestern Russian mainland rels of crude oil, 380 trillion cubic feet of natu- (south), the Norwegian Sea and Svalbard (west), ral gas, and two billion barrels of natural gas Franz josef Land (north), and the Kara Sea and liquids (Klett and Gautier 2009). Novaya Zemlya (east). It is 1,300 km long and Norway and the USSR started exploring the 1,050 km wide and covers 1,405,000 km2. Its region in the late 1970s, but in the 1980s they average depth is 229 m, with a maximum depth agreed not to carry out exploration or exploita- of 600 m in the major Bear Island Trench. tion activities in the previously disputed area. 55 he Barents Sea Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Deposits discovered so far in the Barents Sea, continental shelf between these two lines, of outside the formerly disputed area, include the approximately 155,000 km² (and the overlap- Norwegian Snøhvit gas ield and Goliat oil ield ping exclusive economic zones within this and the Russian Shtokman gas ield. area) that constituted the disputed area in the he Barents Sea is also an important trans- Barents Sea. In addition, there were overlap- port junction between Russia, on the one hand, ping claims further north in the Arctic Ocean, and Northern Europe and the North Atlantic, of approximately 20,000 km². Altogether the on the other. Moreover, the Northern Sea Route disputed area was approximately 175,000 km². starts on the border of the Barents and Kara seas and continues eastward. he pursuit of control over this economically In 1977, the talks between Oslo and Moscow were further complicated by the establishment of a 200 nm (nautical mile) Norwegian EEZ and and strategically important region, as well as a 200 nm Soviet Fishery Zone. hese zones did the lack of a proper legal regime in the Barents not totally correspond to the countries’ conti- Sea, led to the dispute between Norway and nental shelf claims in the region. he so-called Russia over these maritime territories. Loop Hole in the middle of the Barents Sea constituted an area of some 62,400 km² of high History of the dispute. he Norwegian-Rus- seas that was completely surrounded by the sian dispute in the Barents Sea dates back to the Norwegian and Russian 200 nm zones. Both 1920s. he 1926 Soviet decree “On the Proclama- Oslo and Moscow agreed to draw a single mari- tion of Lands and Islands Located in the Arctic time boundary for the continental shelf and the Ocean as Territory of the USSR” (he Central EEZ, but they still were unable to agree on the Executive Committee of the Soviet Union 1964) boundary line. reiterated the legal tradition in Tsarist Russia However, Oslo and Moscow realized the that was characterized by the notion of the sec- necessity of regulating foreign ishing activities toral line, the line of longitude that starts from in the Barents Sea and, for this reason, signed a the terminus of the land boundary and inter- provisional ishing agreement in 1978 (the so- sects with the North Pole. he sectoral principle called Grey Zone Agreement). his agreement of demarcation of the Arctic territories, how- was initially designed for one year, but it still ever, was not supported by some other coastal remains in force, having been renewed annu- states, including Norway. ally. Its geographical scope is diferent from the In 1957, Norway and the USSR agreed on previously disputed area. It applies to a total their irst maritime boundary in the Arctic. his area of 67,500 km², of which 23,000 km² were in boundary runs from the northern end point of undisputed Norwegian waters and 3,000 km² the land boundary in a northeasterly direction were in undisputed Russian waters. through the Varangerjord and terminates on here were ups and downs in Norwegian- the Varangerjord’s closing line, thereby not Soviet/Russian negotiations over the following extending into the Barents Sea. It was not until years. For example, in 1991 there were oicial after each country claimed exclusive rights announcements that the talks were soon to to the continental shelf in 1963 and 1968 that be inalized, but no early agreement was ever Norway and Russia began informal talks about achieved. hrough the 1990s and 2000s, there their maritime boundary in the Barents Sea in were regular conlicts between Oslo and Mos- 1970. Oslo and Moscow agreed to conduct nego- cow because Norway, for ecological reasons, tiations on the basis of Article 6 of the multilat- introduced strict rules and ixed quotas to eral Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958 regulate ishing in the region, which were never (United Nations 1958). However, their diferent been accepted by the Russian side. his led to perceptions of delimitation of the maritime ter- numerous tensions over the inspection and ritory in the Barents Sea brought negotiations boarding of Russian ishing boats by the Norwe- to a halt. gian Coastal Guards. Moscow has traditionally based its position on a sector line running roughly along longi- Several factors eventually brought about a Norwegian-Russian compromise: tude 32 E northwards from the Russian coast- First, Norway and Russia signed and rati- line. Oslo, on the contrary, has based its position ied the 1982 United Nations Convention on the on an equidistance (median) line between the Law of the Sea (United Nations 1982) in 1996 and coasts on either side of the border. It was the 1997, respectively. As a result, they modiied the 58 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War DELIMITATION OF MARITIME TERRITORIES IN THE BARENTS SEA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 2010 NORWEGIAN-RUSSIAN TREATY Svalbard NORWEGIAN SEA Novaya Zemlya BARENTS SEA NORWAY RUSSIA The agreed border Russia’s preferred maritime border Disputed area Norway’s preferred maritime border Source: www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11299024 rules applicable to the delimitation of the con- political reasons to inally strike a deal. For Nor- tinental shelf and the EEZ because the UNCLOS way, a compromise was important because the provides identical rules for these legal proce- dispute with Russia was one of the last of that dures, thus favoring the median rather than sort in its relations with its Arctic neighbors. In sectoral principle of demarcation of maritime 2006 an agreement was signed between Nor- territories. way, Iceland, Denmark, and the Faroe Islands Second, in the 1990s and 2000s the Inter- on a modus vivendi on the delimitation of their national Court of justice (ICj) in he Hague and common continental shelf beyond 200 nm in specially appointed arbitration tribunals issued the Northeast Atlantic. In 2009 a decision was decisions that clariied important principles made by the UN Commission on Continental and provided guidance for coastal states. In Shelf that formally deined the limits of the particular, the ICj speciied that the solution Norwegian shelf and EEZ in the Arctic (beyond must be based on objective geographical fea- the Barents Sea). he proposed accord with tures where any major disparities in the respec- Moscow would leave the maritime boundary tive coastal lengths may be of signiicance. Both between the outer continental shelves of the Norway and Russia took notice of the ICj’s deci- Norwegian Svalbard Archipelago and Greenland sion to solve their dispute in the Barents Sea. as the last unresolved boundary issue afecting hird, in addition to the legal factors above, both Oslo and Moscow had several serious Norway in the Arctic and legal experts believe that this issue too will likely be resolved soon. 59 Oslo withdrew some of its territorial claims Moscow, on the other hand, by resolving the Barents Sea dispute, would have free hands and Moscow consented to a shift of the 1926 for continuing its “ight” with Denmark and demarcation line to divide the 175,000 km2 of Canada for the underwater Lomonosov and disputed area in two almost equal parts deined Mendeleev ridges that are potentially rich in by eight points. he northern terminal point of hydrocarbons. Moreover, by striking a com- the delimitation line is deined as the intersec- promise, the two countries would get a lot of tion of the line drawn through points 7 and 8 good PR, presenting themselves as responsible and the line connecting the easternmost point international actors who were able to solve one and the westernmost point of the still undeined of the most complicated international disputes outer limits of the countries’ continental shelves by peaceful methods. (Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Fourth, economic interests drove the Norwe- Russian Federation 2010). he agreement allows gian-Russian compromise. Oslo was particularly Russia to exercise sovereign rights and jurisdic- interested in the development of hydrocarbon tion derived from EEZ jurisdiction that Norway deposits in the disputed area because since could otherwise have exercised in an area east of 2001, oil production on the Norwegian shelf has the maritime delimitation line that lies within declined. With the end of the 1980s moratorium 200 nm of the Norwegian mainland and beyond on hydrocarbon exploitation and exploration 200 nm of the Russian coast. After entering into force, the new agreement activities in the disputed area, a resumption of these activities and new discoveries could be ex- terminated the Grey Zone Agreement of 1978. pected. In Russia’s case, the need for new hydro- However, this treaty will not alter or adversely carbon deposits was not as strong as Norway’s afect the Norwegian-Russian cooperation in because Moscow had enough ields to develop ishery. Cooperation will continue, for example, in the undisputed areas. However, in order to in the Norwegian-Russian joint Fisheries Com- have strategic control over a region potentially mission. he 2010 agreement puts an end to the rich in oil and gas, Moscow was interested in reaching an agreement with Oslo to legitimize 1980s moratorium on the exploration and ex- its territorial ambitions. ploitation of hydrocarbon resources. However, Finally, the two sides were psychologically the treaty does not prompt unhealthy competi- tired of the 40-year-long negotiations and were tion in this ield. On the contrary, it features eager both to put an end to the dispute and to certain provisions for the coordinated exploita- bring about a success story in their bilateral tion of transboundary hydrocarbon resources. relations. Implications of the 2010 Norwegian-Russian he 2010 Agreement. In 2007, Oslo and Mos- Agreement. In Norway, the Agreement was cow signed a new document that revised the ratiied unanimously and is considered very 1957 agreement by extending the maritime positively, while in Russia strong debates on the boundary in the Varangerjord area north- documents’ negative consequences resulted in wards to the intersection of Norway’s preferred ratiication by the State Duma only because of median line and Russia’s preference, the sector the constitutional majority of the ruling United line in the Barents Sea. Norwegian Foreign Russia party. Both political and expert commu- Minister jonas GahrStøre then stated that this nities are split into two almost equal parts, just agreement should pave the way for an accord as the disputed area. on the area of overlapping claims in the Bar- he main arguments of the opponents to ents Sea. However, it was not until April 2010 the Treaty boil down to the following: irst, the that Norwegian Prime Minister jens Stolten- Treaty is an “unjustiied concession” of a sover- berg and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev eign area to Norway, and, second, the content publicly announced that negotiations had been of the Treaty is not suiciently elaborated with completed, with the exception of some tech- regard to its future application. nicalities. he inal agreement was signed in he irst argument is rather emotional, al- Murmansk, Russia, on September 15, 2010, and though it has its own rationale in claiming that has subsequently been approved by the two the Russian-Norwegian relations are far from countries’ national parliaments. he document being ideal in practice. here are contradictions came into force in july 2011. over isheries and continuing discussions over 60 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War the “administrative sovereignty” of Norway at particularly to the UNCLOS and, in a broader Svalbard/Spitsbergen. hus, the only reason to context, to the principles of the Ilulissat Dec- sign the Treaty is the possibility of hydrocar- laration of 2008 that conirmed the eagerness bons extraction, which would be possible only of the ive Arctic coastal states (A-5) to solve in the long term. disputes between them by peaceful means, on he second argument, although being the basis of international law (Ilulissat Declara- strictly judicial, partly overlaps with the irst tion 2008). Finally, Oslo and Moscow signaled to counter-Treaty argument stated above. Some the other A-5 states that by adopting a common believe that the Treaty disregards the extremely policy on conlict resolution they can rein- important issue of the regime of sea and shelf force their claim to leadership in Arctic afairs areas adjacent to Svalbard, which may have against emerging actors such as the European negative efect on the work of Russian compa- Union and East Asian countries. nies in the region. However, the proponents of the Treaty maintain that by signing the agreement, both RUSSIAN CLAIMS ON THE ARCTIC Norway and Russia clariied their maritime CONTINENTAL SHELF boundary in the Barents Sea, thereby ensuring predictability and legal certainty in the region. Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has exclu- his is important for the two countries to be sive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the able to enact and enforce environmental rules natural resources of its continental shelf up to BY CONCLUDING THE 2010 AGREEMENT, NORWAY AND RUSSIA SIGNALED TO THE OTHER A-5 STATES THAT BY ADOPTING A COMMON POLICY ON CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEY CAN REINFORCE THEIR CLAIM TO LEADERSHIP IN ARCTIC AFFAIRS and ishery regulations, as well as to carry out 200 nm from its shores. Beyond this limit, it has future exploration and exploitation of hydrocar- to provide scientiic evidence to establish the bon resources in the area. extent of the legally deined continental shelf in he 2010 agreement may facilitate a fu- order to exercise the same rights. hese rights ture settlement of the residual dispute on the apply to the exploitation of living and non- interpretation of the Paris Treaty on Svalbard living resources of the state’s share of the shelf’s of 1920 (Treaty Concerning the Archipelago of seabed and subsoil, but do not extend to re- Spitsbergen 1920). Norway and other signato- sources in the water column such as ish stocks, ries (including Russia) disagree on whether the which are covered by a separate regime. he equal treatment rights guaranteed by the Paris application should be submitted to the United Treaty apply to maritime zones, the develop- Nations Commission on the Limits of the Conti- ment of which could not be foreseen in 1920, nental Shelf (CLCS). he CLCS covers continental and whether Oslo is allowed to exercise coastal shelf claims beyond the 200 nm zone, up to a state jurisdiction in these zones that encom- maximum of 350 nm. It should be noted that pass rich ishing grounds and are expected to the CLCS’s ruling is inal and binding. contain oil and gas resources. By concluding hanks to the marine research systemati- the 2010 Agreement, Oslo and Moscow demon- cally carried out in the Arctic since the 1960s, strated their eagerness to settle the remaining in 2001 Russia became the irst country to refer disputes that create obstacles to international to the CLCS, a review body of scientists cre- economic cooperation in the region. ated under UNCLOS. In so doing, it created a he 2010 Agreement also demonstrated that legal precedent, which other states hastened to in resolving their territorial disputes Norway follow. For example, in 2006 Norway was the and Russia are committed to international law, second country (after Russia) to apply to the 61 he Franz josef Land archipelago Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War AREA OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN OUTSIDE THE 200-MILE ZONE CANADA DENMARK UNITED NORWAY STATES North Pole Svalbard CHUKCHI SEA BARENTS SEA EAST SIBERIAN SEA KARA SEA LAPTEV SEA RUSSIA Tentative boundary demarcating the continental shelf of the Russian 60-mile zone from the foot of the continental slope Federation and those of neighboring states; subject to negotiations 200-mile zone from initial boundaries The agreed Russian-Norwegian border Area of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation Isoline showing sedimentation sheath potential, equal to 1% in the Arctic Ocean outside the 200-mile zone of distance from continental slope foot Source: www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/Skaridov-arctic-strategy.pdf CLCS and the irst Arctic state to get a positive the 2007 expedition with lag planting as a by- decision from the Commission. product. Interestingly, in preparing its new submis- Russia submitted its documentation on December 20, 2001. In its claim, Russia argued sion Russia has employed not only academic that the Lomonosov Ridge and the Alpha-Men- resources, but also the military. he objective of deleev Ridge are both geological extensions of the Russian Navy’s mission within the frame- its continental Siberian shelf and, thus, parts work of the Arktika-2012 expedition was to of the Central Arctic Ocean, as well as parts of prove that the Siberian continental platform the Barents Sea, the Bering Sea, and the Sea of extends to the North Pole by collecting rock Okhotsk, fall under its jurisdiction. In efect, samples on the sealoor of the Arctic Ocean. Russia claimed sovereign rights over seabed he Kalitka, a Losharik-class nuclear auxiliary resources of some 1.2 million km2 beyond the submarine, assisted two ice-breakers in drilling 200-mile line. a number of boreholes on the Mendeleev Ridge However, the CLCS found the grounds of (IISS 2012). the Russian claim on the shelf insuicient and International experts predict several sce- asked for more information (United Nations narios for further developments, should the 2002). Since then a new submission has been second, revised, submission also be returned under preparation, reportedly to be inalized by the CLCS. One extreme would be for Russia by 2015, involving comprehensive research to just declare unilaterally that its continental expeditions to collect data. Among these was shelf reaches up to the North Pole. he coun64 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War try could simply withdraw from the UNCLOS. all the same, such a stance would involve large It would still retain the right to a continental domestic political costs. Any Russian leader shelf, and would ind itself in the same posi- would ind it very diicult to abandon Russia’s tion as the United States, which stands outside ambitious Arctic claim, and all the more so to the convention, and would have to rely on cus- explain this decision. he experts (Moe forthcoming) also predict tomary law to support its claim. However, this approach would provide a much less secure a third scenario, which is the most likely. his legal position than would a recommendation is the postponement of the second submission. from the commission, which ofers inal and First, there is the possibility of several rounds binding limits. with the commission, which could take decades. As one Norwegian expert believes (Moe But even if at the end of the day it remains clear forthcoming), strong nationalistic groupings that the claims in the Arctic cannot be recon- in Russia would support such unilateralism. ciled or substantiated, all the Arctic states may But Russia’s oicial policy since the ratiication see it in their interest to merely agree to dis- of UNCLOS has been to adhere to the UNCLOS agree and go on with their business. Apart from framework. And as concluded above, Russia has a shared interest in preserving the UNCLOS in a great deal to lose if it undermines the author- the Arctic, a realistic assessment of economic ity of international law, and the UNCLOS in par- interests should tell them that a conlict is not ticular. Consequently, it will seek to avoid a con- worthwhile. he seabed areas which may be lict situation since, even if not an armed one, it contested are, after all, very deep down. It seems would prove to the world that the institutions unlikely that industrial activity there could set up under the UNCLOS do not work, which become proitable in several decades’ time. And would weaken the legitimacy of the Conven- the US Geological Survey, the most authoritative tion. And given the changing balance of power and much cited assessment of Arctic mineral in the world, as alluded to above, this would be resources, maintains that most resources are very dangerous for Russia. likely to be found in relatively shallower wa- Another extreme scenario would be to accept ters, within the 200-mile limit (U.S. Geological that the continental shelf does not reach as far Survey 2008). Most of these uncontroversial as claimed and come back with a revised, less continental shelves are virtually unexplored expansive position. his alternative would dei- and the conlicting parties would irst need to nitely show respect for international law. But develop these areas. 65 NORTHERN SEA ROUTE he physical and economic geography of the Dmitri Laptev and Sannikov straits, and passes NSR. Moscow deines the NSR as a histori- through three archipelagos, Novaya Zem- cally existing national uniied transport route lya, Severnaya Zemlya and the New Siberian of the Russian Federation in the Arctic, and Islands. he legal deinition is thus made more therefore considers it to be under its exclusive complex as there is not one single shipping jurisdiction. Although Russia’s Arctic coast- channel; rather, there are multiple lanes, and line stretches more than 14,000 km across the the NSR crosses through waters of varying sta- Barents, White, Kara, Laptev, and East Siberian tus: internal, territorial and adjacent waters, seas, the NSRis considered to lie between the exclusive economic zone, and the open sea Kara Gate, at the western entry of the Novaya (Dunlap 2002; Moe and Øystein 2010; Stepa- Zemlya straits, and the Provideniya Bay, at nov, Ørebech and Brubaker 2005). Indeed the the southern opening of the Bering Strait, for course of the route depends upon whether the a total length of 5,600 km. he Barents Sea is ship crosses close to the coastlines or further therefore not an integral part of the NSR’s le- out, or chooses to bypass Severnaya Zemlya. gal regime. he NSR includes nearly 60 straits, he NSR has been vitally important to the main ones being the Vilkitski, Shokalski, Russia both economically and socially since THE WATER AREA OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE ACCORDING TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL LAW OF JULY 28, 2012 68°35’Е Cape Zhelanie Novaya Zemlya 168°58’37”W Kara Gates RUSSIA 66°05’N Dezhnyov Cape Boundaries of the exclusive economic zone Boundaries of the water area of the Northern Sea Route Source: asmp.morflot.ru/en/granici_smp/ 66 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War the Soviet era. he NSR is now actively used he NSR’s competitive advantages. It is by such companies as Norilsk Nickel, Lukoil, widely acknowledged that an ice-free Arctic Gazprom, Rosneft, Rosshelf, and Novatek to could signiicantly reduce transportation costs ship products and supplies to and from their by cutting the distance from Western Europe plants, mines, oil and gas ields. It is also one to japan or China by 20% to 40%. All the Asian of the main routes for Russia’s “Northern sup- cities north of Hong Kong could reach Europe ply” which delivers foodstufs, consumer goods more rapidly via the Arctic than the Suez Ca- and fuel to the northernmost Russian settle- nal. As such, the potential beneits of opening ments. the NSR are of greater interest to japan, Korea In the Soviet era, the NSR was solely a do- and China than, for example, India. It’s easy mestic sea route and was closed to international to see why. he trip between Hamburg and shipping. However, as Arctic ice continues to Yokohama using the Suez Canal is 18,350 km, melt, the NSR will become more accessible compared to just 11,100 km using the NSR. for navigation. Today, Russia has signiicant his would cut sailing time from 22 to 15 days, interest in transforming the NSR into a sea a 40% reduction. From Rotterdam to Shang- line of communication open to international hai via the Cape of Good Hope is 22,200 km, trade (Dunlap 2002; Moe and Øystein 2010; and only 14,000 using the NSR. he volatility Ragner 2000). he cost of maintaining an in the Middle East, especially since the Arab Arctic leet, in particular icebreakers, as well as Spring of 2011, an overburdened Suez Canal, port infrastructure is extremely high, and so rising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and, any additional source of revenue is welcome. most importantly, growing piracy in the Horn As international navigation grows, the cost of of Africa, are all driving the search for new intra-Russian trade will decline. alternatives. VARIANTS OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE GREENLAND (DENMARK) CANADA ARCTIC OCEAN UNITED STATES North Pole (ALASKA) NORWAY CHUKCHI SEA Murmansk EAST SIBERIAN SEA Mys Shmidta BARENTS SEA Pevek KARA SEA LAPTEV SEA Arkhangel’sk Dikson Nordvik Khatanga Salekhard Tiksi Dudinka Igarka Coastal Route Transit Route Mid Route Over-the Pole Route Source: www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/images/north-sea-route-map1.gif 67 Mys Provideniya BERING SEA Crossing the Arctic would also shorten the NSR poses a number of signiicant challeng- transit from Russia to the North American es (Antrim 2010; Laruelle 2014, 176–181; Moe continent. Murmansk is only 9,600 km from and Øystein 2010; Smith and Giles 2007; Ste- Vancouver via the Bering Strait, but 16,000 panov, Ørebech and Brubaker 2005). First, the km via the Panama Canal. In 2007, Russia and disappearance of polar ice during the summer Canada both began talking about the idea of an does not mean that the Arctic Ocean will ever “Arctic bridge” connecting the Port of Churchill become totally ice-free. Ice can quickly form in in Manitoba to Murmansk. he idea had already a wide variety of locations and can take ships by been proposed some years