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Why France leaves Africa

2022, Harper's

Eight years ago, in the Sahel region of West Africa, the French Army launched a lightning strike against bands of jihadists heading toward the capital of Mali. But beginning this year, France will withdraw its military. In the meantime the French Army, entangled by its reintegration into NATO, accepted the premises of American COIN and made the error of prolonging its Blitzkrieg by occupying territory. And failed, just as in Indochina and Algeria, and just as the Americans failed in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The complaint made by Africans has little to do with the perpetuation of colonialism and everything to do with the French army’s defeat in the field.

Why France leaves Africa… Jean-Philippe Immarigeon Eight years ago, in the Sahel region of West Africa, the French Army launched a lightning strike against several bands of jihadists heading toward the capital of Mali. The French liberated the north of the country, pushed the rebels into the Sahara, and brought security to states across the region. Everywhere that French armored and aerial units went, they were welcomed as saviors by local populations. Praise from American media sources soon followed. A Newsweek headline ran, “Vive la France ! The French are a decisive, manly superpower. Unlike America.” (1) The Rand Corporation released a detailed report, France’s war in Mali : Lessons for an expeditionary army (2), in which the “The French” appeared 84 times on 45 pages, conveying the Pentagon’s astonishment at the Gallic officers’ habit of conducting cavalry charges, characteristic of that very French “art of war” exemplified by a certain Napoléon Bonaparte (3). But beginning this year, France will withdraw its military following a crisis that began when a supply convoy, driving to forward bases at the edge of the Sahara, was held up for more than a week in Burkina Faso and then again in Niger by thousands of angry protestors, only managing to escape after firing warning shots. Several civilians were wounded and a number of deaths were reported. For most people, these scenes, so reminiscent of their own days in Iraq and Afghanistan, might seem incomprehensible. How did the conquerors of 2013 get bogged down in this way, considering that they—unlike the Americans, charging into Vietnam or barging around Iraq and Afghanistan like an elephant in a china shop—knew the peoples of the region very well ? They governed them for a century, after all, while also learning respect for their customs, studying the deeply-rooted version of Islam practiced in the Sahel, writing any number books about the place (just dust off your copy of Saint-Exupéry), and speaking a common language, the tongue of Voltaire and Hugo ? The problem is that in the meantime the French Army, entangled by its reintegration into the command structure of NATO (4), accepted the premises of American warfare and made the error of prolonging its Blitzkrieg of 2013 by occupying actual territory, building their own versions of the forts used by the US in Afghanistan, and trumpeting McNamara-like body counts that were completely counter-productive. The IMMARIGEON © HARPER’S 2022 2 French were right in 2003 when they told the Americans not to invade and occupy Iraq ; they were wrong in 2013 when they made the same error in the Sahel. It’s no surprise they lost the same thing that the American Army itself keeps losing (5). The resentment felt by Africans toward the French evokes Marshal Foch’s pertinent remark, made on the signing of the 1918 Armistice to a German representative, who claimed the capitulation wasn’t the result of the military’s failure but was only caused by the previous week’s revolution: the barricades in your streets, the allied generalissimo replied, are but a symptom of your defeat in the field. And indeed, the complaint made by African media, by protestors blocking the supply convoys, and by the Malian junta who gave the French ambassador three days notice to leave, had nothing to do with the perpetuation of colonialism and everything to do with the army’s inability, after eight years, to win the war against the jihadists. In other words, its defeat in the field, its utter uselessness. France go home ! And France took the hint. It is now clear that France will have to leave most, if not all of its former colonies in West Africa, where it no longer has real interests (6). If it still trades more there than one would expect, this is simply because the francophone monetary system, inherited from the colonial era and now reliant on the Euro, guarantees convertibility at a fixed rate. But a currency risk can be managed, and the uranium that France still extracts from Niger can be found at the same price on the international market, and even less if one takes into account the financial and human costs of the associated military operations. Why continue to drain the French Army, already undersized and in dire need of reform (which will involve hard choices), and why continue to sacrifice young French men and women (almost sixty have died in the current operation), if the result is to be criticized by governments and the media and have stones thrown at them precisely by those who, despite everything, the Army continues to protect against terrorists ? President Macron said game over – goodbye Africa ! In 2013, the French held all the cards in the Sahel ; they failed, just as they once failed in Indochina and Algeria, and just as the Americans have failed—with far fewer assets, setting aside their powerful military—in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan…and the Russians in Ukraine. These wars no longer serve any purpose at all. But will the lessons of History ever be heeded ? IMMARIGEON © HARPER’S 2022 3 References (1) « Why France is a more manly superpower than the U.S. », Newsweek on line, Feb18, 2013. (2) Michael Shurkin, France’s war in Mali : Lessons for an expeditionary army, Rand corporation, 2014, www.rand.org/t/rr770. (3) J-Ph Immarigeon, « La Guerre des Français » Revue Défense Nationale, n° 777, Feb 2015. (4) J-Ph Immarigeon, « A low point in strategic thinking», Revue Défense Nationale, n° 711 Aug/Sept 2008 ; « The odd couple », Revue Défense Nationale, n° 724, Nov 2009. (5) Le Cadet : « Manuscrit trouvé sur Saragosse », Revue Défense Nationale, n° 765, Dec 2013 ; « COIN COIN », Revue Défense Nationale, n° 767, Feb 2014. (6) Le Cadet on www.lettrevigie.com : n° 67, « Sahelistan, poil aux dents », Jan 2020 ; n° 77, « Le Cyber des Tartares », Dec 2020 ; n° 82, « Sur la pointe des pieds », Jun 2021 ; n° 87, « OSS 117, rentre à la maison ! », Jan 2022. IMMARIGEON © HARPER’S 2022