Mackie's Error Theory: A Wittgensteinian Critique

Revista Kínesis (Vol. 7 (13)), 2015

I start by arguing that Mackie’s claim that there are no objective values is a nonsensical one. I do this by ‘assembling reminders’ of the correct use of the term ‘values’ and by examining the grammar of moral propositions à la Wittgenstein. I also examine Hare’s thought experiment which is used to demonstrate “that no real issue can be built around the objectivity or otherwise of moral values” before briefly looking at Mackie’s ‘argument from queerness’. In the final section I propose that Robert Arrington’s ‘conceptual relativism’, inspired by Wittgenstein, helps to make our use of moral language more perspicuous and avoids the problems faced by Mackie.

In this paper I argue that moral error theories are subject to a tension that lies at the heart of their theory. Error theorists point out that parts of morality are bogus, meaningless, false, etc. They have to focus in on a target moral belief or claim in order to make their arguments stick, which may mean construing the claim narrowly. But they also have to make sure that the target belief or claim has wide enough influence such that the whole of everyday moral thinking is seen as bogus. Whilst not a fatal flaw, this tension does need to be overcome by error theorists. [This was published the collection I co-edited with Richard Joyce, 'A World without Values: Essays on J. L. Mackie's Error Theory' (Springer, 2010), pp. 167-182.]

2011

In his response to my paper ‘The Error in the Error Theory’ criticizing his and J. L. Mackie’s moral error theory, Richard Joyce finds my treatment of his position inaccurate and my interpretation of morality implausible. In this reply I clarify my objection, showing that it retains its force against their error theory, and I clarify my interpretation of morality, showing that Joyce’s objections miss their mark.

Filosofiska Notiser, 2023

In this paper, we argue that "The Moral Problem" identified by Michael Smith in his book of that name as "the central organizing problem" of metaethics needs to be refined in order to accommodate moral error theories (in the style of J.L. Mackie), and we suggest a refinement that allows it to do this. We conclude by drawing out some consequences for the formulation of internalism about moral motivation.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2014

2013

maintenance in years 1-3 under grant agreement no. 231016) and the Jacobsen Studentship funded by the Royal Institute of Philosophy (year 4). Finally I would like to thank my grandfather Carel Lodewijk Kalf for convincing me (but especially my parents) to go to 'Het Stedelijk Gymnasium' in Schiedam to get a diploma with which I would be able to go to university. Without that advice I would not have been where I am now. Thanks to Laila Al-Jarml for proofreading. Most of all, however, I thank my father Carel Albert Kalf, my mother Veronica Elizabeth Maria Kalf-Müller and my brother Laurens Marnix Kalf for their unfailing support throughout my studies, first at Leiden University, then at University of California-Irvine and finally at the University of Leeds. Without them I would never have been able to achieve what I have.

The Journal of Ethics, 2020

The moral error theory has become increasingly popular in recent decades. So much so indeed that a new issue emerged, the so-called "now-what problem": if all our moral beliefs are false, then what should we do with them? So far, philosophers who are interested in this problem have focused their attention on the mode of the attitudes we should have with respect to moral propositions. Some have argued that we should keep holding proper moral beliefs; others that we should replace our moral beliefs with fictional attitudes, beliefs in natural facts, or conative attitudes. But all these philosophers have set aside an important question about the content of these attitudes: which moral propositions, and more generally which moral theory, should we accept? The present paper addresses this neglected issue, arguing that moral error theorists should adopt a utilitarian moral fiction. In other words, they should accept the set of moral principles whose general acceptance would maximize overall well-being. According to a prominent version of the moral error theory, all atomic moral propositions are false because they entail the existence of categorical reasons while all the reasons we have are hypothetical. Consider the proposition Torture is wrong by way of illustration. If the error theory is correct, then this proposition entails that we have a reason not to torture people regardless of our desires. But this implication is false, for all the reasons we have depend on our desires-they are reasons to act in a way that would satisfy our desires. Hence, the proposition Torture is wrong is false. And the same can be said about every atomic moral proposition. The error theory raises the so-called "now-what problem" (Lutz 2014): as error theorists, what should we do with the moral practice-with moral thought and discourse? Obviously, this is not a moral question. Since the error theory entails that there is nothing we morally ought to do, it entails a fortiori that there is nothing we morally ought to do with our moral thought and discourse. The question is prudential and therefore presupposes only that there are things we prudentially ought to do, which may be the case provided that prudential reasons are hypothetical.

2008

Moral error theory of the kind defended by J.L. Mackie and Richard Joyce is premised on two claims: (1) that moral judgements essentially presuppose that moral value has absolute authority, and (2) that this presupposition is false, because nothing has absolute authority. This paper accepts (2) but rejects (1). It is argued first that (1) is not the best explanation of the evidence from moral practice, and second that even if it were, the error theory would still be mistaken, because the assumption does not contaminate the meaning or truth-conditions of moral claims. These are determined by the essential application conditions for moral concepts, which are relational rather than absolute. (AJP Best Paper Award, 2009)

Error theorists such as Mackie (1977) hold that our moral judgments are systematically false -- that is, for any moral judgment Px, where P is a moral predicate and x is some action, state of affairs, person, or other proper subject of moral predication, the judgment is false. I appraise the consequences of this view, and argue that it is incoherent. Specifically, I argue that, if we think that at least some negations ~Px of some moral judgments Px are also moral judgments, then the error theorist is committed to a contradiction.