before. OmniTRAX, surprise, reducing the predictability of travel. a major railroad operator that owns the Port of here will still be icebergs, and the danger of Churchill, had been in negotiations with the collision will remain considerable. Murmansk Shipping Company on the project. In Second, travelling in an extreme climate and 2007 and 2008, the irst shipments of Russian darkness during the Polar Night poses techni- fertilizer from Kaliningrad to the Farmers of cal challenges and requires ice-class vessels, North America cooperative of Saskatoon arrived including ice-breaking capacities. in Churchill from Murmansk. hird, there are numerous administrativetechnical barriers to be taken into account, such he NSR’s weaknesses. In contrast with the as the Russian demands that foreign ships pay optimistic expectations discussed above, some to charter icebreakers, access weather and ice re- international experts point out that travel along ports, and hire Russian pilots to guide vessels in THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE HAS BEEN VITALLY IMPORTANT TO RUSSIA BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY SINCE THE SOVIET ERA THE NORTHWEST PASSAGE AND NORTHERN SEA ROUTE Rotterdam Yokohama San Francisco The Northwest Passage Northern Sea Route Current route Current route Source: www.grida.no/graphicslib/detail/northern-sea-route-and-the-northwest-passage-compared-with-currently-used-shipping-routes_77e3 68 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War the straits. hese costs are considered too high established in the Regulations for Navigation by the main international shipping companies. on the Seaways of the NSR (1991), the Guide for Fourth, insurance tends to be very expensive, Navigation through the NSR, the Regulations as international insurance companies have to for the Design, Equipment and Supply of Vessels take into account the NSR’s unpredictability Navigating the NSR (1995), the Federal Law on both in terms of shipping times and conditions. the NSR (2012) and the Ministry of Transport’s Fifth, the NSR currently has a limited op- Rules of Navigation through the NSR (2013). erational rescue system, with only three rescue he latter two documents stipulate condi- centers in Dikson, Tiksi and Pevek. he num- tions of transit and impose new insurance re- ber of deep-water ports that are able to host quirements, under which responsibility for pos- ships in need of repairs is insuicient given sible environmental damage and pollution lies the considerable risk of collisions stemming with ship owners, and which set rather costly from unpredictable ice conditions and the lack tarifs for assistance and logistical information. of clearly deined lanes of direction. he Rus- Icebreaker assistance, sailing master services, sian government plans to build 10 search and radio communication and hydrographic infor- rescue centers along its Arctic coastline, but it mation are provided by the federal state unitary remains an open question whether these plans enterprises Atomlot (nuclear icebreakers, pilot will ever be realized and whether these centers services) and Rosmorport (diesel icebreakers) are suicient to bring the NSR up to the level of as well as by private companies such as the Far international safety standards. Eastern Shipping Company, Murmansk Ship- AS PART OF ITS EFFORT TO INTERNATIONALIZE THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE, MOSCOW HAS LAUNCHED A NUMBER OF INVESTMENT PROjECTS TO UPGRADE THE ROUTE’S INFRASTRUCTURE. TO THIS END IN 2012–2014 OVER 21 BILLION RUBLES ARE ALLOCATED Sixth, maritime traic in the Arctic region ping Company, the Murmansk transport branch will increase the risk of accidents, which pose of Norilsk Nickel, Lukoil (diesel icebreakers) and an environmental hazard. he recent interna- Ice Pilots Ltd (pilot services). he NSR Admin- tional agreement on preventing and ighting oil istration, which was revived in March 2013, con- spills in the Arctic signed at the Arctic Council siders applications to navigate the NSR, coordi- ministerial meeting in Kiruna (May 15, 2013) is nates the activities of the above companies and a helpful step in the efort to address environ- oversees navigation safety. mental threats but still insuicient to solve the problem. hese concerns, however, do not preclude he binding rules released by Russia’s Ministry of Transport have been accepted by major international insurance companies. However, both Russia and potential NSR users from the U.S. rejects them, believing that acceptance participating in ambitious plans to develop this of such regulations would mean recogniz- important Arctic route. ing Russia’s sovereignty beyond its territorial waters. he International Chamber of Com- Russia’s policies on the NSR. Moscow irst of- merce has expressed concerns, arguing that fered to open the NSR to international shipping the UNCLOS regime on straits used for interna- as early as 1967, with the beginning of détente tional navigation should take precedence over between the superpowers, but the idea didn’t go the rights of coastal states. Moreover, the U.S. anywhere. Mikhail Gorbachev repeated the ofer argues that under the regulations only foreign in his Murmansk speech (1987). he route was ships have to pay for possible environmental formally opened to international use in 1991, damage and pollution, while Russian ships are just a few months before the collapse of the exempt. Moscow denies that the regulations are Soviet Union. he rules for using the route were discriminatory, noting that all ships – Russian 69 SEARCH AND RESCUE CENTERS ON THE ARCTIC OCEAN’S COASTLINE AND THEIR ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY Area of Maritime Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) Murmansk Area of Marine Rescue Coordination Center (MRCC) Dikson Area of Marine Rescue Subcenter Archangelsk Marine Rescue Subcenter Port Tiksi Area of Marine Rescue Subcenter Pevek 1 2 2 3 4 1 5 1 1 Marine Rescue Coordination Center Port of Murmansk Marine operations Headquarters. Western sector of the Arctic (icebreakers) 2 Marine Rescue Coordination Center Port of Dikson 2 3 Marine Rescue Subcenter Port of Tiksi Marine operations Headquarters. Eastern sector 4 Marine Rescue Subcenter Port of Pevek of the Arctic(icebreakers) 5 Port of Provideniye Plane AN-26 Archangelsk airport Helicopter MI-8 Naryan-Mar airport Rescue assets and oil spill response equipment Source: www.arctic-lio.com/nsr_searchandrescue and foreign – must present civil liability and was only one “political case” in 2013 when the insurance certiicates when applying to use the application of the Green Peace icebreaker Arctic NSR (he Northern Sea Route Administration Sunrise was rejected four times by the NSR Ad- 2013). ministration. hree denials were based on the Legal disputes aside, since 2009 internation- lack of information on technical details (such al shipping companies have started consistently as the class of the vessel or its ice belt breadth), using the NSR. According to recent data, in 2013 and the fourth denial was based on the ship’s the NSR Administration received 701 applica- violation of the Regulations on Navigation tions from Russian and foreign companies,3 through the NSR: “Navigation in the water area 620 were approved4 and 81 were declined.5 of the Northern Sea Route from 24.08.2013 to he same sources estimate that freight traic 27.08.2013 without permission of the Northern through the NSR exceeded one million metric Sea Route Administration, as well as actions tons in 2013 (Ol’shevski 2013). taken that created a threat of marine pollution Contrary to Western assumptions, almost all rejected applications were declined on purely in the water area of the Northern Sea Route, which is covered in ice for most of the year”.7 As part of its efort to internationalize the technical grounds, such as incomplete information on the ships listed on the application or NSR, Moscow has launched a number of invest- lack of proper documentation. In fact, more ap- ment projects to upgrade the route’s infrastruc- plications for Russian vessels were rejected than ture. To this end in 2012–2014 over 21 billion for foreign ones (63 and 18 respectively).6 here rubles are allocated for the construction and 70 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Viev on the Pevek harbor’s environs modernization of maritime infrastructure in the Arctic.8 Some experts expect the volume structure, it will remain a priority of Russia’s strategy in the Arctic region going forward. of freight traic in both Eastern and Western he Kremlin considers the NSR an efective re- directions of the NSR to reach 35–40 million source for developing the Russian Arctic Zone metric tons per year by 2020,9 while others con- both domestically and internationally. For this tinue to have serious doubts about not only the reason, Moscow plans to make considerable prospects of the NSR as an alternative route to investments in the NSR and bring its infra- southern ones but also about the need for infra- structure in line with international standards. structure development in the High North. hese However, as with other aspects of its Arctic analysts believe that Russia has more impor- policy, Russia faces a diicult dilemma: how tant priorities, such as developing the national to maintain control over the NSR while also transportation system. opening it up to international cooperation Despite some legal inconsistencies surrounding the NSR and the lack of proper infra- and integration with the global transportation system. 71 CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT Both Russian policymakers and academics afects them directly or indirectly in many acknowledge the manifold efects of climate ways. Moreover, they have a lot to ofer their change on society, the economy and interna- international partners. Many of them have tional relations in the Arctic region. Along with considerable experience in polar research and environmental and societal implications, climate some (like China, japan and South Korea) have change contributes to the existing instability in money to invest both in Arctic research and the Arctic region, and may lead to disputes over the regional economy. It is also important to trade routes, maritime zones and previously in- remember that the Arctic Climate Impacts As- accessible resources. his competition could pose sessment (2004), the irst comprehensive study security threats to particular countries of the re- on the impacts of climate change in the Arctic gion and contribute to international instability. region, was carried out under the auspices of ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC HAVE CAUSED CHANGES IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR, SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Moscow is aware of the fact that, in contrast with Antarctica, the Arctic region lacks a the Arctic Council, of which all eight Arctic states are members. proper international legal regime to cope with Eastern Asian states also believe that the security threats and challenges, including en- Arctic is an asset that belongs to all of human- vironmental ones. he Arctic-5 (the ive Arctic ity, and, hence, its natural resources and trans- coastal states – Canada, Denmark/Greenland, port routes can and should be exploited by all Norway, Russia, and the United States) deliber- the countries of the world. he Arctic should ately seek to avoid signing any binding agree- be maximally “internationalized” (opened to ment on regional security so as not to encum- international access and cooperation) and the ber themselves in the unfolding geopolitical coastal states should ratchet down their na- race for the division of the Arctic continental tional egoism with regard to the High North, shelf. he absence of a legal regime impedes while respecting the Arctic-5’s legitimate international cooperation on environmental rights in the region, including their exclusive security in the Arctic and hampers the search economic zones. for ways to adapt regional ecosystems, as well As underscored by Russian experts, the as socioeconomic and cultural institutions, to environmental efects of climate change in the climate change. Arctic have caused changes in human behavior, he situation is complicated by the inter- socioeconomic development and international ference of non-coastal Arctic states (Finland, relations. he areas where climate change pos- Iceland, Sweden) and non-Arctic states (China, es both challenges and opportunities include India, japan, South Korea, UK, etc.) in climate isheries, production of hydrocarbons, trans- change-related disputes. hese states claim port systems, tourism, and national security. a legitimate right to contribute to regional environmental cooperation, as climate change Fisheries. Russian specialists argue that cli- in the Arctic has global implications and mate change has the potential to increase the 72 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War productivity of some ish stocks and change opposed the 2010 Russian-Norwegian treaty the geographical distributions of others. New on delimiting maritime zones, believing that areas may become attractive for ishing due the division of zones is more beneicial for to the increased access allowed by reduced sea Norwegian ishers. he beneits of climate ice coverage. here is not yet an international change for commercial ishing in the Nor- conservation and management regime in place wegian “part” of the Barents Sea have also for some waters of the Arctic high seas, which prompted Oslo to push for revision of the 1920 could lead to unregulated commercial ishing Paris Treaty on Svalbard, which establishes and related disputes. an international regime for economic ac- For example, isheries have become a bone tivities on the archipelago. Russia and other of contention in accession negotiations be- signatories oppose Norway’s calls for revision. tween the EU and Iceland. Reykjavik feels here have been repeated encounters between uneasy about providing EU member states Russian trawlers ishing around the Svalbard with access to its economic zone, while Brus- and the Norwegian coast guard, which tried to sels insists on an end to whale hunting in arrest them. which Iceland is involved along with Norway and japan. Russian-Norwegian bilateral tensions are Hydrocarbons. Retreating ice opens up new commercial opportunities for gas and petro- also driven by the conlict over commercial leum production. New industrial development ishing. Particularly, the Russian ishing lobby in the High North will not take place ofshore NEW INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE HIGH NORTH WILL NOT TAKE PLACE OFFSHORE ONLY. THERE IS ALSO HUGE POTENTIAL FOR NEW ONSHORE ACTIVITY IN THE GAS/PETROLEUM INDUSTRY Champ Island. he Franz josef Land Federal Nature Reserve 73 only. here is also huge potential for new on- the gas/petroleum industry and the transport shore activity in the gas/petroleum industry. and military sectors. hese developments will his could increase competition between the necessitate large-scale socioeconomic programs ive coastal states for control over continen- to help local populations adapt to these radical tal shelf and maritime zones, as well as cause changes. conlicts between the Arctic-5 and non-coastal states (such as Finland, Sweden, UK, China, ja- Militarization. Increasing competition for pan, South Korea, India, etc.) who would like to trade routes, maritime zones and natural re- participate in the exploitation of Arctic natural sources continues to drive a military build-up resources. he role of international agreements in certain coastal states and the intensiica- (especially UNCLOS) and bodies (UN CLCS) are tion of NATO military activities in the region. particularly important in this regard. In contrast with the Cold War era, when the global confrontation between the superpowers Transport. Retreating ice opens up new op- or military blocs deined military decision- portunities for shipping as well, including making, the current military eforts by Arctic more intensive use of the Northern Sea Route states are about protecting economic interests (NSR) and North-West Passage (NWP). his and asserting national sovereignty over mari- may increase competition between coastal time zones and trade routes. and non-coastal states for the control of these passages and highlight the need for new legal hese developments will have an extremely negative impact on international security in CLIMATE CHANGE CAN EXPAND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TOURISM/ RECREATION INDUSTRY IN THE ARCTIC regimes as well as transport and search/rescue the region. Many Russian experts advocate for infrastructure. China, japan and South Korea special arms control measures for the Arctic and (the nations most interested in using these new legal mechanisms to solve climate change- sea routes) insist that the NSR and NWP are related conlicts. humankind’s assets, or commons, and should be internationalized and made available for ev- International cooperation and Governance. eryone. Russia and Canada, on the other hand, Moscow recognizes the challenge posed by believe that they have priority in these areas climate change and included it in its recent for reasons of geographic proximity and his- Arctic strategy. Russia has called for improve- tory. Both Moscow and Ottawa plan to develop ments to the United Nations Framework these routes and create there more advanced Convention on Climate Change and the con- infrastructure. tinuation of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment project, which was jointly implemented Tourism. Given the potential of climate change by the AC and the International Arctic Science to expand opportunities in the tourism/rec- Committee. reation industry in the Arctic, both individual Moscow also realizes that there is still a long countries and international organizations way to go to create an eicient multilateral should continue to support sustainable Arctic system of governance to both adapt the region tourism, and welcome eforts to minimize its to climate change and prevent related conlicts impact on the environment. Environmental between various international players in the protection and beneits to local coastal commu- Arctic. nities should be primary considerations. Environmental protection and cooperation in Russia’s Arctic strategy dates back to 1987 Migration. Climate change promises to in- speech (Gorbachev 1987.) hat speech led to vari- crease migration by indigenous populations ous environmental initiatives, such as Finland’s due to radical restructuring of the economy and 1989 initiative on Arctic environmental protec- traditional ways of life, and by the workforce in tion cooperation, which resulted in a number 74 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War of technical and scientiic reports between 1989 on behalf of the governments of Finland, Ice- and 1991. his ultimately led to the development land, Norway and Sweden (NEFCO 2013). of the Arctic Environment Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991 (Heininen 2004, 208–209). he Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the At the national level, a program to clean up the Franz joseph Land Archipelago was launched by the Russian government in 2011. Arctic Council have emerged as the main inter- According to then Prime Minister Vladimir Pu- national forums to discuss and solve Arctic en- tin, the government allocated 2.3 billion rubles vironmental problems. he BEAC approved the (approximately USD 77 million) to the program “Barents Environmental Hot Spot List” in 2010 to clear the archipelago of barrels of waste oil based on a report by the Nordic Environment by 2015. Wrangel Island and Russian villages Finance Corporation (NEFCO) and the Arctic on Spitsbergen are next in line. In addition, a Council’s 2003 Arctic Monitoring and Assess- comprehensive analysis of the environment is ment Program (AMAP). he list included 42 “hot planned in another seven major Arctic zones spots” in the Barents Region, all of them situ- (Putin 2011). ated in the Russian part of the Barents Euro- It should be noted that Russia still lacks a Arctic Region (BEAR) (BEAC 2011). In 2013, the sound and coherent environmental strategy in eight-step process to eliminate the hot spots the Arctic. In recognition of this, Russia’s recent began with the inancial support of the Barents Arctic doctrine, Strategy-2013, calls on relevant Hot Spots Facility, which is managed by NEFCO agencies to develop one in the near future. 75 RUSSIA’S ENERGY POLICIES IN THE ARCTIC More than 200 prospective oil and gas ields and by rescinding the 30 percent export duty on over 20 proven or expected ields are located in pipeline gas,13 is said to be the main reason for the seabed of the Arctic Ocean, primarily in the the delay. As a result, the SDAG is about to do a Barents Sea and Kara Sea. comprehensive review of the technological plan Under current Russian law (Federal Law 1992), for the Shtokman ield’s development,14 which only state-owned oil and gas companies (more may alter the project’s schedule, postponing the than 50% of shares owned by the state) may start of gas recovery indeinitely. here was a participate in the development of ofshore ields. danger that Gazprom might decide even to delay hus, the main actors are Gazprom, Rosneft and the start of oil recovery from the Prirazlomnoye Zarubezhneft. In the Arctic, Gazprom is mainly re- ield15 if the government can’t come to a decision sponsible for gas ields, while Rosneft for oil ields. on tax breaks for Arctic ofshore ields. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING AND PROTECTION, AS WELL AS THE ENVIRONMENTAL SAFETY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS, REMAINS ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF OFFSHORE DRILLING IN THE ARCTIC Unlike Gazprom, which seems conident Opinions vary on the prospects of ofshore oil and gas extraction by Russian companies. On the about the success of the Prirazlomnoye project, gas side, projects like Shtokman have been under Rosneft actively promotes an internationalized development for several years, but only mod- model of ofshore drilling in the Arctic. Rosneft est progress has been made to date. In Febru- has gained the right to explore and extract oil ary 2008, Gazprom (Russia), Total (France) and resources from most ields on Russia’s Arctic Statoil (Norway) formed the Shtokman Develop- shelf. In 2012, Rosneft bought three blocks in ment AG (SDAG) to implement the irst of three the Barents Sea – Fedynsky, Perseyevsky and phases to explore the Shtokman ield, which Tsentralno-Barentsevsky/Central-Barents16 – was discovered in 1988 and has total estimated for almost 925 million rubles (approximately reserves of 3.9 trillion cubic meters of gas and 56 $32 million).17 Recently, Rosneft has contracted million tons of gas-condensate.10 Gas recovery with several foreign and domestic Russian oil was expected to start in 2016 (with production companies to explore twelve ofshore oil ields of liqueied natural gas to begin in 2017), but in in the Barents Sea and Kara Sea, ofering them june 2011 Gazprom submitted a request to the 33.3% stakes in each of the twelve projects. he Subsurface Management Agency with a request Italian company Eni received two blocks – Fe- to postpone the start of gas recovery by one to dynsky and Tsentralno-Barentsevsky – in the two years. Following this, the SDAG board of di- former “grey zone” or disputed area of the rectors decided to postpone the inal investment Barents Sea. Norway’s Statoil got the third decision till july 1, 2012.11 Total later announced and northernmost part of the grey zone, the that the company would be ready to take the Perseyevsky block.18 he Admiralteyskaya and inal decision only in 2013.12 he unwillingness Pakhtusovskaya structures in the Barents Sea, of Russian authorities to create more favor- as well as other potential oil ields owned by able tax conditions for the project, for example Rosneft, will be or already have been ofered 76 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War to the Russian oil companies Lukoil, TNK-BP, “he platform is made from second hand spare Bashneft, and Surgutneftegaz.19 parts [accommodation, technical and drilling In the Kara Sea, the Vostochno-Prinovoze- modules – ed. G.Y.], which are not designed for melsky (East Prinovozemelsky) block went to drilling in ice-covered Arctic waters,” said Andrei ExxonMobil. As reported on the Rosneft website, Zolotkov, Director of the environmental NGO “in the Kara Sea, plans are under way to imple- Bellona Murmansk.23 Bellona together with ment seismic and environmental programs for other environmental NGOs (Greenpeace Russia, the East Prinovozemelsky block later this year WWF and others) requested documents on the in anticipation of a potential exploration well oil-spill prevention technology at the Prira- in 2014.”20 he cost of the project is estimated zlomnaya IRSP, which Gazprom denied, citing to reach $50 billion.21 he creation of the Arctic technological secrecy. Research and Design Center for Ofshore Devel- he activists then appealed to then Prime opments there will support research on devel- Minister Putin in a letter24 to suspend the oping Arctic ofshore ields and environmental project until Gazprom provides clariications on monitoring. the oil spill prevention technology being used. Environmental monitoring and protection, as he letter, signed by more than ten thousand well as the environmental safety of technologi- people according to Bellona, got lost in the cal solutions, remains one of the main problems interiors of the government.25 Later Gazprom of ofshore drilling in the Arctic. Currently, made assurances that they will organize info environmentalists in Russia are reviewing the seminars on technological issues to show that technology used at the Prirazlomnaya Arctic- the project is transparent.26 However, the class ofshore ice-resistant stationary platform meeting did not take place, convincing envi- (IRSP), the irst of its kind, which was assembled ronmentalists that Gazprom is unable, both at the Sevmash shipyard in Severodvinsk. Russia technically and inancially, to develop and uses the caisson (the lower part of the platform) execute a reliable Oil Spill Contingency Plan for constructed at Sevmash (construction lasted the Prirazlomnoye ield.27 hus, the environmental risks involved in from mid-1990s till late 2000s) and the topside facilities as well as the main hull de-mated from ofshore oil drilling are high in the Arctic. Since the out-of-service Hutton Tension Leg Plat- Gazprom remains the sole owner of the project, form,22 which was originally installed in 1984. there is no other avenue for inluencing it other he Prirazlomnaya oil rig in the Barents Sea 77 than oicial pressure by the Russian govern- stability” of the Putin regime, is highly depen- ment. However, in that case the government dent on the exploitation of new production would put pressure on itself, as Gazprom is a ields. In 2013, the Russian Government and the state-owned company. Again, the Kremlin is State Duma, acting under pressure from Gaz- highly interested in this project from an eco- prom and Rosneft, formulated economic incen- nomic standpoint, which promises to bring tives to encourage the development of Arctic about 500 million rubles ($17 million) in revenue ofshore resources. he amendments to legisla- annually to the budget of the Nenets Autono- tion became efective in 2014. Rosneft President mous Area alone. here is hope that ramping up Igor Sechin said that these innovations “will ac- the volumes of ofshore oil production combined tually double the incentives for the development with some international pressure would make of hard to recover oil reserves to $54.80 per barrel Russian oil and gas companies, as well as the and increase the efectiveness of new ofshore oil Russian authorities, assume responsibility for projects by nearly 150%.”30 he package includes the following tax and environmental protection in the Arctic in deed and not just in theory. customs incentives:31 1. Zero export customs duty (efective for proj- he other challenge with oil and gas extraction in the Russian Arctic is the tax regime for ects in the north of the Barents Sea and in the ofshore drilling. As mentioned earlier, Gazprom Eastern Arctic until March 31, 2042). 2. An ad valorem mineral tax for the new announced that it will postpone oil extraction at Prirazlomnaya if the government refuses to ofshore deposits in the Arctic where commercial GROWTH OF RUSSIA’S HYDROCARBONS-DRIVEN ECONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY THE “POLITICAL STABILITY” OF THE PUTIN REGIME, IS HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON THE EXPLOITATION OF NEW PRODUCTION FIELDS pass a tax break for ofshore drilling. SDAG’s production will begin no sooner than in 2016, for delay in making a inal investment decision on which the mineral tax rate will amount to 5% for the Shtokman ield is also reported to be closely oil and 1% for natural gas. 3. A separate procedure for calculating the related to iscal incentives. In response, in spring of 2012, then Prime Minister Putin announced taxable proits of the new ofshore deposits. 4. Tax exemptions for company property a list of prospective tax beneits for ofshore projects. All potential ofshore projects will be located on the continental shelf and zero trans- divided into four categories according to an “in- port tax for stationary and loating platforms, tegral index” relecting sea depth, technological ofshore drilling rigs and vessels. complexity, infrastructure, and ice conditions.28 In fact, a new tax program has been approved All new ofshore ields will be exempt from ex- in Russia for the production of ofshore resources port duties; the most complex projects – those in in the Arctic. While this will not resolve all of the northern Arctic – will be subject to a ive per- the many challenges to energy production in the cent mineral production tax. It is expected that Arctic Ocean that include the lack of technol- the new tax legislation for ofshore projects will ogy and global energy prices, it is a major step come into efect by 2013. However, the ongoing toward Russia’s goal of retaining its status as an projects of Gazprom, such as Prirazlomnaya and Arctic power. Shtokman, are not covered by the new legisla- Finally, the general development of Rus- tion. hus, the Ministry of Finance will have to sia’s hydrocarbon-driven economy in the Arctic discuss the issue of export duties and tax breaks has a lot to do with energy security, which is separately with SDAG and Gazprom Neft Shelf, a global and highly (geo)strategic issue. Fur- the owner of Shtokman (a wholly owned subsid- ther, it leads to the an “Arctic paradox” in iary of Gazprom).29 which increased utilization of of-shore hydro- In sum, the growth of Russia’s hydrocarbonsdriven economy, and consequently the “political carbons as a result of climate change leads to more rapid climate and other change. 78 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War RUSSIAN MILITARY POLICIES IN THE ARCTIC Contrary to Western alarmists’ worries about strategic bomber and strategic nuclear sub- Moscow’s military preeminence in the Arctic, marines, and naval patrols, as well as land and Russia has scaled back its military presence naval exercises. he air force is a central element in Mos- in the region considerably over the last two decades, and both components of the Rus- cow’s eforts to project power in the region. sian Armed Forces in the region – naval and Over-lights of Russian military aircraft in air force – are inferior to NATO forces (see also the Arctic fell from 500 per year during the Konyshev and Sergunin, forthcoming). Soviet period in the 1990s and the 2000s. In Moreover, in contrast with the Cold War 2007, Russian strategic bombers lew over the period when Russian military strategies in the Arctic for the irst time since the end of the Arctic were dictated by the logic of global politi- Cold War. Two Tu-95MS, based in the Saratov cal and military confrontation between the two Region at the Engels aviation base with mid- superpowers (USSR and USA) and military blocs light refueling capability, now regularly pa- (Warsaw Pact and NATO), Moscow’s current mil- trol the Arctic. hese over-lights drew heavy itary policies in the region are driven by com- criticism from Norway, Canada, the UK and pletely diferent motives. As the threat of global the U.S. which view the patrols as evidence of nuclear war has disappeared, these strategies Russia’s return to Soviet-like military practices now aim to achieve three major goals: to assert and growing strategic ambitions in the Arctic. Russian sovereignty in the region; to protect However, most authoritative Western mili- Russia’s economic interests in the High North; tary experts recognize that the resumption of and to demonstrate that Russia remains a great strategic bomber patrols in the Arctic may be power with world-class military capabilities. more about Moscow’s desire not to lose capaci- Russia demonstrates its military power and regional presence in the Arctic mainly with ties, and see them, above all, as a political tool rather than the sign of a renewed aggressive- he Tupolev Tu-160 strategic bomber in light 79 THE RUSSIAN, U.S. AND NATO ARMED FORCES IN THE ARCTIC THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE ARCTIC USSR in 1980s Russia in 2010s Submarines 172 30 of them SSBN 39 7 10–12 (6–7 in Arctic) 1–2 2 1 74 17 Auxiliary vessels 200 33 Aircrafts 400 100 — 40 SSBN in permanent patrol Aircraft carriers Lager ships Helicopters U.S. AND NATO FORCES CAPABLE TO OPERATE IN THE ARCTIC U.S. in 1980s U.S. in 2010s NATO in 2010s 85 Submarines 78 33 of them SSBN 28 6 8 SSBN in permanent patrol — 6-8 — Submarines armed with cruise missiles Tomahawk — 39 — 7 4 6 Lager ships 90 49 100 Ships fAircraftor landing troops 24 14 — 700 360 200 Aircraft carriers Aircrafts Source: Arbatov, A. Arktika i strategicheskaya stabil’nost (2011) Arktika: Zona Mira I Sotrudnichestva ness in the region (Lasserre et al. 2012, Laruelle age of mid-air refueling tankers remains the 2014, 128–129). most serious limitation on the operational ca- Russia’s capabilities to conduct air op- pabilities of Russian strategic aviation. Several erations in the Arctic rest on a leet of ageing Arctic air bases have been reactivated in Anadyr, long- and medium-range bombers. here are Monchegorsk, Olenia, Tiksi, and Vorkuta, al- 63 turbo-propelled Tu-95MSs which are very old though their capacities are quite limited. (designed in the 1950s) but still the mainstays of No credible plans to modernize this leet Russian strategic aviation. he Russian air force have been announced. In 2009, the Russian also has 18 more modern, long-range Tu-160 government granted a contract to the Tupolev Blackjacks bombers, as well as 80 Tu-22M Back- company to develop a new stealth bomber, the ire medium bombers, which were especially PAK-DA, to replace the Tu-22M, the Tu-160 and feared by NATO in the Cold War period for their the Tu-95MS. he prototype is scheduled to ly anti-ship capabilities. It should be noted that in 2020, and the aircraft is expected to enter these are not stealth planes, and they are easily service only in 2025–30. However, these plans detected when lying at high altitude, despite can be changed if other programs (for example, the electronic countermeasures recently added the 5th generation ighter Sukhoi T-50/PAK-FA) to the Tu-160 and Tu-22M. Moreover, the short- become a more important priority for the Rus80 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War sian Air Force. Because of the lengthy timeframe frigates will not be enough to renew Russia’s for the development of the PAK-DA, the decision ocean-going surface ships. Maintaining the Northern Fleet’s nuclear was made to upgrade the Tu-22M and produce 10 more Tu-160s before 2020. Some experts sug- deterrence capabilities is crucial for its future. gest that many of the current Russian strategic Russia’s older sea-based nuclear deterrent is in and medium-range bombers will no longer be the process of extensive modernization. Behind operational by 2025–2030, leaving the Air Force is the fact that the Arctic Ocean, with its sea ice, with only its ageing Tu-160 and Tu-95 leet. has retained its strategic signiicance for the Russia resumed long-range naval patrols major nuclear weapon states being still the best in diferent parts of the world in 2007, most sanctuary for strategic nuclear submarines to prominently the patrols of the nuclear-powered maintain the global deterrence by the capability guided-missile cruiser Peter the Great through for the revenge strike (Heininen 2013, 104). Pres- the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas, and ently, Russia has six operational Delta III and six the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. In 2008, Delta IV strategic submarines. According to the Russia conirmed that it was expanding opera- Russian Defense Ministry, there are no plans to tions in the Arctic. he Navy resumed its war- modernize the older Delta III class submarines. ship presence in the Arctic Ocean, with military hey were built during the 1980s and will be ships patrolling near Norwegian and Danish decommissioned in the near future. Only the defense zones. It also increased the operational Delta IV submarines will receive upgrades, in- radius of the Northern Fleet’s submarines, and cluding a new sonar system and the new Sineva RUSSIA DEMONSTRATES ITS MILITARY POWER AND REGIONAL PRESENCE IN THE ARCTIC MAINLY WITH STRATEGIC BOMBER AND NAVAL PATROLS, AS WELL AS LAND AND NAVAL EXERCISES under-ice training for submariners has become intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (Skif a priority task. SSN-23), which entered service in 2007. Sineva is Russia has ambitious plans to modernize a third-generation liquid-propelled ICBM with its naval forces deployed in the High North. For a range of 8,300 km and can carry either four or example, after the Peter the Great’s successful ten nuclear warheads.32 Russia is planning to trip around the world in 2008–2009, the Defense equip its Delta IV class submarines with at least Ministry announced that it would upgrade three 100 Sinevamissiles, which are to remain on alert other heavy nuclear-powered missile cruis- until 2030. he Sineva missiles can be launched ers, the Admiral Lazarev, the Admiral Nakhi- from under the ice while remaining invisible to mov and the Admiral Ushakov. Currently, the enemy satellites until the last moment (Lasserre Admiral Kuznetsov, the only Russian aircraft et al. 2012, Laruelle 2014, 122). Another class of Russian strategic subma- carrier,operates with the Northern Fleet, hosting twenty ighters and ten anti-submarine helicop- rines, the Typhoon – considered the world’s ters on board. he recently repaired destroyer the largest – will be re-equipped with long-range Vice-Admiral Kulakov was integrated into the cruise missiles. So far, only one Typhoon-class Northern Fleet in 2011. Naval aviation includes strategic submarine, the Dmitri Donskoy, has 200 combat aircraft and ifty helicopters. been modernized and deployed to the North- Among the challenges facing the Northern ern Fleet. It conducts test iring for the Bulava Fleet is the need for coastal ships and frigates system, a new generation solid-fuel SLBM with able to conduct rapid intervention operations. a range of over 9,000 km, designed to counter Several are currently under construction, but possible future U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense there have already been numerous delays. he weapons.33 Future plans call for the Typhoon-class project – routinely delayed – to build eight Admiral Gorshkov-class and six Krivak-class submarines to be replaced with new Borey81 he Peter the Great cruiser in the Strelok Gulf MAINTAINING THE NORTHERN FLEET’S NUCLEAR DETERRENCE CAPABILITIES IS CRUCIAL FOR ITS FUTURE class fourth-generation nuclear-powered stra- completed by 2020, which seems too ambi- tegic submarines. he irst Borey-class subma- tious to be achievable. rine, the Yuri Dolgoruky – the irst strategic To provide logistical and administrative sup- submarine built in Russia since the collapse port to the Northern Fleet, the Arctic Center for of the Soviet Union – has been in operation Material and Technical Support with a staf of with the Northern Fleet since january 2013. over 15,000 was created in 2012. Two other Borey-class submarines, the Alex- As for land forces, the 200th Independent ander Nevsky and the Vladimir Monomakh, Motorized Infantry Brigade, with specially are undergoing sea trials, while the fourth, the trained soldiers and modern personal equip- Prince Vladimir, is under construction at the ment for military operations in the Arctic, will Severodvinsk shipyard.34 hese three sub- be based at Pechenga close to the Norwegian marines will be part of the Paciic Fleet. he border town of Kirkenes and be operational by rest of the Borey-class submarines to join the 2016. Northern Fleet will be based at the Gadzhievo Along with the Army, Air Force and Navy, naval base (about 100 km from the Norwegian eforts have been made to strengthen moni- border), where new infrastructure is being toring by the Border Guards Service (subordi- built to host them. his new generation of nated to the Federal Security Service – FSS) in Russian strategic submarines is almost unde- the region. An Arctic border guards unit was tectable at great ocean depths. Furthermore, created as early as 1994. Its aim was to moni- taken into account that it has several types of tor the movement of ships and illegal ishing. cruise missiles and torpedoes, it will be able to he unit was reorganized in 2004–2005. In carry out multi-purpose missions, including 2009, it was announced that new Arctic units attacks on enemy aircraft carriers and mis- had been established at border guard stations sile strikes on coastal targets. According to the in Arkhangelsk and Murmansk to patrol the Defense Ministry’s plans, the building of eight NSR for the irst time since the collapse of the Borey-class submarines (four for the Northern Soviet Union. Now border guards are tasked Fleet and four for the Paciic Fleet) should be with addressing new, soft security threats and 82 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War he nuclear submarine (APL) «Vladimir Monomakh» before being launched into the water in Severodvinsk challenges such as establishing reliable border a view to a better monitoring of the Arctic, but control systems, introducing special visa regu- this is far from an arms race. As the Canadian lations in certain regions, and implementing Standing Committee on National Defense technological controls in luvial zones and sites concluded in its 2010 report,35 “there is no im- along the NSR. It is currently monitored from mediate military threat to Canadian territories. the air by border guard aircraft and on the land […] he challenges facing the Arctic are not of and sea by the North-Eastern Border Guard the traditional military type. […] Rather than Agency. he Russian border guards further sovereignty threats we face what might best be plan to establish a global monitoring network termed policing threats. hese do not require extending from Murmansk to Wrangel Island. combat capability.” Given Moscow’s military strategies in the In all, Moscow plans to build 20 border guard stations along the coast of the Arctic Ocean region, it is safe to assume that Russian ambi- (Zagorski 2013). tions in the Arctic region may be high, but they All forces (army, navy, border guards and the are still far from being realized, and they do not Ministry of Emergency Situations) are charged necessarily imply intentions and proper capa- with implementing the 2011 Arctic Council bilities of confronting other regional players by agreement to build a Maritime and Aeronauti- military means (Laruelle 2014, 128–129; Lasserre cal Sea and Rescue System (SAR). Each country et al. 2012; Zagorski 2013). Russia may be eager is responsible for its sector of the Arctic, with to build a powerful military presence in the Russia’s being the biggest. he SAR agreement’s Arctic, but will encounter diiculties imple- signatories undertake joint exercises on a regu- menting plans to modernize its strategic air lar basis. Many experts see the SAR activities force, re-establish a strong navy, modernize its as a clear sign of the shift from purely military leet of strategic submarines, commission new functions to soft security missions. icebreakers and replace old ones, and establish According to numerous military analysts, new monitoring capabilities for FSS border con- Russian modernization programs do not af- trol and SAR units. It is doubtful that Russia has fect the regional military balance. Other Arctic the inancial and technical capacities, as well as coastal states have also begun to upgrade their the managerial acumen, to meet these objec- military equipment and military doctrines with tives in the foreseeable future. 83 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES POLICY IN THE ARCTIC Experts believe that “contemporary Russia is Peoples of the North, Siberia and Far East of the pursuing a less articulated and responsive policy Russian Federation adopted a resolution that toward its northern territories” (Ryabova 2010, recognized that “some work has been done by 132). his has special bearing on the indigenous the federal authorities” while also including a peoples who constitute a signiicant part of the list of unsolved development problems facing population. Twenty seven indigenous groups, indigenous peoples prepared by the Russian totaling about 200 thousand people, live in the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, High North of Russia, where they carry on an- Siberia and the Far East (RAIPON). he list cient cultures and traditions (Savelyeva, Savelyev included such problems as inefective manage- 2010, 75). Although “improving the quality of ment of development eforts; the absence of life of indigenous peoples and their economic efective mechanisms to engage indigenous activities” is mentioned as a strategic prior- peoples in the decision-making process; lawed ity in he fundamentals of state policy of the legislation lacking provisions guaranteeing Russian Federation in the Arctic in the period some speciic rights set forth in the Constitu- up to 2020 and beyond” (2008), it wasn’t until tion of the Russian Federation; and the impos- February 2009 that a special document was sibility of upholding the right to use lands and released, entitled “Concept for the Sustainable other natural resources required for maintain- Development of Small Indigenous Peoples of the ing the traditional way of life, economy and North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian occupations of indigenous peoples (RAIPON Federation” (Concept 2009). he document de- Resolution 2009). scribes the measures undertaken by federal and Despite the apparent similarity of the ap- regional authorities over the preceding 15 years, proaches advocated by the government and such as federal and regional target programs,36 RAIPON, the actions taken by the federal gov- legislation providing government support (in ernment following the adoption of the Con- the form of incentives, subsidies, quotas on the cept were met with bewilderment among the use of biological resources), and active participa- representatives of Russia’s indigenous peoples tion in the International Decade of the World’s of the North. In October 2009, Olga Murashko, Indigenous People (1995–2004) and Second RAIPON’s Information Center Director, posted International Decade of the World’s Indigenous an article criticizing the incoherence of gov- People (2005–2015). At the same time, it also ernment policy and its disregard for RAIPON’s recognizes the serious socioeconomic problems positions and work (Murashko 2009). Years after facing indigenous peoples (the incompatibility the adoption of the Concept, the situation re- of their traditional way of life with current eco- mains unclear. While executive authorities have nomic conditions, the low economic competi- introduced new documents emphasizing the tiveness of traditional occupations, increased importance of support for indigenous people, incidence of diseases, elevated infant mortality organized numerous activities within the rates, alcoholism, etc.37). Implementing the Con- framework of the Second International Decade cept should foster favorable conditions for the of the World’s Indigenous People,38 and trans- sustainable development of indigenous peoples ferred millions of rubles to the regional budgets in the Russian Arctic, which entails raising their for the support of indigenous peoples,39 repre- quality of life to match the average in Russia sentatives of indigenous peoples do not believe and cutting the infant mortality rate at least in these eforts have been suicient. “he Con- half between 2007 and 2025. cept – a very important document – has failed. In April 2009, two months after the release of the Concept, the 6th Congress of Indigenous he implementation measures for this Concept include only what the Ministry of Regional 84 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Development inds relevant; and even those spent eiciently, that the increased funds did measures, to my deep regret, have not been not result in a noticeable improvement in the met,” the former irst vice president of RAIPON, lives of indigenous people (living standards Pavel Sulyadziga, said to Prime Minister Putin are lower than average in related regions; the in july 2011.40 RAIPON’s position echoes the position of the unemployment rate is 1.5–2 times higher than the national average), and that the core prob- Public Chamber of Russia and the Upper House lem is imperfect legislation that still has to be (Federation Council) of the Russian Parliament. improved.42 he dispute over Russia’s policy toward In September 2011, the Public Chamber hosted the round table “Legislative development of indigenous peoples intensiied with the Rus- the rights of indigenous peoples of the North, sian Ministry of justice’s attempt to close down Siberia and the Far East: Issues and horizons.” RAIPON in 2012–2013. he directive from the he round table’s conclusions were rather ministry was received a month after RAIPON pessimistic: federal legislation on indigenous submitted the report to the United Nations Hu- peoples’ rights is moving backward (members man Rights Council criticizing the Russian au- of indigenous groups now have to prove their thorities for neglecting the rights and problems nationality in court to be able to hunt, ish and of indigenous people.43 Although former president of the organiza- receive their pensions); the federal government is not developing its own proposals to the Forest tion, Sergey Kharyuchi, has managed to keep Code, Land Code, and Water Code, nor does it RAIPON open, the indigenous peoples saw it as support the legislative initiatives of the Federa- the government’s attempt to squeeze them and tion Council; and there is still no progress in their rights in the Arctic. As the organization’s legislation on health, education and support of irst vice president, Rodion Sulyaudziga, said, indigenous peoples’ languages.41 In April 2012 “there has been a considerable increase in the the Federation Council discussed the Audit level of industrialization in the north, and the Chamber’s report on the use of federal funds to indigenous peoples are among the last barri- support indigenous people in 2009 and 2010. ers against the companies’ and state’s pursuit he report concluded that the funds were not of its resources.” He also said that the authori- Herders with their harnessed sled at the event 85 POPULATION IN THE ARCTIC REGIONS OF THE WORLD, THOUSAND PEOPLE 43 Northwest Territories 12 Nunavik (northern Quebec) 32 Nunavut 33 Yukon CANADA U.S.A. 649 Alaska 58 GREENLAND 313 (DENMARK) ICELAND 49 Faroe Islands Orkney Islands 20 ARCTIC OCEAN Nordland NORWAY 49 Chukotka Autonomous Area 3 Svalbard 235 155 Troms SWEEDEN Norrbotten 250 72 Finnmark Koryak Autonomous Area, Kamchatka Territory 21 163 Lapland 184 FINLAND 3 Novaya Zemlya (Arkhangelsk Region) 842 Magadan Region Yakutia 37 Murmansk Region 37 Nenets Autonomous Area 42 Vorkuta District, Komi Republic 113 Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area 546 Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) District Norilsk District, 205 including Talnakh and Kayerkan RUSSIA Population of Arctic regions Russian Arctic European Arctic 1 280 000 2 089 000 American Arctic 827 000 Arctic as a whole: 4 238 000 people ties strongly disapprove of RAIPON’s extensive and other public organizations so that their international engagement.44 hat said, RAIPON position, opinion, and interests are taken into was able to send a representative to the Minis- account”.45 In short, so long as the interests of the terial Meeting of the Arctic Council in May 2013 in Kiruna, Sweden. RAIPON received permission from the indigenous peoples of the Arctic clash with the interests of big business, as well as with Russia’s Ministry of justice to resume its activities only national interests – access to the region’s natu- in mid-March 2013. Two weeks later, President ral resources, which support the country’s po- Putin welcomed the participants of the seventh litical and economic stability – the government Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and will side with business. his could complicate the Far East conference, organized by RAIPON, Russia’s relations with a number of the Arctic with the following statement: “I emphasize inter-governmental and other international that the implementation of large-scale territo- organizations, from the Barents Secretariat in rial development programs in Russia should Norway to the Arctic Council and even the UN, be carried out in continuous dialogue with not to mention Russia’s relations with indig- the representatives of national communities enous organizations such as RAIPON.46 86 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War CONCLUSIONS AND SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 87 3. CONCLUSIONS he Russian Federation has important econom- geopolitics in Russia’s Arctic discourse, it has ic, societal, environmental and military-strate- become much more diverse, creative and in- gic interests in the Arctic region. hese interests teresting. A number of alternative schools have include the access, exploration and develop- emerged, namely neo-liberalism, globalism and ment of Arctic natural resources (especially social constructivism. Russian decision-makers, hydrocarbons). Russia is seeking to modernize facing a rather diverse intellectual landscape, and further develop the industrial base of the now have access to expertise on Arctic issues RAZ, which makes a signiicant and valuable from diferent schools and groups. contribution to the country’s economy. Moscow he conceptual/doctrinal basis of Russia’s is also interested in opening up the Northern Arctic strategy has turned out to be less ambi- Sea Route for international commercial traic tious and aggressive, and more realistic and and developing circumpolar air routes. Moscow cooperative in spirit, than many might have is deeply concerned about the acute ecologi- expected. Russia’s most recent Arctic strategy cal situation in the RAZ and trying to stop and (2013) is more inward-looking than expansion- reverse negative trends on this front. Russia still ist. Regarding the international dimension, has considerable military-strategic interests in Moscow’s Arctic policy calls for international the region as well, which have not faded since cooperation, multilateral diplomacy and peace- the end of the Cold War. his continuity can be ful resolution of existing disputes. clearly seen in Russia’s security views on the Russia’s geo-economic and geostrategic Arctic as a region of both challenges and op- ambitions in the Arctic are considerable, and, portunities. contrary to the 1990s, there is now the political Despite the continuing prevalence of the schools of thought of realism and classical willingness and inancial resources to launch ambitious investment projects and increase 88 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War Franz josef Land Federal wildlife reserve. Hall Island, Cape Tegethof defense spending. Currently, Russian political, tal strategies (for example cleanup of the Franz military and economic interests in the region josef archipelago is predominantly seen as a are being pulled in the same direction. he cosmetic rather than systemic efort) and its increase in Russia’s economic and military policies toward indigenous populations, which activities in the High North as well as Moscow’s became even more antagonistic and oppressive assertiveness and sometimes confrontational as the case of RAIPON demonstrated. rhetoric on the Arctic are most probably only here have also been a number of posi- the beginning of a greater presence in the tive changes in Russia’s Arctic policies. Mos- region. Whether this new Russian activism will cow now realizes that most of the threats and be positive or negative for regional develop- challenges to its positions in the Arctic region ments remains to be seen. originate from inside rather than outside the Currently, Russia’s Arctic strategy represents country. hese problems are caused by several a mixture of expansionist/revisionist and soft factors such as the degradation of Soviet-era power/status quo policies. On the one hand, economic, transport and social infrastructure Moscow is quite assertive about defending its in the region, the current resource-oriented claims to the Arctic continental shelf as well as model of Russian economy, the shortage of demonstrating its sovereignty over the Russian funds and managerial skill to develop the RAZ, part of the Arctic and military presence in the etc. herefore, Russia’s strategy aims to solve region. Russia’s military modernization pro- existing problems through domestic rather grams in the High North are also seen by other than external means. Moscow understands Arctic players as worrisome and destabilizing to that the success of its Arctic strategy, to a larger the regional strategic balance. Russia’s inter- extent, depends on how efective its socioeco- national partners are also concerned about the nomic policy in the region is. he course toward lack of serious progress in Russia’s environmen- modernization and innovation charted by the 89 Russian government should move from making and more realistic, and are now comparable declarations to the implementation phase in- with the military modernization programs of volving speciic and realistic projects in the RAZ. other Arctic players (especially naval programs). Russia’s political leadership seems to un- he Russian military increasingly seeks to derstand the need for constructive dialogue defend the country’s economic interests in the and deeper political engagement with Rus- region and control the huge RAZ territory rather sia’s Arctic regions, municipalities, indigenous than expand its “sphere of inluence.” To conclude, the overall “balance sheet” of people and NGOs. Moscow encourages these actors to work with international partners (un- Russia’s Arctic strategy is quite positive. It is safe less it takes the form of separatism or attempts to assume that in the foreseeable future Mos- to challenge federal foreign policy prerogatives). cow’s strategy in the region will be predictable he main problem here is implementation and pragmatic rather than aggressive or spon- again. In reality, the federal bureaucracy’s poli- taneous. In contrast to the widespread stereo- cies are not always conducive to the initiatives type of Russia around the world as a revisionist of local and civil society institutions. power in the Arctic, we believe that Moscow Moscow is also demonstrating a growing will continue to pursue a dual-track strategy willingness to solve the environmental prob- in the region: defending Russia’s legitimate lems of the RAZ and cooperate with interna- economic and political interests, while remain- tional bodies (e.g., AC, BEAC, NDEP, etc.) in this ing open and willing for cooperation with sphere. Hopefully, this will result in a more foreign partners willing to contribute to exploit- systemic approach to Russian environmental ing Arctic natural resources, developing sea policies in the region, backed by considerable routes and solving the numerous socioeconomic inancial support. and environmental problems of the region. To Elements of “new political thinking” are achieve this, Russia will employ peaceful diplo- evident even in Moscow’s military strategies in matic, economic and cultural methods, and act the region. Russia’s military modernization pro- through international organizations and forums grams are rather modest and aim to upgrade the rather than unilaterally. his brings Russian Russian armed forces in the High North rather behavior (at least regionally, if not necessarily than provide them with additional ofensive globally) closer to the so called soft power model, capabilities. Given budgetary constraints, these though there is a long way to go before Russia programs have recently become less ambitious fully adopts this framework. 90 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE here are two major competing geopolitical academic circles; some scholars advocate a discourses or scenarios regarding the future “code of conduct” for Arctic states (Trenin, Baev development of circumpolar international rela- 2010: 10–11), while others propose an Interna- tions in the globalized Arctic: tional Arctic Union and Arctic solidarity, which he irst scenario assumes that the Arctic is destined to replace “anti-Russian” Atlantic region is stable and peaceful, and that disputes solidarity (Lukin 2010: 111–113). Russia has oi- over the delimitation of the Arctic will cease cially responded to these proposals in the form in 10 to 15 years thanks to the eforts of inter- of its national policies on the Arctic, Arctic eco- national institutions (e.g., UN, BEAC, AC) and nomic forums,48 various polar projects, such as bilateral diplomacy, allowing mutually benei- “he Arctic –Territory of Discovery”, and Arctic cial cooperation to bloom (e.g. Voronov 2010: expeditions, such as Arctic 2007, which were 64; Heininen 2012). In the alternate scenario, funded by foreign capital (Trenin, Baev 2010: emerging conlicts will worsen, leading to 17), as well as participation in bilateral and remilitarization and greater muscle-lexing by multilateral Arctic cooperation. Weighing the pros and cons, it becomes Arctic states and non-Arctic actors. Currently, the circumpolar macroregion remains a source clear that, at least for Russia, wide-ranging of competing interests rather than only a circumpolar cooperation is more appealing than smooth cooperation between states (Konyshev exclusive ownership of the Arctic’s resources.49 and Sergunin 2010: 53), although any military As with many other issues in modern Russia, conlict between Arctic littoral states is almost Arctic strategy and the prospects of Arctic policy impossible to imagine (Khramchikhin 2011: 14). depend signiicantly on the political will of the Politicians are also rather contradictory on president.50 Former president Dmitry Medve- prospects for Arctic cooperation.47 In addition dev was set to become the “Arctic Gorbachev” of these two scenarios a dualist approach points by signing the Barents Delimitation Treaty out that based on this high stability and keen with Norway, in contrast to “new old” President international cooperation there is a growing Putin, who has far more Realpolitik views on global interest towards the Arctic region and international relations, and who sees Russia as its natural resources, which easily means more the leading Arctic power. economic and other activities, and competi- Should Russia’s leadership in the region rely tion (Heininen 2014). All this indicates that the on technological, rather than military prowess, Arctic is global. and the will to achieve consensus or at least To be sure, there is a crucial need for more mutually beneicial agreements in conditions of transparent, predictable and consistent Arctic complex interdependence, this could give rise to policies of circumpolar states insofar as global a new system of international relations in the sustainable development, at least for the fore- Arctic. seeable future, depends on the Arctic. he Arc- Russia should work to ensure that Arctic tic now probably needs a kind of updated form players interact with each other on the basis of of Gorbachev’s “new thinking.” he problem the following principles: is that Russia considers itself the loser in the • preserving peace, predictability and stability • ensuring environmental protection, sus- Cold War (partly because of Gorbachev’s policies), thus we have to speak about the wider Arctic new thinking, namely desecuritization in the Arctic, which is actually not impossible (see Åtland 2008), or to redeine the importance of the Arctic in world politics, which has been growing in the last two decades. In Russia, this idea has gained some support in in the Arctic region; tainable management and development of natural resources; • international cooperation to meet common • developing national and international legal 91 challenges in the Arctic; mechanisms to promote Arctic governance. he Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, Severny Island. Russkaya Gavan. A lighthouse Considering the region’s strategic impor- modernizing Russia”, he wrote.) hat means tance to the country, Russia’s Arctic policy internationalization, not nationalization of the should be part of the broad modernization Arctic. he focal point of internationalization process announced by the former President is broad cooperation in the Arctic, involving Medvedev (Medvedev 2009). (In his article not only Arctic states (the “A8+” model instead “Russia Forward!” he identified three main problems in Russia: centuries of economic backwardness, centuries of corruption, and widespread paternalistic attitudes in society. To cope with this miserable and dangerous situation, he proposed five dimensions of modernization. All of them are limited to economic development, and the first priority is to become a leading country in production, transportation and utilization of energy resources. However, political modernization, including foreign policy, was mentioned as well. “It is not nostalgia that should determine our foreign policy, but strategic long-term goal of of the “A5” model), but also trans-national actors, such as international organizations (both inter-governmental and non-governmental), international business, and local actors, primarily indigenous people, who should have a voice in Arctic decision-making. For Russia, this would bring not only international investments and technology for both economic development and a “general cleanup” of the Arctic region and the entire North. 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Approved by the order of the Ministry of Transport of Russia, january 17, 2013, № 7.Available at: http://asmp.morlot.ru/iles/ ileslist/20130725190332en-Rules_Perevod_CNIIMF-25–04.pdf 103. Tkachenko, Stanislav. 2000. Rashirenie ES I voprosy bezopasnosti Rossii [EU enlargement and Russia’s security concerns]. In Trenin, Dmitri (ed.). Rossiyai osnovnye instituty bezopasnosti v Evrope: vstupaya v XXI vek [Russia and the main European security institutions: approaching the 21st century]. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre, 2000, pp. 49–75. 104. Trenin D., Bayev P. (2010). he Arctic: A View From Moscow. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Centre. 105. (2010). Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Sept. 15, 2010. http://www. regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Folkerett/avtale_engelsk.pdf 106. (1920). 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Yarovoy, Gleb. “Russia’s Arctic Policy: Continuity and Changes.” International Relations and the Arctic: Understanding Policy and Governance. Eds. by Robert Murray and Anita DeyNuttall. Cambria Press, june 2014. 98 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War 118. Zagorsky (ed.). 2011. Arktika: Zona Mira I Sotrudnichestva [he Arctic: Zone of Peace and Cooperation]. Moscow: Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. 119. Zagorsky, Andrei. 2013. Arkticheskie ucheniya Severnogoplota [he Arctic exercises of the Northern Fleet]. http://www.imemo.ru/ru/publ/comments/2013/comm_2013_053.pdf (in Russian). 120. Zysk Katarzyna. 2008. Russian Military Power and the Arctic. Russian Foreign Policy (EU–Russia Centre’s Review) 8, pp. 80–86. 99 NOTES: 1. http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/08/21/canadian-rangers 2. Beringia park’s web-site: http://beringiapark.ru/ 3. http://asmp.morlot.ru/en/perechen_zayavlenii/ 4. http://asmp.morlot.ru/en/razresheniya/ 5. http://asmp.morlot.ru/en/otkazu/ 6. http://asmp.morlot.ru/en/otkazu/ 7. http://asmp.morlot.ru/iles/zayavka/20130920143952ref%20A%20S.pdf 8. http://premier.gov.ru/events/news/17172 9. http://www.dvinaland.ru/economy/priority/smp_doclad.html 10. See Shtokman review at http://www.shtokman.ru/r/D2A156D8-9388-43CE-8CC4-3EABA21FDF87/ ShtRevRus_0.pdf 11. “Shtokman remains unsettled”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver.com/en/energy/shtokmanremains-unsettled, 30 March 2012. 12. “Total: Shtokman decision postponed until 2013”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver.com/en/ energy/total-shtokman-decision-postponed-until-2013, 04 May 2012. 13. “No tax breaks yet for Shtokman – Russian deputy minister of inance” at http://www.reuters.com/ article/2012/03/23/russia-gas-shtokman-idUSL6E8EN4PF20120323, 23 March 2012. 14. “New delay for Shtokman”, at http://kommersant.ru/doc/1928414, 04 May 2012. 15. According to Gazprom, the oil reserves of the Prirazlomnoye ield in the Pechora Sea total 72 million tons, http://www.gazprom.ru/about/production/projects/deposits/pnm 16. he Fedynsky block covers an area of 38,000 km2 in the southern part of the Barents Sea. Sea depth at the block varies from 200 to 320 meters. It consists of nine promising formations holding total recoverable hydrocarbon resources of 18.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent. he irst exploration well should be drilled before 2020, and, if successful, a second exploration well is to be drilled by 2025. he Central-Barents block adjoins Fedynsky in the north. hree promising formations holding total recoverable hydrocarbon resources of more than 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent have been identiied earlier. he irst exploration well is to be drilled by 2021, and if successful, a second exploration well is to be drilled by 2026. See: “Rosneft and Eni join Forces to Explore Fields in the Barents and Black Seas” at http://www.rosneft.com/ news/pressrelease/25042012.html. No oil or gas ields have been identiied on the Perseyervsky block so far. See: “Norway takes Russian shelf” at http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1929554, 05 May 2012. 17. “Rosneft to pay 925 million rubles for three blocks in the Barents Sea”, at http://www.arctic-info.ru/News/ Page/-rosneft_--zaplatit-za-3-ycastka-nedr-v-barencevom-more-pocti-925-mln-ryblei 18. “Statoil, Rosneft sign landmark Barents Sea deal”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver.com/en/ energy/statoil-rosneft-sign-landmark-barents-sea-deal, 05 May 2012. 19. “Rosneft invites competitors to Russian-Norwegian waters”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver. com/en/energy/rosneft-invites-competitors-russian-norwegian-waters, 17 April 2012. 20. See: “Rosneft and ExxonMobil Announce Progress in Strategic Cooperation Agreement”, at http://www. rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/30082011.html 100 Russian Strategies in the Arctic: Avoiding a New Cold War 21. “Partners of Rosneft” at http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2012/04/25/4563441.shtml?incut2, 25 April 2012. 22. “Platform hull from Murmansk to Mexico”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver.com/en/ node/20723, 27 November 2008. 23. “Russia is not ready for Arctic oil”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver.com/en/articles/russia-notready-arctic-oil, 26 August 2011. 24. he full text in Russian is available on the Greenpeace Russia website at http://www.greenpeace.org/ russia/Global/russia/report/Arctic-oil/Letter-to-VPutin-to-stop-Prirazlomnaya.pdf 25. “Gazprom again refuses to discuss the safety of Prirazlomnaya: What’s there to hide!?” at http://www. bellona.ru/articles_ru/articles_2011/1321443638.83 26. “We want openness on the shelf, says Gazprom”, BarentsObserver at http://barentsobserver.com/en/ russia/we-want-openness-shelf-says-gazprom, 12 September 2011. 27. It should be noted that IRSP Prirazlomnaya is far from technically ideal even in less complicated conditions. he irst emergency incident occurred in mid-September 2011, when “the only staircases designed to board and disembark the platform simply fell of.” See: “he irst well will be drilled at Prirazlomnaya. But the future of the project remains unclear” at http://neftegaz.ru/news/view/101871 28. “Ministry of Finance, RF: Prirazlomnaya ield falls outside the scope of the new ofshore tax system; Shtokman will be discussed separately” at http://quote.rbc.ru/news/fond/2012/04/13/33620781.html 29. “Deputy Minister Shatalov speaks to news agencies” at http://www.minin.ru/ru/press/speech/printable. php?id4=16117, 13 April 2012. 30. http://pro-arctic.ru/17/10/2013/news/5268 31. For details, go to: http://www.rg.ru/2014/01/28/shelf.html 32. http://www.arms-expo.ru/049055051051124052049049.html 33. http://www.arms-expo.ru/049057054048124050052056054051.html 34. http://bastion-karpenko.narod.ru/955_more_01.html 35. http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4486644&File=21&Language=E&Mode= 1&Parl=40&Ses=3 36. Federal and regional target programs (FTO and RTP) contain research & development, production, socioeconomic, organizational, economic and other measures to ensure eicient resolution of structural problems in the public, economic, environmental, social and cultural development of the Russian Federation. FTPs are one of the most important means of implementing the federal government’s structural policy. Although FTPs irst appeared in the early 1990s, actual implementation of the FTPs began in the 2000s, when oil revenues started to grow. Since 2002, some 46 FTPs have been implemented, including Socioeconomic Development of Small Indigenous Peoples of the North to 2008, costing 2.744 billion rubles (http://www.programs-gov.ru). 37. According to statistics cited by First Vice President of RAIPON Rodion Sulyandziga, suicide accounts for 30% of deaths among indigenous peoples (See Sulyandziga’s speech during the meeting with Prime Minister Putin on 19 july 2011 at http://www.government.ru/docs/15972). For an in-depth analyses of the causes of the problems facing indigenous populations, see e.g. Pika (1999). 38. he list of activities includes 37 items for the period 2011-2014, divided into four parts: 1) improvement of regulatory framework and development of efective economic mechanisms to maintain the traditional lifestyle of the indigenous peoples; 2) activities in the sphere of healthcare and education of indigenous peoples; 3) preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage and traditional culture of indigenous peoples; 4) holding international, national and interregional events (Decree of the Government No 2455p. Moscow; adopted 28 December 2010, published in Rossiiskaya Gazeta on 11 january 2011 and at http:// www.szrf.ru/doc.phtml?op=1&nb=00_00&year=2010&div_id=8&iss_id=273&doc_id=34763 39. In 2011, the Ministry of Regional Development transferred 240 million rubles in state subsidies to the 28 regional budgets under Concept 2009 (According to the Directive of the Ministry of Regional Development No 35 of 7 February 2011, published at http://severcom.ru/oicials/id326.html). 40. See Sulyandziga’s speech during the meeting with Prime Minister Putin on 19 july 2011 at http://www. government.ru/docs/15972 41. See “he legislation on the indigenous peoples rights was discussed in Russian Public Chamber”, at http://www.raipon.info/en/component/content/article/8-news/70-the-legislation-on-the-indigenousrights-was-discussed-in-russian-public-chamber.html 101 42. See “he problem of inefective use of federal funds of indigenous small-numbered peoples support was discussed in the Federation Council”, at http://raipon.info/component/content/article/1-novos ti/2913-2012-04-03-13-33-34.html 43. See: Russia stomps on human rights of its Arctic indigenous citizens: report, Nunatsiaqonline, November 26, 2012, at http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674russia_stomps_on_human_rights_of_its_ arctic_indigenous_citizens_report 44. See: Hard-fought new life for RAIPON. BarentsObserver, March 15, 2013, at http://barentsobserver.com/en/ society/2013/03/hard-fought-new-life-raipon-15-03 45. See: http://www.raipon.info/home/arhiv-sobytij/vii-sezd-kmnss-i-dv-rf.html 46. See e.g. Moscow orders closure of indigenous peoples organization, BarentsObserver, November 12, 2012, at http://barentsobserver.com/en/arctic/moscow-orders-closure-indigenous-peoples-organization-12-11 47. Sergey Lavrov, Russian Minister for Foreign Afairs: “All problems existing in the North <…> can be solved politically and legally; the hand-wringing over a potential war over the resources is provocation.” (“Lavrov: Talk of possible war over Arctic resources is provocation”, at http://ria.ru/arctic_ news/20110113/321042542.html, january 13, 2011). Admiral james G.Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe: “For now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural resources” (Senior NATO commander: Climate change could lead to Arctic conlict, at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/oct/11/nato-conlict-arctic-resources, October 11, 2010). jonas GahrStøre, Norwegian Minister for Foreign Afairs: “Considering resources, transport routes and people, then we have a mixture which is needed for a potential conlict” (“Battleheats up for Arctic resources”, he Financial Times, http://www.inosmi.ru/arctica/20110705/171619818.html, july 4, 2011). 48. Arctic Murmansk International Economic Forum (http://www.arcticforum.ru/?lang=en); International Arctic Forum in Russia “he Arctic – Territory of Dialogue” (http://www.arctic.ru/forum). 49. One of the main rationales for the internationalization of the “Russian” and, more importantly, the “potentially Russian” parts of the Arctic is the costs of the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the shelf, which demand investments of more that $ 2.5 trillion till 2050. See: How much does the Cold War in the Arctic cost? [Skol’ko stoit holodnaya voina v Arktike?] Kommersant, № 4 (4059). 14 january 2009, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1102508 50. In 2010, A. Mikhailov, the columnist of Gazeta.ru, drew up two models and scenarios for the development of Russian economy, deining them as “Putinomics”, i.e. the system of economic regulation under Putin, or the subordination of the economic resources to Putin, vs. “Medvervization”, i.e. modernization à la Medvedev, or the resubordination of economic resources to Medvedev. (See “Medvernization of Russia,” Gazeta.ru at http://www.gazeta.ru/column/mikhailov/3318587.shtml, 02 February 2010). After the presidential election in 2012, it became clear that Putinomics is the much more likely scenario.